Schooler, J. (2015). Bridging the Objective/Subjective Divide - Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience
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Bridging the Objective/Subjective Divide Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience Jonathan Schooler In this paper I use the thesis that perspective shifting can fundamentally alter 2uthor how we evaluate evidence as the backdrop for exploring the perennial challenge of bridging the divide between the sub!ective first-person perspective of experi- Jonathan Schooler ence" and the ob!ective third-person perspective of science# I begin by suggesting !onathan#schooler3psych#ucsb#edu that reversible images provide a metaphor for conceptuali$ing how the very same situation can be understood from two very different perspectives that appear to 4niversity of California produce seemingly irreconcilable accounts of their contents. However" when one Santa &arbara" California" 4nited recogni$es that both views are different vantages on some deeper structure" a States of America meta-perspective can emerge that potentially offers a vantage by which the op- posing perspectives can be reconciled# &uilding on this notion of a meta-perspect- .ommentator ive" I outline a framework for conceptuali$ing how science can draw on individuals’ first-person experience in order to explicate those experiences within the neces- 5erena 6ottschling sarily third-person perspective of science# I then show how this approach can illu- vgott3yorku#ca minate one of the most private yet ubi(uitous aspects of mental life) mind-wan- 7or 4niversity dering# *inally and most speculatively" I attempt to tackle the enduring ontolo- Toronto" 8ntario" Canada gical tensions that emerge from the disparities between the first- versus third-per- son perspectives. Specifically" I suggest that the present prevailing third-person Editors perspective of material reductionism fails to ade(uately account for the first-per- son experience of sub!ectivity" the flow of time" and the present# +hile I argue Thomas Met$inger that these differences are an intrinsic property of each perspective" and thus irre- met$inger 3uni-main$#de concilable from the vantage of either" I raise the possibility of a meta-perspective in which these clashes might be better accommodated# Toward this end" I specu- Johannes 6utenberg-Universit9t latively suggest that experience" the flow of time" and the uni(ue (uality of ,now- Main$" 6ermany might be accommodated by the postulation of a sub!ective dimension or dimen- sions of time# Jennifer M# +indt !ennifer#windt3monash#edu Keywords Monash 4niversity .onsciousness / Heterophenomenology / Meta-awareness / Meta-perspective / Melbourne" Australia Mind wandering / Mind0body problem / 1europhenomenology / 1eutral monism / Panpsychism / Phenomenology / Time 1 Introduction I am the proud owner of a philosopher’s stone. an ordinary river rock is that it has engraved Although it does not hold any of the mysterious upon it the statement Nothing is written in powers (e.g., turning lead to gold, providing stone." In pondering its irony, I’ve come to real# endless youth) that the alchemists attributed to i$e that my philosopher’s stone can be viewed its namesake, I nevertheless feel its title fitting, in at least three ways, each leading to a differ# as it offers some rather deep insights into the ent accounting of its merit. %rom one vantage importance of perspective in defining what the statement on the stone is self-evidently seems true. What distinguishes my stone from false, as clearly revealed by where it is carved. Schooler" J# :;<=>?# &ridging the 8b!ective0Sub!ective @ivide - Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience# In T# Met$inger A J# M# +indt :Eds?# Open MIND: BC:T?# *ran furt am Main) MI1@ 6roup# doi) =<#=>><;0DEFBD>F>E<C<> 1 | C< www#open-mind#net %rom another it is demonstrably true, as the ample of the manner in which perspective can word nothing" is written in stone right there. alter how we understand the world. %inally, the fact that the presentation of the In this paper I attempt to nudge the field stone’s message simultaneously reveals it to be towards a rapprochement between the sub(ect# both true and not true enables the stone to cla# ive first-person perspective of e&perience and rify the parado&ical essence of its meaning. the ob(ective third-person perspective of sci# Nothing is definitive because a change in per# ence. My efforts are divided into three some# spective may shift what is seen as factual. 'ow# what distinct sections+ all united by the goal of ever, the stone further illustrates that when one illustrating how the divide between the sub(ect# recogni$es how the perspectives that one takes ive and ob(ective might begin to be bridged by influence the conclusions that one draws, one a broader perspective that acknowledges that gains a larger meta-perspective that can accom# while neither can be reduced to the other, they modate them both. may be alternative vantages of a larger meta- perspective. In the first section, I use the analogy of re# versible images to emphasi$e the importance of perspective shifting in recogni$ing that views that seem one way from one perspective may seem ,uite different from another. However, when one recogni$es that both views are differ# ent vantages on some deeper structure, a meta- perspective can emerge that potentially offers a vantage by which the opposing perspectives can be reconciled. I propose that the relationship between the first-person perspective of sub(ect# ive e&perience and the third-person perspective of ob(ective science can be conceptuali$ed in this manner, and that at least some of the Figure 1: %rom one perspective, as evident from the place heated debate between scholars on this topic onto which it is carved, !othing is Written in .tone" is a may stem from their e&clusively favoring one contradictory statement. 'owever, from another perspective, vantage over the other. !othing" is in fact written in stone, making the statement In the second section, I illustrate how the true. )hus, !othing is Written in .tone" illustrates that third-person perspective of science can both when one recogni$es how the perspectives that one takes in# draw on and elucidate first-person e&periences, fluence the conclusions that one draws, one gains a larger and in particular the ubi,uitous internal state meta#perspective that can accommodate them both. of mind-wandering. I argue that although people’s self-reports of private internal e&peri# Although it is relatively straightforward to ences such as mind-wandering necessarily rely describe the manner in which my philosopher’s on a re-representation of the e&perience to stone conveys how shifting perspective can alter themselves (meta-awareness), we can neverthe# what is seen as true, such descriptions do not less draw inferences about their underlying e&# do (ustice to the impact the stone has when one perience by e&amining the relationship between actually encounters it. )he stone not only con# self-reports and physiological and behavioral veys its message, it embodies it. Its message measures. )riangulation between these measures thus speaks not only to one’s capacities of logic has highlighted both the strengths and limita# but also viscerally, physically, through one’s tions of people’s meta-awareness of their drift# senses. Indeed this difference between the third# ing minds- although people fre,uently fail to no# person account of something and the first-per# tice that their minds are wandering, when ,uer# son experience of it is perhaps the ultimate e&# ied they are ,uite accurate at reporting whether Schooler" J# :;<=>?# &ridging the 8b!ective0Sub!ective @ivide - Towards a Meta-Perspective of Science and Experience# In T# Met$inger A J# M# +indt :Eds?# Open MIND: BC:T?# *ran furt am Main) MI1@ 6roup# doi) =<#=>><;0DEFBD>F>E<C<> 2 | C< www#open-mind#net or not their minds were on task. )his analysis tual understanding, we routinely use perceptual thus reveals the value of using empirical third# metaphors (.chooler et al. 4335). We speak of person science to clarify the nature of first-per# thinking out of the bo&," or of stepping back son e&perience. and looking at the bigger picture." 6ven the In the final section I consider how first# term that we use for gaining a fresh perspective person e&perience may inform our understand# on an old problem, i.e., insight," directly al# ing of ob(ective reality. /urrent views of science ludes to the parallels between perceptual and offer no way of accounting for the e&istence of conceptual perspective shifting. It is no coincid# sub(ective e&perience, the flow of time, or the ence that the 7estalt psychologists who pion# privileged present, leading mainstream science eered research on visual perspective shifting to marginali$e these essential elements of con# (Wagemans et al. 1241) also were the first to in# sciousness as irrelevant or illusory. However, vestigate the processes of conceptual insight from my vantage these aspects of e&istence are (8uncker 4359). And indeed, research in our lab at least as certain as physical reality itself. It (.chooler 0 Melcher 4339) reveals a strong cor# seems nonsensical to characteri$e e&perience as relation between people’s ability to make per# an illusion, because even an illusory e&perience ceptual insights (e.g., recogni$ing out-of-focus (i.e., where the contents have no bearing on pictures) and conceptual insights (e.g., solving physical reality) is still an e&perience. Moreover, insight word problems). )hus, in order to e&# e&perience e&clusively resides in an ever-chan# plore how perspective may constrain our con# ging present. A characteri$ation of reality that ceptual understandings, it is helpful to start by has no place for sub(ective e&perience, the flow briefly considering the ways in which perspect# of time, or importance of the present seems ive can influence perceptual e&periences.