Special Warfare the Professional Bulletin of the John F

Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80Ð96Ð2 May 1996 Vol. 9, No. 2 From the Commandant Special Warfare

As the new commander of the JFK Spe- cial Warfare Center and School, I look forward to the opportunity of commanding the soldiers and the civilians who develop the doctrine and the training for our Spe- cial Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces. We face a challenging task in developing a special-operations force for the future. As we work together to develop that force, we should remember that despite changes in the strategies and in the tools we use to wage wars, the soldier will always be of paramount importance in winning them. In this issue of Special Warfare, several discuss the use of SOF in our current and articles emphasize the importance of the future security environments and propose human element of warfare. Lieutenant a structure for a new special-operations Colonel William Jacobs describes how brigade to deal with the nontraditional Ardant du Picq’s 19th-century theories of missions that we will surely encounter. the human aspect of war apply to the SOF’s usefulness in a variety of opera- dilemma faced by Chief Warrant Officer tions comes in large part from the qualities Michael Durant, and how these theories of SOF soldiers — their interpersonal can help us to train for operations on the skills, their flexibility, their adaptability, modern battlefield and to deal with the and their capacity for independent action. timeless factors of fear and loneliness. These qualities have served us well in the Major Sam Young’s history of SF selec- past, and they will be essential to our suc- tion and assessment shows that our cur- cess and survival on the confusing and iso- rent SF selection techniques stem from lated battlefields of the future. those developed by the OSS during World War II. In assessing and selecting individuals for unconventional assignments, we still adhere to the basic principles used by the OSS. Colonel Thomas Carlin and Dr. Mike Sanders explain how SOF assess- Major General William P. Tangney ment-and selection-techniques might be applied Armywide as a means of selecting soldiers for the various components of Force XXI. In his assessment of conflict situations that the United States is likely to face in the 21st century, Brian Sullivan predicts that special-operations forces will be our most valuable resource in dealing with those challenges. Major General William Garrison and Colonel Hayward Florer also PB 80Ð96Ð2 Contents May 1996 Special Warfare Vol. 9, No. 2

Commander & Commandant Major General William P. Tangney Features Editor 2 Special Operations and LIC in the 21st Century: Jerry D. Steelman The Joint Strategic Perspective by Brian R. Sullivan Associate Editor Sylvia McCarley 8 A View from the Field: Army Special Operations Forces Graphics & Design in the Current and Future Security Environments Bruce S. Barfield by Major General William F. Garrison, U.S. Army (ret.), and Colonel Hayward S. Florer Jr. Automation Clerk Debra Thomas 16 Soldier of the Future: Assessment and Selection of Force XXI by Colonel Thomas M. Carlin and Dr. Mike Sanders 22 A Short History of SF Assessment and Selection by Major Sam Young

V E AS R I RT T A E S LI B E T 28 The Role Technology Can’t Fill Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the by Sergeant First Class Michael W. Devotie United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special- 30 How to Succeed in Foreign Internal Defense operations forces by providing a forum for the examination by Colonel J.S. Ranger Roach, U.S. Army (ret.) of established doctrine and new ideas. Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This 36 The Human Element of Battle: The Theories publication does not supersede any information presented of Ardant du Picq in other official Army publications. Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and by Lieutenant Colonel William M. Jacobs should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors. Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Dennis J. Reimer General, United States Army Departments Chief of Staff 41 Enlisted Career Notes Official: 42 Officer Career Notes 44 Foreign SOF Joel B. Hudson Administrative Assistant to the 46 Update Secretary of the Army 48 Book Reviews 01516 Headquarters, Department of the Army Special Operations and LIC in the 21st Century: The Joint Strategic Perspective

by Brian R. Sullivan

While it has become something armed forces in the foreseeable number of low-intensity conflicts. of a cliché that the United States future. Finally, international organized will not become involved in a major But that cliché can create a dan- crime is posing a serious danger to conventional war within the next gerous sense of complacency, for it the security of the U.S. and to the 15 years, there are good reasons to is precisely because of our powerful stability of the international order. believe it. The powerful impression image that unconventional and Despite the growing severity of created by U.S. military might dur- irregular military challenges to illegal activities, the responsibility ing the Gulf War, the high level of U.S. interests are quite likely to for combating them remains pri- American defense spending rela- occur. Its position as a global leader marily with law-enforcement agen- tive to that of other states, the pre- makes the U.S. an obstacle to those cies. In a small number of eminence of the U.S. in a wide who wish to upset the internation- instances, however, effective range of military technologies, and al or the regional status quo. When response may require the interven- the frequently demonstrated com- such antagonists seek to remove tion of the U.S. military. For exam- petence of the U.S. armed forces the American barrier by violent ple, some small, impoverished seem likely to deter an attack on means, the only practical methods states may be overtaken by crimi- American interests by regular available to them are insurgency, nal gangs and become modern ver- terrorism or assassination. sions of the buccaneer states of the This article is an expanded and Furthermore, it seems likely 17th-century Caribbean or the revised version of a paper presented that in the coming years our gov- pirate states of 19th-century North by the author at the American ernment will place U.S. armed Africa. Destroying outlaw regimes Defense Preparedness Association forces in harm’s way. The recent may require armed invasion, with conference held in Washington, D.C., interventions in northern Iraq, heavy reliance on our special-oper- in December 1995. It examines possi- Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti and Bos- ations forces. ble roles that SOF could fill in deal- nia have demonstrated that violent The increasing disparity ing with the problems the U.S. may anarchy or widespread suffering between the living standards of encounter in the 21st century. In the and bloodshed can trigger Ameri- economically developed regions next issue of Special Warfare, a sec- can military intervention. Evi- and those of economically underde- ond article by Dr.Sullivan will exam- dence suggests that worsening veloped regions often provokes ine future revolutions in military demographic and economic condi- warnings of future North-South affairs. The views expressed in this tions may increase the chaos in the conflict. In fact, the relative wealth article are those of the author and do poorer sections of the world. As a of Australia and New Zealand, the not necessarily reflect the policies of consequence, threats to U.S. inter- growing prosperity of Chile and the National Defense University, the ests or the pressure generated by Argentina, and the possibility that Department of Defense or the United American public opinion may lead South Africa and parts of South- States government. — Editor. to our armed involvement in a east Asia may develop into econom-

2 Special Warfare ic successes suggest a different plunder, rape and murder. Weak- U.S. to terrorist attack are reasons geographic reality. Global misery ened by economic decline, many why Americans cannot ignore the and disorder are deepening not so central governments may be troubles that will afflict the poor much in the southern parts of the unable to control long-festering majority of mankind. globe but rather in a broad region- ethnic and regional hatreds, with al strip centered on the equator. large-scale slaughter as a result. New challenges Already, a number of failing states Massive illegal immigration into In dealing with those troubles, have appeared in that wide portion the developed world could take on the U.S. will find that the most of the planet. similar aspects of the tribal inva- efficient and cost-effective option There is reasonable hope that sions that toppled the Roman and is the use of its special-operations some countries in that belt – Mexi- Chinese empires. A desire either forces. Special-operations person- co, Peru, Morocco, Ghana, Angola, for vengeance or for extortion could nel possess the required language and even India and Bangladesh – generate widespread terrorism by skills and the knowledge of for- may escape their present low the poor against the rich. eign cultures and geography to standard of living. But other countries in what was once called the Third World almost certainly will Our grandchildren and great-grandchildren may suffer a horrid fate in coming live in a far happier world, thanks to the anticipated years, sinking into a condition of degradation almost too awful to mid-21st-century easing of demographic pressures imagine. Our grandchildren and great- and to the continued advances of technology. But grandchildren may live in a far the next several decades are likely to witness happier world, thanks to the anticipated mid-21st-century easing of human misery on a scale unprecedented in history. demographic pressures and to the continued advances of technology. Famine, pestilence and death, three of the Four But the next several decades are Horsemen of the Apocalypse, probably will ravage likely to witness human misery on a scale unprecedented in history. hundreds of millions — perhaps billions — of Famine, pestilence and death, three of the Four Horsemen of the human beings. And the fourth horseman is war. Apocalypse, probably will ravage hundreds of millions — perhaps These catastrophes may not function effectively among non- billions — of human beings. And occur, but even if they do, they may Western peoples. U.S. intervention the fourth horseman is war. not threaten the prosperous por- in chaotic or failed states probably Food and water shortages may tions of the human race. Technolo- will involve a combination of mili- prompt desperate invasions by peo- gy and wealth may allow the West tary and nonmilitary activities. ple seeking escape from hunger to build a wall against the suffer- Such a range of difficult and deli- and thirst. Deadly plagues may ing that exists outside its borders. cate activities represents the forte prompt mass flight across even But will none of these dreadful pos- of special-operations forces. Those well-guarded borders. Crime may sibilities trouble the U.S. or its who take part in such operations appeal to many as the only relief allies? The term “global interde- will require certain personal qual- from poverty, leading entire soci- pendence” is more than a buzz- ities: daring, imagination, initia- eties away from the rule of the law word. The American economy’s tive, hardiness, inventiveness, to the law of the jungle. Cities in growing reliance on exports, our persistence and flexibility. These the impoverished world may need to import raw materials, the are traits for which members of become the scene of huge riots rapid spread of infectious disease the special-operations forces directed by demagogues whose aim in an age of jet travel, the instant are chosen and which their train- is to topple governments. Religious access to worldwide communica- ing further enhances. SOF indi- fanatics may turn against the tions, the unitary nature of the vidual and small-unit skills in adherents of other religions, claim- world ecological system, and the combat, medicine, communica- ing divine sanction as an excuse for demonstrated vulnerability of the

May 1996 3 tions, teaching, mechanics, field repeated in other areas where world’s Muslims may be especially engineering, demolitions, naviga- AIDS is spreading at an alarming hard-hit by economic misery. tion and survival are vital in com- rate, then civil rule may also erode plex circumstances. or break down in parts of North Muslim resentment Despite their present readiness, Africa, the Middle East, India and Already, for psychologically and special-operations forces still Southeast Asia. It is estimated that historically understandable rea- require enhancement and restruc- AIDS will ultimately claim at least sons, the imbalance of wealth has turing to deal more effectively with one million victims in the U.S. One created severe Muslim resentment likely future challenges. In prepa- can only imagine the number of toward Christians and the West. As ration for operations at the least victims it will claim in far less a result, some Muslims have violent end of the spectrum, we will medically advanced societies. turned to violent religious fanati- need to increase the number of our Moreover, a number of scientists cism. It is possible that many more Civil Affairs units. While it appears worry that AIDS may be only a pre- will join them as social and eco- unlikely that the U.S. will inter- cursor to other, more deadly nomic conditions further deterio- vene in every crisis throughout the plagues. rate in parts of the Islamic world. world for the purpose of restoring a Epidemics might totally destabi- Consequently, any future Ameri- collapsed government, it seems lize certain portions of the Eastern can military intervention in coun- equally unlikely that Washington Hemisphere. The U. S. would prob- tries with large Muslim popula- would tolerate widespread disorder ably be unwilling to tolerate a total tions is certain to fuel negative in Latin America, Africa or Asia. lack of government in a region sentiments. Civil Affairs and Certain sea-lanes, maritime where the interests of the major PSYOP units would face a special choke points and canals would powers converge – a region that challenge in these areas. Although have to be kept free from piracy, includes both the Suez Canal and Americans are uncomfortable mix- sunken ships, mines and terrorism. the chief source of the world’s ing religion and politics in the con- When anarchic states spill chaos petroleum. Nor is it likely that the duct of foreign and security affairs, across their borders, we might best U.S. would stand by while govern- PSYOP units must be prepared to protect our allies by returning ments collapsed in countries imme- ameliorate anti-Western religious those anarchic states to the rule of diately to the south of China, to the attitudes in certain Islamic coun- law. In the wake of conventional east of India and to the north of tries if U.S. forces have to deploy to military action in these failed Indonesia. American interests those areas. states, Civil Affairs forces would be would not be served if India, required to reimpose order on the China, Indonesia and Vietnam Cultural domination disrupted societies, if only for oper- were allowed to collide in an effort The U.S. victory in the Cold War ational reasons. The demands of by each to impose its rule on the has not been followed by an effort restoring government and essen- ruins of the Bangladeshi, Burmese, to control the world in a political or tial services on a wide scale would Thai, Cambodian or Laotian states. military sense. But consider the be far beyond our present CA The U.S. might therefore intervene tremendous impact of American capacity. to prevent war and to provide order culture and entertainment on the in these heavily populated areas. Epidemics rest of mankind over the past The area of the globe likely to decade alone. Anyone who has The immediate future may pre- suffer the greatest deprivation over recently traveled in Latin America, sent other daunting challenges to the next few decades – North Africa or Asia has witnessed the Civil Affairs units. Because of com- Africa, the Middle East, Central growing availability in those areas plicated social and cultural rea- Asia, and parts of Southern Asia – of televisions, satellite dishes, sons, AIDS already infects a high is also the center of the Muslim radios, tape players and compact- proportion of the military and civil- world. True, some countries with a disc players, personal computers ian officials of Zaire, Uganda, substantial or a majority Islamic and videocassette recorders. These Kenya, Zambia and other central population — for example, Moroc- entertainment and information African countries. In some or all of co, Turkey, Lebanon, India, sources are dominated to an extra- these countries, government estab- Bangladesh, Malaysia, the Philip- ordinary degree by the transmis- lishments may collapse in the next pines and Indonesia — may enjoy a sion of American popular culture. 10-15 years. If this pattern is substantial rise in their living That domination seems certain to standards. But the majority of the

4 Special Warfare become even more widespread as foreigners in the U.S., detailed stress counterintelligence and the entertainment industries knowledge of American society, cul- security measures far more than it assume an increasingly important ture and politics is being spread to has done in the past. The U.S. role in the American economy. every part of the globe. Our gradu- Marines paid a high price in Unfortunately, the images of ate schools are educating large Lebanon for their lack of emphasis American society projected by our numbers of foreign students. As we on these concerns. Recent news popular culture are often more rep- already know, some Middle East- from Bosnia suggests that the ene- resentative of our nightmares and erners and Latin Americans who mies of the U. S. continue to envi- fantasies than of our realities. This have graduated from American sion terrorist attacks as a prime is not always clear, however, to universities are inevitably joining weapon against our armed forces. poorly educated foreign audiences, the ranks of our enemies. Unless Although our military’s technical and they often form a distorted the U.S. armed forces are prepared intelligence is superb, our human opinion of Americans. to operate under great intelligence intelligence is often poor. U.S. Even when American reality is disadvantages, our military per- forces, in general, and SOF, in par- portrayed accurately, to know us is not necessarily to love us. Such Unfortunately, the images of American society pro- concepts as multi-party democracy, religious freedom, individual free- jected by our popular culture are often more repre- dom to choose a marriage partner, freedom of artistic expression, and sentative of our nightmares and fantasies than of the right of adults to disobey their our realities. This is not always clear, however, to parents are genuine American values, protected by our laws and poorly educated foreign audiences, and they often cherished in our culture. But in societies functioning according to form a distorted opinion of Americans. contrary beliefs and customs, the positive portrayal of these values sonnel must know far more about ticular, must address intelligence can provoke violently negative foreign societies than they do now. and security deficiencies to ensure reactions. Nor will it be sufficient to be successful operations in the poorer To many living in traditional knowledgeable only about certain regions of the world. societies, Americans appear to be parts of the world, as it was during trying to dominate humanity with the Cold War. Given the changes in Urban warfare our notions about sex, religion, pol- the international system over the Since their inception, Special itics, child-rearing and other inti- past five years, it is impossible to Forces have operated mainly in mate or personal matters. PSYOP rule out American military inter- rural areas. But the populations in and CA units will have to work vention anywhere. It is equally impoverished areas of the world together to convince large numbers impossible to know where such are becoming increasingly urban- of misinformed or highly suspi- operations are most likely to occur. ized. A few cities already contain cious people that a temporary U.S. Consequently, the need for univer- populations in the tens of millions. military intervention is not an sal knowledge of the world and of In the next decade, the central attempt to impose U.S. values on its peoples presents a particular regions of the world will contain them. problem for special-operations dozens of cities populated by multi- The educated among our oppo- forces. To a large extent, the millions of inhabitants. Mexico nents may present us with addi- responsibility of providing univer- City, Cairo and Calcutta have tional problems. Members of for- sal knowledge rests with the Amer- already established a pattern of eign elites typically have much ican educational system. But enormous urban squalor. In coming more knowledge about the U.S. should the system fail to inculcate decades, this pattern will be than most Americans have about such knowledge among young repeated in scores of other cities foreign countries. The English lan- Americans before they volunteer around the globe. Consequently, it guage is understood by increasing- for military service, the armed seems almost certain that Special ly larger numbers of people. forces will have to educate their Forces will be involved in urban Because of international broad- own personnel. warfare. Recent operations in casting and widespread travel by The American military must also

May 1996 5 Panama and Mogadishu provide a artillery and aircraft. should develop methods of mini- foretaste of such combat. But we may have to rethink mizing fatalities in certain urban- our traditional tactics and devise warfare situations. U.S. forces New burdens alternate methods. Future urban must also be prepared to treat Urban warfare will impose new warfare in flimsily constructed, potentially huge numbers of both burdens on U.S. Special Forces. For densely populated slums could enemy and civilian casualties. By example, making maps of huge mean that U.S. Special Forces necessity, our opponents will be slum cities will not be an easy would inflict enormous numbers forced to develop a plan to offset task. But in order to perform effec- of civilian deaths. For obvious the high quality of U.S. Special tively, our SF soldiers must have ethical and political reasons, Forces. To achieve this, they may accurate maps and other crucial such bloodshed would be unac- increase the number of their information. This need creates a ceptable, except in the case of forces or use civilian populations major responsibility for U.S. intel- dire circumstances. Special as shields. There will be times ligence agencies, since reliable Forces cannot engage in the cal- when U.S. forces will have no choice but to shoot to kill, an action that is certain to result in Future urban warfare in flimsily constructed, dense- large numbers of wounded and ly populated slums could mean that U.S. Special dead. In turn, Special Forces medical personnel may be called upon Forces would inflict enormous numbers of civilian to provide assistance to survivors, who could number in the tens of deaths. For obvious ethical and political reasons, thousands. such bloodshed would be unacceptable, except in Urban operations will also bring about widespread destruction, the case of dire circumstances. … The harm done along with the need for Civil Affairs units to provide shelter and would not only lose the support of the American food for many displaced persons. people, it would also provoke international outrage. Many situations involving future special operations will also pertain to low-intensity conflict conducted maps of such areas, with their lous use of firepower as the Rus- by conventional U.S. forces. But the twisting alleys and slapdash build- sians have done in Grozny and in use of the qualifier “low” should not ings, are unlikely to be available Chechnya. The harm done would lead to false expectations: Low- from conventional sources. Satel- not only lose the support of the intensity conflict in the urban envi- lite imagery and computer-gener- American people, it would also ronment will still produce heavy ated maps will have to be created provoke international outrage. enemy and civilian losses and a and carefully studied if Special Although it may be unfair, the great deal of destruction. Forces are to perform successful fact remains that American In thinking back to the urban operations in sprawling slums. forces are held to a much higher operations in Algiers and Oran The trend in 20th-century war- standard of conduct than most during the Algerian War and to fare has been toward ever-increas- foreign militaries are. the operations in Hue, Saigon and ing civilian losses. Moreover, U.S. On the other hand, attempts to Cholon during the Vietnam War, Special Forces command the ever- develop truly non-lethal weapons we may derive a general idea of more-awesome ability to inflict for the U.S. military may be some- what to expect in the future. The heavy casualties. Given the what unrealistic. Certainly we human scale, however, will be far nature of their operations, Special would prefer to conduct crowd con- larger. The population of Algeria Forces may be forced to engage trol or border-security operations has nearly tripled in the past 35 conventional enemy troops many with a minimum of violence. But years; the population of Vietnam times their number. To ensure the the idea of a bloodless war is a dan- has more than doubled in the past survival of their units, Special gerous fantasy: It is precisely the 25. Throughout the rest of the Forces must be able to call in sup- destruction inflicted on the foe that underdeveloped world, the popula- porting firepower, especially from forces him to seek peace. tion has also greatly increased. It Nevertheless, Special Forces continues to grow at an alarming

6 Special Warfare rate and is overwhelmingly con- matching available means to the After receiving a Ph.D. from centrated in urban areas. chosen ends. The U.S. has passed Columbia University, he taught through the isolationist and con- military history at Yale University, Question of strategy tainment phases of its national his- and strategy at the Naval War Col- U.S. special-operations units tory. We are now on the edge of a lege. During the Gulf crisis and intervening in the poorer areas of new period. But we have neither War, he was an adviser to the the world may encounter a popu- reached a national bipartisan con- Assistant Secretary of Defense for lation scale and a density of sensus on a new national security Special Operations and Low- crowding that is difficult for most policy nor have we developed a Intensity Conflict. At INSS, Dr. Americans to imagine. Somalia strategy for achieving it. Only after Sullivan analyses and writes doc- and Bosnia are relatively empty such a fundamental national deci- uments on issues pertaining to compared to other areas where sion has been reached will it be U.S. defense strategy. He is also the the U.S. government might con- possible to evaluate wisely where author of numerous articles about sider intervention. Future opera- the U.S. should commit its forces. military history and national tions may be more like mega- On that decision much depends, security. Rwandas or mega-Haitis. U.S. including the future of U.S. special- leaders should carefully consider operations forces. the ends and the means before embarking on so-called low- intensity conflict in such regions. Brian R. Sullivan Even a very low level of violence is a senior research on an individual scale, when mul- professor at the tiplied by tens of millions, could Institute for Nation- result in a conflict of high inten- al Strategic Studies, sity in terms of the effort and the National Defense resources necessary for U.S. University. He forces to wage it. served as a Marine officer in Viet- This last point raises the final nam, where he was awarded the and essential question of strategy: Silver Star and the Purple Heart.

May 1996 7 A View from the Field: Army Special Operations Forces in the Current and Future Security Environments

by Major General William F.Garrison, U.S. Army (ret.) and Colonel Hayward S. Florer Jr.

Copyright 1996 by Much has been said and written about moil: Deep ethnic, national and religious William F. Garrison the current security environment, and rivalries and hatreds have been unlocked and Hayward S. many speakers and writers agree that the throughout the old Soviet Union and its Florer Jr. Used with primary event shaping the world today is sphere of influence. This era has also gen- permission. This the end of the Cold War. What has not been erated an enormous increase in crime and article is taken from so thoroughly analyzed are the two dra- criminal cartels. In some places, our world MG Garrison’s pre- matically different effects produced by that looks like the world of the 1920s. In fact, sentation at the event, and the ways in which those effects the post-Cold War problems are similar to December 1995 con- are relevant to special-operations forces. those that occurred after World War I. The ference of the Amer- The first effect brought on by the end of consequences of this unleashed turmoil are ican Defense Pre- the Cold War has been the increase in tur- playing out in unforeseen ways. Predicting paredness Associa- tion. Continuing the discussion of SOF’s role in future Special Forces, Psychological Operations, conflicts, it proposes a new force struc- and Civil Affairs ture for dealing with nontraditional missions — Editor.

8 Special Warfare SF, CA, and PSYOP Deal with Today’s World

Provide Ground Truth

Excel at Intercultural Communications

Have Earned Influence with Leaders in Emerging Areas of National Interest Have History of Bringing Military and Civic Leaders Together and anticipating today’s security require- In response to the trend toward global- ments remains an enormous challenge to ization, powerful non-national actors, our national leadership. whether they are drug cartels or interna- The second effect of the end of the Cold tional business conglomerates, have War has been a resurgence in democracy arrived on the operational security scene. and globalization. In sharp contrast to the These actors, with their self-interests and divisive power unleashed by the first effect, narrow constituencies, have no national we are now witnessing a trend that is mov- mandates for action. Third World nations ing politics toward more self-determination, that have weak institutions must struggle and economics toward freer markets. with them to maintain their sovereignty The old, centrally planned, closed and their responsibility to their citizens. In economies of the Soviet Union and its Marx- some nations, these actors supplant the ist surrogates are opening rapidly to both institutions in an effort to acquire money capitalism and the international market- and to increase their power. Our National place. Even though the authoritarian lead- Security Strategy commits the United ers of China, Vietnam and other Asian States to strengthening and supporting the nations continue to resist democracy, they democratic institutions in their attempt to have initiated some forms of capitalism. As limit the power of non-national actors.2 history shows, these nations will learn that As a result of the two broad trends that capitalism’s premium on individual initia- have emerged from the end of the Cold War, tive undercuts the authoritarian rulers’ grip our nation’s military forces are facing new on power and increases the demands for challenges. In preparing to meet these, we democratic reforms. Elsewhere, the ideas of are reminded of General Omar Bradley’s democracy have taken root, especially in statement, “Our compelling need ... (is) not Latin America and in parts of Eastern for air power, sea power, or land power — Europe. Francis Fukyama, an analyst with but for American military power commen- the RAND Corporation, predicts a dramatic surate with our tasks in the world.”3 Spe- decrease in conflict as new democracies cial Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological learn to settle disputes peacefully.1 Operations are part of a joint team that is

May 1996 9 The Culturally and Geographically Oriented Force

Special Forces Civil Affairs Psychological Operations Train and Practice Persuasion Languages Cross-cultural Communication

For All Regions of the Globe

designed to be deeply integrated into Gen- Venezuela, Paraguay and Belize. There, eral Bradley’s idea of American military American officers use their skills to bring power. together local military officers and local The security environment of today is ill- civilian officials to discuss issues such as defined and unpredictable. Nevertheless, disaster preparedness and environmental SF, CA and PSYOP forces can provide protection. The program works because the ground truth in this amorphous environ- CA officers gain the trust of all the partici- ment because of their current worldwide pants and help them to focus on local needs deployments to carry out the engagement- and concerns. and-enlargement mandate from the cur- Another element of today’s operational rent National Security Strategy.4 In fact, environment is the integration of technolo- SOF may be the only U.S. forces who have gy at all levels. SF, CA and PSYOP forces been on the ground and know the leaders stay connected with the Army and with in dangerous areas in which only five years other services in this high-tech arena as ago we would never have predicted we the Army prepares to fight and win in would have an interest. major regional contingencies anywhere in Today’s SF, CA and PSYOP are also the world. SOF’s leadership in technology structured and trained to meet the chal- is exemplified by our MH-60K and MH- lenges of enlarging and strengthening 47E helicopters, our tactical use of satel- democratization. SOF have access to mili- lite-communications radios, and our devel- tary leaders and can often influence them opment of highly secure high-frequency with American values regarding human radios. All the developments in informa- rights and democracy. In some countries, tion operations, command-and-control war- CA forces have brought military and civic fare, battlefield awareness, and an order- leaders together for the first time, thus of-magnitude improvement in the accuracy increasing the leaders’ trust in new demo- of smart weapons, as described in JCS cratic institutions. The 361st Civil Affairs Vision 2010, include ARSOF participation.5 Brigade conducts a series of seminars in Over the next 10 years, these develop- Latin American countries such as ments will help make the joint-force com-

10 Special Warfare mander, or JFC, decisively successful. The recently, they have been critical to the coor- complementary technological improve- dination and synchronization of operations ments and the total integration of ARSOF with our NATO and European partners in doctrine into joint and Army doctrine will Balkan operations. ensure that SF, CA and PSYOP forces PSYOP forces develop and deliver appro- remain on the joint team today and in the priate themes and products that are future. designed to influence all levels of foreign Because of their core capabilities and audiences. CA forces bring the skills of civil values, SF, CA and PSYOP forces are called administration and civil-military coordina- on by the geographical commanders in tion to the joint force. The PSYOP and CA chief, or CINCs, to execute missions in ill- capabilities give the joint-force commanders defined and high-risk environments. The great flexibility and multiple options in entire force is culturally and geographical- accomplishing their military objectives. Haiti ly oriented and sensitized. Language profi- represents a classic example: SF, CA and ciency is only part of the power of this PSYOP teams deployed to the countryside, capability. SF, CA and PSYOP forces train allowing the general-purpose forces to focus and practice the arts of persuasion, negoti- on the center of gravity in Port-au-Prince. ation and cross-cultural communication for So far, we have discussed today’s opera- all regions of the globe. Special Forces add tional environment. Now we will focus on the cutting edge of tough combat skills and the future and what it means for SF, CA survivability. Although SF can execute and PSYOP. The trends described earlier commando-style operations, their real skill will continue to bring a more unpredictable is in teaching, advising, assisting and world. We will see an era of fewer nation- assessing other nations’ forces. They adapt state wars. But on the other hand, we will particularly well to the needs of coalition- see more violence, along with simmering support operations. As stated by General conflicts that flare up and then cool down Norman Schwarzkopf, during Desert once the antagonists have exhausted their Shield/Desert Storm they provided the resources. These will be unwinnable wars glue that held the coalition together.6 More whose end state and military objective may

Special Forces Capabilities

Perform Commando Operations Teach, Advise, Assist Foreign Nations Conduct Coalition Support Operations Conduct Reconnaissance and Assessments

May 1996 11 be difficult to ascertain. gone. Tactical decisions will have larger Poorly trained but fully politicized para- political implications than in the past. An military groups will continue to commit example of this was seen in Somalia, genocide and ethnic cleansing; narcotraf- where a tactical decision had long-lasting fickers will place our future generations at negative political implications, even risk; criminal cartels will undermine our though it resulted in a successful combat economic and personal security; and ter- operation. rorists will attempt to destroy our institu- Army Major Ralph Peters has written tions. Any of these elements may use two important articles in Parameters with- weapons of mass destruction as a tool for in the last year that aptly and dramatical- extortion, profit or actual destruction. ly describe a potential future. He describes Dealing with an enemy who thumbs his a “new warrior class” that does not follow nose at a military force that can fly, shoot what he calls the highly stylized and ritu- and sail with unmatched speed and accu- alized customs and forms of warfare that racy will require us to answer the ques- the Euro-American soldier follows. tion, “How do we use a high-tech force The U.S. military must still be pre- against a low-tech enemy?” To begin, we pared to meet and to fight organized mil- must provide a 21st-century soldier – one itaries, but it may often have to deal with who is comfortable with technology, is cul- warriors from this new class as well. To turally aware, is a good information defeat them, the U.S. needs a two- processor, is capable of adapting, is tena- pronged approach: an active campaign to cious under stress, is intelligent, is dis- win the support of the populace, coupled cerning, is a good thinker, and is able to with an overwhelming and violent attack demonstrate sound judgment. This model against the warriors and their leaders. soldier and his leaders must be capable of As Peters says, “You cannot teach them a dealing simultaneously with all levels of lesson ... you either win or lose. This kind war, networked by technology. In short, of warfare is a zero-sum game. And it the Cold War norms of hierarchical and takes guts to play.”7 Or as Admiral sequential decisions and operations are Owens has said, “Identify [the] crown

Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Capabilities

CA Personnel Give Joint Forces Civil Administration and Civil-Military Coordination Capability

PSYOP Personnel Develop and Deliver Products to Influence All Levels

12 Special Warfare Future Operations

The Cold War Diplomatic Now and Tomorrow

Strategic Diplomatic Strategic Operational

Tactical Operational Tactical

Hierarchical and Internetted and Sequential Simultaneous

jewels of [your] adversary and destroy future, just as joint operations have them.”8 Dr. P.J. Berenson, scientific become the norm today. The mix of adviser to the commander of the Army humanitarian, peacekeeping, peace- Training and Doctrine Command, writes enforcement and nation-building objec- about the difficulty of deterrence against tives requires all the elements of power of these future actors in the security envi- the U.S. And while the complicated objec- ronment. He states that selective, violent tives will not be clearly military, their action by Special Forces, to destroy what consequences will be highly political. an adversary most highly values, may be Therefore, the intense interest of the necessary.9 National Command Authority will SF, CA and PSYOP will play an impor- require tight interagency cooperation. tant role as high-tech combatants on a Again, SF, CA and PSYOP forces can highly lethal joint team. This team will operate easily in this kind of environ- be able to hit the new warrior class ment, particularly where selective and where it lives. Yet, just as they are doing politically sensitive military operations today, SF, CA and PSYOP teams will be support specific U.S. policy goals. the primary element executing a low- Whether the mission is a sensitive effort tech campaign to gain the support of the to counter the proliferation of weapons of population in the old-fashioned, people- mass destruction, or a long-term effort to to-people method that President John F. promote democracy and human rights, Kennedy envisioned in 1961.10 Simulta- the initial elements on the ground are neous operation in the high-tech, highly usually SF, CA and PSYOP. synchronized environment of joint opera- New thinking about organizations may tions and in low-tech operations with provide a solution to help us accomplish indigenous armies and populations will such a mission. In the past, we have used be the trademark of SF, CA and PSYOP traditional structures such as an armored in the future. division to handle high-intensity-combat U.S. interagency cooperation and inte- command and control. In today’s environ- gration must become the norm in the ment, we need a headquarters and a

May 1996 13 Army SOF Exceptional Force Task Organized

Joint Forces Command

ARSOF

SF CA PSYOP MP

CS CSS

structure that are prepared to deal with The dynamic team provides command non-traditional missions on a full-time and control so that the JFC does not have to basis. form ad hoc organizations. The team also provides its own minimum security for force Proposed ‘exceptional force’ protection, with the innate ability to deter- An “exceptional force” is any element of mine when more help is needed. It provides the combined-arms team or service that a sophisticated headquarters for continued dominates a given operation and plays the assessments of a country or a region amid decisive role. A task-organized Army spe- the confusion of the future operational envi- cial-operations brigade could be such an ronment described earlier. It is an ideal ele- exceptional force for the future. It would ment from which to base joint and inter- consist of SF, CA and PSYOP, as well as agency operations of the future. elements of infantry, aviation, combat sup- It is conceivable that an SF, CA and port and combat service support to fit a PSYOP team could be advising and assist- particular mission. An operation should be ing a foreign nation in peacetime when a built around the dominant element, and contingency requirement would compel it to the exceptional-force headquarters should perform special reconnaissance or direct serve as the headquarters for the operation action or to facilitate other joint-force which it dominates, using joint and coali- actions. Once the joint contingency operation operations to complement and rein- tions were over, the original team would force it. revert back to its engagement mission. The In combining the capabilities of SF,CA and Army special-operations task force will ease PSYOP with the capabilities of these other the transition through these phases of the elements, we produce the nucleus of a operation for the joint force commander. It dynamic team that provides the theater should be the exceptional force in future CINC with a tool that can be used to lead, peacetime operations when political factors, support or advise the joint and interagency interagency cooperation, intercultural com- team efforts. munication, and human-intelligence collec- tion are dominant elements of an operation.

14 Special Warfare We have seen how the SF, CA and Intelligence Security Agency of the U.S. PSYOP team fits in today’s operational Army Intelligence and Security Command. environment as a critical member of the joint team and as executor of the U.S. Colonel Hayward S. Florer national security policy. We have also Jr. is director of the Direc- explained ways in which the unpredictable torate of Training and Doc- future environment will need SF, CA and trine, JFK Special Warfare PSYOP to play an important role in the Center and School. A former increasingly frequent interagency opera- Infantry officer and Africa tions, while they remain a part of joint and foreign area officer, he has coalition operations. We are but one ele- held Special Forces assignments from the ment of General Bradley’s American mili- A-detachment to the battalion level. He tary power that is “commensurate with our commanded the 1st Battalion, 10th Special tasks in the world.” Forces Group, during Operations Desert In closing, we should remember that the Shield/Storm and Provide Comfort. main thing is to keep the main thing the Colonel Florer is a graduate of the U.S. Mil- main thing. The main thing is stated best itary Academy at West Point and the Army by General Dennis Reimer, our Army Chief Command and General Staff College. He is of Staff: also a War College graduate from the The idea of war in the information age Advanced Operational Studies fellowship will conjure up images of bloodless con- at the School of Advanced Military Studies flict, more like a computer game than the at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and holds a bloody wars we’ve known in the past. master’s degree in history from the Univer- Nothing could be further from the truth. sity of Kansas. Warfare may change – its impact on nations, armies and soldiers will not. The Notes: fates of nations and armies will still be 1 Francis Fukuyama, Have We Reached the End of History? (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, decided by war, perhaps more rapidly than 1989); and The End of History and the Last Man (New in the past. Losers may still spend genera- York: The Free Press, 1992). tions recovering from the consequences of 2 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and defeat. Soldiers will always be the key to Enlargement, The White House, February 1995, pp. 1-5. victory. Technology and the ability to han- 3 General Omar Bradley, quote used by Joint Chiefs of Staff, J5, to guide the attitude of the Joint Staff. dle it may be increasingly important, but 4 A National Security Strategy, pp. 7-24. soldiers will always win or lose wars. The 5 Discussion paper attached to Warfighting Vision battlefield will always be a dangerous, 2010: A Framework for Change, 11 September 1995 frightening and lonely place. Only soldiers (Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine Division, Fort of character and courage, well-trained, Monroe, Va.). 6 Norman Friedman, Desert Victory (Annapolis, ably led, and properly equipped will sur- Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 224. vive there and win – tomorrow, as they 7 Major Ralph Peters, “The New Warrior Class,” have in the past.11 Parameters, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 1994, pp. 16-26. 8 As stated by Dr. Paul J. Berenson, Thoughts on Deterrence, 6 October 1995, quoted with permission of the Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Major General William F. Staff, 29 November 1995. Garrison retired from the 9 Berenson, Thoughts on Deterrence. Army in May 1996 as com- 10 James J. Schneider, “Ambushing the Future,” mander of the JFK Special Special Warfare, Vol. 8, No. 2, April 1995, pp. 2-10. Warfare Center and School. 11 General Dennis Reimer's speech prepared for the Fletcher School of Law symposium, “War In the Infor- In previous assignments, he mation Age,” 16 November 1995, Cambridge, Mass. served as commander of the Joint Special Operations Command, as deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and as deputy commander of the U.S. Army

May 1996 15 Soldier of the Future: Assessment and Selection of Force XXI

by Colonel Thomas M. Carlin and Dr. Mike Sanders

As the Army prepares to meet the challenges of the 21st century, changes in doctrine, in tactics and in U.S. demographics will require us to tailor the manning process that the Army uses to fill the force. The manning process and the indicators the Army uses to identify who should fill each slot in the force — the job-soldier match — are critical to the future of Force XXI. According to Army Training and Doc- Photo by Kirk Wyckoff trine Command Pamphlet 525-5, AirLand Operations, “Quality soldiers, trained and led by competent and caring leaders, will remain a key to success on future battlefields. Soldiers in the 21st century will be faced with a wide variety of challenges in preparing for and executing missions in This article is an outgrowth of a briefing full-dimensional operations. … Increased conducted in 1994 for the Army’s leadership. flexibility and adaptability will be required The briefing, initiated by General Wayne at all levels, along with increased responsi- Downing, Lieutenant General J.T. Scott and bility at much lower ranks.” Major General William Garrison, proposed For the past 20 years, the Army has a process by which the Army might man orchestrated a quiet revolution in one of its Force XXI. The authors wish to acknowledge manning processes — the assessment and the contributions of Colonel Greg Pulley in selection of personnel for special-opera- the development of the original briefing tions forces, or SOF. SOF assessment and and, thus, in the development of this article. selection, which has been an evolutionary The authors also emphasize that the SOF process, has produced revolutionary leadership in general is interested in hear- results. The lessons learned could have a ing soldiers’ ideas on ways to enhance or similar revolutionary impact on the way improve current SOF assessment-and-selec- the Army mans Force XXI. tion programs. Readers are encouraged to The SOF community has always placed an use Special Warfare as a forum for the emphasis on people. One of its primary goals expression of those ideas. — Editor. has been to develop a cost-effective process

16 Special Warfare for manning the force and for placing the right soldier in the right job. Through mission analysis, SOF have determined that General Model for Assessment and Selection their soldiers will be more successful if they have the following attributes: • Organizational skills. FRONT-END ANALYSIS OF • Trainability. MISSION REQUIREMENTS • Situational awareness. • Ability to make complex discriminations and decisions. • Personal adaptability. • Resistance to stress. • Dependability, determination and stability. ATTRIBUTES REQUIRED • Physical endurance and specialized FOR MISSION military skills. SOF must select soldiers who can remain “mentally alive” while experiencing deep fatigue and personal discomfort. SOF soldiers must also be capable of performing their duties while on solo missions in sen- TOOLS TO ASSESS sitive environments. Ultimately, each SOF ATTRIBUTES soldier must demonstrate the stability, dependability and adaptability required to operate independently in fluid and challenging situations. The SOF community developed its initial assessment-and-selection program in 1976 TEST, EVALUATE AND SCREEN OUT for one of its classified units. In developing CANDIDATES, USING EXISTING TESTS the program, SOF reviewed and incorpo- AND MEASURES rated elements from similar programs, including those of the World War II Office of Strategic Services, or OSS; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the British 22nd Special Air Service, or SAS. The OSS’s CONTINUE SEQUENTIAL SCREENING selection process often failed to match a USING MORE MISSION-ORIENTED SITUA- person to the job he or she would perform TIONAL AND PERFORMANCE TESTS UN- in the field. A later review indicated that TIL ALL ATTRIBUTES ARE EVALUATED this ineffective job match was the primary reason for failure in the OSS operational environment.1 Likewise, the SAS had developed an assessment-and-selection process because a large number of its men TRAIN REMAINING SOLDIERS had been proven unsuitable for their jobs. ON KEY MISSION SKILLS That mismatch resulted in a substantial waste of resources.2 In 1987, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School began developing a selection program to use in screening candidates for Special Forces training. The first SF assessment and selection began in June APPRENTICE 1988. SOF assessment-and-selection programs

May 1996 17 have continued to evolve and to expand. the various SOF units, the statistics are Today they are also used to screen candi- representative of all those programs. The dates for the Rangers and for the 160th overall assessment-and-selection process Special Operations Aviation Regiment. typically begins with an initial screening Assessment and selection is a sequential based on a soldier’s GT test score from the process designed to screen out, as early as ASVAB. Only 35 percent of all soldiers possible, soldiers who do not possess the achieve the required score of 110. The sec- attributes required for mission success. ond screening is based on the soldier’s PT The overall process (shown on page 17) test score — only 59 percent of those who begins with a review of current and future take this test meet the requirements. Sol- mission requirements. The next step is to diers who pass the first two screenings, identify the attributes soldiers must have satisfy a background check and meet spe- to perform their missions successfully. cific psychological requirements are eligi- Trainers then develop or adapt screening ble to attend a structured assessment-and- tools that can determine whether the sol- selection program, where they undergo diers possess the critical attributes. Once additional psychological and performance the tools have been validated, they are screening. used in the assessment programs. Included There is a great deal of truth in the in the screening tools are the General adage, “The best predictor of future per- Technical Composite, or GT, of the Armed formance is past performance.” However, Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, or individuals mature with experience, so the ASVAB; physical-fitness tests; and spatial- best predictor of one’s future performance relations tests. is his recent performance on similar tasks. The figure below shows the sequential The screening process enables the Army to SOF assessment-and-selection process. select those soldiers who are likely to meet While the numbers vary slightly among performance standards. Assessment con- the assessment-and-selection programs of tinues into the training phase, where sol-

Sequential SOF Assessment and Selection Process

OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT ASSIGNMENT SCREENING & SELECTION TRAINING & CONTINUED ASSESSMENT

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASVAB MISSION PT TEST PERFORMANCE UNIT GT-110 & SITUATIONAL TASKS TESTS

35% MEET 59% MEET 14% MEET 95% MEET 99.5% MEET REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS

18 Special Warfare diers undergo situational testing. nance, for example, spatial-relations tests Soldiers selected during the assessment- could help identify soldiers who have the and-selection process have a high probabil- potential to read and use complex wiring ity of success during operational training diagrams and schematics of mechanical and assignment. SOF have achieved 95 linkages. These tests could also identify percent success in training and more than soldiers with particular skills and inter- 99 percent success during operational ests in a specific series of aircraft such as assignments. Research proves that the attack helicopters. (Assigning mainte- overall monetary savings resulting from nance personnel into different mission the selection-and-assessment process have tracks, after having considered their far outweighed the initial investment. skills, abilities and interests, is consistent Some of the key lessons learned during with the Army Aviation Center’s past the 20 years of SOF assessment and selec- approach to the assignment of aviators.) tion are as follows: The technological advances in informa- • The assessment-and-selection process tion-age computing could make it easier to enables the Army to select the right sol- develop a means of testing a soldier at each dier for a specific job. stage of his or her career. Individual soldier • The assessment-and-selection process is performance in realistic simulations, exer- cost-effective and enhances individual cises and operational assignments could be and unit effectiveness. objectively recorded into databases. The • Candidates should be screened early. information could be retrieved as needed, • Screening should continue through job- and considered in assignment decisions. related situational and performance The figure on page 20 depicts a hypothet- tests. ical example in which institutional training • Performance evaluation during the and assessment data, along with evalua- assessment-and-selection process tions from operational assignments (effi- should relate to the critical attributes ciency reports), could be used to support the identified in the mission analysis. selection of new commanders. The key • Objective performance standards should attributes required for success in the new be established for assessment, selection command position might be those listed to and initial training. the left of the figure. Scores for various offi- In applying SOF assessment-and-selec- cers’ performance on tasks related to the tion methods to other career-management key attributes would be recorded. For exam- fields, the Army could identify tests and ple, Officer A has the scores 9, 3, 8 and 5; measures that are predictive of the desired Officer B has the scores 7, 2, 5 and 2. The mission performance. These could be used prediction model would combine each offi- at military entrance and processing sta- cer’s scores, placing emphasis on the vari- tions, or MEPS, and incorporated into basic ables that represent the predictors of suc- military training, or BMT. For instance, the cess for that particular job. As a result, the ASVAB could be augmented with addition- selection board would have an objective al tests and measures to assess the sol- analysis — a rank-ordering of candidates — dier’s ability to perform a specific require- to support its selection decisions. ment, such as learning a second language. It is important that the selection process Programs should be developed to maxi- address only the needs identified by the mize the use of the Army’s training cen- mission analysis. A thorough mission ters and schools as primary sites for per- analysis and the validation process adhere forming screening and assessment. Early to the principle that “perfect” is the enemy testing could identify those candidates of “good enough.” The screen that the can- who do not possess specific aptitudes and didates must pass through should be only skills, and it could also identify those as fine as the mission analysis dictates. whose skills and interests match profiles It is also critical to note that the board of particular jobs within a career-manage- phase of the assessment-and-selection ment field. In the field of aircraft mainte- process is indispensable. While the assess-

May 1996 19 Assessment Model for Commanders (O-6 and below) KEY ATTRIBUTES FOR SUCCESS SCORES* IDENTIFIED A B

■ ABILITY TO PROCESS AND INTEGRATE A 9 7 LARGE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION ■ ABILITY TO MAKE SCORES 3 2 ■ BOARD REVIEW ORDER OUT ENTERED CANDIDATES OF DATA OF AMBIGUOUS INTO A RANK- ■ SITUATIONS SELECTION DE- 8 5 PREDICTION ORDERED CISION MADE ■ ADAPTABLE MODEL ■ EFFECTIVE IN WORK- ING WITH SENIOR 5 2 AND SUBORDINATE OFFICERS AND NCOs

* SCORES BASED ON INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING & ASSESSMENT, OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENT (OERs)

ment process is strongly dependent upon by using methods that have proven to be empirical data, assessment is an art, not a effective in measuring aptitude and poten- science. Paper-and-pencil drills, by them- tial, in determining compatibility, and in selves, cannot substitute for the judgment placing each soldier into the job that is of leaders who are trained and experienced compatible with the individual’s abilities. in the operational environment.3 Soldier assessment and job selection, if One final point to consider is that assess- continued throughout the soldier’s life ment and selection is a dynamic process cycle of professional development, should that requires continual validation. The result in increased retention and mission SOF community maintains the closest pos- effectiveness. In order to leverage our sible relationship with the Army Research human resources, we must select the right Institute, or ARI, in order to gain assist- personnel for the force and make every ance for the continual validation of SOF’s effort to retain them. various assessment-and-selection process- A study of SOF’s successful assessment- es. In the past 12 years, ARI has conducted and-selection processes has led to the fol- several research projects that support lowing conclusions: these processes. On SOF’s behalf, ARI has • A front-end analysis to determine mis- surveyed various populations and provided sion requirements and the required sol- insight into such issues as SOF retention, dier attributes should be the first step in officer assessment and selection, minority assessment and selection. recruiting, and periodic reassessment of • Processes of assessment and selection the force. should be tailored to address the critical Despite the emphasis on technology and elements necessary for mission success. information warfare for Force XXI, we • Force XXI soldier assessment should must not neglect the importance of the build on successful approaches that human component. The Army must maxi- have evolved over the years. mize the potential of its human resources • Force XXI assessment-and-selection

20 Special Warfare programs should use information-age ical Research Laboratory. At the Fort Ruck- computer technology to produce a better er ARI Field Unit, his research continued job-soldier match. on aviator selection, screening, training, • The application of appropriate assess- performance assessment, and retention. Dr. ment-and-selection procedures reduces Sanders also served as the ARI field unit attrition, increases job satisfaction and chief at Fort Gordon, Ga., where his unit enhances mission performance. performed research on training technology Greater use of assessment-and-selection enhancements for Signal soldiers. He holds techniques should be strongly considered a master’s and a doctorate in experimental for Force XXI. To support future demands, psychology, with an emphasis on human training centers should evolve into train- factors. ing-and-assessment centers. The wise use of assessment-and-selection techniques Notes: will improve the job-soldier match, 1 Office of Strategic Services Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men, Selection of Personnel for the increase retention throughout the soldier’s Office of Strategic Services (New York: Rinehart & life cycle, increase job satisfaction and Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 14, 18-20 and 459. enhance mission performance. The chal- 2 From personal correspondence between Colonel lenges associated with the changes we Thomas M. Carlin and Lieutenant Colonel John M. have proposed are considerable, but they Woodhouse, RA (ret.), commanding officer of the 22 SAS from 1962 to 1965. Woodhouse served in Malaya are consistent with other changes antici- with the Malayan Scouts (SAS), the post-World War II pated as the Army continually evolves predecessor of the 22 SAS. Then a major, he was per- toward a force for the 21st century. sonally responsible for establishing the SAS’s assessment, selection and training process in 1952 at the direction of the commander of the newly created 22 SAS. Colonel Thomas M. Carlin 3 OSS Assessment Staff, p. 459. is commander of the 5th Spe- cial Forces Group. He entered the Army in December 1973. Since December 1975, his special-operations assignments have included command of special-operations elements at the captain, major and lieutenant-colonel levels. He has served as a deputy commanding officer and on a joint special-operations staff. He holds master’s degrees in international relations and in security management. From January 1989 until June 1991, Carlin commanded an assessment-and- training detachment that was, in part, responsible for the administration of one of SOF’s assessment-and-selection processes.

Dr. Mike Sanders has served as chief of the Fort Bragg office of the Army Research Institute since July 1994. He and other ARI psychologists provide research support to the SOF community on topics that address the life cycle of the soldier, including recruiting, assessment and selection, training and retention. He began service in the Army at Fort Rucker,Ala., as an active-duty aviation psychologist at the Army Aeromed-

May 1996 21 A Short History of SF Assessment and Selection

by Major Sam Young

Throughout U.S. history, soldiers have ing inductees, 21-30 years old, using two volunteered for duty that was different and procedures: a physical examination and a more dangerous than conventional assign- newly developed intelligence-quotient test. ments. This was true for those who served These procedures revealed widespread with Robert Rogers’ Rangers during the illiteracy and physical disabilities among French and Indian War; with Francis Mar- the ranks of the inductees.3 ion, “The Swamp Fox,” during the Revolu- Until the early 1940s, selection for spe- tionary War; and with Colonel John Mosby, cial-mission units remained basically the the Confederate cavalry leader, during the same as in Robert Rogers’ time: Soldiers American Civil War. Each of these units “migrated” to those units and were used tactics and techniques that were con- assessed while on the job. With the coming sidered unconventional, and each unit of World War II, the newly created Office of required soldiers who could adapt to Strategic Services made great progress in unique demands. the selection of personnel for unconven- There was no formal selection process for tional units. these units. The heat of battle weeded out those who were physically, mentally or OSS morally unsuited. If a soldier did not have The OSS’s mission included infiltrating the special skills and abilities that the unit personnel into Axis-occupied territories, required, or if he did not have the aptitude organizing guerrilla armies, and conducting to learn quickly, he was soon either trans- sabotage and subversion missions. Seeking ferred, wounded or killed. the best-qualified personnel for these The lack of selection procedures was not demanding missions, the U.S. War Depart- restricted to special-mission units. In ment tasked psychiatrists and psychologists George Washington’s day, the only prereq- to screen and select candidates for positions uisite for joining the Army was that the throughout the OSS organization. candidate be a male U.S. citizen.1 The pro- The assessment team modeled its proc- viso of citizenship was intended more to ess on the work of Fred Taylor, an early motivate citizens into doing their duty management theorist who conducted stud- than to screen possible candidates. ies on efficiency, task construction and It was not until 1917 that selection pro- worker productivity. Taylor’s studies sug- cedures were used for U.S. soldiers. On gested that in order to achieve the best March 28 of that year, President Woodrow results on a specific task, managers should Wilson formally approved the use of a draft observe the “best” worker’s method of to man the Army.2 The Army began screen-

22 Special Warfare Members of the OSS Jed- burghs climb an obstacle during training. Courtesy National Archives accomplishing the task, and have all other assessment team incorporated the organis- workers imitate that method.4 mic and elementalistic approaches into the The assessment team researched two process. approaches to assessment: organismic and Once the proper approach had been elementalistic. The organismic approach determined, the team had to identify the assesses an individual’s performance on an desired end state of the candidates — the assigned task or in a difficult situation.5 foundation of any assessment or selection For example, an individual is given an ax process. To obtain information about the and a set of climbing spurs and is instruct- full range of tasks that soldiers might ed to retrieve an object from a tree. The encounter, the team approached OSS staff way the individual accomplishes the task members who were developing deployment reveals much about his personality and plans. Unfortunately, because of the behavior. uniqueness and the newness of the OSS While the organismic approach requires organization, no institutional knowledge assessors to develop situations that will existed.6 The team knew only that the com- allow them to evaluate behavior, the ele- mon-task missions included conducting mentalistic approach, which was in its sabotage, organizing resistance groups, infancy during the early 1940s, identifies and developing propaganda campaigns. personality traits through written tests. For Beyond that, no one could assist the team example, a series of questions can reveal in identifying personality traits consistent behavioral or personality traits about an with mission success. individual when he answers in a particular Once the traits had been defined, the fashion or pattern. team also had to develop the most effective Believing that a combination approach method of assessing those traits in candi- would better capture a candidate’s capabil- dates. An assessment program should have ities and predict his performance, the a certain degree of flexibility so that it will

May 1996 23 not overlook skills that could be put to use a period of time, Special Forces assessment in other areas of the organization. In and selection was very much organismic. assessing personnel for combat and haz- In 1954 the PSYWAR Center contracted ardous situations, the OSS assessment researchers from George Washington Uni- team also considered those who might be versity to determine specific personality qualified for administrative positions and factors or traits that would be most likely intelligence-gathering and processing posi- to ensure a soldier’s success in Special tions. There was also flexibility in the OSS Forces. To accomplish this task, the hiring process: While the assessment team researchers used innovative techniques.11 provided an assessment and a recommen- For example, they asked 10th SF Group dation based on a candidate’s qualifica- soldiers to place their colleagues into one of tions, the OSS board was the final author- three categories – superior, inferior or in- ity. In rare cases, the board selected an between – regarding their probable success individual who had been rated “not recom- in combat. Combining the data collected mended” or “unsuited.”7 from these evaluations, researchers placed soldiers into one of the three categories. Special Forces They then distributed questionnaires and At the close of World War II, the OSS was administered psychological tests to select- disbanded. However, with the beginning of ed soldiers in the superior and inferior cat- the Cold War era and with the growing egories in order to identify the personality threat of communism, members of the U.S. traits, attitudes and personal histories pre- War Department’s Psychological Warfare dictive of success in Special Forces. Department saw the urgent need for a The elementalistic approach to assess- unique force capable of conducting uncon- ment began to re-emerge in 1961, when the ventional-warfare missions similar to basis for Special Forces selection and train- those which had been conducted by the ing changed. Admission into Special OSS. In 1952, to develop that unique force, Forces, which by this time consisted of the the Army established the Psychological 10th, 7th and 1st SF groups, became more Warfare Center and activated the 10th difficult. In addition to implementing a res- Special Forces Group – both organizations ident training course,12 the Army Special were based at Fort Bragg, N.C. Warfare School began administering the The 10th Group’s selection process was Special Forces Selection Battery to screen different from the one which had been used out volunteers who were not likely to suc- by the OSS. To volunteer for Special Forces, ceed in SF training. soldiers had to satisfy the following criteria: The selection battery consisted of four • Meet the physical qualifications for tests: the Special Forces Suitability Inven- parachute duty. tory — to measure personality aspects suit- • Score a minimum of 200 on the physical- able for Special Forces activity; the Critical fitness test. Decisions Test — to measure a soldier’s • Not be over age 36, with exceptions risk- or chance-taking tendencies; the Loca- granted. tions Test — to measure a soldier’s ability • Have completed 10 weeks of basic to perceive terrain features by reading a training. map; and the Infantry Aptitude Area — to • Be airborne-qualified or volunteer for measure soldiers’ potential for developing airborne training.8 infantry skills. On Aug. 21, 1961, the Once accepted into the 10th Group, sol- Department of the Army also revised the diers were evaluated, often during field- regulation governing Special Forces training exercises,9 on their job perform- entrance criteria, adding the following pre- ance. Limited SF training courses were con- requisites to the ones established in the ducted at the PSYWAR Center,10 but the 1952 regulation: authority to award SF qualification was • Have an interim secret security restricted to the group commander. Thus for clearance. • Be able to swim.

24 Special Warfare • Pass the Special Forces Selection tions, the sole avenue to SF qualification. Battery.13 Although the training and qualification Just over a year later, on Aug. 29, 1962, courses have varied, they have typically the Department of the Army again revised consisted of three or four phases devoted to the Special Forces entrance criteria, SF common skills, SF MOS training, and adding the following: field training exercises. Until 1988, sol- • Achieve a score of 100 or higher on the diers were also observed and assessed dur- Infantry Aptitude Area. ing the first phase in an effort to determine • Achieve a score of 380 or higher on the their suitability for Special Forces. They Special Forces Selection Battery regard- were subjected to harsh conditions, such as less of score on the Critical Decisions stress, sleep deprivation, time constraints Test or, and physical exertion, which were • Achieve a score of 370-379 on the Spe- designed to test their motivation and com- cial Forces Selection Battery, and score mitment to complete the training. 50 or higher on the Critical Decisions Test. SFAS Despite the changes in selection criteria In the mid-1980s, the Special Warfare and training, the authority to award SF Center and School, in an attempt to save qualification remained exclusively with SF training time and resources, began design- group commanders until the early 1970s.14 ing a program in which soldiers could be Afterward, SF commanders and the U.S. assessed before they attended the SF Qual- Army Institute for Military Assistance ification Course. In 1987, project officers shared qualification authority. This from SWCS began working with the Army arrangement continued until 1977, when Research Institute to define desirable per- completion of the Special Forces Qualifica- sonality traits and effective methods of tion Course became, with limited excep-

The OSS selected candidates based on their ability to overcome difficult situations. Here, members of the Jedburghs climb a tower during their training.

Courtesy National Archives

May 1996 25 OSS soldiers, such as these Jedburghs attending a demolitions class, received extensive psychological testing to determine their behavioral traits. Courtesy National Archives assessing human behavior. In June 1988, through their own desire and motivation. SWCS conducted the first Special Forces As they experience periods of limited sleep Assessment and Selection, or SFAS. and increasing stress, soldiers are evaluat- The selection process that had been ed on cognitive reasoning, teamwork and developed for the OSS became one of the leadership through events modeled on foundations of SFAS.15 Assessors in SFAS those used by the OSS.17 still observe candidates for positive and The OSS used extensive psychological negative displays associated with the and situational testing to determine the behavioral traits that have been deter- personality and behavioral traits of candi- mined best for the organization. A board dates. SFAS, however, does not use psycho- then selects soldiers who have demonstrat- logical testing to determine a soldier’s suited the desired behavior. ability to begin or to remain in the pro- During SFAS, soldiers are tested during gram.18 It is used to determine any incli- times of stress. For example, soldiers suf- nations toward extreme deviations from fering from sleep deprivation may be the norm. These findings are then reported required to march long distances while car- to the selection board. Soldiers may also rying 45-pound field packs. The concept of demonstrate abnormal behavioral patterns SFAS evaluation and assessment is based while undergoing physical and psychologi- on the “whole man” theory.16 Evaluators cal stress during SFAS.19 If so, course eval- assess a soldier’s physical and psychologi- uators also submit that information to the cal abilities to accomplish a task. Soldiers selection board. are not coerced into completing arduous More than 50 years ago, the authors of the tasks — in fact, they are given every oppor- OSS program stated, “It is easy to predict tunity to quit. They must have the will and precisely the outcome of the meeting of one the desire to perform each assigned task, known chemical with another known chemi- and they must complete the program cal in an immaculate test tube. But where is

26 Special Warfare the chemist who can predict what will hap- Warfare School (1956), the U.S. Army John F. pen to a known chemical if it meets an Kennedy Center for Special Warfare (1964), the U.S. unknown chemical in an unknown vessel?”20 Army Institute for Military Assistance (1969), and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center Since that time, assessment and selection of (1983). It took on its current name, the U.S. Army candidates for Special Forces, using the OSS John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School program as a basis, has advanced to a in 1986. sophisticated process using mission-oriented 11 Herbert Abelson, Factors Related to the Effective- tasks and psychological testing. Yet despite ness of Special Forces Personnel (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, August 1954), pp. 18- these advances, evaluators still grapple with 24. the challenge that OSS researchers faced in 12 Rudolph Berkhouse, Research on Selection and the early 1940s: anticipating and predicting Special Forces Manpower Problems – Status Report human performance. (Behavioral Evaluation Research Laboratory, Army Project OJ95-60-001, Study 63-2). 13 Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1963. 14 From the records of the Command Historian, U.S. Major (P) Sam Young is Army Special Operations Command. the deputy inspector general 15 Beer, Spector, Lawrence, Mills, Walton, Human for inspections, U. S. Army Resource Management: A General Manager’s Perspec- Special Operations Com- tive (New York: The Free Press, 1985), p. 339. 16 Personal interview with John Galland, former mand. His previous Special commander of the Special Forces Assessment and Forces assignments include Selection Course, 1993. commander of Company F, 17 Galland interview. 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK 18 Telephone interview with Dr. Morgan Banks, Special Warfare Center and School; com- staff psychologist for the 1st Special Warfare Training Group, December 1993. mander of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 7th 19 Banks interview. Special Forces Group; chief of the Infiltra- 20 OSS Assessment Staff. tion and Studies Branches, Directorate of Combat Developments, USAJFKSWCS; and detachment commander in the 10th Special Forces Group. He has held various staff and leadership assignments in the 25th and 101st Infantry Divisions. He holds a master’s degree in administration from Central Michigan University.

Notes: 1 John W. Chambers, To Raise an Army (New York: The Free Press, 1987), pp. 21-230. 2 Chambers. 3 Chambers. 4 Author’s notes from a lecture by Dr. Robert Green- wood during a management history course at Central Michigan University, 1993. 5 Office of Strategic Services Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men (New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1948). 6 OSS Assessment Staff. 7 OSS Assessment Staff. 8 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Special Regulation 600-160-10, April, 1952. 9 Telephone interview with Fred Funk (Fort Bragg, N.C.: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 28 January 1994). 10 The institution responsible for training Special Forces and other elements of SOF has a history of its own. Over the years, it has been named the Psycho- logical Warfare Center (1952), the U.S. Army Special

May 1996 27 The Role Technology Can’t Fill

by Sergeant First Class Michael W. Devotie

Recent articles in Special Warfare and in nam. As the conflict progressed, the flow of other publications suggest that technology newly designed gadgets turned into a flood. will provide solutions to problems encoun- For those within the defense establish- tered by United States military forces ment, faith in technology became the new engaged in difficult missions such as coun- religion: American technology could solve terinsurgency, peacekeeping or peace any problem, anytime, anywhere. High- enforcement. Some military experts have ranking officials in Washington placed their even predicted that Special Forces missions faith in gadgets, and numbers replaced real- may eventually be performed by computers ity. Our leaders overlooked or ignored the and precision weapons systems. There has fundamental truths about fighting a also been a suggestion that because of tech- strange war in a far-off place, where rules nological advances, SF could become a relic did not apply and state-of-the-art war of the past, replaced by the “new warriors” — machines were ineffective. presumably, computer wizards. Some of the newly developed gadgets were While we are being inundated with pre- tiny, such as the micro-gravel mines. There dictions about what technology can do to were also huge undertakings, including the solve our problems, we might consider our massive spraying of both herbicides and defo- not-so-distant history as a lesson in what liants on thousands of acres of jungle. Some technology can’t do. devices, such as infrared warning transmit- During the Vietnam conflict, U.S. forces ters and “starlight scopes,” worked well. Oth- were successful in pitched battles with ers, such as “people sniffers,” which were North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong designed to detect humans by the ammonia units. However, our forces became weary of in their perspiration, were abject failures. the frustrations, uncertainties and hazards One device that might have helped our of combating the VC’s unconventional-war- forces was never developed: a truth detector fare tactics. Although our Special Forces capable of quickly and accurately identify- had effective countering techniques, our ing a person as friend or foe. Distinguishing conventional forces did not have the special friend from foe is a problem encountered in training or equipment to use them. all environments, but during ambiguous The military’s response was characteristi- operations, such as counterinsurgency and cally American: Believing that miraculous operations other than war, the problem is inventions would help expedite a decisive vic- amplified. tory for the U.S., the Army developed its own Insurgent forces have learned to use the technology to help eliminate the ambiguities cover of the local populace to hide their and frustrations it was experiencing in Viet- activities. They conceal their loyalties; they

28 Special Warfare organize, train and plan; and at the most methods inaccessible to high-tech devices. advantageous time for their cause, they Large operations such as Desert Storm strike. In some countries, participation by demonstrate the stupidity of engaging in a U.S. or coalition forces is desired by some set-piece battle with a technologically superi- factions and opposed by others. Factions or force. Our enemies, no doubt, will study may seek to use peacekeeping forces as a Desert Storm and choose a more indirect buffer or as a screen for their activities. Still route. We face great danger in assuming that others may simply wish to be rid of all for- future enemies will have mission capabilities eigners, and they plan actions designed to equal to ours and that they will use the same weaken U.S. resolve and support. When con- fighting techniques that we use. They might ducting these actions, the irregular force instead trump our strong suit and strike us attacks our weakest points. in a manner for which we are unprepared, Although we have information-gathering just as the Viet Cong did nearly 30 years ago. platforms that can detect a small vehicle Should this occur, the need for SF will moving in darkness hundreds of miles away, become more urgent rather than diminish. can we determine whether the vehicle’s SF may be at a ideological crossroads. occupants are hostile? Satellites can photo- Should we become computer gurus, teach- graph a group of people standing in the cen- ing foreign personnel the techniques of wag- ter of a village, but can we determine ing war through cyberspace, or should we whether there are insurgents among the continue to teach basic and advanced mili- group? Can remote, high-tech devices locate tary skills? The multiskilled operators in SF key threat individuals in a given country? are too valuable a resource to lose by nar- Can machines and technology establish rap- rowing the mission focus of SF. Certainly we port and build trust with the local populace? should evaluate and adopt any new technol- Even with our advanced technology, it is ogy that enhances our mission capabilities, unlikely that we will ever be able to invent a but we need not become members of the device that can read and analyze a human “software of the month club.” mind or determine a person’s intentions. If we blindly chase computer technology, Perhaps the most effective way of determin- we risk becoming an organization that is no ing a person’s loyalty or his whereabouts is more effective at conducting unconventional to seek out members of the local populace warfare than IBM is. Regardless of how and ask them. Since only they know the true badly the “new warriors” would like to wage orientations of their countrymen, they are bloodless computer conflicts, wars are still the best sources of information. won by seizing and holding ground, and Military planners and foreign-policy force will continue to be the ultimate solu- strategists seem to agree that in the fore- tion in most conflicts. seeable future, U.S. forces will most likely be used in small, ambiguous brush-fire wars. The value and the utility of SF in these con- Sergeant First Class Mi- fusing environments have already been chael W. Devotie is one of three demonstrated. Decision-makers who are not enlisted doctrine writers well acquainted with special operations assigned to the Special Forces should understand that the ability to per- Doctrine Division, Directorate form precision-strike operations is but one of Training and Doctrine, capability of SF – and one that is perhaps USAJFKSWCS. During his over-emphasized. Other SF capabilities, military career he has served in the 101st derived from our core mission of unconven- Airborne Division, the 2nd Infantry Divi- tional warfare, allow SF to operate and suc- sion, the 24th Infantry Division, the 278th ceed in ambiguous situations. Language Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Tennessee abilities and interpersonal-communications National Guard, the 82nd Airborne Divi- skills, combined with cultural awareness sion, and the 1st, 7th and 3rd Special Forces and area orientation, enable SF to gather groups. information from sources and through

May 1996 29 How to Succeed in Foreign Internal Defense

by Colonel J.S. Ranger Roach, U.S. Army (ret.)

There seems to be a consensus force. FID missions provide sup- to accept our ideas and recom- among the senior leadership of port to Third World nations that mendations. We represent Army special-operations forces can neither afford high technolo- change, and change is almost that foreign internal defense, or gy nor maintain an overwhelm- always resisted. Therefore, we FID, will continue to be the prima- ing force. must be prepared to seize any ry mission of Special Forces. • United States military leaders opportunity that a receptive The FID mission is clearly in are trained to focus on the syn- host-nation commander pre- keeping with the operations of SF’s chronization of overwhelming sents. Host-country units have forerunners — the World War II military force. Third World mili- their own standards, and we Jedburgh teams who supported the tary leaders do not control over- should be sensitive to how much French Resistance in its fight whelming force; they have to and how quickly they are willing against the Nazi occupation force. develop mission-analysis strate- to change. The unconventional-warfare tradi- gies that will enable them to • Conventional military operations tion established by the Jedburghs gain a tactical advantage. focus on operational-security continues in Special Forces today, • U.S. leaders focus solely on the measures. But in FID, part of the and our UW skills are extremely military element of national fight for the support of the popu- well-suited to the FID environ- power, but our Third World coun- lation takes place in the open ment. Given more information on terparts must play legitimate press. Anti-government forces, how to succeed in FID, our soldiers roles in the other three elements notably the narcos in South Amer- can become even more effective. of national power: economic, polit- ica, use the press to spread disin- Experience has taught us that ical and informational. formation that undermines their FID and conventional military mis- • Our military doctrine stresses the government and any cooperation sions have different operational importance of synchronization, it has with the U.S. government. environments: but Third World military leaders Simply put, this is an example of • Conventional military missions must approach their mission of information warfare. Real-time, focus on destroying enemy units; internal defense and develop- worldwide news reporting deeply FID focuses on building friendly ment from a perspective that influences the public. If we treat military institutions. emphasizes agility and initiative. the news media as the enemy, we • Conventional military opera- We have also learned that FID forfeit an important opportunity tions are normally conducted in presents some distinct challenges: to counter disinformation. weeks or months; FID may per- • In our attempts to help Third • The paradigm for conventional sist for decades. World armies improve their military operations is “move, • Conventional military missions agility and initiative, one of our shoot, and communicate.” While emphasize high-technology greatest challenges has been we should teach our counter- weapons and overwhelming convincing host-country officials parts to apply that paradigm, we

30 Special Warfare should also expand our perspec- The theater-command headquar- sented to the host country, but the tive. In FID we are a catalyst for ters and the theater special-opera- training is only the end product of a change; therefore, we must tions command are the operational complex process. Prior to deploying maintain a presence in order to chain of command for SOF. But in on a FID mission, soldiers receive effectively influence our coun- FID, their primary responsibility is their deployment orders through the terparts. We must be patient and to determine the needs of the coun- formal tasking channel. But once understand that our counter- tries and to prioritize our efforts they are in country, soldiers often parts will not change as quickly between these countries. Because receive additional taskings from the as we would like, and we must those headquarters are not in a MILGROUP and the host country’s be persistent and continue work- position to directly supervise the military. Soldiers then tailor a pro- ing the important issues in a execution of training programs, gram of instruction that will satisfy manner that does not offend our they rely on the Military Group, or the MILGROUP, the host-country’s counterparts. We must teach MILGROUP, which is part of the military, and the requirements set “move, shoot and communicate,” U.S. Embassy country team. forth in their deployment orders. but we must live “presence, The embassy country team is The reality of a FID mission is patience and persistence.” • In a FID mission, the critical implied task is that we help a In FID we are a catalyst for change; therefore, we host-country force to adapt to must maintain a presence in order to effectively necessary change and to evolve into a more effective organiza- influence our counterparts. We must be patient and tion. Institutional change takes place over a period of time; understand that our counterparts will not change therefore, we must realize that as quickly as we would like, and we must be per- short-term deployments are but one step in a long journey. sistent and continue working the important issues Customers in a manner that does not offend our counterparts. In the U.S., the organizations involved in the planning of a FID responsible for all U.S. activity with- that it requires not only skilled mission include Department of in its respective country. Each coun- instructors but also skilled systems Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, try team has developed a strategy analysts, curriculum developers and Department of the Army, Depart- for influencing the host-country’s negotiators, all of whom must have ment of State, International Nar- government. A FID mission must fit the ability to ensure that the train- cotics Matters, Agency for Interna- into a particular country team’s ing program is acceptable to the tional Development, U.S. Special strategy, but this rarely creates a myriad personalities and organiza- Operations Command, U.S. Army problem, since FID missions nor- tions involved. Many aspects of a Special Operations Command, U.S. mally begin in the MILGROUP.The FID mission evolve according to the Army Special Forces Command, MILGROUP commander is an needs of the organization involved; and the applicable Special Forces important member of the embassy therefore, patience is a virtue in group and battalion headquarters. country team and serves as the pri- working through the planning and Each has important responsibili- mary military adviser to the ambas- execution phases. Soldiers who lose ties in resourcing, training, certify- sador. He also serves as the person- their patience and composure also ing, coordinating and deploying al representative of the regional lose their effectiveness. teams for FID missions. commander in chief, or CINC, and A theater-command headquar- ensures that the CINC’s concerns Interpersonal skills ters is responsible for all military are addressed in the country team’s In a FID mission, SF soldiers operations conducted in theater. strategy. typically work with personnel in One level down is the theater spe- each level of the host-country force, cial-operations command, responsi- Product from the brigade commander to the ble for all operations conducted in When discussing the FID mission, common soldiers. Host-country theater by special-operations forces. we often focus on the training pre- senior officers may have as much

May 1996 31 civilian and military education as gram we have contracted with demonstrate supervised practical the U.S. senior officers. We should the host-country commander, we exercises and then allow the sol- not approach any host-country should offer our services when- diers to practice them. We should forces with the attitude that we are ever we have the opportunity. also request feedback from the sol- going to “train” them. This kind of • Organizational consulting. This diers. Because of their strong attitude is classic “ugly American,” is the ultimate phase. We may be desire to please us, host-country and it is not realistic. invited to perform this role if we soldiers will rarely admit any diffi- Normally, we can develop rap- have completed the first three culty in understanding material port in four phases: phases in a manner that demon- covered in a formal presentation. • Training preparation. We should strates our support for the local Require them to demonstrate their plan a training program that is commander. We are most effec- proficiency, and drill them repeat- appropriate for the host coun- tive in this phase when working edly. Continue this process until try’s requirements. During the indirectly. Once our host-country they can successfully execute the site survey, ask the local com- counterparts have recommend- tasks and can critique one anoth- mander to define his priorities. ed a course of action, we should er’s performance. Performance-ori- Allowing the host-country com- reinforce their ideas rather than ented training, rather than class- mander to participate in the seeking a solution of our own. room instruction, is crucial. development of the training program validates his ownership Although the host- Presence and ensures his support for the No matter which level of the training-execution phase. country soldiers may be host-country organization you’re • Training execution. Although we dealing with, your presence, both are responsible for executing the dedicated, strong, intel- on-duty and off-duty, is key to long- training program, we must be ligent and brave, … term success. A Salvadoran colonel flexible enough to modify it in once made an unsolicited but inter- accordance with the guidance because of their lack of esting comment on the difference provided by the host-country he saw between U.S. Special Forces commander. The program may classroom experience, soldiers and U.S. conventional sol- also have to be changed if the their knowledge base is diers: “When any other Army offi- host-country forces are not pre- cer or NCO arrived to work a proj- pared for the level of training limited and their learn- ect with my Salvadoran brigade, planned. This is always a sensi- they would have a short meeting tive issue – and one that is mag- ing skills are impaired. with the brigade commander and nified by national pride. No one perhaps the brigade executive offi- wants to be reminded that he In dealing with host-country sol- cer, but then it was lunch time, and needs more work on the basics; diers, we should adjust our pace to they would leave to go eat a ham- however, if soldiers haven’t mas- theirs. The rifles they carry may burger at a local restaurant. They tered the basics, focusing on represent the highest level of tech- would return to visit once a week more advanced topics would nology that they have ever experi- for updates on the project. waste our time and theirs. enced. A task that U.S. Army “On the other hand, when Spe- • Garrison management. This is recruits can learn in one day may cial Forces soldiers arrived, they perhaps the most important of well take two or three days for not only talked to the brigade com- the four phases. We should do Third World soldiers to master. mander and executive officer, but whatever we can to help the Although the host-country soldiers also to all the members of the local commander solve his may be dedicated, strong, intelli- brigade staff. When it was lunch “housekeeping” problems. In the gent and brave, the majority of time, they stayed and ate tortillas, past, 7th SF Group soldiers have them may also be functionally illit- rice and beans with us. After lunch, voluntarily repaired plumbing, erate. These soldiers have a great they went down and talked to the performed maintenance on vehi- desire to do well in training, but battalion commanders, company cles, and reorganized arms because of their lack of classroom commanders and anyone else who rooms and dispensaries. experience, their knowledge base is was in the area. The Special Forces Although volunteer assistance limited and their learning skills soldiers spent the time and came to cannot eclipse the training pro- are impaired. We must explain and

32 Special Warfare Performance-oriented training, rather than classroom instruction, is critical in FID missions.

Photo by Douglas Wisnioski understand our organizations and to laugh at ourselves, makes us more have only 40 rounds of rifle ammu- our problems as well as we did.” approachable and more effective. nition per soldier for a week of These observations perfectly Humor can be misinterpreted, how- training. Yet we are expected to match the author’s experience: To ever, and we should exercise great zero the soldiers’ weapons; qualify understand the people with whom care in making sure that we commu- the soldiers on a range which we you are working, to be accepted by nicate only the meaning intended. have had to construct; and train them, and to be effective, you must the soldiers in individual tactical invest your time. Informal contacts Standards movement, buddy-team move- are extremely important in winning Our Army focuses on the highest ment, fire-team movement, and the confidence of your counterparts. of standards. We strive to provide squad fire and movement. Obvi- Regarding personal comfort, we information to individuals and ously we will not be able to train must be willing to live in the same units that will improve their per- these soldiers to the same stan- primitive conditions that the host- formance. In our attempts to dards as a Ranger regiment rifle country soldiers endure. We are improve, we often overlook the 85 company, but we can improve their there to help the leader solve percent of our effort that went well operational capability. his problems, not to create addi- and focus on the 15 percent that Given the obvious differences tional ones for him by demanding didn’t. Although this emphasis is between our military and the support that he doesn’t have and necessary if we are to improve, we host-country’s military, it would can’t provide. If we demonstrate often forget how effective and be easy to look down on Third respect and competence and com- sophisticated we have become, until World militaries as not being in municate a desire to help the we visit a Third World country and our league. Frankly, they aren’t. If leader solve his problems, we will see their performance problems. we were to engage in direct com- be accepted and, perhaps, so will For instance, we may worry bat with them, the U.S. Army no our recommendations. about the percentage of our sol- doubt would win decisively. But Humor is an important social diers who achieve an expert rifle they don’t need the ability to fight lubricant, and it is all the more qualification, whereas host-coun- in our league – we’re not their important when we are working in try soldiers might never have had enemies. They should, however, be Third World countries. We represent the ammunition with which to able to confront their own coun- the most powerful military in the zero their weapons. If we are work- try’s problems and threats. world, and our simple presence is ing on a small-unit training pro- It is difficult not to admire these sometimes overwhelming for our gram in the Third World, we might Third World militaries and their hosts. Humor, especially the ability accomplishments, considering

May 1996 33 their limited resources and sensi- afford to purchase it. Goal dis- comes from the people of the tive missions. We’re there to help placement becomes common, with country. them identify problems and to be many of the host-country forces • Maintaining support of the civil- a catalyst for change; however, we adopting the idea that, “If only we ian populace. Legitimacy of the should never miss a chance to had that radio, that rifle, or that national government and of the exercise positive reinforcement. first-aid kit, we could solve all of host-country military is crucial On a daily basis, seek out a project our problems.” As a general rule, to long-term stability. Civic- they have done well or have the less equipment there is, the action programs and psychologi- improved upon, and enthusiasti- more effective the training pro- cal programs are important cally reinforce their success. gram will be. Of course, we do pro- force multipliers in gaining and vide essential equipment, and we maintaining the support of the Equipment might also bring along some “high- people of the country. In FID our goal is to help host- speed, low-drag” equipment to • Defense of human rights. country forces seek solutions to enhance our chances of opening Respect for human rights is of their problems. Throughout the otherwise closed doors. pragmatic importance to the process, however, we should military in maintaining the sup- encourage them to use their own Values port of the people. equipment and resources. If we Each FID mission contributes to • Accountability. It is important to provide all the materiel for a FID the professionalism of the host coun- establish and maintain internal mission, at least two distractions try. The technical tasks of the train- discipline and order within the take away from the mission itself: ing are important, but the values armed forces. The military insti- First, a certain amount of time that we represent and attempt to tution must guard against indi- must be allocated for properly reinforce are an even more impor- vidual misconduct if it is to managing the equipment, if only to tant part of the professionalization maintain faith and confidence secure it and to perform routine process. The following are some of among the people. If there is maintenance on it. In turn, our sol- our most fundamental values: misconduct, the perpetrator diers have less time to focus on • Military subordination to politi- must be actively pursued, inves- host-country forces. cal authority. It is important to tigated and appropriately pun- Second, although Third World support elected government offi- ished. We must convince our armies are fascinated by our “hi- cials and to understand that the counterparts that individual tech” equipment, they can rarely legitimacy of the government misconduct is not a reflection on the honor of their institution,

Civic-actions programs, such as construction, are important for gaining and maintaining the support of the host-country population. Photo by Douglas Wisnioski

34 Special Warfare but the institution’s failure to nomic growth. Salvador, Korea and Colombia. police itself is. Over the past few years, there has Roach recently returned from Ser- • Interagency teamwork. The been much discussion about the bia after having served there for host-country’s military must term “democratization.” The author two months as an international work with the other branches of first heard General George Joulwan observer. He lives with his family in government and accept the fact use the term at the 1993 Low Inten- northern Virginia. that in internal defense and sity Conflict Conference sponsored development, political and eco- by the Association of the United nomic factors are often more States Army. General Joulwan’s important than military fac- comment was, “Special Forces was tors. This is critical in a Third the most important factor in the World country, since its military democratization of Latin America.” organization often is not only Many of our officials now use the the shield of democracy, but word “democratization” to describe also the backbone of democracy. almost any kind of positive influ- In the U.S., the military fulfills ence our government exerts in the shield-of-democracy role, underdeveloped countries. But the but other elements, both from focus of democratization should be the government and from the not on a scholar’s knowledge of our private sector, form the back- Constitution or Declaration of Inde- bone. In Third World countries, pendence, but rather on the concern the military institution is often for the practice of social equality at the only branch of government the lowest level. that functions from the nation- During World War II, the forerun- al level down to the local level. ners of Special Forces, the Jedburgh The host-government officials teams, conducted unconventional often have good ideas to make warfare to help the French Resistance their branch of government liberate France from the oppression of work, but they do not have the a hostile occupation force. Modern necessary resources to imple- Special Forces are conducting FID ment their ideas. As a result, missions to help friendly countries the host-country military is achieve stability; in the process, they often drawn into the vacuum also help liberate the people from the and can play important positive ignorance, poverty and lawlessness roles in the internal develop- that are sapping their national vitali- ment of the country. ty. Over the past decade, Special • Selfless service. The welfare of Forces have achieved significant suc- the country comes before the cesses in FID operations. And welfare of the military services although FID is truly a politically or of the officer corps. sensitive, dangerous and fluid envi- We do not teach these values as ronment, it is one in which SF can be separate blocks of instruction – an effective catalyst for change. they must be integrated into every formal class and woven into the informal conversations we have J.S. Ranger Roach with our counterparts. We advo- retired from the cate these values because they Army in 1995 after reflect the ideals of our society, but having commanded we must help our brother soldiers the 7th Special recognize the pragmatic reason for Forces Group. His 29 adopting them: These values, years of active service which all democracies share, pro- included 10 years of overseas duty, mote internal stability and eco- with tours in Vietnam, Germany, El

May 1996 35 The Human Element of Battle: The Theories of Ardant du Picq

by Lieutenant Colonel William M. Jacobs

Napoleon stated, “In war the moral ele- strategic implications. Consider, for exam- ment is to all others as three is to one.”1 ple, Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant. The American way of war asserts the the special-operations aviator who was importance of moral forces and how they captured in Somalia. By virtue of his can be used as both multipliers and debili- media-portrayed plight, Durant became a tators of combat power. Integral to our con- tragic figure whose fate was anxiously cepts about the nature and the purpose of awaited by millions at home and abroad. war is an appreciation of the human ele- He was no longer just another soldier, but ment and its effects on the conduct and the a combatant whose capture and negotiated outcome of war. fate had become a major policy issue. Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq’s Battle Durant’s experience shows how the Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle is a human element, described by one writer as revolutionary study of the human element a “summation of elan, esprit de corps, on an ever more dispersed and lethal bat- courage and unit cohesion,”4 can be tran- tlefield, with particular regard to the scended into a combat multiplier. Durant’s nature of fear and cohesion. Du Picq situation invites attention to the study of asserts, “While all other circumstances the human element in war and to the the- change with time, the human element ories of du Picq. remains the same, capable of just so much endurance, sacrifice, effort, and no more.”2 Soldier He differentiates between “war” and “bat- Ardant du Picq was born in 1821 in tle.” While war is accepted by statesmen Perigueux, France. After graduating from and soldiers alike as Clausewitz’s “exten- the French military academy at Saint-Cyr, sion of policy,” du Picq views battle as a dis- du Picq fought in the Crimean War. He was tinctly unique dynamic more akin to a taken prisoner by the Russians following “contest of arms and will between tired and the siege at Sevastopol. After his release at terrified men.”3 He opines that the concern the end of the war, du Picq served in cam- of the soldier is not policy or strategy, but paigns in Syria and in North Africa as an the study of battle at the lowest level. infantry officer at battalion and regiment The employment of soldiers as an imple- levels. He won promotion to colonel and ment of policy remains key to concentrated was ultimately awarded command of the and overwhelming combat power. On the 10th Infantry of the Line Regiment. Du modern battlefield, the solitary soldier, Picq succumbed to mortal wounds in the although inserted into battle at the tactical 1870 Franco-Prussian War. Even as he lay level, may have significant operational and

36 Special Warfare From his studies of ancient and modern warfare, du Picq concluded that the Romans most clearly appreciated the debilitating effects of fear in battle. dying, du Picq expressed concerns about cohesion is more apt to break down, lead- the morale and the welfare of his regiment. ing to unit disintegration.5 In 1903, 32 years after his death, du Picq’s Although du Picq acknowledges the rise writings were published in France. In 1921 of technology, he also states, “The art of they were translated into English and pub- war is subject to many modifications by lished as Battle Studies: Ancient and Mod- industrial and scientific progress. Howev- ern Battle. er, there is truly one constant, and that is For his writings, du Picq relied on three the heart of man.”6 He remarks, “It is the major sources of martial knowledge: per- mind that wins battles, that will always sonal experience; historical research of win them, that always has won them the Greeks, Romans and Gauls; and sur- throughout the world’s history.The spiritu- veys that he fielded to fellow officers to ality, the moral quality of war has not obtain accounts of their battle experi- changed.”7 ences. The careful, scientific approach du Du Picq argues that preserving even a Picq used in conducting the surveys modicum of courage within a force gains an allowed him to collect precise details and exponential advantage for the force com- to avoid speculation that his work was mander and that simultaneously instilling based on conjecture. fear into the hearts of the enemy produces inversely proportional deleterious effects Theorist on the enemy force. The Industrial Revolution provided American doctrine acknowledges that technological advances that not only fear is a debilitating factor and that it pre- drastically changed warfare but also pro- sents a constant challenge to all who face duced an arena characterized by disper- battle. From a deep understanding of his sion and the requirement for autonomous own experiences, du Picq arrived at the action. Du Picq makes the observation premise that the element of fear is a fun- that technologically sophisticated damental battle consideration.8 He argues weapons turn the modern battlefield into that every soldier experiences fear, and an increasingly expansive and more lone- that overwhelming fear is the contiguous ly place for the soldier. His view is shared and pervasive thread common to all com- by modern-day military theorist James bat. Controlling both fear and the powerful Schneider, who posits that because of the instinct for self-preservation requires a expanded and more lonely battlefield, deep psychological understanding of the combatants.

May 1996 37 Du Picq concludes that although war tle-stress casualties.” Du Picq’s ideas serve evolves from the relatively simple to the as a precursor to the related studies of more complicated and technically S.L.A. Marshall and John Keegan that advanced, the “ration” of human courage is illustrate how one’s morale can be quickly a finite quality. Men in battle, with their overtaxed by fierce combat. limited capacity to endure, cannot main- Du Picq cites many examples of battles, tain the frenetic pace required in modern ancient and modern, that attest to the warfare, thus reducing the combat power implications of moral issues in warfare. He of the individual soldier. Du Picq posits observes that the Romans, in particular, that fear produces acute and chronic were the most honest in dealing with fear effects – effects that draw from a finite on the battlefield because they most clear- reservoir of moral strength. When that ly appreciated its debilitating effects. Dis- reservoir is ultimately depleted, fear pro- cipline emerged as the key concept in duces results disastrous to the overall exploiting moral issues and in overcoming fighting force. human frailty under duress. The modern In du Picq’s view, a soldier is more than battlefield, replete with highly lethal a manipulable pawn; he is a human, con- weapons systems capable of killing soldiers strained by the frailties of flesh and blood. at great distances, exacerbates “the Du Picq was the first theorist to postulate instinct of self-preservation, so powerful that there is a direct relationship between that he [the soldier] did not feel disgraced the number and the degree of battle-stress in obeying it.”11 Du Picq cites high morale, casualties and the increased lethality leadership and cohesion as means of con- wrought by high-technology firepower. He trolling both fear and the instinct of self- notes that “absolute bravery is not natural preservation. More important, high in man,”9 and that strong men are rare morale, leadership and cohesion enhance exceptions.10 In battles of higher intensity the combat power of a unit. and of longer duration, men who experi- One excerpt from Battle Studies best dis- enced in seconds what formerly required tills Ardant du Picq’s thesis: “Battle is the hours or days to absorb succumbed as “bat- final objective of armies, and man is the

Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant arrives in Germany following his release from Somali captors.

Photo by Janel Schroeder

38 Special Warfare fundamental instrument in battle. Nothing epitomizes the soldier whose discipline, can wisely be prescribed in an army — its high morale and cohesion enable him to personnel, organization, discipline, and overcome abject fear. tactics, things that are connected like the Strong motivators provided the incentive fingers of a hand — without exact knowl- Durant needed to survive – thoughts of his edge of the fundamental instrument, man, wife and small son, thoughts of the comrades and his state of mind, his morale, at the whom he had inserted into the battlefield, instant of combat.” thoughts of his aircrew — all dead — and At a time when Jomini’s principles of thoughts of the two Special Forces soldiers, warfare dominated French military Master Sergeant Gary Gordon and Sergeant thought, du Picq challenged Jomini’s most First Class Randy Shugart, who had fought elementary calculus. And when the bayo- so valiantly and died to save his life. net was still the national weapon of Durant, who at the time of his capture France, du Picq identified the timeless was a member of a highly specialized unit, principle that man is the fundamental benefited from the camaraderie and the instrument of war. cohesion that come from mutual trust and confidence. Cohesion is not synonymous Durant case study with esprit; it is more than the good feel- Chief Warrant Officer Michael J. Durant ings that a soldier and his leader have found himself in a situation requiring toward each other. Cohesion is a prerequi- great courage, stamina and discipline. site to a soldier’s fighting spirit. It imparts Durant’s tragic experience on Oct. 3, 1993, a strong loyalty and dedication to support during the Battle of the Black Sea in comrades in danger; it partially compen- Mogadishu, encompassed precisely the sates for the effects of fear; and it serves as environment of lethality, loneliness and an antidote to the effects of dispersion. fear that du Picq had described in his the- Cohesion is also the product of shared ories more than 100 years earlier. tough training. Today, Durant extols the Durant suffered a fractured spine and a virtues of combat training he received as broken femur in the crash of his helicopter. an aviator in the 160th Special Operations Following a fierce firefight, he was cap- Aviation Regiment, particularly the Army’s tured by Somalis, subjected to a series of Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape beatings by a mob of civilians, carried Course. Throughout his ordeal, Durant through the streets, chained, shot through performed exactly as he had been trained the arm, and interrogated for 24 hours. To to do. the questions and the demands levied by Michael Durant’s experience provides us his captors, Durant responded with with a valuable learning opportunity. Not answers that allowed him to continue to only did he prevail, he emerged as a cham- resist, yet he steadfastly refused to reveal pion who overcame a seemingly inextrica- any information that could endanger his ble predicament. Durant’s display of comrades or degrade their trust and confi- courage and dignity under austere condi- dence in him. tions will serve as an inspiration to others. Michael Durant not only survived, he Durant’s experience also serves as a acquitted himself well in the face of reminder that the moral quality of war has impending disaster. Mustering his courage not changed and that du Picq’s theories and maintaining his decorum as an Amer- concerning the human element in war ican fighting man in the international remain as appropriate as if he had penned spotlight, Durant overcame what du Picq them yesterday. calls the “pervasive power and overwhelming effect of fear on the battlefield.”12 Du Picq and future battles Durant embodies du Picq’s concept of the In War in the Modern World, Professor individual soldier, the starting point for the Theodore Ropp refers to du Picq as “an analysis of all things military. Durant also obscure French colonel.”13 Far from obscure,

May 1996 39 du Picq is a relevant theorist whose work manding general, Task Force deserves a place of honor beside that of oth- Black/Raleigh in Haiti; and Regiment S3 ers — Clausewitz, de Saxe, Jomini, Liddell- for the 160 SOAR. His overseas assign- Hart and Sun Tzu — who are cited as prime ments include tours in Berlin, Graffenwho- sources for the development of American er and Garlstedt, Germany; Honduras; and military doctrine. El Salvador. Jacobs is a recent graduate of Avoiding mathematical principles that the National War College, National Defense failed to consider human dynamics, du Picq University, where he received a master’s studied the human spirit in war. He recog- degree in national security policy and strat- nized that battle casualties often result egy. He also has earned master’s degrees merely from the lack of small-unit leader- from Boston University and from the Com- ship, morale and cohesion, and that when mand and General Staff College, Fort Leav- these factors are present, they work in con- enworth, Kan. cert to produce moral supremacy. The need for extraordinary courage in Notes: the face of danger is truly the aspect that 1 Frank H. Simonds, Preface to Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle, by Charles Ardant du Picq makes the military profession unique. The (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1921), p. vii. American fighting man continues to risk 2 Charles Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient danger at the tactical, operational and and Modern Battle (New York: The Macmillan Com- strategic levels. Our goal of behavioral pany, 1921), p. vii. development for combat is to help soldiers 3 Mitchell M. Zais, “Ardant du Picq: Unsung Giant of Military Theory,” Army, April 1985, p. 58. overcome fear and to control the natural 4 Zais, p. 56. instinct to preserve life and limb. In pur- 5 James J. Schneider, “The Theory of Operational suit of that goal, we must understand war Art,” (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Command and Gener- at the human level. al Staff College, March 1988). The farsighted theories of Ardant du Picq 6 Du Picq, p. 135. 7 Zais, p. 58. provide a view of warfare with a special 8 Zais, p. 57. emphasis on the human element. Against 9 Zais, p. 59. the currently prevailing technological sen- 10 Zais, p. 59. timent, Battle Studies remains a poignant 11 Du Picq, p. 72. treatise on military morale — one that our 12 Zais, p. 58. 13 Zais, p. 57. political and military leaders should con- 14 Du Picq, p. 118. sider as they ponder the nature, the purpose, and the conduct of war. From beyond the horizon, du Picq implores our military leaders and policy-makers to ask them- selves: “Among those who would contem- plate war, how many would risk their own lives?”14 While war may be politics by other means, the human dynamics of combat are more than an extension of policy.

Lieutenant Colonel Wil- liam M. Jacobs is assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. His previous assignments include deputy commanding officer for the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Fort Camp- bell, Ky.; director of plans, policy and strategy/J5 and executive officer to the com-

40 Special Warfare Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

E8 promotions for SOF The results of the 1996 master sergeant promotion board results have exceed Army average been released, and once again promotions for special-operations soldiers have exceeded the Army average. The overall Army select rate was 8.2 percent; CMF 18 achieved 12.1 percent and CMF 37 achieved 26.7 percent. Future SOF promotions to master sergeant should continue in these ranges, but eventually they will be more in line with the Army average. The MOS breakdown is as follows: Primary Zone Secondary Zone Total Elig. Sel. Elig. Sel. Elig. Sel. %

18B 156 26 57 2 213 28 13.1 18C 96 20 114 4 210 24 11.4 18D 154 29 62 1 216 30 13.9 18E 79 3 147 4 226 7 3.1 18F 345 58 45 5 390 63 16.2

37F 3 2 12 2 15 4 26.7

PERSCOM points of contact Staff members of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, are as follows: MAJ Adrian Erckenbrack SF Enlisted Branch chief MSG R.B. Gardner Senior career adviser SFC Todd Young CMF 18 career adviser; reclassifications SFC Stewart Marin CMF 37F career adviser Mrs. Faye Matheny 1st, 5th and 10th SF groups; ROTC and JRTC assignments Ms. Franca Lockard 3rd and 7th SF groups; JFKSWCS; USASOC; USASFC; SATMO; 96th CA Battalion Ms. Dyna Amey SFQC student manager

Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager; career-development questions should be directed to the senior career adviser. Students enrolled in the SF Qualification Course who have questions about assignments should contact their student PAC. Questions regarding NCOES should first be directed to the SF group schools NCO. The SF branch phone number is DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395, fax -0524. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0454.

May 1996 41 Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

Advanced education In addition to the Command and General Staff Officers Course, or for SF field-grade officers CGSOC, there are five sources of advanced education for SF field-grade officers: • CGSOC SF Advanced Studies Program. This program is mandatory for SF students who are attending the resident CGSOC. It is the only SF-specific field-grade institutional training for SF officers. The CGSOC admin- isters the program in coordination with the JFK Special Warfare Center and School; instructors are chosen from all areas of the joint SOF community. SF CGSOC. The program, which trains officers to perform Special Forces group and joint duties as SF majors, culminates with an exercise integrating Army SOF into a JTF campaign plan. JFKSWCS is developing a parallel course for non-resident SF CGSOC students and for SF students who attend sister-service command-and-staff colleges. The non-resident CGSOC will consist of a distant-learning phase and a resident phase. • Naval Post Graduate School SO/LIC Program. This is a voluntary advanced-degree program for senior SOF captains and junior majors. For each course, PERSCOM selects 10 SOF officers (six 18A54 officers, two 18A39 officers, one Ranger Regiment officer, and one SOF aviation officer), all of whose records must reflect above-average performance. The academic program lasts 18 months, followed by a three-year utilization assignment. Utilization positions are joint billets in theater special-operations commands. Interested officers should send a completed DA Form 1618R to Commander; U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; TAPC-OPE- SF; 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0414. For more information, contact Captain Roger Carstens at the SF Officer Branch. • Advanced Military Studies Program. This is a highly competitive advanced-degree program for selected resident CGSOC students. The program is conducted at the Fort Leavenworth School of Advanced Mil- itary Studies, or SAMS. All SF CGSOC attendees may volunteer and compete for this professional-development opportunity, and the Special Warfare Center and School strongly encourages them to do so. The AMSP has three phases: Phase one is the resident CGSOC. Phase two is an additional year of study at SAMS. (Resident Army students who are attending either the Marine Corps or the Air Force command-and-staff college may complete phases one and two at their respective institution.) Phase three comprises the utilization and branch-qualification assignments. Utilization assignments are with a corps or division staff. The corps commander may approve the officer’s branch-qualification assignment before the officer performs the conventional-unit utilization assignment. Following the utilization period, PERSCOM will assign the officer to a functional-area or branch assignment at the highest level possible. For more information, contact Major Ray Helton at the SF Offi- cer Branch.

42 Special Warfare • Olmstead Scholarship. This highly competitive program, administered by the civilian Olmstead Foundation, accepts four captains, Armywide, per year to attend foreign universities. The foundation considers the country preference of each applicant. Participants gain language proficiency and learn about a foreign culture. Programs of study are diverse, including such fields as political science, regional studies and even music. Studies last two years, and there is no requirement for a utilization assignment. If course credits fall short of U.S. college and university requirements, some students may not be awarded a master’s degree. How- ever, the Army will subsequently afford those students an opportunity to complete master’s-degree requirements fully funded. To apply, contact Captain Roger Carstens. • Harvard/DCSOPS Fellowship. This highly competitive one-year program, administered by PERSCOM, accepts only two captains, Armywide, per year. Participants attend Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and earn a master’s in public administration. A two-year utilization assignment in DA DCSOPS follows. To apply, contact Captain Roger Carstens. All these programs complement the officer’s professional development achieved during SF operational assignments, and they are viewed favor- ably by promotion boards and by command-selection boards. Interested officers should plan to attend one of the voluntary programs as senior captains or as junior majors. Contact Major Ray Helton or Captain Roger Carstens at the SF Officer Branch, phone DSN 221-3175/3178 or commercial (703) 325-3175/3178.

VI status no longer In a permanent change to AR 135-215, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for automatic with promotion Personnel approved the reimplementation of voluntary indefinite status- to CW2 selection boards for warrant officers. As of Jan. 1, 1996, warrant officers are no longer automatically granted VI status upon promotion to CW2. Warrant officers appointed prior to Jan. 1, 1994, will not be affected by the new policy. The first DA centralized VI board will convene during FY98 to consider warrant officers who were appointed after Jan. 1, 1994, and have obligated volunteer dates of Jan. 1, 1998, to Sept. 30, 1998. Those who are rated most qualified will be selected to fill the force at the CW2 grade. War- rant officers selected for VI status may continue to serve past their initial six years of active duty, in accordance with AR 600-8-24, or they may revert back to their previously held enlisted rank. For more information, contact CW3 Wayne Searcy, 180A manager in the SWCS Proponency Office, phone DSN 239-2415/8423 or commercial (910) 432-3175/3178.

May 1996 43 Foreign SOF Special Warfare

Bosnian ‘Black Swans’ The Bosnian Muslim army unit known as the “Black Swans” is considered aggressive commando unit one of the most motivated and professional indigenous units in the Bos- nian force structure. More accurately described as commandos than as special-operations forces, the Black Swans, currently 800 men, perform missions ranging from spearheading tactical infantry attacks to providing security support for senior political officials. Soldiers are often equipped with French- or American-made assault rifles and rocket launchers. Ini- tially comprised of refugees and formed near the central Bosnian town of Konjic under the operational control of the Bosnian 4th Corps, the unit quickly developed a reputation for aggressive action. It soon became directly subordinate to the Bosnian Supreme Command and transferred its headquarters to Kakanj. From this location, the unit began performing combat missions in all sectors along the confrontation lines existing prior to the Dayton Accords. Recruits for the Black Swans must be Muslim, must be under 21, must have prior military experience and must have been wounded at least twice in battle. They must also agree to abide by specific Islamic strictures. The commander of the Black Swans claims that Islamic fundamentalism does not necessarily provide inspiration to all of his troops; but he insists that obligatory prayers, religious education, and attendance at Friday mosque services aid in solidifying unit identity.

Russian general charged By all accounts, Russia has inherited from the USSR the largest chemi- with weapons diversion cal weapons arsenal in the world — about 40,000 metric tons of chemical agents, resident in bombs, missile warheads, artillery shells, other munitions, and canisters. According to the Russians, 32,300 mt of these include paralyzing nerve gases, such as sarin, soman, and VX, while the remainder comprise older agents, such as lewisite and yperite. The size of the chemical-weapons stocks continues to be challenged by internal Russian critics, with some charging that 100,000 mt of chemical agents are being maintained in Russia. Whatever the full size, the stocks, under the purview of the Russian Federation Radiological, Chemical, and Bio- logical Defense Troops, are reportedly poorly accounted for, improperly maintained, and inadequately secured. Against this backdrop, in October 1995, the Russian Federal Security Service charged former Lieutenant General of Chemical Troops Anatoliy Kuntsevich with both the delivery of about 800 kg of chemicals in 1993 to Middle East buyers and the subsequent attempted smuggling of an additional 5.5 tons in 1994. The chemicals reportedly could be used for civil applications or for the cre- ation of chemical weapons. It is worth recalling that Kuntsevich was awarded the Lenin Prize in 1991 (along with his fellow team members), for the development of Soviet binary nerve agents. It was revealed retro- spectively that in April 1994, Boris Yeltsin removed Kuntsevich from a presidential advisory post on chemical and biological issues for “gross violation of his duties,” but Kuntsevich remained affiliated with the Rus- sian Academy of Sciences. Distinguishing truth from mere assertion in

44 Special Warfare the shadowy world of Russian “weapons of mass destruction” is always difficult, but the dissension and the disarray in the military chemical structure suggest that the diversion of the materials or the technologies associated with chemical weapons is a continuing danger.

Russian counterterrorist Russia’s premier counterterrorist group, “Alpha,” is under the control of the group hanging on Russian Federal Security Service, a successor organization to the KGB, after changes in subordination and status following Alpha’s ambiguous role in the failed August 1991 Soviet coup. Reportedly, Alpha comprises a main group of 250 personnel as well as smaller detachments in Yekaterinburg, Krasnodar and Khabarovsk. The unit’s morale and its capabilities may be declining, however. Alpha’s mid-June 1995 attempt to storm the Budennovsk hospital and free hundreds of hostages seized by Chechen guerrillas ended unsuc- cessfully. Chechen rebels were later granted safe passage home. Meanwhile, a strong Alpha veterans association has been formed, which claims that it “can exert a real influence on Alpha activities.” Other former Alpha members also have joined or created private security firms and entered other private ventures based on their Alpha affiliations and experience.

Peruvian subversives The Peruvian subversive organization Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, now on Internet has been severely reduced in strength, cohesiveness and effectiveness over the last few years. Its leader, Abimael Guzman, was captured in Septem- ber 1992 by the Peruvian National Police’s National Counterterrorism Directorate, or DINCOTE; DINCOTE chief General Carlos Dominguez continues to dismantle the Sendero leadership and structure; and Sendero has suffered defeats in the field by the Peruvian armed forces. Neverthe- less, remaining Sendero elements continue their efforts to reorganize, and they have carried out periodic terrorist acts in urban and rural areas as a reminder that they have not completely vanished. Another reminder, aimed primarily at foreign audiences, is found on a Worldwide Web site designated, “The People’s War in Peru: Information About the Peruvian Communist Party” (http://www.blythe.org/peru-pcp/). The site is replete with portraits of Marx, Lenin, Mao and Abimael Guzman. It includes Guz- man speeches, Sendero documents and position papers, and 29 “frequently asked questions.”Although the site purports to represent the Peruvian Communist Party, or PCP, it is unclear whether information posted on the site reflects the positions of the Sendero/PCP leadership or those of foreign sympathizers who have for years been active in Europe and in the U.S. The site does note, in accordance with current orthodoxy, that the PCP continues to make preparations to “seize power nationwide in a final insurrec- tion against the old State.”

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Lieutenant Colonel John E. Sray of the Foreign Military Studies Office, U.S. Army DCSOPS, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

May 1996 45 Update Special Warfare

Shelton takes command and brought him to the surface. of USSOCOM Thomas then noticed that a small boy who had dived in to help them Army General Henry H. Shelton was also in trouble and rescued took command of the U.S. Special him. Bryant, who saw the difficulty Operations Command Feb. 29, each soldier was having, dived in to 1996, in a ceremony held at MacDill assist them. All five swimmers AFB, Fla. returned to shore safely. Shelton was previously the com- On Oct. 11, 1994, Register wit- manding general of the XVIII Air- nessed a mob of 300 angry Haitians borne Corps and Fort Bragg, N.C. He beating a man in Port-au-Prince. has also served as commander of the Register made his way through the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort mob to shield the man and adminis- Bragg and as assistant division com- ter first aid. He was alone until mander of the 101st Airborne Divi- other soldiers arrived to load the vic- sion at Fort Campbell, Ky. Earlier in tim into Register’s vehicle. En route his career, Shelton served as com- to the Port-au-Prince General Hos- mander of Detachment A-104, 5th pital, Register was stopped by Special Forces Group, in Vietnam. another mob, which began to beat During Operation Uphold Democra- DoD photo the man through windows of the cy in Haiti, Shelton served as com- General Wayne Downing (left) transfers the vehicle. Register shielded the man mander of the joint task force. USSOCOM flag. General Henry Shelton stands at until he could get the vehicle moving Shelton replaced General Wayne far right. again. According to Major George P. A. Downing, who retired from the A Co., 1st Bn., 3rd SF Group, Clements, battalion executive offi- Army following the transfer of com- received the medals in a ceremony cer, 2nd Bn., 3rd SF Group, “Without mand. Downing had been command- held on Fort Bragg Feb. 8. Register’s actions, the mob would er of USSOCOM since May 1993. The Soldier’s Medal is the highest have continued to beat the man USASOC soldiers receive medal awarded during peacetime. until he was dead.” — Sergeant First Following Hurricane Gordon in Class Mike Brantley, USASOC PAO Soldier’s Medal November 1994, Ward and a group of Five soldiers from the U.S. Army soldiers and Haitians performed life- Special Operations Medical Special Operations Command have saving efforts to save a family of six Training Battalion activated received the Soldier’s Medal for from drowning. Using a fire hose as a The JFK Special Warfare Center their heroic efforts in three separate safety line, Ward and the team and School activated the Special incidents that occurred during pulled five children and an elderly Operations Medical Training Bat- Operation Uphold Democracy in woman from a cinder-block house talion (Provisional) Nov. 1, 1995, in Haiti. that was moments from being swept preparation for the opening of the Staff Sergeant Bart R. Bryant, away by torrential floodwaters. Special Operations Medical Train- Headquarters and Headquarters Bryant, Hall and Thomas saved a ing Center, scheduled to take place Co., 3rd SF Group; Sergeant James drowning man on Dec. 19, 1994, at in July. E. Hall, C Co., 1st Bn., 3rd SF Jeremie, Haiti. Hall and Thomas “The Special Operations Medical Group; Sergeant First Class Joseph dived into murky water and swam Training Battalion will be responsi- E. Register Jr., B Co., 2nd Bn., 3rd 150 feet to reach the man. Each ble for training all Special Forces SF Group; Specialist Daryl Thomas, made several dives attempting to medical sergeants, and for the Spe- B Co., 528th Support Battalion; and recover the man. On Hall’s third cial Operations Medical Course, Sergeant First Class Bruce A. Ward, attempt, he grabbed the man’s shirt

46 Special Warfare designed to train all medics in the Special Forces soldiers are no The scenario in Class 1-96 Army Special Operations Com- longer required to be en route or on involved business negotiations. In mand, Navy Special Warfare Com- orders to an SF dive detachment or Class 3-96, the negotiations block mand and the Air Force Special SF free-fall detachment in order to will involve a peacekeeping scenario Operations Command,” said Colonel attend either of the courses. Prereq- including nongovernmental organi- Lance E. Booth III, commander of uisites for all other MOSs remain zations, military commanders and SWCS’s 1st Special Warfare Train- the same for both courses. For more local civilian officials, Thomas said. ing Group. information, contact Captain The CAC also incorporates brief- According to Lieutenant Colonel Stephen R. Lasse, S3 Operations, ings from Civil Affairs personnel John R. Chambers, commander of 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare returning from operational deploy- the Special Operations Medical Training Group, at DSN 239- ments. The intent is to continually Training Battalion, the $18 million 4387/5473 or commercial (910) 432- update the course to ensure that it Special Operations Medical Train- 4387/5473. is realistic, doctrinally based and ing Center will feature automated engages the interest and participa- computer training aids, closed-cir- PERSCOM establishes tion of the students, Thomas said. cuit television access throughout Worldwide Web site For additional information, contact the facility, and operating rooms The U.S. Total Army Personnel Major Gerald Thomas at DSN 239- and laboratories. “The improved Command, or PERSCOM, has 6504/3427 or commercial (910) 432- curriculum and facilities will far established PERSCOM Online, a 6504/3427. exceed the scope of training the Spe- homepage on the Worldwide Web, to SWCS, Army SF Command cial Forces medics were receiving at provide information about Army Fort Sam Houston, Texas,” he said. personnel issues and programs. get new commanders SWCS dedicates free-fall PERSCOM Online is linked to Major General William P. the Army homepage “Army Link”; Tangney took command of the JFK simulator it can also be found under the uni- Special Warfare Center and School The JFK Special Warfare Center form resource locator http://www- May 29. and School dedicated its military PERSCOM.army.mil. For more Tangney had been commander of free-fall training facility to the late information about PERSCOM the Army Special Forces Command Sergeant Major Santos A. Matos on Online, contact the PERSCOM since May 1, 1995. His other assign- April 29. Public Affairs Office by phone at ments include deputy commanding Born in Vista Allegre, Panama, on (703) 325-8857, DSN 221-8857, or general and chief of staff, Army Spe- Nov.22, 1942, Matos joined the Army e-mail at TAPCPAO@Hoffman- cial Operations Command; com- in 1965. He served 26 years and com- emh1.Army.mil. manding general, Special Opera- pleted Airborne, Ranger, Pathfinder, tions Command, U.S. Central Com- Special Forces, Jumpmaster and Mil- SWCS updates CA course mand; and commander, 10th Special itary Free-Fall schools. Matos died in The JFK Special Warfare Center Forces Group. a free-fall parachuting accident in and School has made changes to the Tangney replaced Major General November 1993. Civil Affairs Course in support of William F. Garrison, who retired The $5 million military free-fall the expanded role of Civil Affairs in from the Army. Garrison had com- facility, which opened in 1992, con- nontraditional operations. manded SWCS since August 1994. tains a vertical wind tunnel that The four-week course trains active- Brigadier General Kenneth R. offers a safe training environment and reserve-component officers for Bowra took command of the Army for military free-fall students. duty in Civil Affairs positions. Special Forces Command May 21. Civil Affairs Course 1-96, which Bowra was previously deputy Prerequisites change began in January 1996, incorporat- commanding general and chief of for CDQC, MFFPC ed 18 hours of formal negotiations staff with the Army Special Opera- In response to the decrease in training, according to Major Gerald tions Command. His other assign- SF dive and free-fall teams to one Thomas, operations officer, 3rd Bat- ments include commanding gener- team per battalion, the JFK Spe- talion, 1st Special Warfare Training al, Special Operations Command, cial Warfare Center and School Group. Four hours of the new block U.S. Southern Command; and com- has changed the prerequisites for were formal instruction; students mander, 5th Special Forces Group. the Special Forces Combat Diver spent the remaining 14 hours in Qualification Course and the Mili- individual and team negotiations tary Free-Fall Parachutist Course. supervised by the instructor.

May 1996 47 Book Reviews Special Warfare

Managing Contemporary Con- offers a strong base for understand- flict: Pillars of Success. Edited by ing contemporary military prob- Max G. Manwaring and William J. lems. It might best be used as a text- Olson. Boulder, Colo.: Westview book by the military professional Press, Inc., 1996. ISBN: 0-8133- who seeks to understand how and 8969-0. 269 pages. $49.95 (cloth). why foreign policy will be important to conflict other than war. Today’s military professionals, especially those in the special-opera- MAJ Robert C. Shaw tions community, must have an USACGSC understanding of two areas: the con- Fort Leavenworth, Kan. cepts, constraints, direction and technology progression of Force XXI; You’re No Good to Me Dead: and the political views and trends Behind Japanese Lines in the that can lead to the deployment of Philippines. By Bob Stahl. military forces to execute the foreign Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute policies of our government. Press, 1995. ISBN: 1-55750-793-7. Foreign policy is a dynamic 232 pages. $26.95. instrument. With growing national- security requirements, smaller mili- Like many of his contemporary tary forces and shrinking budgets, biville Jr., Dr. Roy Godson, retired World War II draftees, Robert E. our foreign-policy makers require a Air Force Colonel Dennis F. Caffrey Stahl was not enamored with the more systematic process for identify- and Dr. William J. Olson contributed United States Army, but he was ing the goals and the steps neces- to make this book an intellectual determined to do his part in the war. sary for success. Managing Contem- guide through today’s international In 1943, after a series of training porary Conflict provides sound ideas threat climate. programs that can be most kindly for the ingredients of a strong for- Managing Contemporary Conflict described as haphazard, he was eign policy: identifiable and support- provides examples of recent and cur- assigned as a cryptographer, techni- able ends, sufficient means and a rent conflicts to support its theories. cian 3rd class (roughly the equiva- clear purpose. One theory discusses the legitimacy lent of today’s staff sergeant) with Managing Contemporary Conflict theory of engagement for the post- the Allied Intelligence Bureau, or is structured in terms of three pil- Cold War period. Another theory dis- AIB, in Australia. The AIB was an lars — a sound theory of engage- cusses a 10-step analytical process inter-allied organization. It per- ment, development and use of in end-state planning, which is formed for the Southwest Pacific appropriate instruments of national much like a doctrine for success in Area, or SWPA, many of the func- power, and an appropriate manage- determining what the end-state tions that in other theaters were ment structure to implement the goals should be in any situation or performed by the Office of Strategic theory of engagement and to coordi- conflict. Dr. John Fishel writes on Services, or OSS. General Douglas nate the instruments of power. The the challenge of achieving unity of MacArthur, who was distrustful of book’s contributors cover the spec- effort in interagency operations and non-subordinate organizations, trum of current regional security in coalition warfare. His work would not permit the OSS to operate studies of the diplomatic, military includes a look at joint issues, civil- in the SWPA. and intellectual arenas. Profession- military issues and the challenges of Impressed by guerrilla radio traf- als such as retired Army General using ad hoc coalitions as tools for fic and by an officer who had escaped Wayne A. Downing, Ambassador managing conflict. from the Philippines and was David Passage, Dr. Graham H. Tur- Managing Contemporary Conflict preparing to return there, Stahl vol-

48 Special Warfare unteered to accompany him. Stahl ships of the Southwest Pacific was accepted and with almost no area’s special-operations control additional training, he deployed with organizations. 11 other soldiers via submarine. You’re No Good to Me Dead is not You’re No Good to Me Dead recounts only very readable, it has potential Stahl’s growth as he survives and lessons in the aspects of guerrilla operates in the rear areas of a pow- warfare, strategic reconnaissance erful and determined enemy. and psychological operations. The The infiltrating teams were told Naval Institute Press is to be com- to avoid combat: their mission was mended for adding this book to its to report intelligence. The book’s Special Warfare Series. title is, in fact, a quote from General MacArthur’s farewell injunction to COL Scot Crerar the teams. Although the introduc- U.S. Army (ret.) tion of the book states that the story Vienna, Va. is not a guerrilla-warfare account, the growth of the guerrilla move- PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare ment around Stahl’s location, Stahl’s in Korea 1950-1953. By Stephen E. use of the movement, his depend- Pease. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole ence upon it and, later, his assist- Books, 1992. ISBN: 0-8117-2592-8. ance to it make it difficult to identi- 194 pages. $12.95 (paper). fy any real differences between ous examples, including “Operation Stahl’s actions and those of the Jed- Stephen Pease’s meticulous Moolah,” in which a $50,000 reward burghs in Europe. The length of the research of a virtually undocument- was offered for the defection of a operational period is an important ed area of the Korean conflict is North Korean, Chinese or Russian distinction: Stahl’s deployment was indicative of his research abilities pilot with his MiG-15 or -17 aircraft. for 15 months. Most Jedburgh and erudition. Pease researched offi- As Pease points out, President deployments lasted two months or cial Army, Air Force and Navy Dwight Eisenhower was opposed to less. records to provide a broad-brush this particular project — he felt that This book’s introduction, written look at PSYWAR efforts during the defection should occur for ideological by Dr. Clayton Laurie of the U. S. Korean conflict. Extensive inter- reasons rather than for monetary Army Center for Military History, views with Korean War PSYWAR ones. The subsequent defection of a contains a rare bonus: an explana- operators of all services add color North Korean pilot was hailed as tion of the evolution and relation- and an “I was there” attribution to the greatest PSYWAR operation of his book. It works well — PSYWAR the Korean War, because it defini- is highly readable. tively supported U.S. claims that the Pease transitions smoothly from Soviets were supplying the North background on the history of PSYOP Koreans with hardware, training and its strategic context in the Kore- and technical assistance. an conflict, to more singular and Ultimately, Pease’s effort is a good extensive chapters on leaflets, prop- one. He details numerous psycholog- aganda, and Chinese and North ical operations, methods and tech- Korean PSYWAR efforts. The book’s niques (some of which are still in bibliographic references and appen- use), and he provides illumination of dices provide a treasure-trove of suc- a rather unknown aspect of the “For- cessful and unsuccessful PSYOP gotten War.” tactics, techniques and procedures. Pease’s chapter on leaflets is CPT David Knapp extensive and contains many pho- USAJFKSWCS tographs illustrating the types of Fort Bragg, N.C. leaflets produced. Most significant in this chapter are the ideological and moral questions raised by the use of certain types of leaflets. Pease highlights this problem with numer-

May 1996 49 Special Warfare

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