I-- 7 A A' Vol. 1 No. 5 REPORT

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SOUT ICCA S WAR ON jjfpr9g &, Vol. 1 No. 5 REPORT April 1986

Contents

Editorial : Hitting from the Laager

The Coup d'Etat in Lesotho ...... 3

Angola: Tough Road Ahead ...... 6

Botswana: Beleaguered Oasis ......

Southern Africa Defending Apartheid ......

REPORT Looking at SADCC ...... is produced 5 times a year by a vol The Hidden Violence of Apartheid ...... unteer collective of the Toronto Com mittee for the Liberation of Southern Coke Adds Artificial Sweetener: Africa (TCLSAC), Buying Into the Black Opposition ...... 427 Bloor St. W. Toronto, M5S 1X7 Stamp News ...... 22 Tel. (416) 967-5562. Divestment at Queen's: Submissions, suggestions and help The Pressure Mounts ..... with production are welcome and in vited. Laval Divestment? ...... 25

We Symbolize Toughness: Subscriptions MATCH Supports Zimbabwean Women . . 26 Annual TCLSAC membership and ANC - COSATU Meetings ...... 27 Southern Africa REPORT subscrip tion rates are as follows: Review: - The "Peasant Option" in Zimbabwe ...... 28 SUBSCRIPTION: Individual ...... $15.00 Institution ...... $30.00 MEMBERSHIP: (includes subscription) Contributors Regular (Canada) ...... $30.00 Unemployed Pat Baker, Jonathan Barker, Nancy Barker, Student ...... $15.00 Claudette Chase, Shirani George, Linda Guebert, Senior Susan Hurlich, Jo Lee, H6lne Castel Moussa, $50.00 Sustainer ...... to John Saul, Doug Sider, Heather Speers, $200.00 Joe Vise, Mary Vise. Overseas add $5.00 Cover design by Margle Bruun-Meyer

Printed by Union Labour at Action Print Apartheid: Hitting Out From the Laager There has been a dramatic mobiliza tion against apartheid in North America over the past year or so. But even within the anti apartheid movement and in a politi cal climate so unfavourable to South Africa the brutal wars of destabi lization which that country is con tinuing to wage against its neigh bours have remained far too in visible. How ironic, too, that in the United States the very same Congress which began to set in motion economic sanctions against South Africa could vote, almost si multaneously, to repeal the Clark amendment (an amendment which had, for ten years, set severe lim its to American covert intervention in Angola). Yet this latter action further freed the hands of the Rea gan administration to back South Africa's destabilization efforts - via its UNITA proxy - in Angola. A particularly brutal exercise in destabilization continues in Mozam bique as well - despite the well publicized struck in 1984 between South Africa and Mozambique. The destructive ac tivities of the counter-revolutionary undermine support for the African do the ANC some damage, however movement there (the MNR or "Re National Congress in the neighbour temporary. namo") are still crucially dependent ing states, in particular concrete There are other, perhaps more on South African backing. Or take support in the form of bases, sup important reasons for South Africa's , its once peaceful and sta ply lines and freedom of passage. assertiveness vis-d-vis its neigh ble polity increasingly rocked by the Clearly, South Africa is mainly en bours, however. One is economic. South African attacks which Pe gaged in a propaganda exercise here The southern African economy de ter Gillespie itemizes in this issue - the better to project its own inter veloped, historically, as a hinter of SAR. And, most recently, there nal conflicts onto the rest of the sub land for South Africa and the is Lesotho. As analyzed by Dan continent and present them as com latter is prepared to try various O'Meara below, South Africa has ing from outside, from 'communist means to retain its economic hege capped an extended period of both backed," hit-and-run "terrorists." mony there, to retain it as mar military and economic destabiliza Needless to say, this approach seeks ket, labour pool, transport out tion of Lesotho by facilitating a coup to blur the fact that the ANC is, let. In consequence, one key tar d'6tat in that country. Clearly, it is first and foremost, rooted not out get of South African-sponsored in South Africa's neighbours who still side South Africa but in the on cursions into neighbouring countries must pay much of the price for the going struggle within; it manages, has been the infrastructure of trans defensive death agonies of apartheid too, to overstate the degree of sup port and communications among and racial capitalism. port (in logistical as distinct from these states which, under the aus Domination of its regional en rhetorical terms) which has come to pices of such intiatives as the South vironment in defense of the status the ANC from states in the region. ern African Coordination Confer quo at home: this is South Africa's Still, as the Nkomati Accord demon ence (SADCC), might be seen to goal. More specifically, it seeks to strated, South African pressure can be contributing to the emergence

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 1 of a regional economic grid outside Africa's own internal contradictions. the orbit of South African control. Indeed, these contradictions have Moreover, South Africa can hope sharpened - since Nkomati! - in to so weaken individual states and 1984's dramatic resistance to the economies as to make them more new South African constitution and vulnerable to economic penetration, amidst 1985's deepening crisis; the both by its own and other interna ANC's star has continued to rise and tional capitalist actors. the apartheid regime's isolation con South Africa also relishes the tinued to grow. Moreover, as Dan possibility that failed economies and O'Meara puts the point elsewhere shattered societies beyond its im in this issue, South Africa's actions the mediate borders will serve its pro may also come back to haunt paganda purposes, both externally apartheid regime in another way: and domestically. If, on the one for hand, South Africa's own respon "the blockade against Lesotho has sibility for these outcomes can be sharply undermined 's own blurred somewhat, then it might be propaganda offensive against sanc made to appear that it is "social tions. If it is admissible for South ism" and "black majority rule" that Africa to force political change in are not working in Africa. If, on Lesotho through sanctions, presum the other hand, significant economic ably it is admissible to use sanc and political concessions can be ex tions to try to do the same in torted from its neighbours some South Africa. Moreover as the coup might be convinced to hail South proved, sanctions work." Africa's "positive" role as peace In the meantime, however, the maker and help-mate in the region; costs of South Africa's aggressive so, at least momentarily, was South policies to its neighbours are high. Africa able to present the Nkomati As Steve Godfrey's first-hand report Accord, parlaying it into a 1984 from Angola in this issue demon Botha tour of Western European strates, the latter do resist as best capitals during which he found a few they can, and even the new Lesotho more doors than usual open to him. much too close to the truth of the government is attempting to retain Nonetheless, it is primarily the matter for any easy comfort: some room for manoeuvre vis-d-vis invisibility, rather than the accept "Yes, humble Swaziland agrees, Pretoria. At the same time, and ability, of these wars that South humble Mozambique accepts, hum ominously enough for such neigh Africa relies upon. That, and the ble Zambia hosts meetings of un bours, the Pretoria regime does extreme difficulty which the highly equal neighbours like South Africa seem presently to be giving a re vulnerable target states of southern and Angola. What else can we do? newed currency to its characteristic Africa have in resisting such bully But we are not doing it with happy rationale for aggression: a rhetorical ing. For brute force - along with the hearts. We do it out of fear, but that line, downplayed somewhat around manipulation (involving both eco fear will end one day. It is bound the time of Nkomati, which em nomic blackmail and the occasional to." phasizes the threat of a "total on proffering of economic carrots) of In fact, none of these countries slaught," mounted, both globally South Africa's inherited predomi and regionally, against can hope even to begin to realize South Africa nance in the region - is the name by that old bogeyman, "the commu of the game. As Lesotho's Foreign their full potential for development so long as an untransformed South nist menace." For southern Africa, Minister admitted quite candidly on in short, worse may be yet to come. one earlier occasion - when, in 1983, Africa hovers over them, stick and carrot in hand. This is one more good reason why Lesotho was forced to evacuate cer we must not allow the drama of tain ANC personnel from its terri We may take some consola South Africa's internal crisis - cru tory - his country "could no longer tion from Kaunda's final line, of cial though that crisis undoubt withstand South African military course. Any advantages that South edly is - to displace a simultaneous and economic pressure." Under Africa can gain from regional ag concern for South Africa's wars of such circumstances, the summary gression are bound to be short destabilization from the agenda of of the situation offered by Zambia's lived. For destabilization can do the world-wide anti-apartheid move President Kenneth Kaunda remains nothing whatsoever to resolve South ment.

april 1936 Southern Africa REPORT The Coup d'Etat in Lesotho

BY DAN O'MEARA and establishing close links with from the collapse in the region of (CEDMAA) both South African capital and the Portuguese colonialism, Jonathan On the 19th of January the head apartheid government, Jonathan ac hailed Mozambican independence, of Lesotho's Paramilitary Force, tually lost the first post condemned the 1976 Soweto mas General Justice Lekhanya, deposed independence election to the BCP sacre and, his greatest crime i. Prime Minister Chief Leabua in 1970. But Jonathan then merely South Africa's eyes, undermined the Jonathan who had ruled the former seized state power with the sup latter's "grand apartheid" strategy port of the South African trained British Protectorate (once called by refusing, in that same year, to Lesotho Paramilitary Force and Basutoland) since its independence recognize the "independence" of the ruled for some time by decree - de in 1966. The new ruler of this . tiny mountain kingdom quickly ini spite an abortive uprising by one wing of the BCP in 1974 Somewhat paradoxically, a fac tiated talks to end South Africa's tion of the BCP in exile now struck three week blockade of Lesotho. Surprisingly, however, from such a markedly opportunist deal with Goods began to flow across the bor beginnings as a faithful client of Pre South Africa's Bureau of State Se der, and within a week 60 South toria, Jonathan slowly but surely curity (to "ride on the back of the African refugees were expelled from devil to cross the river" as that fac Lesotho. Lesotho's six-man Mili tion's leader put it at the time), tary Council handed over formal ex becoming, under BOSS's aegis, the ecutive power to King Moshoeshoe Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA). II, officially reserving for itself a The LLA was thus available to Pre purely "advisory" role. toria as an instrument for the escala This is Lesotho's second coup tion of sabotage and terror against since independence. Like the ear Lesotho when, after Mugabe's vic lier coup in 1970, it was provoked tory in Zimbabwe and the collapse by South Africa's apartheid govern of South Africa's scheme to create a ment. Yet this latest coup is a far "Constellation of Southern African more complex affair than the earlier States" under its hegemony, Pre one, and though its political con toria lashed out at most of the sequences are not easy to predict, states in the region. But the South they are likely to be contradictory. Africans were also quite capable of Any understanding of the coup and acting more directly, as witnessed its consequences requires a grasp of by the brutal commando raid on the extraordinarily complicated de Maseru in December 1980, when velopments in Lesotho's politics be some 30 ANC members and 12 Ba tween the two coups. sotho citizens were murdered. From Client to Critic of Preto In response, Jonathan both King Moshoeshoe II ria strengthened his ties with various Chief Leabua Jonathan's Basotho turned sharp critic as the 1970s Eastern bloc governments and rein National Party (BNP) emerged in progressed. Personally, Jonathan forced his backing of the ANC, this the late 1950s as a conservative felt betrayed by the meagreness latter move, in particular, winning alternative to the already exist of South Africa's economic assis him some grudging support from ing Basotho Congress Party (BCP). tance and cooperation; in addi radical students and others who With backing from the British tion, he increasingly sought to use might, under other circumstances, colonial administration, conserva "anti-Boer" nationalism as a means have opposed his corrupt and au tive chiefs and Lesotho's power to improve his domestic image af tocratic government. Nonetheless, ful Catholic church, not to men ter the uprising. More gener conservatives within his own party tion South Africa's secret Afrikaner ally, behind him a new generation were increasingly uneasy at some of Broederbond, the BNP squeaked of Basotho technocrats and aspi these developments, as were army out an electoral victory in 1965 rant capitalists was growing increas leaders at the increasing promi and led Lesotho to independence in ingly restive at the extent of South nence, at Jonathan's side, of the 1966. Sidelining King Moshoeshoe African control. Taking strength BNP Youth League (many North

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 Korean-trained and some of them armed). Moreover, a wave of in tensified destabilization from South Africa began in 1983. Sabotage and infiltration increased sharply (e.g. a bomb attack on the Maseru Hilton Hotel and, by extension, against Lesotho's luxury tourist industry); in addition, sporadic border closings were imposed by Pretoria by way of further harrassment. In conse quence, Lesotho was that same year forced to ask the ANC to withdraw large numbers of refugees. Yet it refused, despite pressure to do so from both Pretoria and the United States, to enter into a humiliating security pact with South Africa on the model of the latter's Nkomati Accord with Mozambique. The result? An intensification, in 1984, of South Africa's squeeze play via a second wave of desta bilization. Thus, on the one hand, South Africa orchestrated the for mation of a new formal politi cal opposition group in exile (the Bosotho Democratic Alliance); on the other, it threatened the reduc General Justice Lekhanya (at left) ta tion of Lesotho's quota of migrant Lesotho's coup. workers to South Africa (workers whose remitted wages make up 42% had enabled Jonathan to rally fierce curity pact!) Vincent Makhele, of Lesotho's GNP!), refused the anti-South African sentiment and BNP Secretary-General, very close transit of several key shipments of paper over divisions in his own to the Youth League and Sekho arms to the land-locked country, party. However, once South Africa nyana's successor as Foreign Minis and purposely stalled a crucial joint switched to economic and political ter, led a second, opposed faction. development project (the Highlands pressure after the Nkomati Accord, Water Project). There was then a this fed into growing political ten Two other issues temporary lull in this kind of har sions within the BNP ruling group surfaced, one relating to the election of Septem rassment (in part because of crit itself and opened the way for Preto ber 1985. By the end of 1984 icisms of South Africa's role by ria to provoke a coup. the British government, among oth Jonathan faced strong pressure ers), but in late 1985 South Africa One dimension of this was fierce to hold such an election. His launched its third, and decisive, factional conflict within the BNP, stubborn assertion of independence wave of destabilization. Another mainly over the eventual succession had enhanced Lesotho's reputa brutal attack on Maseru claimed to the aging Jonathan and center tion and Jonathan was awarded nine lives in December. This was ing around the question of the ap the Dag Hammarskjold Peace Prize followed on New Year's Day by the propriate response to South African in December 1984. Yet interna imposition of the total economic destabilization. Planning Minister tional donors, and particularly the blockade against Lesotho which fi Evaristus Sekhonyana led one in Scandinavian countries, were eager fluential nally precipitated the January 19 faction which argued that to see a "restoration of democ Lesotho coup. should sign a pact with the racy". Despite domestic support South African government. (Sekho for Jonathan's anti-South Africa Events Leading Up To the nyana actually lost his second port stance, the BNP had never Coup really folio, that of Foreign Minister, in shed the stigma of usurping power Pretoria's initial use of the LLA 1984 for presuming to begin ne in 1970. An electoral victory would to destabilize Lesotho backfired. It gotiating the details of such a se- establish its legitimacy.

april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT 2NMIUD-

The timing was propitious too. the population became increasingly of the squabbling politicians, King The opposition parties were in dis restive. A week before the coup the Moshoeshoe has long sought to array, the "common front against LPF occupied the Prime Minister's transform the constitutional monar Jonathan" announced by the BCP residence in a still unexplained "mil chy into an executive one. His new (itself badly split) never having itary exercise". General Lekhanya Council of Ministers is based mainly materialized, for example. Yet probably used this display of force on the military and "third force" in Jonathan remained a despot to the to urge Jonathan both to settle with tellectuals he had gathered around last and chose to manipulate the South Africa and disband the Youth him. It covers the political spectrum electoral rules unscrupulously - and, League. from conservatives through to the radical, Moscow-trained, Minister of in all probability unnecessarily Three days before the coup Gen with the result that all 60 BNP can eral Lekhanya led a Lesotho delega Planning, Michael Sefali. Sekho nyana is the only former BNP Min didates were duly declared elected tion to negotiate with South Africa. ister who remains in the govern without a contest. In consequence, Prime Minister Jonathan still re ment, now as Finance Minister, and Jonathan's authoritarian image was fused to accept the South African only one of the former opposition merely reinforced, both internation demands, and announced the day parties is represented (the Marema ally and domestically. before the coup that he would now Tlou Freedom Party). seek direct assistance from Cuba Second, as previously men whose Foreign Minister was visit A week following the coup, tioned, the growing influence of the ing Maseru at the time. This decla Planning Minister Sefali informed Youth League and its often ques ration provided the anti-communist the Harare SADCC meeting that tionable methods brought it into Lekhanya with the pretext to seize Lesotho's commitment to SADCC conflict with General Lekhanya's power. It seems obvious that he remained firm, that it would not to Pre Paramilitary Force. Lekhanya, him had already privately agreed sign a security agreement with Pre self a highly conservative Catholic toria's demands and informed the toria, and would not allow it and fierce anti-communist was South African government of his self to be used against the in deeply disturbed, in any case, by planned coup. ternational campaign for sanctions what he saw as the Youth League's On January 19th the LPF over against South Africa. However "radicalism". Then, emboldened threw Jonathan. Five people were Lesotho's sovereignty has clearly by the outcome of the elections killed in a shootout which seems been deeply compromised, and it and with its domination of the to have disposed of the more di will be very difficult for the new BNP seemingly secure, the Youth rect challenge to the LPF chain government to maintain an anti League faction appeared to seek of command from the BNP Youth South African position, even if it control of the Paramilitary Force it League (as Africa Confidential del wants to. While the government self. While, for starters, the Youth icately put the point). Lekhanya is clearly popular domestically, its League looked to the replacement immediately dispatched former For room to manoeuvre is severely re of General Lekhanya as LPF Com eign Minister Sekhonyana to Cape stricted. Lesotho is totally de mander, Lekhanya's own efforts to Town to negotiate. Since, as seen, pendent on South Africa econom persuade Jonathan to rein in the Sekhonyana was dismissed in 1984 ically, and even a radical govern Youth League failed. for advocating an agreement with ment would be able to do little to South Africa this was a clear sig change this. Thus the inclusion of It was this growing tension be nal of an intention to comply with a Marxist Planning Minister in the tween the Youth League and the Pretoria's demands. The blockade Cabinet is little more than a ges Paramilitary Force which finally ceased and 60 refugees were rapidly ture to national unity. The very gave South Africa a context for suc expelled. broad base of the government must cessful intervention. Pretoria again in fact lead to divisions within it, demanded a formal security pact and a consolidation of the position Implications of the Coup obliging Lesotho to expel refugees of the King. Lesotho does not have whom South Africa claimed were Despite support for Jonathan's anti the same kind of royalist tradition ANC personnel, and giving South South African stance, his corrupt as Swaziland, and its class struc Africa the right to vet all fu and despotic government had never ture does not really lend itself to the ture refugees in Lesotho. When been really popular, and few Ba same sort of consolidation of royal Jonathan again refused, a total sotho mourned its demise. The ist power. Yet, as noted, the King blockade was imposed at the be hand over of formal executive power has long wanted effective executive ginning of 1986. Supplies of food, to King Moshoeshoe II by the power for the monarchy, and can be petroleum products and medicine Military Council was a popular expected to try to consolidate and rapidly dried up in Lesotho and move. Though identified with none extend it. (continued on page 13)

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 5 Angola: Tough Road Ahead

BY STEVE GODFREY tos has carried out a reorganization an inner cabinet - around the Pres and The governing MPLA-PT party faces of the party and government, ident able to take a more effective changes in minis formidable new challenges in the com made substantial control in executive management of ing year due to renewed US support terial and party leadership. the affairs of state. to the rebel movement UNITA and a More importantly, the day-to In announcing the change dos catastrophic fall in oil revenues - the day management of the economy Santos stated that the "new work mainstay of the economy. At the same has moved more firmly into minis ing style" of ministers of state would time there have been important polit terial hands with the establishment overcome "a lack of mechanisms to ical changes in Angola. Steve Godfrey of three new Ministers of State ensure coordination of the execution of Inter Pares, recently returned from for Production, Economic and So and control of decisions." Angola, reports. cial Affairs, and State Inspection. Whilst debate at the Congress The Second Congress of the MPLA Two new members of the politburo, was muted on a number of sub held in Luanda in December saw Maria Mambo Cafe and Loy Van stantive issues such as economic lib major changes in the structure and Dunem head the first two of these. eralization and the black market, leadership of party and govern The streamlining of the state struc a number of important criticisms ment. The most dramatic changes tures in the economic sphere by prevailed. Among these was the were the departure from the polit the appointment of three "super need to make party organization buro of party secretary Lucio Lara ministers" closely associated with more dynamic and geared to pop and other seemingly permanent el the President will improve coordina ular needs. In his closing address ements in the leadership of the tion between the economy and De to the Congress, President dos San Angolan revolution such as Ludy fence and Security, External Rela tos stated that "more effort must Kissassunga, Evaristo Kimba and tions and Justice (which already re be made to improve the Party's Joao Neto Xieto. In the ensuing port directly to the President). It working style and methods, combat three months President dos San- creates a small group of ministers - ting the tendency to bureaucratize

april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT ffila ""(I central and intermediate structures, the changes there is recognition that overlapping and varied rather than which has negative effects on the an infusion of new blood was needed in clear "blocks." The new leader base organizations." Significantly, to provide a fresh impetus in coming ship will miss the experience of some dos Santos himself has taken over to grips with the enormous problems of its former members. It remains to the party responsibility for organi of poor economic performance, and be seen how far greater likeminded zation, replacing Lucio Lara. In ad the coordination of national efforts. ness and a fresh approach will suc dition two new departments - for As a result, the role of the party will ceed in compensating for this. agrarian policy and for youth and be more strategic with the govern Economic Policy mass organizations - have been cre ment able - because its key leaders ated to build greater involvement at more effectively dominate the party Discussion on key problems in the grassroots. Other changes in hierarchy-to get on with the job of the economy was muted at the the party secretariat are substantial: governing. Politically, the removal Congress: ideological skirmishes six departments dissolved or merged from the centre of power of con were avoided. Nevertheless, the and some nine department heads re vinced Marxists such as Lucio Lara, dominant trend in party thinking moved from their posts. As a result and former foreign minister Paulo is towards greater decentralization and democratization of economic the majority of the thirteen depart Jorge, is interpreted by some as a ment heads are new. Ministerial shift towards more pragmatic poli control. The desperate need to im prove changes are lighter: four new min cies. Other commentators sensitive food production and recon struct isters were appointed up to the end to issues of racial balance emphasize the rural economies is evident to all. But efforts to develop peas of February with another post, that that their departure represents pri of State Security, vacant. Most no ant production in the north and the marily the further "africanization" "experiment" with more decentral table among the ministerial changes of the leadership. was the removal of planning minis ized economic planning in the south ter, Lopo de Nascimento, who be In any case the real effects may west have suffered from poor im comes Commissioner of Huila. be less dramatic than ideological plementation capacity and reticence interpretations suggest. External from some sectors of the party There is no agreement by outside pressures mean that Angola has lit quite apart from the security and observers of the exact significance tle room for manoeuvre in the policy logistical problems. of these changes. Even among An arena, and within the party individ In the international field Angola golans not fully in agreement with ual positions on key policy issues are is likely to continue to expand its

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 7 magom

widespread feeling in the nation that Angola should as far as possible fol low a non-aligned policy in foreign affairs. [The Party Congress, with only a low-key resolution recogniz ing socialist country support, em phasized that Angola does not wish to increase the heavy dependence on these countries which the circum stance of South African destabiliza tion has clearly required.] In the past twelve months An gola has sought to increase its contacts with Canada. Follow economic relations with western na barrel has halved in the last three ing the first ministerial visit to tions. The accession to the Lom6 from $25. As a result An months Canada since Independence by Loy Convention - which brings some gola's national product has roughly Van Dunem and $90 million in aid over five years Trade Minister halved and in March the Politburo Ismael Martins, political relations from the EEC - will boost links austerity pro announced a crash have warmed considerably. In Jan with Europe. However, the polit gram - cutting foreign travel, over uary, the Conservative leader of the ical impact of this opening of eco seas diplomatic missions and ex Senate, Duff Roblin went so far as to nomic relations with the West can ternal telex and telephone costs; publicly disagree with U.S. proposal be overestimated - Angola, due to redefining investment priorities to to back Savimbi. "We're ... having the structure of its main exports wards industrial rehabilitation; and a problem," he said, "because our (oil, diamonds and coffee) has al promoting foreign exchange control policy does not coincide with that ways required close economic ties for foreign companies. with capitalist countries, and the of the U.S." Since defence is the number one current drive is an effort to diver Angola, with its high credit rat priority of the economy and cannot sify economic links with such coun ing, offers good commercial poten be cut, cuts in living standards in tries as Spain, Brazil, Canada and tial for Canada in such sectors as the urban economies are likely to the Nordic States. In particular, oil, gas, transport and communica be sharp - food and other consumer these moves do not, in themselves, tions. In January, the Government imports will probably be hard hit. represent a political shift away from affirmed $30 million cover for An These consequences will be unpopu the socialist block. The Soviet gola by the Export Credit Develop lar and it could be argued will pose a Union itself clearly recognizes the ment Corporation, and commercial more formidable political challenge need of many socialist countries, exchanges are planned during 1986. to the party than even the UNITA eg., Nicaragua and Mozambique, for In addition, the Canadian Coordi problem. western technology and investment. nator for the African Emergency, Foreign and Defence Policy David McDonald, However, the drive for more plu visited Angola in February and added his voice to the ralistic economic relations is part Whilst economic policy is in flux, of an attempt to improve the qual foreign and defence policies are need for Canadian emergency and development assistance ity of foreign, particularly techni likely to remain stable. Cuban to Angola. cal, assistance. As a result, the for and socialist block military assis But whilst CIDA will support eign labour force will be reduced, tance will remain crucial; but the some emergency aid and assistance together with its cost - some $180 dos Santos government will continue through NGOs, the lack of any bi million in 1983. The poor quality of to seek negotiated solutions with the lateral aid program is likely to be technical assistance from the social U.S. and South Africa, and con a block in developing relations. Al ist countries is a frequent complaint tinue to deal with economic rela though, like Mozambique, Angola is heard in the country. tions on a pragmatic case-by- case eligible to receive funds for regional basis. The limits of Angolan flex SADCC projects, it is only a Cat Overshadowing the economic ibility stop at U.S. requests to ne egory III country in its own right plan affirmed by the People's As gotiate with Savimbi, or place the and is not eligible for bilateral aid. sembly in January is a fall in oil security of the country in jeop Despite a strong argument on hu prices - which will devastate the An ardy. Such a policy of dialogue manitarian, development and com golan economy. Oil revenues make has its critics, who argue that the mercial grounds, it is unlikely that up some 85% of Angola's Gross Do results so far have been unimpres Ottawa will upgrade Angola with mestic Product, and the price per sive. But the policy does represent a out further public pressure.

april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT Botswana: Beleaguered Oasis D N " l lWlP) dITPr T I T'I A., S = XAA. flflt. .X* 4Jb~arfl tz shocked in May by the car bomb as This military strategy is a major Peter Gillespie was a CUSO cooperant sassination of refugee Rogers Nkadi escalation of the destabilization war in Botswana and now works for Inter meng, a part-time CUSO worker against Botswana. South Africa, of Pares in Ottawa. and son of SACTU Secretary Gen course, has conducted military oper In mid January of this year, eral John Nkadimeng. In June, ations against other front-line states Botswana braced itself in anticipa the South African military staged a and undertaken covert actions in tion of an attack from South Africa. midnight raid into , killing Botswana in the past. But the June Troops and heavy military equip 12. raid on Gaborone was the first mili ment were stationed around the South Africa denied any respon tary attack against Botswana. As a Botswana capital of Gaborone. One sibility for the attacks on Serache precedent, it makes future military border village in the south was re and Nkadimeng. The raid on action all the more real. portedly deserted, as terrified resi Gaborone, South Africa said, was Why the change in strategy? dents fled the area. an exercise carried out with military In part, military action against Much to everyone's relief, the at precision against members of the Botswana is a reflection of the gen tack didn't materialize. Botswana armed wing of the ANC. The truth eral escalation of war in the region, officials later said that it was only is that the raid was conducted with a war that South Africa is waging the vigourous diplomatic interven all the precision and subtlety of a with increasing desperation. Such tion of the British and Ameri sledgehammer. None of those killed attacks detract attention away from cans that prevented the attack. in the raid were military targets nor rapidly expanding dissent within South African Foreign Minister remotely associated with armed ac South Africa and contribute to the 'Pik' Botha once again accused tivity. Victims included a univer propagandized fiction that guerilla Botswana of harbouring ANC guer sity student, community workers, an activity is conducted from outside rillas and allowing them to mount artist, a civil servant responsible for South Africa's borders. Military ac attacks across the border. Botswana day care, and a six-year old boy. All tion has public relations value for Minister Chiepe responded were unarmed and most were shot in Foreign the right wing constituency and is by saying that the South Africans their beds. were "bullies" and "sabre-rattling" and reiterated her government's pol icy of not allowing Botswana terri tory to be used as a springboard for armed incursions.

This incident is the latest in a series marking a new phase in South Africa's destabilization cam paign against Botswana. In the last 12 months South Africa has em barked on a strategy of murder and military attack designed to terror ize and punish Botswana for its pol icy of sanctuary for South African refugees and its defiance in refusing to sign an Nkomati-type accord. This latest phase was announced in February last year with a mas sive bomb blast which destroyed the Gaborone home of South African exile Nat Serache. Serache, a corre spondent for the BBC and Reuters, miraculously survived the blast and has since fled to Zambia. The nor mally peaceful Gaborone was again

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 WAOW&ME likely a morale booster for an in In the past, South Africa's desta nomic development. South Africa creasingly frustrated and impotent bilization strategy has primarily controls the purse-strings of the South African army, faced with an consisted of selective economic ac union, thus controlling the turnover elusive enemy. tions. The opening of the mili time in revenue payments. The tary option has immediate and trau agreement is more or less binding, But perhaps most importantly, withdrew from the matizing effects; economic actions, since if Botswana the shift to military tactics is evi Union it would forfeit revenues from dence that previous destabilization however, are as punitive and dam aging. the Drevious year. efforts have not achieved the de South Africa continues to use its sired effect. Botswana has remained powerful influence in the Botswana Between a Rock and a Hard firm on its policy related to South economy as a bludgeoning tactic. Place African refugees and intransigent on The recent withdrawal of South the question of an Nkomati-type ac Much like Lesotho and Swaziland, Africa from a soda ash project in the cord. Clearly, past tactics have Botswana is an economic hostage of Sua Pans ensured the speedy col not been successful in bludgeoning South Africa. Deliberately created lapse of the project. Selective sub Botswana into following a more ac as a resource and labour preserve sidization of South African exports ceptable line. for South Africa, Botswana has been to Botswana ensures no local com Botswana's policy on refugees unable to disentangle itself from the petition develops and dependency is tentacles of economic power, control has long been a sore point for South thus maintained. South Africa's ille and influence emanating from the Africa. Because of its proximity to gal occupation of Namibia prevents - and literally, all South Africa, Botswana has become south figuratively the building of a trans-Kalahari rail roads lead to Pretoria. an important centre for exiles and way which is prerequisite to the host to a number of politically active South Africa has a formidable development of Botswana's massive liberation support groups. Groups array of economic tactics at its dis coal reserves. These are power like the MEDU Arts Ensemble, for posal. Botswana is dependent on ful levers to engage in exploiting example, became rallying points for South Africa for most of its im Botswana's economic vulnerability. exiled writers, poets, artists and ports, including fuel. South Africa Dependency and vulnerability, musicians to promote cultural forms prevents Botswana from building then, provide the context for of resistance. Similarly, the Solidar up strategic fuel supplies and could Botswana's development struggle. ity News Service (SNS) was estab quickly bring the country to a halt It is a context which can only change lished by exiles for the express pur with a full blockade. Similarly, when a non-racist, democratic gov pose of gathering and disseminat Botswana products are exported ernment is installed in Pretoria. Un ing information on the struggle from through South African transport til then, the use of terrorism and sources within South Africa. South networks, providing South Africa economic sabotage will inevitably Africa was enraged that such groups with control over access to external increase as the South African regime were openly operating so close to its markets. brings the region to the brink of all borders and made repeated requests South African interests play out war. to the Government of Botswana to a major role in the two largest One of the tragic consequences close them down. Subsequently, sources of government revenue in of this escallation is increased mil both MEDU and SNS were key tar Botswana. The South African cor itarization, both in the region gen gets in the Gaborone attack. The poration Anglo-American controls erally and in Botswana. Botswana SNS office and equipment were de the copper mines at Selebi-Phikwe is now diverting scarce resources to stroyed and several MEDU mem as well as the vitally important arming itself. The Botswana De bers were targeted for assassination. diamond industry through its De fence Force is being trained by the In attacking Botswana, South Beers subsidiary. Botswana's re elite British SAS and there have Africa is also attempting to sow in source industry is thus firmly under been American promises of military aid in the form of helicopters. ternal dissent around the question of South African control. Botswana refugees. There exists disagreement gains substantial revenue from its Another outcome of this escalla within Botswana related to official membership in the Southern African tion is a new awareness within refugee policy and South Africa is Customs Union, a relic of the colo Botswana of its role and place in clearly attempting to exploit these nial past which integrates the struggle for a free and non divisions. In the aftermath of the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland racist South Africa. Historically, Gaborone attack there were calls into the South African economy. Botswana has been rather like a within Botswana to force refugees The Customs Union ensures that peaceful oasis surrounded by con into camps in the north. Fortu the BLS countries are captive mar flict in the region. South African nately, the government position has kets for South Africa manufactured military attacks have punctured this prevailed. goods and deters self-sufficient eco- illusion.

Africa REPORT april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT ______, ______Defending Apartheid

If some of the dealings of South Africa with its neighbouring govern ments show that sanctions can work, the case of South Africa's arms in dustry shows that the United Na tions ban on sales of arms and re lated materials to South Africa has had more ambiguous results. The ways the ban has been evaded and the way the South African arms in dustry has developed are revealed in two recent articles in two very dif ferent magazines. How the ban con tinues to be implemented will have a real influence on the maintenance of South Africa's military capacity, a: capacity that is directed both to repression inside South Africa and to aggression against surrounding countries. The Bulletin of the Atomic Sci A new three dimensional milling and measuring machine at ARMSCOR is entist for March 1986 carries an arti large enough to handle entire vehicle hulls. cle by Thomas Conrad of the Amer ican Friends Service Committee in government arms sales by other na bargo. South Africa, a nation Philadelphia. With the title and tions. shunned worldwide and thought to theme "South Africa Circumvents "The real record, however, is have lost its access to outside mili Embargo" he writes: mixed, in large part due to the tary technology, has itself grown to 'The officialrecord shows that there failure of the United States and the world's tenth-largest arms man have been no such [arms] shipments other Western nations which are ufacturer. [from the United States] to South deeply and directly involved in the "Pretoriahas added several new Africa for several years; the same South African economy to strictly locally manufactured products to its seems to be true for government-to and resolutely implement the em- arsenal. A relatively well-known one is the G-5 155-millimeter how itzer and its variant, the G-6, two E spinoffs of a system developed in the E late 1970s by the U.S.-Canadian South African firm, Space Research Corporation. Other less well known systems include the Kukri V3 missile, an innovative frequency hopping tactical communications system, a laser rangefinder, a new family of grenade launchers, a new series of mine-resistant counterin surgency vehicles, and new sonar electronics systems. "The fact that South Africa has been able to design, develop, and field these new systems points up one of the major failures of the arms embargo: Pretoria continues

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 2oMo MTh©K______to have commercial access to a vast identification cards, 'provides full the embargo is severely limited... array of advanced foreign products, information on every worker, from [M]uch of South Africa's equipment including systems with direct mil his ethnic group to his merit rating, is obsolete and overworked. ... The itary applications, dual-use com and also keeps tabs on where every embargo has forced South Africa modities, and 'precursor technolo worker is at any given time'." (Re to accept a decline in its net mil gies' vital to whole generations of ported in the Financial Mail of 11 itary capacity that no other in arms. These commodities - foreign July 1980.) dustrial nation of comparable size supplied computers, software, laser would countenance. ... The pivotal technology, electronics, communica question is whether policy-makers in tions technology, and components the United States and other coun are the building blocks of modern tries will stop winking at the strate weaponry." gic commercial trade with Pretoria. The article goes on to say that The lavishly illustrated defense the purchases are usually straight industry trade journal from Paris, commercial transactions duly au Defense 8( Armament in its Jan thorized by the U.S. Departments uary 1986 issue has a lead article on of Commerce and State, often the "South African Armament In with the South African govern dustry". This article confirms some ment arms manufacturing conglom of the above points, if indirectly. erate ARMSCOR. Among the im 'With many factories operating at portant suppliers are Mohawk Data one-third capacity and international Systems (equipment for the ARM pressure on South Africa at its peak, SCOR subsidiary, Kentron, which ... South Africa must export. And makes guided missile systems and to export, it must work on its inter. for other military units and sup nationalimage." pliers in South Africa); Sperry (a computer for ARMSCOR's At The Chairman of ARMSCOR, las Aircraft); and Hewlett-Packard Piet Marais, stresses the importance (computer for ARMSCOR affili of fast and mobile weapons "to move ... from the Angolan Border across ate Naschem). Other suppliers to the country to Mozambique." Pre civilian-owned firms and to gov ernment research bodies who do dictably, he links the development of work for the South African Defense ARMSCOR and its future to "the Force include: Burroughs Corpo arms embargo" and "the amount ration, Digital Equipment Corpo of Soviet equipment coming into ration, IBM Corporation, Control South Africa." "Now these two Data, Amdahl Corporation. The ac things were orchestrated to happen tivities which these sales may have together." It is interesting that, in enhanced include: missile design, ARMSCOR frequency hoppi.ng response to a question about riot fingerprint storage, signal process tactical radio control equipment, he does see the ing, and counterinsurgency vehicle importance of developing weapons design. Typical of the comments on calculated to control the black pop the computer companies confronted ulation: U.S. computer corporations also with the above facts was that The definition of these weapons is supply the agencies which control of John Emmerich of Ontel: 'A very difficult. First of all, you don't and manage the black population of general-purpose computer could want to maim or kill people; you South Africa. One such application have many applications. We don't just want to neutralize them. Some has expanded "surveillance of black have any knowledge of what they times they are as close as 25 me workers at the workplace:" use it for." tres. Then the stonethrowing will "A microprocessormade by the U.S. Conrad concludes: take place up to 150 metres. So you electronics manufacturer Ontel Cor have the problem that the rubber poration functions as the electronic "Though flawed and inadequately enforced, bullet that can be effective at 150 brain of a locally assembled worker the arms embargo is be ginning metres will kill or maim someone at monitoring network which has been to have a negative effect on South Africa's 25 metres. We have asked them to installed in over 25 mines. The military potential. •... [T]he capacity of the sit down and work out their speci 'Labour Information System', which growing in digenous fications. Then you find that con reads workers' arms industry spawned by electronically coded ditions can vary. In the urban ar-

april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT 12 april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT ______o M©Th©©Jk eas, the people are in concentrated as advise the elements and organi One other question was: "Do crowds. When you are out in the zations of those other countries... you feel your soldiers are well pre townships, they are spread out wide. I will not deny that SWAPO and the pared to cope with the current un So the equipment must be differ ANC started out in the 1950's as rest situation?" ent. We are setting about this in champions of internal ideals, fight "Yes, even if this is not the primary a very scientific way, just to get ing for more rights, etc. But this role of the Army. After all we have their thinking right. Once we know been mentalized for use of the Army what they want, then we can de in this role. It happened in 1922, velop something. Another concept 1948, 1949, in the late 1950s, 1960, we are working on is throwing up 1976, 1984. Recent military history blockades with rolls of barbed wire. is full of cases where we did just this But we have not been tasked to work sort of thing." on this yet. In his interview with Defense & On the question of being effec Armaments, General J. J. Gelde tive "in a time of shrinking bud nuys, the newly appointed Com gets", the Commander brags: mander of the South African De fense Force made much of the So "We have a record of cost-effective viet presence in the region, paxticu utilization of the SADF. For in laly their aid to SWAPO forces and stance, we have the smallest ratio FAPLA (Angolan army) and their of soldiers per terrorist in any war growing capacity to intervene mili of insurgency, except for Rhodesia tarily in the region. More reveal roughly 1.9 troops per SWAPO ter ing, however, was his response to the rorist. I don't want to evaluate our question "What do you think is the operations by a hit count. But we greatest threat South Africa faces inflict more casualties on the enemy today, the external arms build-up or per contact than any other case I the internal unrest?" know." There is a linkage between the two. was a long time ago. Today, if the Because if you have the ANC infil Soviet Union does not have com Thus do the developers and trating to place mines and commit plete control of these organizations, the commanders of South Africa's acts of sabotage, they come from the they do have a very strong hand on machinery for war and repression same places, and have the same ad them, and ... they do use them to "work on their government's im visors and the same organizations, achieve their own goals. age".

level the bully boy tactics have to the armed struggle. So at this worked again. level Pretoria has achieved little. It (continuedLesotho from page 5) Coup The use of the big stick against may also have really damaged itself. By provoking the coup the South Jonathan was probably also de The blockade against Lesotho has sharply undermined African government seems to have signed to show to the far right op Pretoria's own had both regional and domestic ob position that P.W. Botha's govern propaganda offensive against sanc jectives. It has succeeded in forcing ment is doing something to stem tions. If it is admissible for South Lesotho to crack down on the ANC. the mass revolt inside South Africa. Africa to force political change in The new government may well not Since the right has always ascribed Lesotho through sanctions, presum sign a formal security agreement. all black resistance to "external ag ably it is admissible to use sanc Yet despite the brave claims at the itators", the evident use of South tions to try to do the same in SADCC meeting, Lesotho is now African power will have pleased South Africa. Moreover as the coup clearly going to have to allow Preto them. But it has done nothing to proved, sanctions work. ria to decide which refugees can re solve the acute crisis confronting the main in Lesotho. The coup further apartheid state. Botha's problems Finally, however, the Pretoria demonstrates to regional govern are internal not external, and as provoked coup simply re-emphasizes ments that as the Pretoria regime the sharp escalation of ANC armed that so long as apartheid sur gets ever more desperate, it will actions in the 18 months follow vives, peace and political stability escalate efforts to bend southern ing the Nkomati Accord showed, se in Southern Africa will remain a African states to its will. At this curity Pacts are also no solution chimera.

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 _ __ fm m It ______Looking at SADCC Presently, SADCC's primary SADCC States goal is the integration and devel opment of regional transportation and communication links. Mozam bique coordinates these areas - a sound choice given that its ports are the only real alternative to South Africa's, on which most SADCC states are currently dependent. As six- SADCC countries are land locked, the development of these ports is fundamental to lessening South Africa's control in the region. Certain rail lines already in place and linking the member states are being rehabilitated and new lines The article that follows is based on a are being built. bined GDP of US$27 billion. Min seminar on SADCC which TCLSAC erals and energy are the basis of hosted in Toronto, March 22, 1986. Re the region's exports and the poten SECTORAL source people Dan O'Meara from CID RESPONSIBILITIES tial for its wealth. Oil, coal, elec MAA and Steve Godfrey of INTER tricity, gold, copper, chrome, cobalt PARES provided us with a stimulat Angola Energy Conservation and other minerals are all exported. ing day of colid information and useful and Development In spite of these riches, however, ideas about the Southern African De Botswana Agricultural Research SADCC countries are among the velopment Coordination Conference. and Animal Disease poorest in the world and have been Control What Is SADCC? Lesotho Soil and Water severely hit, as export-dependent economies, by the world recession. The Southern African Conservation Development and Land Utilisation; No SADCC country's annual per Coordination Conference, SADCC, Tourism capita income exceeds US$900 and was formed in 1980 Malawi Fisheries, Wildlife and and comprises in three it is less than US$300. De the states Forestry of Angola, Botswana, pendence on a single export com Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Mozambique Transport and Communications modity makes countries vulnerable Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Swaziland Manpower Development and for three member states one Zimbabwe. It explicitly aims to re Tanzania Industrial Development product accounts for more than two Zambia Southern Africa duce economic dependence on South thirds of its total exports (oil in An Africa and develop economic coop Development Fund and Mining gola; diamonds in Botswana; cop eration and integration among the Zimbabwe Food Security per in Zambia) for another three be nine countries in the region. tween one- and two-thirds (coffee in The model SADCC chose to A quick look at the rail, road, Tanzania; sugar in Swaziland; to achieve its goals is unique: each communication and power grids in bacco in Malawi). As with most member state has assumed respon dicates the enormity of the task that export economies, industry is woe sibility for a particular aspect of the integration of these infrastruc fully underdeveloped. Zimbabwe is the regional economies and coordi tures involves, as well as pointing to the only semi-industrialized country nates joint projects within their in the history of underdevelopment in among the nine although Mozam dividual sector. There are 17 sec the region and within the nine coun bique, Angola and Tanzania have tors, and projects are undertaken tries. some industrial development. by two or more member states; any project vetoed by even one of the The combined human and natu With the exception of Angola nine countries is rejected. Another ral resources of the area hold great and Tanzania, SADCC countries are notable characteristic of SADCC is promise and it is these resources locked into South Africa in three its remarkable lack of bureaucracy SADCC is determined to channel. major ways - transport, labour and - there are only three SADCC offi Sixty-five million people are rep as markets for South Africa's man cials. resented in SADCC with a com- ufactured goods. The position of

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT tr(Kmt nnmw0

.e' -

Mozambican militias arrive at Machipanda on the border of Zimbabwe on a train carrying goods for Zimbabwe.

Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland SADCC and South Africa geographically and politically ties and pressures) and dirict and indi them even more closely to South Given that 14% of South Africa's ex rect military aggression focussed on Africa. Along with Namibia, they ternal trade is with Africa - mostly the frontline states. South Africa hoped to consolidate are formally connected to one an with southern Africa - any lessening ite powerful other and South Africa through of this dependence poses a threat to economic position through the for mation of its South Africa's "Southern Africa South Africa. As well, the wealth of Constellation of South African States Customs Union", a common tar natural and human resources in the in 1979. South Africa's hopes hinged iff union in which customs and fis region plays no small part in South on getting a pliant black government in power in cal decisions affecting member coun Africa's determination to maintain Zimbabwe to balance against the so tries directly are made in South its control. cialist governments of Angola and Africa without their participation. The 1970s saw not only the es Mozambique. Historical and eco tablishment of radical, black To add to these grim facts, major nomic ties would bring Zambia and SADCC countries were among the ity governments in southern Africa Zaire into the economic and so worst hit by the recent drought. with their powerful message to cial Constellation. There could be While it appears that the worst is blacks inside South Africa, but also no doubt that Botswana, Lesotho the re-emergence over and some states are predicting of black opposition and Swaziland would soon follow. self-sufficiency and even surpluses inside, particularly in the formation When ZANU-PF defeated the com of militant black in food, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho trade unions and promised Muzorewa in Zimbabwe's and Mozambique continue to have the student movement. elections, South Africa's hopes for food crises. This fact makes it even Against this background the CONSAS were dashed. Then began more difficult at the present moment South African government, in 1978, the shift of the "total strategy" to for them to break their links with developed its "total strategy" com military aggression. If there could South Africa. bining economic actions (incentives not be a forced economic union then

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 15 Mmmt nnom( 110 states would be beaten into submis bique's coordination of transporta port of $125 million in 1984, to be sion. Regional aggression was aided tion and communication within spread over the following five years. by Reagan's "constructive engage SADCC, there was some fear that The support of several U.N. agen ment" policy, which handed South Nkomati spelled the end of the ex cies, Commonwealth funds, some Africa virtual carte blanche to es periment. But South Africa could Arab countries, China, Brazil, and calate terror throughout southern not or would not deliver its part of India have all helped SADCC real Africa. the bargain - the MNR aggression ize its objective of a diversified base Through a combination of eco has continued and the promise of of support. nomic incentives and military ter food stabilization and economic in Canadian support centres on the ror, South Africa forced a num vestment never materialized. The development of rail links, research ber of its neighbors to sign agree war in Angola rages on and as and training in the food sector, as ments. In exchange for signing a sumes even graver implications with sistance in the integration of electri non-aggression pact in 1982, Swazi Reagan's recent pledges of increased cal power grids, and soil, water and land gained an extra $50 million un aid to UNITA. The reappearance of forestry management and conserva der SACU and received assistance in Holden Roberto on the scene illus tion. trates all too well that "constructive building a railway line to the South The importance of SADCC is African port facilities of Richard's engagement" is continuing it's albeit somewhat rocky marriage to "total fundamental during the present Bay. The pattern was repeated phase of the South African libera strategy". throughout the region - in 1980-81, tion struggle and in the future. The for example, 40% of Lesotho and The aim of "total strategy" was point has been made by SADCC Swaziland's national budgets came to tighten South Africa's economic officials - SADCC is essential irre from SACU. and social dominance in southern spective of who is in power in Sorth The perceived radical threat Africa, disrupt the socialist govern Africa. ments completely and cut off all ex posed by Angola and Mozam governmental and ternal support for the ANC. Has it Canadian bique called for less subtle tac NGO involvement in the region succeeded? Perhaps to some de tics, made possible by the climate must focus more clearly and vigour gree. SADCC member states have provided by "constructive engage ously on the important components ment". Through its support to the been forced to withdraw support for for change - support for the ANC the ANC; MNR in Mozambique and UNITA war and drought have and the , the appli in Angola, South Africa assumed a forced economic reliance not only cation of economic sanctions against relentless bombardment of the po to continue but in some instances the present regime, support for the to increase; projects litical and economic structures in developed to activities of South Africa's internal cut dependence - rail, road and these two countries. In the four progressive forces, and increasing communication links in particular year period from 1980 to 1984 these economic support for the SADCC have been sabotaged and destroyed. attacks cost the Angolan economy countries and projects. For exam However, the ANC continues its at US$10 billion and Mozambique's ple, Mozambique is at present a cat tacks against strategic installations economy US$3.8 billion. It seems - inside South Africa; black militancy egory 3 country aid must be ap obvious that the key positions oc proved at the Cabinet increases and strengthens daily; the level. This cupied by Angola and Mozambique is an important target for change, in SADCC, as well as the inclina superfederation of Jabour unions, COSATU, has emerged as a tremen in order to permit agencies such as tion of their governments, fuelled CIDA a more unfettered involve the viciousness of South Africa's at dous step toward black trade union ment in a country so crucial to tacks. The losses suffered in hu unity and the international commu SADCC's prospects. man terms are incalculable. Reel nity has been forced to increasingly ing from these attacks and the war question, if not yet to cut, its sup Support for sanctions must be induced famine, Mozambique signed port for the apartheid state. The de linked to support for SADCC, if we a non-aggression pact, the Nkomati struction of vital projects not with are truly concerned about the re Accord, and Angola the Lusaka standing, SADCC continues to at Agreement, both in 1984. These tract more support from a growing gional economic damage and dislo cations that the application of sanc agreements generated tremendous number of countries. tions will have. In the immediacy of debates, interpreted by some as vic the present struggle there is a ten tories for Mozambique and Angola, Canada and SADCC dency to lose sight of the future vi by others as capitulation especially Initial support for SADCC came sion - the economic richness and po significant as their governments cut from the nordic states and the EEC tential of the region being fully de off support for the ANC. (with the exception of the U.K. and veloped with South Africa a partner Significant now, however, is the West Germany, who contribute a in the process, no longer a focus of failure of Nkomati. Given Mozam- pittance). Canada announced sup- aggression and destabilization.

api 96 SotenAriaRPR april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT ______©~lwn-~___ J ______The Hiddei of Aparthe BY CLAUDETTE CHASE We are all by now familiar with the overtly violent tactics the South African government uses to con trol the lives of blacks and main tain the economic privileges enjoyed by whites. The news media (be fore they were banned from areas of confrontation) supplied numerous photos and film clips of riot police attacking blacks with guns, tanks and tear gas. These armed attacks have led to the death of over 1250 Africans in the last year. The world has reacted in hor ror to these deaths and much in ternational support for black South Africans has been mobilized to op pose the police state tactics em ployed by P.W. Botha and his back ers. However, there is a covert vi olence going on that takes the lives of tens of thousands of blacks each year, yet receives little or no news coverage. In the wealthiest African country, African people are dying from diseases directly attributable and children are the ones who have clean water, overcrowded housing to poverty and lack of health care. been forced to relocate to these re and the stress of no work-all of serves. Although advertised by the which sap people's strength, leaving Disease: A Political Weapon South African government as ar them vulnerable to disease. Health care issues in South Africa eas where blacks can support them Integrally related to bantustan are inextricably bound to the so selves by farming, the reality is that policies and is the migrant cioeconomic system that apartheid the tiny land area set aside for re labour system. Under this system, is structured to maintain. A desire serves cannot begin to feed the large people are only given passes to be in to preserve the status quo privileges population of people forced to live white areas if they have a job. This of whites permeates all health poli there. , one of the so-called means the families are left behind to cies and explains the wide discrep independent homelands, is a good hope the worker is able to send part ancy in disease patterns and levels example of life in the . of his wages home. The worker is of health between blacks and whites. Only 15% of the land can be farmed only able to return if his contract ex Two of the most important socioe there and 90% of the people have pires or he has become too ill or old conomic factors which impact on the either plots too small to farm or no to work. Because of a new system of health of black South Africans are land at all. Clean water, recognized contract labour passed in 1968, this bantustan policies and the migrant as an essential step in stopping the means some workers spend as little labor system. spread of communicable disease, is as two weeks a year with their fami The bantustans, only 14% of available to less than half of Ciskei's lies. The return of ill workers to the South Africa's total land area, have population. Unemployment (no ac homelands guarantees that a steady been designated as "homelands" for curate official figures are available) stream of diseases is carried back to blacks by the minority government. is estimated at 35%. Life in the those already weakened by malnu Unemployed and ill people, women bantustans involves hunger, lack of trition and overcrowded conditions.

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 ~~Th1 ~

Statistics: The Government Si- pose an atrocious health record. tail here: tuberculosis, malnutri lence UNICEF figures show the infant tion and women's gynecological ill mortality rate for whites at 14/1000 nesses. The common denominator Research in South Africa is difficult live births as compared to 80/1000 to these three problems for black to conduct. There are no accurate live births for Africans. By look South Africans is that they are all intensified by the living conditions state figures in many areas that are ing at combined sources such as readily available in all other devel- independent studies, hospital sur associated with apartheid; all are at among black South oped nations. The government ei- veys and informed individuals we epidemic levels Africans. ther doesn't keep or refuses to re- are able to examine some of the gen lease vital statistics on infant mor- eralized health issues faced by the tality rates and common communi- black population as well as problems Tuberculosis: Barometer of So cable diseases (e.g. measles). We more specific to age, gender, occu Conditions know, thanks to the independent ef- pation and geographic location. cial forts of committed researchers, that Of the myriad of health is Tuberculosis is part of South they don't keep these statistics be- sues blacks contend with, three Africa's colonial legacy and demon cause the information would ex- will be examined in closer de- strates the link between socioe conomic factors and poor health. Brought originally by white colonists, it only reached epidemic proportion with the development of mining and the influx of infected white workers from England and Europe. Tuberculosis is a disease that thrives on poverty, overcrowd ing and poor working conditions. Healthy, well-fed individuals may become carriers if exposed to the bacillus, but the disease usually be comes active only in those whose resistance is weakened by malnutri tion or the heavy exposure one gets living or working in crowded, poorly ventilated quarters. Black miners, forced to live in crowded barracks, to work ten hour shifts and to exist on only enough food to keep going, certainly meet these criteria. Living and working conditions at the mines are responsible for the men contracting the disease and the migrant labor system is responsi ble for them spreading it to their families. According to the South African National Tuberculosis Asso ciation, between 50,000 and 60,000 new cases are reported each year and at least ten people die every day from this treatable disease. Nei ther the advent of drugs to treat tuberculosis or BCG immunization which increases resistance to the dis ease has halted the epidemic among blacks. In contrast, whites, with their adequate diets and comfort able living quarters, seldom contract Women collecting water at a tap in Crossroads tuberculosis. Whites comprise a

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT mere 0.5% of the population with creased rate of cervical cancer and in a pediatrician in Durban, has es the active disease, leaving black South Africa poor nutrition and the timated that 30,000 South African Africans to make up most of the unavailability of proper gynecologi children die of malnutrition every remaining 99.5%. Without proper cal care strengthen the relationship. year. Forty children die of kwash nutrition, adequate land space and South Africa has one of the high iorkor and marasmus each day in well-ventilated working conditions, est rates of cervical cancer in the the area of only one hospital in thousands will continue to die of this world with 35.6 per 1000 screened Pietermaritzburg. At a United Na preventable, treatable disease. women having been diagnosed with tions conference in 1980 it was re the disease. In 1980 the government ported that '75 children (African Women's Health stopped paying for pap smears, a and Coloured) are dying every day from lack of proper and adequate people to the bantustans simple diagnostic test for early de Banishing food". and creating the economic need for tection of cervical cancer. thousands to participate in the mi Cervical cancer and STD's can Perhaps after the staggering grant labour system has turned the be controlled by comprehensive numbers of starving people we've lives of most black women in South community health programs. The heard about in Ethiopia, it would Africa into one continuous strug government has chosen to not take be difficult to not have a certain im gle for survival. The interests of basic preventive actions. This iner munity to these statistics. What the South African government are tia is one effective way to undermine makes it real is to read the com served by keeping blacks from devel the health and strength of black ments made by parents: "We are oping stable communities and rela women, yet the government doesn't being forced to live in places where tionships. The courage and strength always just sit back and let things we find no work or food, and have of black South African women has take their course. The widespread witnessed the painful death of our thwarted state desires to prevent a use of Depo-provera for birth con children through starvation." The sense of community from develop trol shows that the state is also obscene contrast between well-fed ing, as these women have shown the quite capable of taking the offensive white children and black children ability to organize and support each against women. This drug, linked literally starving to death is per other under even the desperate con to breast cancer, prolonged infertil haps the strongest indictment of the ditions of the townships and bantus ity and lethal blood clots, has been South African government. South tans. The government has had lit banned in the U.S. since 1978. It is African Minister of Health, Dr. Van tle success in defeating the women's given as an injection that works to der Merwe, demonstrates govern spirits but their policies have cer prevent conception for three to six ment insensitivity to the question of tainly worked to weaken women's months. Women who have no access black children starving to death by bodies. to safer methods of birth control or attributing the problem to %ncon trolled breeding". Malignant neglect South Africa's medical care sys who want certain jobs must accept these injections. characterizes the health care situa tem is set up with a heavy em tion for blacks in South Africa. This and research. phasis on treatment hidden violence kills tens of thou Only 4% of the total health budget Malnutrition sands of people yearly. When the goes to preventative care and com government veers from this policy of munity health. The lack of these Very few black South Africans have proper nutrition. People don't make inaction it is only to further weaken services, combined with the break the health of people already debili down of social structures inherent the wages in urban areas to eat a well-balanced diet and there is no tated by malnutrition, tuberculosis under apartheid has led to a situ and other communicable diseases. ation where sexually transmissable longer enough land in rural areas to support even subsistence agricul As long as the socioeconomic condi diseases (STD's) are readily spread tions perpetuated by apartheid ex and no effort is made to treat them. ture. The extent of malnutrition is well documented by numerous non ist, so will these illnesses. Women are left the most vulner governmental studies. These stud Resources used for this article include: able and suffer the most pain and ies attempt to fill in the gap left *For Their Triumphs and For Their longterm ill effects from STD's. One when the government took kwash Tears by Hilda Bernstein study estimated that 25% of rural iorkor and marasmus (nutritional * The South African Disease: Apartheid black women have syphilis. Syphilis diseases) off the list of notifiable dis Health and Health Services by Cedric de and gonorrhea can cause severe ab eases in 1966. Rather than deal Beer dominal pain and result in perma with the problem, they just stopped *South African Women on the Move by nent infertility. keeping statistics on nutritional dis the Vukani Makhosikazi Collective Research shows that STD's are eases. Children pay the most for in * The Apartheid Handbook by Roger commonly associated with an in- adequate diets. Professor A. Moosa, Omond.

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 T-______Coke Adds Artificial Sweetener: Buying Into the Black Opposition BY JAMES CASON AND MICHAEL FLESHMAN In a surprise announcement in late March, the Coca-Cola Company an nounced that it was forming a se ries of "Equal Opportunity Funds" to support black economic devel opment in South Africa. The funds, which will be administered by a board of prominent South Africans, including anti-apartheid campaigners Bishop Desmond Tutu and Rev. Allan Boesak, are to be started with a $10 million grant from Coke. According to a Coca Cola spokesperson in Atlanta, the funds are to support "education, housing, health care and business opportunities, particularly business opportunities". L Just a few days before the Things going better with Coke announcement, another ma Coke? jor American investor in apartheid, It did not go unnoticed among nothing to do with aiding black Citibank, announced it was begin U.S. business and government lead South Africans; in fact the Harvard ning to provide loans at preferential ers that workers at the formation of administration made no serious ef rates to black businessmen. COSATU late last year denounced forts to contact representatives of There is little question here in not only apartheid but also capi black South Africans. Instead, the the U.S., however, about what moti talism. The angry denunciations Harvard activists charged, the pro vates these companies' rush to help of apartheid, the U.S. and capital gram was designed to support the black South Africa - both have been ism in general that have become status quo and to divert attention targetted for specific consumer boy regular features at mass demonstra away from efforts to force Harvard cotts in the U.S. and these steps tions and funerals in recent years to divest its more than $400 million are clearly attempts to deflect the have conjured up fears that a fu in South African related stocks. growing divestment movement. It is ture, black majority-ruled South particularly noteworthy that Coca Africa might adopt a harshly anti Another conference in January, Cola chose Tutu and Boesak - two capitalist, pro-socialist perspective. sponsored by the Johnson Founda oft-quoted advocates of divestment In reacting to the trend, the U.S. tion (of the Johnson Wax Corpo - as members of the foundation's has developed a number of programs ration with investments in South board, although at Southern Africa that are designed ultimately to di Africa), encouraged U.S. students to "support REPORT press time there was some rect any future transition in South their non-white counter controversy over the terms of their Africa in a more capitalist direction. parts who seek a higher education participation. Thus Harvard University late in South Africa where, in time, they will have responsibility for sharing Less well-known, however, is last year set up a $1 million fund to "aid black South in the leadership of their nation". that these corporate initiatives are Africans" and an part of a broader - and growing nounced that its first project would And the president of Tufts Uni effort by corporations, universities, be to send Harvard students to versity, Jean Mayer, has set up a foundations and private groups to South Africa as interns with pro fund that provides money for blacks promote the development of a black, grams beneficial to blacks. The to attend university in South Africa pro-capitalist middle class in South program, as Harvard anti-apartheid (whites, of course, get government Africa. activists quickly pointed out, had funding). Mayer, an energetic critic

api 96 SotenAriaRPR april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT of divestment, argues that his fund makes "a strong contribution.. .to the dismantling of apartheid and the preparation of a non-white profes sional and politically sophisticated class in South Africa". These programs are certainly di rected at defusing pressures for di vestment, but they may also be part of a growing acceptance of a U.S. policy toward South Africa that has been advocated by a few liberal foundations for a number of years. In this "liberal option", articulated most succinctly in the 1981 Rocke feller Foundation study Time Run ning Out a transition to black ma jority rule is inevitable in South and, increasingly, students and was driven home in early March workers in the black urban town Africa in the relatively near future when the White House strongly cen ships. sured Crocker for suggesting that and the task for the U.S. is to man ANC in South Africa might have age that transition. Thus Time At the State Department, the within it some legitimate freedom Running Out argued for closer U.S. Chester Crocker's "constructive en fighters. links to black organizations, for U.S. gagement" policy even seems to efforts to promote black leadership have adopted some of these pro The failure of constructive en and business training and for a dis grams. In 1981 Crocker was declar gagement made most obvious by the tancing of American policy from ing that "In South Africa it is sustained black rebellion in South apartheid through open condemna not our task to choose between Africa has forced the U.S. establish tions of the whole government. black and white" and in the en ment, both in an out of government, to scramble for new policies that Such a policy clearly seems to tire period January 1982 to De cember 1984 the Assistant Secre protect their interests. This sudden be the intent behind many of the tary managed only to meet with new interest in "black opportunity" programs described above, but per that a major new focus of haps even more interesting is that 16 black South Africans. But in suggests stark contrast, Crocker now regu future U.S. policy will be efforts to this policy appears to be gaining create a pro-capitalist, pro-western some currency among sectors of the larly condemns apartheid and drops middle class. Or to put it conservative and neo-conservative in to visit with black leaders in black Soweto on most of his trips to South more crudely, to buy off as broad or establishment. The conservative Africa. The U.S. has also substan "authentic" a portion of the black churchman Richard Neuhaus, direc tially beefed up its aid programs opposition as possible - hence the tor of the Centre for Religion and inside the country, with over $20 significance of Tutu's and Boesak's Society, thus recently signed on to million in projects this year pro decision to sit on the board of Coke. an Anglo-American funded study project, "South Africa Beyond moting programs for, among oth As U.S. policy comes to include ers, entrepreneurial training and ed Apartheid", that seeks to "outline corporate carrots as well as govern Herman and evaluate a range of strategic ucation. Even Ambassador ment sticks it will become increas options for post-Apartheid South Nickel, who in 1984 declared that ingly difficult for anti-apartheid ac Africa". Black neo-conservative white minority rule would last un tivists to maintain the momentum Bayard Rustin, who in February til at least the next century, and on divestment. Difficult but not im hosted UNITA leader Jonas Sav that U.S. policy should focus on the possible. imbi at his New York office, has whites, is now overseeing the $2.5 The Harvard students' 48-page just set up a "Project South Africa" million human rights fund that gives critique of their school's program, to encourage Americans to estab grants to black organizations for le for example, lays bare the political and promo lish direct links with individuals and gal training, education intentions of the liberal option and groups in South Africa that are tion of private enterprise. may have increased pressure on Har "waging the struggle in a demo This is not to suggest, how vard to divest by focussing attention cratic, nonviolent manner", and op ever, that a consensus on policy back on black South Africans' de pose the armed opposition offered even within the Reagan adminis mands for divestment and true lib by the African National Congress, tration has emerged. That point eration.

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 moo0 0 mbJt ______Stamp News BY TOM WHELAN The ad reads (in part): "Postage a Midwestern industrialist to trade stamps may change the course of $2.5 million of costume jewelry in history for Angola ... Dramatically exchange for a rare cover posted drawn freedom stamps signify the in a rebel-held area of Afghanistan, fight of UNITA against an oppres franked with two stamps issued by sive marxist government." Jonas one of the guerilla groups in 1982. Wrecked Benguela Railway petrol Savimbi and his UNITA forces are The jewelry went to the Federation tanker: continuing UNITA seeking to raise funds and establish for American Afghan Action, which sabotage legitimacy by issuing propaganda will use the proceeds to support the no Universal Postal Union member stamps for sale to stamp collectors. mujaheddin. ship (Taiwan, Turkish Cyprus), but whose mail is distributed by a mem A Florida stamp dealer, Marc The first four Unita stamps, is ber, so the UNITA stamps will prob Rousso, has been appointed by sued in March, show propagandistic ably have UNITA no problem in being ac as their philatelic agent. images of UNITA's so-called "free cepted. For this purpose, Rousso has cre dom struggle". ated the Resistance Stamp Agency (RSA) Inc., based in Palm Beach. Each stamp's surtax (the larger If successful, there is a danger (It is ironic that RSA is also number given - see boxes) is unusu that similar arrangements in the the acronym for the Republic of ally large; most countries which is near future could be made for the South Africa, UNITA's main sup sue semi-postal stamps, such as Bel Afghan rebels, Nicaragua's contras, porter) The stamps will be de gium, rarely make the surtax more and maybe even Renamo of Mozam than 50 per cent of the postal value. bique. Philately in the service of signed and printed by George Mc "anti-communism" Dermott, a printer from Pompano One set of four stamps will be is should not sur Beach, Florida. sued per month over the course of prise us. As a propaganda ploy, the next year and each set will cost the UNITA labels are a distorted Rousso is no stranger to right $15. reflection of a longstanding exam wing philatelic ventures. Last ple of philatelic solidarity - the over November, he brokered a deal for Many collectors are wondering 40 nations who have issued close to whether or not there is a local postal 160 stamps honoring the liberation U *1 need for these stamps in eastern An struggles of southern Africa over the gola. U.S. Congressman Dan Bur years. ton (Republican - Indiana), a lead ing supporter of aid to UNITA, as sures us that there is. In a press re lease, Burton says that "Many sets will be used as postage for letters that proclaim UNITA's struggle. "10-2 MOR I a!A1 These letters will be mailed from UNITA headquarters in Jamba to Namibia and then to UNITA corre spondants all over the world." The The 10 kwanza + 200 k shows sets will probably be used exclu Savimbi in uniform, with the K.4O.5 -ANGOLA sively for propaganda purposes quote: "There are no weapons in on mail showing that there is a postal I the world with the capacity to for system in UNITA-held areas. Such The 30 kwanza + 400 k shows ever stop the will of the people." mail would never see Angola; the a tiger, symbolizing UNITA's de The 20 kwanza + 300 k shows letters can be cancelled in Namibia termination. a black hand shaking a white hand or South Africa, and then placed The 40 kwanza + 500 k shows in friendship with the UNITA flag in the international mails. The US a portrait of Savimbi with the in the background. Postal Service accepts the validity UNITA flag in the background. of stamps from nations which have

22 april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT Divestment at Queens: The Pressure Mounts

BY LAURIE E. ADKIN ten reports to the Board of Trustees Losing Momentum on investment policy. Its member The divestment campaign at The divestment drive lost momen ship is composed of 6 members of Queen's has gathered momentum tum in 1984; the CSR's May 1983 the Board of Trustees, one alumnus, since September 1985, with the con report had reasserted the policy of one support staff member, one fac vergence of efforts by undergradu support for the Sullivan Principles ulty member, and one representa ates, graduate students, and fac and a turn-over in student lead ulty members to exert pressure on tive of each of the graduate students ership resulted in less progressive the Board of Trustees. Unlike and undergraduate students. AMS and GSS executives. The the situation at York University Selective Divestment AMS became enmeshed in the is where campus- based unions be Since the South Africa divestment sue of its own corporate responsi came involved in the issue - at issue was raised on campus in 1981, bility. The 1983-84 AMS Outer Queen's members of the undergrad the CSR has adopted a position Council had recommended that the uate students' society [AMS] have, in favour of what it calls "selec AMS withdraw its account with the since 1981, taken the lead in pursu tive divestment", or constructive en Bank of Montreal, which lent to ing the divestment issue. Queen's gagement. In response to a strong the Government of South Africa. conservatism and the administra student-initiated divestment drive The AMS, it was argued, could not tive system of "collegiality", under in 1983, the Chairperson of the lobby the University Administration pinned by its affluence relative to CSR, Alan Broadbent, reasserted with credibility as long as its own other Canadian universities, have the committee's view that foreign house was not in order. The Bank withstood efforts in recent years to investment in South Africa "can of Montreal is a major donor to unionize staff, teaching assistants, be a positive force" toward ending Queen's, and its President, Mr. W. and faculty. The campaign to in apartheid. In 1983 Queen's had D. Mulholland, is a member of the fluence Queen's investment policies a $40 million investment portfolio. Queen's Board of Trustees. AMS has therefore been sustained by the Nearly $18 million, or 44 per cent of activists were made to feel that fu educational work of the student this total, was invested in 24 com ture donations might be "adversely organizations (AMS Outer Coun panies and banks that either op affected" by a successful divestment cil, 1983-84; AMS Committee on erated in, or lent money to South campaign. South Africa, 1985-86; the Grad Africa (according to the Kingston The 1984-85 AMS Committee uate Students' Society, 1981-83), Whig Standard of 22 March 1983). on Divestment rejected much of the and by off-campus groups like the As a result of this experience, previous year's report, and decided Kingston Solidarity Committee and student activists concluded that the not to withdraw AMS funds from the Kingston Anti-Apartheid Coali real function of the CSR was not the Bank of Montreal. In Septem tion [KA-AC]. These groups have to hear and report to the Board of attempted to mobilize student and ber 1985, the Bank of Montreal is Trustees the majority view of the sued a statement that it would make faculty opinion in order to bring Queen's community on divestment, no further loans to South Africa, pressure to bear on the structures but to deflect pressure by appear but this was a managerial deci of 'collegiality". ing "to examine such issues openly sion, rather than a policy formally Faced in the late 1970s with ... and with confidence that our long adopted by the Bank's sharehold protest against Queen's holdings in established governing structures are ers. In any case, the AMS decision Noranda, then operating in Chile, appropriate for wrestling with such had the effect of damaging the cred the Board of Trustees (responsible difficult ... problems" (in the words ibility of its committment to divest for administering the University's of Principal Smith as quoted in ment, and of defusing the student investments) created a Committee the Queen's Journal, 7 Feb. 1986). campaign. on Social Responsibility in Invest As David Duff, one of the 1983 ment Policy [CSR]. The CSR's offi student organizers observed: "[The Reviving the Issue cial functions are to "receive repre CSRJ are open to students express In 1985 the divestment issue has sentative views of the Queen's com ing their views, they just won't act been revived as a result of the work munity" and to make re&ular writ- on them". of the new AMS Committee on

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 South Africa [AMSCOSAI, more ac of shares in the Queen's portfolio, in The Graduate Students Society tive involvement by graduate stu companies and financial institutions [GSS] voted in January on a mo dents, the formation of an Ad Hoc which: i) have direct investments tion to hold a referendum on the Committee of Students Concerned in South Africa; ii) have a control same question. However, the GSS with Apartheid (which has under ling interest in South African oper referendum of February 5-6 resulted taken its own actions to educate and ations; iii) are controlled directly or in a 53 per cent vote in favour mobilize students and to lobby the indirectly by South African interests; of the withholding of the $15 stu AMS and other bodies), and of an iv) make loans to the South African dent contribution to the Queen's Ad-Hoc Faculty Group on Divest Government or its agencies. Appeal until such time as the Board ment. In addition, the Kingston ethat the AMS maintain its current of Trustees adopts a policy of di Anti-Apartheid Coalition has linked banking practices with the Bank of vestment in South Africa-tied firms. up non- campus based groups and Montreal unless the Bank resumes Moreover, the funds thus accumu individuals with student and faculty lending to the government of South lated will be redirected to "the pro organizers, adding considerable mo Africa or its agencies. Immediate motion of racial equality in South mentum and scope to anti-apartheid withdrawal of all AMS funds will oc Africa if the Board fails to adopt activities. cur if the Bank reverses its manage [this] policy before January 31, A series of events was organized rial decision. 1989". In 1986-87, this graduate in the fall term by the Queen's Inter student contribution will amount to *that major capital purchases by approximately $24,000. Graduate national Centre, the Kingston Soli the AMS be made from companies darity Committee, the Programme and undergraduate student contri that are not South African in ori butions combined would amount to for Studies in National and Interna gin, or which do not have direct in tional Development, the Graduate approximately $150,000 per year, vestments in South Africa, and are or $450,000 over the duration of Students' Society, and the Friends of not transnational corporations with Oxfam Society. They included Mr. the Queen's Appeal (which ends in South African subsidiaries, unless Jabu Dube, on "The ANC's Agenda 1989). the purchase is approved by the AMS for Dismantling Apartheid and the Assembly. The Debate Polarizes Role of International Solidarity"; a lecturer at the University of Witwa However, the Assembly split On February 7, a number of events tersrand on "South Africa: the War over a tactic which would exert eco converged to polarize the university Inside and Out"; a film about Al nomic pressure on Queen's to di around the apartheid issue. Wes lan Boesak and a public forum on vest. An ad hoc committee of stu ley Johanneson, Second Secretary "South Africa: State Violence, the dents collected 500 signatures on a at the South African Embassy, ad Resistance Movement and the Case petition for an AMS referendum on dressed the opening session of the for Sanctions". It was noted that no the withholding of student contribu Model U.N. Assembly, held on cam members of the Board of Trustees, tions to the Queen's Appeal, a ma pus, despite concerted efforts by with the exception of Alderperson jor university fundraising campaign. the KA-AC to persuade the AMS Helen Cooper, attended these edu (These contributions would amount to withdraw its invitation. Johan cational events. to approximately $370,000 over the neson's talk was met by about 300 three remaining years of the Ap demonstrators and a public meet In October 1985, AMSCOSA or peal.) While the petition's success ing across the street with repre ganized a series of open forums on required the AMS to hold a referen sentatives of the ANC. The same Queen's and South Africa, and car dum on the question, at a March 6 day, the CSR met to hear rep ried out a survey of student views meeting the Assembly voted to take resentatives from the AMS, GSS, on social responsibility and divest a "no" stand on the Question. The and the Ad-Hoc Student Commit ment. Sixty per cent of the 400 stu "nos" argued that such an action tee, and to vote on the divestment dents interviewed agreed that the would be detrimental to the qual question. About 300 students ral AMS should pressure the Board of ity of education students receive at lied outside the building in support Trustees to divest. Then in De Queen's, and is effectively a tactic of of a pro-divestment position. A pe cember, AMSCOSA released a re "blackmail", rather than of reason. tition was presented to the AMS and port documenting student opinion the CSR by the Ad-hoc Commit and recommending a course of ac In view of the AMS Assembly's tee with 2,500 signatures gathered tion for the AMS on divestment. decision, the ad hoc student com in a period of two weeks. A let At subsequent meetings of the AMS mittee decided to withdraw the pe ter, circulated by the Ad-hoc Fac Assembly, the following recommen tition. They fear dividing the stu ulty Group on Divestment, bearing dations were debated and adopted: dent body over this tactic, thereby 272 signatures from 27 departments, * that the AMS make a committ weakening the overall momentum of (collected in four days) was also pre ment to working for the divestment the campaign. sented.

Africa REPORT april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT O&M@Momo0

After receiving this impressive *to follow the examples of McGill of sensing incoming questions about declaration of the university com and Dalhousie, i.e.,"total divest investment policy and deflecting munity's views, the CSR voted 6 ment"; them. The Board was repeatedly 3 against divestment. (The three eto "modify the present approach told that refraining from any ac members in favour were the GSS with some new directions that bet tion on divestment amounts to tak and AMS representatives, and City ter meet the diverse concerns of the ing a position on complicity with Alderperson Helen Cooper.) How Queen's community". apartheid no less than a decision ever, because of the obvious "un to divest does. The Board was representativeness" of this decision, In an interview in the Queen's Jour urged to take a clear decision on di the CSR recommended to the Board nal published February 11, Broad vestment at its May 9-10 meeting, of Trustees, at a meeting later the bent said: "What I would like to see and warned against any further at same evening, that it hold an open is further amplification of the [Sulli tempts to defend its position of "se meeting on the question. (This had van] principles to make them speak lective investment" as one compati been proposed by a faculty dele more to the areas that are central ble with its professed "abhorrence" gation which met CSR Chairper to the apartheid structure." It ap of apartheid. son, Broadbent, earlier in the day. pears that the higher echelons of col Other CSR members were not in legiality at Queen's are taking a few Another speaker compared the vited to this meeting, and no report lessons from the manoeuvres of the Board's past committment to con of it was made to the full meeting Botha regime - on reforms without structive engagement to an attach of the CSR later, despite a request change. ment to the ideology of "white man's burden". He challenged any from the 0SS representative that Forum: April 2 the arguments of the faculty mem persons in the university adminis bers be made known. Nor were fac At the April 2 Forum, the Board of tration or the CSR who still defend ulty members invited to address the Trustees heard two and a half hours the Sullivan principles to speak up CSR meeting. In view of the CSR's of presentations from the Queen's at the Forum, to expose their views failure to act on the wishes of its students, faculty, the KA-AC, and to debate. Let us not hear later, he constituencies, the GSS is currently the union of library workers (CUPE concluded, that on the basis of argu considering boycotting the commit local 1302), all in favour of divest ments which no one had the courage tee.) ment. The oral presentations com to voice publicly, the Board has de plemented an impressive set of writ cided against divestment. Of the Consequently, the Board decided ten submissions prepared by AM approximately 25 speakers, not one to hold an open forum on divest SCOSA and the Ad hoc Faculty advanced an argument against di ment, April 2. Formal discussion of Group on Divestment. vestment. the question will begin at the May One speaker described the CSR The Forum was preceded by a di 9-10 Board meeting, after most stu as the "Star Wars" of the Board vestment rally which drew 300-400 dents have left for the summer. of Trustees - having the function people, and the Forum itself was at Recently published interviews tended by about 300 - the limit of with the Board's Director of In Laval Divestment? the room in which it was held. vestment, Darryl MacDermiad, the From Nouvelles Universitaires. Queen's has rarely, if ever, seen CSR Chairperson Alan Broadbent, The Syndicat des professeurs de l'Univer the university community so united and Principal David Smith, have in around a political issue. In the dicated their continuing committ sit6 Laval (SPUL) has asked the univer sity retirement committee to withdraw light of the overwhelming message ment to the policy of "selective di any investments it has in companies in directed at the Board on April 2, vestment", perhaps with some face vesting directly in South Africa. it is difficult to conceive of the saving modifications. (The current This resolution follows a request Board failing to take a decision to market value of the securities that made by SPUL to the Vice-Rector about divest. At least, to do so would Queen's owns of companies that investments by the university in South mean a severe loss of credibility and have activities in South Africa, ac Africa. It appears that 11% of the Cana an even more determined conver dian companies and 52% of the Ameri cording to Broadbent, is about $22 gence of pressure. Student leaders can companies in which the retirement million.) In a February 7 Queen's have not ruled out a September ref Journal interview, Smith identified committee had interest, had direct in vestments in South Africa. erendum on the witholding of stu three options for he investment pol dent contributions to Queen's Ap icy: The decision by SPUL to withdraw investments in companies dealing with peal, and the momentum for divest *to continue basing South African South Africa follows a worldwide cam ment will only be fuelled by a Board related investment decisions on the paign against apartheid which has gained decision which flagrantly disregards degree of corporate adherence to the momentum ever since major unrest be the views of the majority of the uni Sullivan principles; gan in that country last year. versity community.

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 We Symbolize Toughness: MATCH Supports Zimbabwean Women

As women in Zimbabwe BY SHERRY GALEY We symbolize toughness. Sherry Galey is the CanadianProgram Officer for MATCH. It's so tough struggle and through the politiciza It can only be handled by women. tion process by the cadres, rural women gained a politicalconscious It does not matter how ness that pervaded other aspects of hard or how tough it becomes; their lives. In fact, women gained We as women ourselves symbolize toughness. such a confidence that it has mani fested itself in the increased aware Women sang this song every ness of their situation byexpression nizations that have defined their of a desire to change - not just im where during Zimbabwe's liberation needs and formulated the most ap prove - their basic position." war. It is still very popular and propriate solutions for their situ today the words refer to women's ation. Funds are raised through And the changes Zimbabwean struggle for liberation from social a Canadian support network com women need include increased eco and economic subordination. posed primarily but not exclusively nomic power - most women have lit tle or no economic power MATCH International Centre is of women. The Canadian Interna base in the home or a small non-governmental develop tional Development Agency (CIDA) community. Women must have more access to both formal ment agency that was set up in 1976 contributes three dollars for every and non-formal education to support the struggles of women one MATCH raises. MATCH's ed to close the gap between men and women. in developing countries like ucational programs are designed to Zim The burden of domestic babwe. Every year the Centre ap provide information about women and agri cultural proves about 25 new projects each in the Third World and to promote work borne by women must having an average value of $10,000. cross-cultural solidarity and under be reduced so that women will standing among women. have the time to take part in self MATCH's premise is that al development and community devel though women are deeply involved MATCH's support to women in opment efforts. And finally, women in the work of development, their southern Africa is currently concen must be afforded increased opportu crucial role is unrecognized and un trated in Zimbabwe. Three exam nity to make their voices heard in dervalued. Women continue to ples of projects currently receiving decision-making bodies at all levels. make up the majority of the world's MATCH support include the Zim poor, powerless and exploited pop babwe Women's Bureau, the Vol VOICE is an umbrella orga ulations. But women in every part untary Associations in Community nization of voluntary groups in of the world are joining together to Enterprise (VOICE), and the Col Zimbabwe. It promotes self challenge these conditions. In their lective Kitchens component of the help projects by providing con quest for empowerment, women are Zimbabwe project. sultation, information and advi demanding an equal role with men sory services and by seeking sup The struggle for political libera port for the programs of member in making the decisions that affect tion involved women in many ways their lives. agencies. Josephine Mutandiro of - on the front lines and in the vil VOICE came to Canada in October MATCH takes its cue from the lages - and had a profound impact 1984 at the invitation of MATCH women in poor countries because on their consciousness. According to participate in our Management we believe that the process of to Olivia Muchena, for Change training program. She change cannot be imposed from out "It would not be an exaggeration and another participant from New side. Projects should be directed to say that rural women - perhaps' foundland, Dot Whelan, became in by those who are most affected. more than any other category of terested in each other's work and MATCH responds to requests for people - bore the brunt of the war. resolved to find a way to continue assistance from groups and orga- Through their involvement in the their supportive relationship in a

april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT wwnz nong nnonnm practical way. The Newfoundland member: "Women are beginning to share more fairly the work of prepar women learned about Zimbabwean play a role side by side their male ing food so that women will have women's need both to reduce the coop members. Some of the old dis more time to participate in the man time they spend grinding grain and crimination is wearing out but some agement of the cooperative. As the to generate income. The Newfound of it keeps coming back. We come organizers of the project like to say, land women committed themselves back tired from the fields. But they "The first revolution was waged in to raising money that would be (the men) want us to demonstrate the bush. The next one will be in channelled through MATCH to sup that we are wives by cooking them the kitchens." port a cooperative grinding mill en meals family by family." MATCH is still seeking funds for terprise run by a women's group. these projects. If you can help to Zimbabwe's cooperative move With MATCH funds, the Zim support Zimbabwean women, please mert has grown in the last five babwe Project, which is also funded contact MATCH at 171 Nepean years from 375 to 1500 coopera by CUSO, has begun a program of Street, Suite 401, Ottawa, Ontario, tives. One third of these are run by setting up ten communal kitchen to K2P 0B4, (613) 238-1312. ex-combattants from the liberation war and returned refugees. Coop eratives range from farms to super markets to machine shops. Women make up anywhere from 25 to 55 per cent of the large agricultural co operatives. Women are beginning to challenge the traditional expec tations that even though they work outside the home just as hard as the men, they should also continue to be exclusively responsible for domestic work. In the words of one female ANC - COSATU Meeting In our last "South African Note Congress of Trade Unions - SACTU "They (the three delegations) book" (Southern Africa REPORT - also participated) tends to rein agreed that the solution to the prob I, 4) we took note of a Decem force the point. lems facing our country lie in the ber meeting in Zimbabwe between establishment of a system of ma Jay Naidoo, new general-secretary Thus all parties "recognized that jority rule in a united, democratic of the Congress of South African the emergence of COSATU as the and non-racial South Africa. Fur Trade Unions (COSATU) and rep giant democratic and progressive ther, that in the specific conditions resentatives of the ANC. At that trade union federation in our coun of our country it is inconceivable meeting, readers will recall, Naidoo try is an historic event in the process that such a system can be separated emphasized to the ANC that, in his of uniting our working class and will from economic emancipation. Our words, "COSATU was looking at al immeasurably strengthen the demo people have been robbed of their ternatives which would ensure that cratic movement as a whole". Yet it land, deprived of their due share any society that emerged would ac was also "recognized that the funda in the country's wealth, their skills curately reflect the interests of the mental problem facing our country, have been supressed and poverty working class". the question of politicalpower, can and starvation have been their life not be resolved without the full par experience. The correction of these We suggested, at the time, that ticipation of the ANC, which is re centuries of old economic injustices there was no reason to think that garded by the majority of the people lies at the core of our national as Naidoo spoke to deaf ears when he of South Africa as the overall leader pirations. Accordingly they are made this kind of argument. And and genuine representative". united not only in their opposition the joint communique from a more to the entire apartheid system, but recent and more formal meeting be And what of the future which also in their common understand tween the ANC and COSATU (a these kinds of "recognitions" are ing that victory must embrace more meeting in which the South African likely to define? than formal political democracy."

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 ral guerilla war: was it beneficial in the long term for the guerillas to The "Peasant Option" incorporate pre-existing relations of legitimacy rather than more defini tively beginning to transform them? For the democratic village commit tees set up during and after the in Zimbabwe war were soon replaced, in post liberation Zimbabwe, by district and regional councils which BY DAVE MOORE shows the old ideologies of author are far more bureaucratic and more easily sub ity to have been bent to the new. Dave Moore is a PhD candidate in ordinated to central fiat. And Ranger's committed espousal Might Political Science at York University, a more thorough-going of what he conceives to be the rad transforma currently doing field research in Zim tion from the outset ical "peasant option" - as well as have prepared babwe. the ground for greater his insistence that this was and re peasant resis tance to such negative trends? mains the substance of the Zimbab Review of: David Lan, Guns and wean revolution - is marked by a Rain: Guerillas and Spirit Mediums Ranger prefers not to question polemical spirit that engages even as in Zimbabwe and Terence Ranger, the nature of the relationships be PeasantConsciousness and Guerilla it arouses. tween peasant, guerilla and politi War in Zimbabwe: a Comparative cian in this way. Instead he as Study, both published by James Guns and Rain is the more serts, and sets out to prove, that Curry, London, University of Cali straight-forward and less controver the ideology which dominated the fornia Press, Los Angeles, and Zim sial of the two, because it is devoted Zimbabwean revolution was that of babwe Publishing House, Harare, to a specific time, place and sub the "peasant option" - by which he 1985. ject - the interaction of the ideol means an ideology which gives pri David Lan and Terence Ranger ogy and authority of the guerillas ority to the peasants' unfettered ac have written two quite exhilarating entering the northeastern Dande re cess to the market! For those who books. They should be read to gion, with that of the spirit medi doubt the correctness of this inter gether not just because they deal ums, those repositories of ancestral pretation, he somewhat mockingly with an essentially unified subject political legitimacy. asks the question posed indirectly area - or because they represent the by Lan: 'Within a short period of their beginnings of true scholarship on ar allow then are we to evaluate all this rival in Dande, the ZANLA guerillas Zimbabwe and the launching of an (i.e. the subordination of the aims were incorporated into local social exciting new publisher of "Africana" of the war to the 'peasant option', categories. The category into which (James Curry). More importantly including all its traditionalcompo they were placed was 'descendents for supporters of liberation in south nents)? Are we witnessing a trea of the mhondro', which is to say ern Africa, they offer key and spe son of the modernizing intellectuals, that they ... and by extension the cific insights into the interactions of a wilful failure to carry out the task nationalist politicians ... were re peasants, guerillas and politicians of enlightening the peasantry? Are garded as the members of the royal into the very political and ideo we witnessing the failure to achieve lineages... With the spirit mediums logical substance of wars of libera a true 'people's war'?" tion. As such, the two books give mounting a guard of honour, the guerillas marched us a much deeper understanding of in and took hold For Ranger the answer to such of the Zimbabwean politics than the jour symbols of their new power." questions is a resounding "No". The nalistic works of Martin and John (Lan pp. 19,170) Zimbabwean revolution embodied a son (The Struggle for Zimbabwe, Although Lan's aims are modest in radical peasant option because its Monthly Review Press, 1981) or the comparison with Ranger's (and thus key ingredient was opposition to the petty-bourgeoisie bashing of Andre more attainable) he does come to settler state's interference with the Astrow (Zimbabwe: A Revolution some interesting conclusions - per free market and African access to that Lost Its Way, Zed Press, 1984). haps implicit, but there nonethe land. In contrast, says Ranger, It's an added bonus that both books less - about the nature and roots of "modernizing intellectuals" most of are finely crafted. Lan's expertise the contemporary relationship be ten tend to betray this peasant as a playwright enlivens his anthro tween peasant and government in small-holder vision of laissez-faire, pology, linking the modern dialec post-independence Zimbabwe. In either in the interests of "collec tic of peasant-guerilla politics with deed, the book raises a question tivism" on the one hand or pre- ex the "spectacle of the past" as he key to any socialist analysis of ru- isting (much more advanced) capi-

,' ' A- april 1986 Southern Africa REPORT talist patterns of land ownership on (I la Ranger) make similar points, kind they have the other. But not in Zimbabwe (or always been against. although they tend to leave out (There is of course at least not quite - Ranger does give a third option, the prefix "entreprenurial" when de the "socialist option": perhaps it evidence of the squatters' increas scribing their peasants. Moreover, is "pie-in-the-sky" ing impatience with a state that just to add this in both right and left populisms, in as conceivable one in the Zimbabwe might be waiting too long to chal their concentration on the "mon context, but it bears noting lenge the power of the large agricul that ster state and the mythical masses" it, too, is tural interests!) still being talked about (in Bernstein's phrase), fail to make there). Comparisons with Mozambique clear that their "peasant options" and Kenya are used to reinforce are unequivocally capitalistoptions. In this regard, it is clear that Ranger's point that the Zimbab At their best, such options would Ranger would prefer the ZANU-PF wean leadership did not "sell out" lead to accumulation and differen to be more interventionist than it is, its peasant base. For Ranger, tiation in the countryside, and a in order to redress the imbalances the Zimbabwean nationalists have process of urban industrialization of the colonial state and economy. not been "petty-bourgeois politi and proletarianization that will take He would have the state (in a some cians" falling eagerly to the al decades and generations to work it what paradoxical and self-negating lures of neo-colonialism (in nega self through. At its worst - and in way) further clear the ground for tive contrast to John Saul's and Africa this is the norm - the "free the laissez-faire "peasant option", Basil Davidson's "noble but impos market" in agriculture leads to ac for the non-socialist people's revo sibly utopian" (Ranger, p. 11) vi cumulation for international capital lution. But in the absense of a sion of FRELIMO in Mozambique) (and a few of its local allies) and ur clear analysis of the formation of the Indeed, the liberatarian content of ban marginalization instead of pro new state and of the forces which, the radical peasant consciousness letarianization. Such would seem to in addition to those allied to the was so deep, says Ranger, that a be the fate of the laissez-faire option peasant option, are acting upon it, Marxist-Leninist and statist solu in Zimbabwe. we cannot really get much of an tion could not have been imposed. There are many times when idea as to what are the prospects of Vanguard party or not, the peas Ranger's own work seems to recog realizing Ranger's preferred future. ants would not allow themselves to nize certain of the problems here. What are we to make, for example, be "sold out" to the collectivist op There are definite signs of rural dif of the state's vacillations around tion. Nor, Ranger argues, has this ferentiation, he notes, but he hes the squatter question (which Ranger radical peasant option been sub itates to follow this through to any does describe with a strong anti verted by large bureaucratic rural capitalist in systematic questioning of the notion tone)? To describe the terests as in the Kenyan Zimbabwe case; suf of the "peasant option" itself. Sig state as a people's state ficient rural differentiation has not nificantly, the main text closes with merely shuffles aside such questions. taken place for such a form of class the thought that "the beginnings of [Ranger has been accused of struggle to take shape. In short, the a dominant rural bourgeoisie ... this two comparisons serve to make the shuffling aside other problems with ambiguous (sic) class" could well be his brand of ZANU-PF-oriented same point. Zimbabwe is not cap underway. Lan ends with the same italist (bad) like Kenya, nor social progressive populism, as when he sort of preoccupation. If this is so, deals with recent difficulties in ist (equally bad) like Mozambique. might not any "ambiguity" lie pri Rather, it is something Matabeleland by advising the Nde unique: pro marily in the eye of the beholder, gressive, liberal and even "good". bele peasants to devote their critical and in the sort of ideology which attention to the "big men" and the The notion of "populism" has of uncritically underwrites the peasant politicians who manipulate tribal ten been criticized as an imprecise option? ism to maintain the socio-economic ideological category, but loose as it A second and even more imme privileges of chiefs and cattlemen. It is one could correctly attribute this diate problem arises in Zimbabwe. is then indicated that the ZANU perspective to Ranger. As Henry The new state and the new state PF "men of the people" are the real Bernstein has recently pointed out classes have, as Ranger and Lan hope for Matabeleland. Some re (at Cambridge, November, 1985), make clear, come into power on their viewers (see David Caute's scathing such populism fits both right and promise of "land for the people". review in the London Review of left. The new ideologies of the Unfortunately, large local and for Books, November 21, 1985) have World Bank and the IMF, epito eign interests still hold most of the seen this as a stark oversimplifi mized in the Berg Report, heap land, so the state is being forced to cation of the issue of "tribe and praise upon the "entreprenurial make a decision: either for the kind class" in Zimbabwe and as reflecting peasant" and pour scorn on the in of (small-holder) capitalism that the a very selective brand of populism, terventionist and parasitical "mon peasant masses, in Ranger's view, one which has degenerated into a ster state". Many left-populists have always been for or for the kind of partisan apologetics.]

Southern Africa REPORT april 1986 GRINDSTONE ISLAND WORKSHOP SOUTH AFRICA ON THE MOVE South Africa is in the news every day, * South African women: Their struggles; yet it's easy to feel overwhelmed by the in our support. formation, and cynical about our sources. " Labour: democratic trade unions and What is really happening? How can we best their struggle against apartheid. support the struggle? In a year when a uni " Children under apartheid: helping fied, educated solidarity movement is more Canadian kids to develop links. necessary than ever, this is indeed a timely conference. Co-sponsored by TCLSAC and " Racism: links with anti-racist work in Grindstone Co-op, it's for people who are Canada. already active in anti-apartheid work and " Educating Canadians: using popular ed those who would like to get more involved. ucation techniques to spice up our soli We'll take a deeper look at the forces inside darity work. and outside South Africa, and share ideas for effective solidarity work. The total cost of the 2-day programme, including room & food, is $100 ($85 for low The weekend will begin with an overview income or $110 to support others). A non of popular resistance in South Africa. Then refundable deposit of $35 will reserve your we'll work in interest groups on more spe space. cific topics. Workshops could include: GRINDSTONE CO-OP P.O. Box 564, Station 'P' For information, or to register, please contact: Toronto, Ontario, M5S 2T1 (416) 923-4215 j

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