1. Dawisha Pp.5-20.Pmd

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

1. Dawisha Pp.5-20.Pmd ADVANCE COPY Not for Publication IRAQ: SETBACKS, ADVANCES, PROSPECTS Adeed Dawisha Adeed Dawisha, who was born and raised in Iraq, is professor of politi- cal science at Miami University, Ohio. His most recent book is Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (2003). He is now working on a research project on the possibilities for a demo- cratic transition in Iraq. Whatever their views regarding the wisdom of the U.S.-led war in Iraq, friends of democracy cannot help but wish that the new regime which emerges in that country will be a reasonably democratic one. This is a matter of the gravest concern to the long-suffering Iraqi people, and to many others besides. For the success or failure of the effort to build and maintain a law-governed and democratic Iraq is bound to have major implications for the fate of democracy in the Middle East and beyond. The outcome of the attempt at democratization in Iraq is not likely to become clear for a number of years. Although many serious obstacles have already been encountered, the most difficult institutional challenges, in- cluding holding elections for a representative government and drafting and adopting a new permanent constitution, still lie ahead. Moreover, this essay is going to press just after the capture of Saddam Hussein, and other significant changes are sure to take place as well. Nonetheless, given the importance of the Iraqi case, it seems worth the risk to offer an analysis of the early efforts to begin laying the foundations of democracy there, as well as some thoughts about what the future might hold. The threefold goal of this essay should be stated at the outset: It begins by analyzing the serious setbacks that have dogged U.S.-led efforts to reconstruct Iraq into an at least relatively functional law- governed and democratic society. The essay then takes stock of the many successes and achievements that these efforts had nonetheless realized by the time of this writing, eight months after the armed forces of the United States, Britain, and some smaller allies toppled Saddam Hussein’s 35-year-old dictatorship in three weeks of mobile, high-speed Journal of Democracy Volume 15, Number 1 January 2004 6 Journal of Democracy warfare. And finally, it suggests various modalities for the building of democratic institutions, and analyzes the prospects for a sustainable democracy in Iraq. The coalition forces have faced serious difficulties in Iraq, and these were apparently intensifying as the end of the year approached. But to portray these difficulties as definitively signifying the failure of the reconstruction or Iraqis’ rejection of the U.S.- and British-led coalition’s plans for their country would be a mistake, since it would mean unreal- istically discounting many positive developments that augur well for Iraq’s future as a free, democratic, peaceful, and law-governed country. Iraq is obviously not out of the woods, but to pronounce the coalition’s effort a failure after just a few months of reconstruction following de- cades of dictatorship would be premature, to say the least. With that proviso noted, let us turn to the setbacks. These fall into two categories: Some represent the appearance of difficulties inherent in the knotty circumstances of Iraq after decades of Saddam’s depreda- tions, distortions, and neglect, while others have been the bitter fruit of unforced errors. Coping with the former and learning to recognize and rectify the latter have demanded considerable flexibility and improvi- sation from veteran U.S. diplomat L. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that he heads. U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell relayed a sense of the challenge when he confided in a Septem- ber 2003 interview that “one unanticipated aspect of the postwar occupation was the extent to which the entire structure of Iraqi military and civil society collapsed so completely as the war ended, leaving a vast problem for American troops to handle.”1 Indeed, the problem of which Secretary Powell spoke has been vast. A seemingly endless array of challenges has confronted the CPA, at best delaying and at worst threatening to undermine the economic and po- litical reconstruction of Iraq. The intrinsic difficulties can readily be listed: They include the political power vacuum created by the swift collapse of Saddam’s regime; the chaotic and sometimes violent mani- festations of political demands by people suddenly freed from tyranny; and the damage visited upon the country’s economy and basic-services infrastructure by Saddam’s abuses plus more than a decade of international sanctions. Yet other troubles can be traced to blunders committed by the CPA itself, some of whose policies and political decisions, particularly in the important early period after the fall of Baghdad on 9 April 2003, smacked of poor preparation, scant knowledge of the country, and lack of sensitivity to certain salient social and cultural mores. It is undeniable that insecurity and at times chaos have reigned for a dismayingly long time in some parts of Iraq, particularly in sections of Baghdad (whose sprawling environs contain around a fifth of Iraq’s total population of about 25 million people) and in the “Sunni” zone. This area, which is often called the “Sunni triangle,” is actually more of Adeed Dawisha 7 a quadrilateral whose corners rest on Baghdad in the south, Saddam’s home city of Tikrit in the north, Ramadi in the west, and Baquba in the east. The Arabic-speaking, Sunni Muslim tribes who predominate in this area received ample largess and many privileges from Saddam, and in turn staffed much of his secret-police and military apparatus. It is in this area that the vast majority of U.S. casualties have occurred. Saddam loyalists, who stand to lose the most from the demise of his regime, have perpetrated almost-daily attacks on U.S. convoys and personnel in this zone. Well-equipped and seemingly generously financed by Saddamist remnants who raided Iraq’s treasury before fleeing Baghdad, these guer- rillas have been waging a low-intensity war that U.S. commanders have been hard-pressed to contain, let alone eliminate. It also appears that many (some say more than 2,000) violent Islamists from other Arab countries have infiltrated the porous borders of post- Saddam Iraq to strike at the U.S. “infidels.” It is hard to say precisely how extensive and sophisticated is the cooperation between Saddamists and Islamists, but some does seem to exist. Adding to the CPA’s woes are the vast numbers of convicts—some estimates run as high as 280,000—whom Saddam let out of jail in late 2002. Many of these are hardened murder- ers, kidnappers, robbers, and rapists who have terrorized certain cities, particularly Baghdad, and created a climate of lawlessness. Compounding all this is the veritable sea of easily accessible weaponry in which Iraq is awash. In the early days after Saddam’s fall it was reported that one could buy five hand grenades for a dollar in the main markets in broad daylight. Some improvement had occurred by August, when the price had reportedly risen to $3 per grenade, though a bulk rate of $20 for ten grenades was also said to be available.2 Most of the armaments come from looted government arsenals: The CPA estimates that Saddam stock- piled a staggering 600,000 tons of arms and munitions. After six months of occupation, coalition forces had been able to destroy or secure no more than about 75,000 tons—or 12.5 percent—of the deadly stuff. All these things have contributed to the precarious security situa- tion, which weighs heavily and directly on U.S. forces and the CPA, and which has led to a substantial erosion of the initial good will and popu- lar support that was in evidence just after Saddam and his regime were forcibly unseated last spring. Of course, any fair account of the deterioration in security must rec- ognize that many difficulties flow from the vacuum created by the collapse, under the guns of outside forces, of one of the twentieth century’s most Procrustean and barbaric authoritarian systems. Iraq has previously known military coups followed by swift clampdowns, but never a sustained power vacuum. The war that the coalition launched on March 19 aimed to defeat the Iraqi armed forces and neutralize the Ba’ath Party, the two institutions that for more than three decades had sus- tained Saddam Hussein’s grip on power. This meant that a yawning 8 Journal of Democracy political void would be left, with the well-nigh unavoidable conse- quence of an indefinite period of insecurity and instability. There were, however, things that the coalition authorities could have done differently to ease the security problem. Two major mistakes were the decision to dissolve immediately all regular Iraqi military forces and the decision to ban all Ba’ath Party members from taking part in public life. The point is not that these institutions should have been allowed to carry on “business as usual.” By any measure, Saddam’s conscript army of almost half a million troops was absurdly bloated and a mainstay of his coercive rule. The Ba’ath Party, too, functioned as an instrument of in- timidation designed to dragoon all sectors of society into line behind the “Great Leader.” Coalition authorities were correct to think that Iraqis would be better off without such predatory entities in their midst. The blunder lay in the timing. Evidently looking far over the horizon but not just down the road, CPA officials seem to have forgotten to ask themselves what it might mean to turn tens of thousands of military offic- ers loose on the streets without at first even the promise of monetary compensation.
Recommended publications
  • Highlights Situation Overview
    Iraq CRISIS Situation Report No. 43 (6 – 12 May 2015) This report is produced by OCHA Iraq in collaboration with humanitarian partners. It covers the period from 6 – 12 May. Due to the rapidly changing situation it is possible that the numbers and locations listed in this report may no longer be accurate. The next report will be issued on or around 22 May. Highlights • Clashes around the Baiji refinery causes minor displacement • Eviction of IDPs from Kerbala hotels deferred for another two months • Shikhan Camp in Dahuk opens and fills quickly with IDPs from informal settlements and other critical shelter situations • Mr. Chaloka Beyani, Special Rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs visits Iraq Map Source(s): IOM DTM 25 April 2015, Clusters, CODs. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Map created on 16 May 2015. Situation Overview Throughout the reporting period, fighting was ongoing in al-Baghdadi, Falluja and Ramadi districts in Anbar Governorate. Clashes also continued in Baiji District, Salah al-Din Governorate, including around the Baiji oil refinery. Iraqi security forces reportedly regained control of the highway between Haditha and Baiji. Local sources reported that 200 families crossed into al-Alam Sub district, Salah al-Din Governorate from Baiji District. These families have been displaced due to the ongoing military operations near Baiji. Local authorities reported that these families are in urgent need of food and non-food items. Dhuluiya Town in Salah al-Din reportedly received 120 IDP families bringing the total to 1,900.
    [Show full text]
  • Weekly Explosive Incidents Flas
    iMMAP - Humanitarian Access Response Weekly Explosive Hazard Incidents Flash News (25 June - 01 July2020) 79 673 11 6 4 INCIDENTS PEOPLE KILLED PEOPLE INJURED EXPLOSIONS AIRSTRIKES Federal Police Forces 01/JUL/2020 DIYALA GOVERNORATE Found and cleared 22 IEDs in Samarra district. Security Forces 25/JUN/2020 SALAH AL-DIN GOVERNORATE Destroyed an ISIS hideout and cleared a cache of explosives containing seven mortar Security Forces 25/JUN/2020 shells, three homemade IEDs, three detonators, and ammunition. Found and cleared a cache of explosives belonging to ISIS in the Al-Dhuluiya subdistrict. An Armed Group 26/JUN/2020 Coalition Forces 26/JUN/2020 Shot and killed a Security Forces member near Abu Al-Khanazer village on the outskirts of Launched several airstrikes and destroyed many ISIS hideouts and tunnels, killing 24 Abi Said subdistrict, northeast of Baqubah district. insurgents in Khanuka mountain. Popular Mobilization Forces 26/JUN/2020 Military Intelligence 29/JUN/2020 Destroyed five ISIS hideouts and killed five insurgents in the Al-Adhim area, north of Diyala. Found and cleared 24 IEDs and artillery shells in the Mukayshafa desert of Samarra district. ISIS 27/JUN/2020 Killed four Federal Police Forces members and injured two others in an attack at Abu Coalition Forces 29/JUN/2020 Al-Khanazer village, northeast of Baqubah district. Launched several airstrikes and destroyed many ISIS hideouts, killing everyone inside in Makhoul mountain of Baiji district. Popular Mobilization Forces 27/JUN/2020 Repelled an ISIS attack in Sheikh Jawamir village, north of Muqdadiya district. An Armed Group 30/JUN/2020 A targeted IED explosion struck a Popular Mobilization Forces patrol, killing four members Popular Mobilization Forces 27/JUN/2020 and injuring another, west of Baiji district.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq CRISIS Situation Report No. 49 (17 June – 23 June 2015)
    Iraq CRISIS Situation Report No. 49 (17 June – 23 June 2015) This report is produced by OCHA Iraq in collaboration with humanitarian partners. It covers the period from 17 – 23 June. Due to the rapidly changing situation it is possible that the numbers and locations listed in this report may no longer be accurate. The next report will be issued on or around 3 July. Highlights More than 1,500 families return to Tikrit. Returnees need humanitarian assistance Close to 300,000 individuals displaced from Ramadi since 8 April NGOs respond to Sulaymaniyah checkpoint closures Concern over humanitarian conditions in Ameriyat al-Fallujah and Habbaniya Insufficient funding continues to limit humanitarian response capacity The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Map created 25 June 2015. Situation Overview More than 1,500 families (approximately 9,000 individuals) returned to Tikrit City and surrounding areas between 14 and 23 June, after the area was retaken by Iraqi Security Forces in April, according to the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Most of those who returned were Government civil servants who were requested to return. Approximately 80 per cent of Government employees have gone back to the area, local authorities report. Returnees reportedly were required to submit to ID checks, body and vehicle searches before being allowed through manned checkpoints. Authorities have reportedly dismantled 1,700 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and cleared more than 200 booby-trapped houses. The recent returns brings the estimated total number of returnees in Tikrit District to 16,384 families (over 98,000 individuals), according to a partner NGO.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq Crisis Situation Report No27 10 – 16 Jan 2015.Pdf
    Iraq CRISIS Situation Report No. 27 (10 – 16 January 2015) This report is produced by OCHA Iraq in collaboration with humanitarian partners. It covers the period from 10 – 16 January 2015. Due to the rapidly changing situation it is possible that the numbers and locations listed in this report may no longer be accurate. The next report will be issued on or around 24 January 2015. Highlights • Over 2,000 new arrivals to Arbat Camp provided with cash, food, tents and non-food items amidst cold and wet conditions. The camp is now over-capacity, but an addition is planned • Two inter-agency missions deliver aid to 500 families in Dhuluiya, Salah al-Din after 7 months of ISIL siege • Over 800 families have been displaced from Makhmur District south west of Erbil Governorate • Kerosene distributions have started in Erbil, although still insufficient to cover needs • Protection actors concerned over reports of forced conscription in ISIL-held areas Situation Overview Over 340 families newly displaced by fighting in Salah al-Din Governorate arrived in Arbat IDP Camp in Sulaymaniyah Governorate at the end of last week. They were all provided with emergency cash assistance, registered and data was shared among partners. Humanitarian partners assisted the new arrivals amidst snow and sub-zero temperatures. Over 870 people received Immediate Response Rations (IRRs) on 10 January, 24 hours after having arrived at the camp. They were also provided with tents, core relief items, kerosene, cooking kits, blankets as well as hygiene kits, jerry cans for water, and winter clothes for infants and children.
    [Show full text]
  • Highlights Situation Overview
    Iraq CRISIS Situation Report No. 43 (6 – 12 May 2015) This report is produced by OCHA Iraq in collaboration with humanitarian partners. It covers the period from 6 – 12 May. Due to the rapidly changing situation it is possible that the numbers and locations listed in this report may no longer be accurate. The next report will be issued on or around 22 May. Highlights • Clashes around the Baiji refinery causes minor displacement • Eviction of IDPs from Kerbala hotels deferred for another two months • Shikhan Camp in Ninewa opens and fills quickly with IDPs from informal settlements and other critical shelter situations • Mr. Chaloka Beyani, Special Rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs visits Iraq Map Source(s): IOM DTM 25 April 2015, Clusters, CODs. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Map created on 16 May 2015. Situation Overview Throughout the reporting period, fighting was ongoing in al-Baghdadi, Falluja and Ramadi districts in Anbar Governorate. Clashes also continued in Baiji District, Salah al-Din Governorate, including around the Baiji oil refinery. Iraqi security forces reportedly regained control of the highway between Haditha and Baiji. Local sources reported that 200 families crossed into al-Alam Sub district, Salah al-Din Governorate from Baiji District. These families have been displaced due to the ongoing military operations near Baiji. Local authorities reported that these families are in urgent need of food and non-food items. Dhuluiya Town in Salah al-Din reportedly received 120 IDP families bringing the total to 1,900.
    [Show full text]
  • The Doubt Inside Iraq's Sunni “Revolution”
    IRAQ Crown prince Ali Hatem Suleiman leads one of the biggest factions fighting Iraq’s government. Can he live with his extremist Islamist allies? The doubt inside Iraq’s Sunni “revolution” BY NED PARKER AND SULEIMAN AL-KHALIDI SPECIAL REPORT 1 IRAQ THE DOUBT INSIDE IRAQ’S SUNNI REVOLUTION ARBIL, IRAQ, AUGUST 4, 2014 heikh Ali Hatem Suleiman, one of the leaders of the Sunni revolt Sagainst the Shi’ite-led government of Iraq, sat cross-legged on a couch last month, lit another Marlboro Red, and dis- cussed the struggle with visitors from his home city of Ramadi, where the uprising began late last year. Instead of taking delight in the rebel- lion’s progress, though, the 43-year-old crown prince began lamenting the fact that Iraq’s patchwork quilt of ethnicities and religions was being torn apart. “How do we guard what we still have?” he asked his visitors. The revolutionary sheikh’s doubts may seem surprising. Over the past seven REBEL HEAD: Sheikh Ali Hatem Suleiman (on cover) is head of the Dulaim tribe, which dominates months the Sunni armed factions which Ramadi and the sprawling desert province of Anbar. In Ramadi, protests against Iraq’s Shi’ite-led Suleiman helps lead, and their allies in the Government, such as the January march shown above, have turned into civil war. REUTERS/STRINGER (2) far more extreme al Qaeda offshoot known as Islamic State, have captured most of the north’s largest Sunni cities. The battle against affront to Suleiman, who grew up in cos- greatly outnumber the jihadis, both in the Prime Minister Noori al-Maliki in Baghdad mopolitan Baghdad and has often spoken overall populace and in men under arms.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq 2016 Human Rights Report
    IRAQ 2016 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT Note: This report was updated 3/29/17; see Appendix F: Errata for more information. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Iraq is a constitutional parliamentary republic. The outcome of the 2014 parliamentary elections generally met international standards of free and fair elections and led to the peaceful transition of power from former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. Civilian authorities were not always able to maintain effective control of all security forces which include: the regular armed forces and domestic law enforcement bodies; the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-sponsored umbrella military organization composed of nearly 60, predominantly Shia components , which report directly to the prime minister; and the Peshmerga--the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) principal military force. Prime ministerial decrees on February 22 and July 27, as well as a November 26 parliamentary vote, boycotted by most Sunnis, established prime ministerial authority over the PMF; however at year’s end the command and control over the PMF remained inconsistent and ineffective. Violence continued to divide the country, largely fueled by Da’esh’s actions. Violence occurred throughout the year as government forces fought to liberate territory lost to Da’esh, principally in Arab Sunni and some other minority and mixed areas. Armed clashes between Da’esh and government forces caused civilian hardship. At year’s end the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) declined to 3.03 million from a peak of 3.4 million in March. The decrease in IDPs was primarily due to Iraqis returning to their homes after those areas were liberated from Da’esh.
    [Show full text]
  • IRAQ COUNTRY of ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT COI Service
    IRAQ COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT COI Service 25 March 2011 IRAQ 25 MARCH 2011 Contents Preface Latest News EVENTS IN IRAQ FROM 2 FEBRUARY 2011 TO 24 MARCH 2011 Useful news sources for further information REPORTS ON IRAQ PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED BETWEEN 2 FEBRUARY 2011 AND 24 MARCH 2011 Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 1.01 Size and population.............................................................................................. 1.01 Ethnicity and religion........................................................................................... 1.04 Language .............................................................................................................. 1.06 Measurements ...................................................................................................... 1.07 Public holidays ..................................................................................................... 1.08 Maps ...................................................................................................................... 1.09 2. ECONOMY ................................................................................................................ 2.01 Currency................................................................................................................ 2.05 Employment.........................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • ENVIRONMENTAL and SOCIAL MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (ESMF) Public Disclosure Authorized IRAQ ROAD MAINTENANCE MICROENTERPRISES GRANT PROJECT
    ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (ESMF) Public Disclosure Authorized IRAQ ROAD MAINTENANCE MICROENTERPRISES GRANT PROJECT Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Prepared By: MOCHMPW/RBD/PMT/E&S Team September, 2020 Disclaimer: This document is a draft and the information contained herein is subject to change. The final version of the document will take into consideration any further comments received from the Public Disclosure Authorized International financing institution. 1 Table of Contents LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................................... 5 LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................................... 6 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................... 7 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 11 1.1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................. 11 1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE ESMF ............................................................................................................. 11 CHAPTER TWO: PROJECT DESCRIPTION ......................................................................................... 13 2.1 Project Components ....................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
    NOV 2014 TThhrreeaatt TTaaccttiiccss RReeppoorrtt:: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant CTID TRADOC G-2 Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA) Complex Operational Environment and Threat Integration Directorate (CTID) TRISA-CTID Threat Tactics Report: ISIL Introduction The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has risen to prominence as a danger to peace and a regional threat with global impact. This perception comes, in large measure, because of its successes in Syria and then a rapid takeover of northern Iraq. Its military victories are largely due to successful recruiting, intra-insurgent conflict, large cash reserves, and ineffective opponents. There is much to learn from how ISIL is fighting. The ready availability of recruits, many of whom are foreigners attracted to ISIL successes, and large amounts of money for payroll and purchasing war materiel are critical considerations, but it is also important to consider how ISIL is fighting on the ground. This report is intended to identify key aspects of tactics and techniques used in ISIL’s actions in Iraq and Syria. ISIL, unlike its predecessors and competitors, is a paramilitary insurgency. While the baseline techniques being used by ISIL do not differ significantly from those it has employed since its early days as an al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq, its capabilities have increased in scope and complexity. Techniques making use of suicide vehicle-borne IEDS (SVBIED) and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIED) have become more sophisticated. ISIL’s use of information warfare (INFOWAR) has become more refined and pervasive with the adaptation of social media technology and increased technical competency among recruits.
    [Show full text]
  • IRAQ COUNTRY of ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT COI Service
    IRAQ COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION (COI) REPORT COI Service 25 March 2011 IRAQ 25 MARCH 2011 Contents Preface Latest News EVENTS IN IRAQ FROM 2 FEBRUARY 2011 TO 24 MARCH 2011 Useful news sources for further information REPORTS ON IRAQ PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED BETWEEN 2 FEBRUARY 2011 AND 24 MARCH 2011 Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................ 1.01 Size and population.............................................................................................. 1.01 Ethnicity and religion........................................................................................... 1.04 Language .............................................................................................................. 1.06 Measurements ...................................................................................................... 1.07 Public holidays ..................................................................................................... 1.08 Maps ...................................................................................................................... 1.09 2. ECONOMY ................................................................................................................ 2.01 Currency................................................................................................................ 2.05 Employment.........................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • SFG2247 REV Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
    IRAQ EODP - ESMF SFG2247 REV Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) Public Disclosure Authorized Iraq: Emergency Operation for Development Project (EODP) (P155732) IRAQ EODP - ESMF CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS °C : Degree Celsius °F : Degree Fahrenheit % : Percent BCM : Billion Cubic Meter DRB : Directorate of Roads Bridges EA : Environmental Assessment EERP : Emergency Electricity Reconstruction Project EHSG : Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines EMP : Environmental Management Plan EOD : Explosive Ordnance Disposal EODP : Emergency Operation for Development EOI : Expression of Interest E&S : Environmental and Social ESAP : Environment and Social Action Plan ESIA : Environment and Social Impact Assessment ESMF : Environmental and Social Management Framework ESMP : Environment and Social Management Plan EWR : Explosive War Remnants FY : Financial Year GDP : Gross Domestic Product GOI : Government of Iraq GRS : Grievance Redress Service GSCOM : General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers IBRD : International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA : International Development Association IDPs : Internally Displaced Persons IEDs : Improvised explosive devices IFC : International Finance Corporation ISIS : Islamic State of Iraq and Syria IUCN : The International Union for Conservation of Nature Km : Kilometer Km2 : Square Kilometer mg/l : milligram per liter m3 : Cubic meter M&E : Monitoring and Evaluation
    [Show full text]