Graduate Course Draft Syllabus1

“The Mushroom Cloud: Nuclear Weapons and International Relations” Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark

Course Description Nuclear weapons played a key role in ending World War II and in the Cold War competition between two global superpowers. Some believe that future great power competitions may bring them back to the forefront of national defense policy. Others shift the focus and argue that they are now more consequential in the realm of non-state actors and non-traditional security threats. These and other issues are the focus of this course. Together, we will explore the basic technical aspects, history, and potential future of nuclear weapons issues. In short, we will explore the causes and consequences of nuclear weapons proliferation in international politics, both historically and with an eye to the future.

Learning Objectives • Develop a basic understanding of the competing schools of thought regarding nuclear weapons, proliferation, and security • Integrate theory and practice through applying political science theory to current events and historical cases • Provide a basic understanding of international relations theory, physical science, and policy issues that are integrated in nuclear and international political issues • Examine key contemporary problem areas – states, non state actors, and international organizations – relevant to nuclear politics presently and compare to historical antecedents • Encourage critical thinking about contemporary policy debates

Course Readings This course draws primarily on scholarly articles, book chapters, and news sources for each week’s readings. These will be made available through the course website, but are also accessible through Google Scholar, JSTOR, and the Electronic Databases available via the University Library. As this is a reading-intensive course, students should expect approximately 150-175 pages of reading per week.

Course Requirements 1. In-class participation is a vital component of this seminar, and significant in-class contributions are expected. Students are expected to come to each class having read and analyzed the materials, prepared questions about material they would like to explore further, and ready to present, debate, and analyze in class.

2. Memo and Class Leadership – Depending on course size, students will be responsible for leading a course discussion once or twice during the semester. This entails preparing a short (2-3 page) memo on the week’s readings, including 5-6 discussion questions, and circulating the memo to the class roster the day before the class meeting. Then, in class, the student will lead the discussion, raising important or puzzling aspects of the readings, highlighting conflict or complementarity across readings, and leading their peers in discussion and debate.

3. The final paper, (approximately 20 – 25 pages double-spaced), will be a project of original research that engages critically with some aspect of nuclear issues covered during the semester. Papers can be historical or address a current policy problem, but they must be theoretically informed, make an argument, and demonstrate extensive research beyond the materials used in class. They may address a single case or compare multiple cases. More specific guidelines and expectations will be discussed during the first few weeks of class and small activities will be conducted throughout the semester that will build towards the final product. In addition to consulting with me during office hours early on as they begin to formulate their research topic,

1 Syllabus can be modified to suit a variety of course sizes, formats, and student levels.

1 students will also conduct a peer-review exercise of a first draft during week 12 of the semester. Failure to produce a first draft and conduct the peer-review exercise will result in a penalty to your grade. Final papers will be due following the conclusion of the course sessions and at the beginning of the university exam period. The final paper grade will be an aggregate grade comprised of the components listed below.

Course Grades • Class Participation – 20% • Memo and Class Leadership – 10% • Paper – 70% o Proposal 10% o Draft and Peer Review 15% o Final Version 45%

Academic Integrity and University Statement on Plagiarism

Academic Support Services

Research Resources For further information, background reading, and research for the paper assignment, see the following journals of international relations and nuclear affairs: 1. Foreign Affairs 2. Foreign Policy 3. International Organization 4. 5. The Washington Quarterly 6. World Politics 7. The Nonproliferation Review 8. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

2 Subject and Readings Schedule (The approximate number of pages of required reading are noted in parentheses; these are approximate and subject to change at the professor’s discretion.) Please note students are expected to have read and analyzed each week’s readings BEFORE they arrive in class for that week’s sessions.

Week 1. Course Introduction (5 pages) a. Thomas C. Schelling, “A World Without Nuclear Weapons?,” Daedalus, Vol. 138, No. 4 (Fall 2009), pp. 124-129.

Week 2. Nuclear Weapons – Technical and Historical Background (123 + Brodie) a. Dietrich Schroeer, Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Arms Race, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984). Chs. 2-3 (pp. 14-81). b. Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washing- ton: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). Ch. 3 (pp. 45–56). c. Joseph Cirincione, Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). Chs. 1–3 (pp. 1–46). d. Brodie, Bernard, , , Percy Ellwood Corbett, and William Thornton Rickert Fox. The absolute weapon: Atomic power and world order. New York, Harcourt, 1946. Chs. 1-2.

Week 3. Why do states want nuclear weapons? (Causes of Proliferation, Demand-Side) (145) a. Sagan, Scott D. "Why do states build nuclear weapons?: Three models in search of a bomb." International Security 21.3 (1996): 54-86. b. Solingen, Etel. "The political economy of nuclear restraint." International Security (1994): 126- 169. c. Hymans, Jacques EC. The psychology of nuclear proliferation: Identity, emotions and foreign policy. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Chs. 1 & 2. d. Singh, Sonali, and Christopher R. Way. "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test." Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004): 859-885.

Week 4. Why do states get nuclear weapons? (Causes of Proliferation, Supply-Side) (169) a. Kroenig, Matthew. "Exporting the bomb: Why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance." American Political Science Review 103.1 (2009): 113-133. b. Fuhrmann, Matthew. "Spreading temptation: Proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements." International Security 34, no. 1 (2009): 7-41. c. Hymans, Jacques EC. Achieving nuclear ambitions: scientists, politicians, and proliferation. Cambridge University Press, 2012. Chs 1 & 2. d. Kemp, R. Scott. "The Nonproliferation Emperor Has No Clothes: The Gas Centrifuge, Supply-Side Controls, and the Future of Nuclear Proliferation." International Security 38, no. 4 (2014): 39-78.

Week 5. Nonproliferation (Internal & External) (154) a. Rublee, Maria Rost. Nonproliferation norms: why states choose nuclear restraint. University of Georgia Press, 2009. Chs 1 &2. b. Hymans, Jacques EC. "Veto players, nuclear energy, and nonproliferation: domestic institutional barriers to a Japanese bomb." International Security 36, no. 2 (2011): 154-189. c. Miller, Nicholas L. "The secret success of nonproliferation sanctions." International Organization 68, no. 04 (2014): 913-944. d. Gerzhoy, Gene. "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions." International Security (2015).

Week 6. Counterproliferation (160)

3 a. Fuhrmann, Matthew, and Sarah E. Kreps. "Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000." Journal of Conflict Resolution 54.6 (2010): 831-859. b. Raas, Whitney, and Austin Long. "Osirak redux? Assessing Israeli capabilities to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities." International Security 31.4 (2007): 7-33. c. Braut-Hegghammer, Målfrid. "Revisiting Osirak: preventive attacks and nuclear proliferation risks." International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 101-132. d. Lindsay, Jon R. "Stuxnet and the limits of cyber warfare." Security Studies 22, no. 3 (2013): 365-404. e. Whitlark, Rachel Elizabeth. “Nuclear Beliefs: Nuclear Proliferation, Preventive War, and a Leader’s Decision to Intervene.”

Week 7. Nuclear Weapons and the Cold War (166) a. Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: CT Press, 1966. Chapter 1, Skim chapters 2 and 3. b. Sagan, Scott D. Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security. Princeton, NJ: Press, 1990, pp. 10-57. c. Betts, Richard K. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1987, pp. 1-16, 174-179, 180-195, and 206-211. d. Foot, Rosemary J. "Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict." International Security (1988): 92-112. e. Trachtenberg, Marc. "The influence of nuclear weapons in the Cuban missile crisis." International Security (1985): 137-163.

Week 8. Nuclear Weapons and Contemporary International Affairs (160) a. Fravel, M. Taylor, and Evan S. Medeiros. "China's search for assured retaliation: the evolution of Chinese nuclear strategy and force structure." International Security 35, no. 2 (2010): 48-87. b. Brands, Hal, and David Palkki. "Saddam, Israel, and the bomb: nuclear alarmism justified?." International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 133-166. c. Narang, Vipin. "What does it take to deter? Regional power nuclear postures and international conflict." Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 3 (2013): 478-508. d. Lieber, Keir A., and Daryl G. Press. "The end of MAD? The nuclear dimension of US primacy." International Security 30, no. 4 (2006): 7-44.

Week 9. How Have Nuclear Weapons Changed International Relations? Or Have They? (139) a. Jervis, Robert. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990, pp. 1-45. b. Mueller, John. "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World." International Security 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988): 3-17. c. Sagan, Scott D., and Kenneth N. Waltz. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. (Chapter 1 pages 3-17, 41-45; Chapter 2 pages 46-55, 63-87) d. Deudney, Daniel. "Nuclear Weapons and the Waning of the Real-State." Daedalus 124, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 209-231. e. Wilson, Ward. "The winning weapon? Rethinking nuclear weapons in light of Hiroshima." International Security 31, no. 4 (2007): 162-179.

Week 10. Norms and The Use of Nuclear Weapons (110) a. Tannenwald, Nina N. "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use." International Organization 53.3 (1999): 433-468. b. Paul, Thazha Varkey. The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. Stanford University Press, 2009. Chs. 1 – 3.

4 c. Press, Daryl G., Scott D. Sagan, and Benjamin A. Valentino. "Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons." American Political Science Review 107.01 (2013): 188-206. d. Sagan, Scott, “Realist Perspectives on Ethical Norms and Weapons of Mass Destruction, in Sohail H. Hashimi and Steven P. Lee, eds., Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives. Cambridge University Press, 2004: 73-95.

Week 11. In-class Peer-Review This week’s session will be devoted to conducting an in-class peer review. Students will be required to circulate a full draft of their paper to their partner for the exercise (both the date by which the draft must be circulated and the individual you are partnering with will be determined by the professor at a later date) in advance of the session. Together in class, the student pairs will evaluate, offer constructive criticism, and seek to improve both papers. Then students will have the remainder of the semester to modify the draft paper for the final version due during the university exam week.

Week 12. Accidents, Non-State Actors, and Nuclear Terrorism (139) a. Bunn, Matthew, and Anthony Wier. "Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Construction: How Difficult?" The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 607, no. 1 (September 2006): 133-149. b. Allison, Graham. "How to stop nuclear terror." Foreign Affairs. 83, no. 1 (2004): 64-74. c. Mueller, John. Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda. Oxford University Press, 2009. Chs. 13 (181-198) & 15 (217-234). d. Lieber, Keir A. and Daryl G. Press. “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.” International Security 38. 1 (2013): 80-104. e. Sagan, Scott D. "The perils of proliferation: Organization theory, deterrence theory, and the spread of nuclear weapons." International Security (1994): 66-107. f. Albright, David, and Corey Hinderstein. "Unraveling the A. Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks." The Washington Quarterly 28, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 111-128.

Week 13. Global Zero (~80) a. Schelling, Thomas C., “A World Without Nuclear Weapons?,” Daedalus, Vol. 138, No. 4 (Fall 2009), pp. 124-129. b. Shultz, George P., et al. "A world free of nuclear weapons." Wall Street Journal 4 (2007): A15. c. Glaser, Charles. "The flawed case for Nuclear Disarmament." Survival 40, no. 1 (1998): 112- 128. d. Perkovich, George, and James M. Acton. Abolishing Nuclear Weapons. Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008. Ch. 1. e. Daalder, Ivo, and Jan Lodal. "The Logic of Zero." Foreign Affairs 87, no. 6 (2008): 80-95. f. Sagan, Scott and . “The Great Debate.” The National Interest, September/October 2010: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23588/Sagan_Waltz_- _National_Interest_-_The_Great_Debate.pdf

Week 14. Iran (54 + TBD) a. Chubin, Shahram. "Does Iran want nuclear weapons?." Survival 37, no. 1 (1995): 86-104. b. Kroenig, Matthew. "Time to attack Iran." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (2012): 76-86. c. Kahl, Colin. "Not Time to Attack Iran'." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (2012): 166-173. d. Waltz, Kenneth N. "Why Iran should get the bomb." Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (2012): 2-5. e. Kaplow, Jeffrey, and Rebecca Gibbons. "The Days After a Deal with Iran." The RAND Corporationhttp://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE135.html?utm_source=t.co&utm_ medium=rand_social f. Additional Readings TBD.

5 Scenario Exercise: The course will conclude with an in-class scenario exercise where we look into the medium-term future to hypothesize about potential future nuclear worlds.

Paper Due Date: TBD, approximately one week after the course concludes, and as dictated by the University’s final exam schedule.

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