Saudi National Security
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CSIS_______________________________ Center for Strategic and International Studies 1800 K Street N.W. Washington, DC 20006 (202) 775-3270 Access: Web: CSIS.ORG Contact the Author: [email protected] & [email protected] Saudi National Security: Military and Security Services- Challenges & Developments Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Draft: May 30, 2004 Please note that this document is a working draft and will be revised regularly as part of the CSIS Saudi Arabia Enters the 21st Century Project. It is also being used by the authors to develop an analysis for the Geneva Center on Security Policy. To comment, or to provide suggestions and corrections to the authors, please e-mail them at [email protected], [email protected] and [email protected]. Cordesman: The Security Apparatus in Saudi Arabia 6/1/04 Page ii I. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................................................... 1 II. THE SAUDI SECURITY APPARATUS AND SAUDI MILITARY FORCES.................................................... 2 THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SAUDI SECURITY APPARATUS ............................................................................ 3 THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSENSUS AND CONSULTATION ............................................................................ 4 THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SAUDI MILITARY FORCES................................................................................... 5 MANAGEMENT, BUDGETING, LEADERSHIP, AND CIVILIAN CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF THE REGULAR ARMED SERVICES ...................................................................................................................... 6 SAUDI MILITARY EXPENDITURES............................................................................................................... 8 Finding the Proper Level of Expenditure.............................................................................................. 9 SAUDI ARMS IMPORTS.............................................................................................................................. 11 Corruption, Waste, and Accountability............................................................................................... 15 THE MILITARY FORCES OF SAUDI ARABIA............................................................................................... 16 The Saudi Army................................................................................................................................... 17 The Saudi National Guard.................................................................................................................. 23 The Saudi Navy ................................................................................................................................... 25 The Saudi Air Force............................................................................................................................ 26 Saudi Land-based Air Defenses .......................................................................................................... 29 III. THE SAUDI PARAMILITARY AND INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS.............................................. 30 THE EVOLVING SAUDI INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGE........................................................................ 30 Saudi Internal Security Before “9/11” ............................................................................................... 30 Problems in Saudi Internal Security ................................................................................................... 31 Saudi Internal Security After “9/11” .................................................................................................. 32 The Impact of May 2003 ..................................................................................................................... 34 THE SAUDI SECURITY APPARATUS THAT DEALS WITH THESE CHALLENGES. .......................................... 40 THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR................................................................................. 41 THE POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICES ..................................................................................................... 43 THE GENERAL INTELLIGENCE PRESIDENCY.............................................................................................. 45 BORDER AND COASTAL SECURITY ........................................................................................................... 47 SECURITY AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM................................................................................ 48 The Judicial System and Internal Security.......................................................................................... 49 THE “MUTAWWA’IN” OR RELIGIOUS POLICE ........................................................................................... 50 IV. REFORM AND THE MILITARY........................................................................................................................ 51 SAUDI MILITARY DEVELOPMENT ............................................................................................................. 52 Cooperation with Other Southern Gulf States .................................................................................... 52 Force Transformation and Mission-Oriented Procurement Priorities ............................................... 54 ELIMINATING THE GLITTER FACTOR ........................................................................................................ 55 Cordesman: The Security Apparatus in Saudi Arabia 6/1/04 Page iii Realistic Limits on Military Spending and Arms Purchases............................................................... 55 Reducing Future Waste....................................................................................................................... 55 RESHAPING DEFENSE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND TRANSPARENCY........................... 56 ARMS SALES AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE ............................................................................................... 56 V. REFORM AND INTERNAL SECURITY............................................................................................................. 57 SAUDI REFORMS TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY APPARATUS BEFORE MAY 2003 ...................................... 58 International Cooperation .................................................................................................................. 58 Arrests and Questioning of Suspects................................................................................................... 58 Legal and Regulatory Actions and Freezing Terrorist Assets and Combating Money Laundering.... 59 Actions Taken in regard to Charitable Organizations........................................................................ 61 Other Initiatives Related to Fighting Terrorism .................................................................................62 SAUDI INTERNAL SECURITY REFORMS SINCE MAY 2003 ....................................................................... 63 PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER INTERNAL SECURITY REFORMS....................................................................... 66 VI. BROADER SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS ARE THE KEY SECURITY PRIORITY.................. 68 THE AUTHORS ........................................................................................................................................................... 69 Cordesman: The Security Apparatus in Saudi Arabia 6/1/04 Page 1 I. Introduction The Saudi security apparatus is undergoing major changes. Saudi Arabia no longer faces a major threat from Iraq, but must deal with the growing risk that Iran will become a nuclear power. This confronts Saudi Arabia with hard strategic choices as to whether to ignore Iran’s efforts to proliferate, seek US military assistance in deterring Iran and possibly in some form of missile defense, or to acquire more modern missiles and its own weapons of mass destruction. The Kingdom’s most urgent security threats, however, no longer consist of hostile military forces. They have become the threat of Islamic extremism and terrorism. Saudi Arabia faces a direct internal and external threat from Islamic extremists, many affiliated with Al Qaida or exile groups, and it must pay far more attention to internal security than in the past. At the same time, it must deal with the fact that this threat not only is internal, but also is regional and extends throughout the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia’s religious legitimacy is being challenged, and its neighbors and allies face threats of their own. Saudi Arabia must also make major adjustments in its alliances. The events of “9/11,” the backlash from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, differences over how to deal with terrorism, and differences over the Iraq War have all combined to complicate Saudi Arabia’s security relations with the US, and to force it to distance itself from the US in some ways. At the same time, the Al Qaida terrorist attacks on Saudi Arabia in May 2003 made it brutally clear that Saudi Arabia was a full participant in the war on Islamic terrorism and had even stronger incentives to cooperate with the US in anti-terrorism. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has not found any substitute for US power projection capabilities in dealing with Iran, instability in Iraq, or Yemen, and needs US technical