ANALYSIS 273 January 2021 THE ROLE OF FOREIGN ACTORS IN LIBYA: THE CASE OF PRESIDENT MACRON’S ENIGMATIC LIBYA POLICY Abdennour Toumi ANALİZ Konu Başlığı Ocak 2021 26 Copyright Ankara - TURKEY ORSAM © 2021 Content of this publication is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or re-published without prior permission by ORSAM. The views expressed in this publication reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM. Publication Date: 31 January 2021 Center for Middle Eastern Studies Adress : Mustafa Kemal Mah. 2128 Sk. No: 3 Çankaya, ANKARA Phone : +90 850 888 15 20 Email : [email protected] Photos : Anadolu Ajansı (AA), Shutterstock According to the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Regulation on Banderole Application Procedures and Principles, the use of banderole for this publication is not compulsory. ANALYSIS 273 January 2021 THE ROLE OF FOREIGN ACTORS IN LIBYA: THE CASE OF PRESIDENT MACRON’S ENIGMATIC LIBYA POLICY About Author Abdennour Toumi Abdennour Toumi, a journalist and a North African Studies expert at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM), received his PhD in Toulouse University Political Science department. His articles are published in the National Turkish newspaper Daily Sabah English. He worked as a lecturer at Portland Community College in the Department of Middle Eastern and North African studies. He was the reporter at Maghreb & France Arab Daily News. Currently, he is the member of Paris France Arab-American Journalists Association and Chicago IL USA. Mr. Toumi focuses on North Africa’s socio-political mutation, the role of Turkey in the region, immigration issues and North African diaspora in France. CONTENTS 3 INTRODUCTION 4 FRANCE ACCUSES TURKEY OF VIOLATING ARMS EMBARGOES IN LIBYA 5 WHAT DOES PRESIDENT MACRON NEED FROM THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES? 7 FRANCE’S MILITARY PRESENCE IN LIBYA 10 FRANCE AND LIBYA FACE OFF IN CHAD’S CIVIL WAR 11 LIBYANS TALK AND TALK BUT DO NOT BUY 14 CONCLUSION INTRODUCTION FRANCE ACCUSES TURKEY OF VIOLATING rance’s foreign policy has been orchestrated a prudent foreign policy in office, ARMS EMBARGOES IN LIBYA F known for its realism and stead- which matched his character and a long-run- fastness under all presidents of the ning course of realpolitik designed by the first French Fifth Republic.1 However, President socialist President François Mitterrand in the Emmanuel Macron has shifted his foreign po- ‘80’s and early ‘90’s. licy towards idealism unlike his predecessor Francois Hollande, a paradigm that can put Unlike his late predecessors and despite France’s foreign policy goals in the MENA his own constitutional attributes, foreign policy region at great risk. The risk stems from the was not related directly to President Macron’s challenges which idealism presents to the persona. Similarly, he did not place much em- domestic political imperatives. phasis on it during his presidential campaign in 2017, although he adopted a constructive President Macron is haunted by the ghosts position on the E.U., a contrastingly aggres- of one-term presidents like his predeces- sive one on Syria and a preemptive defense sors President Nicolas Sarkozy and Presi- policy in the Sahel, notably in Mali. He even dent François Hollande. President Macron, paid a visit to the French troops stationed in however, has taken over an unusual determi- Northern Mali on his very first day in office. nant and objective of foreign policy from his mentor and predecessor, former President Does President Macron really have a for- François Hollande. President Hollande had eign policy in Libya? According to history 1 “How French Government Works”, Gouvernement.fr, https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/how-government-works, 2020. www.orsam.org.tr 3 ANALYSIS The Role of Foreign Actors in Libya: the Case of President Macron’s Enigmatic Libya Policy January 2021 273 and geopolitics, France should. latest verbal escalation between Nonetheless, President Macron the two countries’ presidents has been displaying a style that over the French president’s dec- is likely to push France into iso- larations on Islam and his poli- lation because of his foreign cies with Muslims in France have affairs and European minister, worsened the relations between Jean-Yves Le Drian. For instance, the two countries. in his anti-Turkey rhetorical style in the last couple of months, FRANCE ACCUSES while Turkey is a NATO ally and TURKEY OF VIOLATING a major intelligence and military ARMS EMBARGOES IN asset in the MENA region to fight LIBYA the IS Organization in Syria and Beyond the maritime inci- Iraq, Ankara was infuriated about dent, during a press meeting undiplomatic French foreign af- last July the French Ministry of fairs minister statements about Armed Forces said: “At the bot- At the bottom of the Operation Peace Spring last tom of the case, there are repea- the case, there fall. Last summer, with the naval ted violations of the embargo by are repeated incident between France and Turkey and a record of falsificati- violations of Turkey on June 10 off the Libyan ons and trafficking.” Paris indeed the embargo coast - the Frigate Courbet in- denounced the Turkish military by Turkey and cident - France accused Turkey intervention in Libya alongside a record of and took the case to a high in- the government of national unity falsifications stance of NATO and did call the (GNA) of Tripoli, led by Premier 2 and trafficking. EU Commission for more sanc- Fayez Al-Sarraj recognized by tions against Turkey. the U.N., and France protested before participating again in Op- With the latest tensions in eration Sea Guardian. the Eastern Mediterranean, in which France explicitly sided In order to better understand with Greece following Turkey’s France’s foreign policy in Libya, gas drilling mission in the Med- it must be put into perspective. iterranean, the tension is over For a long time, Paris had an gas reserves and maritime rights ambiguous relationship with the and has prompted fears that Al-Qaddafi regime. Over the last tensions could escalate further century and a half, France has between the two neighboring never had a coherent strategy countries. Hence, Paris is bring- in Libya. French authorities have ing down 71 years of principles been inconsistent and impatient of collective security since the with this territory that acts as a creation of NATO and since the kind of black hole for its MENA adhesion of Turkey in 1952. The foreign policy framework. The 2 ”Libya’s PM Fayez Al-Sarraj Reportedly Set To Resign”, Middle East Eye, 16 September 2020. 4 www.orsam.org.tr Abdennour Toumi history of Franco-Libyan relations is littered In desperate attempts President Macron with diplomatic about-faces and they are less wants to bring together the two main bellig- a sign of an in-depth understanding of the lo- erents in the Libyan armed conflict, LNA chief cal realities than a sign of French single-mind- Khalifa Haftar and the GNA Premier Fayaz edness in arbitrary or distorted interpretations Mustafa Al-Sarraj. However, President Ma- of Libyan politics. cron’s latest initiative, is too little and too late because of his ambiguous and paradoxical The relations between the two countries policy in Libya. President Macron domestical- resembles a revival of Napoleonism while the ly is facing serious socioeconomic challenges French return to Libya is a strategic imperative following the impact of COVID-19 crisis mis- according to President Macron. However, re- management, which has added as another lations between Paris and Tripoli deteriorated layer to the narrative in his presidential sto- in 2019 only to worsen from the full support ry-line campaign populist discourse in 2022. of Khalifa Haftar by France. Meanwhile France has been endorsing the legal government Such an initiative existed already in the (GNA) in Tripoli led by Fayaz Al-Sarraj, head of frame of 5+5 Mediterranean dialogue creat- the legitimate government recognized by the ed in 1990 in Rome as a sub-regional system, international community. a security initiative to secure closer cooper- ation between the five Western Mediterra- In May 2018, France hosted a meeting in nean E.U. member states and the five Arab Paris bringing together Libya’s four principal Maghreb countries. This was enhanced by the competing leaders to endorse a roadmap for Euro-Mediterranean conference in Barcelona the country’s stalled peace process. This was in 1992.3 to be sanctioned by key external stakehold- ers, including the U.N. The proposed draft WHAT DOES PRESIDENT MACRON agreement called for Libya to organize elec- NEED FROM THE NEIGHBORING tions by the end of 2018, support adoption of a COUNTRIES? constitutional framework, reintegrate military “This re-engagement of the Libyan neigh- forces through the ongoing Egypt-led secu- bors is essential in the long-term,” said Presi- rity dialogue and reunify financial institutions. dent Macron in his speech to the United Na- Thus, in September, President Macron, tions General Assembly. He did not, however, considering his yearly UNGA speech, an- name which countries he wanted to involve in nounced that he wanted to gather together the talks or elaborate on the details. Follow- all of Libya’s neighboring countries to help ing the 2015 Shkirat Agreement, Morocco has, find a solution to the country’s conflict. “This is to some extent, excelled in reviving this ac- the initiative that France wishes to lead in the cord, despite its rejection by Haftar last sum- coming weeks in conjunction with the Secre- mer. Yet Rabat has launched another round of tary General of the United Nations, bringing peace talks last September in the Bouznika together all the neighboring countries to help meeting in the province of Casablanca under bring about the Libyan solution,” said Presi- the auspices of UN Interim Libya Special En- dent Macron.