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Privacy and Common Law Names: Sand in the Gears of Identification
PRIVACY AND COMMON LAW NAMES: SAND IN THE GEARS OF IDENTIFICATION Adam Candeub* Abstract During the last two decades, law and regulation have expanded to require real name identification in virtually every aspect of life—from online purchases to healthcare. This slow, subtle transformation has rendered a de facto nullity the Constitution’s anonymity protection against compelled identity disclosure. This evolution also has rendered impracticable the traditional, but mostly forgotten, common law rights to use whatever name one wishes—the de facto right to pseudonymity. This common law right facilitates anonymity, which, in turn, facilitates privacy. This Article argues that the continued vitality of common law name rights, particularly in light of recent First Amendment jurisprudence, establishes a right to pseudonymity. This right includes, in certain circumstances, the ability to demand a government-issued identification under a common law pseudonym. This ability would allow individuals to frustrate regulatory identification regimes and regain some privacy. Beyond these practical implications, this Article, employing the classic property–liability distinction, demonstrates how name governance changed from the common law liability regime to a government-owned property regime. This shift reflects an important, and hitherto unrecognized, transformation in the legal relationship between the state and citizen. * Professor and Director, Intellectual Property, Information, and Communications Law Program. I wish to thank Jim Harper for his many helpful suggestions. Pro Julia facio omnes. 467 468 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 468 I. PSEUDONYMITY, MANDATORY IDENTIFICATION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT ................................................................ 473 II. HOW THE COMMON LAW NAME DIED .................................... 481 A. The Common Law Name, National Registries, and the Unique American System of Identification .................................. -
N We I NATIONALCENTER
WHISTLEBLOWERS N we I NATIONALCENTER February 25, 2014 The Honorable Carl Levin Chairman The Honorable John McCain Ranking Member Homeland Security & Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee Investigations 340 Dirksen Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510 Dear Senators: The National Whistleblower Center (NWC) thanks you for holding tomorrow's hearing, "Offshore Tax Evasion: The Effort to Collect Unpaid Taxes on Billions in Hidden Offshore Accounts," to focus on the federal government's efforts to address this serious problem. Unfortunately, the federal government has too often forgotten that it was whistleblowers who first gave them the road map on how to pursue illegal offshore accounts. The federal government's success on offshore tax evasion was all started by a single whistleblower - Bradley Birkenfeld. Unfortunately, the federal government has not done nearly enough to take advantage of the information provided by this whistleblower such as encouraging additional whistleblowers to come forward, rewarding whistleblowers who have come forward, protecting whistleblowers, and recognizing those capable Department of Justice (DOJ) and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) employees who have successfully worked with whistleblowers. The failure of the federal government to fully utilize the information provided by whistleblowers, which encourages more whistleblowers and adequately rewards whistleblowers, has cost the American taxpayers bilions of dollars. Sadly, the tragedy of failing to address offshore tax evasion goes beyond just dollars - undermining efforts to stop corruption, bribery, organized crime, and exploitation of women and children. Making full use of whistleblowers is critical in all areas of tax evasion - but especially with respect to ilegal offshore accounts due to significant limitations on the ability to obtain bank information from a bank secrecy jurisdiction. -
Not Just Whistling Dixie: the Case for Tax Whistleblowers in the States
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR302.txt unknown Seq: 1 14-AUG-14 14:25 2014] NOT JUST WHISTLING DIXIE: THE CASE FOR TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS IN THE STATES DENNIS J. VENTRY, JR.* I. INTRODUCTION AX whistleblowing has been in the news lately. In September 2012, Tthe IRS wrote a check for $104 million to Bradley Birkenfeld, a for- mer banker with UBS, the Swiss banking giant. The payment, made under the federal government’s tax whistleblower program,1 represented Birkenfeld’s cut for providing information to the IRS that exposed how UBS actively concealed taxable income of U.S. clients for decades by hid- ing assets in secret offshore accounts.2 Birkenfeld’s assistance was “excep- tional in both its breadth and depth,” the IRS explained in making the award, and allowed the U.S. government to pursue “unprecedented ac- tions against UBS AG, with collateral impact on other enforcement activities.”3 “Collateral impact” hardly does justice to the effect of Birkenfeld’s whistleblowing. The “treasure trove of inside information” that Birkenfeld provided U.S. officials formed “the foundation for the UBS debacle and everything that followed.”4 Indeed, thanks to one of “the biggest whistleblowers of all time,”5 the U.S. government (take a deep breath) * Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. I thank Gregory Krakower, Darien Shanske, and Dean Zerbe for their helpful comments. I also benefited from suggestions and conversations at the Norman J. Shachoy Symposium, sponsored by the Villanova Law Review, particularly those from Jeremiah Coder and J. Richard Harvey. 1. For a discussion of the IRS whistleblower program, see infra notes 349–86 and accompanying text. -
Has the United States Government's Quest for Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell for Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws Bradley J
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business Volume 30 Issue 1 Winter Winter 2010 Don't Tread on Me: Has the United States Government's Quest for Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell for Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws Bradley J. Bondi Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb Part of the Banking and Finance Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Bradley J. Bondi, Don't Tread on Me: Has the United States Government's Quest for Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell for Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws, 30 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 1 (2010) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. Don't Tread On Me: Has the United States Government's Quest for Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell for Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws? Bradley J. Bondi* I. INTRODUCTION Privacy protection is a defining characteristic of Swiss culture and a pillar of the Swiss economy. For centuries, the Swiss people have coveted the principles of individual privacy, regularly reaffirming those principles in response to referendums designed to limit them. Swiss banking secrecy, one aspect of privacy, is protected by Swiss criminal and civil laws and professional duties. Swiss banks pride themselves on protecting customer identity and have leveraged their legal and cultural commitment to secrecy to gain a competitive advantage in the global banking market. -
Whistleblower Bradley Birkenfeld
http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2010/04/16/2... http://www.nydailynews.com/fdcp?1271432199119 Get Morning Home Delivery of the Daily News for up to 70% off. Call (888) 393-3760 subsidiary, UBS America, said of the Washington Whistleblower Bradley office claim. "We are unaware of its having been raised previously." Birkenfeld: Some U.S. Byrne added that "no U.S. or Americas management pols kept off-shore [of UBS] were implicated" in the tax evasion scheme. accounts with UBS Birkenfeld spoke even as his lawyers were filing a petition with the Justice Department seeking clemency from President Obama. Juan Gonzalez - News Whistleblower advocates across the country regard Friday, April 16th 2010, 4:00 AM the government's treatment of Birkenfeld as a colossal disgrace. After all, federal prosecutors A former banker who blew the whistle on thousands admit the information he voluntarily provided them of secret bank accounts rich Americans held at in 2007 led to their uncovering the biggest tax Swiss giant UBS claimed Thursday some U.S. fraud in U.S. history. politicians also kept off-shore accounts with the bank. UBS pleaded guilty last year to conspiring to defraud the government and helping U.S. clients hide up to "We had an office in Washington that we all referred $20 billion in assets from the IRS. to as the PEP office - for 'Politically Exposed People,'" Bradley Birkenfeld said. The bank admitted that between 2000 and 2007 as many as 50 of its bankers traveled to this country He was speaking by phone - on tax day, no less - from Switzerland every few months. -
REPORT: Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance
United States Senate PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Carl Levin, Chairman Norm Coleman, Ranking Minority Member TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U. S. TAX COMPLIANCE STAFF REPORT PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE RELEASED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS JULY 17, 2008 HEARING SENATOR CARL LEVIN Chairman SENATOR NORM COLEMAN Ranking Minority Member PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS ELISE J. BEAN Staff Director and Chief Counsel ROBERT L. ROACH Counsel and Chief Investigator ZACHARY I. SCHRAM Counsel LAURA E. STUBER Counsel ROSS K. KIRSCHNER Counsel MARK L. GREENBLATT Staff Director and Chief Counsel to the Minority MICHAEL P. FLOWERS Counsel to the Minority ADAM PULLANO Staff Assistant to the Minority MARY D. ROBERTSON Chief Clerk TIMOTHY EVERETT Intern ALAN KAHN Law Clerk JONATHAN PORT Intern JEFFREY REZMOVIC Law Clerk LAUREN SARKESIAN Intern SPENCER WALTERS Law Clerk 9/26/08 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 199 Russell Senate Office Building – Washington, D.C. 20510 Telephone: 202/224-9505 or 202/224-3721 Web Address: www.hsgac.senate.gov [Follow Link to “Subcommittees,” to “Investigations”] PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS STAFF REPORT TAX HAVEN BANKS AND U. S. TAX COMPLIANCE TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................. 4 A. Subcommittee Investigation ............................................ 4 B. Overview of Case Histories ........................................... -
Policy and Fiscal Effects of Swiss Bank Secrecy
POLICY AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF SWISS BANK SECRECY Dr David Chaikin∗ Bank secrecy has provided a significant competitive advantage to Switzerland in its development as an international financial centre. The ‘Rolls Royce’ image of Swiss bank secrecy is not merely determined by its legal components, but also by its underlying philosophy, and the perceived discretion, honesty and efficiency of the Swiss banking system. Although bank secrecy in Switzerland has been diluted by the enactment of new financial crimes, it continues to be unassailable in the case of fiscal offences. Switzerland has sought to protect its reputation by prohibiting bankers from actively assisting in flight capital and tax evasion, but this has had little effect on Switzerland’s position as the world’s leader in the management of offshore private wealth. Introduction Swiss bank secrecy has been a major competitive advantage in Switzerland’s growth as an international financial centre. The concept of bank secrecy is supported by a philosophy that places importance on the private sphere of the individual. The financial privacy philosophy underpins the extraordinary success of Swiss bank secrecy. Although many countries have copied the Swiss legal concepts of bank secrecy, none of them has acquired the branding of Swiss bank secrecy. Switzerland as an international financial centre Switzerland is located in the centre of Western Europe, bordering five countries, namely France, Germany, Austria, Liechtenstein and Italy. It is a country with few natural resources, apart from hydro‐electric power, and with a small population of 7.25 million. Although geographical location has assisted Switzerland in its financial development, it is Swiss human resources and skills which lie behind its financial success. -
International Tax Evasion and Avoidance
E/C.18/2011/CRP.11/Add.1 Distr.: General 19 October 2011 Original: English Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters Seventh session Geneva, 24-28 October 2011 Item 5 (h) of the provisional agenda Revision of the Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Note on the Revision of the Manual for Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Summary This note comprises the second part of the draft revision of the Manual for Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties prepared by the Subcommittee on revision of the Manual. It is provides an introduction to tax evasion and avoidance. II. INTERNATIONAL TAX EVASION AND AVOIDANCE A. Concepts and issues 70. Various features of the globalized economy have enabled an increasing number of individuals and companies to resort to tax evasion or tax avoidance. These features include the ease and rapidity of communications, the progressive elimination of obstacles to the movement of persons and property, the expansion of international economic relations, the differences in national tax systems and hence in the tax burden from country to country, and the growing sophistication and aggressiveness of taxpayers and their advisers in developing legal and illegal techniques for taking advantage of weaknesses in national tax systems. 1. The concepts of tax evasion and tax avoidance 71. Tax Evasion-The terms “tax evasion” and “tax avoidance” have not always been used precisely or with a uniform meaning.1 Tax evasion is usually associated with the commission of a criminal offense. It can be considered to consist of wilful and conscious non-compliance with the laws of a taxing jurisdiction which can include a deliberate concealment of facts from revenue authorities. -
Blackjack Or Bust: Can U.S. Law Stop Internet Gambling
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Volume 16 Number 3 Article 3 3-1-1996 Blackjack or Bust: Can U.S. Law Stop Internet Gambling Seth Gorman Anthony Loo Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Seth Gorman and Anthony Loo, Blackjack or Bust: Can U.S. Law Stop Internet Gambling, 16 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 667 (1996). Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol16/iss3/3 This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. COMMENTS BLACKJACK OR BUST: CAN U.S. LAW STOP INTERNET GAMBLING? I. INTRODUCTION Take a stroll down Money Lane. Three dimensional pictures with vivid colors illuminate your first stop on the Internet:' Casino Antigua. Next door is Casino Belize. Enter and meander through the virtual poker tables surrounded by virtual people and dealers. Virtual slot machines clang with awards, sounds blasting from the speakers attached to your personal computer. Across the way is the virtual lounge. Have a seat, have a virtual drink. Chat with the stars or have a live cyber-affair with a user from any part of the world. The technology is here and the program will soon follow.2 By September 1995, several Internet casinos opened their doors to accept wagers offshore.3 By stationing offshore, these Internet casinos 1. -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT of NEW YORK ------X
Case 1:12-cr-00002-JSR Document 22 Filed 02/25/13 Page 1 of 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : -v.- : S1 12 Cr. 02 (JSR) WEGELIN & CO., et al., : Defendants. : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM PREET BHARARA United States Attorney Southern District of New York Of Counsel: Daniel W. Levy David B. Massey Jason H. Cowley Assistant United States Attorneys Case 1:12-cr-00002-JSR Document 22 Filed 02/25/13 Page 2 of 24 U.S. Department of Justice United States Attorney Southern District of New York The Silvio J. Mollo Building One Saint Andrew’s Plaza New York, New York 10007 February 25, 2013 By Hand The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff United States District Judge Southern District of New York Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street, Room 1340 New York, New York 10007-1312 Re: United States v. Wegelin & Co., et al. S1 12 Cr. 02 (JSR) Dear Judge Rakoff: In advance of the sentencing of defendant Wegelin & Co. (“Wegelin” or the “defendant”), currently scheduled for March 4, 2013, at 4 p.m., the Government respectfully submits this Sentencing Memorandum. For the reasons set forth below, the Government respectfully requests that the Court: (1) impose a fine of $22,050,000, which is the midpoint of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines fine range, and impose a short term of probation; (2) order the defendant to pay $20,000,001 in restitution to the victim of its illegal conduct, representing the approximate unpaid taxes as of the date of sentencing; and (3) enter the proposed Final Order of Forfeiture of $15,821,000, representing what counsel for Wegelin has stated are the gross fees earned by Wegelin as a result of its illegal conduct. -
NWC | NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWER CENTER 3238 P St., NW, Washington, D.C
NWC | NATIONAL WHISTLEBLOWER CENTER 3238 P St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20007 | 202.342.1903 | www.whistleblowers.org July 11, 2018 Antonio Tajani President of the European Parliament Bât. Altiero Spinelli 60 rue Wiertz 1047 Brussels Belgium Jean-Claude Juncker President of the European Commission 60 rue Wiertz 1047 Brussels Belgium Re: Proposal for EU Whistleblower Directive/FEEDBACK COM/2018/218 Dear President Tajani and President Juncker: We are writing in regard to the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM/2018/218), the proposal for a European Union-wide whistleblower directive (hereafter, “Whistleblower Directive” or “Directive”) which has been submitted to the European Parliament for approval. We are filing this letter as part of our official filing permitted under the EU’s “Feedback” provision. Although we strongly support the efforts of the European Union to improve whistleblower protections, the Directive includes a number of provisions that would undermine this intent. Moreover, the Directive is inconsistent with the requirements of three anti-corruption conventions approved by nearly every nation-state in the EU.1 Consequently, the Directive should be amended consistent with the concerns raised in this letter. We base these conclusions on our experience representing whistleblowers since 1984, working with the U.S. Congress in drafting key whistleblower laws incorporated into major anti-fraud legislation, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts, our extensive and highly successful 1 All members except for Portugal have signed the Council of Europe’s Civil Law Convention on Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto. -
Money Laundering and the Role of Offshore Financial Centres
Money laundering and the role of offshore financial centres CHARALAMPOS KOLIGKIONIS Legal Adviser of the Institute of Research and Training on European Affairs| Attorney at Law| LL.M. University of Athens Generally Money laundering refers to the transformation of the proceeds of criminal activity into untainted, innocent money that bares no traces of its illegitimate origin. Laundering money hides or disguises untaxed and otherwise illegitimate income from tax collectors and law en‐ forcement. The term “money laundering” involves all the activities and processes, acts and omissions that alter the identity of illegally ac‐ quired money into legitimate investments or income that seems to be obtained from a legitimate source.1 More recently, the term has been referred to money secretly channeled into financing terrorists.2 We cannot be really sure when money laundering started. How‐ ever, we can be confident that it has been going on for several thou‐ sand years. Sterling Seagrave3 explains how 2000 years BC merchants in China would hide their wealth from rulers who would simply take it off them and banish them. In addition to hiding it, they would move it and invest it in businesses in remote provinces or even outside China. That is how offshore industry and tax evasion were born. And so were 1 Larry Allen, The Encyclopedia of Money, 2009, p. 292. Kenneth A. Reinert, Ram‐ kishen S. Rajan, The Princeton Encyclopedia of the World Economy, 2009, p. 785. 2 Money laundering makes it more difficult to trace the origin of terrorist activ‐ ity. 3 Lords of the Rim, 1995. 1352 Charalampos Koligkionis the principles of money laundering, i.e.