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How to Make Yourself Invisible to the Tax Inspector?

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How to Make Yourself Invisible to the Tax Inspector? How to make yourself invisible to the tax inspector? Iven De Hoon Edition 2016! Daan Desloover The year 2030 .............................................................................................................. 4 Don’t feed the monster! ............................................................................................. 5 The myth of social engineering ................................................................................... 6 Is there such a thing as a governmental diet? .............................................................. 7 Don’t blame yourself, blame the government! .............................................................10 Fiscal competition is our only hope .............................................................................10 OECD: more than scandalous.....................................................................................11 The banking secrecy? ...................................................................................................13 Long live the banking secrecy! ...................................................................................13 The origin of the banking secrecy ...............................................................................14 What about all these agreements? .............................................................................17 So, what’s the current situation? ................................................................................22 What to expect in the future? ....................................................................................22 Lebanon...................................................................................................................23 Panama ...................................................................................................................23 Hong Kong and Singapore .........................................................................................24 Other hits.................................................................................................................24 And otherwise your own bank... .................................................................................25 Banking secrecy isn’t for cowboys! .............................................................................25 Managing an existing fortune discreetly .........................................................................27 Why should I create a discreet structure for an existing fortune? ..................................27 Luxembourg SPF.......................................................................................................28 The Curaçao Private Foundation: something for you? ...................................................32 The Panamanian Private Interest Foundation ..............................................................37 The trust... and which jurisdiction? .............................................................................44 1 Beating the game by understanding the rules .................................................................49 No pain, no gain .......................................................................................................49 A rectification to begin with .......................................................................................50 Each country acts ‘like a boss’ ....................................................................................51 Countries MAY tax income in 2 ways ..........................................................................52 Residents versus non-residents ..................................................................................54 International double taxation .....................................................................................57 Avoiding to be ripped off twice...................................................................................59 Europe and its EU law: Plenty of opportunities ............................................................61 Low-tax jurisdictions.....................................................................................................62 The disappearing taxpayer ........................................................................................62 What not to do! ........................................................................................................64 Offshore centres .......................................................................................................64 Don’t compare apples and oranges.............................................................................66 A complex world .......................................................................................................72 How to become a tax haven? Image is important…......................................................72 Balancing between right and wrong............................................................................73 The discreet businessman .............................................................................................74 Bring that wizard inside you to life .............................................................................74 You invented something ............................................................................................82 Hybrid companies .....................................................................................................84 Discreet spots...........................................................................................................89 Bearer shares ...........................................................................................................89 Otherwise, choose a nominee shareholder?.................................................................90 You have an online store ...........................................................................................91 Sailor Ahoy!..............................................................................................................95 The ultimate advice? Pack your bags! ............................................................................99 2 Andorra: nicely high in the Pyrenees ..........................................................................99 Switzerland: still full of certainty............................................................................... 106 Fashionable Monaco ................................................................................................ 115 Go into hiding in Belize ............................................................................................ 118 Let’s go all together to Curaçao................................................................................ 124 Costa Rica .............................................................................................................. 126 The United Arab Emirates (the UAE) ......................................................................... 131 Do it in Prague ....................................................................................................... 134 Malta for culture-holics ............................................................................................ 135 Malaysia, also your second home? ............................................................................ 142 Panama ................................................................................................................. 147 Isle of Man ............................................................................................................. 153 Hong Kong and Singapore ....................................................................................... 155 Wet dreams ........................................................................................................... 155 Freedom Ship ......................................................................................................... 156 International entrepreneurs in international waters .................................................... 156 Time for some joking... ........................................................................................... 157 Some mobile devices and a number of credit cards .................................................... 158 Citizenship ................................................................................................................. 160 3 The year 2030 After an unnerving day at the office and too many hours of biting my nails while stuck in a traffic jam, I finally sit with a glass of excellent Médoc and think about the day’s activities. I’m already trying to mentally prepare and even reload for tomorrow. I must confess I can’t refrain from checking the messages that make my phone beep. I quickly send a short reply to one message, the last one of this never-ending day. More asleep than awake, I skip a TV commercial and watch today’s news bulletin. While the images of another suicide attack in Iraq hardly reach my retina, somebody is persistently ringing my doorbell. I don’t know what’s happening, so I jump from my comfortable couch. My limbs are stiff and I rub the sleep from my eyes. Who is ringing? One look at my watch tells me it’s already 11 p.m. Distracted by the unknown person standing outside, I rush downstairs and open the door without hesitation. Two men in suits stand there looking at me. The older of the two stares at me with a severe and angry look. He asks, “Sir, what does this mean?” “Did I do something wrong?” I try to sound innocent with my reply.
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