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CRIME and ETECTION 1111
Reference Guide Workbook Case Study HV 8079 .M64 P7 1993d Guide
Solicitor General Canada I Solliciteur général Canada Canad'a •
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CRIME 11110 DETECT1011 Proceeds of Crime
Reference Guide
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The following training program, which includes a reference guide, a video, and a stu- dent workbook with a case study, is intended to assist police forces in developing the skills of police officers and investigators in the area of proceeds of crime investigation.
These materials are not intended to supplant the discretion and judgement of the police forces in any proceeds of crime investigation.
These materials are in no way meant to be comprehensive or to be taken as legal ad- vice. If you are in doubt as to the proper procedure, seek legal advice.
Further, the views expressed in these materials are those of Bindernagel-Ross New Media and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Canada. •
• •
Copyright CD 1993 Bindernagel-Ross New Media All rights reserved.
It is illegal to reproduce any portion of this book except by special arrangement with the publisher. Repro- duction of this material without authorization by any duplication process whatsoever is a violation of copy- right. Every effort has been made to determine and locate copyright owners. In the case of any ommissions, the publisher will be pleased to make suitable acknowledgements in future editions.
Bindemagel-Ross New Media 306, 2000 Weston Road Weston, Ontario M9N 1X3 • Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I • Money Laundering Table of Contents
SECTION 1 Introduction 6 Chapter 1 - Money Laundering 9 What Is Money Laundering? 11 Money Laundering - The Techniques 21 The Load 25 The Wash 35 The Dry 38 Moving Money 39 Social Mores 40
Chapter 2 - Secrecy Havens 41 On Law Enforcement and Foreign Banks 47
Chapter 3 - The Canadian Banking System and Financial Transactions and Records 49 The Canadian Financial System 51 Account Records 56 Over the Counter Services 62 Investment Services 64 Lending Services and Mortgages 66 Safety Depo,sit Boxes 67 Double Entry Accounting 68
Chapter 4 - Financial Investigation and Public Information Systems 69 Pathfinding 73 Where to Apply for Information on Corporations 74
Chapter 5 - Financial Investigation Techniques 77 Audit Trails 79 Investigating a Bank Statement 79 Investigating a Bank Account Passbook 85 Investigating a Cheque 88 Investigating a Deposit 98 Investigating a Proof Tape 105 Investigating a Cheque on Deposit 107 Investigating a Wire Transfer 109 Investigating a Money Order/Draft Purchase 112 Investigating a Client Profile 115 Investigating Foreign Exchange 116 Currency Source Declarations 116 Summary 117
Chapter 6 - Financial Investigation Summary and Analysis 121 Source and Use of Funds 123 Net Worth Analysis 148 Appendix A: Lecture Scene Transcript 151 Appendix B: Summaries of Records 173 Glossary 179 Endnotes 181
SECTION 2 • Workbook W1 SECTION 3 Case Study Cl Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Introduction
Introduction Crime and Detection is a Police Education Program developed for the Federal Ivfmistry of the Solicitor General of Canada to develop the skills of police officers and investigators in the area of proceeds of crime investigation. The purpose of the training program is to build upon the criminal investiga- tion skills and applied experience the student investigator already possesses. It introduces a relatively new and potent method of law enforcement that targets criminal enterprises through the identification and demonstration of the profits or assets obtained through the criminal activity. The application of proceeds of crime enforcement has been particularly well-demonstrated by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police against narcotic trafficking organizations in Canada and has been an effective law enforcement measure by United States law enforcement agencies in their war against drugs. This program has been developed with the assistance and cooperation of expert sources including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Metropolitan Toronto Police, Ontario Provincial Police, Investigative Accounting Group of Ernst & Young Public Security of Canada, and Mr. Charles Intriago, an inter- nationally renowned expert on the topic of money laundering. The Canadian banlcing industry and specifically the Royal Bank of Canada has been extremely helpful in the development of this training package. VVithout the support and cooperation received from the Royal Bank of Canada, the creation of this training program would not have been possible. Throughout this course and the case study, several references and illustra- tions of financial records relating to a fictional money laundering case have been presented to assist the investigator with interpreting realistic and accurate evidence during an investigation. The requirement to present the investigator student with accurate records has been critical to achieve the learning objectives of this training program. In doing so, nearly every major Canadian fmancial institution has been represented in this investigation in order to demonstrate the fluency with which transactions can be structured by launderers. We do not imply or target any specific financial institution as being espe- cially vulnerable or susceptible to laundering activity, nor do we intend to suggest that any of the financial institutions has been victimized by a launderer.
6 Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Introduction
The training is broken down into the following sections:
Moneg Laimdenng In this section you will learn: • The definition of money laundering. • The motivations and techniques criminals use to launder money. • Why identification of money laundering can be difficult, and what steps the financial industry has taken to prevent themselves from being used by money launderers.
Financial Insbtubon Records In this section you will learn: • The structure and organiz.ation of the Canadian banlçing and trust industry. • The methods of domestic and international financial transactions. • Record-keeping practices for financial transactions.
Financial Invesbgabon Techniques In this section you will learn: • The principles and techniques of fmancial (forensic accounting) investiga- tion and how it applies to a proceeds of crime investigation. • What an audit trail is. • What records make up an audit trail and where to find them. • How to analyse evidenc,e and determine further financial investigative steps. • How fmancial transactions can be used in intelligence gathering. • About financial investigation summaries such as a Source and Use of Funds analysis and a Net Worth analysis, and how to prepare them for court. • You will be introduced to Proceeds of Crime investigation.
Case Study In this section you will learn; • How the knowledge presented in the workbook applies to a proceeds of • crime investigation. 1 Cnme 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Introduction
• How the example of the proceeds of crime investigation dramatized in the video was conducted. • The difficulties and challenges that may be experienced during an investiga- tion. • How to use the evidence'gathered from this investigation to complete certain elements of the investigation yourself.
In this section, you will practice: Document investigation techniques. Interpreting and analysing actual evidence from the investigation. Preparing a Source and Use of Funds Worksheet.
This training package is designed to be a self-paced, self-study learning and reference material which includes a reference guide, a video case study, a print case study, and reproductions of key evidence from the video. The suggested study pattern for this course is: 1 Read through Chapters 1 through 6 of the reference guide. 2 Read the Case Study introduction. 3 Start the Case Study by watching the video (approximately 60 minutes). 4 As you watch the video, refer to the evidence sections (especially Appendix A and Chapter 6) of your workbook to get a closer view and understanding of the evidence that the investigators on the case are handling. 5 After the video, commence the case study exercises on document investiga- tion and asset tracing. 6 Verify the correctness of your answers by comparing your results to the answer key found in the Workbook. 7 If you experienced difficulty in understanding the document investigation techniques, review the video again and/or refer to the appropriate topic of Chapter 5 in the Reference Guide.
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Money Laundering
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10 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime"
Chapter I 0 Money Laundering
• What Is Mo e u Laundermg? While the term "money laundering" may sound mysterious, essentially it is disguising the origins of money that has been obtained illegally. Generally, money laundering is thought to be an act exclusive to the illegal drug trade; yet laundering has been a pursuit of all major cash-generating criminal organizations and individuals. Prostitution, gambling and loan sharlcing are traditional criminal activities that would require laundering, but also to be included in the Money Laundering Hall of Fame are tax evaders, some political organizations and some corporations. An individual who has been bribed, an employee who used inside information to profit in the stock market, a political party that received financial contributions from a source it does not want to publicly acknowledge: all of these, and others, want to disguise the source of their income. They are all money launderers.
Whg is É done? In order for a criminal to reap the rewards of his labour he must present himself as a legitimate individual who has attained his wealth and standing in a legal and accountable way. The money you spend must come from somewhere. Any country that taxes income regulates which sources are legitimate. In order to spend money, you must be able to declare its source. You could hardly declare • income from drug trafficking or extortion on an income tax return! Drug traffickers launder money to convert the vast amounts of cash generated by their sales to more manageable assets. Large amounts of cash must be converted to less conspicuous forms which can be moved more easily than cash. Money is usually laundered through the domestic and international banking systems which keep the capital flowing to the international connections of the drug traffickers.
Drug Organzabons Criminal enterprises involved in trafficking illicit drugs are large, sophisticated organizations. Much like a multinational corporation, they have in place a wholesale, distribution, retail, financial and administrative network that spans the world. They are often controlled by citizens of the area in which the drug is cultivated. Many drug organizations have invested their enormous profits and have extensive holdings in prime downtown real estate in major cities, legiti- mate businesses, stocks and bonds, etc. They have become powerful, wealthy business concerns. These organizations are thought to receive an estimated $US 300 billion annually in worldwide sales of illegal narcotics — $U.S. 822 million a day! •
II Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 1 o Money Laundering
lhe Ihe cFle The drug cycle starts with the cultivation of the plant required to produce the drug. For cocaine, the coca leaves cultivated in South America provide the "raw material." Farmers in Bolivia and Peru rely heavily on this crop for sustenance. The fanners are generally not linked to the drug trafficking organi- zations, and there are many legitimate reasons for growing coca. However, they play an essential role in the drug cycle. Heroin, which is characteristically produced in Asia, is derived from opium plants. Farmers rely on this crop for their livelihood and receive a moderate sum of money for their crop. Once the plant is cultivated, it is transported to a manufacturer, usually a jungle chemical plant, where it is refmed and re-refined into a product that can be sold on the street. Throughout this process the raw materials and the manu- facturers are under the enormous protection of the drug organization's security because of the enormous profits to be made by selling the drug. At each stage, management and administration ensure the continued unin- terrupted flow of product with an efficiency and effectiveness not duplicated in the legitimate business world. VVhen the product is in a saleable forrn, it is transported to the market. With the obvious threats of detection and seizure by law enforcement agencies in both the countries of import and export, the product is carefully concealed and transported by boat and plane. In the Western hemisphere cocaine trade, the product transported north from Colombia is under intense surveillance by the United States Custom Service, United States Military, United States Drug Enforcement Agency, and the United States Coast Guard through naval patrols, air patrols using both regular police and military aircraft, and sophisticated secret spy planes and satellites. The regular military and commercial radar facilities in place all along the U.S. coast are now used extensively for drug interdiction and United States Military Reserve Forces are also used to support this role. As the entry points to the United States are closed, more and more evidence supports the theory that Canada has become the preferred and ideal entry point for the drugs destined for the U.S. market. Canada shares with the U.S. the longest unguarded border in the world and is an excellent access point for drugs. The preferred method of transportation is small planes equipped vvith extra long range fuel tanks that will allow the plane to fly far off the U.S. Atlantic coast just out of radar range, and then in over Canada's Atlantic coast to land at small landing strips in the eastern provinces. Once there, the planes can refuel and fly to a central Canadian landing point and then into the United States. A
12 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 1 • Money Laundering
flight plan filed from an Ontario point to a small U.S. airport arouses little suspicion and is therefore not as likely to be detected by American Law En- forcement agencies. An alternate method is to unload the drugs in the Atlantic landing destination and transport them by cars, trucks, etc. across Canada and then to the U.S. The methods used, the individuals used, the entry points and the receiving contacts are managed and chosen by King Pins or the "CEO's" of the drug organizations based and he,adquartered in Colombia. Their vast business networks are managed by financial and business advisers around the world. The drugs are received in the importing country by contacts or members of the same organization who act as wholesalers and/or distributors and regional managers. The drug is either sold wholesale to local independent drug dealers or distributed to their ovvn retail network of street drug dealers and then to the teenage pushers and couriers. $200,000 every minute is generated in cash drug sales in the U.S. At each point of this cycle, the value or price of the product increases substantially. (See Table 1.1, page 14.) The value of one successful shipment brings tremendous wealth to the drug corporations. The risk of losing the shipment or of arrest is considered small compared to the potential gains. While the effects of the drug trade on Canada pale by comparison to the United States, several indicators concern Canadian law enforcement agencies. Canada's proximity to the United States, the world's largest drug consumption market with the world's longest unguarded border, allows a tremendous vol- ume of illegal narcotics and profits from drug sales to be transported back and forth. The Canadian economy, its investment opportunities, and financial com- munity with its strong international financial relationships offer a very attractive base to drug organizations.
How long has É been done? Disguising the proceeds of crime has long been the sensible way to avoid any undesirable attention to the business of the criminal. The art of laundering the proceeds of crime was perfected in the early 1930s by an American named Meyer Lansky. Lansky was a business partner of Salvatore 'Lucky' Luciano. 'Lucky' was responsible for leading the notorious Chicago mob (once run by Al Capone) into the heroin business after prohibition was lifted. After the convic- tion of Al Capone on tax evasion charges, the Mafia lords recognized the need • for an effective laundering system that distanced the proceeds of crime from them firther than the existing chain of laundromats and car washes.
13 Crime o Detecbon "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 1 Money Laundenng
FIGURE 1.1
Representative Prices for Southeast Asian and Southwest Asian Heroin at Successive Stages of Trafficking, 1984'
Southeast Asian Heroin Farmer 10 kg of opium $ 1350-$1500 Laboratory (Golden Triangle) 1 kg of No. 4 heroin (pure) $4200- $5800 Distribution Centre (Bangkok) 1 kg of No. 4 heroin (pure) $7400-$11500 Canada 1 kg of No. 4 heroin (pure) $225000 1 ounce (28 grams) of No. 4 heroin (pure) $13000 1gram of No. 4 heroin (pure) $600-$1000 1 capsule of No. 4 heroin 15%-6% pure) $35-$60
Southwest Asian Heroin Farmer 10 kg of opium $90041000 Laboratory (Golden Crescent) 1 kg of heroin (pure) $520047150 Distribution Centre (Europe) 1 kg of heroin (pure) $50000-$85000 Canada 1 kg of heroin (pure) $225000 1 ounce (28 grams) of heroin (pure) $13000 1gram of heroin (pure) $60041000 1 capsule of heroin (5%-6% pure) $35-$60
lbw Is it done? The mechanical methods of money laundering are many and complex; however, the principle underlying laundering is quite simple: to render police investiga- tors ineffective by distancing the true origins of the money from the criminal. With the knowledge that all financial transactions have a true source and a true destination, launderers rely on the following methods: Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime"
Chapter I 0 Money Laundering
• • altering the perception of the source by creating a series of nonoperating companies owned by the money launderer that create the appearance of legitimate sources for income, FIGURE 1.2
• manipulating the flow of cash so as not to raise any undue suspicion by bankers, FIGURE 1.3
$5,000 $3,000 $8,000
• creating a network of financial transfers between various accounts and financial institutions that has limited exposure to any individual placing the information about the owners of the accounts at a distance,
FIGURE 1.3
77-1
ge.eraln • •••••• •
IS Crime 0 Detecbon "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 1 0 Money Laundering
• taking advantage of an impersonal financial network that provides for the quick courier of international funds expediently and efficiently, • manipulating payments between financial institutions and corporations so as to create a incomprehensible trail of records for investigators, • using foreign banking and corporation havens that offer secrecy laws to protect owners from prying eyes.
Does money laundenng work? Launderers understand the precautions financial institutions have taken at a policy level to prevent laundering, but depend on the branch's lack of stringent enforcement of these precautions. They assume that the bank's policy of know- ing the source, purpose and destination of all transactions is unrealistic and impractical. They also rely on the lack of access to and understanding of the fmancial system by proceeds of crime offic,ers. The Imowledge necessary to launder depends on the preventative measures used by both bank employees and law enforcement officers, and the length of the trail. If money is moved from point A to point B without being detected, money laundering is perceived to be successful. In the same way, a burglar who has sneaked past the guard and alann system without detection has been successful. If he leaves and never returns to the same route he probably will never be caught. If an investigation leads to an individual who has been laundering drug money for a number of years and the assets or proceeds of the crime can be seized some years later, the money launderers will not seem so successful. It is unlilcely that money laundering will be stopped at the moment the money is deposited. However, because the records of these transactions remain intact for several years, it is possible to investigate and obtain evidence for prosecution after the fact. A launderer will feel comfortable and secure with a method that appears to be successful. This perception of security will work to the advantage of investi- gators because much of their work can be done quickly and quietly, without the launderer's knowledge! Once law enforcement investigators have bridged the gaps of knowledge in understanding financial transactions and financial investigations, their perception of the success and failure of money laundering individuals or organizations will change. It will change because they will learn that almost anything can be traced.
16 Crime 0 Detection -Proceeds of Crime- Chapter 1 0 Money Laundering
The Financial Organization DRUG SALES of 1 Drug Corporations Courier Smurfs Service Fronts FIGURE 1.4
Trauporsed Conversai to dreg, by canner truretlier's casquas, money orders
e e Secrecy !savers: Mailed to International iasernational corporstiosu iII Mint" Yor* Torcasio Hong Kong London cosporesions secrecy havens • in secrecy lamas
1=1WeNee Maiden
Foreign Corporations for Legitimate Investments
All OvCrned By Drug Corporation
DRUG CORPORATION'S • PRIVATE AND BUSINESS WEALTH
11 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime-
Chapter I 0 Money Laundenng
The Money Laundering Cycle
FIGURE 1.5
Life-style
The drug corpora- tion is the begin- ning and the end of the money Cayman laundering cycle,. Islands
Plants that are the raw material for drugs are purchased and refined, then smuggled to 7 North America to be sold. Cash is converted into other payment instru- ments in countries like Canada with a stable banking system and transfenred electroni- From sales, huge cally to accounts around amounts of cash accu- the world. i mulate. It is heavy and bulky, and launderers have devised many ingenious ways to con- vert the unwieldy cash into more manageable forms. /
ID Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime- Chapter 1 Money Laundering
lbw sophisbcated are theg? To effectively launder great quantities of cash, one needs to lmow how the financial community works, especially if the financial institution has prioritized itself to recognize the signals of money laundering. If the organization and the quantities of cash are small (under $5 million a year), the trail would not neces- sarily be long and might not be international. In this case a woriring knowledge of the mentality of the financial institu- tion's employees and the establishment of a good client/bank relationship with a few different institutions under the front oflegitimate businesses would prob- ably suffice. A more intimate understanding of financial institutions and instruments of 'flight capital' would be necessary for larger international organiz.ations vvith larger volumes and quite possibly different intentions for the cash. Such an organization might want to decentralize its wealth into its various countries of origin and into legitimate investment vehicles such as stocks, real estate or businesses. Expertise might be obtained from legitimate sources such as lawyers, accountants, and bankers. The financial expert could be from the home country that directs the financial operations worldwide of many satellite organizations. Local dealers could also be set up as franchises with advice rendered but autonomy left to the owner/operator. There are also individuals or organiza- tions that could be hired to move or 'courier' the money for the dealers. In all cases the advice would probably take into account the present barriers in the system that are intended to prevent laundering and would count on lack of attention to those barriers when calculating the risks and likelihood of suc- CeSS. A lack of understanding of the record keeping of transactions, a lack of confidence in the analytical ability of both law enforcement and financial institu- tion employees, and a complete failure to recognize the impact of recent legisla- tion and zealous fmancial investigators dominate the launderer's approach!
Bo th know the baking sgstem? The manipulation of various financial institutions and their respective accounts sug,gest that launderers receive expert advice either from an individual who has developed experience from the act of laundering or possibly from a banker. It would be simple to plant someone into a branch to learn the banicing system. In a few short months the necessary information could be obtained. Accurate advice must come from a banker, not from a lawyer or from an accountant! The banking community's ecology is sophisticated and difficult for the outsider to understand. There are constant innovations in technology and operating procedures. 19 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I Money Laundering
Do those who are abasmg them [accountants lawyers hankers] know the banking sgstem? Neither lawyers nor accountants are experts on the administrative and opera- tional infrastructure of banking. Their expertise will be limited to the percep- tions obtained through observation as a bank client and through correspondence such as bank statements. Concentrated exposure to fmancial institutions from a client point of view will certainly give a sound understanding of the aspects of banlcing as it pertains to them: how long it takes to wire money, what documentation is required to open bank accounts, and also a detailed understanding of the worlcing mentality of the typical branch employee! Accountants would understand the bookkeeping aspects of operating a business and would certainly be able to give direction with respect to reconcil- ing the bank records on their client's company with their own records. They are generally very knowledgable about directing individuals as to what type of bank accounts to open and what (legAly) would be required to open them. Their lcnowledge of how a bank operates its own records is normally very little — unless they have a worldng source in a banking system. Lawyers would defmitely be capable of giving expert advice about the legal obligations of operating a business. Based on their experiences with their own trust accounts, they could explain the particularities of such accounts and would be well-acquainted with banldng documents from the client's point of view. Both of these professionals normally offer incorporation services which would be the first stop for advice about opening any type of business operation. In addition, some might offer an administrative service. For example a lawyer or accountant with a power of attorney can operate the daily transactions of the operation and protect the true owner from exposure. A banker who is approached for advice (covertly) about the daily operation of the banldng systems might be unable to give the advice needed to assist the trafficker depending on his/her position in the bank.
Is angthmg untraceable? The record-keeping proc,edures in the Canadian banking system are quite effective in tracing the route of fimds. It is impractical for branches to monitor daily transactions given the volumes they process. To overcome this problem, the processing centres of the financial institutions have developed an extensive system of electronic recording and filining of the transactions it processes. The records are retained for a specific amount of time for branch reference in case of errors or problems. Any opened account, deposit, cheque, wire transfer or foreign exchange transaction produces either electronic records or film copies.
20 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I • Money Laundering
• the transactions of an organization or individual, you In order to reconstruct must know where to find these records and how to interpret them. This infor- mation will be covered in Chapter 3. Almost anything is traceable.
Money Laundermg • The Techniques A money laundering operation will take dirty money and route it through several structures such as cash yielding businesses and place it back into the hands of the drug dealer. (See Figure 1.6, page 22.) A Judiciary committee submitted to Congressional hearings in the United States that: These launderers carry on a number of activitie,s at one time. They arrange for the deposit of illicit cash into domestic financial institutions; arrange for the transportation or delivery of currency into or out of the U.S.; they may buy U.S. dollars in exchange for Colombian pesos; buy pesos in exchange for dollars; buy and sell both Colombian banking instruments as well as U.S. cashier's checks, personal checks or corporate checks; manipulate U.S. domestic disguised wire transfers of funds from the U.S. to relatively secure havens such as Panama, the Cayman Islands and Switzerland; set up sham foreign corporations...sometimes all these things are happening at the same time.2 The money launderer may carry the funds through as many corporations or businesses as he controls. The number he does use probably depends on how secure he feels about the safety of his money laundering operation. Funds could be moved locally (i.e.. in North America) by directing payments back and forth inconspicuously and simultaneously through twenty banks by mail or telephone. (See Figure 1. 7; page 23.) Once the cash has been accepted by the bank and placed into the dealer's account, it begins to appear legitimate. The payments made between the various corporations belonging to the money launderer are in the form of regularpaynent instruments. Financial institutions process biffions of individual payments every day! Once satisfied that the money has been sufficiently distanced from him, the money launderer will route it back to himself in the guise of legitimate salary. However long and indiscernible the trail, it is a safe assumption that the • fiinds will lead back to the launderer in some relatively liquid form. 21 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime Chapter I 0 Money Laundering
FIGURE 1.6
The money launderer deposits cash through the businesses that would be expected to yield cash deposits. He then dmws the money out to himself as apparently legitimate salary.
DRUG SALES - CASH
Pizza Plus Have Fun Club 99 Amusements
Bank A Trust B Bank C
Cheques drawn on Cheques drawn on Cheques drawn on
ena 111,4 Hass ha Usk 99 'MOOD $05 000 $25 000 Ilbag lasieme ern lammileut Waal Imair14
These cheques are payable to the money latmderer as apparently legitimate income.
22 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I 0 Money laundering
FIGURE 1 .7
The money launderer decides to move the flow of proceeds of crime through various shell companies and financial institutions to extend the trail further both geograhically and on paper.
DRUG SALES - CASH
Pizza Plus Have Fun Club 99 Amusements
Avocado Investments Back Door Holdings New Wave Marketing
Avocado Inv. NY Two Cities Inv. Fia. Running News Inv. Ca
Running News Inv. Toronto Inv. Holdings Vancouver Inv. Ltd.
Money launderer receives apparently legitimate • investment income.
23 Cnme 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I • Money Laundering
The use of dummy corporations The need to spread the trail out further in the distribution process of money laundering is satisfied by forming corporations that can accept large transfers of capital into and out of the corporation's books. The use of corporations gives an air of respectability. Since the receipt of capital in any form by a corporation is quite normal it will not be suspect. The use of a corporation also provides privacy since the ownership is determined by shareholders and information on the shareholders would never become public knowledge unless investigated by authorities. Incorporation is a simple inmensive process that would raise no suspicion. Many businesses incorporate for tax purposes. There are many sources of expert advice and service. A lawyer, accountant or paralegal service can provide the documentation and act on your behalf to incorporate. You need never step into the offices of the Mmistry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs where corporations are regis- tered. Once incorporated, the business is maintained and operated at the owner's discretion. The accountant or lawyer might be retained as council or to act on the owner's behalf with a power of attorney, but in the case of Money launder- ers that could compromise security. It is therefore unlikely. Information about corporations is available upon request and is based on information provided to the registrar by the corporation. Even in countries with secrecy laws, information as to the ownership of a corporation may be available with proper investigation and cooperation. Information such as internal accounting records and who owns corpora- tions is the key to imrestigating the money laundering trail.
Open ng Midi account Once a front corporation ha.s been established, the next component in the money laundering mechanism is opening a bank account. The most important part of laundering drug money is to establish a relation- ship with a financial institution that is willing to accept large quantities of cash and execute transactions without getting suspicious. The dealer's criteria for selecting a branch is really no different than that of any legitimate businessman. However, certain factors will contribute to a lack of suspicion. • A money launderer would not choose a corporate banlcing centre where account managers get to know clients and their businesses in order to sell
21i Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I Money Laundering
banking services. Large volumes of money or transactions in an account would attract the account tnanager's attention. This would be dangerous for a money launderer. • The branch's location could affect the level of suspicion on the part of the bankers towards cash deposits. For instance, bankers will be more suspi- cious if the branch is located in a seedy part of a city that is known as a drug-ridden neighbourhood. • A branch that is very busy all of the time is a good choice because the employees are too busy performing administrative functions and serving customers to take the time to scrutiniz.e clients and their transactions. It is easy to establish a good friendly relationship with these employees because they are appreciative of nice, understanding clients. • A branch in a buik up retailfmdustrial area would receive large cash deposits from legitimate business clients such as stores, service stations and restau- rants. Financial institution employees would be used to large cash transac- tions. This would also ensure that the branch would have a large cash limit and would be able to absorb steady cash volumes without raising any suspicion at head office. • The branch should not be located close to the location that the dealer lists as luis business address. For example, if he represents himself as a restaurant owner he wouldn't want any of the bank tellers trying to fmd it for a lunch excursion. • The branch that doesn't exercise too much inquisitiveness when approached about opening a new business account is less likely to be inquisitive later.
Once the launderer has satisfied some or all of these requirements, has opened an account, and has established a friendly rapport with the branch employees, the money laundering mechanism has its first and most crucial element in place. Now to effectively and safely operate this aspect of the laundering mecha- nism, the launderer must understand the barriers that bankers and legislators have instituted to prevent or detect laundering, and then fmd a way to circimvent them. Since many financial institutions have a policy of obtaining declarations from clients as to the source of cash transactions over $10,000, a launderer must naturally take care not to do business in a branch that adheres to these guidelines. The cash must enter the banking system quietly. Dropping more than $10,000 cash at a time is not wise. Except for major department stores or high 25 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter le Money Laundering
volume restaurants like McDonald's, very few businesses generate more than that $10,000 cash sales on a daily basis. A consistently large, recurring drop of cash in the banker's lap could attract the attention of someone in the branch since it would not only cause a substan- tial increase in the normal work load, but would also put the branch over the branch cash holdings limit (i.e. the amount of cash a branch is allowed to have on hand). The bankers are required to justify why the litnit was exceeded. Large cash drops are neither safe nor smart on the part of the launderer. The shotgun approach to dumping the cash into the banking system is not necessary. Individuals who show so much skilful planning and patience in the business of the development and importation of narcotics need not become impatient or ignorant at the cash processing end of the business. A calculated and methodical approach to placing the cash into the financial system is not only safer, but once perfected is capable oflaundering an astounding amount of funds. The launderer has a whole financial world of opportunity at his disposal.
Service fronts - In order to maintain discretion and secrecy when moving the cash into the fmancial system, the launderer may use several 'service' type fronts such as restaurants, jewellers, or bars to move a steady source of cash into the bank through daily deposits. Actually establishing operating businesses provides legitimate representation in the community and provides income earning assets, which is the launderer's goal. The cost of taxes would be far less than the cost of laundering money. The Colombian cocaine cartels are said to be a large conglomerate inte- grated vertically and horizontally with holdings in commercial real estate, restaurants, TV and radio stations, manufacturing and retail businesses. These holdings are worldwide and could be part of a load mechanism or results of a wash investment (This is discussed in more detail on page 35). Estimates also suggest that the Colombian c,ocaine industry provides for a $20 billion annual injection of capital into the Colombian economy. In its early times the Capone organization held intere,sts in a string of car washes through which a great amount of income from liquor sales was laun- dered. When a storefront operation is used with careful attention to detail, com- plex series of international transfers may not be necessary. Records of operation are produce,d for potential audits and further diversification into legitimate enterprises can be made.
26 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I 0 Money Laundering
Example of a Storefront Operation A downtown jewellery store that was floundering under its previous manage- ment was purchased outright at a generous price by a young established entre- preneur who was diversifying and interested in the jewellery business. The former owners, who had run the store for some 15 years, are in their early fifties and excited about the prospects of early retirement. To their delight the payment for their business is svvift and they consider it good fortune to have sold to an established individual who didn't require financing. Payment was delivered two weeks after the purchase agreement was signed. Payment was in the form of bank drafts in U.S. currency from the purchaser's different companies. The drafts were from different banks in incre- ments of $10 000 to $50 000. The books and the keys were turned over to the new owner. The new owner, a money man for the country's largest cocaine lord, purchased the business to launder cash from local drug sales. The store was kept open as a front. An ambitious business plan was enacted and new bank accounts opened at different banks across the city. The new banks were ap- proached by the young entrepreneur and a professional presentation of business strategy was made to the various bank managers showing tremendous future growth potential. In addition, a substantial amount of working capital was transferred to each new acc,ount to the satisfaction of each branch manager. If the dealer's goal is to appear legitimate and to pass audit inspections, then the actual operation of the business must expand to show proportionately realistic increased cash flows to absorb more drug cash. One store wouldn't increase its sales from $300000 to $30 million annually. However, if the store were expanded into a chain, further laundering would be facilitated. This option has many benefits. It further legitimizes the dealer in the eyes of his bankers and the community since entrepreneurial skills are greatly admired and respected. The drug proceeds can also be further laundered through the purchase of real estate for the new locations and gems for inventory. The guarantee of legitimate sales through the new stores is secured by advertising and cheaper inventory costs from buying in bulk. All of these benefits are the result of cheap money, i.e. drug cash. The "jeweller's" competitors, who borrow from banks, do not have this advantage. • As a result, the launderer's selling prices could be lower, which in turn gener-
21 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I 0 Money Laundenng
ates a larger sales base through which drug cash could be laundered. Hundreds of millions of dollars could be laundered in such operations. The actual accounting for the sales of each store would be done centrally. The drug cash would be mixed in at this point as nominee sales, through ficti- tious bills of sale made up for diamond rings, paid for by cash and deposited with daily receipts. In order to account for inventory discrepancies (i.e. sale of non-existent inventory), false purchase orders could be made up to a jewel wholesaler and payments made to the wholesaler by cheque for a product never delivered. The jewel wholesaler is an international company outside the immediate investigative powers of local authorities and is secretly owned by the same drug dealer through a series of dummy corporations. This is another step in the laundering mechanism which just furthers the trail. If the books are audited, an investigator would find paYments to the whole- sale supplier, with supporting invoices and accounts payable ledger entries and inventory entries. In addition, waybills showing shipping records would also be on hand. All of this would seem very legitimate but would be in fact a series of non-existent transactions. Once the money is in the hands of the jewel wholesaler who would be incorporated in a secrecy haven, the funds would be transferred to several dummy financial corporations and dumped into a holding corporation located in any financial centre in the world earning 20% legitimately! At this point the proceeds could be invested in perfectly honest businesses, stock markets or real estate. The probability of any future direct ties (i.e. business transactions) with any of the dirty or unrecycled cash or businesses would be unlikely since the risk of association would create a short trail and unravel the distance already created. Should records ever be examined, accounting and business records might also exist between all the dummy corporations to document what would appear to be perfectly legitimate transactions. The jewel wholesaler could also purchase inventory with the drug proceeds and would roll it several times to further the trail. This would be in the form of legitimate commercial transactions with other jewellers. shotgun If the dealer elects the shotgun approach a number of accounts are set up at several banks and trust companie„s. The cash is deposited at a rate of approxi- mately $50,000 a day and is spread out between the various accounts to avoid suspicion. Alternate methods are used such as night deposit and service branches. This method, if properly applied, could operate safely for a year or two and launder about $10 million annually. 28 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I • Money Laundering
An FBI report documented how a ring of twenty elderly women each made three deposits of $8000 US weekly at six different banks, and within 52 weeks had laundered $150 million. This could be done with business or personal bank accounts.
Money Orders/Drafts Money orders or drafts can be anonymously purchased at street lewl by %muds', inconspicious, looking people who blend in as bank customers. Smurfs, anned with a bag of cash, will travel to various bank branches exchanging small amounts of cash to drafts or money orders. This disposes of cash at a distance from the launderer and converts it into low profile negotiable instruments. Once in this form, the funds can be deposited into the bank account of a front such as a marketing or consulting firm that would be expected to receive large receiva- bles. There are a number of cases where teams of elderly women were discov- ered to be travelling to cities that had hundreds of banks, and with shopping bags of cash, purchased money orders and drafts each under $10,000. Enor- mous amounts of cash could be dropped this way. The drafts could be cashed overseas. "The money orders (could be) made out to a Swiss bat* and sent through the mail or carried by a courier, with less risk than a bulky quantity of cash."
Mire Transfers Local wire transfers from another financial institution can be credited to the launderer's account, ostensibly from another business or individual for services rendered. The wire could be paid for by cash and sent under a false name. A stranger can walk into a financial institution, hand over a large quantity of cash, and have it transferred by cable to the credit of a Swiss or other foreign bank account. When the financial institution executes the transfer, it usually insists (as when a customer uses cash to buy a large money order) that the unknown customer complete a currency report giving his name and address. This presents no problem for the dirty-money courier, who supplies a fictitious name and address. If the financial institution asks to see some identification, he is well supplied with fake passports and driver's licenses. 4 Multiple transfers can be made on a given day by making consecutive transaction using many financial institutions. The number of transfers made may depend on how secure the launderer feels about the safety of his money laun- dering operation. The more transfers made, the more records created, and the • more complex the investigation into the trail.
29 Crime 0 Detecbon "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I • Money Laundering
By using a financial institution outside of the jurisdiction of investigators, the pursuit of information on the transactions is firther delayed. A wire transfer mechanism can be established whereby the funds are wire transferred from a bank account to another ftnancial institution. Bank accounts are set up across the country to receive these wire transfers. Instructions are left on each account to wire transfer funds from that account to another account at a different ftnancial institution. This process is repeated until the launderer is satisfied that enough of a paper trail has been left to hinder an investigation. Both the chequewriting method and wire transfer method can be used individually or together to wash the funds. When used along with drafts, money orders and traveller's cheques, the trail becomes extremely lengthy and complex.
Currency exchanges Currency exchanges could be used to change the cash to a money order, travellers cheques or a commodity such as gold or silver. Gold and silver are available in easily transportable form and are readily exchangeable in most countries.
Stocks and bonds 11, Securities such as stocks or bonds are an excellent disguise because they are easily purchased and sold, easily transported, and respectable. Securities can be bought at a brokerage house or through a bank branch. In addition, the intro- duction of discount brokerage services by the banks have distanced the buying and selling of securities even further.
Bearer rnuesbnents Bearer investments such as treasury bills and banker's acceptances are available at most financial institutions and brokerage houses. Share certificates of stock, bonds, and bearer investments can be carried easily by mail or by person to European markets where they can be disposed of easily and secretly by Swiss bankers. limbered accounts Wire transfers can be made to a Liechtenstein ansalt (see page 43 for further information), which can then be forwarded to a Swiss numbered bank account. The same can be done with international bank drafts and money orders. • 30 Crime 0 Detecbon "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I Money Laundering
hnpersonal bank services Bank services that distance the client from the banker such as night deposit, bank machines, and service branches can be used. Night deposit is done at the banker's leisure and is done in the absence of any client presence (before business hours). It is usually done by several tellers cotnmunally. In the absence of the client, the level of scrutiny and suspicion is low. Bank machines allow for the deposit of tens of thousands of dollars daily to personal accounts. The employees that service the machines would not be suspicious of these deposits. Service branches are used by a business client of one branch of a bank who wishes to make deposits at another branch. The original branch sends a letter to the second branch introducing the business client and asking them to accept deposits for credit to the original branch. This fiwther detaches the launderer from the bank's scrutiny since the service branch employees have little knowl- edge of the client and don't have to concern themselves about the deposits since the original branch is responsible for recourse. • Inventory The launderer may use inventory or other relatively liquid assets with commer- cial appeal. For instance, a money launderer decides to convert cash into bank drafts or set up a temporary mechanism to get cash into the banking system. The goals are to use the cash in legitimate trade transactions a few times, and then draw it out clean. This can be done by putting sufficient distance between the original sources of the transactions and the final withdrawal of clean cash. For example, a money launderer purchases 3000 VCRs wholesale from Taiwan VCRs Ltd. through a distributor in Toronto. The cost is $100 per unit for a total payment of $300,000. Then the VCRs are immediately sold to a national TV sales outlet at $95 per unit. This excellent price ensures the sale. With the $285,000, real estate is purchased and three months later resold at a profit. The $310,000 resulting from the real estate transaction is used to purchase gold (in certificate form) which is carried to Switzerland. There it is sold on the Euro- pean market for shares in IBM. The trail can be extended as far as the laun- derer wishes. Another related technique would be to make cash purchases of big ticket items at large department stores such as Eaton's. Later, the product could be returned for refund by cheque or the product could be resold, accepting a • cheque as payment. 31 Cnmeo Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I * Money Laundering
Personal accotmts In addition to using business accounts, sewral personal accounts could be opened using false identification. Using banking machines, credit cards, night deposits and branch-to-branch service, an extensive amount of drug cash could be laundered. Non-interest bearing accounts could be opened so that no state- ments of interest would be forwarded to Revenue Canada.
Traveler's cheques Cash could be used to purchase traveller's cheques at any bank or trust com- pany branch. It would be quite easy to convert $100 000 into traveller's cheques in a day by going to several different branches. These traveller's cheques could be deposited anywhere in the world or deposited into a business account used for laundering.
Credit card schemes Several credit schemes could be used to launder money. For example, Mr. X acquires a VISA credit card. He goes to Mr. Y's store (Mr. Y is a money launderer) and charges extensive purchases to his VISA credit card. Mr. X then pays his VISA bill at the bank in cash, and VISA credits Mr. Y with the amount Mr. X charged at his store. This quickly washes dirty money. Mr. X and Mr. Y could be the same person or accomplices. Gold or stocks can be purchased through banks and paid for by credit card. Again, the credit card bill would be paid for by cash. The gold or stocks could be resold on other mar- kets.
There are many opportunities to convert cash to liquid assets in the legiti- mate market. A pusher c,ould use many of these techniques to launder his cut of the profits, but those techniques would not be sufficient to launder the tremen- dous amounts of cash the drug lord would receive. In certain cases the conventional methods of laundering give way to unique efforts.
Couners Couriers carry cash across borders to a country that will allow for an easier entry of the cash into the banking system. The money couriers pick up suitcases of cash and carry it to Panama or the Caribbean where banIcers will accept it without question. It is quite risky to carry cash out the United States, where one must declare the transportation of cash over $10,000 into or out of the
32 Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I Money Laundering
country. In Canada there are no such restrictions. This makes Canada an appealing route for couriers, if the U.S./Canada border can be safely crossed. One humorous example of this tells of four Mexicans attempting to cross the Canada-U.S. border by car at Bellingham, Washington. They were pulled over for inspection. An astute customs inspector noticed that the two rear tires did not match the front. Upon closer investigation the tires were found to contain $2 million U.S. stuffed in the hub caps. Under Canadian law this did not constitute contraband, but the method of transportation was highly suspi- cious. So the Mexicans were refused entry and sent back to the American side where notified officials were waiting. No declaration of the cash had been filled out. The Mexicans were subsequently arre,sted and the cash confiscated.'
Letters of Credit Letters of Credit (L/Cs) are used for legitimate transactions in trade, whether for coffee beans or widgets. For illegitimate purposes, local branches are ap- proached for L/Cs which are made payable to a 'supplier'. L/Cs are then taken to the destination country and cashed at a local bank by a shell company acting as the supplier. In addition false commercial invoices could be fabricated to firther disguise the transactions. A Letter of Credit is a form of credit line issued between two companies conducting business. Company 1 must guarantee to Company 2 that it has the funds to complete a business transaction and has reserved those funds for payment to complete the transaction. Company 1 does this by approaching a fmancial institution and purchasing a Letter of Credit. The financial institution will determine if Company 1 has the fimds and if it does, the financial institution will hold the funds. If it does not have the funds, Company 1 may be granted a loan by the financial institution to pay for the Letter of Credit. The Letter of Credit is then issued by the financial institution to Company 2. If Company 2 desires, it may cash that Letter of Credit at any time and is guaranteed the funds by the financial institution. Normally, the Letter of Credit serves as a guarantee of payment, whereby if Company 1 does not pay Company 2 by other means, then Company 2 vvill cash the letter of credit. The money launderer may use the Letter of Credit as well. For example, he may approach a Canadian bank in Toronto for a business loan. The launderer explains that there is an opportunity to import fine ceramic tiles from Italy. • These tiles are in high demand and because the launderer is going to purchase 33 Cnmeo Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter le Money Laundenng
$10 million in tiles from the manufacturer, it will be able to acquire and sell them at a price which is 40% below what other Canadian distributors vvill pay. In order to obtain the loan, the launderer explains to the Canadian bank that there are European investors (who are actually the launderer) who will guaran- tee the loan by issuing a Letter of Credit to the Canadian bank for $ 15 million drawn off a bank in Great Britain. The bank, with $15 million collateral, issues the loan to the launderer. The launderer imports the tiles and undersells the legitimate competition. The Canadian bank then receives instruction from the London Bank to cash the Letter of Credit, pay out and close the loan. The launderer has successfully laundered the $10 million, has provided a legitimate source of income, has established a succ,essful legitimate business, and has created a complex trail.
Cscrow or trust accounts Money laundering has attracted large numbers of otherwise respectable people who see nothing wrong in being accomplices to crime. Take the case of Richard McConnell, a former trial attorney in the US Justice De- partments Tax Division... .and subsequently in private practice in Alexan- dria, Virginia. On behalf of a client named Julian Penell, McConnell used his fimi's escrow accounts to deposit large sums of cash, which were with- drawn after short periods and paid to newly established US corporations or trusts set up in the Cayman Islands. In this way, over $30 million of Penell funds were moved during a seven year period without filing federal cur- rency reports. These fimds, it turned out, came from marijuana and hashish operations in which 20 people, including Penell, were charged and later convicted. 6
Secunbesfrms Securities firms can also be used to launder money. For example, a Swiss bank places an order with a New York broker for the purchase of a large block of securities worth $100,000. The bank tells the broker that "our courier will pay you on the settlement date." This is welcome news to the broker. He will be paid on time and will avoid a late delivery charge. The settlement date arrives and the courier calls on the broker with $100,000 in cash or in the form of a bank cheque.
311 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I 0 Money Laundering • The broker accepts the cash or cheque and the stock certificates can be held in the vault of the Swiss or of another New York bank, or sent directly to Switzerland in care of the bank account of the heroin smuggler. The account in the Swiss bank may be in the supplier's own name or, more likely, in the name of a dummy foreign company:7
The Mash Once in the fmancial system, money moves easily and quickly. The next objec- tive is to create as much distance as possible fi-om the entry point of the funds to their final resting place in legitimate business or investments. If you can't spend and enjoy the money, there's no point to the rislcs. There is the case of the Bronx bagel baker who sold heroin and lived a double life with luxury cars and condos in Florida and a low-income lifestyle in New York. However, few people would be disciplined or patient enough to be so distanced from their wealth. The source of the drug money (the load) must be distanced from the lifestyle and income of the dealer (the final stage). This is accomplished using the same mechanisms that serve legitimate business. The distance is less geographic than it is a maze of paper and financial transactions. Paper and financial records will be defined in the following way. Paper refers to the documentation of business ownership, such as registra- tions or shares, and any subsequent changes to the same. Paper also refers to internal accounting record of the business and/or any commercial transactions such as invoices, bills of sale, sales journaLs, shipping records, and trade records. Financial records refer to records of the actual movement of cash or the transfer of assets (i.e. the transferring ownership of real estate holdings). Finan- cial transactions are documented through bank records and through correlation with accounting records. Emphasis should be focused on bank records, as they are a record of what actually happened. A launderer, unless very thorough, will not have accounting records of his transactions, especially at the load stage. Most load companies would be abandoned quickly in order to avoid detection. As the wash advances through cleaner and more legitimate companies, more accounting records will be found. Paper and fmancial records for a legitimate operation would be identical. Since the launderer's goal is to deceive, his accounting records can not be considered reliable. The fmancial records prepared by financial institutions are the most • reliable source of information.
35 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I 0 Money Laundering
The wash will incorporate both paper and financial records. If effectively done it will also include a stage using a secrecy haven where investigator's access will be limited or non-existent. Unformately for money launderers, there are records of every transaction. If these records are carefully and thor- oughly examined, the money launderer's tracks can be followed. To distance the investigator from the truth, the money launderer relies on several things: • Knowledge - The investigator does not understand what money laundering is or how it works. • Experience - The investigator has not spent enough time investigating money laundering to know how to effectively and quickly unravel the trail. • Skills - The investigator does not know which documents to search for, where to find them or how to use them effectively. • Privacy - The investigator is denied access to records or accurate informa- tion by secrecy havens • Distance - By taking the trail of records outside of the investigator's imme- diate jurisdiction, the process of investigation is lengthened and it is more difficult to see the complete picture. • Time -By maximizing the use of all of these factors, any investigation can be made slow, costly and beyond the immediate resources of the investiga- tor. Ultimately, the launderer's goal is to discourage the investigator. Payments by cheque or wire transfer will be made from one corporation to another and so on. Gold or other liquid assets may be purchased by one corpo- ration and cashed by another. As transfers are completed, others could already have been completed or transactions may be taking place concurrently. Money could be moved through 10 to 15 corporations within 48 hours.
Suppose that a New Jersey gambler has $500,000 in book-malcing profits hidden in a numbered Swiss bank ac,count. In order to repatriate this dirty money, he decides to invest it in a chain of Long Island car washes costing $1 million. To finance his purchase, he makes a down payment of $500,000 in "clean money," which has been declared to the government and properly taxed. He then "borrows" the remaining $500,000 from his Swiss banlc. This $500,000 is, in fact, mon' from his own Swiss account disguised as a legitimate loan.
36 Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I Money Laundermg
In order to perpetuate this loan charade, the gambler repays the $500,000 as if it were a legitimate loan. This repayment includes interest charges. In this way the loan-back not only allows a dirty money man to repatriate his money but also gives him the chance to pay himself interest and deduct these payments from his taxes. This slick "double play" has made the loan-back the most popular method of bringing dirty money back to the United States. The fact that he must repay the principal on the loan does not bother the criminal, since, if he chooses, as soon as these repayments have been made he can immediately relend the money to himself Through a continuous use of the loan-back technique, a criminal can recycle his money between the United States and Switzerland on a perpetually moving conveyor belt that connects the criminal, his Svviss bank, and dummy foreign companies together with his legitimate American business enterprises. The cooperation of the Swiss bank is not needed to complete the loan- back. In fact, in only a few instances is the money tendered directly from the bank to the criminal. Usually it travels through a number of layers of insulation, and the Swiss and other financial institutions involved may not even suspect that the loan is not legitimate. To provide more insulation, the foreign representative or the courier who originally brought the money to Switzerland often transfers the money from the Swiss bank account to another account owned by a dummy foreign company "head-quartered" in Liechtenstein, Panama, or the Baha- mas. The foreign company then tenders the "loan" to an American lawyer or a dummy company in the United States which is associated with the American criminal. The apparent legitimacy of this loan is reinforced by the fact that the transfer facilities of the large international banks are used to move funds between Europe and the United States.'
Second example of a loanbacis The launderer has $1 million of laundered drug profits in a bank located in a international secrecy haven (see chapter 2 for more information). The launderer also has a number of corporations registered in that secrecy haven. One corpo- ration named Drug Corporation holds the drug cash, and another one is called Phoney Finance Corporation. The launderer arranges for the bank that holds his $1 million in the name of Drug Corporation to lend Phoney Finance Corporation $1 million using the $1 million in the account of Drug Corporation as collateral for the loan. Phoney Finance Corporation then lends 'Mr. Respectable' AK.A. the launderer located in Toronto $1 million to purchase a legitimate business. • The launderer now has acquired a legitimate source of income, the business,
31 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I 0 Money Laundering
and legitimate representation in the community. The launderer can then use profits from the operation of the legitimate business to "repay" the loan to Phoney Finance Corporation, which is actually himself. head' Using money held in a Swiss bank account to secretly buy your own prop- erty is another favorite laundering technique. Suppose the New Jersey gambler who bought car washes with the loan-back has another $500,000 in his Swiss bank that he wants to move to the United States. He first has the money transfen-ed from the Swiss bank to a dummy Liechtenstein trust he secretly owns. The trust now openly buys the car washes from hirn and as partial payment transfers $500,000 to the gambler's New York bank account. By using his Swiss bank and Liechtenstein company to "buy" his own car washes the gambler has been able to launder an additional $500,000. He still secretly owns the car washes through his Liechtenstein company, and their profits can now accumulate in his secret Swiss bank account.9 The secrecy havens are the break points of the trail and the investigations because at this point the launderer will turn the cash around. It will head back through legitimate companies and investments to provide income for his life- style. He is fully confident that there vvill be no connection between his drug businesses and his legithnate businesses. There will be no business transactions between the two since the latter will probably be open to public and tax scru- tiny. At this point the investigator will probably be denied access to both bank and corporate records. So ends the continuity. The Dry The return of the money would start at the haven but could follow through several routes unlimited by geographical boundaries such as investment in: Manufacturing in Hong Kong Real Estate in New York City Eurobonds on the Swiss Market European Stocks or North American Stocks L/C 's supporting North American business ventures etc... The route would probably follow through a number of holding corporations as it did during the wash so as to ensure privacy.
38 Crime 0 Detection -Proceeds of Crime- Chapter I Money Laundering
Moumg Money Funds are transferred between various corporations using regular bank payment instruments such as a cheque drawn off one account and payable to another, wire transfers made between banks or by using currency exchanges. Take the case of Eduardo Orozco Prada, who deposited over $150 million in cash with about 18 banks and foreign exchange firms, mostly in New York, for transfers to Panama, the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, and in various accounts distributed around the United States. Most of the money apparently was from drug trafficicing. The laundering operation also involved Orozco's interests in small business in a variety of countries in Europe, the Middle East and Latin America, as well as major currency exchange businesses in Colombia and several other countries in the region. Described as a `...well educated, sophisticated, highly intelligent profes- sional, with all the trappings of a legitimate businessman', Orozco enjoyed the support of many legitimate business people and senior-level Colombian politicians. Once established in New York, Orozco set up a company called Cirex International at 120 Wall Street, which in retrospect was dearly a money laundering operation. Over a four-month period, he placed $2.3 million in cash deposits with a Swiss bank until it refused to talce any more, and subsequently with the Marine Mdland Bank & Trust Company and the Irving Trust Company, both in New York The cash evidently came from his ovvn exchange houses in Colombia, either via Miami or via Panama using couriers and occasionally the planes of the Colombian Air Force — on average about $3 million monthly. Cash transport was difficult and risky, but necessary to avoid FBI surveillance of South Florida banks and to avoid the cash-deposit fees charged by some of them. The deposits were then transferred after varying periods of time to accounts in other banks by wire, and were thus effectively laundered. Apparently the laundering operations were highly sensitive to the investigative activities of the federal authorities. In 1980 and 1982, Orozco was doing substantial business with the currency exchange house of Deak- Perera in the name of Interdual, a Panamanian affiliate, and Dial Securities. Unlike other laundering operations that find ways to avoid filing currency transactions reports, Orozco's transactions were always in compliance with the law, yet difficult or impossible to trace because he used other people's names and never made a cash deposit himself. Intermediaries were evidently paid 25 cents per $100 cash deposit, with possible firther payments to bankers to see that funds were transferred without delay. By mid-1981 his deposits at Deak-Perera were running at $10-12 million a month and were beginning to attract an unusual amount of attention.
39 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter I e Money Laundering
In his search for yet another bank, Orozco fell into a Drug Enforcement Agency trap. Subsequent fund movements through third parties were tracked mostly deposits of $10 and $20 bills, totalling $15 million over an 18-month time span. Tape-recorded conversations confirmed that most of it was drugs-related money, with a 3 per cent laundering commission probably earned by Orozco, and possibly large additional gains from acting as a principal in the drugs trade itself— yet he never physically came into contact with the drugs. In 1983 Orozco was found guiky of drug law violation and sentenced to one year in prison and a $1 million fine; he was immediately released on $2 million bail pending appeal.i°
Social mores Financial institutions now train their employees to recognize and prevent money laundering. However, barriers still exist. First is the "It couldn't happen to me" syndrome. Money laundering could not happen in a respectable bank branch. Second is the belief in tell-tale signs. "Surely I would recognize the drug dealer from Miami Vice! Slicked back hair, alligator boots, black raybans, followed by four or five bodyguards forming a wall of security around him! I would recog- nize someone like that!" Unfortunately, most money launderers appear to be perfectly respectable people. Barriers to prevent money laundering have gradually been developed and implemented. Both the financial community and the police recognize that the financial system is used to transport drug money and that it is a crucial element of the drug cycle. The anti-profiteering enforcement approach has been revitalized, and this, combined with new legislation designed to increase search and seizure abilities, creates an opportunity for progress.
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Secrecy Hauens
0
0 •
0 42 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime Chapter 2 0 Money Laundering and Secrecy Havens
Countries around the world are set up as secrecy and tax havens. There are many legitimate reasons for such havens. For example, some were set up to allow persons being persecuted in the Second World War to hide their assets from the Na7is. However, the laws set up to protect legitimate clients can be used by money launderers to protect themselves as well. They may be used to set up untraceable bank accounts or anonymous corporations. This chapter summarizes details about some countries set up as tax or secrecy havens." It is in no way meant to be comprehensive or to be taken as legal advice. Regulations outlined here are subject to change. For complete current details about laws and acc,ess to information, seek professiOnal legal advice.
Liedienstem Liechtenstein is a small country between Austria and Switzerland that has no currency or army of its own. Reliant on Switzerland for these, its population of 27,700 (1987) depends on tourism and incorporations for income. A country with almost as many incorporations as citizens, its secrecy laws appeal to individuals who desire anonymity. Its laws specify that only certain designated individuals, "persons of repute," may act as representatives in incorporation in Liechtenstein. These representatives must be citizens of Liech- tenstein and must be masters of their own affairs. If you wished to remain anonymous when setting up a Liechtenstein corpo- ration you could instruct one of these representatives to act on your behalf. Since Liechtenstein law does not require the name of the real owner of the corporation to be registered, the name of the representative would be the only information registered with the government. Since the representative (usually a lawyer), has no legal obligation to reveal the identity of the real owners under Liechtenstein law, the wall of secrecy is first put in place here. The representative could be instructed to establish a trust or "ansalt"on behalf of the company which would give the corporation a headquarters and a brass plaque on the wall with hundreds of others in the administrator's office building. The tax payable on the corporation is a nominal amount. The repre- sentative would also receive a fee for being on the board of directors of the corporation. Since the representative probably manages some 500 corporations, each corporation would probably occupy a file in his drawer. The representative could be instructed to establish a secret Swiss numbered bank account in the name of your corporation. The only representative of the corporation lcnown to e the bank would be the Liechtenstein lawyer.
1-13 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 2° Money Laundering and Secrecy Havens
Monies could be forwarded to the lawyer for credit to the Swiss bank account. A power of attorney would give him the authority to transfer money from the Svviss account to another location upon your instructions. The combi- nation of the Liechtenstein corporation and a Swiss bank account provides a double wall of secrecy that would be nearly impenetrable. You could also instruct your Swiss banker to open a Liechtenstein corpora- tion for you in which the bank officer would be listed as the shareholder of the corporation on the Liechtenstein representative's records. The name of the owner of the corporation would only be listed on a trust agreement between the Swiss banker and the owner. That could be kept in a safe deposit box in a Bahamian or Panamanian bank. This would introduce a third wall of secrecy for the individual.
Spitzerland Whoever divulges a secret entrusted to him in his capacity as officer, em- ployee, mandatory, liquidator or commissioner of a bank, as a representa- tive of the Banldng Commission, officer or employee of a recogniz.ed auditing c,ompany, or whoever tries to induce others to violate professional secrecy, shall be punished by a prison term not to exceed six months or by a fine not exceeding 50 000 francs. The violation of professional secrecy remains punishable even after termination of the official or employment relationship or the exercise of the profession. Federal and Cantonal regulation concerning the obligation to testify and to fiirnish information to a government authority shall remain preserved. Article 47, Swiss Banking Law VVhoever makes available a manufacturing or business secret to a foreign governmental agency or a foreign organization or private enterprise to an agent of any of them, shall be subject to imprisonment and in grave cases to imprisonment in a penitentiary. The imprisonment may be com- bined with a fine. Article 273, Swiss Penal Code The Swiss Government holds steadfast on its bank secrecy laws. On occasion it has prosecuted separately on each document released against the law by a bank officer to a maximum penalty of ten years in prison. Es,sentially, the law provides that no information will be released to any foreign government or agent without prior approval from the Swiss govern- ment. titi Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 2 0 Money Laundering and Secrecy Havens
To apply for disclosure of banking information the crime must be outlined to the Swiss Government in Letters Rogatory explaining details of the crime and evidence supporting the charges. In addition, the crime must be a criminal offence under Swiss Law. Switzerland's banlring system has certainly won great appeal because of its strict secrecy laws. It can also offer tremendous services to its banking clients such as securities service on any market, foreign exchange, trust services, commercial and personal account management, and any of the other more common banking products found around the world. Swiss bankers are known for their superior judgement and service. Banlcing as a profession has tremen- dous respect and heritage.
Bahamas Banking Bank secrecy has been covered by criminal law since 1979. The foreign authority must show that a crime has been committed, proof of which hinges on the requested documents; a crime is suspected, proof of which rests on the requested documents; or criminal proceedings are already under way abroad. - Incorporation Any lawyer may register a company for incorporation. There is II> no requirement to evaluate the incorporator's credentials.
Antigua Banlcing There are no registration requirements for banlcs or companies. Incorporation Since there are incomplete or non-existent records, the ability to search out owners is limited.
Catinan Islands Banking The secrecy laws state that a person can be jailed for asking for financial information about a client. Considered the largest haven in the world, deposits estimated were at $200 billion in 1987. It is also one of the largest Eurocurrency booldng centres in the world. With an estimated population of 1500, there are 17,000 companies, 300 insurance companies and 450 banks and trust companies. Incorporation There are no restrictions on residence or nationality of share- holders; no requirement for a register of members or an annual return of share- holders, directors and officers; and incorporations with only a single shareholder • are acceptable.
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In 1984 the Cayman authorities passed the 'Narcotics Drug Law' that guaranteed the release of information to the United States within two weeks of application where drug involvement could be shown.
Monteserrat Secrecy on the island was essentially guaranteed by its deliberate mishandling of records. After the Government crackdown on this problem and a treaty signed with the United States providing for the release of information on very little criteria, the number of banks dropped from 62 to 12.
Getherlands Addles Incorporation service is fast and cheap. Well connected vvith the European market and international banking, it is efficient and discreet. The incorporations are protected by Antillean nominees and agents through tiered corporations. In addition, while the Government has been willing to release information on U.S. citizens it will not release information on citizens of other countries. In cases where the information has been released, it has not always been complete or detailed. When the U.S. Department of Agriculture wanted to lcnow who owned 1437 acres purchased in Orange County, Florida, for example, it wrote to the Curacao International Trust Co., which was managing the company listed as buyer, Debco NV. In reply, the Department was told through a Houston lawyer that Debc,o NV was a 'wholly owned subsidiary of Pathway Investments NV,' which in turn was described only as 'a corporation under the laws of the Neth- erlands Antilles.' In addition there is an aftermarket of locals who are in the business of supplying false invoices and other useful services.
The Channel islands 0 Jerseg and Guernsey This offshore banking centre has little visible interest in dealing with drug money. Its respectability is a valuable commodity. The Islands passed regula- tions requiring the banlcs to disclose records where there are drugs involved.
The Rock is a tax exempt haven, with approxitnately 4000 c,ompanies set up annually. Bank deposits have increased at a tremendous rate, from $298 million (1984) to $800 million (1987).
45 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 2 0 !Honey Laundering and Secrecy Havens
Luxembourg The secrecy laws that are slowly relaxing in Switzerland are being tightened in Luxembourg. There are mandatory jail sentences for those who make unauthor- ized disclosures. In order to obtain information on a depositor an order is required from a Luxembourg court. Foreign authorities may only request such an order if the depositor in question has been charged in his home country with an offence that is also a crime in Luxembourg and that relates to the account under scrutiny.
Panama The political situation of the country dictates its role as a haven and its involve- ment in the money laundering mechanisms operating from the United States. Long under the control of General Manuel Antonio Noriega, Panama's policies were designed to benefit the leader. Noriega himself was extradited to the United States for his involvement in the drug industry. Banking Panama's central bank is denied the right to audit any bank operating there. Banks have long accommodated couriers with bags of cash, no questions asked. There has been testimony that the military has been used to provide escort for and transportation of funds arriving for cleaning. $500 million a year and growing is the estimated laundering of cash. The U.S. dollar is essentially the national currency. The United States Treasury often receives old notes from Panamanian barks for new ones. Based on the large quantities of small bills received, U.S. officials estimate that Pana- manian banks are also engaged in exchanging small bills for large bills. In addition, the Panamanian banks have access to the Eurodollar market. It is estimated that the figures for the amount of drug money that is electronically sent into the turegulated market and ultimately into legitimate commerce is in the billions. Incorporations Paper corporations are available. Lawyers keep established incorporations no longer in business alive on paper for clients who want a company with a history. There are also statutes in Panamanian law that allow for the establishment of secret registered companies.
On Law Enforcement and Foreign Banks Take the case of a U.S. grand jury's investigation of a criminal fraud in the early 1980s. Relevant bank records were subpoenaed from the Bahamas branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia, headquartered in Toronto, via a U.S. branch. This method of serving a subpoena on a foreign bank was established in the Quigg e case in 1981. In this instance the document was addressed to the Canadian bank
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in general, though delivered to its New York branch. This was held to be binding on the head office, which was doing business in the United States - through its New York branch. The head office could then order its branch in the offshore haven (in this case the Bahamas) to release the relevant documents — and if the Bahamas branch refused to do so it could be pwished through the U.S. branch for failing to comply. 12 In the Nova Scotia case, the branch, citing the Bahamas Bank and Trust Companies Regulation Act which prohibits the release of documents to foreign authorities without official authorization, refused to comply. At this point the U.S. judge followed the 'balancing test' criterion, established in 1968 in the Loveland case, to decide, in simple terms, which laws should prevail. In Loveland, the head office of Citibank in New York had been served with a subpoena requiring the production of records from its West German branch. It argued that c,ompliance would put it in breach of West German civil (though nôt criminal) law, which could expose it to a claim for damages from the client. In considering whether U.S. or West German law should prevail, the court tried to weigh an amalgam of factors — the vital national interests of the two coun- tries, the hardship that inconsistent enforcement would impose on the bank caught in the middle, etc. The court concluded that for the United States the violations under investigation were of a criminal nature, whereas breach of bank secrecy was only a civil offence in West Germany, and that U.S. interests should therefore dominate. • However, in the case of the Bank of Nova Scotia, it was a criminal offence in the Bahamas for the bank to produce documents. Nevertheless, the ruling went in favour of the U.S. investigation again. A federal judge in Florida thereupon fined the branch $500 per day on a contempt of court citation in late 1981. These fines were affirmed by a federal appeals court in 1983 and let stand by the Supreme Court itself. Subsequently, the judge increased the fine to $25,000 per day, whereupon the bank turned over the requested documents. The Bahamanian government undertook a criminal investigation of the Bank of Nova Scotia's violation of local disclosure laws, threatening a fine of $15,000 and two years imprisonment for those involved. It also sent letters to (then) President Reagan and (then) Vice-President Bush, protesting US legal extraterritoriality and further straining diplomatic relations over the matter of financial disclosure."
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The Canadian Banking System and Financial Transactions and Records
• SO Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 30 The Canadian Banking System and Financial Transactions and Records
The Canadian Fmancial System Investigations of money laundering operations will always have one common denominator: the use of the financial system. The money launderer uses it to launder dirty money and investigators rely on it as a resource for an investiga- tion. To use a financial institution as a resource, you need to understand the industry, how it is organized, and who will be able to help you get the informa- tion you need.
nnannal Insbtubons:Thm r role Canadian banks and trust companies are large financial institutions. They are very competitive and most of them operate internationally as well as across Canada. Some of the major Canadian banlcs are: The Royal Bank of Canada The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce The Bank of Nova Scotia The Bank of Montreal The Toronto Dominion Bank The Canadian trust industry consists of a number of quickly growing trust companies such as: Canada Trust National Trust - Premier Trust Montreal Trust Credit unions are smaller institutions, often with only one branch, which serve a membership. These financial institutions are responsible for serving most of Canada's financial service clientele, and offer a number of basic and specialty services. Regulatory laws ensure that Canadian banks are stable and publicly control- led. No one individual or associated shareholders is allowed to own more than a 10% of the shares of a Schedule A bank. Regulations for banks, trust compa- nies and credit unions differ. Like any business, a financial ingitution's purpose is to make money and to capture a larger share of the market from its competitors. Competition is fierce, and you will often see four corners of a downtown intersection occupied by • competing financial institutions. 51 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 30 The Canadian Ranking System and financial Transactions and Records
The world of financial institutions is constantly evolving through the intro- duction of new technology, new products and services, new demands by cus- tomers, and through changes in legislation. Deregulation of the financial industry has resulted in the traditional inde- pendent industries of banlçing, securities, insurance, trust services, mortgages and card services being offered by one company. Insurance companies are opening trust companies and fiercely seelcing mortgage business. Banks are offering insurance products and mutual funds/discount brokerage services throug,h their retail branches. Credit card companies are seeking larger partici- pation in the market and one (American Express) has opened its own bank. Trust companies are seeking expanded roles in the commercial banlcing mar- kets. Most financial institutions have bought the right to Visa or MasterCard.
Clectronc Technological advancements such as automated banking machines, debit cards and home/office banking have changed the way many customers conduct financial transactions. Over the last ten years there has been a dramatic increase in the application of computer technology to financial services. Internal ac,counting functions and account reporting to customers is computerized. (Prior to that a ledger card system was in place.) Teller terminals allow financial service employees to update accounts and inquire as to balances and transactions. Client Information Systems electronically store personal information about customers and the services they use. With increasing use of card services such as Visa and Mastercard, on-line terminals and customer information services have been updated at many institutions to access credit card account information such as balances, payments and itemization of charges. Automated banking machines are replacing tellers for personal banking. Deposits and vvithdrawals, credit card payments and cash advances, bill pay- ments and account funds transfers can be made at banking machines at all hours of the day and night. Daily deposits are unlimited at some institutions, although a single deposit would be limited by the capability of the machine. For example, the Toronto-Dominion Bank has a deposit limit of $9,999 per transaction, with an unlimited number of deposit transactions per day, the ClBC has a deposit lirnit of $50,000, with an unlimited number of deposit transactions per day, and the Royal Bank has a daily deposit limit of $50,000 per day.'4 The automated banking machine cards are also called "Debit Cards." At specially equipped stores payments can be made with these cards for goods and services. The debit cards immediately electronically transfer the amount of money due from the cardholder's account to the store's financial institution 52 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 30 The Canadian Banking System and Financial Transactions and Records
account. Grocery stores and a McDonald's restaurant have been experimenting with this systetn, which is offered by several financial institutions. Home/Office banking is available on an experimental basis where a compu- ter tenninal located at home offers balances, transfer services etc. You can also conduct your banking over the phone. Electronic banlcing has reduced the amount of paper and time required for the completion of financial transactions. The future of financial services will see a greater role for electronic banking.
Communcabons between Fmannal Insbtubons Electronic banking between financial institutions entails the communication of intent of transactions betvveen different banks. The notification of instructions of a funds transfer is followed by a settlement of funds. In the past, an individual cheque was written to cover each specific transfer. Today, many transactions are handled by computer instructions and are settled by an electronic transfer of the total amount of funds from the sending financial institution to the receiving financial institution. Electronic transactions have to a large extent replaced the paper-based audit trail.
Canadian Pagments lissonabon The Canadian Payments Association regulates the clearing payments between financial institutions. For example, the amount of acceptable time in which a cheque may be returned Non Sufficient Funds from one financial institution to another is two days. The rules are set out by the Canadian Payments Associa- tion with the agreement of participating financial institutions. The Association also publishes a directory of Canadian financial institutions, listed according to their clearing numbers (institution and transit (branch) numbers) and by their representation in a geographic area.
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Organizabon of a financual insbtution Typical financial institutions are organized much like any large corporation. A large administrative national head office houses the executives of the financial institution, who make decisions about domestic and international plans. The performance of the various provincial or regional headquarters is also managed here.
Regional Head Office Regional or provincial headquarters and management are responsible for under- standing the local markets and managing several hundred branches or depart- ments. Each region (usually a province) might have its own International Centre and Data Processing Centre.
hiernabonal Centre The International Centre is responsible for financial transactions in foreign currencies. Activities include determining rates of exchange, clearing foreign cheques to the respective foreign countries and financial institutions, processing wire transfers with foreign countries and fmancial institutions, and managing the correspondence vvith all foreign institutions.
Ike Data Centre The Data Centre is the distribution centre for all of the cheques and accounting entries processed in a region by a particular institution in a business day. Since smaller trust companies do not have their own processing centres, their data centre functions are performed by a bank for a fee. Credit Unions often have only one office/branch and rely on a central Credit Union organization for clearing, administration and other vital services.
Brandies The competitive market segments require that financial institutions have signifi- cant repmsentation through branch networks. Each branch is run, to a certain extent, like an independent company with its own budget, accounting and operational management. Most financial transactions are conducted at retail branches. In branches, the employees are trained to sell the products that the particular institution offers, and deliver and administer that financial institution's services. Sit Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 30 The Canadian Ranking System and Financial Transactions and Records • In addition to retail branches, there are commercial branches that cater to business clients, and private banidng branches for more wealthier clients. The branches operate under rules, policies and procedures that the financial institution has in place to ensure a uniform approach in the service of clients and maintenance of financial accounting.
Orgazzabon of a branch Understanding how a branch is organized will help you understand how a transaction is handled and who would be involved in processing it. To investi- gate records you should know which employee keeps and can interpret them. Most financial institutions, organize their branches and employees in sitnilar ways. Tellers or customer service representatives are the front line of all finan- cial institutions. They handle deposits and withdrawals, and sell products such as bank drafts, money orders, traveller's cheques, and wire transfers. They are the normal liaison between the client and the financial institution. Quite often they know the most about who the clients are and what types of transactions they perform. The difference between a teller and a customer service representative (csr) is that the teller operates a cash drawer and csrs go to a central teller for cash transactions. Usually one employee is ultimately responsible for cash control. This is a head teller in a teller branch, and a central teller in a csr branch. This em- ployee verifies the accuracy of cash paid out and received on deposit, and is responsible for maintaining cash levels in the branch. A bank branch has a cash holdings limit which regulates how much cash they may have on hand. If it is consistently exceeded it is the central teller's responsibility to report the reason for this to head office. The current account teller/csr operates a special wicket to serve business clients only. This person is most familiar with regular business clients and the types of deposits that they make. The personal chequing clerk and the business account clerk are respon- sible for the administrative functions of personal chequing and business ac- counts. They get daily reports about maintenance charges to accounts, nonsufficient funds cheques, and overdrawn accounts. Any other reports about • account activity are also administered and filed by these employees.
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The wire transfer derk is responsible for the verification of outgoing and incoming wire transfers. The savings clerk or savings manager administrates personal savings accounts, receiving reports about maintenance charges, nonsufficient funds, overdrawn accounts, and other savings account activity. This person may also supervise the tellers. The proof operator processes all of the daily withdrawals and deposits through a machine that a.dds the total transactions and checks addition. The proof machine also micrencodes the amounts of the cheques and deposits onto the vouchers, and prepares the vouchers for sorting and rebalancing at the Data Centre. When a voucher passes through this machine a stamp that identifies the branch where the proof is processed is put on the back of the items. The investment officer sells investment products such as tenu deposits and treasury bills. This person may also take orders for selling and buying stocks. The branch administration officer (BAO), or customer service man- ager, supervises all these employees. She or he is also responsible for branch operations. The BAO accepts responsibility for transactions over the authoriza- tion limits ofless senior employees, signs drafts and handles customer com- plaints. The BAO also ensures that the company's policies and procedures are followed by employees, handles all training in the branch, and is the main liaison with the branch manager. Branch managers are responsible for the overall operation and profitability of the branch, for extending credit to clients, developing business, as well as communicating with senior management.
Account Records When an individual opens an account at a financial institution, a New Account Form is completed by an employee listing the following detaiLs: Personal &mounts Name Supported by Acceptable Identification - Drivers Licence - Social Insurance Number - Major Credit Card - Previous Financial Institution Reference - Photo ID. Address Tdephone Numbers Business Home Employer Spouse Name and Employer 56 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 30 The Canadian Ranking System and financial Transactions and Records
If the account is for business purposes, proof of registration is required. For a sole ownership or partnership this would be a certified copy of the registration form; for a corporation, the Articles of Incorporation or corporate seals. Copies of these forms are kept in a file on the client's business. As well, the business customer will have to complete several legal account operation docu- ments that identify the owners and officers of the company. The paper forms are retained for various time periods. The new account information is entered into a computer database. This creates a client profile which records personal or business identification, and all accounts held by the client at that institution, with the date on which each was opened. The client profile c,an be accessed by computer from other branches of the financial institu- tion. Clients must also sign a card to provide a specimen of their signature. These are kept at the branch of account. Some financial institutions can display signatures on their computers. Savings and chequing accounts are common products available at financial institutions. They offer clients security for their savings while allowing them the freedom to draw the funds out at any time. Clients are provided with an account record such as a passbook or monthly statement shovving funds on deposit, transactions, interest and charges made to the account. Computers are used to post transactions to accounts. Each transaction must be entered into the computer so that the financial institution's records can be updated and the client can be given a receipt. Clients deposit funds into their accounts using a deposit slip. This slip provides the financial institution a paper record of the transaction. A receipt of their deposit is provided by the computer entry made to their passbook or on their statement. The business deposit slip is a larger form and usually has three copies: Cony Purnose Retained By Copy 1 Original is processed Branch as CREDIT. Copy 2 File copy for audit Teller Copy 3 Receipt Customer
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Cash makes up a large proportion of the transactions processed by fmancial institutions. The following is a detailed account of how cash is managed, re- ceived and dispersed paying attention to the problem of money laundering and detection of irregularities. There are many potential options for depositing cash.
When a teller receives a deposit, he or she makes sure the amount of cash is the same as what is written on the deposit slip. The cash would be placed in the teller's cash drawer or in the anti-hold-up safe undemeath their wicket. If there is too much cash (over their limit) then the teller will immediately place the exc,ess cash in his or her own compartment in the vault or give (cross) the cash to the head teller. The limit of cash a teller may hold is usually between $5,000 and $10,000 depending on how busy the branch is and how busy the day is. The purpose of the limit is to reduce losses in hold-ups. If large cash deposits are made with the teller, then the teller would continu- ally exceed his or her limit. This would indic,ate that there is a problem with the limits or the teller is receiving an unexpectedly large amount of cash. Large cash deposits are generally made only by businesses bringing in the day's deposits. Average cash deposits by personal account holders are $1,000 weekly or less. Average cash deposits by small to mid-size retail businesses are $1,000 to $2,500 daily. The account record shows the date, a coded description and the amount of the transaction and the balance of the account after the transaction. The de- scription of the transaction codes can be found at the bottom or on the back of the account record. Deposit slips are retained in the branch of account by the financial institution as proof of transaction. knpersonal deposts Clients are not restricted to using tellers at the branch of account for making deposits and withdrawals. If the client has a bank card, both deposit and withdrawal transactions to accounts c,an be made using a banking machine. These banking machine depos- its and withdrawals appear in the account records with a transaction description code indicating that it was a baniring machine transaction. Clients can also make deposits using the night depository or fast deposit located at the branch of their account. These services are designed for clients who do not need an immediate receipt.
S8 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 30 The Canadian Rankly System and Financial Transactions and Records • Night depository, a dropoff outside the branch, is used mostly by business clients. The client receives a numbered lockable bag, and a key to the night deposit box. The bag's number and the name of the company using the bag are recorded by the branch. The company can now malce deposits when the branch is closed. Night deposit can also be used for smaller deposits, simply by putting the cash and completed deposit slip into an envelope. These can be put into the night deposit box through a smaller opening (like a mail slot) which does not require a key. The deposits are counted and processed by the employees the next morning. All of the transactions made by night depository are recorded on a night depository record sheet which is kept by the branch. In the branch clients can put their deposit in an envelope and drop it into the fast deposit, which is a mini-vault. The branch staff will open up the mini-vault when the branch closes and process the transactions. Service branches are used by business clients of one branch of a bank who wish for some reason to make deposits at another branch. The original branch sends a letter to the other branch introducing their business client and asking them to accept deposits for credit to the original branch. Service branch em- ployees usually know little about the client and don't have to concern them- selves about the deposits since the branch of account is responsible for recourse.
Withdrawal Records The most common method for clients to draw funds out of their account is by writing a cheque. A cheque is designed for presenting payment to a second party. The second party may cash that cheque at the branch and fmancial institution that the cheque is drawn on, or may present the cheque to their own financial institution in exchange for cash or credit to their account. A payment or clearing system ensures that the institution which cashes the cheque will be able to recover money from the account the cheque was written on, even if that account is with a different fmancial institution. Each cheque contains markings that identify the financial institution, branch and account it is drawn upon. The financial institution, branch and account number are numerically coded using a standard that is regulated through the Canadian Payments Association. This information is located on the bottom of the cheque reading left to right. s
59 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 30 The Canadian Bantling System and Financial Transactions and Records
FIGURE 3.1 Club 99
IlAn7.3 19.2L.
PAY TO THE ORDER OF New WaveMarketing $ 150,00000
One Hundred Fifty Thousand xx DOLLARS THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA HAZELTON LANES BRANCH 87 AVENUE ROAD TORONTO, ONTARIO M6R 3R9
MOM Fitedgaek
1:33 1:C6652 8 CO3 933 ni9391o9r 100015000000 i/1
Cheque Branch Institution Account MICRencoded amount of cheque number number number number
If the cheques are numbered, the first set of numbers is the cheque number (not shown above). These numbers allow financial institutions to indicate the cheque numbers of statement accounts. Immediately to the right is the five die branch or transit number which identifies the branch where the account is located. To the right of that, the institution number can be found. Each financial institution has its own three digit code. Moving further right, the account number is located. The number and combinations of digits will vary from one institution to another. These numbers are printed on the cheques using a magnetic ink and are called MICRencoding. The use of magnetic ink allows high-technology ma- chines and computers to read the cheques. When a cheque is presented for payment at a financial institution, the branch must prepare that cheque to be processed through the clearing system. The branch will process the cheque as an accounting entry through a proof machine located in the branch. The proof operator will examine the cheque to ensure that it can be processed properly, for instance to ensure that there are no tears in the cheque or to ensure that it is micrencoded, and will pass the cheque through the track of the proof machine. When the cheque passes through the machine, the amount of the cheque is micrencoded on the front of the cheque in the bottom right-hand corner. This allows the processing centre's computers to electronically read the amount of the cheque and to Imow what amount to withdraw from the clients' accounts. The proof machine also stamps on the back of the cheque the branch identification stamp to indicate where the cheque was negotiated, the date it
60 Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 30 The Canadian Banking System and Financial Transactions and Records
was negotiated and a trace number. The trace number is assigned by the branch should a copy of the cheque ever be required from the processing centre. Once the cheque has been through the branch proof machine, the cheque is forwarded along with all of the other items processed by that branch to the processing centre. This is done at the end of each business day. The data or processing centre receives items from all branches in the region. Cheques drawn on their own institution are separated by branch and account number. The value of the cheques is electronically withdrawn from the clients' accounts. The financial institution's computers capture all of the transaction informa- tion at this point to produce the client's statement and internal financial institu- tion records. Cheques drawn on other institutions are totalled and are presented to the corresponding financial institutions for payment. Cheques drawn on accounts at their own branches and cashed at other institutions are paid to those institutions. Computers sort the cheques by branch and account number and the clients' accounts are electronically debited. As each of the cheques passes through various processing centres, the front and back of the cheque is micro-filmed. The back of each cheque is stamped at each processing centre it passes through, indicating the location of the process- ing centre and the date it was processed. The cheques in the processing centre are sorted by branch and account number, bundled up and sent to the branches of account or to an administration centre. The cheques are filed by account number until the monthly statement is produced. The cheques and statement are then mailed to the customer. If a cheque clears on an account that has not enough funds on deposit to cover the amount, the branch or administration staff will remove the cheque from the pile and retum it to the fmancial institution that had cashed it as NonSufficient Funds. A client may also withdraw funds from his or her account in person at a branch by completing a withdrawal slip. This slip will be processed through the data centre. Deposit slips that are micrencoded and internal accounting records are processed in a very similar way using the processing centre. These records are kept at the branch of account or an administration centre.
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Over the Counter Services Many clients require a more secure or quicker method of payment than cheques or cash. If a client must guarantee a payment or send funds overseas, they turn to well-known and acceptable payment instruments such as money orders, drafts and wire transfers. You do not have to have an ac,count with the financial institution to purchase these products and services.
Men Orders. Drafts . Traveler's Cheques The use of money orders and drafts is popular because the fimds are guaran- teed. A personal or business cheque c,ould be returned nonsufficient funds. The customer requests the draft or money order from a financial institution and pays the bank the value for it. The instrument is drawn on the particular financial institution from which it was purchased, and the funds are guaranteed by the same institution. The branch that issues the draft or money order keeps a c,opy of all payment instruments issued. Money orders are issued for amounts less than $1000. The customer is not required to indicate the payee. Drafts are issued for amounts over $1000, and a payee must be indicated. Drafts can be issued in many currencies. Traveller's cheques are sold by various fmancial institutions but can be drawn on an entkely different financial institution. Certain banks will clear all traveller's cheques internationally. These can be readily purchased in Canadian, United States and Great Britain Pounds Sterling currencies in most denotnina- tions. The traveller's cheque has two signature lines on it. One is signed when it is purchased and one is signed when cashed. There is also an area on the cheque to make it payable to someone.
Ware Transfers Another popular payment method for sending money a long distance is a wire transfer. A customer usually wants to wire money for one of two reasons: • The customer must send money to a foreign country and wishes the funds to be available immediately to the beneficiary of the funds. • The customer wants the money to be delivered right into the bank account of the beneficiary quickly, and the beneficiary deals at another bank, or at the same bank in another region.
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When a wire transfer is requested at a branch, the client's instructions include: - ordering/sending customer; - amount of money and currency type; - beneficiary customer's country; - beneficiary customer's fmancial institution; - beneficiary customer's name, address, or account number; OR instructions to pay upon notification; - identification. This information is taken by a bank employee, recorded to a wire transfer application, and the money is immediately taken from the client. Since a wire transfer is guaranteed funds, the bank wants to ensure that it has received the fimds first. The funds vvill be deposited into an internal account. The branch then telephones or faxes the instructions to the financial institu- tion's regional International Centre. The International Centre then uses a system similar to telex to contact the destination bank with the details of the wire transfer. Financial institutions can become a member of this system, called SWIFT. This communication machine sends instructions to the foreign banks in a prearranged format agreed to by participating financial institutions. The system also translates any foreign lan- guages into the destination bank's language. Financial institutions that have accounts with one another specifically for transferring money are called "correspondent" institutions. The sending bank instructs the destination bank to debit the value of the wire from the sending bank's account. If the destination financial institution is not a correspondent one, then the transfer is sent to the correspondent financial institution in the destination country. The correspondent financial institution forwards the transfer to the destination fmancial institution. If funds are being wired domestically, the funds are sent from the Interna- tional Centre of the sending bank to the International Centre of the receiving bank and forwarded to the branch at that time. Some receiving banks will wire the funds to their closest branch and the fimds are hand-delivered to the receiv- ing branch in the form of a draft. If a wire transfer is being done between two branches of the same financial institution, the sending branch will telephone the instructions directly to the receiving branch. The communication methods used for wire transfers make the transfer of • money as fast as possible BUT NOT INSTANTANEOUS. At all points of 63 Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 30 The Canadian Banking System and Financial Transactions and Records
communication of the wire transfer, the transactions are carefully documented. Each intermediary's involvement in the transaction at their respective locations is recorded. The time involved in a wire transfer varies, depending on when each link in the chain receives the instructions. A reasonable guideline to follow is: Domestic transfers between the same bank: same day Domestic transfers between different banks: same or next day International transfers between correspondent banks: up to two days International transfers between noncorrespondent banks: three days A wire transfer confirmation report listing all the details of the transfer is eren to the sending branch the next day.
Foreign exchange Foreign currencies, drafts, money orders, and traveller's cheques can be exchanged at most branches of ftnancial institutions. A conversion form is completed by the financial services employee. This form indicates whether the transaction is cash or cheque, as usually a different rate applies to each, and the customer signs the form. These forms are stored at the branches after œmpletion.
Investment Seruices Investments such as Term Deposits, Guaranteed Investment Certificates, Guaranteed Savings Certificates are available at most financial institutions. Treaswy Bills and Bankers Acceptances are also available over the counter in most branches. huestment cerbficales The terms of these investments vary from one day to five years. Normally, the minimum amount of investment for terms under 1 year is $5,000 dollars. The minimum amount of deposit for fewer than 30 days is $25,000. The minimum deposit for 1 day is $100,000. Investment certificates are available in Canadian and U.S. currencies in most denominations. Foreign currency investment certificates are available in large amounts (minimum $100,000) and are placed offshore with foreign banks.
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Certificates are available in registered or bearer form. A registered certifi- cate is payable to the person whose name appears on the certificate. A bearer certificate may be cashed by whoever presents it (i.e. the bearer, or carrier, of the certificate). Government securities and corporate notes are also available in registered and bearer form. When an investment is purchased the customer completes an application for the investment that indicates his or her name, (regardless of whether or not the certificate will be registered), an address, and an account number to which interest should be credited (if the interest is credited periodically). This applica- tion is signed by the customer. Additionally, the employee will probably indicate the source of the funds for the investment on the form That source may be an account number, a cheque drawn on another account, etc.
Stodis and bonds Investment products such as stocks and bonds are available at branches. The customer need not have an account with the institution to purchase securities and mutual funds. Employees may only process requests for purchase,s and sales of securities and are not able to advise clients on investment matters. When a purchase or sale of securities is made in a branch, the employee first must deternine whether they know that customer. If the customer has no ac,count with the fmancial institution, identification will be taken. A buy or sell order is then completed. If stock is being sold, the certificate is signed by its registered owner and the financial institution telephones the sell order to the financial institution's trading department. The buy or sell order is signed by the customer. The certificate number of the security is written on the branch buy/sell order when available. Payment is received or credit instructions (such as an account number to which the pay- ment should be credited) are taken. When the transaction is confirmed, which usually takes one or two days, the amount is debited from the branch's general ledger account and credited to the customer (for a sell order), or credited to the branch's general ledger account and debited from the customer (for a buy order). Many financial institutions have purchased securities companies. Clients could be referred to these brokerage firms by the branch. Most financial institutions also have self-directed investor services where a branch client can call a trader directly and request that buy and sell transactions be made. A personal security code is used for identification of the client and the client's account is debited or credited when the transactions are made.
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Specialty business services Business clients often require specialty services from financial institutions to assist them with domestic and business transactions. These services are offered through normal branches and through the assist- ance of commercial banking branches that have staff trained to understand business and international banking services. For a fee, clients can arrange for services such as foreign exchange, interna- tional payments and credit, export and import financing to be delivered with the assistance of corresponding foreign banks.
Letters of Credit Letters of Credit are often used for international trade between tvvo companies operating from different countries. A Letter of Credit is a form of credit line issued between two companies conducting business. They are described in detail in Chapter 1, page 31. Normally, the letter of credit serves as a form of guarantee of payment, whereby if Company 1 does not pay Company 2 by some other payment instrument, Company 2 will cash the letter of credit.
Lendmg Services and Mortgages Mortgages are available at all fmancial institutions. The records and procedures for processing the application and credit investigation are similar to those for consumer loans. Available for nearly every purpose, a customer can borrow money from most fmancial institutions if he or she can meet the criteria of the lenders. (That criteria is generally a significant amount of assets for collateral or high income.) When a customer borrows from a financial institution, a detailed credit application is filled out indicating personal information about the applicant. Inc,ome levels are declared and income verification (a copy of an income tax return or financial statements) is provided. The branch runs a credit bureau check which will indicate the financial institutions that the applicant deals with or has borrowed from. This includes institutions at which the applicant has credit cards, even if he or she has no other dealings with that institution. To approve a loan, a formula is used to compare the total payments required to make the debt payments with the customer's total income. Assets pledged as collateral for the loan, such as a car pledged for a car loan or a house pledged for a mortgage, are registered by the branch as security on
66 Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 30 The Canadian Oniony System and Financial Transactions and Records • the loan. If the borrower defaults on the loan, the financial institution will be able to seize the collateral and sell it to recover its money. To keep track of registered liens or claims on property the Personal Prop- erty Securities Act was proclaimed. Registration under this system allows the financial institution and branch to note publicly that it has a registered mortgage against the asset. If a client is given a loan, the client will sign a note promising to repay the loan plus interest. The financial institution will open a loan on their computer system that calculates the interest due and when the payments are required, and electronically debits the client's account for the payments. If the client does not have an account with that fmancial institution, they may leave post-dated cheques drawn on their account with another fmancial institution. The loan will be entered onto the client profile in the client database. All of the documentation is retained by the financial institution in a loan file. When a client applies and is turned down for a loan, the financial institution may retain the file in a declined loan file for their records. After a client finishes paying off a loan, the branch may retain the credit file in a closed loan file. This is done should the customer wish to apply for another loan.
Credit cards Most fmancial institutions offer credit cards. When a credit card is issued by a financial institution to a customer, a credit application and/or a detailed credit investigation should be kept on file at the branch or at the credit card centre. When a customer makes a purchase with their credit card, the purchase will appear on a monthly credit card statement administered and mailed by the financial institution's credit card centre. Copies of statements and records of charges and payments would be kept at the credit card centre but should be requested at the branch.
Safety Deposit Boxes Most branches offer safety deposit boxes or safekeeping services to clients. The safety deposit boxes are located in the vault and require 2 keys to open them. One key is held by the branch and the other is held by the customer. There are lease cards that are signed by safety deposit box clients and also access cards. These cards are usually located in the vault and the access card is signed each time the client enters the box.
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The safekeeping services offer storage of securities or sealed envelopes to clients. The securitie,s or envelopes are kept by the branch in a large common safe compartment accessible to the branch custodians. A safekeeping record card is completed listing the contents and retained and filed by the branch.
Double Entry Ilccounbog Financial institutions use the double entry accounting method. This means that for every financial transaction there is a debit and a credit of equal value. This is important to note when reviewing internal records of financial institutions. The type of accounting entries can indicate whether a transaction was cash or cheque, and where to search for further records. These records are called the audit trails. A deposit to a customer's account is a credit. A withdrawal or cheque drawn on a customer's account is a debit. A positive balance in a customer's account is a credit balance. An overdraft or minus balance in a customer's account is a debit balance. All accounting transactions are represented by vouchers. These serve as the audit trail. They are the bacicup records to the c,omputeriz.ed posting of transac- tions. In financial institutions there are accounting records to support all of the transactions that oc,cur. For example, a customer wishes to put $100 into her passbook account. The customer presents to the teller a deposit of $100. The deposit is a CREDIT to the account and the deposit slip is the CREDIT voucher. The cheque being deposited will DEBIT the issuer of the cheque's account.
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There are many other sources of financial information in addition to financial institutions.
For real estate When you have identified a location or an address, you can conduct a search on the history of the property which will show when and for how much the prop- erty was sold and whether a mortgage has been registered against that property. If a mortgage exists it will give you the name of the lender which could reveal another banking relationship and perhaps the existence of another bank account. You may also estimate the amount of equity or net worth in the property by subtracting the amount of mortgages from the estimated value. Of course if a property was paid for by cash no mortgages will show on the search.
For assets [chattels] When you have identified the full name of an individual you can run a PPSA search (Personal Property Security Act). This is similar to a real estate search but is for chattels: things like cars or furniture bought with financing. The lender files a statement under this PPSA which is registered by the provincial government at the Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations (MCCR). Anyone can ask for what is registered against anyone. This can reveal other assets that have been acquired and further relation- ships with lenders.
For control of companies Corporations are required to file an information retum with the MCCR for the names of the Directors and Officers of the Corporation. Whenever changes are made in these positions, an information return is also required. This should provide some indication of who is running the company but it is also possible to create blinds and use nominee names such as a lawyer or acquaintance. However, this filing does not indicate who owns the company. Usually, to determine that, you need to find out who is the lawyer for the corporation and obtain, by search warrant, the share register where the listing of shareholders is recorded. Of course, there is no guarantee that those listed are the same benefi- cial ovvners of the shares, but it is a start. •
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For ownership of computes There is a filing requirement under the Corporations and Labour Unions Re- turns Act which discloses the stated ownership of the corporation.
For credÉ worthmess of mdwuluals Lenders have a central repository of information on consumers called a Credit Bureau that they can reference to check on the credit rating of individuals. Many lenders file voluntary reports which are recorded in this repository which can be accessed by other members or the police. The Credit Bureau can pro- vide information on the number of credit cards held by an individual; what companies have granted credit to the individual, such as a bank; and even the average number of digits in the bank account. This is a great source of financial information on individuals. A record of persons who have requested informa- tion about individuals is kept and is available to the individual on whom a Credit Bureau is kept.
Credit Weans Credit bureaus exist in most areas and are responsible for monitoring all financial dealings as reported by their member fmancial companies. The credit bureaus are available to financial companies to check on the existence of loans to or bad credit ratings on prospective borrowers. There are two separate systems in place: one for persons and one for businesses. In order to gain access to the credit bureau system you have to be registered with them and have a computer terminal to communicate with the bureau's files. In order to inquire about a file you must know: SIN number first and last name Present address, and past addresses if possible Occupation Date of birth For business inquiries, all of the above information about each owner would be helpful. In addition you must Imow: Name of company DBA (Doing business as) Where and how the company was registered. While fishing you might discover discrepancies in the names used or find
12 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter q0 Financial Investigation and Public Information 5g stems • that a number of smaller associations or financial connections exist. Be prepared to open subfiles or investigations on these. A note of caution: credit bureaus keep track of inquiries, including who made the inquiry. This information is available to individuals who are interested and apply for it. Since a suspect might occasionally request this information to see if anyone is checking up on him, it could compromise the secrecy of an investigation. This should be taken into consideration when making inquiries.
Tax Returns Tax returns can show the existence of income producing assets such as rental properties or bonds which would bring the assets into consideration for seizure. There would be a tendency for the dealer to report legitimate income once his drug profits have successfully allowed him to acquire income producing assets. You might also obtain other financial information attached to the return such as a T4 slip sug,gesting employment income and a working relationship of some lcind or fmancial statements on companies which are owned by the dealer. Finally, the income that has been disclosed in the return can be used as a reference amount for a net worth analysis (discussed in Chapter 6) and the assets (or liabilities - i.e. from loan interest claimed) can be double checked for their inclusion in that analysis.
Pathfmdmg The first task of the investigation is to determine where the perpetrator is doing his laundering. As in most investigations, it would be fundamental police work that will determine his name and from where he operates.
Where to sedi a trad There are several methods or sources available to the investigation team to get a financial profile. First of all, a trail could lead to a financial institution or institu- tions where he might do business. A courier or bag man could be in use to make the deposits, so a tail on the associates could also be valuable.
Postal Survuey Mail surveys by postal authorities have been extremely effective for the Internal Revenue Service in detecting financial dealings of individuals under investiga- tion, especially those dealing with foreign bank accounts. Unfortunately, Swiss banks and other financial companies have several methods of avoiding this • problem for the clients that request it. Plain envelopes are almost always used.
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In certain instances all correspondence, including statements of accounts, have been held by the bankers for years until the client personally picks them up. In addition, postal meters leave their marks and the corresponding postmark.
Conspicuous Assets Monitoring the spending habits and payments of an individual could also turn up a part of the trail. Automotive dealers would have purchase records as to how the suspect paid for a car or truck. If ftnancing was arranged with the company, there will be records of financial disclosure. If it was paid for by cash, the automotive dealer may have a copy of a receipt. If it was paid for by cheque, then the automotive dealer's fin ancial institution would have a copy of the cheque that was used. If the cheque was issued by a financial institution, then financing could have been arranged there. Again there must have been disclosure of financial infor- mation. The same theory applies to any property that is owned by the suspect. The PPSA on the property will show if there are any mortgages, which will lead to a financial institution. Once any part of the trail is exposed, bank records of payments to and from that part can lead to more hidden financial connections — even connections overseas.
Where to Apply for Information on Corporations Information about corporations is available at the local government agency that is responsible for registration of businesses. Registering a corporation in a country such as Liechtenstein that provides secrecy will hinder any inquiries. In North America, however, the information is available upon request. The name and address of the corporation's owners can be obtained at these sources. If a front or dununy corporation is being used, there are signs that will give it away. If the company professes to be in a certain business, do any of its owners have any special skills in that area? Is it recognized by the industry associations? Does the company have any public contact? Does it have a rela- tionship with the normal suppliers of such a business? Is it listed in the telephone book? Is there an employee answering the phones in a businesslike manner? Who would be the clients of the business that they profess to operate? Are there any signs of business activity or solicitation?
eel Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 11 e Financial Investigation and Public Information 5H stems • Comparing these claims of legitimacy to local tax returns, if available, or to bank records or other information a.ttained during the investigation with taxa- tion records, may also suggest whether the business is legitimate. If there is a system in place, a fmancial fanout by the local cooperative financial institutions could uncover dealings at an unknown bank or trust com- pany.
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18 Crime 0 Detection **Proceeds of Crime Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
AUDIT TRAILS The following chapter explains the documents traditionally encountered during a financial investigation. These records make up the backbone of any financial investigation and the skills needed to interpret these documents are critical to a proceeds of crime investigation. Records may appear slightly differently depending on the financial institution but the principles of their investigation are the same. The first time you read the following information, you may not thoroughly understand the value of knovving all these details. Once you participate in the case study or in an actual investigation, the importance of understanding these infinite details will become more appar- ent. This chapter may become the most valuable information to you in this training program and you may find it very useful as quick reference mate- rial.
Investigating a Dank Statement • A bank statement is used by a financial institution to report and maintain records on transactions to a customer's account. It summarizes financial activity over a period of time and provides details about individual transactions that can be used to further audit trails and establish relationships that the suspect has with other companies, individuals, or assets. Transactions appear on the statement indicating the date the transac- tion was processed, the type of transaction, the amount of the transaction, and the resulting account balance. Transactions that decrease the account balance may appear in the form of cheques, withdrawals, banking machine withdrawals, transfers out, debit memos, pre-autho rized payments, loan payments, and overdraft interest and service charges. Transactions that increase the account balance may appear in the form of deposits, banking machine deposits, transfers in, credit memos, pre- authorized payroll credits, investment proceeds, loan proceeds, and interest earned.
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FIGURE 5.1
ROYAL BANK 0 F CANADA 32nd Street Branch Toronto, Ontario
International Investments Ltd. 1 90 Bay Street Toronto, Ontario M5G 1X0 Account #: 112-411-9 Statement Date: 01/21/88:
01/01 Balance Forward $ 0.00 01/02 Deposit $ 5,000.00 $ 5,000.00 01/04 Deposit $ 3,500.00 $ 8,500.00 01/07 Cheque $ 2,500.00 $ 6,000.00 01/11 Deposit $ 4,300.00 $ 10,300.00 01/13 Deposit $ 2,700.00 $ 13,000.00 01/14 Cheque $ 4,000.00 $ 9,000.00 01/15 Cheque $ 1,000.00 $ 8,000.00 01/18 Cheque $ 500.00 $ 7,500.00 01/18 Deposit $ 2,800.00 $ 10,300.00 01/19 Cheque $ 2,200.00 $ 8,100.00 01/20 Deposit $ 4,800.00 $ 12,900.00 01/20 Cheque $ 1,500.00 $ 11,400.00 01/20 Cheque $ 800.00 $ 10,600.00 01/20 Cheque $ 750.00 $ 9,850.00 01/21 Deposit $ 3,800.00 $ 13,650.00
Total Debits: $ 13,250 Total Credits: $ 26,900
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Business and personal chequing accounts usually generate an account statement for each month, which reports on the previous thirty days activ- ity. When produced, the account statement is sent to a department or branch where the vouchers (cheques, deposit slips, withdrawal slips, etc.) are matched with the transactions that appear on the account statement. For electronic transactions such as interest, pre-authorized payments or banldng machine transactions, there may not be an accompanying paper voucher. Cheques are microfilmed when processed at the data centre. Original cancelled cheques are returned to the client with the account statement. (Cancelled cheques are cheques written on an account, which have been cashed, and cleared (i.e., the money has been withdrawn from the customer's account and paid to the account at the financial institution of the person or company that cashed the cheque).) Normally only one paper copy of the account statement is produced. It is mailed to the customer. The statement is microfilmed so that the financial institution will have a record of the account should the customer lose or not receive the state- ment. A microfiche containing all of the monthly account statements is sent to the branch of account and a backup copy is retained at a head or admin- istrative office. All statements indicate a start and end date. Ensure the statements cover a continuous time period. Do not assume that 12 statements will cover a year's operation on an account. It is a common practice for cus- tomers to request interim statements covering a specific period resulting in 13 or more statements a year. On the top of an account statement are account number, the account owner's name and address, and starting and closing dates of the summary. The main portion of the statement summarizes the transactions for that reporting period. The first entry is the balance forwarded from the previous statement. Each transaction entry will appear on the statement with the date of the transaction, a code or abbreviation for the transaction type, and the result- ing account balance after the transaction. Abbreviations or codes differ by financial institution and are usually explained on the back of the statement.
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Details found on this record: Account name Account number Period starting/ending Financial transactions Dates of transactions
Inuesbgation The purpose of investigating an account statement is to determine the total amount of money transacted through an account, the source of funds, and the final destination of those fimds (assets). You will require the original account statements or certified true copies obtainable from microfilm. When investigating an account, first determine the start date of the investigation. You may wish to use the date the account was opened. You can determine the date an account was opened by exatnining the client profile either on paper or computer. This should list all of the ac- _ counts opened by the individual and the date each was opened. If such a system does not exist, examine the signature card for that particular account. This should be dated. However, be aware that signature cards are updated periodically, which may be misleading. You may also examine the microfiche copies of the monthly account statements. The first account statement should have an entry at the begin- ning of the statement such as "account opened" with a starting balance of $0.00. Once you locate the required microfiche, paper copies of the state- ments can be produced by the financial institution. However, this is usually done at another location and may take up to weeks to obtain. Always examine the microfiche account statements first to determine the quantity and amounts of transactions that have taken place. This will help determine how much work and time will be involved in the investigation of the sus- pect. When a broad and detailed investigation of the suspect is initiated, the amount of work involved for the financial institution in tracing items is substantial. If an investigator can first examine statements and prioritize the tracing requests (by larger transactions or recent activity), the financial institution can arrange to produce the more important requests first. Other- wise important traces could be delayed by the large volume of less impor- tant tracing requests.
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For example, there may be 25 cheques on an account statement being investigated, but you are particularly interested in three cheques for very large amounts. If a request were made simply for copies of every cheque, obtaining the tracing information and the completion of tracing requests would be done arbitrarily; therefore, the delivery of the important copies of the large cheques could be delayed by the smaller cheques. Leave instructions with the financial institution to contact you when important items have been produced. Otherwise, the voucher copies will be delivered at one time, unnecessarily holding up the delivery of important items. Transposing the account activity to a worksheet should be done prior to asking the financial institution to produce paper copies. By starting work directly from the microfiche, you will save time normally spent waiting for records. You will be able to leave the branch after the initial visit with an idea of the amount of activity which has taken place and how large the financial investigation will be. Paper copies of statements are not required to begin tracing the trans- action items that appear on the account statements. This is one of the more important aspects of the financial investigation. The financial institution may use microfiche as the basis for tracing individual transaction items. If not, with details of the transaction which are available on microfiche, the financial institution can determine what supplementary records are required to trace individual transaction vouch- ers. The account statement is critical to tracing cheques and deposits because it indicates the exact date that the items were processed. This determines the date of records that must be examined to obtain tracing information. Using this information, financial institutions can produce a copy of vouchers for the transactions appearing on the statement. If originals are not available, you require certified true copies of the front and back of each item. This action will be completed through the processing centre and can take up to several weeks. For example, certified true copies of cancelled cheques may be ob- tained using the information available on the statement. The statement reveals the date on which the cheque cleared, as well as any additional information to further indentify it, such as the amount of the cheque, the cheque number, etc. Another report, sometimes referred to as an account history report, must be referred to upon determining the date on which the • cheque cleared. This report is usually produced weekly or biweekly.
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It lists all the transactions that occurred through the account each day. It also provides a trace number which allows the data processing centre to find their copy of the cheque. The financial institution employee must now complete a form request a copy of that cheque. It will be sent to the data processing centre, where someone will then have to find the electronic copy of the cheque, convert it to a paper copy, and return it to the branch that requested the copy. Depending upon how complete the information is on the request form, and how long ago the cheque was processed, this could take anywhere from three days to several weeks. On average, it takes 15 minutes of a financial institution's time to trace one item. Certified true copies of other documents, such as deposit slips, with- drawal slips, etc. could be obtained in this way if the original voucher could not be found at the branch. The next step in the creation of the audit trail is to investigate the cheques that were deposited to the account (determine the source of the funds) and the cheques that were drawn on the account (determine the destination of the assets).
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inuestugahng a Bank Account Passbook Most business and personal savings accounts record activity in a passbook rather than a statement. The passbook is the only complete continuous record of the account. It is kept by the client and updated periodically by the client in a branch. As transactions are processed through an account, the financial institu- tion's computer stores the transactions in its memory until the passbook is updated. Prior to being updated, the financial institution may be able to produce an on-screen or paper activity history of the account. Once the passbook has been updated the financial institution loses that ability. The account passbook or account history reports provide a sununary of financial activity over a period of time. The passbook or history report also provides the details of individual transactions such as the deposits and cheques which are obtained and used to further the audit trials and estab- lish relationships that the suspect has with other companies, individuals, or assets. When the passbook is updated, it shows transactions that have taken place throug,h that account including the date the transaction was proc- essed, the type of transaction, the amount of the transaction, and the resulting account balance. A glossary of transaction codes is usually on the front or back inside cover of the passbook. A passbook is the customer's only record of financial transactions for the account. The customer does not receive a statement or cancelled cheques. In the absence of the original passbook, no other records so conven- iently package all of the transaction activity in one place. Instead, you must rely on alternate records to piece together the account activity. For in- stance, some financial institutions produce a report that indicates the passbook was updated, and shows the items entered into the passbook. Other financial institutions produce summary account history records for all accounts on a microfiche each weelc, which is sent to the branch of account. What is important to remember is that the financial institution will always have alternate records. Microfilmed copies of the alternate records are kept at the branch of account and also at the processing centre. Deposits and withdrawals can be made in the branch with or without the bankbook, or through a banking machine. Withdrawals can also be • made by writing cheques. As vvith a statement account, credit and debit
85 Crime Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5e Financial Investigation Techniques
memos may be used, and some electronic transactions will not provide paper vouchers. Original cheques, withdrawal slips, and deposit slips are retained by the financial institution as proof of the transaction. If the transaction is posted (i.e., the transaction is immediately entered into the financial institution's computerized system), the slip will be kept at the branch where the trans- action took place (the branch of transaction posting). If the transaction is note posted immediately and the vouchers are micrencoded, it is left for the clearing at the end of the day, when the slips will be processed at the data centre and sent to the branch of account for storage. The purpose of investigating an account passbook is to determine the total amounts of money that were transacted through an account, the source of ffinds, and the destination of those funds (assets). lnuesbgabon During an investigation, you may encounter two possible scenarios. The first scenario is that you have obtained the passbook from the target of the investigation and are approaching the financial institution for details of the transactions found in the book. The second scenario is that you are ap- proaching the financial institution without the passbook. In this case you will need to obtain copies of alternate records such as account history reports that provide details about transactions in the account during the time period under investigation. The start and end dates of the investigation can be established from the client profile, the signature card, or internal records. As well, if you have the passbook you can look at the first entry to see if is an account opened entry with a zero balance. If not, there is a previous passbook. Ensure that the passbook or history reports produced cover a continuous time period. A passbook can be quicldy filled up, and a new one issued. Make sure that you do not assume the passbook in your possession is the only record of account. The passbook or account history reports are critical to tracing the cheques and deposits. They indicate the exact date that transactions were processed. This determines the date of the records that must be examined to obtain tracing information. The passbook or account history report provides the following details: Account number Amount of transaction Type of transaction Date of transaction
86 Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 financial Investigation Techniques
FIGURE 5.2
Date Particulars Debit I audit Balance
Jan 1 Jan 2 Dep 100.00 100.00 Jan 5 WD 50.00 50.00 Jan 6 NSW 10.00 40.00 Jan 7 PTD 10.00 30.00 Jan 8 CHQ 10.00 20.00 Jan 9 CM 100.00 120.00
DEP = Deposit
WD = Withdrawal
NBW = No Book Withdrawal
PTD = Personal Touch Debit ("bank Machine")
CHQ = Cheque
CM = Credit Memo
Always examine the passbook or history report first to determine the quantity and values of transactions that have taken place. This will help determine how much work and time will be involved in the investigation.
01 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Inuestigation Techniques
Inuesbgabng a Cheque A cheque is used by an account owner to transfer funds from his/her account to the payee: another individual, entity, or account. When the cheque is cashed by the payee, the cheque is presented for payment at the issuer's financial institution. The amount will be withdrawn from the issuer's account and the transaction vvill appear on the account passbook or statement as a cheque. The cheque is a permanent record of a transac- tion. By examining a cheque, you can obtain a number of details about the transaction. Cheques may be drawn off most passbook, statement, credit card, and investment accounts. Statement accounts return original cancelled cheques to the customer with an account statement. Passbook accounts normally do not return original cancelled cheques to the client. Originals are stored at the branch of account or administration centre for up to two years and then sent to storage for up to seven years. Microfihned copies of the front and back of cheques can be obtained at the financial institution which cashed the cheque and at the institution the cheque is drawn on. You will require the original cheque or a legible certified true copy of the front and back.
The Clean of Cheques Financial institutions try to process voluminous service as efficiently as possible. Human handling of cheques written on a customer's account is slow and costly. The use of micrencoding and Data Centres eliminates nearly all involvement by branch employees. An employee would be prompted by the financial institution's computer system to investigate only if the cheque is nonsufficient funds or if it could not be processed by the Data Centre's computers. At the branch which cashes the cheque, the cheque is run through a track of a proof machine which: • balances the transaction; • encodes the amount of the cheque on the front; • stamps the financial institution's name, branch, and the date on the cheque; and • stamps a tracing number on the cheque and a corresponding number on a proof tape.
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Along with the cheque (DEBIT), the deposit slip must also be proc- essed through the proof machine as a CREDIT. In this way the entry will remain balanced. All entries for that day are processed by the proof operator. A perma- nent record of all entries sent to the Data Centre is indicated on a tape that the proof machine produces. Each evening, every branch forwards their proof tape to the data centre. The cheque, along with all of the other accounting entries processed that day by the branch, is also forwarded to the financial institution's Data Centre. The Data Centre is the distribution point for all the cheques and ac- counting entries processed by that financial institution in that region on that business day. Special machines electronically read the micrencoding on the cheques and sort and separate the items cashed by another financial institution. The total value of all the CIBC cheques cashed at the Royal Bank branches is added electronically by the Royal Bank's Data Centre and is presented for payment along with the vouchers that same night to the CIBC's Data Centre. The CIBC electronically transfers the value of the cheques to the Royal Bank immediately. The same process would take place between the CIBC and the Toronto Dominion bank or any other financial institution. This process is called the clearing of cheques.
•
89 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Inuestigation Techniques
At the Data Centre, each cheque is electronically photocopied. Com- puters read the micrencoding of the cheques drawn on their own branches. The micrencoding gives the computer the following information based on the numbers on the bottom of the cheques: 1. The cheque number (optional). 2. The branch number. (Each branch has its own number, called a transit number, which normally has five digits.) 3. The financial institution number (normally three digits). 4. The account number (which could be a combination of number se- quences). 5. An internal transaction number (optional - generally two digits). 6. The value of the cheque (added on by a proof machine operator at the branch).
FIGURE 5.3 Maritime Fisheries Corporation 237
February 10 19 2L PAY TO Pacielli"s Fine Foods $ 75,000.00 THE ORDER OF
Seventy-five Thousand JirC DOLLARS THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA MAIN STREET BRANCH 87 MAIN STREET MONCTON,NEW BRUNSWICK
MEMO hut gooepk
(612.31 7500000 \ Cheque Branch Institution Account Value of Number Number Number Number Cheque
The computer reads all the information on the cheque and electroni- cally debits the appropriate account at the appropriate branch. The cheque vouchers are then routed to the proper branch. When the cheque arrives at its final destination, (the branch of the financial institution on which it is drawn), the signature on the cheque is checked against the signature card and the cheques are filed. If the cheques are returned to the customer with his or her statement, the cheques are filed by customer account number. If it is a passbook account, the cheques are stored at the branch. They are filed by the date of clearing. Within these date bundles, the items may be sorted by account number.
90 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Inuestigation Techniques
Micrencoded deposits can be processed within the same financial institution in the same way, and the account is electronically credited. In case of error, each stage of processing a cheque is filmed by com- puters. This process can be used as a witness to the transaction. hwesbgabon Investigating in a financial environment dictates that evidence will always appear slightly different due to various accounting methods used by finan- cial institutions. When examining the front of a cheque, the information will always be arranged the same way, but the micrencoded account numbers on the bottom front of the cheque will differ. This is because the numbers indicate which financial institution the cheque is drawn on. The number of digits in the account number may be arranged differently and vary in quantity. The following details can be found from the front of a cheque: • the financial institution where the account is held; • the account the cheque is drawn on; • the name of the issuer; • the signature of the issuer; • the amount of the cheque; • the date that it was issued; and • to whom the cheque was issued.
FIGURE 5.4 Name of issuer Amount of cheque
237
Date cheque was issued ehruary 10 19 91 To whom the cheque was isme PAY TO THE ORDER OF Pacieles Fine Foods Z5, 000.00 Amount of cheque S'eveirtfive Thousand MC DOLLARS Financial Institution THE OVA SCOTIA AIN STREET BRANCH Branch where account 87 MAIN STREET is held MONCTON,NEVV BRUNSVVIC
MEINO
237 Ii .1112 123 et 456 oor
Branch Financial Account Signature of issuer where Institution cheque is account is drawn on held 91 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
The micrencoding on the bottom of the cheque indicates the cheque number, the branch number (also called the transit number), and the ac- count number that the cheque is drawn on. After it has been processed through proof, the amount of the cheque also appears in micrencoding. Understanding the meaning of the various stamps found on the back of a cheque is important. As a cheque passes through various processing points a microfilmed copy is made. At each of these points a record of the transaction can be found.
FIGURE 5.5 Trace Date Branch Deposit to the Credit Number Number of the payee stamp
Proof Stamp - CN:0053q DA 002-010
For Deposit To The Credit o«.,..f The Payee 00002-010 1 CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE FEB '91' 10 FEB '91' 10 BA.NK OF C.LB.C. FEB 10 1991 DATA CENTRE NOVA SCOTIA MAIN BRANCH MONCON, N.B. EASTERN PC MONCTON, N.B. 1 00002-010
CIBC Processing Teller stamp Bank of Nova Scotia Centre stamp Processing Centre stamp
On the back of the cheque, you can usually find the signature and account number of the person who cashed a cheque. This endorsement is made by the payee. In some cases a cheque could be double endorsed — the payee signed the back of the cheque and gave it to another person who signed and cashed it. Instead of an endorsement you may find a "Deposit to the Credit of the Payee" stamp. The most important stamp to be found on the back of the cheque is the earliest dated stamp. This should be the teller's stamp that is applied when the cheque is deposited or cashed. This indicates the financial institution and branch destination of the asset transfer. A lighter inked stamp could be found on the back of the cheque if the branch runs its own proof. This stamp is left by the proof machine that balances the proof and gives the following information:
92 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
• the branch transit number; • the date the proof was run; and • the trace number. (This number tells you where in the batch of proof the item was run. It is simply a "counter" which increases by one number per item.) A stamp from the data centre which cleared the cheque should be visible. If the cheque is drawn on a different financial institution, a stamp from that institution's data centre would also be found. Each of the data centre stamps will include the financial institution's name, the date, and the region (usually province). This example illustrates the elements of information that are found on the front of a completed cheque.
FIGURE 5.6 Maritime Fisheries Corporation
February 10 19 91
PAY TO Pacielli"s Fine Foods $ 75,000.00 THE ORDER OF
Seventy-five Thousand xx DOLLARS THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA 1C0 MAIN STREET BRANCH • 87 MAIN STREET MONCTON,NEW BRUNSWICK
MEWO Pied ewe»
1:30241 • 002 I: 123 .4561.7r 7500000
Details of this record: Payee: Pacielli's Fine Foods Body and Figure: Seventy-five thousand dollars $75,000 Branch/Transit Number: 30241 Main Street Branch Institution Number: 002 Bank of Nova Scotia Account Number: 123 456 7 Date: February 10, 1991 Account Name: Maritime Fisheries Corporation • Signature: Fred Joseph 93 Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
Information that is gathered from a single document begins to con- struct an audit trail and establish financial and other relationships. • In this example, a financial relationship exists between Maritime Fisher- ies Corporation and Pacielli's Fine Foods. Further to this relationship, a transfer of assets (cash) of $75,000 occurred between Maritime Fisheries and Pacielli's. The date of that transfer may be on or any day after (not exceeding six months) February 10, 1991. There is also a senior or ownership relationship between Maritime Fisheries Corporation and Fred Joseph, who is authorized to draw funds from the company. Additionally, there is a relationship between Maritime Fisheries and the Bank of Nova Scotia through its Main Street branch where an account 123 456 7 is held. When a cheque is processed, the amount of the cheque is micrencoded on the bottom right corner of the front of the cheque. The back of a cashed cheque also provides important information about how that cheque was processed and about the payee. Each of the stamps left on the back of a cheque by the processing financial institutions create a trail that indicates which institutions and employees processed the cheque and on what date. This is important as it vvill lead you to the bank and branch that cashed it. When a cheque is deposited or cashed at the financial institution where the payee has an account, the payee either endorses the cheque or the teller will stamp the back of the cheque with the "Deposit to the Credit of the Payee". As indicated in figure 5.5 this cheque was presented to the CIBC Main branch by Pacielli's Fine Foods for deposit and transacted on February 10, 1991, by teller #1.
Proof Illadoe Stamp CN:00530 DA:10/02/91 TR:0002-010 The cheque was processed that day through the CIBC proof machines and the trace number on the proof tape is 00530.
94 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
Data/Processmg Cenbm Stamp
FEB '91' 10 FEB '91' 10 C.I.B.C. BANK OF DATA CENTRE NOVA SCOTIA MONCON, N.B. EASTERN PC
The cheque cleared the CIBC processing centre in Moncton on Febru- ary 10, 1991, and was processed through the Bank of Nova Scotia's Eastern Processing Centre on February 10, 1991, where the account was electronically debited. Having examined the trail markers on the back of the cheque, the investigator can determine the destination of the transfer of assets, and develop an audit trail from one corporation and bank to two corporations and two banks. If this cheque had been deposited at a Canadian trust company, the stamps on the back of the cheque would probably include a third party bank's stamp. Many Canadian trust companies do not have their own processing centre and therefore rely on a bank to process all of the cheques drawn on that trust company. FIGURE 5.7
CN:00530 DA:10/02/91 TR:0002-010
For Deposit To The Credit Of The Payee 00502-590 1 NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY FEB '91' 10 FEB '91' 10 FEB 10 1991 BANK OF C.I.B.C. DATA CENTRE 21 KING ST EAST NOVA SCOTIA MONCTON, N.B. MONCTON, N.B. EASTERN PC 1 00502-590
3 1i 4 The cheque was processed as follows: 1. Deposited at National Trust Company; 2. Processed through proof machines of the C1BC Main branch for National Trust Company; 3. Processed through the crBc Moncton Data Centre; and 4. Processed through the Bank of Nova Scotia's Eastern Processing • Centre.
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Not all cheques will be cashed at a financial institution in the same province or country. If the payee deposits this cheque at a bank in the United States, the back of the cheque will appear as follows:
FIGURE 5.8
CN:51280 DA:10/02/91 TR:57124-324 FEB '91' 11 C.I.B.C. INTERNATIONAL For Deposit To The Credit CENTRE Of The Payee MONTREAL, PQ. 57124-324 1 CHASE MANHATTAN BANK FEB '91' 12 FEB '91' 12 BANK OF C.I.B.C. FEB 10 1991 DATA CENTRE NOVA SCOTIA MAIN BRANCH-54 STREET MONCTON, EASTERN PC N.B. NEW YORK CITY, NY 1 57124-324
4 1
The cheque was processed as follows: 1. Deposited at Chase Manhattan Bank, New York City; 2. Processed through proof at Chase Manhattan Bank, NYC; 3. CIBC International Centre, Montreal (the Canadian clearing bank for Chase Manhattan); . 4. C1BC Data Centre, Moncton; and 5. Bank of Nova Scotia Eastern Processing Centre
96 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 Financial Investigation Techniques
When examining cheques, you will find some stamps overlap or bleed, rendering some information illegible. In order to ascertain any illegible information, the financial institution from which the cheque was drawn can check the institutional relationships to detemine the clearing institutions. In proceeding with the investigation, the next point in the development of the audit trail would be to determine the financial institution, branch, and account of the payee. In the case of this example, the targeted source documents required to further the investigation and maintain the audit trail are: • deposit slip that credited the $75,000 to Pacielli's Fine Foods account at the C1BC Main branch; • client profiles of both Maritime Fisheries Corporation and Pacielli's Fine Foods; and • bank account statements of both Maritime Fisheries Corporation and Pacielli's Fine Foods. •
•
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Inuesbgabng a Deposit Deposit slips are used for any deposits made in person to an account. Deposits can be made to an account by persons other than the account owner. Chequing (personal and business) deposit slips are usually micrencoded. Savings (passbook) deposit slips usually have the account number handwritten on the front. Deposit slips are used by a financial institution to record a credit to a client's account. Deposits can be credited to a customer's account in two ways: by posting it through a computer terminal in the branch, or by sending it to the Data Centre. Microfilmed copies of micrencoded deposit slips (front and back) that were processed at the Data Centre are available. Originals are stored at the branch or administration centre for up to two years and then sent to stor- age for another four years. Deposit slips are retained by financial institu- tions for up to six years. All of the deposit slips processed at a branch in one day are bundled together and filed by that transaction date. If three deposits appear on the account statement on December 7, 11, and 19, the deposit slips will be located in the branch in the deposit slip bundles for December 7, 11, and 19. Within each date the slips are filed by account number in ascending order. Banking machine deposits generally do not produce deposit slip vouch- ers. The records from this type of transaction need to be obtained from where the banking machine is located The banking machine deposit transaction appearing on the statement or passbook should also indicate the branch transit number where the transac- tion took place. If not, the branch of account will have a daily report of all banking machine transactions by the branch's clients. This report will indicate the banking machine location and the branch responsible for that banking machine. Have the employee contact that branch, requesting details of the de- posit, such as cash or cheques, and certified true copies of the front and back of all cheques deposited. When deposits are made at service branches, while requests for infor- mation can be made for records at the home branch, the tracing informa- tion about deposits made at service branches will be located at the service branches. When an account is being investigated, ask the manager if these service
98 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 • Financial Investigation Techniques
arrangements exist, as he or she might not think to note this. If a service branch is being used, it may be valuable to actually inter- view the staff Some transactions conducted by the suspect at the service branch may not show up on records. Such transactions could be cash purchases of drafts, money orders, or wire transfers. You will require the original deposit slip or a legible certified true copy of the front and back. The front of a micrencoded deposit slip is made up of several elements. The main information is: Transit Number: The branch where the account is held. Institution Number: The financial institution where the account is held. Account Number: The account that the deposit is made to. Deposit code: Indicates a deposit. Cheques on Deposit: Individual items on deposit. Cash on Deposit: Total cash. Date: The date the deposit was made. Account Name: May appear on the deposit slip. Initiais: The person who made the deposit and the teller who accepted it.
FIGURE 5.9 Financial Institution Date Initials and Branch deposit is Cheques on being made to Deposit
TORONTO-DOMINION BANK BLOOR & BATHURST BRANCH _ TORONTO, ONTARIO
2.1] ES ,, INITIAIS CASH • Feteme,10,11 POSITOR TELLE 8,000 @1 ER PLO 4,500 5 ©I0 = 150 CREDIT 0 @20 = 1600 ACCOUNT OF 0 @50 = 1500 Account Name NEW TECHNOLOGIES INC. 1115,© 100= 1000, TÔTALCHEGIUES 1 12,500 CASH::: 4250 TOTAeSEPOSrf 16,75 .00
004 1: 11 m11111 r 51 800001675000 I 10
• Transit Institution Account Deposit Cash on Number Number Number Code Deposit 99 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
A deposit appearing on any account record and the corresponding deposit slip are essential to the identify what was deposited (cash, cheques, or other payment instruments), and the successful tracing of these items. If the date of the deposit is unknown, the investigator must first locate the deposit on an account statement, passbook, or other record. Then the investigator will request and review microfiche copies of either the monthly statements or account history for statement accounts or an ac- count history for passbook accounts. Once the date of the deposit is discovered, it is necessary to the branch to produce the original deposit slip or a certified copy of the original. Deposit slips are completed by the customer and verified by the teller. The slip is supposed to indicate what was deposited, but often a slip may only have a total of the deposit and no disposition as to what was depos- ited. Figure 5.10 displays an example of a cash deposit. Since cash transactions are frequent in financial institutions, there are internal vouchers completed to record incoming and outgoing cash. These vouchers go by different names but are sometimes called cash audit slips. There are two copies of an audit slip. One copy is forwarded to proof. The other copy is retained by the teller or central teller for balancing at the end of the day. Both copies are retained by the branch that handled the cash. Cash is of value to whoever has it and is therefore considered an asset. An increase in an asset is a DEBIT and a decrease in an asset is a CREDIT. When the financial institution receives cash its assets increase and therefore a DEBIT cash audit slip is prepared. When the financial institu- tion pays out cash its assets decrease and therefore a CREDIT cash audit slip is prepared.
IN Cnme * Hetecbon "Proceeds ot Crime" Chapter 5e Financial Inuestigation Techniques • For example, a client deposits $100 cash to a passbook account. The CREDIT would be the deposit slip. The DEBIT would be the debit cash audit slip. DEBIT CREDIT Cash Audit Slip $100 Deposit Slip $100 In figure 5.10, the customer has exchanged the $100 cash asset for the bank account balance asset of $100.
FIGURE 5.10
Date Particulars Delit Credt Balance
Jan 1 Jan 2 •
CASH AUDIT SLIP
Debit Audit Slip
5x$20
$100.00 • DEBIT CREDIT 101 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
ram* This example illustrates the elements of information found on the front of the completed business deposit slip that was used to deposit the example of the cheque deposited in "Investigating a Cheque." The details of this record are: Transit Number: 0002 Main Branch Institution Number: 010 C1BC Account Number: 11 11111 Deposit Code: 51 Cheques on Deposit: 1 @ $75,000 Cash on Deposit: None Date: February 10, 1991 Account Name: Pacielli's Fine Foods Initials: SB
FIGURE 5.11 Financial Institution Date Initials and Branch deposit is Cheques on being made to Deposit
CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE MAIN BRANCH MONCTON, NEW BRUNSWICK
CHEQUES INITIALS CEPOS OR I TEU- e @2 @5 - CREDIT @10 - @20 = ACCOUNTOF Name of @ 5° - account to PACIELLrS FINE FOODS © 100 which deposit is ïêi;i' iieniieli- 75.000 CASH I being made rAta)Epprer. 75,000.00
11 11111
Transit Institution Account Deposit Number Number Number Code
102 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
If an investigation was begun with this deposit slip, the objective of the investigation would be to determine what was deposited. Since we know that the deposit slip was processed through the proof machine on the day of the deposit, we will examine the back of the deposit slip to help us determine where on the proof tape we can find these entries.
FIGURE 5.12 Branch Trace Number Date Number
Proof stamp CNt00529DA:10/02/91 10
For Deposit To The Credit Of The Payee
00002-010 1 CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE FEB '91' 10 FEB 10 1991 DATA CENTRE MAIN BRANCH - COMMERCE COURT TOR, ONT. TORONTO, ONTARIO 1 00002-010
Processing Teller's stamp Centre stamp
The teller's and processing centre's stamps indicate that the deposit was accepted and processed on February 10, 1991. The proof stamp, in this case found on the top left corner, also gives us the date and branch where the deposit was processed: Date: 10/02/91 Branch Number: 0002. More importantly, the proof stamp indicates the trace number of the deposit slip: 00529. The stamp shows that the deposit slip was the 529th item processed through the proof machine on that day. With that trace number, the trans- action can be located on the proof tape quicldy.
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The investigator has discovered a deposit of $75,000 to the account of Pacielli's Fine foods dated February 10, 1991. In order to determine the source of the funds that were deposited, the copy of the cheque deposited is required to show the account, branch, and financial institution that the cheque was dravvn on. The cheque will probably also have the name of the individual or company that issued the cheque printed on it.
10q Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 • financial Inuestigation Techniques • Investigating a Proof Tape The proof tape or proof machine is used by a financial institution to main- tain accuracy of the accounting and transactions entries it processes every day. The machine adds transactions (debits and credits) and ensures that all entries processed by the branch are balanced (properly added), micrencoded with an amount (for those entries that will go to the data centre that evening), stamped by the proof machine (to identify the branch that processed the entries), and numbered so that tracing of items can be completed if required. Note: When a transaction (credit and debit) is processed through proof, they are processed together. As each item is keyed into the system, the voucher is dropped through a track which prints the amount of the item on the front, and the financial institution, branch, and trace numbers, as well as the date, on the back. An adding machine style tape also registers the transaction, recording the type of transaction, whether it is a debit voucher or a credit voucher, the amount, and the trace number. This same trace number is stamped on the back of the voucher. This proof tape acts like an index, telling the financial institution em- ployee where to obtain a copy of the voucher. The numbering system is a simple counter that increases by '1' as each item is processed. The tape has two copies. One is kept at the branch. The other is forwarded to the data centre with the micrencoded items. At the data centre, the 'proof batches' are verified for accuracy. The cheques and deposits are sorted by financial institution and distributed by a machine similar to a proof machine. At this point the items are copied.
Example A deposit transaction of $500.00 would have two vouchers, a (CREDIT) Deposit Slip $500.00 and a (DEBIT) cheque of $500.00. When processed they would be 'run' as a Credit $ 500.00 000001 Debit $ 500.00 000002 •
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The trace number is an integral part in the location of the item by the branch and the copying of the item by the processing centre. To trace items on deposit, the financial institution employee must: 1. Identify the date of the transaction. 2. Locate the proof tape for that day. 3. Locate the transactions on the proof tape. 4. Fill out a form using the information on the proof tape to request a copy of the item.
FIGURE 5.13
0001 25000.00 C01 — A credit or deposit slip 0002 5000.00 04 — Represents cash (cash debit audit slip) 0003 15000.00 02 — 0004 750.00 02 — Trace Number: The / 0005 750.00 02 — Represents debits on deposit counter increases by one 0006 750.00 02 — such as cheques, drafts or digit as each item is 0007 500.00 02 — money orders. entered and is stamped on the back of the respective 0008 250.00 02 item. 0010 500.00 02 0011 500.00 02 0012 500.00 02 BALANCE 0.00 — No errors in addition. The above debits and credits total zero.
0013 100000.00 CO1 — A credit for a wire transfer 0014 100000.00 02 — The payment (cheque) BALANCE 0.00
0015 750.00 C01 — Credit portion of a money order sold 0016 750.00 04 — The payment (cash) BALANCE 0.00
0017 12500.00 C01 — U.S. $ to CDN $ customer credit 0018 12500.00 02 — Bank gives value for $10,000.00 BALANCE 0.00 U.S. @ 1.25
106
Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Inuestigation Techniques • Inuestigating a Cheque on Deposit In order to obtain a copy of the cheque deposited, the transaction entries (deposit and cheque on deposit) that were processed by the branch on the day of deposit must be located on the proof tape for that day. In the example of the cheque for $75,000 payable to Pacielli's Fine Foods: The deposit slip was the Credit. 75,000.00 The cheque on deposit was the Debit. 75,000.00 The proof tape for that day is examined until transaction number 00529 is located. FIGURE 5.14 Proof Tape 01 100.00 00527 02 100.00 00528 0 01 150,000.00 00529 02 150,000.00 00530 0 01 750.00 00531 07 750.00 00532 0
Once the deposit has been located, the investigator can see that the cheque deposited follows directly after the deposit slip on the proof tape. The proof tape also indicates the trace number of the cheque (00530 in this case). It is with this number that the financial institution can obtain a copy of the cheque that was deposited from its processing centre.
• Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Inuestigation Techniques
This example indicates a deposit of 4 cheques each of $10,000 for a total of $40,000.
FIGURE 5.15 CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE MAIN BRANCH -COMMERCE COURT TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE A EPOSTOR TELLE 10,000.00 Febuay10,91 @ 1 BIZBR I givrei 10,000.00 @2 = @ 5 - CREDIT 10,000.00 10 = @20 ACCOUNT OF 10,000.00 50 '` INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT @ 100 = CORPORATION eAsit:1 DTAtiDEPOSIT 40,000.00
100002 Hi 010 11 Hi 11111 rr 51 00001000000 10
You would be able to obtain copies of all of the cheques deposited, which would further the investigative trail, in the same way that you ob- tained a copy of single cheque being deposite d. The proof tape for this transaction would appear as follows: FIGURE 5.16 01 40000 00541 02 10000 00542 02 10000 00543 02 10000 00544 02 10000 00545 0
108 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
hweshgating a Wire Transfer The purpose of investigating a Wire Transfer is to determine the source of the funds (incoming) or the destination of the funds (outgoing). A Wire Transfer Form and Activity Report are used by financial insti- tutions to record the instructions on incoming and outgoing wire transfers. To send a wire transfer, an application is completed at the branch and signed by the customer. The customer and the branch each keep a copy. The wire transfer clerk can assist you in getting copies of wire transfer records. The original Wire Transfer Form is stored in the branch of the transfer or in an Administration Centre for a period up to two years. After that period, the branch vouchers are stored at a records storage company for up to six years. The Wire Transfer Activity Report will give details on all incoming and outgoing wire transfers. Each business day, the report is produced at the branch and the international centre recording all of the details of the wire transfers that occurred the previous business day. By examining the Wire Transfer Form or the Wire Transfer Activity Foi-m, you can obtain the following details relating to the transaction. • The ordering customer's name and address. • The amount, currency and Canadian equivalent for foreign currency transfers. • The beneficiary's country, name, address and telephone number, the destination bank, branch and account number. • The beneficiary may not have an account at the destination bank. In this case, instructions may be given to call the beneficiary to come and pick up either cash or a draft. You require the original wire transfer form or a certified true copy; or the branch Wire Transfer Activity Report, or an account statement indicat- ing a vvire transfer transaction. Because all of the transactions are internal within the financial institu- tions, the approach that is taken with examining cheques and deposit slips for trail markers is impractical and unnecessary. The Wire Transfer Forms and Activity Reports give all of the necessary information required to determine the destination financial institution, • branch, customer and account of wire transfers.
109 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
FIGURE 5.17
Bank of Montreal CURRENCYNANE . USDOLLARS RATE FOREIGN CURRENCY AMOUNT(EXCEPT U.S.) RATE U.S. DOLLARS 1.1657 APPLICATION FOR MAIL & TELEGRAPHIC TRANSFER CANADAN 32nd Street 00457 Feb. 8/91 EQUIVALENT 25,000.00 US.AMOUNT RATE CONIViSSION EfiAtCH TRANSITNO. US.AMOUIVT RAIE AIR MAIL OR CAI3LECHARGES PLEASETRANSFER AT MY/OUR RISK BY: TOTAL 25,003.(X) 0 MAIL(ATTACHRBVIITTANCE) RATE °VYING TO INTERNAMONALCENTRE CAI3LE (CRJELEGRAPHICTRANSFERPAYNENTACCOUNT) 1/2 corvivessioN AIR MAIL OR CABLE CHARGES TOTALOWINGTOINTERNATIONALCBVTRE
TRANSACTION REF. NO. QUOTED BY INTTERNATIO NAL CENTRE 45678921354
NAM E OF CO RRESPONDENT IN DI CATED BY I KfTERNATIONAL CENTRE Chase Manhattan Bank
ORDERING CUSTOMER- NAME AN D ADDRESS International Investments Ltd. 190 Bay Street, Toronto, Ontario M5G 1X0
DESTINATION BANK- IF SPECI Fl ED BY ORDE RING CUSTOMER San Francisco Bank 1245 Bayview Road Branch
BENEFI CIARY CUSTOM ER - NAME &ADDRESS (0 R ACCO U NT NO.) West Coast Realty Holdings 66457
DETAILS OF PAYMENT- REFERENCE, INVOICE NOS ETC .
BANKTO BANK I NF-ORMATION -SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS RE PAYMENT
SGNATURE FREPAREDBY CHECKEDBY TELDESP. INITOF RECEIVING OFFICER AT INT'L C ENTR E.
110 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques • Incommg Wire Transfer& All of the information required to determine the source of funds wire transferred into an account can be obtained from the Wire Transfer Activ- ity Report at the branch of account and the International Centre. The transactions are processed through the international centre where a micro-filmed copy of the transaction may be stored. The name and address of the ordering customer combined with tracing the payment method tell you the source of funds. The next step in the creation of the audit trail is to investigate the cheque/account that was used to wire transfer the funds.
Outgomg Ohre Transfer& When fimds are wire transferred, the financial institution which has been requested to transfer funds deposits the cheque the customer uses to pay for the wire transfer into an internal account. The financial institution then uses those funds to pay the destination financial institution. For example, a customer approaches Bank A to wire transfer $10,000 to Joe Smith at Bank C located in London, England. The customer pays Bank A $10,000 using a draft from Bank B. Bank A cashes the $10,000 draft from Bank B, depositing the money into its internal account. Bank A then sends $10,000 from its internal account to Bank C with instructions to credit Joe Smith. The destination of funds is determined in part by the wire transfer application itself which indicates the beneficiary name, the destination bank, branch, account number or money order number. Further pursuit of the destination of the funds relies on cooperation from the destination financial institution. The next step in the creation of the audit trail is to investigate the account to which the funds were wire transferred to determine the destina- tion of the funds. •
III Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 50 Financial Investigation Techniques
Investigating a Money Order/Draft Purchase Money Orders and Drafts are forms of guaranteed payment sold to clients by financial institutions. These instruments can be cashed almost anywhere in the world. The original draft/money order is given to the client. The client gives the original to the payee who will deposit or cash it. The cashing financial institution will return the draft for payment to the original fmancial institution where it was purchased, and that original will be kept on file at a central location for a period of time. The selling financial institution can now provide a copy of the front and back which will indicate where and by whom the instrument was cashed. The same techniques for investigating a cheque can be used. The financial institution keeps copies of these instruments from the time of the sale. The credit copy is sent to the processing centre, where the micrencoded serial number, date and amount are read by computer and a report of issued drafts and money orders is produced. When the draft or money order is returned cashed, it will be removed from this report. There is a theory that a branch that has been used extensively by smurfs will have many long-outstanding items (Drafts/Money orders sold but not cashed) on this report.
FIGURE 5.18
BANKOFMONTREAL IHIRDAVENUEERANCH 9912230 VANCOUVER,BRITISHCOLUMBIA 9auertij D 91
PAYTOTHE ORDEROF 9stioutaflogat 91Webbtœiti3 £tS. 0513 3,300.00
TIckez fitoumutd, &tee luuteted CANADIANDOLLARS
RE
TOTHEBANKOFMONTFEAL Hari Soseé14e SIMED SIGNA1UFESTAMP
ERNel-IllidinnelhankihIRMet COUNTERSIGNS) SIGNATUFESTAMP
9912230 1:02526 III 001 999 I. 659112r 79 00000330000 80
02 Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" 5 Financial Investigation Techniques • Chapter Another copy of the draft/money order is stored in the branch of account or in an Administration Centre for a period of up to two years. After that period, the branch vouchers are stored at a records storage company for up to 6 years.
Source of ['ads To determine how the draft/money order was paid for will involve review- ing the financial institution's records for that business day. The first step is to locate the credit portion of the draft/money order (financial institution copy) which the branch can easily retrieve. The second step is to examine the back of the credit portion of the draft/money order for the proof machine stamp. The proof stamp will indicate the day the credit was processed through the proof machine and the trace number. The trace number will tell the financial institution employee the date and where on the proof tape to look for the offsetting debit. From the proof tape the employee can determine whether the draft/money order was paid for by cash or cheque. If it was paid for by cheque, the branch will complete a trace request to produce a copy of the front and back of the cheque. For example, the credit voucher is located by the branch. By examining the reverse of the credit, the trace number 00545 was found. The proof tape for that day is then examined and trace number 00545 is located. Credit Voucher $10,000.00 00545 Cheque (payment) $10,000.00 00546 The tape indicates that a cheque was used to pay for the Draft/Money Order and the trace number was 0000546. With that number, the branch can now request the copy of the cheque. If the draft/money order was paid for by cash, the proof can also confirm this using nearly the same methods. Credit Voucher $10,000.00 0000545 Cash $10,000.00 0000546 The source of the funds is the method used to pay for the purchase of • the draft or money order.
113 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
If the customer has an account at that financial institution, a cheque or withdrawal from an account may be used. However, even clients with accounts at the branch have been known to use cheques drawn off another financial institution as payment. The only way to determine this is by investigating the other account, or by asking the branch employee who sells drafts if he or she remembers whether the draft was paid for with a cheque drawn off another financial institution. The branch that sold the instrument can determine the method of payment by tracing the voucher that was processed with their copy of the draft or money order.
Use of Funds To determine the destination of the funds, the reverse of the original draft/ money order must be examined. As mentioned earlier, once it has been cashed, it is retu rned to the selling institution for filing. A copy of the front and back of a cash draft/money order can be ob- tained by determining the number of the draft/money order, the amount, and the date it was purchased. Using this information, the branch can trace the draft/money order and produce a copy of the front and back. Once a copy of the cash draft/money order has been obtained, apply the same techniques for investigating a cheque to ascertain by whom and where the draft/money order was cashed. The next step in the creation of the audit trail is to investigate the individual who deposited or cashed the draft/money order to determine the destination of the funds.
IN Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
Inuestigabng a Client Profile The client profile card is a financial institution's computer record of a client. These will vary in appearance from one financial institution to another. The client profile could be viewed onscreen or you could obtain a paper printout. Electronically stored and accessed, this is a record of personal informa- tion about the customer, a record of all types of accounts owned and the date each account was opened, as well as a record of services used by the customer. Use this profile to quicldy determine how many accounts the individual under investigation has and the how far back the investigation needs to date back to (the date the account was opened). It may also indicate undiscovered accounts at other branches, loans, FIGURE 5.19 safety deposit boxes, credit cards, etc.
H8XP0095 CLIENT PROFILE DISPLAY SRF002 CLIENT NO 459241356C RESP TRANSIT ACCT MGR NO INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS LTD. 190 BAY STREET CIS ENTITLEMENT...CURRENT ACCOUNT TORONTO CIS DELIV METHODS...BRANCH SER ON M5G 1X0 CATS POS HOME BR TRANSIT 00457 MAIL DESTINATION. CANADIAN ADDRESS CLIENT STATUS ACTIVE RESIDENCE CODE 03500 NR -TAX 0 DUNS NUMBER 98798747 BUS SEGMENT CODE 100-BUS-CURRENT SIC CODES 13830488 CONTACT PERSON STEVEN DANIELS SEX LANGUAGE SIN BIRTH DATE 06/07/52 DRIVERS PERMIT HOME PHONE BUSINESS PHONE (416) 988-2325 EXT. CONSL WARNING CD CLT DATE OPENED. 1989/NOV CAPS. .NO BCRMS..NO PCI..NO CLIENT COMMENT NSF FOR 91=0 MAINT TRAN/DATE 00457 1991/FEB/26 INT MAINT/DATE.VSA/LD 1991/FEB/05
CLIENT NO: 459241356C SERVICE ACCOUNT NUMBER DATE OPENED REL JOINTPTY/ NAME/ A CCT DESC ADDR CURR 1124119 1989-NOV-05 SO 1 VISA 4512984785334 1990-JAN-30 SO 1 LOAN 711311901 1990-APR-16 SO-1
115 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
Inuestigatmg Foreign Exchange In order to ascertain the volume of foreign currency transactions in a particular branch, the daily increases of foreign currencies can be compared for unusual increases. These amounts appear on tellers' balancing blotters, which will show the previous day's total and that day's ending balance. Compare incoming foreign currency shipments for each branch at cash clearing centres of the financial institution. Look for regular foreign currency shipments significantly above the branch's limit. Branches keep a nominal working amount of foreign currency on hand and ship the excess with the regular weekly armoured car shipment to cash clearing.
Currency Source Declarations A currency source declaration is a form that financial institutions have their customers complete for suspicious or large cash deposits or transactions (usually over $10,000). The declaration identifies the customer by name and indicates the amount of funds, currency, account number if any, what the funds are being used for (such as buying a money order), and the source of funds. If the declarant is not a customer of the financial institution, identifica- tion is recorded on the form. The currency declaration may be taken by the teller or customer serv- ice representative, or by a senior officer of the branch. The customer signs a statement that the fimds are not from an illegal source. Generally, the statement also permits the financial institution to turn the information about the transaction over to the police, should the financial institution decide if such action is appropriate. The currency declaration might either be kept on file at the branch or sent to the security department for further review and investigation. If it is deemed suspicious, the security group will turn the information over to the police for review and investigation.
116 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 financial Investigation Techniques • Summary Once the source of the trail has been established, the financial institution will be approached by the investigative team. At this point an effective methodology must be developed to keep the time factors in control. The time factors pertain to: 1. How long it takes to locate the records required. 2. How long it takes to attain certified copies of those records. 3. Ensuring that the data from the bank stays organized so as not to waste time putting it back in order later.
Gathering hionnabon The first piece of information that you should request to examine immedi- ately is the branch client profile or general records. This could be found on printed cards or, in most cases, on a computer system. Get a printout! You can refer to it easily and take it with you. This record will include the name and address and account mailing ad- dresses (if available) of the account owner. It will also list personal identi- fication taken from the client and when accounts were opened. All of the accounts held by the client at that branch should be listed on the card. In some cases accounts held at other branches will also be in- cluded. If no accounts at other branches are listed, request a separate name search to double check. If a company is being investigated, ask to see the authorizations the bank is holding on the company. Also, ask the bank employee who is responsible for the management of the account if he or she has additional files on the client. If the original lead is on the business account/name then repeat the request for the general files (if any) on the owners of the company. If the lead is on the owners, ask for information on any business accounts. The names of the various companies might be different and therefore the bank might keep separate unconnected files on the other companies. Ask the bank employee responsible for that type of account (the current account clerk) if there are other connected companies owned by the same person. If you don't ask, the bank employees might not think to tell you. If you or a bank employee are uncertain of an answer to a question, • verify if there is any other employee who can help.
In Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
Once you have these records (they should be available immediately), take a step back and examine the types of accounts and the dates they were opened. In most cases you will find most business accounts are statement accounts which return cancelled cheques to the client. The customer has original cheques and statements. There will prob- ably be a microfiche showing copies of the bank statements every month. Initially this will be your first exposure to the activity on the account. Microfiche are kept in the branch for a certain period of time before they are shipped to a storage company (There will be a record of what is in storage). You can use a machine which allows you to look at the micro- fiche copies of the statements inunediately. Next you need to request copies of all of the statements from the opening date of the account to the present day. Information for ordering copies of the cheques listed on the statement may be on this fiche. Information may also be available on a weekly or biweekly fiche that lists the trace numbers of the cheques shown on the monthly statement. Once you have the copies of the statements, you can enter the data into a computer that can keep track of all the dollar values processed through the account. This will also monitor individual transactions on the accounts and remind you that copies of the cheque or deposit are still outstanding from the banlc. In addition, a computer can add all of the payments or transfers to the same individuals, organizations, or through the same banks and summarize the information for you. Once the statements are available, copies of the cheques can be or- dered (if they have not been ordered already) and copies of the deposits can be taken. The deposit slips are kept by most banks in the branch, so they should be available immediately. From the deposit slips you will get information about whether the deposits were cheques or cash. If there were cheques or money orders deposited, request copies of the items on deposit. This is important because the cheques could be written on un- known accounts at unknown banks by the organization you are investigat- ing. This may also lead to another trail. If you discover cheques have been written by different organizations, you might consider investigating them.
118 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 6 Financial Investigation Techniques
You should also investigate drafts purchased consistently at one bank branch, or wire transfers which have been sent consistently from the same person. A useful technique for detennining smurfing activities at a branch is to request a list of long outstanding money orders and drafts purchased but not yet cashed. This should be kept on one computer-based reporting system. Any incoming wire payments deposited into the account vvill only show wire payments on the account statement. The details that would be avail- able are the name of the sender, the sending bank, and the currency. If insufficient information is available at the branch, then the details will be available at the bank's international centre. If there are large deposits of cash (over $10,000), ask for the cash declarations taken from the customer by most financial institutions. Ask the manager or current account teller if the company makes deposits at any service branches. If a deposit was made at a specific service branch, then the record of what was deposited will be kept there. If a company does deal at other branches then it would probably be wise to have the employees at those branches questioned about any fre- • quent cash transactions such as wire transfers out, draft purchases, or currency exchanges. These questions should also be asked at the home branch because such transactions would not show up in the account records. When a draft or money order is purchased at the bank, a copy should be requested because this will show where it was cashed and by whom, possibly leading to another part of the trail. Once the information on the accounts is available, you must determine who payments are from and to whom they are made. The next step is to pursue the trail through the financial institutions that the cheques on de- posit came from, and the banks at which the cheques issued were cashed. If a payment is made to an organization then it must be determined for what purpose the payment was made. For instance, what was a cheque to a stock broker used to purchase? Talk to the broker. If 1,000 shares of IBM were purchased, what was the certificate number. Who was it payable to? Have they ever purchased through this broker before? If yes, when and what did they purchase? How did they pay? Ask the broker for a copy of the cheque used to pay the broker. Did they sell any stocks through the broker? If yes, get a copy of the cheque the broker used to • pay the launderer.
119 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Techniques
Contact D3M. Who is their trust agent on shares? Have these shares been redeemed? If yes, when and where? Contact someone where they were redeemed. If they were sold by another stock broker, what other business has this stock broker done for this company? Get a copy of the cheque that the broker issued to pay for the 1,000 shares of IBM stock. It has been cashed at another bank where there is a business account. The whole process starts again! This could take an investigator through real estate transactions and personal accounts. Each step must be meticulously recorded for seize and freeze enforcement under the Proceeds of Crime Act.
Io financial Inuestigation Summary and linalysis
• •
• 22 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 6 0 Financial Investigation Summary and finalysis • This chapter may be used as a reference book for the acccompanying video. It illustrates the process of constructing a Source and Use of Funds Worksheet using banking documents, and explains the purpose of a Net Worth Analysis using the case examples.
Source and Use of Funds Q. What is required to complete a source and use of funds worksheet? A. The starting point requires copies of the bank statements for the particular bank ac,count we have discovered. This provides the dates and amounts of entries so that the bank can fmd copies of the source documentation behind these entries. Typically, the next step is typically to get copies (or originals) of all deposits to the account. These deposit slips reveal whether the deposit is cash or cheque. Some deposits come direct to the account by wire from another bank. For these deposits there vvill be a credit memo prepared by the receiving branch. When cheques are noted on the deposit slip a further step is undertaken to ask the banker to provide a micro film copy of the deposited cheque. of withdrawals ... A further request is made to the banker for the microfilm made from the bank account. On a spreadsheet, all the details are recorded: for deposits the payor, and for withdrawals the payee. The spreadsheet can be used to sort the transactions by payee and payor to arrive at a simple one page court exhibit for this bank account showing the flow of fimds into and out of the account. Q. What is the intention in completing the worksheet? The source and use of funds analysis does several things for an investigator: - Provide an organized approach to analyiing the flow of funds into and out of an account; - Provide an investigative aid in identifying further bank accounts; - A summary of cash deposits can be readily prepared for the account (which can be convincing at trial); - A simple summary describing activity in the account may be prepared, which can become the court exhibit; - Finally, the detail within the source and use of fimds spreadsheet will • associate specific funds to their specific use. 23 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 6 Financial Investigation Summary and Rnalysis
SpeaficTracmg In order for a judge to issue a special warrant to seize assets, you will likely need to be able to demonstrate the assets were indeed purchased from proceeds of crime. How can the source and use of funds analysis help? You will want to show that the purchase of an asset was financed or paid for by the monies deposited to the account, which can be shown to be proceeds of crime. A very useful appendix to your Information to Obtain the Special Warrant which you provide to the judge, would be an accounting schedule which dem- onstrates this financing. The follovving pages demonstrate the creation of a source and use of funds worksheet, following the statement used in the video. - Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 6 0 Financial Investigation Summary and finalysis
FIGURE 6.1
ROYAL IIANK OF CANADA 32nd Street Branch Toronto, Ontario
International Investments Ltd. 190 Bay Street Toronto, Ontario M5G 1X0 Account #: 112-411-9 Statement Date: 02/27/91
01/28 Balance Forward $ 23,200.00 02/01 Deposit $ 35,000.00 $ 58,200.00 02/02 Cheque $ 800.00 $ 57,400.00 02/03 Deposit $ 8,500.00 $ 65,900.00 02/07 Cheque $ 4,000.00 $ 61,900.00 02/08 Wire $ 25,000.00 $ 36,900.00 02/10 Debit Memo $ 10,000.00 $ 26,900.00
Total Credits 50,000
12S Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 6 financial Investigation Summary and Ilnalysis
Take each transaction in order. Look at the first transaction.. .a deposit foi $35,000.
FIGURE 6.2 Account Statement
ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 32nd Street Branch Toronto, Ontario
International Investments Ltd. 190 Bay Street Toronto, Ontario M5G 1X0 Account #: 112-411-9 Statement Date: 02/27/91
Seiefit al.an.de
01/28 Balance Forward $ 23,200.00 02/01 Deposit $ 35,000.00 $ 58,200.00
126 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 6 0 Financial Investigation Summary and Ilnalysis •
FIGURE 6.3 Deposit Slip
ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 32nd STREET BRANCH TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE INIT ALS CHEQUES,' DEPO9TOR1 TELLER Massif 2. el 8000 3600 @1 @2 = 2500 3875 FRONT SD FIR @ 5 = CREDIT 3300 2325 @10 — @20 = ACCOUNT OF 5200 4500 @50 = I@ 100 - INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS LTD. 1700 190 BAY STREET eO8tr 000.00 CASH:1 TORONTO, ONTARIO MSG 1X0 35,000.00
1:00457 oi 003 I: 112 411 o91' 51 01 0003500000 Ili • CN:00785 DA:01/02/91 TR:00457-003
For Deposit To The Credlt Of The Payee BACK 00457-003 5 ROYAL BANK OF CANADA FEB '91' 01 ROYAL BANK FEB 01 1991 DATA CENTRE 32ND STREET BRANCH TOFL ONT. TORONTO, ONTARIO 5 00457-003
•
In Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 6 0 Financial Inuestigation Summary and Ilna'gm
FIGURE 6.4 Cheques Deposited
THE ROYAL BANK HAZELTON LANES BRANCH 9700583 OF CANADA TORONTO, ONTARIO
"ffleee&yefe 19 eef
PAY TO THE ORDER OF e .4 e„ wee CAD cgoaaar
egbfeememeeee CANADIAN DOLLARS
R E
TO THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA ,Werre ewe SIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
unANcH Hazelton Lanes, Toronto 114414 Mies* COUNTERSIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
9700563 105652 le 003 1: 999 • 555 it9r 79 100000850000 ill
THE CANADIAN IMPERIAL 124th STREET BRANCH . 9912588 BANK OF COMMERCE VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA Decennber 1 2 19 90
PAY TO THE ORDER OF International Investments Ltd. CAD 2,500.00
Twenty-five hundred CANADIAN DOLLARS
R E
TOTHECANADIANIN1FERIALBANKOFCCIMMERCE Larry Tseng SIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
Wecyyte Marie BRANCH 124th Street Branche Vancouver COUNTERSIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
9912568 1:32567 to 010 I: 999 M654117r 79 100000250000 ill
128 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 5 0 Financial Investigation Summary and Ilnalysis • BANK OF MONTREAL 'THIRD AVENUE BRANCH 9912230 VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA
(Taney 8 19 9i
PAY TO THE /gtee,ratkealAvestmees ORDER OF CAD 3, 300. 00
nett tIcecea,y4 th»te kieleed CANADIAN DOLLARS
R E
TO THE BANK OF MONTREAL fife :awe* SIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
BRANCH Third Avenue Branch, Vancouver Sun Greene COUNTERSIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
9912230 1:02526 o 001 1: 999 01659 79 ill 0000330000 111
D THEBANK OF GRAFTON STREET BRANCH 886453 NOVA SCOTIA HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA bewail. 1.2 19 9
PAY TO THE ORDER OF .901eutationai .9étemioneoù cAD 5,-200.00
gitie lhoiaaeid,Ii hid4ed CANADIAN DOLLARS
R E
TO THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA 141 ealIt SIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP (.7- BRANcii Grafton Street Branch mfAA COUNTERSIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
886453 1:02036 in 002 1: 999 122111r 79 00000520000 01
• 129 Crime 0 Iletecbon "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 6 • Financial Investigation Summary and Rnalysis
THE TORONTO-DOMINION BANK QUEEN STREET BRANCH 664564 WINNIPEG, MANITOBA
19 e
PAY TO THE ORDER OF /4.1eileeeo4d leeet14+4444. W. CAD 1,700 DO
Oet det4■44e4i, «ute 1444.440.41 CANADIAN DOLLARS
R E
TO THE TORONTO-DOMINION BANK sumleue...t SIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
BRANCH Queen Street Branch &detail loluatoa COUNTERSIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
664564 1:00321 004 I: 999 ri 665 air 79 0000170000
THE BANK OF MONTREAL 1366 rue Ste. Catherine 785252 Montreal, Quebec
,lanuaty 8 19 91
PAY TO THE ORDER OF .0e:iv:national grum5lentnis CAD 3,600.00
dotasancl, air Le:dud CANADIAN DOLLARS
R E
TO THE BANK OF MONTREAL SIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP 1366 RUE STE. CATHERINE BRANCH Neee 14" COUNTERSIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
785252 1:40267 lo 001 I 999 la442 gar 79 01 0000360000
130
Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 6 0 Financial Investigation Summary and Analysis •
G THE CANADIAN IMPERIAL 31 5th Avenue 978321 BANK OF COMMERCE Calgary, Alberta
3cou4aey 20 1 9 9 1
PAY TO THE ORDER OF 3vvieenationial Cm/eel-men-1-s Ltd. CAD 3,875.00
Tkeee -1-kousanci, ekkfkuncleed end severdy -five CANADIAN DOLLARS
R E
TOTHECANADIANIMFERIALBANKOFCOMMERCE Scwak IieHi SIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
rrgewe BRANCH 315th Avenue g COUNTERSIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
978321 1:05023 le 010 1: 999 el 8611119r 79 0000387500 VI
H THE BANK OF River Street Branchy 875623 NOVA SCOTIA Saskatoon, Saskatchewan
January 8 19 91
PAY TO THE ORDER OF International" Investments Ltd. CAD 2/325i 0
Two thousand, three hundred and twenty-five CANADIAN DOLLARS
R E
TO THE BANK OF MONTREAL Ann Levy SIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
Brent Devlin BRANCH River Street Branch COUNTERSIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
875623 1:53021 002 1: 999 11 857 rsr 79 01 0000232500 ill • 131 Crime 0 Detecbon "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 6 0 Financial Investigation Summary and llnalysis
THEROYAL BANK King Street 795321 OF CANADA Gander, Newfoundland
January 24 19 91
PAY TO THE International Investments Ltd. ORDER OF CAD 4, 500 . 00
Fourthousand, five hundred CANADIAN DOLLARS
R E
Christine Martin E SIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
BRANCH King Street Branch Wayne Sartor COUN TERSIGNED SIGNATURE STAMP
795321 1:05874 a 003 1: 999 • 442 lor 79 10 0000450000 ul
A number of drafts were deposited (Figures A - 1),In Figure 6.5, these drafts have been captured in the 'source of funds" column. The next step is to contact the banks from which these drafts were pur- chased. (See the front of the draft for details on the name of the bank and branch).
132 • •
FIGURE 6.5 SOURCE AND USE OF FUNDS WORKSHEET
SOURCES DATE PAYCR AN1GUNT C. CI-EQUE BANK& BRANCH DATE DESCRIPTION DEBT CREDIT BALANCE 01/28 Balance Forward $ 23,200.00 02/01 Intl Inv. 35,000.00 8,000.00 Royal, Hazelton Lanes, Toronto 02/01 Deposit $ 35,000.00 $ 58,200.00 2,500.00 OBC, 124th St, Vancouver 3,300.00 Bank of Montreal, 3rd Ave. Vancouver 5,200.00 BNS, Grafton Street, Halifax 1,700.00 TD, Queen St., Winnipeg 3,600.00 BM, 1366 rue Ste. Cath, Montreal 3,875.00 C1BC, 31 5th Ave., Calgary 2,325.00 BNS, River St, Saskatoon 4,500.00 Royal, King St., Gander Crime Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 6 o Financial Investigation Summary and Analysis
Let's look at the next transaction. It's a cheque to a car leasing company.
ROYAL E3AN K 0 F CANADA 32nd Street Branch Toronto, Ontario
International Investments Ltd. 190 Bay Street Toronto, Ontario M5G 1X0 Account It: 112-411-9 Statement Date: 02/27/91
sore 01/28 Balance Forward $ 23,200.00 02/01 Deposit $ 35,000.00 $ 58,200.00 02/02 Cheque $ 800.00 $ 57,400.00
International Investments Ltd.
February 01 19 91
PAY TO THE OftDER OF Mire Automobiles g 800.00
Eight hundred xx DOLL4RS THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 103 32nd Street Branch Toronto, Ontario
MEMO Steven )anie
1:00457 e 003 112 i 411.9r 0000080000
CN:000341 DA:01/02/91 TR:00025-001
For Deposit To The Credit of The Payee
01752-580 3
ROYAL TRUST FEB '91' 02 FEB '91' 01 FEB 01 1991 ROYAL BANK BANK OF MONTREAL BAY &WELLINGTON ONTARIO PC DATA CENTRE TORONTO, ONTARIO TORONTO, ONTARIO 3 01752-580 1311 • • ▪
SOURCE AND USE OF FUNDS WORKSHEET
USES DATE DESCRIPTION DEW CREDIT BALANCE WE PAYEE AMOUNT BAAKCASHEDAT ACCOUNTNUIVEIER 01/28 Balance Forward $23,200.00 02/01 Deposit $35,000.00 $58,200.00
02/02 Cheque $800.00 $57,400.00 02/02 Fine $800.00 Royal Trust Automobiles Bay and Wellington
CD
01 o
5- 5 G CD e.•r p., re• o re- •= o a -cz
CD
r.= CD = o- CL. t=i "C- J Ca-1 cY, Crime o Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 6 • Financial Investigation Summary and Onalysis
Next we've got another deposit— a cheque for $8500 from Yonge Hold- ings Corporation. They show up a lot on our Source and Use ofFunds worksheet.
ROYAL BANK 0 F CANADA 32nd Street Branch Toronto, Ontario
International Investments Ltd. 190 Bay Street Toronto, Ontario M5G 1X0 Account #: 112-411-9 Statement Date: 02/27/91
Date Description
01/28 Balance Forward $ 23,200.00 02/01 Deposit $ 35,000.00 $ 58,200.00 02/02 Cheque $ 800.00 $ 57,400.00 02/03 Deposit $ 8,500.00 $ 65,900.00
136 Crime 0 Detection "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 6 • Financial Investigation Summary and Analysis
Deposit
ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 32nd STREET BRANCH TORONTO, ONTARIO
DATE I NIT ALS DEPOSITOR1 TELLER February 3, 91 8500 @1 @2 =
SeD @ 5 - CREDIT @10 - @20 - ACCOLIIVT OF @ 5° - INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS LTD. @ 100 - 190 BAY STREET THiiie..6IPCHIF4:1 8500.00 CASH: TORONTO, ONTARIO M50 1X0 e:ITAL:DEPOgf 8500.00
1:00457 is 003 1: 112 411189r 51 0 0000850000 10
CN:002686 DA:03/02/91 TR:00457-003
For Deposit To The Credit of The Payee
00457-003 3 THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA FEB '91' 03 FEB '91' 04 ROYAL BANK C.LB.C. FEB 03 1991 DATA CENTRE ONTARIO PC 32nd STREET BRANCH TORONTO, TORONTO, ONTARIO ONTARIO 3 00457-003
• 131 Crime 0 Detecbon "Proceeds of Crime" Chapter 60 Financial Investigation Summary and Rua!gm
Cheque on Deposit
Yonge Holdings Corporation
February 01 19 91
PAY TO $ THE ORDER OF International Investments Ltd 8,500.00
Eight thousand, five hundred XX DOLLARS THE CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF COMMERCE 100 1 Verne Street Weer Toronto, °nude
MD110 Ron Mair
1:00457 • 010 1: 75 • 85642 r 0000850000
CN:002687 DA:03/02/91 TR:00457-003
For Deposit To The Credit of The Payee
00457-003 3 THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA FEB '91' 03 FEB '91' 04 ROYAL BANK C.LB.C. FEB 03 1991 ONTARIO PC DATA CENTRE 32nd STREET BRANCH TORONTO, TORONTO, ONTARIO ONTARIO 3 00457-003
138 • s •
SOURCE AND USE OF FUNDS WORKSHEET
SOURCES DATE PAYCR Amcue CAS-I 0-ECLE BANK&BRANCH