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Russian Foreign Policy 2018 Presented by Patti Nordskog Davis, B.A. History and Soviet Studies M.A. International Relations 1 Sources The Man Without A Face, The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin, Masha Gessen 2012 Putin, His Downfall and Russia’s Coming Crash, Richard Lourie, 2017 Once Upon a Time in Russia, Ben Mezrich 2015 Fragile Empire, How Russia Fell in and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin, Ben Judah 2013 Red Notice, Bill Browder 2015 The New Tsar, Steven Lee Myers 2015 All the Kremlin’s Men, Mikhail Zygar 2016 Winter is Coming, Garry Kasparov 2015 2 Sources, Continued… The Putin Interviews, Oliver Stone Interviews Putin 2017 The New Cold War, Edward Lucas 2008 Implosion, The End of Russia and What It Means for America, Ilan Berman 2013 Foreign Affairs Magazine May/June 2016 Foreign Affairs Magazine January/February 2018 The Atlantic Magazine January/February 2018 3 Sources Continued… Various Websites: BBC CNN Fox News ABC News NBC News Bloomberg News NY Times LA Times Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Reuters Associated Press Brookings Institute George F. Kennan Institute 4 Carnegie Endowment CSIS Who Determines Russia’s Foreign Policy? Putin himself. Internal Kremlin Security Council – inner circle, but Putin makes ultimate decisions. Opportunistic and unpredictable, but within stated goals. Always looking for signs of weakness in opponents, waiting and watching for the right moment. 5 One Man in Control 6 6 Putin’s Mandate He was hand-picked by Boris Yeltsin on advice by Oligarch Boris Berezovsky to succeed him in office. As he left the Kremlin for life in retirement, Yeltsin told Putin: “TAKE CARE OF RUSSIA” 7 Yeltsin Resigns NY Eve 1999 8 Putin’s Mandate • Putin seems to feel only he can “save” Russia. He is the Savior of Russia. He is on a “special mission from God” (Time Mag) 9 Under Putin’s Rule, Russia has been in a Constant State of Emergency Terrorists bombings in Russia War in Chechnya Economic collapse NATO expansion up to Russia’s border US Interference and Manipulation 10 The Regime •“It’s Not that the System is Corrupt - Corruption is the System” – Garry Kasparov, World Chess Champion and Human Rights Advocate. 11 The Regime •A grand deal was made between oligarchs and Putin in 2000. Permitted to keep ill-gotten gains so long as they didn’t enter the political sphere or criticize the regime. •Critics are harshly punished or killed. 12 Putin is possibly the richest man in the world. 13 Panama Papers Putin claims to have a $150,000 net worth with a total income in 2012 of $113,000. Panama Papers in 2016 reveal Putin’s offshore companies worth $2 billion – none in his name, but in his closest associates’. Close friend, Sergei Roldugin, a cellist, is noted to be worth $100 million, godfather to Putin’s daughter. 14 Roldugin Bought a $12m Stradivari Cello 15 Panama Papers Putin has numerous governmental residences plus numerous personal residences. 16 Home Sweet Home 17 Pool Has Gold Tiles 18 Country Home 19 Governance by Sistema •Putin inherited a corrupt system in place since collapse of USSR when everything owned by the State was up for sale. •A system of governance powered by internal networks and weak formal institutions. •Nature of informal deals and personalized loyalties. •Hard to define. Russians “know it when they see it”. •Described in book by Alena Ledeneva “2013: Can Russia Modernize” 20 Apartments in the Kremlin 21 Sistema •Prioritizes: • Short term gain over long-term sustainability. • Loyalty over professionalism. • Safety and collective responsibility over leadership. 22 Sistema as a System Works It enables people to: Trust others (inner circle). Access resources (useful friends). Mobilize cadres (core contacts). Things get done despite inefficiencies. It motivates people. Informal income important to thousands and thousands of bureaucrats, businessmen and their dependents. 23 Sistema Communist Ideology was replaced by: Market interests, privatized assets, favors. Emphasis on wealth, income and capital achieved via splitting profits, paying kickbacks and paying bribes. 24 Sistema Compared Over Time 1990s 2010s 25% splits 60% splits 10% kickbacks 30% kickbacks 2% bribes 10% bribes Prices went up! 25 Average Bribes 2000-2017 26 26 Who is Putin? 27 Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin Volodya - Friends Voya – Very Close Friends Putka – School mates Pootie-Poo – George W. Bush (according to Condoleezza Rice) 28 During his 2005 annual State of the Nation speech, Putin proclaimed: “The collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest catastrophe of the last century” 29 What Does Putin Want? • Retain power in office – term limits expire in 2024. No succession plan in place. By controlling most Russian institutions of civil society: media, courts, national politics, economy, resource development (oil, minerals and gas). • Undo Sanctions imposed by Magnitsky Act and by EU For Lawyer’s Death For Annexing Crimea and invading Eastern Ukraine For Use of Nerve Agent Novichok on Ex-spy and daughter in Salisbury, UK in March 2018. 30 Magnitsky Act Explained •Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law & Accountability Act” Law passed by US Congress in 2012 •Imposed sanctions. against specific Russian officials and citizens in retaliation for 2009 death of Sergei Magnitsky. Access to American financial system and visas are denied. •Magnitsky was a tax lawyer to William F. Browder who investigated and revealed a $230 million tax fraud scheme by the Russian government. He died while in pre- trial detention accused of the very crimes he uncovered. Denied essential medical aid in prison. •5 witnesses about the case died under mysterious circumstances. 31 Named for William F. Browder’s Lawyer 32 Sergei Magnitsky Died in Custody 33 Sanctions Hurt Russian Elite (in Biarritz, France) 34 What Does Putin Want? • Recover most key assets lost in Collapse of the Soviet Union Political, economic and geostrategic sphere of influence, (The Putin Doctrine). Retain territory in Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, acquire Baltic states & other areas where ethnic Russians reside Regain World’s Respect as a Superpower. • Keep price of oil high. • Contain and neutralize NATO, and finally destroy it from within. 35 Foreign Policy Objectives • Undermine Western Democracies and their values. • Change the world from unipolar (US-led) to multi-polar world. • Claim Artic Seabed and its Resources, right of passage. • Become a major player in Mideast, Reducing American influence. • Keep Assad in Power in Syria for stability of an ally, and retention of military bases. • Contain China along its border and in Russia’s Far East. 36 Foreign Policy Objectives • Maintain a geopolitical buffer zone (near abroad). • Continue propaganda war against the West. • Meddle in elections in the West to destabilize populace. • Undermine use of US dollar in international trade. • Needs to: • Modernize military (limited funds). • Increase cyber warfare capabilities. 37 What are Russian Attitudes? • Putin enjoys 85% popularity of Russian People. Putin won last election by wide margin. Voter turnout was high. • Older Russians regret collapse of Soviet Union & long for its stability. Young people born after the collapse in 1991 are now 27 years old & don’t know what Soviet life was like. • After collapse, Russia was impoverished, humiliated, a 3rd world country. Putin gave them back their respect and their pride. 38 Russian Attitudes • Paranoia about West’s motives and actions. • “Russians do not comprehend how idealistic Americans really are.” (believing in democracy, human rights, equal rights, tolerance, etc.) • “Americans do not comprehend how cynical Russians are” (Julia Ioffe of the Atlantic Mag) interviewed by Christiane Amanpour. 39 Narrative Russian Attitudes •70 years of communist rule destroyed the work ethic of the nation. Prefer to have government take care of needs. • Communist rule penalized independent thinkers. Prone to accepting propaganda. •1990s privatization brought wide disparities in income •Under Putin, Mid-2000’s saw incomes rise, pensions paid, consumer goods available with rise of a middle class. 40 Russian Attitudes •2008 brought recession and Ruble’s loss of value. •68% of people view U.S. as an enemy – (due to TV news propaganda – such as RT and Sputnik News). 41 Russia’s Mistrust of West Historic. - Except during the reigns of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great when Russia admired and emulated West. Sees the West as morally corrupt and decadent. West is hypocritical especially about human rights. Western troops fought against communist government during civil war in Archangel, Murmansk and Vladivostok. British “secured” the oil fields in Baku. The West failed to recognize the new Soviet government for 15 years. 42 Russia’s Mistrust of West After fall of Soviet Union, U.S. was distracted and did little to help them evolve into modern state or help with economy. Tired of foreign invasions. (Especially German/French) Liberal democracy and international law have produced inequality and chaos. Experienced sudden revolutions in 1905, 1917, 1989, 1991 that did not go well for them. 43 Russia’s Mistrust of the West • Putin says: • Open borders and global trade led to vanishing jobs and mass migration. • Every traditional value is up for negotiation in West. 44 Putin Says • Stability is more important than democracy. • Human duties are just as important as human rights and include: o Patriotism. o Loyalty to the state. o Must hold traditional values: the state, the family and the church over the individual. 45 Putin’s Temperament -KGB-trained to profile other people (size them up). -Has a temper. -Holds a grudge. -Has a potty mouth – switches to street slang. Reporters and interpreters don’t know what to do. -Orders political assassinations and other reprisals. 46 Putin’s Temperament -Extreme reaction to criticism. Example: 2005 in Slovakia went on a tirade against George W. Bush for 2 hours about the West. “W” later said “I wanted to slap the hell out of the interpreter!” 47 Putin’s Fears 48 Putin’s Fears • Mobs, revolutions, chaos.
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