The Role of Foreign Actors in Libya: the Case of President Macron’S Enigmatic Libya Policy

ANALYSIS 273 January 2021

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN ACTORS IN LIBYA: THE CASE OF PRESIDENT MACRON’S ENIGMATIC LIBYA POLICY

Abdennour Toumi ANALİZ Konu Başlığı Ocak 2021 26

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Publication Date: 31 January 2021

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THE ROLE OF FOREIGN ACTORS IN LIBYA: THE CASE OF PRESIDENT MACRON’S ENIGMATIC LIBYA POLICY

About Author

Abdennour Toumi

Abdennour Toumi, a journalist and a North African Studies expert at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), received his PhD in Toulouse University Political Science department. His articles are published in the National Turkish newspaper Daily Sabah English. He worked as a lecturer at Portland Community College in the Department of Middle Eastern and North African studies. He was the reporter at Maghreb & France Arab Daily News. Currently, he is the member of Paris France Arab-American Journalists Association and Chicago IL USA. Mr. Toumi focuses on North Africa’s socio-political mutation, the role of Turkey in the region, immigration issues and North African diaspora in France. CONTENTS

3 INTRODUCTION

4 FRANCE ACCUSES TURKEY OF VIOLATING ARMS EMBARGOES IN LIBYA

5 WHAT DOES PRESIDENT MACRON NEED FROM THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES?

7 FRANCE’S MILITARY PRESENCE IN LIBYA

10 FRANCE AND LIBYA FACE OFF IN CHAD’S CIVIL WAR

11 LIBYANS TALK AND TALK BUT DO NOT BUY

14 CONCLUSION INTRODUCTION

FRANCE ACCUSES TURKEY OF VIOLATING rance’s foreign policy has been orchestrated a prudent foreign policy in office, ARMS EMBARGOES IN LIBYA F known for its realism and stead- which matched his character and a long-run- fastness under all presidents of the ning course of realpolitik designed by the first French Fifth Republic.1 However, President socialist President François Mitterrand in the Emmanuel Macron has shifted his foreign po- ‘80’s and early ‘90’s. licy towards idealism unlike his predecessor Francois Hollande, a paradigm that can put Unlike his late predecessors and despite France’s foreign policy goals in the MENA his own constitutional attributes, foreign policy region at great risk. The risk stems from the was not related directly to President Macron’s challenges which idealism presents to the persona. Similarly, he did not place much em- domestic political imperatives. phasis on it during his presidential campaign in 2017, although he adopted a constructive President Macron is haunted by the ghosts position on the E.U., a contrastingly aggres- of one-term presidents like his predeces- sive one on Syria and a preemptive defense sors President Nicolas Sarkozy and Presi- policy in the Sahel, notably in Mali. He even dent François Hollande. President Macron, paid a visit to the French troops stationed in however, has taken over an unusual determi- Northern Mali on his very first day in office. nant and objective of foreign policy from his mentor and predecessor, former President Does President Macron really have a for- François Hollande. President Hollande had eign policy in Libya? According to history

1 “How French Government Works”, Gouvernement.fr, https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/how-government-works, 2020.

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and geopolitics, France should. latest verbal escalation between Nonetheless, President Macron the two countries’ presidents has been displaying a style that over the French president’s dec- is likely to push France into iso- larations on Islam and his poli- lation because of his foreign cies with Muslims in France have affairs and European minister, worsened the relations between Jean-Yves Le Drian. For instance, the two countries. in his anti-Turkey rhetorical style in the last couple of months, FRANCE ACCUSES while Turkey is a NATO ally and TURKEY OF VIOLATING a major intelligence and military ARMS EMBARGOES IN asset in the MENA region to fight LIBYA the IS Organization in Syria and Beyond the maritime inci- Iraq, Ankara was infuriated about dent, during a press meeting undiplomatic French foreign af- last July the French Ministry of fairs minister statements about Armed Forces said: “At the bot- At the bottom of the Operation Peace Spring last tom of the case, there are repea- the case, there fall. Last summer, with the naval ted violations of the embargo by are repeated incident between France and Turkey and a record of falsificati- violations of Turkey on June 10 off the Libyan ons and trafficking.” Paris indeed the embargo coast - the Frigate Courbet in- denounced the Turkish military by Turkey and cident - France accused Turkey intervention in Libya alongside a record of and took the case to a high in- the government of national unity falsifications stance of NATO and did call the (GNA) of Tripoli, led by Premier 2 and trafficking. EU Commission for more sanc- Fayez Al-Sarraj recognized by tions against Turkey. the U.N., and France protested before participating again in Op- With the latest tensions in eration Sea Guardian. the Eastern Mediterranean, in which France explicitly sided In order to better understand with Greece following Turkey’s France’s foreign policy in Libya, gas drilling mission in the Med- it must be put into perspective. iterranean, the tension is over For a long time, Paris had an gas reserves and maritime rights ambiguous relationship with the and has prompted fears that Al-Qaddafi regime. Over the last tensions could escalate further century and a half, France has between the two neighboring never had a coherent strategy countries. Hence, Paris is bring- in Libya. French authorities have ing down 71 years of principles been inconsistent and impatient of collective security since the with this territory that acts as a creation of NATO and since the kind of black hole for its MENA adhesion of Turkey in 1952. The foreign policy framework. The

2 ”Libya’s PM Fayez Al-Sarraj Reportedly Set To Resign”, Middle East Eye, 16 September 2020.

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history of Franco-Libyan relations is littered In desperate attempts President Macron with diplomatic about-faces and they are less wants to bring together the two main bellig- a sign of an in-depth understanding of the lo- erents in the Libyan armed conflict, LNA chief cal realities than a sign of French single-mind- Khalifa Haftar and the GNA Premier Fayaz edness in arbitrary or distorted interpretations Mustafa Al-Sarraj. However, President Ma- of Libyan politics. cron’s latest initiative, is too little and too late because of his ambiguous and paradoxical The relations between the two countries policy in Libya. President Macron domestical- resembles a revival of Napoleonism while the ly is facing serious socioeconomic challenges French return to Libya is a strategic imperative following the impact of COVID-19 crisis mis- according to President Macron. However, re- management, which has added as another lations between Paris and Tripoli deteriorated layer to the narrative in his presidential sto- in 2019 only to worsen from the full support ry-line campaign populist discourse in 2022. of Khalifa Haftar by France. Meanwhile France has been endorsing the legal government Such an initiative existed already in the (GNA) in Tripoli led by Fayaz Al-Sarraj, head of frame of 5+5 Mediterranean dialogue creat- the legitimate government recognized by the ed in 1990 in Rome as a sub-regional system, international community. a security initiative to secure closer cooper- ation between the five Western Mediterra- In May 2018, France hosted a meeting in nean E.U. member states and the five Arab Paris bringing together Libya’s four principal Maghreb countries. This was enhanced by the competing leaders to endorse a roadmap for Euro-Mediterranean conference in Barcelona the country’s stalled peace process. This was in 1992.3 to be sanctioned by key external stakehold- ers, including the U.N. The proposed draft WHAT DOES PRESIDENT MACRON agreement called for Libya to organize elec- NEED FROM THE NEIGHBORING tions by the end of 2018, support adoption of a COUNTRIES? constitutional framework, reintegrate military “This re-engagement of the Libyan neigh- forces through the ongoing Egypt-led secu- bors is essential in the long-term,” said Presi- rity dialogue and reunify financial institutions. dent Macron in his speech to the United Na- Thus, in September, President Macron, tions General Assembly. He did not, however, considering his yearly UNGA speech, an- name which countries he wanted to involve in nounced that he wanted to gather together the talks or elaborate on the details. Follow- all of Libya’s neighboring countries to help ing the 2015 Shkirat Agreement, Morocco has, find a solution to the country’s conflict. “This is to some extent, excelled in reviving this ac- the initiative that France wishes to lead in the cord, despite its rejection by Haftar last sum- coming weeks in conjunction with the Secre- mer. Yet Rabat has launched another round of tary General of the United Nations, bringing peace talks last September in the Bouznika together all the neighboring countries to help meeting in the province of Casablanca under bring about the Libyan solution,” said Presi- the auspices of UN Interim Libya Special En- dent Macron. voy, Stephanie T. Williams. This is to revive the

3 “The Barcelona Process Or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership”, Barcelona.com, https://www.barcelona.com/barcelona_news/ the_barcelona_process_or_euro_mediterranean_partnership#:~:text=The%20Barcelona%20Process%20or%20Euro%2DMediter- ranean%20Partnership%20(Euromed),the%20Mashriq%20and%20Maghreb%20regions., 2020.

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Libyan Political Dialogue Forum

spirit of the Skhirat Agreement, byan dialogue in Bouznika, re- bringing again the Libyans’ polit- lated to the unification of the ical rivals to the negotiation table sovereign positions included in in Rabat. A peace talks process Article 15 of the Libyan Political is taking place between Tunis, Agreement signed in Skhirat. Tunisia and Tangier, Morocco. This peace process could be Libya has been in a state of cha- a breakthrough if all sides stick The last time os since 2011 and divided since the peace talks 2014 between rival factions in to their promises, especially the process was the east and west, with major in- Eastern side. As the United Nati- about a political stitutions also split or controlled ons has taken the leading role in process but this by armed groups. bringing all parties to the negotiating table to discuss the po- new round of Recently, Moroccan Foreign peace process litical solution, it seems the UN Minister Nasser Bourita has said is trying to include a wide range talks seems to that Libyan members of Par- of people, bringing all different look to resolve liament meeting in Moroccan parties together without exclu- the military Tangiers will decide the date ding any groups and is learning issues such and place of the coming mee- a lesson from the past. as the role of tings expected to take place in foreign fighters Libya. He will strive to unify po- The last time the peace talks in Libya. sitions on the outcomes of the process was about a political Libyan political dialogue, hoping process but this new round of it would lead to a thaw between peace process talks seems to the parties after years of division. look to resolve the military is- The Moroccan Foreign Minister sues such as the role of foreign explained that this meeting was fighters in Libya. The issue of a reaffirmation of the understan- foreign fighters is a key factor in dings reached by the Libyan-Li- deepening the conflict further,

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and that is why this time it is different than the legitimate government of Premier Fayaz Mus- earlier ones. tafa Al-Sarraj, the Chairman of the Presiden- tial Council of Libya and the Head of National On the other hand, Algeria has been try- Accord Government formed on 17 December ing extremely hard since the election of Pres- 2015 in the country’s capital Tripoli. ident Tebboune in December 2019 in Tunisia and has fully supported a peace process and France has been involved in the Libyan a political solution in Libya. Last June, Egypt conflict since the beginning of the Libyan up- did launch a peace initiative in Libya that was rising against the Al-Qaddafi regime in 2011, supported by France, the US, the United King- which led to the ousting of the Colonel Mua- dom, Russia, Greece, Italy, the United Arab mmar Al-Qaddafi. France played a significant Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, Alge- role in his capture, according to French mili- ria, the Arab League, and the African Union. tary sources that were responsible for target- ing the Libyan leader’s convoy, which led to In November, in the Tunisian town of Gam- his capture and summary execution by the marth, Libya’s rival factions met for another rebel forces. round of a peace talks process brokered by the United Nations Mission in Libya. The goal An investigation by the French newspaper, “Le Monde” in February 2016 revealed has been to outline a roadmap to presidential that France had secretly deployed its special and parliamentary elections in the country. forces and the operational arm, called “ser- However, since the fall of the Libyan lead- vice action”, of the French General Directorate er and the takeover of operations by NATO of External Security (DGSE) for very precise forces, France has had three Presidents, Pres- strikes against targets designated as affiliates idents Sarkozy, Hollande, and the current of the Islamic State in Libya. Its aim was to President Macron, whose foreign affairs min- contain the eventual development of the IS ister was President Hollande’s defense min- Organization threat in Libya. ister. The situation got worse under President Although Paris never acknowledged of- Hollande and today it has become clear that ficially providing weapons, training, -intel Paris is not shying away from taking a side in ligence, and Special Forces assistance to the bloody conflict in Libya. Khalifa Haftar, it seems that Paris had been in- FRANCE’S MILITARY PRESENCE IN volved probably since 2015 in training Haftar’s LIBYA military forces. Paris, under the orders of its Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian, cur- In the context of the Libyan civil war, the rently minister of foreign affairs, had decid- French have a military presence in the North ed that Khalifa Haftar would be Libya’s next African state. This is no secret to anyone, de- strongman to rule the country. Yet the latest spite all efforts by the French ministries of de- developments on the ground are showing fense and foreign affairs to hide the fact about the opposite.4 The death of three undercov- French military and intelligence presence in er French soldiers in a helicopter crash in Libya. They are supporting Haftar, a dual cit- Libya in 2016 while conducting an operation izen (Libyan and American), and the ongoing against an “Islamist” group suddenly revealed military struggle between his troops and the France’s secret presence in Libya.

4 “Haftar Losing Battles In Libya’s Civil War”, The Media Line, 23 December 2020.

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On the other hand, Khalifa Haftar has made ment with the Emirati, Saudi, and Egyptian re- no secret of the deal with France nor about gimes, to whom it has sold billions of dollars the modern weaponry he had received from of weapons and who back Haftar. Paris and the UAE during his debacle march The three Arab countries distrust Al-Sar- to Tripoli in Spring 2019. This was despite a raj’s Tripoli-based government because of U.N. arms embargo on Libya. In fact, Khalifa the support it receives from Turkey and Qatar. Haftar’s spokesman revealed at a press con- Also, according to French reasoning, the conference that a French naval force had docked flict in Libya relates to the fight against “Islam- at the Sidra oil terminal with the specific task ic” terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel belt and the of protecting the oil fields from attacks by Is- continued struggle against terrorism at home, lamists or by forces loyal to the Tripoli Gov- and, more importantly, to fight political Islam ernment. in the region. The spokesman said that the French task force was composed of French military of- Backed by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi ficers specializing in aviation and that their Arabia, Russia and Egypt, the “strongman” of number was in the dozens. He noted that the the east recently is facing a challenge from 5 French contingent had emptied the port’s wa- Aquilla Salah, the head of the eastern Liby- ter storage containers to fill them with fuel. an parliament in Tobruk. Khalifa Haftar feels He further elaborated that Haftar’s forces en- emboldened by the support of important re- joyed Emirati, Egyptian, and French support gional players, or proxy players, who are giv- mainly in the form of intelligence assistance ing him legitimacy, France is said to be one of and special forces stationed in Al-Kharruba them, although Paris publicly denies support- base (east of Benghazi, in the middle of Cyre- ing Khalifa Haftar. naica), six kilometers from a separate Libyan On the ground, however, the situation is military base. far from certain. Khalifa Haftar has urged his As the situation has unfolded in the Arab troops to inflict “an even harder” lesson on press, France’s stance on the Libyan conflict forces loyal to the country’s internationally is unclear. One of President Macron’s first dip- recognized government. They have put up a lomatic initiatives as president in 2017 was to counter-offensive in the south and east, de- invite the two competing heads of govern- spite a fragile cease fire that exists between ment in Libya, Fayaz Al-Sarraj (Government of the Libyan armed rivals. Khalifa Haftar’s mi- National Accord) and Haftar (Libyan National litias, however, have violated the agreement Army), to try to broker a power-sharing deal. for the fourth time since it was declared last month. Now, as Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian was the architect of the “behind Haftar” Then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in strategy, he has convinced president Macron the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, fully sup- that he should bet on Haftar rather than on ported his country in the 2011 NATO-coalition Al-Sarraj. France is the second importer of military intervention in Libya.6 Thus, France as Libyan oil and this could be tied to Paris’ align- a pivotal European state ended up with the

5 “France Concedes Haftar In Libya Is A ‘Liability”, Anatolian Agency, 6 July 2020. 6 “Obama scolds Sarkozy over Libya”, Thelocal.fr, https://www.thelocal.fr/20160311/obama-scolds-sarkozy-over-libya , 11 March 2016.

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The 2011 NATO-coalition military intervention in Libya

decisions made by super-pow- acting “hypocritically” by collab- ers that aligned with the national orating with authoritarian and security interests of the non-Ar- corrupted regimes. However, The French ab regional power countries like considering President Sarkozy’s approach Turkey and Israel in the east- relations with the Libyan leader,8 towards its ern Mediterranean. In 2008, the France adopted a leading role in allies in the Mediterranean Union became a the military and intelligence in- region was full potential instrument of the dear tervention in Libya in 2011. Thus, of rhetorical and individual efforts of Presi- the French approach towards and cautionary dent Sarkozy who attempted to its allies in the region was full discourses, and accelerate the process across of rhetorical and cautionary never towards neighboring countries. This proj- discourses, and never towards “regime change,” ect was fruitless7 because of the “regime change,” despite the despite the high stake of heterogeneous overwhelming lack of legitimacy overwhelming strategic interests of fifteen dif- and credibility of those regimes. ferent Mediterranean countries lack of The reaction of Paris to the including Libya and Turkey. legitimacy and popular revolts in Tunisia and credibility of In the face of France’s real- Egypt was bound by a “wait-and- those regimes. politik stance on the MENA re- see” approach despite growing gion before and during the Arab opposition towards the Arab re- uprisings, Paris was accused of gimes. For instance, Madame Al-

7 “25 Years Of The Barcelona Process”, Union For The Mediterranean, 2020. 8 “Former French Leader Nicolas Sarkozy Haunted By Gaddafi’s Spy”, TRT World, 25 February 2019.

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liot Marie, then-foreign minister coalition who were implement- in President Sarkozy’s cabinet, ing Paris’ foreign policy. This was had made the remarkable sug- under a “socialist” president and gestion to equip Tunisian police foreign affairs minister Laurent with metal sticks and modern Fabius. helmets during the Jasmine up- rising against President Ben Ali. FRANCE AND LIBYA FACE According to Mme. Secretary OFF IN CHAD’S CIVIL Alliot Marie who offered French WAR “savoir-fer” before the MPs in Chad’s civil war (1979-1986) the French Parliament in Janu- was turning into an international ary 2011, it was a law-and-order confrontation, with France and 9 matter for the police to resolve. Libya as major foreign players. Libya had occupied a par- Libyan-backed rebels of former Al-Qaddafi ticular place in French foreign President Goukhouni Woddei swept down from the North in a warned that, policy, when viewed from the major attempt to overthrow the ‘’All foreign historical relations between the government of Hassan Habré. To intervention two countries. Paris’ foreign policy became trapped between stop them, France, as the former in Chad will two ways of thinking, like the colonial power in the northern be considered diplomats in Quai d’Orsay or like central Sahelian African coun- by us as an act the thinkers and the designers in try, has moved quickly to sup- of war against Parisian Ivy schools (l’E.N.A. and ply President Habré with mod- Libya.’ Sciences Po), universities and ern weapons, troop trucks, fuel, think-tanks. Thus, the Gaullists and spare parts, as well as an and the Atlanticists guided Paris’ undisclosed number of “civilian foreign policy orientation. experts.’’ President François Mit- terrand warned on a trip to Cam- The ideologue Atlanticists, eroon that, ‘’France must repeat, however, have defended a for- that it cannot accept reckless eign policy close to Washington actions that would make Chad rather than seeking an indepen- fall prey to foreign adventures.”11 dent foreign policy, pushing for an idealist E.U. common foreign Libyan leader Muammar policy.10 This was so, for instance, Al-Qaddafi’s next move was un- when the U.S. was searching known, but some thought he for allies to intervene in Syria in may send his troops into Chad 2013. Paris did not hesitate to just as he did in 1980.12 ‘’We have participate with an international no intention of intervening,’’ he

9 “French Foreign Minister Alliot-Marie Quits Over Tunisia”, BBC News, 27 February 2011. 10 “Libya’s Lessons On Syria”, Foreign Policy, 4 September 2013. 11 William Echikson, “France and Libya facing off in Chad’s civil war”, Christian Science Monitor, 8 July 1983. 12 “Libya/Chad: Beyond Political Influence”, Crisis Group, 23 March 2010.

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told the French newspaper “Le Matin.” But the French admit that intervention this time Al-Qaddafi warned that, ‘’All foreign interven- around is no more likely to create a lasting tion in Chad will be considered by us as an peace than the last time. act of war against Libya.’ and he added that he thinks the United States is trying to broad- LIBYANS TALK AND TALK BUT DO en the conflict by pushing Zaire, Sudan, and NOT BUY Egypt to intervene.13 The recent relations between the two countries can be summed up in three sym- But the French were also worried about bolic dates, representing the milestones of a Libyan adventurism and a possible escalation realpolitik that is now closing in like a trap on on Al-Qaddafi’s part. The Libyan leader had Libya as much as on France. long talked of creating a “Pan-Islamic”14 em- pire stretching across the Sahara and French • 2007, a Sarkozy-Gaddafi “honeymoon” pe- officials said installing Mr. Woddei as Chad’s riod, as a U.S. ambassador put it. leader would be a first step toward this goal. • 2010, the moment of lost illusions has ar- Such a design would threaten Egypt and Su- rived, as demonstrated by the unvarnished dan and both countries have joined France in comment of a French diplomat: “The Liby- announcing that they are prepared to ‘’take ans, they talk, they talk but they don’t buy measures’’ if the Libyan-backed intervention anything (from us)”.15 of Chad continues. • 2011, war - at France’s initiative. Libyan meddling in sub-Saharan Africa also scares Francophone West Africa. But The French highlight how Al-Qaddafi was most of West Africa is looking to France for so recently, unambiguously and largely un- protection from the Libyans. According to the successfully courted for his wealth before French weekly magazine “Le Point,” the Pres- suddenly becoming a despot. He was worthy ident of Guinea, Ahmed Sekou Touré, phoned of odium against whom Paris has led what the Élysée Palace in Paris last week and re- interior minister and Sarkozy insider, Claude minded a top adviser to President Mitterrand, Guéant, controversially called a “crusade.” The ‘’France has its responsibilities with regard to outcome of this appears increasingly uncer- its former colonies.’’ Politically, Chad is a sad tain. story. Since it became independent in 1960, it The ambassador describes, not without has lapsed into civil war after civil war. The ba- irony, the “honeymoon” former President sic division is between the Muslim north and Nicolas Sarkozy enjoyed with the Libyan the Christian and animist south. But personal leader during a visit by the French president and tribal animosities played a larger role in to Tripoli on July 25th, 2007. The title of the ca- recent developments. ble is unambiguous: “President Sarkozy’s Trip Considering Chad’s history and its ram- to Libya sets High hopes for Lucrative Con- bunctious northern neighbor, however, even tracts.” 16

13 “Mot Clé: Zaïre 1971-1997”, Le Monde Diplomatique, October 2020. 14 Kim Willsher, “France’s Foreign Minister Did Speak To Tunisian President While On Holiday”, the Guardian, 16 February 2011. 15 “Special Briefing Via Telephone with Richard Norland, U.S. Ambassador To Libya”, U.S. Embassy In Libya, 5 June 2020. 16 “French ‘honeymoon’ to war: what US cables said about French courtship of Gaddafi”, Mediapart, 30 March 2011.

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The ambassador continued, “Sarkozy’s ufacturer Alstom in the transport sector. Ac- effort to derive real commercial gain from cording to the U.S cable, his newfound relationship with Libyan lead- “Franco-Libyan commitments to build a er Al-Qaddafi is partly intended to make up “nuclear reactor” for water desalination and ground believed lost to the United States to cooperate in the civilian nuclear field were and others since Libya’s rehabilitation in late clearly closely monitored and were the sub- 2003.”17 ject of several U.S. State Department reports The cable mentioned the signing of an in 2007 and 2008.” agreement between the Libyan regime and Bab Al-Aziziya is the site that was bombed Serge Dassault, head of Dassault Group, the by U.S. planes in April 1986, at a time when French civil and military aeronautics firm. This Libya topped the list of rogue states. Ever was for the renovation of twelve Dassault Mi- since the bombing, Al-Qaddafi had displayed rage-F1 fighter planes. These is the very same it as a kind of revolutionary trophy. The bomb Dassault whose jets are today bombing Libya. impacts remain visible on the walls of the That diplomatic cable also mentioned sever- compound. al other framework trade agreements signed during the French president’s visit. For exam- Although known for his strong pro-U.S. ap- ple, this includes French nuclear conglomer- proach, it was in this compound that, in 2007, ate Areva, which is expected to benefit from Sarkozy made a number of trade agreements the warmer relations between France and with Libya, posing for photographs with Col- Libya, as do other French groups such as the onel Al-Qaddafi in front of the shell-ridden petrol company Total and engineering man- walls.18

Emmanuel Macron

17 “From ‘Honeymoon’ To War: What US Cables Said About French Courtship Of Gaddafi”, Mediapart, 30 March 2011. 18 “Sarkozy Meets Gaddafi, Defense Partnership Sealed”, Reuters, 25 July 2007.

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France is pushing for regional military sup- Algiers. This was led by businessmen and for- port in the Sahel, which is part of its national mer intelligence generals. It feels like Paris security imperatives and hegemony. But the and Algiers have been enjoying a love/hate proposed special forces are causing more relationship trajectory and this is going to harm than good. The U.S. special forces are end. Certainly, it will have a direct echo with doing the heavy lifting in terms of intelligence, France’s role in Libya, the military in Algiers sharing their information with Algeria, a pivotal are not going to let Paris use Libya and even- state in the Sahel and North Africa with Egypt tually the Sahel as France’s rear base. and Morocco.

Subsequently, Paris is showing concerns The situation of turmoil in Libya and the about Algeria that it is in a historical turning Sahel needs a new paradigm that will be set point, notably in the aftermath of the purge tactically and strategically and adding to the operation launched by the military in Algiers turmoil is the fact that thousands of migrants against the so-called “French connection” in are crossing to Europe.

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CONCLUSION conflict do not respect the arms embargo on Libya and that all the foreign parties menti- Paris does not have much room left in the oned support armed groups that have com- aftermath of the fall of all the western cities mitted grave human rights violations. The two into the hands of the GNA forces. Yet, Par- camps, the Government of National Accord, is does have to review its foreign policy in based in Tripoli, and the Libyan National Army, Libya and “moonlight” for solutions with the led by Hiftar and based in Benghazi are both main super and regional powers. This is in- supported by foreign combatants, notably stead of pursuing its enigmatic foreign policy from Syria and the Sudan. Syria has also in- as in President Macron’s double-game tactic tervened and sent a military plane to support which he is playing in Yemen, Syria and Libya. Hiftar, probably at Russia’s request. The new military dynamics developed after the major developments on the ground and Here is another enigmatic element of all of these peace talks initiatives that are try- French diplomacy since President Macron ing to reach a breakthrough. Developments took office in May 2017. “Macron advocated for following the election of a new administration smooth diplomacy, which is turning into inac- in the U.S would be a game changer in the tion,” Prof. Emmanuel Dupuy said. In this com- dynamics of the nine-year Libyan armed con- plex geopolitical game, France once again flict, which would make it even more complex has thus systematically missed its second for Paris’s diplomatic contradiction. chance after the Libyan fiasco in 2011.

Paris has always played a double-game in Paris’ intelligence and military presence in the Libya crisis since its military engagement Libya, like in Syria, has become irrelevant. This in April 2011. It is an absolute paradox that is, while their presence officially was aimed shows the delinquency of its timid military to fight against the IS organization and illegal action and diplomacy, a paradoxical foreign migration and human trafficking, it turned to policy that is personified by Foreign Affairs support of a renegade military commander. Minister Le Drian, who was also President Hol- This renegade military commander’s se forc- lande’s defense minister. On the other hand, es are committing war crimes as a 14-month Emmanuel Dupuy, the president of IPSE, Par- battle for the military conquest of the Libyan is, said, “France’s military presence becomes a capital and the overthrow a legitimate gov- de facto element of increasing insecurity for ernment recognized by international gov- our own troops.” Adopting a more construc- ernments including the French government! tive approach in spite of absolutely taking a France also does this in Syria, supporting side could contribute to further isolation and separatists (Democratic Syrian Forces), which jeopardize France’s national security. Nev- proves how limited its vision and influence in ertheless, the result sounds worrisome and Libya and Syria are. is shaping Paris’ concern about the Jihadists’ The “moral-politik” principle of France’s for- dispersion from the Sahel 19 eign policy is damaging the credibility of the President Macron has remained strangely country and its foreign policy determinants silent too over the fact that all parties to the and principles, France’s Droits-de-l’homme

19 “Terrorism: France’s International Action”, France Diplomacy - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, https://www.diploma- tie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/terrorism-france-s-international-action/, 2020.

14 www.orsam.org.tr Abdennour Toumi

(Human rights).20 An imperative is questioning that has already mourned many atrocities and Paris’ independent foreign policy in the MENA wars. region, notably in the Maghreb, while respect- The strategic landscape is evolving so ing the international law and non-govern- mental organizations like MdM (Médecins du quickly that President Macron should take the Monde) and MSF (Médecins sans Frontières), future of the new Libya into consideration. The and the ongoing conditions in Libya and Syr- true evolution, however, is driven by the Turks ia, won’t let Paris revive President Sarkozy’s who have put themselves in a very strong Mediterranean Union project either. The re- position with the Italians and the Germans, cent eastern Mediterranean Basin’s offshore negotiating overtly. The Turks are also coor- natural gas prospects have roused tensions dinating with the Americans and holding the between the five main countries that Paris Russians back, while imposing new imper- sees as potential allies to contain Ankara’s ex- atives in NATO. However, when negotiating ploration projects and role. with the French, one must speak to his adver- saries/enemies and not to his friends. All the France needs to overcome the void be- tensions and contradictory ambitions of super tween its words and deeds, as to be seen in the case with Libya. France should cease turn- and regional powers depend on the priority of ing a blind eye to grave violations there for the their interests. For instance, the fight against sake of preserving its strategic or economic the ISO is no longer a valid argument since interests. Macron’s selective indignation over Paris is siding with the Saudis and the Emir- Libya harms both his credibility and the val- ates who are financing Al-Madkhalis.21 Yet, it ues that he claims are cardinal principles of sounds inevitable that President Macron’s his diplomacy, as well as the fight against im- Libya policy is better off with a cemented real- punity and the return to stability in a country politik, rather than a quarantined irrealpolitik.22

20 Solene Jeanjean, “France’s reaction to the Arab Spring”, Bilgesam, 21 December 2011. 21 “Addressing The Rise Of Libya’s Madkhali-Salafis”, Crisis Group, 25 April 2019. 22 Védrine, H., “Le Monde du Défi”, Pluriel, 29 March 2017.

www.orsam.org.tr 15 ANALYSIS The Role of Foreign Actors in Libya: the Case of President Macron’s Enigmatic Libya Policy January 2021 273

NOTES

16 www.orsam.org.tr www.orsam.org.tr orsamorgtr