Dobrynin and Kissinger Records Of
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Opening the Channel, February–December 1969 31. Memorandum of Conversation (U.S.)1 The President began by saying to Dobrynin, “youhavebeencandid,andIwillbeequallyso.I, Washington,October20,1969,3:30p.m. too,amdisappointedinUS-Sovietrelations.Iam today,inofficeforninemonths.Thebabiesshould AmbassadorDobryninopenedtheconversation havebeenborn;instead,therehavebeenseveral byhandingthePresidentabriefannouncementsug- miscarriages. I recognize that the future of my gestingNovember17thastheopeningoftheSALT countryandoftheworlddependsonthesuccess talks, and suggesting Helsinki as the place.2 The theSovietUnionhasinbringingusclosertogether. PresidentaskedwhyHelsinki—hepreferredVienna. Wehavenotdonewell.Letmepointoutwhy.” AmbassadorDobryninrepliedthatitdidnotmake Middle East. The President pointed out that agreatdealofdifferencetotheSovietUnion,but SiscoandGromyko,andSiscoandDobrynin,have sinceHelsinkihadbeenproposedasoneoftheplac- talked,buttheSovietshavebeentakingahardpo- esbytheSecretaryofStateinJune,theydecidedto sitionbasedontotalwithdrawalwithoutaskinga goalongwiththat.ThePresidentsaidtheSecretary similarsacrificefromtheUAR.ThePresidentpoint- ofStatehadbeenunderinstructionstopointout edoutthattheSovietclienthadlostthewar,hadlost thedifficultiesofHelsinki.AmbassadorDobrynin theterritory,andwasinnopositiontobeextremely replied that all the Secretary of State had said to aggressive. Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether Gromykowas,“tohellwith’Sinki,”whichisnota thePresidentwassuggestingthattotalwithdrawal diplomaticsuggestion.IftheUnitedStatespreferred wasnolongeracceptable,andwhyaUNforcewas someotherplace,thisshouldnotbetoodifficult. notadequate.ThePresidentsaidthatinlightofthe Dr.KissingeraskedtheAmbassadorwhatthey experiencewiththeotherUNforce,onewouldhave meantbypreliminarydiscussion.Herepliedthatthis tounderstandandtakeaccountoftheIsraeliposi- meantonlythefirstphaseofthediscussions,and tion.Wearenotintransigent,thePresidentadded, hadnoparticularsignificance.ButAmbassadorDo- andyoumustnotbe.Ifyouarewillingtopressyour bryninsuggestedthatonepossiblewayofhandlingit client,wemaybeabletomakesomesuggestionsto wouldbebybeginninginHelsinkiandthenmoving Israel.AmbassadorDobryninbegantoargueand ontoVienna.Dr.KissingerpointedouttotheAm- thePresidentcuthimoffbysayingtheseweretech- bassadorthatwehadtoconsultsomeAllies,butthat nicalissueswhichshouldbediscussedwithSisco. thereseemedtobenoinsuperabledifficulties. Turningtotrade, European security and Ber- ThePresidentthensaiditwouldbedangerousif lin, the President said that these could be dealt thetalkswereonlyaseriesofplatitudes.Ambassador withlaterataveryhighlevel,ifwecanmakea Dobryninrepliedthattherewouldbespecificsugges- breakthroughsomewhere.TheAmbassadorasked, tions,dependingontherangeofourproposals,andthey “Howdowemakeabreakthrough?” wouldprobablybeputintheformofseveraloptions. The President ignored him and turned to TheAmbassadorthensaidthatPresidentPod- China.Hesaid,“LooktothefutureofAsia—what gornypaidcloseattentiontogoodrelationshipswith willAsiabe25yearsfromnow?Chinawillbeina the United States, and valued this private contact positionofimmensepowerandwecannothaveit thathadbeenestablished,buttheywantedthePresi- withoutcommunication.Anythingwehavedone denttoheardirectlytheirviewofinternationalrela- oraredoingwithrespecttoChinaisinnosense tions.TheAmbassadorthenreadtheattachedAide designed to embarrass the Soviet Union. On the Mémoire3 to the President. After he was through contrary,ChinaandtheUnitedStatescannottol- reading the Aide Mémoire, the President pulled erateasituationtodevelopwhereweareenemies, outayellowpad,handedittoDobryninandsaid, anymorethanwewanttobepermanentenemies oftheSovietUnion.Therefore,weexpecttomake “you’dbettertakesomenotes,”andbegantospeak movesintradeandexchangeofpersonsandeven- almostuninterruptedlyforhalfanhour. tuallyindiplomacy.AstheAmbassadorhassaid himself,thereareenoughblocsintheworldwith- 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files,Box489,President’sTripFiles,Dobrynin/Kissinger,1969,Pt.1. outcontributingtoanotherone.Herepeatedthis TopSecret;Sensitive;Nodis.ThemeetingwasheldintheOvalOffice. wasnotdirectedagainsttheSovietUnion.Within 2 TheoriginalEnglishtextthatDobryningaveKissingerisprinted inDocument33. 10years,Chinawillbeanuclearpower,capable 3 Document32. of terrorizing many other countries. The time is 86 Meeting Between Nixon and Dobrynin, October 20, 1969 runningoutwhentheSovietUnionandtheUnited wellcouldleadnowhere.Itwastimetogetdiscus- Statescanbuildadifferentkindofworld.Theonly sionsstarted.Thehumiliationofadefeatwasabso- beneficiary,then,ofU.S.-Sovietdisagreementover lutelyunacceptable.ThePresidentrecognizedthat VietnamisChina.And,therefore,thisisthelast theSovietleadersweretoughandcourageous,but opportunitytosettlethesedisputes. sowashe.HetoldAmbassadorDobryninthathe The President then turned to Vietnam. He hopedthathewouldnotmindthisserioustalk. said that prior to the bombing halt, “which you PresidentNixonsaidhedidnotbelievemuch areawarewillbeoneyearoldonNovember1st,” inpersonaldiplomacy,andherecognizedthatthe Ambassadors Bohlen, Thompson and Harriman Ambassadorwasastrongdefenderoftheinterests had pointed out that the Soviet Union could do ofhisowncountry.ThePresidentpointedoutthat nothingaslongastheUnitedStateswasbombing iftheSovietUnionfounditpossibletodosome- afellowSocialistcountry,andthatitwouldbevery thing in Vietnam, and the Vietnam War ended, activeafterwards.Thebombinghaltwasagreedto theU.S.mightdosomethingdramatictoimprove andtheSovietUnionhasdonenothing. Soviet-U.S.relations,indeedsomethingmoredra- Ofcourse,thePresidentsaid,wenowhadan maticthantheycouldnowimagine.Butuntilthen, oblongtabletotheattainmentofwhichtheSoviet realprogresswouldbedifficult. Unioncontributedsomething,buttheU.S.didnot Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether this considerthatagreatachievement.Allconciliatory meantthattherecouldbenoprogress.ThePresident movesforthepastyearhadbeenmadebytheUnit- repliedthatprogresswaspossible,butitwouldhave edStates.ThePresidentenumeratedthem. tobeconfinedessentiallytowhatwasattainablein ThePresidentsaidhethereforehadconcluded diplomaticchannels.Hesaidthathewasveryhap- thatmaybetheSovietUniondidnotwanttoend pytohaveAmbassadorDobryninusethechannel thewarinVietnam.Theymaythinkthattheycan throughDr.Kissinger,andhewouldbeprepared breakthePresident;theymaybelievethattheU.S. totalktotheAmbassadorpersonally.Hereiterated domesticsituationisunmanageable;theymaythink thatthewarcoulddragon,inwhichcasetheU.S. thatthewarinVietnamcoststheSovietUniononly wouldfinditsownwaytobringittoanend.There asmallamountofmoneyandcoststheU.S.agreat wasnosenserepeatingtheproposalsofthelastsix manylives.ThePresidentdidnotproposetoargue months.However,hesaid,inthemeantime,while withtheSovietassessment.Asagreatpower,ithad thesituationcontinued,wecouldallkeepourtone therighttotakeitsposition.Ontheotherhand,the Ambassadorhadtounderstandthefollowing:the downandtalkcorrectlytoeachother.Itwouldhelp, SovietUnionwouldbestuckwiththePresidentfor andwouldlaythebasisforfurtherprogress,perhaps thenextthreeyearsandthreemonths,andthePresi- lateronwhenconditionsweremorepropitious. dentwouldkeepinmindwhatwasbeingdoneright ThePresidentsaidthatthewholeworldwanted now.IftheSovietUnionwouldnothelpustoget ustogettogether.Hetoowantednothingsomuch peace,theU.S.wouldhavetopursueitsownmeth- astohavehisAdministrationrememberedasawa- odsforbringingthewartoanend.Itcouldnotal- tershedinU.S.-Sovietrelations,butwewouldnot 4 lowatalk-fightstrategywithouttakingaction.The holdstillforbeing“diddled”todeathinVietnam. PresidentsaidhehopedthattheAmbassadorwould understandthatsuchmeasureswouldnotbedirect- 4 Duringatelephoneconversationat8:25p.m.,NixonandKissinger discussed how to proceed with Dobrynin: “P said in the meeting edagainsttheSovietUnion,butwouldbeintheU.S. tomorrowwith‘him.’HewouldlikeforKtogivehimthatmessage.Then interestofachievingpeace.TheU.S.recognizedthat iftheVietnamthingisraised(trytogetitraised)thePwantsKtoshake hisheadandsay,‘Iamsorry,Mr.Ambassador,butheisoutofcontrol. asettlementmustreflecttherealsituation.Itrecog- Mr.Ambassador,asyouknow,IamveryclosetothePresident,butyou nizedtherightofallVietnamesetoparticipateinthe don’tknowthisman—he’sbeenthroughmorethananyoftherestofus politicalprocess.Butuptonow,therehadbeena puttogether.He’smadeuphismindandunlessthere’ssomemovement,’ justshakeyourheadandwalkout.He’sprobablyrightnowfiguringout completerefusalofNorthVietnamtomakeitsown whatwassaid.KsaidhemighttypeupeverythingthePsaid[October proposalsinordertohaveanyseriousdiscussion. 20]onaplainslipofpaper.”(NationalArchives,NixonPresidential Materials,HenryKissingerTelephoneConversationTranscripts,Box2, The President pointed out that all the Am- ChronologicalFile)WhenKissingercalledthenextmorning,Dobrynin bassador had done was to repeat the same tired agreedtomeetattheSovietEmbassyinfifteenminutes.(Ibid.)Although norecordoftheconversationhasbeenfound,the“plainslipofpaper” oldslogansthattheNorthVietnamesehadmade thatKissingergaveDobryninisibid.,NSCFiles,Box489,President’s alreadysixmonthsago,andwhichheknewvery TripFiles,Dobrynin/Kissinger,1969,Pt.1. 87 Opening the Channel, February–December 1969 32. Note From the Soviet Leadership to WiththisinmindtheSovietGovernmentde- President Nixon1 cidedtooutlineforthePresidentitsconsiderations onanumberofconcretequestions. Moscow,undated. 2. It is known, for example, that the Soviet Governmenthasexpressedreadinesstofollowthe WhileinMoscow[I]hadmeetingswiththeSo- paththatwouldfacilitatedoingawaywiththeex- vietleadersinthecourseofwhichwediscussedques-