Religion in the Lives: Daimon Andtyche
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chapter 7 Religion in the Lives: Daimon and Tyche In contrast to the Moralia, where daimon is used for the divinity, a spirit, or even the mind itself, in the Lives daimon is frequently associated with fortune or luck (tyche), if not even a synonym for it. One might recall that one of the chapters in M.P. Nilsson’s monumental study of Greek religion, as he came to the Hellenistic period, was entitled “Tyche and Daimon.”1 Another contrast is that, in the Moralia, tyche is often conceived as a godless linking of chance occurrences, a denial of reason or providence. Such is the line implicit at times in De fortuna Romanorum and De Alexandri Magni fortuna to some extent, more expressly in De fortuna, De sera, De tranquilitate, and in De defectu in Lamprias’ speech on the infinity of worlds. In the Lives, we find a drift toward what G. Herzog-Hauaser has noticed, Tyche as a divine power, or as a symbol of the guiding hand of providence.2 1 Geschichte der griechischen Religion ii, 200–218. Cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Der Glaube Der Hellenen (Darmstadt: Wischaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976) i, 362–368, and ii, 297–311. He notes, ii, p. 303, n. 1, a line from Eur. Iph. Aul. 1136 where tyche, moira, and daimon seem to be equated. [en: See now also J. Sfameni Gasparro, “Daimôn and tuchê in the Hellenistic Religious Experience” in P. Bilde (ed.), Conventional values of the Hellenistic Greeks (1997) 67–109; Y. Ustinova, “Either a Daimon, or a Hero, or Perhaps a God: Mythical Residents of Subterranean Chambers,”Kernos 15 (2002) 267–288; A. Timotei, La démonologie platonicienne: histoire de la notion de daimōn de Platon aux derniers néoplatoniciens (Leiden: Brill, 2012).] 2 “Tyche,” re vii a, 2 (1948) 1643–1689. The only monograph on tyche in Plutarch is E. Lassell, De fortunae in Plutarchi operibus notione (Marburg, 1896), a collection of passages and some attempt at source criticism. He felt Plutarch was more tyche conscious when following Phylarchos (Pyrrhos, Aratos, AgisandKleomenes) than Douris (Demosthenes), that in general he was less enthusiastic about tyche than his sources, but used it as a deus ex machina for historical and philosophical difficulties. A more general study is A. Buricks, Peri Tyches (Leiden, 1955). See also A. Pérez Jiménez, “Actitudes del hombre frente a la Tyche en las Vidas Paralelas de Plutarco,”Bol. del Inst. Helen. 7 (1973) 101–110. See also L. Edmunds, Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides (Cambridge, Mass., 1975). [en: See now the following studies: Torraca, “I Presupposti teoretici e i diversi volti della Tyche Plutarchea,” in Gallo (ed.), Plutarco e la Religione, 105–155; F. Mestre Roca & P. Gómez Cardó, “Tyche e individuo: Ambigüedad de usos en las Vidas Paralelas de Plutarco,” in A. Pérez Jiménez et al. (eds.), Valori letterari di Plutarco, 295–305; W.J. Tantum, “Another Look at Tyche in Plutarch’s Aemilius Paullus— Timoleon,” Historia: Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte = Revue d’Histoire Ancienne 59 (2010) 448– 461; the volume edited by F. Frazier & D. Leão, Tychè et Pronoia: la marche du monde selon © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2017 | doi: 10.1163/9789004348776_010 82 part 1, chapter 7 As with so much of Plutarch’s religious thought, we observe not striking innovations as the use of familiar modes of thought in a newer and stronger personal, theistic conception. His attitude toward tyche is rooted as much in the Hellenistic past as in his contemporary world. Working with sources derived from Hellenistic writers, especially for the Greek Lives, as well as those close to his time for the Roman Lives, and with some Roman Lives using Polybios for a base, there is an unusual blending. No real study has ever been made of the peculiar nature of parallel lives and the influence of the ideology of one upon the other. However, in the peculiar mode of composition which Plutarch was working with, often a major source like Livy, with Augustan ideas of fatum and manifest destiny, runs parallel to a Greek Life written in the heyday of Hellenis- tic tyche fever. Plutarch obviously wrote quickly, frequently reflects the aura of Plutarque (Coimbra / Paris: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2010) includes numerous intersting studies: e.g. F. Frazier, “Introduction La marche du monde et les incertitudes de la tychè,” in Frazier & Leão (eds.), Tychè et Pronoia, viii–xxiii; F. Frazier, “Le De sera, dialogue pythique: Hasard et Providence, Philosophie et Religion dans la pensée de Plutarque,” in Frazier & Leão (eds.), Tychè et Pronoia, 69–92; G. Roskam, “Socrates’ δαιμόνιον in Maximus of Tyre, Apuleius, and Plutarch,” in Frazier & Leão (eds.), Tychè et Pronoia, 93–108; A. Pérez Jiménez, “La Providencia como salvaguarda de los Proyectos Históricos Humanos en las Vidas Paralelas,” in Frazier & Leão (eds.), Tychè et Pronoia, 169–182; D. Leão, “Tyche, Kairos et Kronos dans le Phocion de Plutarque,” in Frazier & Leão (eds.), Tychè et Pronoia, 183–194; R. Scannapieco, “I doni di Zeus, il dono di Prometeo. Strutture retoriche ed istanze etico- politiche nella riflessione plutarchea sulla τύχη,” in Frazier & Leão (eds.), Tychè et Pronoia, 207–238; A. Casanova, “Fortuna e carattere da Menandro a Plutarco—con una nota testuale su alcune citazioni di Menandro in Plutarco,” in Frazier & Leão (eds.), Tychè et Pronoia, 239–250; F. Becchi, “La nozione di τύχη in Plutarco: una variabile secondo il genere?,” in I. Gallo & C. Moreschini (a cura di), I generi letterari in Plutarco, Atti del viii Convegno plutarcheo (Pisa, 2–4 giugno 1999) (Naples, 2000) 299–317; J.P. Martin, “Plutarque: un aspect de sa pensée et de son temps,” in Jean-Marie Pailler (ed.), Mélanges offerts à Monsieur Michel Labrousse (Toulouse: Service des publications de l’université de Toulouse-Le Mirail, 1986) 59– 78; S. Swain, “Plutarch: Chance, Providence and History,” AJPh 110 (1989) 272–302; J. Opsomer, “Quelques réflexions sur la notion de Providence chez Plutarque,” in C. Schrader, V. Ramón & J. Vela (eds.), Plutarco y la historia (Zaragoza, 1997) 343–356; J. Opsomer & C. Steel, “Evil without a Cause. Proclus’ Doctrine on the Origin of Evil, and its Antecedents in Hellenistic Philosophy,” in T. Fuhrer & M. Erler (eds.), Zur Rezeption der hellenistischen Philosophie in der Spätantike (Stuttgart, 1999) 229–260; see also F. Becchi, “L’écrit de Plutarque Sur la Fortune: histoire d’une interprétation”, in Frazier & Leão (eds.), Tychè et Pronoia, 47–56; P. Volpe Cacciatore, “Fato e fortuna negli opuscoli contro gli Stoici di Plutarco: un problema ancora aperto,” in Frazier & Leão (eds.), Tychè et Pronoia, 39–46; H.M. Martin, “Plutarchan Morality: arete, tyche, and Non-consequentialism,” in G. Roskam & L. Van der Stockt (eds.), Virtues for the People: Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics (Leuven, 2011).].