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20150312-P+S-051-Justice Annex

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20150312-P+S-051-Justice Annex Freedom from Suspicion Surveillance Reform for a Digital Age a JUSTICE report Freedom from Suspicion Surveillance Reform for a Digital Age October 2011 JUS_Freedom from Suspicion_aw.indd 1 25/10/11 11:14:58 JUSTICE – 50 years of defending the rule of law JUSTICEisanindependentlawreformandhumanrightsorganisation. It works largely through policy-orientated research; interventions in court proceedings; education and training; briefings, lobbying and policy advice. It is the British section of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). JUSTICE relies heavily on the help of its members and supporters for the funds to carry out its work. For more information visit www.justice.org.uk. JUSTICE, 59 Carter Lane, London EC4V 5AQ 020 7329 5100 [email protected] www.justice.org.uk © JUSTICE 2011 ISBN: 978-0-907247-53-1 Designed by Adkins Design Printed by Hobbs the Printers JUS_Freedom from Suspicion_aw.indd 2 25/10/11 11:14:58 Freedom from Suspicion JUSTICE Contents Executive summary.......................................................................................................... 5 Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... 6 Chapter 1: Introduction................................................................................................... 7 Key terms ..................................................................................................................................................... 17 •Interception of Communications ........................................................................................................ 17 •Communications data ........................................................................................................................ 17 •‘Directed’ and ‘intrusive’ surveillance.................................................................................................. 18 •‘Covert human intelligence sources’ ................................................................................................... 18 •Encryption keys .................................................................................................................................. 19 Chapter 2: Surveillance and the right to privacy............................................................ 20 Privacy as a public good............................................................................................................................... 20 What is surveillance?..................................................................................................................................... 21 Privacy and the common law ...................................................................................................................... 23 Article 8 and UK law..................................................................................................................................... 28 •‘In accordance with the law’ .............................................................................................................. 30 •For alegitimate aim ........................................................................................................................... 34 •‘Necessaryinademocratic society’ .................................................................................................... 34 Chapter 3: Interception of communications ................................................................. 38 Lack of prior judicial authorisation ................................................................................................................ 42 Inadequate ex post facto oversight............................................................................................................... 49 Poor drafting and failure to keep pace with technology ............................................................................... 59 Intercept as evidence.................................................................................................................................... 65 Recommendations........................................................................................................................................ 69 Chapter 4: Communications Data ................................................................................. 71 Inadequate authorisation and oversight........................................................................................................ 75 Unnecessarily broad access........................................................................................................................... 79 Increasingly intrusive nature of communications data................................................................................... 82 The riots and social media............................................................................................................................ 84 Recommendations........................................................................................................................................ 85 Chapter 5: ‘Intrusive’ Surveillance.................................................................................. 87 Lack of judicial control of authorisations by Secretary of State...................................................................... 93 Lack of comprehensive oversight.................................................................................................................. 96 Flawed definition of ‘intrusive’...................................................................................................................... 99 Recommendations...................................................................................................................................... 100 3 JUS_Freedom from Suspicion_aw.indd 3 25/10/11 11:14:58 JUSTICE Freedom from Suspicion Chapter 6: ‘Directed’ Surveillance .............................................................................. 102 Flawed definition of ‘directed’ .................................................................................................................... 103 Inadequate authorisation............................................................................................................................ 105 Inadequate oversight.................................................................................................................................. 109 ANPR and CCTV ......................................................................................................................................... 111 Recommendations...................................................................................................................................... 113 Chapter 7: Covert human intelligence sources ............................................................ 115 The need for prior judicial authorisation ..................................................................................................... 117 Recommendations...................................................................................................................................... 119 Chapter 8: Encryption keys.......................................................................................... 120 Unnecessarily complex authorisation and oversight.................................................................................... 123 Encryption and the fight against terrorism.................................................................................................. 125 The right against self-incrimination............................................................................................................. 129 Legal professional privilege......................................................................................................................... 131 Recommendations...................................................................................................................................... 132 Chapter 9: The Investigatory Powers Tribunal.............................................................. 133 Lack of effectiveness ................................................................................................................................... 136 Excessive secrecy and lack of procedural fairness ........................................................................................ 141 Recommendations...................................................................................................................................... 152 Chapter 10: Conclusion............................................................................................... 154 Surveillance reform for a digital age ........................................................................................................... 154 Summary of Recommendations....................................................................................159 Annex: Comparative use of judicial authorsation for surveillance powers in other European and common law countries .............................................................................. 162 4 JUS_Freedom from Suspicion_aw.indd 4 25/10/11 11:14:58 Freedom from Suspicion JUSTICE Executive summary • In 2000, Parliament enacted RIPA. At the time, it was acclaimed by government ministers as human rights-compliant, forward-looking legislation. • Since RIPAcame into force in 2000, there have been: –more than 20,000 warrants for the interception of phone
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