HESPERIA 76 (2OO7) FROM THE WHOLE Pages 323-343 CITIZEN BODY?

The Sociology of Election and Lot in the Athenian

Democracy

abstract

In this article the author examines the sociology of selection procedures in the Athenian democracy. The role of election and lot within the po litical system, the extent (or lack) of corruption in the selection of officials, on are and the impact of the selection procedure political life considered. was a A comparison of selection procedures demonstrates that the lot relatively democratic device that distributed offices widely throughout Attica, whereas elections favored demes near the city. The reasons for these different patterns of are examined. participation

ELECTION AND LOT IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS

were were to Most Athenian officials selected by lot, but elections also held allocate offices that required special expertise.1 In Aristotle's opinion, "the use as of the lot [for the appointment of officials] is regarded democratic, use as and the of the vote oligarchical" (Pol. 1294b7-9). While modern or scholars have sometimes considered the ideological religious factors associated with election and sortition,2 the sociology of selection proce dures has usually been neglected, despite its importance for understanding Athenian political sociology in general. Did the choice of procedure promote one group over another or af 1. Peter and Andy Merrills, Rhodes, fect the ways in which citizens could participate in public life?Was the the referees for anonymous Hesperia or lot democratic in practice, did those who put themselves forward for made a number of to im suggestions as selection represent relatively small sections of society, such the wealthy prove this paper at its various stages. or those who lived close to the Were citizens constrained in their PatrickWhite gave helpful advice on city? I am to choices the of I address these statistics. grateful them all. political by organization officeholding? Unless stated all translations otherwise, questions in this article by examining political participation in the context are my own. of election and lot. 2. See, e.g., Headlam 1933; Hansen There is, little direct evidence for selection 1990; Bers 2000; Daverio Rocchi unfortunately, procedures in ancient Athens. The of bronze tokens confirms that 2001; Demont 2001. For areas outside discovery (pinakia) officials were selected lot allotment machines similar Athens, see Cordano 2001; di Salvatore by using (kleroteria) to 2001. those described in the discussion of jury courts in the Athenaion Politeia

? The American School of Classical Studies at Athens 324 CLAIRE TAYLOR

(Ath. Pol. 63-69; Aischin. 3.13). This process apparently took place in the Theseion (Ath. Pol. 62.1). By the 330s all selected officials except bouleutai seem to and phrouroi have been appointed "from the whole tribe," although was case this not always the previously, and there is controversy about the practicalities of the procedure.3 states Regarding elections, the Ath. Pol. that "the election of strategoi, hipparchs, and other military officers is held in the assembly, in whatever see case way the people fit" (Ath. Pol. 44.4, trans. Rhodes). In the of the ten were one now generalship, "the strategoi formerly from each tribe, but are appointed from the whole citizen body" (Ath. Pol. 61.1, trans. Rhodes). was were some But it not only military officials who elected; financial and as as were religious officials, well envoys and secretaries, also elected (e.g., was Ath. Pol. 54.3-5).4 In elections for the generalship, voting by cheirotonia was (Aischin. 3.13), aprobouleuma necessary (Ath. Pol. 44.4), and it is likely some that form of promotion of the candidate took place beforehand, either or personally by friends (Dem. 13.19; Thuc. 8.54.4).5 to reconstruct Previous scholarship has attempted electoral procedure inmore detail (at least for the strategid) from the limited information sup plied by the Ath. Pol., supplemented by Plato {Leg 755c-d, 763d-e). The was Ath. Pol. is frustratingly vague, however, while Plato not describing any on are existing system. Any conclusions based these texts therefore rather even speculative.6 Furthermore, though it is assumed that the procedure for was were same all elections similar, presumably not all of them held in the as were Assembly meeting, the months inwhich different offices handed over varied considerably.7 Apart from the information in the Ath. Pol., it is not known how votes were or as organized to what extent factors such the candidates' wealth, or a or family background, deme of origin played role in influencing decid we or ing elections. Similarly, do not know whether electioneering electoral were common. on fraud Previous studies have concentrated explaining the intricacies of the nomination of candidates, the changing nature of tribal

on 3. Cf. Whitehead 1986, pp. 266 based Athens," but it is impossible 270, and Jones 1995, pp. 514-515. to be certain which features reflected 4. See dsoAth. Pol 42.2,43.1; contemporary Athenian practice and were to Dem. 21.171; Dein. 1.51; Hansen which due Plato's imagination. 1987, pp. 121-122,188, n. 751; Develin See also Hansen 1987, pp. 44-46. 1989, pp. 1-23; Rhodes 1993, pp. 513 7. Tamiai (treasurers) did not take 517,599-604, 677-688. For elections office until after the Panathenaia, five see or six elections for of envoys, Briant 1968; for priests, months after the see are There was a of some Aleshire 1994, although these strategoi. gap not as months between the election o? counted public officials following strategoi Arist. Pol. 1299al2-31. and the assumption of their office, 5. See Rhodes 1993, pp. 536-537; however. See Hansen 1987, p. 121. For Hansen 1999, p. 234. If tribes were tamiai, set Ath. Pol. 43.1. Furthermore, to an outside the started their allowed adopt candidate, ephebic sophronistai as stated atAth. Pol. 44.4, this must term of office in Boedromion, later in to the than but are have been known prior the election; year strategoi, they only seeMitchell 2000, pp. 347-352. attested after 334/3. See Rhodes 1993, 6. Hansen (1999, p. 235) argues p. 504; Hansen 1999, p. 234. account was that Plato's "probably FROM THE WHOLE CITIZEN BODY? 325

representation, and the political power wielded by the strategoi.8Many schol ars a must outcomes have recognized that range of factors have affected the on of these elections, but much less emphasis has been placed isolating these or a issues assessing the sociology of selection procedures in wider context.9 are a These neglected problems addressed below, beginning with consider a ation of whether corruption was factor inAthenian elections, followed by an analysis of the sociological dimensions of election and lot.

PATRONAGE AND POLITICS IN ATHENS

If there is little evidence for the procedural aspects of Athenian elections, even there is less for any type of malpractice associated with the elections, as or such electioneering bribery. This situation is surprising given the frequent accusations of bribery in other contexts (e.g., for speaking in on an or the Assembly, accepting gifts while embassy, in the law courts) were and may suggest that elections not considered important enough to manipulate.10 In comparison with Roman Republican elections, where was common was an canvassing for votes and money important factor, the case was a Athenian strikingly different.11 The holding of office fulfilled was different sociopolitical function in Athens, partly because power at tainable without political office?through speaking in the Assembly, for no cursus example. There was, moreover, Athenian equivalent of the Roman a a honorum, which required that candidate have held previous office before he could stand for high office. a The Roman Republican example is useful, however, for providing framework inwhich to think about the functioning of Athenian elections. to a To be successful in Roman elections, candidates needed cultivate public reputation with oratorical skills, make great shows of popularity, exploit friendship and patronage ties, and disparage opponents (Cicero, Comment, pet. 2-3, 7-13,16,34-38). Some of these features can certainly be seen in a Athens. For example, the creation and maintenance of public reputation was as as were vital inAthens in Rome, oratorical skills highly prized, and were courts. opponents attacked in the Assembly and Speaking regularly in a s the Assembly considerably enhanced citizen profile, and many strategoi are a known to have played leading role in Assembly policy and decision making, especially in the 5th and early 4th centuries b.c.12 Disparaging op were or ponents and prosecuting them in court also useful ways of obtaining as sustaining influence in the Assembly, the battles between Demosthenes and Aischines demonstrate (e.g., Aischin. 3.93; Dem. 19.120-122).

we must 8. Staveley 1972, p. 102; Pi?rart part... remain ignorant of the Marx 2004, pp. 275-276. 1974, pp. 128-130,142-146; Rhodes political considerations which influ 12. For the separation of rhetores enced Athenian and of and after the see Davies 1981, pp. 129-132; Hansen 1999, appointments strategoi 370s, pp. 233-235; Mitchell 2000, pp. 347 the tribal, familial, and other loyalties 1981, p. 125. That it is not so marked 356. For voting in theAssembly in which probably determined how large asDavies suggests is exemplified by the see numbers of Athenians voted." careers in general, Stanton and Bicknell 1987, of Phormion the 5th century 10. Accusations of see answered by Hansen 1989b. bribery: Hyp. and Kallistratos in the 4th; Sinclair 9.Hamel (1998, p. 19) highlights Eux. 1-2; Dem. 19.277; Ath. Pol. 27.5. 1988, p. 46. the that the most 11. Yakobson Morstein difficulty, stating "for 1999, p. 22; 326 CLAIRE TAYLOR

use so Displays of popularity and the of patronage ties characteristic of Roman elections, however, seem not to have been common inAthens.13 Eliciting sympathy and highlighting personal courage through the display war scars were of wounds and commonplace in Roman elections,14 but such ploys may perhaps have reminded the Athenians too much of Peisistra tos and tyranny to be successful in their case (Hdt. 1.59); Nikomachides was complained that despite his many wounds, he not elected strategos (Xtn.Mem. 3.4.1).15 Paul Millett has argued that patronage, although crucially important a in Roman political life, played minimal role inAthenian politics, at least after Perikles' introduction of jury pay.16 According to Millett, jury pay, as a a portrayed in theAth. Pol. response to Kimon's generosity, undermined social system that tied ordinary citizens to the local elite and enabled them access resources on men as to have to without relying such Kimon (Ath. Pol. 27.3-4; Theopomp., FGrH115 F89; Plut. Kim. 10.1-6).17 Nicholas Jones contends, however, that while Millett is correct in minimizing the role of patronage in the democratic context of the city, where citizens could redirect the patron-client relationship through the democratic institutions of the or Assembly the law courts, traditional patronage relationships survived in as ameans rural Attica, principally of spreading agricultural risk.18The only case direct support for his argument, unfortunately, is from the of Kimon was as himself, since his deme, Lakiadai, not in the city. This reasoning, we shall see, is less than convincing. a Jones acknowledges that there is lack of direct evidence for patron age after this episode in the mid-5th century, but suggests that its absence a conceals form of disguised patronage that is difficult to recognize. He is no reason certainly correct that there is to expect indications of patronage in the literary evidence; as he says, in Rome itwas the role of the client, not the patron, to advertise the relationship, usually epigraphically.19 In as stead, Jones cites honorific decrees passed by demes evidence of local as patronage. This argument is not particularly persuasive, these decrees none praise wealthy demesmen for their benefactions, with of the language of personal patronage that appears in the Roman corpus (e.g., patronus, cliens, and amicus).20 The decrees commemorate expenditures benefiting

wants us to 13. Alkibiades, advertising his Olym believe that Nikomachides 17. SeeMille? 1989, pp. 23-25; also a to his scars the pic victories in bid get elected, actually displayed during Whitehead 1986, pp. 305-311. an vote. He was not too to do may be considered exception; Thuc. certainly shy 18. Jones 2004, pp. 59-88. as well since he is them 6.16.2-6. Amazingly popular so, portrayed showing 19. Jones 2004, p. 73; also Sailer as to but it is clear that the being severely loathed, he played Sokrates, 1989, p. 54. Zelnick-Abramowitz (2000, on own demos knew of his battle this ambiguity for his political experience pp. 72-76) argues, however, that the see Thuc. and still voted for a candidate more orators in exam advancement; 6.28.2; 8.48.4, particular record many in business in war. 53.2. experienced than ples o?philia relationships with "impli 14. see Plut. such a tactic was more success cations in For Cato the Elder, Perhaps the public sphere," which she ful for other since as a Quaest. Rom. 49 (Mor. 276C-D); for candidates, however, interprets form of patronage. see in Nikomachides as Marius, Sail. lug. 85.29; and gen Xenophon presents 20. Zelnick-Abramowitz (2000, someone who the of eral Plut. Cor. 14.1. Cicero also used thought display pp. 68-71) discusses the language the of scars as a rhetorical war wounds could lead to his election. in context. showing o?philia this Whitehead see see tactic in law courts; Quint. Inst. 16.Millett 1989; but also (1983) focuses onphilotimia. For the Zelnick of in see 6.1.21; Leigh 1995, pp. 195-203. Rhodes 1986, pp. 135-136; language patronage Rome, Abramowitz 2000. 15. It is unclear whether Xenophon Sailer 1989, pp. 54-56. FROM THE WHOLE CITIZEN BODY? 327

as a or the entire community, such the financing of chorus (IG II2 1198) the building of a bridge (IG II21191), but they afford little indication of a personal relationship between honorand and deme members. Furthermore, it is difficult to equate these local honorific decrees with those passed by the polis. Jones calculates that 58% (94 out of 162) of the are attested deme inscriptions honorific decrees. Three-quarters of these can as or plausibly be interpreted honoring wealthy prominent citizens; a thus Jones claims that "model of patronal exchange" is represented here.21 These figures, however, are not out of line with the number of decrees enacted by the polis, yet the polis decrees do not represent patronage relations between foreigners and Athens, at least not in the terms that a Jones suggests.22 Clearly, large proportion of surviving decrees, whether or were enacted by the polis the deme, honorific. They demonstrate social some are and economic stratification of sort, but they not in themselves indicators of patronage, as Jones claims. Finally, the distinction Jones makes between the deme of Lakiadai and the city is overstated.23 Lakiadai lay outside the city walls, probably close was to the Sacred Way, east of the Kephisos River.24 It therefore less than was on a 4 km from the city and located major communications route. was not at or The deme all isolated separated from the city, and itwould hardly have been difficult for demesmen to journey toAthens to participate was in democratic government.The democratic alternative to patronage an literally within hour's walk of the deme.

ELECTORAL CORRUPTION? THE CASE OF OSTRACISM

Although Jones's analysis of patronage inAthenian society does not stand are up to scrutiny, there examples of networks of friends of equal status per one as forming favors for another, such lending money without interest (?ra nos or loans)25 the hetaireiai described byThucydides (8.54.4) in the context of the oligarchic coup of 411. Although these groups may not have functioned as are a solely revolutionary organizations, the fact that they mentioned in revolutionary setting and existed for the expressed purpose of promoting courts their members in the law and elections is revealing.26 Such hetai are reiai widely believed to have been used in the ostracism of Hyperbolos, when Alkibiades' and Nikias's supporters allegedly united to exile him.27 In

21.Jones2004,p.79. 24.Milchhoefer 1883, p. 16;Traill pp. 52-55) is skeptical, however, and sees as 22. Of the 775 4th-century decrees 1986, p. 133. the machinations late-5th ?ranos see event to collated by Hansen (1987, pp. 110 25. On loans, Millett century speculation after the were 112), 367 (47%) honorary decrees. 1991, pp. 153-159. explain the surprise result. Nonetheless, 26. and 23. Jones (2004, p. 78) notes that Gomme, Andrewes, Dover contemporary speculation of this kind xuno "the effects of the rise of the democratic (1981, pp. 128-131) associate the is in itself good evidence forwhat the ideology invoked byMillett remained mosiai of Thuc. 8.54.4 with hetaireiai. Athenians believed could have oc a ... mainly urban phenomenon and See also Calhoun 1931, pp. 126-127; curred. See also Hansen 1987, pp. 76 in rural in ones as Konstan 60-67. contra demes, certainly far 1997, pp. 77; Siewert 1999; Rosivach 1987, removed as Kimon's Laki from the asty 27. [Andoc] 4.4; Plut. Nik. 11.3-4, pp. 163-167; Rhodes 1994, p. 94. adai, the old ways survived" (my italics). Alk. 13.4, Arist 7.3. Heftner (2000, 328 CLAIRE TAYLOR

light of this case, itmaybe worthwhile to examine ostracisms for indications of how elections might have been open to manipulation. The evidence is was controversial, however, and the procedure for ostracism slightly differ ent from that used for electing officials. For these reasons, the process is summarized here. an was After the initial vote to hold ostracism taken in the Assembly, a the actual vote, ballot organized by tribe (Ath. Pol. 43.5; Philoch., FGrH was 328 F30), held in the Agora.28 Although Philochoros says that the was was inscribed side of the ostrakon carried face down (implying that this a secret ballot), scribes were sometimes used, which suggests that secrecy was must case not always maintained. This have been especially true in the of were most to a poor citizens, who the likely be illiterate.29 The discovery of name some deposit of ostraka bearing the of Themistokles has suggested to that groups of Themistokles, enemies prepared votes for distribution.30 M. H. Hansen, however, is probably correct in doubting the role of orga nized political groups here; these ostraka were, after all, not used.31 not to Even if the Themistokles ostraka do attest the manipulation of ostracism votes in any underhanded way, it certainly demonstrates that the was as as a vote not secret suggested by Philochoros. Nevertheless, differ can ent sort of manipulation perhaps be detected in the vote to ostracize was Hyperbolos.32 As mentioned above, Hyperbolos ostracized after Al kibiades and Nikias (or Phaiax?) allegedly joined forces against him. It is difficult to reconstruct the details surrounding this vote; the fullest account not is given by Plutarch (Alk. 13.4), who highlights the confusion, least in sources the identification of the protagonists. Contemporary suggest that was s the result not particularly surprising in view of Hyperbolos poor = reputation (Thuc. 8.73.3; Plato Com. fr. 187 K 203 K-A).33 not Given the difficulties of this episode, it may be wise to place too on much weight any suggestions of corruption. It may instead be useful to consider other factors that could have contributed to the result. Proso

pographical analysis of ostraka shows that candidates with large numbers were of votes, that is, those who in serious danger of being ostracized, came as predominantly from the wealthy elite.34 Other factors, such the or or political prominence notoriety of individuals the election procedure itself may also have been relevant, as discussed further below. Direct

it to believe secret ostraka cast them on this occa 28. Hansen 1999, p. 35; Forsdyke difficult that ballots against 2005, pp. 146-149. Brenne (2002, p. 103) (in the law courts) were used in Athens sion, see Heftner 2000, p. 50. A second of "until well into the fifth ostrakon cast Nikias was found discusses the possible interpretations century." against Kerameikos O 1309 (=T 1/88), an 30. Broneer (1938, pp. 231-241) in theAgora in 1998 (P 33264, unpub name 14 were see ostrakon inscribed with the suggested that people respon lished); for details, http://www. son The 190 in the excavation Megakles, of Hippokrates. sible for the ostraka found agathe.gr (1998 season). on the reverse of this sherd See also in 33. Scheidel inscription deposit. Lang Agora XXV, (2002, pp. 488-489) n. (Antiochidesphyles) may demonstrate pp. 142-161; and 31, below. For demonstrates that social and moraliz the of tribes. variation in the letter see Broneer motives for ostracism were as organization voting by styles, ing regu lar as Kimon's Brenne suggests that it may have 1938, pp. 231-232. political motives, e.g., belonged to the tribe of Antiochis, 31. Hansen 2002. It is unknown, alleged sexual relationship with his was not whether ostraka half-sister Kerameikos of which Megakles himself however, any prepared Elpinike; a member. were used. O 6874 (=T 1/67). See also Brenne 29. Plut. Arist. 7.4-6. See also 32. Rosivach 1987, pp. 166-167; 2002, pp. 92-93. Vanderpool 1973, p. 218; Brenne 1994, Rhodes 1994, p. 94; Heftner 2000, 34. See Brenne 2001. p. 21. Boegehold (1963, p. 372) finds pp. 56-57. For other citizens who had FROM THE WHOLE CITIZEN BODY? 329

manipulation of the vote by disgruntled aristocrats cannot necessarily be assumed. use The supposed of the secret ballot in the ostracism of powerful was citizens is interesting, given that secrecy not maintained for the selec was tion of officials in the first place. In Rome, the secret ballot used in A.D. was elections at least after 139. It usually connected with efforts to no sure discourage electoral bribery; candidates could longer be whether their efforts to bribe the voters would be successful.35 Secret ballots were not voters to to used inAthens by elect officials, but by juries decide legal cor cases.36 It is perhaps ironic that the only extant evidence suggesting comes arenas ruption specifically in relation to voting from in which the was was a secret ballot used. This may suggest that there at least perception was that secrecy necessary in certain contexts.37 There are, however, accusations of bribery connected with officials. a Isokrates specifically makes link between bribery and strategoi, noting that "although the penalty fixed for anyone convicted of bribery [?cAXpSer?Ccov] we is death, elect those who do itmost obviously to be generals" (Isok. 8.50). The verb (cruv)o?K?Ceiv often occurs in the context of a law court, but it was is clear that it also associated with the Assembly (ouvoeic?Ceiv xnv even ?KKAT|oiav Kai x?Xka ?iKOcoxripia; Aischin. 1.86), and perhaps with use an as the 10 tribes. This would make its in electoral context plausible, were candidates selected according to tribe (Dem. 46.26; Ath. Pol. 27.5).38 are These elections and the effects of the selection procedure in general assessed in the remainder of this article.

A COMPARISON OF ELECTION AND LOT

or Electioneering, electoral bribery, other electoral malpractice could have cases no been operative in isolated of Athenian politics, but there is evi were a dence that such practices feature of the democratic system. In the source surviving material, the Athenians frequently accused each other

was was 35. If this the intention, it See esp. Boegehold 1963, pp. 372-374, Arist. Pol. 1303al5 for intrigue not were at particularly successful; competitive who suggests that ballots origi (eritheias) in elections Heraia in voters not to be but led to bribery continued, and expected nally intended secret, Arkadia that the switch from to votes to receive bribes from all candidates. that secrecy became important in elections the lot. was See Yakobson 1999, pp. 124-126,142. in which accuracy in counting 38. Nevertheless, the main aim of For a view on different of the political required. See further Rhodes 1981, the surviving legislation bribery of see seems to its in significance the change, Gruen pp. 126-127; Hall 1990, p. 193;Han have been prevention sen to in 1991, pp. 259-261. See also Lintott 1999, p. 202; along with Spivey respect speakers the Assembly, 1990, p. 4. (1994, pp. 48-51), who examines the rather than electoral bribery (Dein. 36. The of the cluster of scenes on religious importance voting red-figure 2.16-17; Hyp. 4.7-8), and admittedly secret around 490-470 and the link with seems to to ballot is highlighted by Dem. pottery suggests strategoi refer 19.239. contrasts was a in This with Lys. 13.37, that this way which the their period of office rather than their a in was not create a link trial which voting secret, Athenians could between selection. Ar. Ach. 598 implies that elec is as a act and "the tions to and which portrayed flagrant contemporary practice epic lent themselves manipulation use of intimidation by theThirty. The past." by the wealthy, however. In any case, were not secret vot of ballots that in the law 37. Dem. 57.13 alleges double MacDowell (1983, p. 68) does not suf courts seems to be associated with revo in a deme Pol. the ing diapsephismos. Ath. ficiently explain the appearance of for to a in lution and oligarchy; see, example, 27.5 claims Anytos tried bribe jury, Assembly Aischin. 1.86-87. See also accuses the reprisals against the Athenian while Lys. 29.12 Ergokles of Harvey 1985, pp. 108-113. at the same. See also Xen. 5.8 and sympathizers Megara (Thuc. 4.74.3). Symp. 330 CLAIRE TAYLOR

to or a of taking bribes speak in the Assembly, propose decrees, advise course an particular of action, but not to sway election.39 This relative lack of interest in electoral bribery may be partially explained by the procedural practices of elections themselves. Inducing many members of the Assembly a to raise their hands for specific candidate may, in practice, have been not difficult, and perhaps worth the trouble?especially if elections were, relatively speaking, not that important in any case.40 If energy was to be spent swaying the Assembly, itwould be better used to influence the vote on a decree. particular Social factors and the dynamics of the selection procedure may more have figured prominently in Athenian political life than electoral as malpractice. The "Old Oligarch" claimed that offices such the strategia on some were distributed socioeconomic grounds; he asserted that citizens or deliberately avoided holding positions that "bring safety danger to the as a not want to people whole," because they did take responsibility for the a associated risks ([Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.3). Although he may have observed were genuine phenomenon (that is, while all citizens equally entitled to hold these offices, in practice not all citizens did), his explanation for this was a need not be accepted. Nevertheless, wealth undoubtedly factor in were political activity, and the wealthy disproportionately represented in areas over many of public life.41 Indeed, well half of all attested elections to produced officials known be rich, supporting the idea that certain types of political activities attracted the wealthy elite.42 resources Large financial may not have been the only factor affecting as com officeholding. Just the procedure used in the judging of dramatic can seen petitions be to influence the outcome of those competitions,43 a was electoral procedure may have been factor in deciding who selected a for certain positions, boosting those candidates from particular region of Attica. Organization of offices into boards of 10 members, although ensure designed to equality of tribal representation, may have accentuated differences and resulted in unintended consequences. For example, the seems geographical distribution of elected officials to have differed from that of officials selected by lot. The relationship between this variation are and the method of appointment considered below.

39. See n. 10, above. Ath. Pol. 62.1 krates (Aischin. 3.79-81; Dein. 1.28). in 41. mentions corruption the appoint This situation may have been ment to more common in than sortitive offices organized by the 5th century in seem to see demes, which they have the 4th; Taylor, forthcoming. been illegally sold.The remedy for this, 42. Of the 631 known elections, was were however, the removal of office allo 61% produced officials who also to cation from the demes the whole liturgy payers. (Note that these figures was treat all tribe, suggesting that there less elections separately, and thus opportunity for this kind of corruption count individuals more than once. If at individuals are counted 42% tribal level.Aischines (3.62) alleges only once, thatDemosthenes bribed fellow of the 305 elected citizens are also not to in as a demesmen stand for the Boule attested liturgy payers?still order that he be selected (by lot). significant proportion). not van 40. Even so, this did prevent 43. SeeMarshall and Willigen on accusations of bribery against those burg 2004, p. 101, the role of the in the Kalli in the outcome of speaking Assembly, e.g., judging procedure stratos Eux. Philo (Hyp. 1-2, 39) and dramatic competitions. FROM THE WHOLE CITIZEN BODY? 331

Elected Officials: Strategoi

were Strategoi could be highly influential, presumably because they among the few officials who could serve for more than one year in office.44 In the were first half of the 5th century the strategoi, like other officials, chosen one from each tribe for a board of 10 (Ath. Pol. 22.2).45 Most scholars were to agree that there three stages in the development of elections the were one strategia. In 501/0 candidates chosen from each tribe, but there some seems to have been modification by at least 441/0 to allow tribes to field two representatives if required.46 Sometime between 357/6 and ca. was 329/8 the tribal basis of elections completely abandoned, and the to Ath. Pol. (61.1) refers all of the strategoi being elected from the whole of the citizen body.47 The phenomenon of double representation has provoked controversy was once both in regard to its organization and its purpose. It thought to a on be way of conferring special privileges individuals, but K. J. Dover has demonstrated that this was not the case. Charles Fornara claimed that was tribal representation completely abandoned in the 460s, but this point most has been disputed, recently by L. G. Mitchell, who also suggested was a that double representation way in which strategoi could be elected as for their special expertise.48 The acceptance of double representation a on phenomenon relies the prosopographical identification of strategoi, which may be problematic in itself.49 The problem is heightened with the possible appearance of "double-doubles" (i.e., only eight tribes represented instead often), but Mitchell has shown that double-doubles can theoreti as a was cally be accepted part of system in which tribal voting still used (tribes that could not field a suitable candidate could put forward someone from another tribe). She suggests that this may have occurred in practice on a on handful of occasions.50 Mitchell's theory the election o? strategoi is persuasive in that itwould account both for double representation and double-doubles. reasons Whatever the behind double representation, it seems that in at the 5th century, least, the practice favored strategoi from demes lying in close proximity to the city (Fig. I).51 This is not surprising, given that were individual boards of strategoi also weighted toward citizens from most one these demes. In 5th-century examples of double representation, or a both members of the pair had demotic from these demes (Table 1).

44. Connor 1971, pp. 9-10; Davies tion, FGrH 324 F38. For three stages in of Hagnous, and possibly Lysimachides 124. see 1981, p. the development of elections, Lewis of Hagnous). See Develin 1989, p. 394. 45. Other officials selected in this 1961; Hammond 1969, pp. 111-114; 48. Dover 1960; Fornara 1971, way included, e.g., tamiai, archons, Staveley 1972, pp. 42-43; Rhodes 1993, pp. 22-27; Mitchell 2000, pp. 352-355, of poletai, apodektai, logistai, epimeletai pp. 265-266; Mitchell 2000, pp. 348 following Pi?rart 1974, pp. 128-139. the of contra a two see dockyards, repairers temples, 350; those who prefer 49. Lewis 1961, pp. 118-119; astynomoi, agoranomoi, metronomoi, stage process without the intermediate also the general criticisms by Thomp of the son epimeletai emporion, synegoroi, stage of modified tribal representation, (1974). and of the Ath. Pol. n. epimeletai Dionysia; e.g., Fornara 1971, p. 20; Bicknell 1972, 50.Mitchell 2000, p. 345, 11, 8.1,47.1,48.1,48.3,50-51,54.2,55.1, pp. 103-111; Bicknell 1979; Hamel pp. 353-354. The years that may have were are 56.4. The Forty appointed four 1998, pp. 85-86. "double-doubles" 432,431, and 426. from a A th. Pol. 53.1. 47. There were three strate 51. The demes shown in 1 are tribe; possibly Fig. 46. from Akamantis around all within In 441/0 Perikles andGlaukon goi 329/8 approximately two-hours' both represented Akamantis; Andro (Sthenyllos of Eiresidai, Mnesimachos walk from the city. 332 CLAIRE TAYLOR

I ..-??" Chol?rgos ~v Kettbs>H^rmSs Kol?nos W J^-

Key to abbreviated deme names B: Boutadai E: Erikeia K: Kydathenaion Kei: Keiriadai Ker: Kerameis Ko: Koile Kol: Kollytos L: Lakiadai Lo: Lousia M: Melite S: Skambonidai 1. Demes in the area 25 km Figure city Base (approximate locations). map from Camp 2001, p. 272, fig. 248

In seven are came 441/0 of the board often strategoi (all of whom known) from demes to area close the city (Androtion, FGrH 324 F38).52 Again in 433/2 five of the nine attested strategoi have demotics from this area (Table 2).53 This may simply be chance, but together these observations that the demes close to were imply the city important providers of strategoi and that belonging to one of these demes aided a candidate's chances of being elected.54 The of the organization strategia along tribal lines is consistent with was the pattern of office division in the democracy, and it presumably deemed to be a of fair way dividing powers.55 The fact that the strategia was distributed among the 10 tribes, however, made it possible that all

52. The of Fornara suggestion during the Peloponnesian War. His 1984, pp. 8-16; Osborne 1996, seem as (1971, p. 49) thatGlauketes Athenaios arguments unlikely, however, pp. 299-304. is a later should stand. a elite still to have been use interpolation city appears 55. The widespread of boards of 53. Thuc. IG F in the after the 10 1.45.2,51.4, 57.6; prominent strategia suggests that the citizen population 364 no. IG F later to the of was least in (=Meiggs-Lewis 61); adjustments system (at the perception of the Plut. Per. 16.3. See Develin which Kleisthenes could not 466; 1989, election, Athenians) divided reasonably equally 99-100. have foreseen after the introduc pp. (i.e., between tribes. This idea gains support 54. It is that this unlikely pattern tion of double representation and the from the fact that the army was also was a deliberate intention of Kleisthe of tribal abandonment organization). organized by tribe (and itwould pre as the evidence have been to nes, suggested by Sealey (1967, Furthermore, probably sumably important have in a of the demotics does not warrant the breakdown into units of pp. 85-94) study fighting approximately equal of known in each decade from strategoi such small temporal categories. See size); Ath. Pol. 21.3,22.2. See Stanton 441/0-412/1. Sealey claimed that this also Sealey 1960, pp. 173-174; Lewis 1984, p. 9; Rhodes 1993, p. 253. was city elite eventually broken down 1963; Andrewes 1977, p. 247; Stanton FROM THE WHOLE CITIZEN BODY? 333

TABLE 1. DOUBLE REPRESENTATION OF STRATEGOI

Tribe Date Strategoi 441/0 435/4 Perikles ofCholargos Akamantis 434/3 Glaukon ofKerameis 433/2

Proteas of Aixone 433/2 Kekropis Archestratos of Phlya?

432/1 Perikles ofCholargos Akamantis 431/0 Karkinos of Thorikos

Proteas of Aixone 432/1 Eukrates Kekropis ofMelite 431/0 Phormio of Paiania? 430/29 Pandionis of Steiria 429/8 Hagnon

426/5 of Acharnai? Sophokles Oineis 425/4 Lamachos of Oe

426/5 Hipponikos ofAlopeke Antiochis Aristoteles of Thorai? of Halimous 424/3 Thucydides Leontis Nikostratos Skambonidai of Kleon 423/2 ofKydathenaion? Pandionis ? ofMyrrhinous Laches of Aixone 418/7 Kekropis Kleomedes of Phlya? Alkibiades Skambonidai 407/6 of Leontis Adeimantos Skambonidai of

in or near Source: Mitchell 2000, pp. 354-355. Strategoi italics have demotics from the city.

TABLE 2. DEMOTICS OF BOARDS OF STRATEGOI

Date <(City" Rest ofAttica

of Kolonos of 441/0 Sophokles KaUistratos Acharnai Andokides of Kydathenaion Kleitophon of Thorai Kreon of Skambonidai Sokrates of Anagyrous Perikles of Cholargos Glaukon of Kerameis ofMelite Xenophon Lampides of Piraeus

433/2 Diotimos of Euonymon Proteas of Aixone of Lakedaimonios Lakiadai Archestratos of Phlya Glaukon of Kerameis Drakontides of Thorai of Koile Metagenes Archenautes of Ikarion Perikles ofCholargos

term to or near Source: Develin 1989, pp. 89-90, 99-100. The "city" refers demes in the city. 334 CLAIRE TAYLOR

a near a strategoi in given year could be from demes the city, enabling city to elite dominate this office. An examination of the strategoi elected between 480/79 and 357/6 (i.e., when the tribal system is known to have operated) was suggests that the bias toward the city elite visible inTables 1 and 2 not uncommon. to assess But in order whether strategoi throughout the 5th and were 4th centuries heavily drawn from demes in close proximity to the city, to it is necessary compare the number o? strategoi who could be expected areas to hold office from specific of Attica with the number who actually served. By comparing this distribution of strategoi with that o? tamiai (who were to see selected by tribally organized lot), it is possible the impact of on the choice of selection procedure participation in politics.

Officials Selected by Lot: Tamiai

were most were Strategoi elected, but tamiai selected by lot, presumably by means Here refers to the tamiai of ofpinakia and kleroteria.56 tamiai Athena and the tamiai of the Other Gods only, since the tamiai of the stratiotic and th?orie funds were elected, and it is disputed whether hellenotamiai were or were elected selected by lot.57 W. Kendrick Pritchett argues that there is evidence of iteration among hellenotamiai and that accordingly the office must have been elected. He claims, moreover, that because the Ath. Pol. (30.2) groups together strategoi and hellenotamiaim the discussion of the constitution of the Five Thousand, they must both have been elected offices in the period of the democracy.58 It is obvious that this cannot be assumed.59 Moreover, Pritchett s claims are of iteration in this office weak and have been completely refuted by Benjamin Meritt.60 in Poli Aristotle groups strategoi with tamiai (not hellenotamiai) his were tics, probably because both offices distributed among the wealthy, rather than because of the method of selection (Arist. Pol. 1282a30-33, 1300b6-13).61 Aristotle also implies elsewhere (Pol. 1309bl-9) that tamiai were elected. Some tamiai were indeed elected in the second half of the 4th were century (Ath. Pol. 43.1, 61.7), but tamiai of Athena explicitly noted not to have been elected (Ath. Pol. 47.1). There is no surviving evidence reason for the selection procedure used for hellenotamiai, and for this they are excluded from the following analysis.

56. Kroll 1972, pp. 55-56. and Ammonias), but these were either elected; p. 105, n. 6); see also Meritt 57. For tamiai of Athena, see elected or had a different role from that 1987, p. 174. The debate is bound up over Ath. Pol. 47.1. For tamiai of the Other of the tamiai of Athena and the Other with arguments the calendar. For see in see Samons 299 Gods, IG I3 52, lines 13-14:utamiai Gods; any case, they provide very discussion 2000, pp. are to little information. 304. of these moneys be chosen by lot prosopographical no [aTcoicuaue?ev]." For the Kallias decree 58. Pritchett 1970, pp. 108-109; 61. Hellenotamiai longer existed a new the time Aristotle was In a and the creation of board of Pritchettl977,p.295. by writing. 59. For discussion of the Five Thou text attributed to Theo tamiai, rather than the reorganization fragmentary a see Ste. Croix and tamiai are con of previously existing board selected sand, 1956, pp. 14-20; phrastos, strategoi a see Rhodes 391-392. sidered by different procedure, Samons 1993, pp. similarly high officials; Keaney 230 2000, pp. 125-126. See ?so Ath. Pol. 60.Meritt (1971, pp. 105-106) and Szegedy-Maszak 1976, pp. 8.1. There are various other tamiai disputes this in vitriolic style (he does 236. See also Davies 1981, pp. 122-123. for P?ralos that hellenotamiai are known (e.g., those the ships allow, however, FROM THE WHOLE CITIZEN BODY? 335

Strategoi and Tamiai in Attica

as Strategoi and tamiai warrant comparison the evidence for both offices cases were to is relatively good, and in both the officeholders likely have been recruited predominantly from the wealthy.62 If the demotics of people holding these two offices reveal different geographical distributions within Attica, this may have been related to differing methods of selection (al or though continuity of officeholding personal prominence may also have some played role). Since the evidence presented above in Tables 1 and 2 came indicates that strategoi disproportionately from demes in close prox to to were imity the city, it is important ask whether all known strategoi or a distributed in this way, whether this pattern is simply feature of the small body of evidence presented in the tables. a A simple chi-square test may be used to establish whether there is statistically significant difference between the number of officeholders at a area area tested in given and the number expected in that if their distribu tion mirrored that of the citizen population in general.63 This analysis is on based the assumptions that the relative citizen population of the demes is partly recoverable through the bouleutic quotas and that deme membership were even and citizen population closely related, if the relationship is not exact.64 Although citizens undoubtedly moved around Attica, permanent migration has generally been overestimated, and regardless of its extent, it does not significantly affect the conclusions discussed below.65 The results of the chi-square test, shown inTable 3, support the pat terns seen were not inTables 1 and 2: strategoi equally distributed through out Attica. A comparison of the observed with the expected distributions on were o? strategoi (based the general citizen population from which they a not case drawn) shows statistically significant difference. This is the for tamiai, however; the difference between the distribution of attested on tamiai and the distribution that might be expected based the general citizen population is not particularly large.66 These results, together with were con the evidence presented inTables 1 and 2, suggest that strategoi areas to wert more centrated in close the city, but that tamiai drawn evenly from demes throughout Attica. This conclusion is further supported by an examination of individual boards of tamiai: in any given board, tamiai were not heavily weighted toward the city.67 The extent towhich personal prominence or office rotation affected the sociology of democracy has long been debated. The different social geog a raphy of the strategoi and the tamiai may have been due to combination

62. For tamiai as pentakosiomedim 1972, pp. 11-12; Traill 1975, p. 56; nearly complete, boards o? tamiai than see Ath. Pol. 8.1. That this meant is tamiai noi, Whitehead 1986, pp. 22-23. strategoi, there little hint that Cf. little by the end of the 4th century is 65. Damsgaard-Madsen 1988; with city demotics outnumbered those evident from Ath. Pol. 47.1. See Rhodes see rest on Hansen 1989c; Osborne 1991; and from the of Attica any specific 1993, pp. 146-148,551. n. 80, below. board. See, for example, IG I3 455 63. See the for de 66. The value is less to Appendix below chi-square 0.36, (dated 444/3); F 457 (442/1; only tails of the test and discus 3.84 see chi-square than the theoretical distribution of eight listed; Develin 1986, p. 82); sion of the mathematical assumptions. (seeTable 3). I3 472 (full boards for 421/0 and 418/7, 64. This view is 67. In are more accepted by, e.g., fact, although there along with nine from 420/19). of or Gomme 1933, pp. 49-66; Rhodes surviving examples complete, 336 CLAIRE TAYLOR

TABLE 3. STRATEGOI AND TAMIAI FROM THE CITY (AND VICINITY) AND THE REST OF ATTICA

Attested Number * (ExpectedNumber)

Officials "City" Rest ofAttica TotalChi-square**

Strategoi 41 70 8.19 111 (27.92) (83.08) Tamiai 67 183 0.36250

(62.88) (187.12)

in is on *The expected number of strategoi (shown parentheses) based the proportion of citizen population attested for each area, derived from bouleutic quotas. If 25% of the can to in or near citizen population be said have demotics from demes the city (123/489 we 111 to from assignable bouleutai), then would expect 27.92 of strategoi have demotics this area. In fact there are 41. ** at a 1 The theoretical value of chi-square significance level of 0.05 with degree of a means a freedom is 3.84; larger observed value that there is statistically significant rela an tionship between deme of origin and officeholding. See the Appendix for explanation of the calculations.

are more of factors. Tamiai often believed to have held responsibility than were power, and the officeholders rotated regularly, thus broadening partici pation in this office.68 The scale of participation in the strategia, by contrast, more may have been influenced by the possibility of holding office for than one more term, making these positions attractive for politically ambitious members of the city elite. The difference in the selection procedure would have further contributed to the differing geographical distribution of of use ficeholders. The comparison o? tamiai and strategoi suggests that the on of the lot mitigated the effects of distance participation in democracy a use to much larger degree than the of election. The question of whether or this conclusion is valid only for these two elite offices, however, whether now other positions were similarly affected must be considered.

Broader Political Effects of Election and Lot

are not Strategoi and tamiai the only officials who show different distri seems to a butional patterns. Selection procedure have had social impact on other elective and sortitive offices as well, and in elections unrelated to officeholding. Like the strategoi, candidates for ostracism (categorized was were as an election because voting used) also distributed unequally were throughout Attica. Conversely, dikasts, who selected by lot like tamiai, more seem to have been distributed evenly (Table 4).69 This observation further supports the hypothesis that selection procedure affected political participation.70

Pol. 1.2-3. whose was found in tomb 148 kleroteria and courtroom see 68. See further [Xen.] Ath. pinakion procedure, a in 69. Table 5 in the Appendix gives the cemetery uncovered by the Rhodes 1993, pp. 704-722; Bers 2000, more metro at detailed breakdown of the evi excavations Syntagma Square pp. 553-557. the out to the 70. A similar can also dence. To those dikasts recorded by (along road leading relationship Parlama and be seen on the Kroll (1972) should be added Chaire mesogeia); Stampolidis magisterial pinakia, son no. 137. For tickets for selection and also for stratos, of Phoryskides of Lamptrai, 2000, p. 166, 4th-century by lot, FROM THE WHOLE CITIZEN BODY? 337

TABLE 4. SELECTION METHODS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY

OfficeChi-square Significant?*

Selection by Election

Grammateis (before 363) Yes5.60 8.19 Yes Strategoi Ostracism candidates 23.72 Yes

Selection by Lot

Grammateis (after 363) 1.54 No Dikasts 0.13No Tamiai 0.36No

is on the a of calcu Significance determined basis of comparison the at lated chi-square value with the theoretical value of chi-square (3.84) a 1 significance level of 0.05 with degree of freedom.

to tes The office of secretary the Boule (grammateus boules) presents another relevant case for consideration.71 This office was an elected of

fice until the 360s; a new grammateus was elected in every prytany from the members of the Boule, except those of the tribe in prytany.72 Between an 366/5 and 363/2, however, the grammateus became annual office chosen by lot from the whole of the demos.73 A difference in the geographical distribution of officeholders between the elected and sortitive phases of this office would provide strong support for the influence of selection a procedure. This pattern is clearly indicated in Table 4: in sample of test were 95 grammateis, the chi-square shows that elected grammateis across unequally distributed Attica, but grammateis selected by lot cannot same be said to be unequally distributed. Such variation within the office strongly suggests that the choice of procedure affected the selection (or self-selection) of candidates.74

to own who served after 73. n. archons (according Ath. Pol. 22.5, representatives, Henry 2002, p. 92, 5. Abel were some sort of order they selected by lot after 487/6). secretary-tribal (1983, pp. 62-63) thinks that gramma allotment had taken teis would have been to The distribution of both magisterial place (Ferguson subject prokrisis and archons cannot be said to but there are other were pinakia 1898, p. 26), possi before they selected by lot because the tribe in could have been unequal throughout Attica, bilities, e.g., prytany they required "functional literacy." But have elected a man from the rest of see following the patterns of tamiai and Rhodes 1985 andHansen 1986 for are the Boule with whom wished to a dikasts. There 18 examples of mag they refutation of her arguments. isterial those of work. the tribes not in 74. 5. ^z'/za&a (31 including Alternatively, See also Appendix, Table could have elected a reason classes 3 and 6, which could be either prytany gramma The for the change from elec or see teus from the 450 bouleutai to dikastic magisterial; Kroll 1972, remaining tion lot is obscure, though it prob 34 the ton selected not a pp. 126-147,212-232) and archons. (as epistates prytaneion ably did signal major change in was as lot one of the nine exclud to or a 71. This position known the by proedroi, attitudes record-keeping desire kata after 363/2. his own to serve as the to weaken the Boule. It grammateus prytaneian ing tribe, epista did, however, tes ton Rhodes the selection into See Rhodes 1972, pp. 134-137; Henry proedroi; 1972, p. 25), bring oigrammateis 2002, p. 92. or the whole Boule could have elected line with that of most other offices is not known the time. The latter was more 72. It who elected grammateus every and perhaps efficient since the but it was seems and since the citizens a ten grammateis, presumably easiest, grammateis would have had longer of are a served the whole it is ure. the members the Boule. There Boule, perhaps See Ferguson 1914-1915, p. 395; to reconstruct most All other offices were variety of ways the elec likely. Rhodes 1972, pp. 137-138; Sickinger tion evi elected the so contra process, though without any by Assembly, however, 1999, pp. 141-146; Brillant remain is this could also have been the case for dence all hypothetical. It 1911, pp. 27-28. possible that each tribe elected its grammateis. 338 CLAIRE TAYLOR

ELECTIONS, SORTITION, AND THE CITY ELITE

use as The of the lot not only randomized the selection process, Isokrates once to a (7.23) noted, it also dispersed officeholding wider section of a com society and prevented monopolization of power by city elite.75 The were parison of the two selection methods shows that when elections held, or near were candidates with demotics from the city disproportionately one represented. On the hand, this finding implies that elective offices were particularly attractive to members of city demes. On the other hand, the lack of evidence for electoral corruption suggests that elections were not were not considered worth manipulating and that elected positions highly sought. If the incidence of allegations of corruption ismeaningful, as or other political activities, such speaking in the Assembly representing on more the city an embassy, seem to have been considered important. as a was a was Serving strategos, of course, not negligible activity. It clearly a position that brought influence, attracting many prominent citizens to serve a a for years at time. The possibility of reelection probably played role in ensuring that strategoi hailed disproportionately from city demes. Yet cannot considerations of political power explain why elected grammateis same as display the distributional pattern the strategoi. It may be useful, therefore, to examine the process of election in more detail, that is, to look at the candidates themselves and how the demos voted.

Wealth may have been an important factor in the pursuit of elected were office. There large numbers of candidates in all types of election who were demonstrably wealthy. Even among the grammateis, those who could as were be classified wealthy selected predominantly by election rather than were by lot.76 If those who wealthy and had longstanding associations with more the city were much visible in elective office than in sortitive office, we should perhaps emphasize the competitive aspect of elections, which offered candidates the possibility of demonstrating and accruing political

capital.77 Members of the elite could compete with one another for influence to in the Assembly, but elections allowed them demonstrate this influence further by winning votes. The process of contesting elections should thus was be seen within the context of an agonistic aristocratic culture. It not was necessarily the office that the primary reward (although the office could bestow on the elite the power and influence to which they believed they were entitled), but the acting out of aristocratic values and rivalries no in open competition. It is wonder, therefore, that Aristotle regarded as 75. Headlam 1933, pp. 12-13; Han elections oligarchic. sen 1999, 236. In terms of the there is little evidence to that p. voting itself, very suggest 76. Seven of the nine even a grammateis was considered a (or feature). It is as the office malpractice problem remotely attested wealthy occupied that the number of elected officials from the when election was possible disproportionate city during the period was used. numbers o? and demes achieved through the mobilization of supporters by hetaireiai Large strategoi more candidates for ostracism were also or other such groups, but it ismuch likely to reflect the organization n. wealthy. See also 42, deliberate or underhanded) of voters from the candidates' demonstrably (not necessarily above. or of candidates themselves. it home demes the self-selection Although may 77. For a similar view of ostracism have been worthwhile for elections to the or as see engineering support strategia "a symbolic institution," Forsdyke to see to rid the city of opponents through ostracism, it is difficult why it 2005, pp. 149-165. FROM THE WHOLE CITIZEN BODY? 339

or one an would have been necessary desirable for to manipulate election to were become the grammateus of the Boule.78 Demes close to the city probably well represented not only by candidates but also by voters who outnumbered those from outlying demes. The comparison of elected and selected officials suggests that members were of the city elite overrepresented in positions of elected responsibility, and also provides insight into the electoral behavior of the Athenian demos. were Sara Forsdyke suggests that ostracisms aimed deliberately to include as as more many citizens possible in "the decisions of exile," but those from distant demes may not have found it easy to attend.79 It may have been more difficult for citizens from nonurban demes to compete in elections, either were not or because they themselves based permanently in the city because were move many of their supporters not. Any individual could to the city not and live there, and many did, but this does explain the disproportionate an representation of certain demes in elective offices.80 To be successful in election or to be ostracized, a candidate would need to be well known to or was area. those citizens who voted, whether not he himself from the city or Given the minimal evidence for corruption malpractice, it is perhaps more area plausible that voters from the city cast their votes in elections in greater numbers than did voters from other parts of Attica. assumes This argument that citizens voted predominantly according an to deme ties. Although this may not be unreasonable assumption, it were more is far from demonstrable, and in reality decisions probably far complex. It would be interesting to know whether the composition of the were was Assembly in meetings inwhich elections for office held socially representative, and whether the voting patterns characteristic of those oc were votes were casions replicated when other taken within the Assembly. Unfortunately, detailed evidence for participation in these proceedings is lacking. to It is possible, however, observe the deme of origin of those proposing decrees. Hansen demonstrated that the number of individuals proposing a must a are decree have been great, since high proportion of proposers are attested only once.81 If the surviving decrees representative, Hansens were a common findings suggest that such proposals form of political not a activity dominated by political elite. Comparing these citizens with

78. The was "in nonurban grammateus charge 1993, p. 603; Lawton 1995, p. 26; Low demotics, perhaps implying of all the documents" (Ath.Pol. 54.4) 2005, pp. 102-103. residence in the city for citizens reg was and responsible for recording and 79. Forsdyke 2005, pp. 162-163. istered in other demes. While some decrees as well as are citizens move to displaying checking 80. There many examples of certainly did Athens, was the archives when necessary. This individuals from nonurban demes it is very difficult to assess whether this an in administrative or movement was or occa important job owning property in Athens Piraeus: widespread one was or terms, but that had little political e.g., Demosthenes of Paiania and sional, whether it permanent in or own power comparison with that of the Timotheos of Anaphlystos both had temporary, whether property A have been in in strategoi. grammateus may properties Piraeus (Dein. 1.69; ership both the city and the deme able to decide whether to include a Dem. was common. For some of 49.22). Timarchos of Sphet the diffi relief on a but tos a near culties of sculpture published stele, had house the Acropolis using funerary inscriptions if cost as see presumably only it fell within the (Aischin. 1.97), andThemistokles of evidence for migration, Osborne or allocated by the Assembly itself Phrearrhioi supposedly had one in 1991. an honorand IG II2 31 81. provided by (cf. Melite (Plut. Them. 22.2). Similarly, Hansen 1989a, pp. 112-125. and IG F 156). See further Rhodes many gravestones from the city record 340 CLAIRE TAYLOR

means the general citizen population by of the chi-square test shows that were proposers of decrees not concentrated in the city area, but came from demes throughout Attica.82 The result of the test implies that the Assembly attracted citizens from a very wide area, not just from the city. If decree came corners a proposers from all of Attica and included large number of we citizens, then might assume that the composition of the Assembly was a quite varied. Thus, wide range of citizens both attended and participated was not actively in the Assembly, and the Athenian democracy merely the concern a of privileged few. were Elected offices inAthens held primarily by the wealthier members near of demes the city. Due to the practice of assigning positions to boards to no of officeholders rather than individuals, however, single officeholder a within the democracy wielded vast amount of power. Instead, elections allowed members of the elite to compete with each other and to demonstrate as a a their influence within the demos whole. Elections played dual role in Athenian life: they allowed offices that required particular expertise to a be distributed according to the wishes of the demos, and they permitted highly controlled form of aristocratic competition. on The selection of officials by lot, the other hand, minimized the more geographical bias of elections and allowed citizens from other parts was of Attica to participate in the political process. Since sortition widely used while elections were Athenian life is 82. The is comparatively scarce, political value of chi-square vote. as in the cases discussed perhaps better characterized by the lot than by the popular The lot 1.55; above, more encour the value would have to exceed 3.84 distributed political power throughout Attica effectively and in to be an was a order for the null hypothesis aged hoi bouloumenoi to take active part in public affairs. It system inwhich nonurban citizens and Aristotle s rejected. could, did, participate widely.83 83. Ruschenbusch 1994, p. 190; was a in ancient observation that the lot democratic element Greek politics and to a lesser extent, Hansen 1989c, iswell substantiated by the evidence presented here. pp. 80-84. APPENDIX THE CHI-$QUARE TEST

a measures The chi-square goodness-of-fit test is statistical test that the a set a set departure of of observed values from corresponding of expected not measure or values.84 It does degrees of association interrelationship between variables, but rather the likelihood that the relationship apparent in the data (here, the relationship between deme of origin and officehold not a ing) is result of sampling variation. The calculation the of a null that requires setting hypothesis (HQ), is, a no test hypothesis of association, that the seeks to disprove. In this case, states that there is no between deme of and office H0 relationship origin states that there is a holding. H2 (its opposite) relationship. the use of the we can either or Through chi-square test, accept reject HQ is by asking how likely it that, for example, the observed number o? strategoi our from various demes in sample is typical of the distribution of the citizen was a population of Attica from which it drawn. The analysis necessitates number of historical and mathematical assumptions. First, it is assumed that bouleutic quotas are representative of the distribution of the citizen population of Attica, which is therefore recoverable within certain limits. Second, the data must be collected in the form of counts and be divided into mutually exclusive categories. Third, underlying the calculation is the assumption that the sample is typical rather than unusual. as The formula for chi-square is follows:

1=1 L;

0.= the observed number of officeholders in any category (expressed as category i) = E. the expected number of officeholders in any category = k the number of categories (i.e., the number of cells in the table)

For example, the chi-square calculation for strategoi (see Table 3, above) is as follows: 84. See esp. Blalock 1972, pp. 275 295; Handel 1978, pp. 310-319; Siegel and Castellan 1988, pp. 49,123-124; (41-27.92)2 + (70-83.08)2 Shennan 1997, pp. 104-121. 27.92 83.08 342 CLAIRE TAYLOR

TABLE 5. POLITICALLY ACTIVE CITIZENS FROM THE CITY (AND VICINITY) AND THE REST OF ATTICA

Attested Number

(ExpectedNumber)

Political Figures "City" Rest ofAttica Total Chi-square* Ostracism candidates 47 55 102 23.72 (25.66) (76.34) Dikasts 17 56 73 0.13 (18.36) (54.64) Grammateis 24 39 63 5.60 (before363) (15.85) (47.15) Grammateis 5 27 32 1.54 (after363) (8.05) (23.95)

at a *The theoretical value of chi-square significance level of 0.05 with 1 degree of free dom is 3.84.

The chi-square value calculated must then be tested for statistical significance by determining what level of risk is appropriate and the degrees of freedom associated with the sample. In this instance the level of risk or is 0.05 standard that if is true there significance (a choice, meaning HQ a as a is only 5% risk of the data showing the observed pattern result of are chance variation). The degrees of freedom determined by subtracting one from the number of cells in the table; here, because there are two cells one in the table there is degree of freedom. Statistics textbooks provide a one reference table to find the corresponding value for chi-square with degree of freedom at the 0.05 significance level.85 This figure (3.84) is then compared with the value calculated. can If the calculated value is larger, chi-square be said to be statistically and must be If the calculated value is the significant, H0 rejected. smaller, cannot null hypothesis be rejected. For strategoi, chi-square is 8.19, which is than 3.84. is there is a larger Therefore H0 rejected; statistically significant relationship between deme of origin and officeholding for strategoi. The case opposite is the for tamiai: chi-square is 0.36, which is less than 3.84, that the null must stand. meaning hypothesis 85. Shennan 1997 is the most acces Table 5 the data on which the calculations discussed above presents sible textbook for nonmathematicians; and summarized inTable 4 are based. see esp. pp. 422-423, table F. FROM THE WHOLE CITIZEN BODY? 343

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Claire Taylor

University of Manchester

department of classics and ancient history

school of arts, histories, and cultures oxford road

manchester mi3 9pl united kingdom

[email protected]