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On Chiang Kai-Shek's Position on Resisting Japan On Chiang Kai-shek's Position on Resisting Japan: An Analysis of "Domestic Stability Takes Precedence Over Resisting Foreign Invasion" Policy, 1928-1936 by SHAO-KANG CHU B.A., Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, IL, U.S.A., 1990 M.A., Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, IL, U.S.A., 1992 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of History) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA December 1999 @ Copyright, Shao-kang Chu, 1999 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, 1 agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of History The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT To the Republic of China, the decade between 192 8 and 1937 was the best and the worst of times. Best because warlordism that had disrupted the nation came to an end in 1928 as a result of the Northern Expedition. With the Republic unified under the National Government in Nanjing, the country embarked on reconstruction. Worst because China in the mean time had to deal with internal strifes, stirred up by the regionalist militarists and the Communists, and Japanese aggression. Caught between two evils which were domestic and external enemies, Chiang Kai-shek turned to China's past for guidance. In Chinese history and ancient writings, Chiang found precedents which convinced him that before Republican China could resist the Japanese invasion, the country had to achieve internal stability in order to strengthen itself. Hence Chiang's famous catchphrase "domestic stability takes precedence over resisting foreign invasion" (rangwai bixian annei). Influences from China's past taught Chiang that before China was militarily and socially strengthened, it had to appease the invaders to avoid war. Last but not least, past influences prompted Chiang to go after the regional militarists and the Communists who he considered were disrupting the nation and distracting his war effort. In addition to past influences, contemporary affairs of state weighed heavily on Chiang Kai-shek as well. According to a 1934 confidential Kuomintang document, national defense was greatly compromised by financial straits, poor transportation ii network, gasoline shortage, and low morale among others. The inadequacy in national defense reinforced Chiang's determination to avoid war. The fact that Chiang Kai-shek tried to annihilate the Communists while making concessions to Japan gave rise to the conventional wisdom which holds that the Chinese Communist Party was Nanjing's foremost enemy, not Japan. In fact, this thesis shows that the opposite was true. Historians have yet to reach a unanimous verdict of the wisdom of "rangwai bixian annei." From the historical perspective, however, the policy of putting the house in order before resisting foreign invasion is a long-established Chinese practice. In pursuing this policy, Chiang Kai-shek was going with the historical tide. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii CHAPTER I Introduction 1 1.1 Domestic Stability Precedes Resisting Foreign Invasion 1 1.2 The Past & the Present 3 1.3 Chengyu: Admonitions from the Past 6 1.4 Historical Analogy: Lessons from the Past 8 1.5 Chiang Kai-shek in Three Different Lights 10 1.6 Neo-Authoritarianism & Traditional Chinese Leadership 12 1.7 Chiang Kai-shek as a Culturalist 15 1.8 Chiang Kai-shek as a Well-informed Leader 17 1.9 Biographical Sketches of Chiang Kai-shek 19 1.10 Appeasement & Chinese Nationalism 21 1.11 In Search of a New Criterion of Assessing Chinese Leaders 24 CHAPTER II "Rangwai Bixian Annei": Three Views from Taiwan, the Mainland, and the West 31 2 .1 War or Peace? 32 2.2 Nationalist Standpoint 34 2.3 Communist Standpoint 3 6 2.4 Western Standpoint 3 8 2.5 Chiang Wei-kuo's Standpoint 43 2.6 "Rangwai Bixian Annei" as Civil War? .... 48 CHAPTER III Chinese Appeasement & "Rangwai Bixian Annei:" Influences from the Past 52 3.1 Chiang Kai-shek as a Prolific Speaker ... 52 3.2 Historical Roots of "Rangwai Bixian Annei" 55 3.3 Fan Zhongyan on Resisting Foreign Invasion 58 3.4 Chiang Kai-shek & Fan Zhongyan: A Comparison 61 3.5 "Heqin": Chinese Style Appeasement 62 3.6 "Heqin": Where Heroes Swallowed Insults . 65 3.7 Appeasement: A Timed-Honored Policy 67 3.8 Limitations to Chiang Kai-shek's Appeasement 68 3.9 Chiang Kai-shek & Historical Parallels .. 69 3.10 No Shortcut to National Salvation 70 3.11 The Lesson of the Ming Downfall 73 iv 3.12 Chiang Kai-shek, A Later-Day Li Hongzhang? 75 3.13 Points to Ponder 7 9 CHAPTER IV Shortcomings of the Chinese War Effort: Autarky & Military Effectiveness 84 4.1 The National Defense Design Council 84 4.2 Education Inadequacy & National Defense . 85 4.3 Financial Straits & National Defense .... 88 4.4 Autarky & National Defense 91 4.5 Playing Off One Barbarian Against Another 94 4.6 Distant Water Cannot Quench Present Thirst 96 4.7 Influences of the German Experience .... 101 4.8 Once Bitten Twice Shy 102 CHAPTER V Shortcomings of the Chinese War Effort: National Defense Industry & Military Effectiveness 106 5.1 Military Effectiveness 107 5.2 Material Strength of the Chinese Air Force & Navy 108 5.3 Material Strength of the Chinese Ground Forces 110 5.4 Classification of the Chinese Ground Forces 113 5.5 Morale of the Chinese Military 116 5.6 Search for New Steel Plants 119 5.7 Inadequacy of the Metallurgical Industry 123 5.8 Uncertainty of Gasoline Supply 124 5.9 Shortage of Military Horses & Mules .... 126 5.10 China's Transportation Network 129 5.11 Not Digging a Well until One is Thirsty 131 CHAPTER VI Jinan 192 8: The First Step Toward Appeasing Japan 13 9 6.1 Significance of the Jinan Incident 139 6.2 Shandong, Germany & Japan 141 6.3 The Jinan Incident Unfolding 143 6.4 The Chiang-Tanaka Meeting, 1927 146 6.5 Backing Down in Jinan 148 6.6 Japan as China's Irreconcilable Enemy .. 151 6.7 China Pleads with the World 153 6.8 The Jinan & Mukden Incidents 155 CHAPTER VII The Anti-Communist Campaigns & the Songhu Incident: Nanjing Takes on the Communists & Japan 162 7.1 Encirclement & Elimination Campaign .... 163 v 7.2 The Songhu Incident: Nanjing's New Japan Policy at Work 168 7.3 Background to the Songhu Incident 169 7.4 China Fights Back in Shanghai 173 7.5 International Reaction 175 7.6 Resisting While Negotiating 177 7.8 Aftermath of the Songhu Incident 181 CHAPTER VIII The Great Wall Campaign & the Southwest Incident: Prioritizing Nanjing's Enemy List 186 8.1 The Great Wall Campaign 186 8.2 The Tanggu Truce 190 8.3 The Southwest Incident: The Last Stand of Regional Militarism 192 8.4 The Southwest Incident Unfolding 194 8.5 Chiang Kai-shek & the Southwest Incident 196 8.6 Prioritizing Nanjing's Enemy List 200 8.7 Disease of the Heart & Disease of the Skin 202 8.8 The Concept of "Hanzei" 2 04 8.9 Japan: White & Red Imperialism in One .. 205 CHAPTER IX Conclusion 209 9.1 Japan as the Foremost Enemy of China ... 210 9.2 Nanjing-Tokyo Relations: Asking a Tiger for its Fur 213 9.3 Appeasement & Reality 215 9.4 Chengyu & Conflict Management in Chinese Society 216 9.5 Preservation of the Body at the Expense of the Limb 218 9.6 To Save Lives: A Comparison of Chiang Kai-shek & Wang Jingwei 221 9.7 Adding a New Chapter to the Study of Chiang Kai-shek 225 Bibliography 22 8 vi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION On September 18, 1931, Japan attacked China by invading the latter's Northeastern provinces. The Republic was in agreement on resistance, but it was bitterly divided on the opportune moment. Many, the Communists and college students in particular, demanded an outright declaration of war on Japan. Others, including Chiang Kai-shek and independent intellectuals such as Hu Shi and Jiang Tingfu (Tsiang T'ing-fu), cautioned against reckless courage and stressed that a hasty declaration of war would devastate the country whose national defense had yet to be strengthened. With both parties claiming to be in the right, when to resist the Japanese invasion became a major issue in contemporary China. Domestic Stability Precedes Resisting Foreign Invasion Long before the September Eighteenth Incident, Chiang knew a full scale Sino-Japanese conflict was only a matter of time. After conferring in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi on the prospect of Sino-Japanese relations in November 1927, Chiang wrote in his diary the following: Japan has in the past negotiated with the Beiyang warlords. After the Jiawu War (1894-1895), all those who negotiated with the Japanese were rotten and selfish people. As a result, the Japanese look upon us as easy prey. My trip to Tokyo will show them that their taking China for granted will not work on me. Although Tanaka still regards me as an old-fashioned warlord and bureaucrat, and tries willfully to win me over by hook or crook, he is nonetheless insincere. I am not able to alter Japan's long standing policy of 1 aggression against China, but I have nothing to lose as I did catch a glimpse of such policy by meeting with Tanaka.
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