The Kula Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski
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BAYERISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN PHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE SITZUNGSBERICHTE • JAHRGANG 2007 , Heft 1 ROLF ZIEGLER The Kula Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski A Simulation Model of the Co-Evolution of an Economic and Ceremonial Exchange System Vorgelegt in der Sitzung vom 12. Dezember 2003 MÜNCHEN 2007 VERLAG DER BAYERISCHEN AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTEN © Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007 Gesamtherstellung: Druckerei C.H.Beck Nördlingen Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier (hergestellt aus chlorfrei gebleichtem Zellstoff) Printed in Germany Table of Contents 1. Introduction ......................................................................... 5 1.1 Embeddedness of Economic Trade in Social Relations ...... 5 1.2 Outline of the Argument ...................................................... 7 2. The Social System of Kula Exchange ................................. 9 3. The General Problem of Explanation: Social Order, Barter and Ceremonial Exchange ............... 14 4. The Methodological Approach ......................................... 16 4.1 Aims and Limitations of the Simulation Model ............... 16 4.2 Game-Theoretical Analysis of Strategic Situations and Derived Strategies of Behavior .................................. 17 5. The Empirical Data ........................................................... 18 5.1 The "Empirically Observed" Kula Ring ........................... 18 5.2 Empirical Boundary Conditions ....................................... 24 5.3 Measures of "Goodness-of-Fit" ........................................ 25 6. Process I: The Development of an Economic Trading Network .............................................. 30 6.1 Conditions of Successful Trade: Double Coincidence of Wants .......................................... 30 6.2 The Importance of Trading by Middlemen ....................... 31 6.3 Comparison with Previous Models ................................... 32 7. Process II: The Spread of Peaceful Relationships ............ 36 7.1 The Basic Prerequisites of Peaceful Trade: Recognizing Property Rights and Creating Trust ............. 36 7.2 Types of Cooperative and Defecting Strategies ................ 37 7.3 The Importance of Expectations, Reputation and Trust ... 41 8. Process III: The Evolution of a Ceremonial Exchange Network ........................................ 45 8.1 The Kula as a Signaling System of Peaceful Intentions ... 45 8.2 Reducing Uncertainty about the Stability of Peaceful Relationships ................................... 47 8.3 Basic Problems of a Signaling System: Cheating and Trust ............................................................ 49 8.4 The Preventive Role of Reputation ................................... 56 4 Rolf Ziegler 9. Emergence and Co-Evolution of a Peaceful Economic and Ceremonial Exchange System .................. 60 9.1 Basic Structure of the Simulation Model .......................... 62 9.2 Results of the Baseline Simulation Model ........................ 67 9.3 Distinguishing Among Historical Phases of Development ..................................... 72 9.4 Co-Evolution of the Kula Ring: Bi-Furcation and Path Dependence .................................. 75 9.5 The Stability of Fixed Points ............................................ 85 9.6 Some Remarks on the Status-Enhancing Function of Kula Exchange .............................................................. 87 10. Some Counterfactual Scenarios ........................................ 89 10.1 Randomization of Boundary Conditions .......................... 89 10.2 Why only Two Valuables? ................................................ 93 11. What Happened to the Kula Ring? ................................... 98 12. Concluding Remarks ....................................................... 101 12.1 Summary and Discussion of Results ............................... 101 12.2 Limits and Future Directions .......................................... 104 Appendix: Empirical Boundary Conditions .............................. 106 A.1 Geographic Distances Among the 18 Kula Communities 106 A.2 Location of Production of Goods ..................................... 107 A.3 Location of Demand for Goods ....................................... 112 References ................................................................................ 117 1. Introduction The Kula ring described by Bronislaw Malinowski in 1922 is an often cited and analyzed system for the ceremonial exchange of gifts among a number of tribal societies inhabiting various island groups in the Massim region east of Papua New Guinea.1 In his famous "Essai sur le don" Marcel Mauss (1969)2, the nephew of Emile Durkheim, formulated the threefold principle of reciprocity – to give, accept and reciprocate –, pointing out its function for creating and sustaining solidarity and emphasizing the non- economic character of social exchange. Scholars have been fasci- nated by the specific pattern of the exchange network, which links numerous partners directly and indirectly in a ringlike structure, and where two ceremonial gifts (vaygu'a) continually circulate in opposite directions. The whole structure has not been intention- ally designed by either the individual actors or a central authority. It is the unintended by-product of many actions and at the same time provides favorable conditions for its reproduction. 1.1 Embeddedness of Economic Trade in Social Relations The ceremonial exchange of the Kula and the work of Bronislaw Malinowski have been cited and analyzed by anthropologists (e.g. Firth 1957, 1967; Lévi-Strauss 1969; Sahlins 1965, 1974) as well as sociologists (Blau 1964: ch. 4; Cook 1987; Emerson 1976; Gouldner 1960; Gross 1961; Homans 1958, 1961, 1974; Mauss 1969). It is considered to be a paradigmatic example of the difference between "economic exchange" and "social exchange" (Ekeh 1974; Heath 1976) and between "commodities" and "gifts" 1 The bibliography of Martha Macintyre (1983a) contains 625 publi- cations that have dealt with the phenomenon of the Kula. 2 The essay was first published in L’Année sociologique (1923/24). 6 Rolf Ziegler (Gregory 1982; Carrier 1991).3 While economic exchange is voluntary and overtly self-interested, ceremonial exchange is a pretense of disinterested generosity and no haggling takes place. The transaction itself is based on obligation. The gift received puts the recipient in debt to the donor, and failure to meet the "norm of reciprocity" (Gouldner 1960) by not making an equi- valent return lowers his reputation and status. Gift exchange transforms the relationship between the partners, creates trust and establishes a bond of solidarity between donor and recipient. While economic transaction is "restricted exchange" among (isolated) dyads on an (anonymous) market, social exchange is "generalized exchange" with a diffuse obligation to reciprocate perhaps not only to the donor but to a (yet unspecified) third person. Malinowski argued emphatically against a simplistic inter- pretation of the ceremonial exchange as economic trade, empha- sizing what he called its social and psychic functions; never- theless he stressed the close relationship between economic and ceremonial exchange: "barter of goods and services is carried on mostly within a standing partnership, or is associated with defi- nite social ties or coupled with a mutuality in non-economic mat- ters. Most if not all economic acts are found to belong to some chain of reciprocal gifts and counter-gifts, which in the long run balance, benefiting both sides equally" (Malinowski 1951: 39-40). According to the prevailing interpretation in anthropological literature (Leach 1983) the main function of the Kula is to create social order by establishing a network of stable, peaceful relation- ships among stateless tribal societies, thereby fostering economic trade among them. The theoretical interpretations of the Kula have mainly con- centrated on the functions of this institution, which could also 3 There are other ceremonial exchange systems of gifts and counter- gifts among different Melanesian tribal communities described in ethno- graphic literature: e.g. the Melpa moka in Mount Hagen of Papua New Guinea (Strathern 1971, 1983), the Enga Tee on the highlands of Papua New Guinea (Meggitt 1972, 1974) or the traders of the Vitiaz Strait (Harding 1967). However, none of these exchange systems received as much attention in the general social science literature as the Kula. The Kula Ring 7 help to explain its maintenance. However, an unsolved problem remains: What kind of starting mechanism could account for the spontaneous emergence of a peaceful exchange that builds only upon the strategic situation of dyadically interacting potential partners who have incentive to trade but uncertainty about the intentions of potentially hostile foreigners and who (at least in the beginning) are not bound by a universally accepted "norm of reciprocity" that applies to clan members as well as strangers? We follow the advice of Mark Granovetter (1985: 493) by avoid- ing the oversocialized approach of generalized morality and the undersocialized approach of impersonal, institutional arrange- ments, modelling instead the emergence of concrete patterns of social relations. Analyzing the generalized exchange of women among Aborigines of Groote Eylandt, an island off Australia, Peter Bearman deals with the same kind of problem: "the identification of possible microlevel sources of cyclic exchange, focusing first on identifying operators