Report No: 215, October 2017

THE SITUATION OF TURKMEN MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR AND THE FUTURE OF TALAFAR

ORTADOĞU STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

ORSAM

Süleyman Nazif Sokak No: 12-B Çankaya / Tel: 0 (312) 430 26 09 Fax: 0 (312) 430 39 48 www.orsam.org.tr, [email protected] THE SITUATION OF TURKMEN MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR AND THE FUTURE OF TALAFAR

ORSAM Report No: 215

October 2017

ISBN: 978-605-9157-25-4

Ankara - ORSAM © 2017 Content of this report is copyrighted to ORSAM. Except reasonable and partial quotation and use under the Act No. 5846, Law on Intellectual and Artistic Works, via proper citation, the content may not be used or republished without prior permission by ORSAM. The views expressed in this report reflect only the opinions of its authors and do not represent the institutional opinion of ORSAM. By: Bilgay DUMAN, ORSAM Researcher Feyzullah Tuna Aygün, ORSAM Middle East Research Assistant

ORSAM 2 Report No: 215, October 2017 Contents

PREFACE ...... 5

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 7

2. THE SITUATION OF MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR INSIDE ...... 9

3. THE SITUATION OF MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR LIVING IN TURKEY ...... 19

4. CONCLUSION ...... 21

ORSAM Report No: 215, October 2017 3 Tables

Table 1. Distribution of Migrants in the Provinces as of March 2017 ...... 10

Table 2. Number of Migrant Families and Families Returned Home as of March 2017 ...... 10 Table 3. Number of families returned to their provinces and districts as of March 2017 according to the data of Iraqi security forces ...... 12

Graph 1. Number of Migrant Families and Returned Home Families as of March 2017 According to Provinces ...... 13

Graph 2. Families migrated from Nineveh () Province and Returnee Families as of March 2017 ...... 14

Table 4. The situation of migrants from Talafar and the distribution of Turkmen migrants from Talafar in other province of Iraq as of February 2017 ...... 15

Graph 3. Proportional distribution of Turkmen migrants from Talafar to the provinces as of February 2017 ...... 15

Map 1. Provinces where Migrant Families from Talafar Reside ...... 15

ORSAM 4 Report No: 215, October 2017 PREFACE

Talafar has been one of the most affected regions by the actions of ISIS since the ter- rorist organization started to gain control over Iraqi territory in June 2014. Among the most significant settlements inhabited by in Iraq, Talafar is known as the largest county in Iraq. It is well known that while the Turkmen constituted a large part of the population in Talafar, a county of Mosul the population of which is approximately 510 thousands, the Kurdish and Arab population lived in the surrounding villages and communes in the pre-ISIS period. However, almost all of these people have become immigrants after ISIS entered Talafar, especially the Turkmen population in Talafar has suffered a great damage.

Turkmens from Talafar, who found themselves in immigration status, could not mobi- lize in a single region and dispersed into different provinces in Iraq. Besides, more than 70 thousand Turkmens had to migrate to Turkey. While most of the Shiite Turkmen liv- ing in Talafar settled in different provinces, mainly in , and Babylon in the south of Iraq, some of the Sunni Turkmens settled in as well as Dohuk and , which are parts of the Regional Government (KRG). Moreover, a camp was established in Kirkuk for the Turkmens from Talafar with the support of Turkey.

The ISIS control in Talafar, which started in June 2014, was completely terminated by the Iraqi security forces’ operation that started on August 20, 2017 and lasted for 11 days, and Talafar was liberated from ISIS. In the wake of this process, the efforts will be made for the reconstruction of Talafar and the return of the migrants. At this point, with the aim of providing a perspective for the future, ORSAM has examined the situation of the Turkmen asylum seekers and prepared this report in line with ORSAM field studies. The report examines several titles such as the reasons for the Turkmen migration; the reason why they preferred to emigrate to Turkey; possibilities of reconciliation, peace, cooperation and conflict between Shia and Sunni Turkmens in case of their return; the Turkmen expectation and requests regarding the administrative and political future of Talafar; examination of the dynamics of perception and radicalization towards ISIS; and the view of the Talafar Turkmens towards the actors in the region (Turkey, , USA, KRG, Hashdi al-Shaabi, PKK, ISIS, Iraqi Central Government). I hope this report, which has been prepared in the light of the primary sources obtained from the field, brings about a different perspective for those who are interested in the subject, and I hope you enjoy the reading. Assoc. Prof. Şaban Kardaş President of ORSAM

ORSAM Report No: 215, October 2017 5

ORSAM Report No: 215, October 2017 ORSAM ORSAM ORTADOĞU STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR MERKEZİ

By: Bilgay DUMAN, ORSAM Middle East Researcher Feyzullah Tuna Aygün, ORSAM Middle East Research Assistant

THE SITUATION OF TURKMEN MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR AND THE FUTURE OF TALAFAR

I. INTRODUCTION Talafar, located 70 km northwest of Mosul four aforementioned sub-districts gained and 110 km from border, has been provincial status; but Talafar could not the largest district of Iraq and a Turkmen gain the same status because majority of city. It fell under the control of ISIS in June, its population was Turkmen. Afterwards, 2014. Before ISIS, the population of Tala- the same issue came to the agenda in 2002; far together with surrounding villages and but it fell off the agenda due to the inva- sub-districts was 510,000, and the popula- sion of Iraq. However, Talafar’s demand to tion of the county seat was 230,000. While become a province was brought up several whole of the population in the county times after 2003 and it was also reiterated seat was Turkmen, there were three sub- in 2005 election agenda of districts of Talafar namely Zummar, Rabia and al-Ayadia (Avgani). Among these sub- Front and by Turkmen candidates for par- districts, Turkmen population constitutes liament as an election promise. In Talafar, the majority in al-Ayadia. While majority which is the largest sub-district of the city of the population is Sunni Arab in Rabia, of Mosul, there was not a significant in- the are Turkmens and few Kurdish popu- cident, rebellion or armed struggle during lations in the surrounding villages. In the US invasion of Iraq and afterwards; Zummar, however, there are Sunni Arab but almost all the Turkmens living in the villages besides Kurdish and Gergeri ma- city had to leave their places during the jority of the population. After ISIS entered operations in September 2004 and Sep- the city in June 2014, almost 95 percent tember 2005, and a chaotic atmosphere of the population had to migrate. While was created in Talafar. In this process, majority of this population has been dis- the pressure of Kurdish groups on Tala- placed inside Iraq, a certain number has far was increased. Iraqi could not migrated outside the country (mostly to control this area because of its Turkmen Turkey). Despite its dense population and fabric; and the Kurdish groups who could vast surface area, Talafar does not have a ‘provincial status.’ It has been claimed not control Talafar could not create their that Talafar could not become a province desired pressure and hold over Mosul. Ta- because only Turkmens populate this re- lafar is separating Syrian Kurdish regions gion. Talafar’s becoming a province first and Iraqi Kurdish regions. That the entire came to the agenda in 1977. At that time, Talafar has been populated by Turkmens work started for Najaf, , Dohuk and hinders the formation of a Kurdish bloc in Talafar to become provinces. Three out of this region.

ORSAM Rapor No: 215, Ekim 2017 7 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

At the beginning of 2014, another reso- instead of Talafar city center. During this lution regarding Talafar’s becoming a time, since Mosul Operation had also province was issued. However, the pro- been continuing, an operation for another cess completely stopped initially by Iraq’s city was not added to the agenda. How- entering into election process and then ever, with the termination of Mosul Op- because of ISIS. The chaotic atmosphere eration, operations to the last town under of 2004-2005 was repeated again with the the control of ISIS like Talafar, Hawijah, existence of ISIS and Talafar fell under the Qaim, Hit, came to the agenda and Iraqi control of ISIS in June 2014. Talafar, which Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi officially became one of the main strongholds of announced the start of Talafar operation ISIS in the process, was especially the on 31 August 2017. Especially issues like east-west connection point for ISIS and who would conduct the operation for Ta- came to the fore as the passage area for lafar, who and how would ensure the con- militants between and Iraq. trol of the city created controversy on the Mosul was the main center of ISIS in Iraq part of the operation. The question marks and the ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, regarding whether Hashd al-Shaabi would proclaimed his “” in this city. To participate in the operation occupied the take back the city from ISIS, Iraq security agenda; but at the end Hashd al-Shaabi forces in coordination with International participated in the Talafar operation to- Coalition Forces Against ISIS initiated gether with the army and police units. On Operation to Recapture Mosul on 17 Oc- the other side, recapturing Talafar was not tober 2016. The operation officially ended only very important for Talafar but also when Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Aba- for termination of ISIS in northern Iraq. di visited the city on 9 July 2017 and made a speech of victory. Afterwards, he offi- Although Talafar is a Turkmen city, the cially announced that the Talafar Opera- sectarian struggle in Iraq and the pres- tion started. However, before this when sure of al-Qaeda on Talafar has created the Mosul Operation had started, Hashd problems among the Turkmens living in al-Shaabi made a move towards Talafar on Talafar. These problems have deepened 1 October 2016. Hashd al-Shaabi started after ISIS has taken control of Talafar. In an operation to open a corridor from the current situation, Hashd al-Shaabi’s Hammam Al-Alil through Talafar. With participation in the operation and its de- this operation that started under the lead- ployment in town raise question marks ership of Hashd al-Shaabi and supported about the returns to Talafar and how they by and army, Talafar Airport was taken back on 8 October 2016 and will be ensured. At this point, examining ISIS was purged from Talafar’s surround- the migrants from Talafar will play an im- ing villages. However, afterwards the portant role for determination of return Hashd al-Shaabi operations did not ad- conditions. In the light of the data gath- vance to the Talafar center but to the west ered during the field studies conducted by (to Syrian border) from Talafar’s south. As ORSAM, this study deals with the situa- a result, the operations reached to Syrian tion of Turkmens of Talafar who were border on 29 May 2017. The operations displaced inside Iraq and who migrated to advanced along the border through Qaim Turkey.

ORSAM 8 Report No: 215, October 2017 THE SITUATION OF TURKMEN MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR AND THE FUTURE OF TALAFAR ORSAM

2. THE SITUATION OF MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR INSIDE IRAQ

After ISIS became active and ensured tached to the Prime Ministry was es- control of areas in Iraq like Mosul, An- tablished. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider bar, Tikrit, Diyala on June 2014, a massive al-Abadi appointed Jafar al-Hussein as movement of migration begun. Besides the head of the commission. Besides the displacements inside Iraq, there were mi- Head, there are five other members in the grations from Iraq to states like Turkey, commission. The representative of - , . However, it is possible to mens in this commission is Nahla Hus- say that the migration after ISIS occurred sein. Also, together with Nahla Hussein, mostly in the form of internal migration. Hunain al-Kaddo (Shabak), Harith Shen- Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Mi- sher (Sabean), Hajji Kandur Al-Sheykh gration states that as the result of migra- (Yazidi) and Joseph Silvia (Christian) are tions occurred after the expansion of ISIS members of the commission. It is stated in Iraq, the number of migrants exceeded that this commission is established to de- over 4 million people. Iraqi government termine the needs of the ethnic groups endorsed the policy of return of all the and the commission members will direct- migrants to the places that they migrated ly convey the problems and needs of the from. Iraqi government afforded initially 1 ethnic groups they represent to the prime million Iraqi dinar and then 250,000 Iraqi minister. dinar one-time assistance to migrant fam- ilies through the agency of Iraqi Ministry The tables regarding the migration situa- of Displacement and Migration. Although tion in Iraq obtained from the Iraqi Min- locally clothes, food, cleaning materials, istry of Displacement and Migration are household goods are provided to migrants provided below in order to see the mi- with aids from time to time, it is impos- gration situation more clearly. Although sible to say that Iraqi government has a all the data are obtained from Iraqi Min- systematic migration policy. istry of Displacement and Migration, the figures given in the three tables below With the decision taken on 2 Febru- regarding the general migration situation ary 2017 by Iraqi Prime Ministry, Ethnic in Iraq differ. However, the figures are ap- Groups Counselling Commission at- proximate.

ORSAM Report No: 215, October 2017 9 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

Table 1. Distribution of Migrants in the Provinces as of March 2017

Provinces Migrated From Name of the Nineveh Kirkuk Salahaddin Diyala Babel Anbar Total city Erbil 62425 1195 19080 878 1341 153 29712 114784 Anbar 86 8 706 32 2222 1366 114678 119098

Basra 839 299 878 174 33 33 548 2804 Suleimaniyah 6601 76 11265 13016 4243 2112 18600 55913 Qadisiyah 1843 531 219 77 134 68 818 3690 Muthanna 531 18 84 21 29 1 211 895 Najaf 10242 201 300 147 156 24 491 11561 Babil 4852 48 541 142 535 2785 3206 12109 Baghdad 9581 306 12789 2555 17066 945 45681 88923 Dohuk 138526 22 782 29 47 5 862 140273 Diyala 242 103 2356 35071 179 13 396 38360 Provinces Migrated To Dhi Qar 853 357 185 53 39 49 393 1929 Salahaddin 70 76 23120 153 24 213 23656 Karbala 9612 226 961 357 272 330 710 12468 Kirkuk 7808 19797 45456 6701 654 308 9612 90336 Maysan 519 139 74 24 27 8 61 852 Nineveh 4629 30 2 2 4663 Wasit 3409 231 321 170 69 21 599 4820 Total 262668 23633 119147 59600 27082 8221 226793 727134

Table 2. Number of Migrant Families and Families Returned Home as of March 2017 Number Number of Ratio of Families Migrant Province District of Migrant Families Returned Home to Families Families Returned Home Migrant Families Left Rutba 173 1848 117250 66720 % 57.0 50530 32201 37311 Qaim 5207 Anbar 1431 3573 Rawa 8741 1661 Heet 9832 9701 % 98.60 131 Karma 14145 11810 % 83.0 2335 Khalidiya 36152 8799

ORSAM 10 Report No: 215, October 2017 THE SITUATION OF TURKMEN MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR AND THE FUTURE OF TALAFAR ORSAM

Number Number of Ratio of Families Migrant Province District of Migrant Families Returned Home to Families Families Returned Home Migrant Families Left Province Total 336793 139762 % 62.0 52996 Khalis 13199 6211 % 47.0 6988 Muqdadiya 3109 7636 Diyala Ba’quba 10303 33 % 0.32 10270 951 131 % 18.0 820 32038 20373 % 64.0 11665 Province Total 59600 34384 % 58.0 29743 Daur 7568 13155 Shirqat 7438 7975 Faris 1216 1500 Balad 10009 3800 % 38.0 6209 Salahaddin 18149 29052 Tikrit 33819 30301 % 90.0 3518 26813 28087 Tuz 14135 Khurmatu Province Total 119147 113870 % 96.0 9727 Ba’aj 5808 - 675 - Shikhan 715 - Mosul 131378 4740 % 3.60 126638 Nineveh Talafar 31984 - (Mosul) Makhmur 3360 1950 % 58.0 1410 Tal Kaif 17892 - Hamdaniya 20618 - 46473 7050 % 15.0 39423 Province Total 258903 13740 % 5.30 167471 Final Total 664443 301756 % 45.40 259937

ORSAM Report No: 215, October 2017 11 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

Table 3. Number of families returned to their provinces and districts as of March 2017 according to the data of Iraqi security forces

Number of Number of Province District Families Province District Families Returned Returned Tikrit 29273 Muqdadiya 6719 Daur 13150 Khalis 6136 Alem 17230 Balad Ruz 130 Abu Ujail 2095 Ba’quba 0 Khanaqin/ Sharq Baiji 9495 Diyala 2930 Karatepe Khanaqin / Shirgat 7975 2997 Sadiye Khanaqin / Samarra (Center) 700 11776 Celevle Samarra 1850 Total 30688 (surrounding area) Balad (Center) 3800 Makhmur 1950 Samarra / 5700 Sinjar 7050 Dhuluiya Ayittin Nineveh Salahaddin Dhuluiya / 4373 Qayyarah 4740 Samidin Makshufiyah 1687 Toplam 13740 Samarra / 5490 Ramadi 66720 Muqtasim

Samarra / Yathrib 4675 Heet 9701

Samarra / Ishaqi 1100 Rutba 1848 Dujail 1500 Khalidiya 11180 Al-Anbar Jazirat al- Huwaish 1200 630 Khalidiya Abbasiya 1060 Karma 8799 Salam / Sayyid 140 Haditha 3573 Gharib Salam ( Farhatiya) 122 Fallujah 37311 Total 112605 Total 139762 Final Total 296795

ORSAM 12 Report No: 215, October 2017 THE SITUATION OF TURKMEN MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR AND THE FUTURE OF TALAFAR ORSAM

Graph 1. Number of Migrant Families and Returned Home Families as of March 2017 According to Provinces

NumberGöçmen Aile Sayısı of Migrant Families Evine Dönen Aile SayısıNumber of Returned Home Families

400000 336793 350000 300000 258903 250000 200000 139762 119147 150000 113870 100000 59600 50000 34384 13740 0 Anbar Diyala Salahaddin Ninova

The figures provided here show the mi- will change the demographic structure in grants after June 2014 when ISIS has be- favor od Shi’as in Diyala where Shi’a and come active in Iraq. The previous migra- Sunni population live together but Sunni tions are not included in the figures above. population is the majority. It is known that As it can be seen in Table 1-2-3- and Iran puts pressure on Diyala in this issue. Graph 1, Ministry of Displacement and It is possible to say since Diyala is the only Migration data provided number of fami- province that has a Sunni Arab population lies. Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and majority in Iran-Iraq border, Iran wants to Migration said that individuals per family secure its border by decreasing the num- was calculated between 5 to 8 individuals. ber of Sunni population here. According to this, in Iraq after ISIS at least 3 million 300 thousand and at most 5 mil- It draws attention that 95% of the popula- lion 300 thousand people are migrants. tion migrated from Salahaddin returned home although it was recaptured after Table 1-2-3- and Graph 1 show that the Diyala. However, the most striking point greatest migration after ISIS occurred about the statistics regarding Salahaddin from Anbar. Then, Mosul, Salahaddin is that among 14135 families migrated and Diyala comes in order. Although one from , none of them could of the first places recaptured from ISIS have returned. Yet, while analyzing data was Diyala, 42% of the migrated popula- about Tuz Khurmatu, attention should be tion could not return home as of March paid to one issue. It is known that a very 2017. The reason for this is stated to be small number of families migrated from the activities of Hashd al-Shaabi in Diyala. Tuz Khurmatu center. Families migrated It is stated that Hashd al-Shaabi prevented from Tuz Khurmatu are mostly from re- people to return to Diyala. It is stated that gions populated by Sunni and Sunni the major security element in Diyala is Turkmens such as Suleymanbeg, Bastamli, Hashd al-Shaabi and for this reason Hashd Yangijah. For this reason, it is known that al-Shaabi determines the families who will Hashd al-Shaabi that controls the region return to Diyala. However, Hashd al-Shaa- between Kirkuk and Baghdad prevents bi does not allow even the families who the residents of this region from returning are not connected to ISIS but one indi- home. It is known that the Shi’ite Turk- vidual among them joined ISIS in the heat men in Tuz Khurmato object the return of of the moment. It is claimed that Hashd Turkmens of Bastamli and Yangijah on the al-Shaabi employs a population policy that basis of the belief that they supported ISIS

ORSAM Report No: 215, October 2017 13 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

in the past. Iraqi government is also not in recaptured much earlier than Mosul from favor of return of the people of this region ISIS. In these regions known as Saheel in order to prevent creation of a sectarian Neynova inhabited by minorities, both tension. ISIS and war against ISIS created a huge destruction in living quarters and there- Nevertheless, it is observed that 62% of fore people could not return. On the other the migrated population has returned to hand, it is observed that there are returns Anbar, which is the last region recaptured to Qayyarah, Sinjar and Makhmur on the from ISIS. However, due to the destruc- south of Mosul. However, it is stated that tion during the war against ISIS, Anbar the people of Sinjar are anxious about needs a serious restoration. On the other coming back due to the conflict environ- hand, the fear from ISIS still exits in An- ment in the district not only because of bar and the people of Anbar live in fear of attacks of ISIS but also because of a pos- return of ISIS. sible conflict between PKK and KDP. In addition to this, the great destruction cre- In other respects, since the data belong to ated by ISIS attacks also affected Sinjar March 2017, the figures regarding Mosul negatively. At the same time, PKK’s exis- do not clearly reflect the situation in Mo- tence in Sinjar also creates a threat for the sul because Mosul operation finished on return of people. Hence, there is need for 9 July 2017. For this reason, the data ob- restructuring for the people to be able to tained belong to the period when Mosul come back. operation was going on and they belong to the east side of Mosul for the east side of Looking specifically at the migration situ- Mosul was purged at the time of the study. ation in Mosul, the greatest migration However, in the current situation it is not movement occurred in center of Mosul. wrong to say that the situation in entire Together with the center where ISIS had Mosul is the same. a strong presence, the migrations from Sinjar and Talafar drew attention when However, it is also observed that there looking at the situation in the districts of were no returns to the districts in the outer Mosul. In the graph below, data regarding circle of east side of Mosul like Sheikhan, migration from Mosul and the returnee Tal Kaif, Hamdaniyah although they were families are provided.

Graph 2. Families migrated from Nineveh (Mosul) Province and Returnee Families as of March 2017

NumberGöç Eden Aile Sayısı of Migrant Families Dönen Aile SayısıNumber of Returned Home Families

140000 131378 120000 100000 80000 60000 46473 31984 40000 17892 20618 20000 5808 4740 3360 7050 0 675 0 715 0 0 1950 0 0 0

Ba’aj Hatra Mosul Talafar Sinjar Seikhan Tal Kaif Makhmour Hamdaniye

ORSAM 14 Report No: 215, October 2017 THE SITUATION OF TURKMEN MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR AND THE FUTURE OF TALAFAR ORSAM

As seen in the Graph 2, the second greatest to, the number of families migrated from migration movement among the districts Talafar to other provinces of Iraq is given of Mosul happened in Talafar. Accord- as 34528. This figure shows only those ing to the data in Graph 2, the number of families migrated from Talafar is 31984. who displaced inside Iraq and does not However, in the table below showing the include the number of Talafar people who provinces that people of Talafar migrated migrated to Turkey and other countries.

Table 4. The situation of migrants from Talafar and the distribution of Turkmen mi- grants from Talafar in other province of Iraq as of February 2017

Number of Migrant Number of Migrant Province Province Families Families Erbil 353 Dohuk 10386 Anbar 11 Diyala 23 95 Dhiqar 121 Suleimaniyah 397 Salahaddin 9 Divaniye 628 Karbala 6216 Muthanna 107 Kirkuk 2253 Najaf 5401 Meysan 52 Babel 2070 Nineveh 3689 Baghdad 1916 Wasit 807 Final Total 34528

Graph 3. Proportional distribution of Turkmen migrants from Talafar to the provinces as of February 2017

12000 %30 10000

8000 %18 %16 6000 %11 4000 %7 %6 %6 2000 %2 %1 %1 %1 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 0

Dohuk Najaf NinewehKirkuk Babil Vasit DivaniyahSulaimaniyahErbil Dhiqar Muthanna Diyala Kerbela Baghdad Basra Misan Anbar Salahaddin

ORSAM Report No: 215, October 2017 15 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

As it is seen in Table 4 and Graph 3, al- In addition to this, there are Turkmens most one thirds of the migrants from Ta- who migrated from Shi’ite Turkmen vil- lafar migrated to Dohuk. It is known that lages of Sharikhan, Sallamiya, Qaraqoyun a majority of people of Talafar living in to Karbala and Najaf. Turkmen migration Dohuk are Sunni Turkmens. After Dohuk, from Talafar to Karbala and Najaf oc- Turkmens of Talafar migrated to Karbala curred immediately after the ISIS attacks and Najaf at most. Especially a small town in June 2014 and there was not any ma- of Najaf located between Karbala and Na- jor migration movement afterwards but jaf, Haydaria, is the region where Turk- individually families changed places from mens from Talafar populate densely. Al- time to time. In this sense, it is possible most all the Turkmens from Talafar who to say that the Turkmen population who have migrated to Karbala and Najaf are migrated from Talafar to southern Iraq re- Shi’ite Turkmens. Most Shi’ite Turkmens mained stable. from Talafar resides in Hosseiniyes (Shi’ite mosques) located between Karbala and Najaf.

Map 1. Provinces where Migrant Families from Talafar Reside

ORSAM 16 Report No: 215, October 2017 THE SITUATION OF TURKMEN MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR AND THE FUTURE OF TALAFAR ORSAM

Besides Karbala and Najaf, there is a sig- the Turkmens in Talafar. It is possible to nificant population of Turkmens from Ta- say that Sunni Turkmens are not optimis- lafar in Mosul, Kirkuk, Baghdad and Ba- tic about returning to Talafar in the short bel. It is stated that majority of Turkmens term. They state that in order to be able from Talafar who went to Mosul escaped to return to Talafar, the public services from Talafar after the air strikes of coali- should be provided in Talafar and also a tion forces and after the Talafar operation protection guarantee should be provided which was given a start by Hashd al-Shaa- for the Sunni Turkmens. This is because bi on 1 November 2016. the existence of ISIS has increased the sec- On the other hand, almost half of the tarian tension. For this reason, in case of Turkmen families from Talafar in Kirkuk return to Talafar, there are serious doubts live in the Yahyava refugee camp. Almost that revenge acts might occur. all of the Turkmens living in the camp are Sunni. There are also Shi’ite Turkmens It is also possible to say that Sunni Turk- among the Turkmens from Talafar living mens who are eager to return will not act in Kirkuk. In addition to this, majority of hastily. Sunni Turkmens are integrated Turkmens migrated to Baghdad from Ta- into the system and social life and estab- lafar are Shi’is. However, different than the lished their living conditions first in KRG Turkmens migrated to southern Iraq from and then in Turkey, and for this reason Talafar, those migrated to Baghdad live they are not hasty about immediate return dispersedly. to Talafar. Yet, those who want to return will wait for administrative, social and po- The primary reason for Turkmens from litical life to be in good order. At least, they Talafar to prefer Dohuk as their first will decide according to which one of the choice is the geographic proximity of two mentioned scenarios will come true; Dohuk and Talafar. Talafar has a common frontier with Dohuk. Also, Turkmens of namely, Talafar’s becoming a province and Talafar had close relations with Dohuk for Talafar’s becoming a region together with shopping, health services etc. even before Mosul. 2014. In fact, Turkmens of Talafar living in Dohuk are quickly integrated to the social It is possible to say that some of the Turk- life. mens of Talafar living in KRG never thinks about returning to Talafar. Relatively sta- In the interviews, it is seen that even Sunni ble, secure and socially comfortable life in Turkmens from Talafar have a great anger KRG attracts Sunni Turkmens of Talafar. against ISIS. For Turkmens, ISIS is stated clearly as an enemy and as the greatest It is also seen that tribal bonds among the reason for emergence of sectarian tension Talafar people has begun to weaken. One in Talafar. of the primary reasons in weakening tribal bonds is the belief that tribal leaders bring Some Turkmens from Talafar state that damage to Talafar instead of being benefi- the only use of ISIS’ entering into Talafar cial. Also, another reason is disintegration is its revealing all the truths in Talafar. It of tribal structures with the impact of mi- is stated that ISIS has wiped out all the gration from Talafar. It has been observed secrecy in Talafar and the return of those who has and will give harm to Talafar will since three years that the tight tribal be impossible in the period after ISIS. bonds have begun to weaken among the people living outside Talafar and multiple At this point, it is accurate to say that there leaderships instead of a single leadership are different views about return among have begun to be formed in any tribe.

ORSAM Report No: 215, October 2017 17 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

However, communication continues to tempts for consensus and peace among be strong among the Turkmens from Ta- Talafar people is likely to reach a positive lafar who migrated to southern Iraq. This result. A consensus among Talafar people communication helps the Turkmens to will be important for returns and stability preserve their unity and national identity. in Talafar. On the other side, migration created a se- rious world-weariness for the Turkmens. It will not be wrong to say that the rise Although they do not have any difficulties of national identity among Turkmens regarding job and participation to social migrated to southern Iraq contributes to life, it has been stated by many people their expectations from Turkey. This ex- that Turkmens cannot get along with the pectation also includes improvement in people in southern Iraq. Also, the fact the current conditions of migrants and the contribution to the rebuilding of Tala- the Turkmen’s life conditions and qual- far in the process after its recapture from ity of their lives are in lower level when ISIS. At this point, it is accurate to say Tur- compared to their conditions before they key’s improvement of relations with Iraq migrate make Turkmens determinate and joint projects regarding Talafar will about return. Turkmens think that they contribute to Talafar’s stability and will are different from the people in southern facilitate return of Turkmens to Talafar. Iraq in terms of tradition, culture, moral Turkmens also give support to increase of and humanitarian values. They also think cooperation between Turkey and Iraq. that even the Shi’a identity do not play a unifying role. Furthermore, Turkmens The dominant idea is that a joint force think that they are being excluded due to that will be established in Talafar will defi- the Arab nationalist understanding of the nitely contribute to the protection of Ta- southern Iraqi people. It is accurate to say lafar. Besides, it has been thought that a that this situation has a positive impact on joint political structuring after the return the preservation and strengthening of the of Talafar people to Talafar will support Turkmen national identity. peace, stability and integration in Talafar. At this point Turkmens of Talafar say that The optimistic attitude regarding return primary destabilizing factor in Talafar is to Talafar is also valid for a future con- the foreign intervention to Talafar and sensus between Shi’as and Sunnis in Ta- they claim that a consensus in Talafar will lafar. It is being argued that there is not prevent future foreign interventions to any problem between Shi’as and Sunnis Talafar. Thus, both future PKK threat and in Talafar and the problem is created by KRG’s attempts to takeover Talafar can be al-Qaeda and ISIS. In this sense, the at- resisted.

ORSAM 18 Report No: 215, October 2017 THE SITUATION OF TURKMEN MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR AND THE FUTURE OF TALAFAR ORSAM

3. THE SITUATION OF MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR LIVING IN TURKEY

As it has been stated before, although ma- the Turkish people show to Turkmens in- jority of Turkmens of Talafar are displaced creased feelings of gratitude. For this rea- inside Iraq, there has been a massive Turk- son, they want Turkey to be active and sta- men migration from Talafar to Turkey. It is bilizing in recapturing Talafar and return known that a majority of Turkmens used of Turkmens to Talafar. irregular ways while migrating to Turkey. For this reason, clear statistics regarding Majority of Turkmens from Talafar living the Turkmens of Talafar living in Turkey in Turkey are hopeless about returning to is not available. However, as a result of Talafar and establishment of peace in Ta- studies conducted by some civil society lafar. Besides lack of confidence towards organizations in Turkey, it is known that Iraqi State, sectarian policies of security over 70 thousand Turkmens from Talafar forces in other regions recaptured from are living in Turkey. This population did ISIS and the ongoing fear towards ISIS/al- not come to Turkey as a result of a mass Qaeda should be highlighted as effective migration movement but through a con- reasons. In the interviews conducted by tinuous migration from Talafar to Turkey. Talafar people living in Turkey, it is stated In the current situation a great majority that a great majority of Turkmens from of Turkmens from Talafar (approximately Talafar living in Turkey still fear from ISIS 75-80%) live in Ankara. Turkmens from and the idea of ISIS will not leave them in Talafar also densely live in the cities like peace even if they return to Talafar. and Şanlıurfa. However, Turk- mens from Talafar are living in many cit- In addition, even Talafar will be cleared ies of Turkey dispersedly. Also, it is known from ISIS, there is hesitation for return that some Turkmens from Talafar settled because of the fact that the restoration down in a migrant camp set for Syrians in period will last long and there may be dis- Kahramanmaraş. ruptions in public services. Also, the dis- ruptions in indemnity payments by Iraqi Turkmens living in Turkey do not encoun- government in regions that were previ- ter a major problem other than general ously recaptured from ISIS like Ramadi, problems that stem from migration. It is Diyala and Tikrit led Turkmens of Talafar possible to say that majority of Turkmens to take a dim view of returns. from Talafar living in Turkey have been in- tegrated into social life. At this point, it is It is thought that government employees seen that Turkmens from Talafar accom- or students may return to Talafar in the modate themselves to Turkey easily. first place, but most of young Turkmen people will opt for staying in Turkey. Es- Although there are some complaints re- pecially the Turkmen youth get used to garding the situation of Turkmens from social life in Turkey due to their integra- Talafar living in Turkey, in general they tion into social life and high welfare level. feel gratitude and trust to Turkey. There As a matter of fact, some young people are are criticisms such as Turkey did not open determinate to stay in Turkey even their its Iraqi border to Turkmens and Turk- families return to Talafar. Even though mens are not being offered the same op- issues like security, instability, economic portunities with the Syrians. However, problems are resolved, most Turkmen the high standard of life and the favor that young people from Talafar feel dubious

ORSAM Report No: 215, October 2017 19 ORSAM CENTER FOR MIDDLE EASTERN STRATEGIC STUDIES

about returning to Talafar. It is being stat- cannot solve issues of Talafar since mul- ed that even though they cannot stay in tiple voices has begun to be raised from Turkey, most Turkmen young people from every tribe. Talafar may apply for asylum to different states through United instead of Moreover, Talafar people lost their con- returning to Talafar, and some young peo- fidence in politicians. Majority of inter- ple have already gone to third countries in viewees believe that politicians has deep- this way. ened the cleavages in Talafar. For this reason, if there will be a return to Talafar, Hopelessness prevails among Turkmens in work should be done to bring the Turk- the matter of ensuring stability in Talafar men national identity forward, and if a due to sectarian problems among them- political structure is to be established, it selves and problems with other groups. should be built on national foundations For this reason, there are ideas about the bearing a Talafarian identity. Otherwise, solution of the Talafar issue such as the so- Turkmens from Talafar think that even lution to Talafar issue has exceeded Iraqi when the problems of Talafar are resolved, borders and there should be a regional the old issues may repeat themselves and and even international solution. There are new problems may emerge in the process. those who think that a consensus between Turkey and Iran can solve Talafar issue, There are serious doubts regarding estab- and those who state that Talafar issue can- lishment of order, justice, balance, secu- not be resolved without US involvement. rity and stability in Talafar on the grounds There is even support to ideas like a Unit- of distrust towards Iraqi government and ed Nations force supported by Turkey can that Iraqi government may behave un- solve Talafar issue as in the case of ending justly despite a possible declaration of an the civil war among Kurds in the 1990s. amnesty.

At this point it is seen that the internal From the point of Turkmens of Talafar liv- structure in Talafar has collapsed and the ing in Turkey, there are dissuasive points tribal system peculiar to Talafar is not that make return a likely idea. Main prob- working. There is a common dominant lems are difficulties in legal actions that view that tribal representation in Talafar Turkmens of Talafar experience in order failed to solve problems and this system to stay in Turkey due to migrant policy has not brought benefit to Talafar until to- of Turkey towards Iraqi people, and high day. For this reason, the tribal leaders are cost of living in Turkey compared to Iraq. not appreciated any more as they were in Especially the crowded Turkmen families the past. Moreover, the extending families have financial difficulties because of their led splits in tribes; the migration from Ta- long stay in Turkey. Therefore, it is pos- lafar after ISIS led collapse of tribal struc- sible to say that some Turkmens of Tala- ture, and the tribal system in Talafar has far will return to Iraq solely for economic been disrupted. It is believed that tribes reasons.

ORSAM 20 Report No: 215, October 2017 THE SITUATION OF TURKMEN MIGRANTS FROM TALAFAR AND THE FUTURE OF TALAFAR ORSAM

4. CONCLUSION

Migration created a serious world-weari- There is a general view that reconciliation ness for the Turkmens. The level of Turk- in Talafar can be reached by the Talafar mens’ living standards and quality in the people and peace and reconciliation will places they migrated to are lower than be difficult in case of a foreign interven- their conditions before migration, and this tion to Talafar. However, Iraqi govern- makes them determinate about return. ment adopts a fair and equal approach However, Sunni Turkmens are not opti- towards the issue of peace and reconcili- mistic about returning to Talafar in the ation, and demands guarantorship of an short term. It is being stated that return- international actor like Turkey or United ing to Talafar necessitates public services Nations. Nevertheless, there is a dominant and security for Sunni Turkmens. It is view that establishment of a joint force observed that Sunni Turkmens have been that involves equal sharing in Talafar after integrated to system and social life in KRG ISIS will absolutely contribute to protec- and in Turkey as migrants, organized their tion of Talafar. lives, and therefore they will not hurry for return. At this point, it is being stated It is being stated that they do not want that especially the Turkmen youth, even either PKK or KRG to have control over though they cannot stay in Turkey, will try Talafar or lay a claim on Talafar. They state to migrate to third countries via United that if such an attempt happen, Sunni and Nations instead of returning to Talafar. Shi’ite Talafar people will fight together to protect their land. There is consensus There are differences of opinion between among Turkmens about PKK threat for Shi’ite and Sunni Turkmens about recon- themselves. It has been stated that PKK is ciliation in Talafar. Shi’ite Turkmens state a terrorist organization and it is impossi- that they do not have any problems with ble to accept PKK as a formation that only Sunni Turkmens. On the contrary, they attacks Turkey. have strong relationships by affinity, and therefore they are open to reconciliation Turkmens are not only against the inten- with the Sunnis. tions of PKK about Talafar but also those of KRG. In fact, Turkmens of Talafar think However, almost all the Turkmens of Ta- that the Kurds (especially KRG) have a lafar have a common attitude towards hostile attitude towards them. It has still ISIS. Both Shi’ite and Sunni Turkmens been remembered that after ISIS entered state that the root cause of the problem in Talafar, Turkmens who had to migrate in Talafar is ISIS. Both sides argue that was not given a pass to KRG and they had the primary condition for reconciliation serious difficulties in checkpoints. is that the perpetrators (members of ISIS, supporters of ISIS, aiders to ISIS) must be The political environment in Iraq is be- penalized. All sides are weary of fighting lieved to incite disintegration in Talafar. and therefore peace will be a natural and There is a belief that especially the poli- self-induced solution; otherwise none of ticians benefit from the conflict situation the parties will be at ease. in Talafar and they use it for political pur- poses.

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Tribal bonds have also begun to weaken their sect). Especially Shi’ite Turkmens of among Talafar people. One of the primary Talafar have a distant relationship with reasons in weakening tribal bonds is the Turkey; but it is possible to say that Iran’s belief that tribal leaders bring damage to policies in Iraq that they experienced dur- Talafar instead of being beneficial. More- ing their migration period in southern over, disintegration of tribal structures with the impact of migration from Talafar Iraq, the attitude of Iraqi government, can be pointed out as other main reason. and the negative approach of southern Iraqi people have risen their expectations The cooperation between Turkey and Iraq from Turkey. In the recent period, visits by is considered important by the Turkmens Turkey’s Ambassador to Baghdad, Fatih of Talafar. The cooperation between two Yıldız, to the Turkmen migrants in south- countries is considered beneficial in the ern Iraqi provinces and aids from Turkish issues of return to Talafar, and maintain- ing justice and preserving balance after institutions such as Kızılay, AFAD, TIKA return to Talafar. There is a high level of have been very helpful to reverse the confidence towards Turkey among major- negative perception of Turkey among the ity of Turkmens of Talafar (no matter of Shi’ite Turkmens.

ORSAM 22 Report No: 215, October 2017