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Asymmetric and Terrorist Attacks with Chemical Weapons

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Asymmetric and Terrorist Attacks with Chemical Weapons CSIS_______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 Updates from: CSIS.ORG, “Homeland Defense” Comments to: [email protected] DEFENDING AMERICA ASYMMETRIC AND TERRORIST ATTACKS WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy SEPTEMBER 24, 2001 Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. CSIS Homeland Defense: Asymmetric Warfare & Terrorism 10/15/01 Page ii Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Linnea Raines, Andrew Li, Preston Golson. and Aviva Roller for their assistance in researching and editing this report Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. CSIS Homeland Defense: Asymmetric Warfare & Terrorism 10/15/01 Page iii Table of Contents i TYPES OF ATTACK: DETERMINING FUTURE METHODS OF ATTACK AND THE NEEDED RESPONSE..................................................................................................................................................................1 ILLUSTRATIVE ATTACK SCENARIOS ..........................................................................................................................3 “CONVENTIONAL” MEANS OF ATTACK .....................................................................................................................6 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION............................................................................................................................8 CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS MEANS OF ATTACK............................................................................................15 THE IMPACT AND VARIETY OF POSSIBLE CHEMICAL WEAPONS..............................................................................15 THE PROBABLE LETHALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CHEMICAL ATTACKS.............................................................17 METHODS OF DELIVERY ..........................................................................................................................................21 DETECTION AND INTERCEPTION ..............................................................................................................................22 ACQUIRING CHEMICAL WEAPONS ...........................................................................................................................23 The Impact of Technological Change ................................................................................................................25 The Aum Shinrikyo Case Study ..........................................................................................................................27 Political and Psychological Effects....................................................................................................................29 THE PROBLEM OF RESPONSE ...................................................................................................................................30 China ......................................................................................................................................................................... 36 India........................................................................................................................................................................... 36 Iran............................................................................................................................................................................. 36 Iraq............................................................................................................................................................................. 37 Libya.......................................................................................................................................................................... 37 North Korea............................................................................................................................................................... 37 Pakistan...................................................................................................................................................................... 38 Russia ........................................................................................................................................................................ 38 Syria........................................................................................................................................................................... 38 Sudan......................................................................................................................................................................... 38 Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. CSIS Homeland Defense: Asymmetric Warfare & Terrorism 10/15/01 Page iv List of Charts, Tables, and Figures Table 4.1......................................................................................................................................................................11 Key Characteristics of Weapons of Mass Destruction -Part One ................................................................................11 Table 4.1......................................................................................................................................................................13 Key Characteristics of Weapons of Mass Destruction -Part Two................................................................................13 Table 4.2......................................................................................................................................................................14 The Comparative Effects of Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear Weapons Delivered ................................................14 Against a Typical Urban Target ..................................................................................................................................14 Table 4.3......................................................................................................................................................................36 US Department of Defense Estimate of Potential National Threats Intentions Involving Chemical Weapons...........36 Table 4.4......................................................................................................................................................................40 Key Chemical Weapons –Part One .............................................................................................................................40 Table 4.4......................................................................................................................................................................41 Key Chemical Weapons –Part Two.............................................................................................................................41 Chart 4.1 –Part One .....................................................................................................................................................42 The Relative Killing Effect of Chemical Weapons Under Different Conditions of Aerosol Delivery........................42 Chart 4.1 – Part Two....................................................................................................................................................43 The Relative Casualty Effect of Chemical Weapons Under Military Conditions .......................................................43 Chart 4.1 – Part Three..................................................................................................................................................44 Exclusion Areas for Release from Bulk Tank of Hazardous Chemicals .....................................................................44 Copyright CSIS, all rights reserved. CSIS Homeland Defense: Asymmetric Warfare & Terrorism 10/15/01 Page 1 Types of Attack: Determining Future Methods of Attack and the Needed Response The US must plan its Homeland defense policies and programs for a future in which there is no way to predict the weapon that will be used or the method chosen to deliver a weapon which can range from a small suicide attack by an American citizen to the covert delivery of a nuclear weapon by a foreign state. There is no reason the US should assume that some convenient Gaussian curve or standard deviation, will make small or medium level attacks a higher priority over time than more lethal forms. The US government is still deciding how to come to grips with these problems and how to assess possible methods of attack. A GAO report that summarized CIA and FBI views on these issues reached the following conclusions, although it must be stressed that the analysis focused on the normal historical pattern of actions by terrorists/extremists, and largely excluded attacks by state actors, proxy attacks, or covert attacks:1 The possibility that terrorists may use chemical or biological materials may increase over the next decade, according to intelligence agencies. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), interest among non- state actors, including terrorists, in biological and chemical materials is real and growing and the number of potential perpetrators is increasing. The CIA also noted that many such groups have international networks and do not need to be tied to state sponsors for financial and technical support. Nonetheless, the CIA continues to believe that terrorists are less likely to use chemical and biological weapons than
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