Warfare in the Nineteenth Century David Gates WAR-FM.QXD 2/6/01 10:08 AM Page i WARFARE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY WAR-FM.QXD 2/6/01 10:08 AM Page ii European History in Perspective General Editor: Jeremy Black Benjamin Arnold Medieval Germany Ronald Asch The Thirty Years’ War Christopher Bartlett Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814–1914 Robert Bireley The Refashioning of Catholicism, 1450–1700 Patricia Clavin The Great Depression, 1929–1939 Mark Galeotti Gorbachev and his Revolution David Gates Warfare in the Nineteenth Century Martin P. Johnson The Dreyfus Affair Peter Musgrave The Early Modern European Economy J. L. Price The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century A. W. Purdue The Second World War Christopher Read The Making and Breaking of the Soviet System Francisco J. Romero-Salvado Twentieth-Century Spain Matthew S. Seligmann and Roderick R. McLean Germany from Reich to Republic, 1871–1918 Brendan Simms The Struggle for Mastery in Germany, 1779–1850 David Sturdy Louis XIV Peter Waldron The End of Imperial Russia, 1855–1917 James D. White Lenin European History in Perspective Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–71694–9 hardcover ISBN 0–333–69336–1 paperback (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England WAR-FM.QXD 2/6/01 10:08 AM Page iii WARFARE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY David Gates WAR-FM.QXD 2/6/01 10:08 AM Page iv © David Gates 2001 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 0LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2001 by PALGRAVE Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE was formerly Macmillan Press Ltd and St. Martin’s Press Scholarly and Reference Division. ISBN 0–333–73533–1 hardback ISBN 0–333–73534–X paperback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gates, David. Warfare in the nineteenth century / David Gates. p. cm. – (European history in perspective) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–73533–1 (cloth) ISBN 0–333–73534–X (pbk.) 1. Military history, Modern – 19th century. 2. Military art and science – History – 19th century. I. Title: Warfare in the 19th century. II. Title. III. Series. U41 .G39 2000 355'.009'034–dc21 00–048340 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 Printed in Hong Kong WAR-FM.QXD 2/6/01 10:08 AM Page v In loving memory of my parents, Margaret and George Gates, whose lives were too often blighted by war WAR-FM.QXD 2/6/01 10:08 AM Page vi WAR-FM.QXD 2/6/01 10:09 AM Page vii CONTENTS Preface viii 1 The Napoleonic Era and its Legacy 1 Music and War Morale, Discipline and Leadership 2 From Waterloo to the Crimea and Solferino 55 War, Philosophy and Natural Science 3 The American Civil War 114 4 The Franco-Prussian War 150 5 From the Treaty of Frankfurt to the Russo-Japanese War 173 Notes 191 Select Bibliography 199 Index 201 vii WAR-FM.QXD 2/6/01 10:09 AM Page viii PREFACE Military history’s boundaries are difficult to identify, for it is hard to think of anything that has not influenced, or been influenced by, war. This book seeks to place warfare in the Eurocentric world of the 1800s in its political, social, cultural, intellectual and technological context. At the end of the day, any such study must reconcile the extent of the author’s vision with the number of words allocated by the publisher; and I can only regret not having had the space to explore certain issues more fully. What I have deliberately shunned, however, is the production of a collection of campaign narratives; reference to events on the battlefield is made only for illustrative purposes. Of this period’s major wars there are in any case innumerable studies, many of which concern themselves with little other than marches and fighting, and go into far more detail than could conceivably be possible in a work of this size. In any event, the scope of the subject posed documentation problems. No literary compilation could fully reflect the breadth of my own explo- rations over many years, still less pose as an exhaustive list of potential sources; so I have restricted myself to providing a select bibliography, essentially as a guide to further reading. For similar reasons, it is impossible to do justice here to all those who, in one way or another, have assisted me in this book’s production. However, I would like to reiterate my thanks to them and stress, as always, that any errors are mine alone. D. G. viii WAR-01.QXD 2/6/01 10:10 AM Page 1 1 THE NAPOLEONIC ERA AND ITS LEGACY In many regards, Napoleon’s genius was more practical than theoretical. As a military reformer, he was not so much an innovator as someone who was obliged to build on or adapt existing concepts, largely because he was constrained by the technological possibilities of his time. Indeed, in this respect he lived during an era of such prolonged consistency that many of his contemporaries, notably the soldier and, later, celebrated military theorist Antoine-Henri de Jomini, persuaded themselves that the ‘essential nature’ of warfare could not change.1 Certainly, from around 1700 until the Crimean War 150 years later, armies continued to consist of three principal branches – infantry, cavalry and technical units such as artillery, engineers and sappers – and were, for the most part, dependent on smoothbore, muzzle-loading flintlocks and ordnance. These weapons had been, and continued to be, refined through incremental rather than revolutionary change. Detachable, socket bayonets, for instance, constituted a significant improvement on the old plug variety in that they afforded individual infantrymen a simul- taneous capacity for both fire and shock action. Indeed, although mili- tary thinkers since the days of Niccolo Machiavelli had pondered on the implications that gunpowder would have for tactics in particular and war- fare in general, despite the ultimate reliance on small and large firearms, at the end of the 1700s many of the features of ancient warfare still seemed to be present. Smoothbore guns had neither much more accu- racy nor reach than the slings, bows and ballistae that they had super- seded, while, for close fighting, manual weapons – swords, bayonets and lances – were commonly relied upon. And just as, for the infantry, move- ment on and between battlefields remained a matter of stamina, traction continued to be furnished by harnessing ‘natural’ forces, too: until the 1 WAR-01.QXD 2/6/01 10:10 AM Page 2 2 Warfare in the Nineteenth Century introduction of primitive railways, horses remained the fastest means of land transport and not only served as mounts for the cavalry but also hauled guns and vehicles. Similarly, the movement of most shipping was still essentially reliant on air and water currents. No, too little, or an adverse wind could utterly paralyze any sailing vessel. Whilst this meant that, particularly in comparatively shallow, coastal waters, there was still some scope for the use of galleys, on the other hand banks of oars were a relatively inefficient, manpower-intensive way of propelling a ship of any size. All of this suggested that much could still be gleaned from the writings of Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Caesar, Tacitus, Vitruvius and other classical authors. Indubitably, all of the Enlightenment’s military intel- lectuals were to some degree influenced by them, notably in the intense debate about the relative merits of the ordre profond and the ordre mince, of shock-action and firepower. The latter had come to predominate by the beginning of the 1800s and, through its ramifications for the deployment of forces, was, in time, to help transform the very concept of the battle- field; once apt, this term became something of a misnomer as improve- ments in the reach of weaponry and increases in the size of fighting units led to engagements being fought over ever larger tracts of territory. During the initial decades of the 1800s, the essential constancy that prevailed in the means with which war could be waged dictated that innovation was confined to changes in how it was conducted. At this, Napoleon surpassed his predecessors and many of his contemporaries. Exploiting latent potential that had often been identified by others, he succeeded in making better use of what material and intellectual resources were at hand.