DOCID: 3860874 I OP SECRETl/eOMINT!/X1 Cryptologic Quarterly

(U) DDE & NSA: An Introductory Survey David A. Hatch

(U) Introduction emphasized Eisenhower's concern to develop a well-rounded aerial reconnaissance capability for (U) When Dwight D. Eisenhower left the pres­ early warning. idency in January 1961, his reputation already had begun to decline. The media and many histo­ (U) However, none of these recent books was rians characterized the man as out of touch and able to discuss Eisenhower's involvement with manipulated by strong-minded subordinates. NSA or communications intelligence (COMINT) as president. Virtually nothing on this subject had been declassified from the 1950s.

(U) In fact, Eisenhower, with considerable experience with COMINT during World War II, continued as an interested consumer of COMINT information during his presidency, and involved himself in many aspects of strengthening NSA to improve government COMINT capabilities.

(U) This article cannot deal with all major events concerning NSA in the 1950s; it cannot even treat all aspects of Eisenhower's interactions with NSA or COMINT. However, the cases cited (U) Dwight D. Eisenhower here will demonstrate, I believe, that Eisenhower was important to the development of NSA as an (U) The resurgence of Eisenhower's reputa­ institution in its formative years and to the health tion, however, began with Fred Greenstein's writ­ of the nation's CO MINT process. ings in the i98os on the "hidden hand" presiden­ cy.1 Greenstein demonstrated that Eisenhower (U) The World of the New had actually been an activist president, but pre­ Administration ferred to work behind the scenes, letting his cabi­ net officers and other subordinates engage in the (U) When the Eisenhower administration took public policy debates, perform public actions - office in 1953, American officials had little solid and take the public heat! knowledge about the sources of policy or immedi­ ate goals of the USSR. Even hard facts on such (U) Parallel with this rehabilitation was the basic matters as Red Army troop deployments at revelation of Eisenhower as active also in the field home and in Eastern Europe and development of of intelligence. Stephen Ambrose, in Ike's Spies2 Soviet weaponry were scarce. in 1981, first showed Eisenhmver as a manager and user of intelligence from World War II (U) In October 1953, the National Security through his presidency. A number of books, such Council adopted a basic statement on the Soviet as Dino Brugioni's Eyeball to Eyeball3 in 1990, threat. NSC 162/1 noted a USSR armed with and Philip Taubman's Secret Empire4 in 2003, atomic weapons, a country that devoted one-sixth

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of its gross national product to military spend­ (U) Goodpaster received daily and weekly ing.5 intelligence reports from CIA that included COMINT and rewrote them for the president. (U) NSC 162/1 also listed fourteen defense When Goodpaster and his staff gave intelligence recommendations; number twelve called for an items to the president, they sent in no more than intelligence system capable of analyzing hostile thirty or forty items daily, and kept them concise, intentions. The system would also have to evalu­ that is, around five lines. The president's daily ate friendly and neutral countries to forecast any report would run three, or sometimes four, pages. "potential foreign developments" bearing on national security." (U) Another principal source of the presi­ dent's intelligence was the weekly National (U) Despite this, Eisenhower sought modera­ Security Council meeting, usually 10:00 every tion in defense spending. He believed that fear Friday. DCI Allen Dulles would often start off compounded by lack of knowledge about the with a juicy tidbit from a recent intercept, but the adversary could lead to a garrison state, that group generally followed an agenda that had been unchecked expenditures for national security set weeks in advance, and thus did not necessari­ would lead to economic ruin. He propounded ly discuss current intelligence.8 what became known as the "New Look" in defense, characterized by a sizeable reduction in (U) Goodpaster rated the president "extreme­ conventional military forces balanced by a great­ ly competent" in analyzing the intelligence ly enhanced nuclear arsenal. brought to him. Eisenhower did not ask about sources and methods, but insisted that he receive (U) Considering the Soviet threat, and \Nith the "best available" intelligence. Goodpaster, the New Look as a cornerstone of the administra­ assisted by the president's son John, found tion's policy, and a desire to damp down budgets, Eisenhower conversant with COMINT and that accurate and timely intelligence would be a must. the president appreciated its value. 9

(U) Eisenhower, believing the national securi­ {U) NSA & COMINT in the 1950s ty staff had been organized too loosely, made General Paul T. Carroll staff secretary to facilitate (U) National-level intelligence activities in the papervvork and coordinate issues across organi­ United States began only after World War I, and zational lines. When, in September 1954, General most were products of the Second World War. Carroll died of a heart attack, the president The community of intelligence producers and brought in Colonel, later General, Andrew J. consumers in the 1950s was still seeking the best Goodpaster as his replacement. Goodpaster had organization and practices. worked with Eisenhower at NATO in the office of chief of staff.7 (U) Both the U.S. Army and Navy had sepa­ rate organizations to produce COMINT (informa­ (U) Eisenhower's management style was to tion derived from the exploitation of encrypted block out wide issue areas, give policy direction, communications) before and during World War and then leave subordinates to handle the details. II. Working with their British counterparts, they He also required his chief of staff to follow up on produced timely and well-detailed intelligence details and prompt him about areas needing reports for Allied military commanders, includ­ attention. ing Eisenhower.

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(U) The postwar atmosphere of budget and ~ NSA itself had a personnel strength of personnel retrem:hment made difficult the main­ just over 10,000 employees, of whom about two­ tenance of three COMINT organizations (when thirds were civilians. In addition to those at NSA, the Air Force became a separate service, it quick­ the Army Security Agency and Air Force Security ly began to do CO!VlINT). To consolidate effort Service each had over 15,000 people, and the and funding, the secretary of defense created the Naval Security Group had about 3,300. Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) in 1949. When problems became apparent in AFSA's ~A constant theme in both internal and structure and practices, President Harry Truman external evaluations of NSA was the difficulty in - on the basis of a study - reorganized it as the hiring a civilian workforce and retaining career National Security Agency in 1952. military in the cryptologic services. The constant turnover not only was a security problem but also (U) Thus, although it traced its antecedents imperiled the continuity of CO MINT operations. directly to organizations of the 1930s, NSA as the government's central cryptologic organization (U //'fOUo.+ Although admitting it was diffi­ had been in existence as such for less than a year cult to compute the total cost of the U.S. CO MINT when Eisenhower took office. effort, a presidential commission in the mid- 195os estimated that the annual expenditure was (U) The National Security Act of 194 7 resulted ''in the neighborhood of $soo,ooo,ooo."10 in formation of the U.S. Intelligence Board and its subcommittee, the U.S. Communications (U) The first director of NSA (DIRNSA) was Intelligence Board (USCIB). These committees Major General Oater Lieutenant General) Ralph brought producers and consumers of intelligence Canine, USA. Although not a professional intelli­ together to consolidate requirements and ensure gence officer, Canine quickly learned the essen­ that operations were conducted in accordance tials of cryptologic management, and worked 1,vith them. hard to build a more effective organization. In 1956 Canine retired and was replaced as DIRNSA (U/7P6UBt NSA, subordinate to the by Lieutenant General John Samford, USAF. Department of Defense, was responsible for national-level or strategic COl\HNT, while each (U //ffiU~ The post of deputy at NSA was a military service had an organic cryptologic agency problem in the early years. Initially, NSA had to provide tactical support. In addition, these three military vice-directors, each responsible for Service Cryptologic Agencies conducted some one particular aspect of cryptologic operations. intercept and intermediate-level processing tasks After the Pentagon urged selection of a deputy for NSA. director from outside, two different civilians had been tried, but were found unsatisfactory. When 0':5//&1-) It was estimated in the mid-195os Pentagon officials again proposed bringing in an that these cryptologic services intercepted in outsider, General Samford asked for promotion excess of five million messages per month, and from within. Referring to the arcane nature of forwarded most of it - about one ton of paper per cryptology, he argued that an outsider would have day - to the D.C. locations of NSA. to survive ''artificial stimulus, frustration, con­ flict, disillusionment, and rationalization" before ~ NSA was also responsible for national becoming effective. 11 communications securitv (C01\1SEC), i.e., estab­ lishing COMSEC doctrine and policy, and procur­ (U / /F6U91-This led to the appointment of ing COMSEC materials. Dr. Louis Tordella in 1958. "Dr. T" had been in

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charge of a major Navy collection station during (U) Studying and Reorganizing World War II; poshvar, as a civilian \-v'ith NSA's predecessors, he had had an important role in (U) Hoover Commission developing early computers for cryptologic tasks. (U) During the campaign of 1952, the (U/~When Dr. Tordella was nominat­ Republicans had charged the previous two ed for the post, Department of Defense senior administrations ·with inefficiency, even outright officials suggested the appointment be for four corruption. Therefore, in 1954 Eisenhower com­ years.12 In actuality, Dr. Tordella became the missioned former president Herbert Hoover to longest-serving deputy director at NSA, holding study U.S. government organization and make the post until his retirement in 1974. recommendations for more efficient operations. This included examination of the intelligence agencies.

(U) Hoover delegated study of the intelligence community to a subcommittee under retired Army General Mark W. Clark.

(U) The study encompassed extensive inter­ viewing - over 200 individuals - as well as visits to sites around the country. The report from the Hoover Commission was sent to the White House on May 25, 1955, \-v'ith a top secret appendix on NSA, communications intelligence, and commu­ nications security. 14

-{TS//~lf The Hoover Commission found NSA (U) Dr. Louis Tordella "basically well conceived, well organized, and effi­ ciently operated,'' and that it did excellent work.

(TS//81) William Jackson, a former director ~ U.S. communications security was of CIA \vho consulted on intelligence matters for adjudged good, although the Commission felt too the president. advocated elevation of responsibil­ many messages were transmitted in plain text, ity for NSA within the Defense Department. The giving away a great deal of information to foreign secretary of defense had given responsibility to a governments. deputy, who. in turn, had delegated it to the assis­ tant for special operations. Jackson wanted ~The Commission found that 30,000 responsibility placed where it had originally been Americans were cleared for COMINT. The vast envisioned when NSA \Vas formed, at the assis­ majority were producers, \-v'ith recipients num­ tant secretarv level. •:l While this idea surfaced bering only 4,687. The commission felt that this again, more than once over the decades, it has large a number, combined with a high turnover never been implemented. rate for military personnel involved in produc­ tion, represented a "constant danger" to the secu­ rity of CO MINT.

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(~) The Hoover Commission recom­ (U) Killian Panel mended that USCIB improve its guidance to NSA, ensuring more realism and clarity. At the same (U) After a White House conference in March time, NSA needed to make greater efforts in pro­ 1954, Eisenhower asked the Office of Defense duction. In fact, expenditures equivalent to those Mobilization (ODM) to study the nation's readi­ of the Manhattan Project were needed "at once. "15 ness to defend against a surprise nuclear attack from the Soviet Union. In turn, the chairman of (TS-) Another major recommendation advised ODM's Science Advisory Committee suggested the administration to consider combining that Dr. James R. Killian, president of the CO~iINT and electronic intelligence (ELINT) in Massachusetts Institute of Technology, conduct one organization. We vvill return to this. an initial study on this.

fFS//Si) Given an opportunity to respond to the provisions of the Hoover report, USCIB, the Department of Defense, and NSA essentially rejected them. They first denied the idea that COMINT production had suffered because of USCIB's guidanct' practices, but, conversely, noted that uscrn vvas already implementing changed requirements and guidance procedures for COMINT. 16

('fS//Si) The Department of Defense expand­ ed on the call for Manhattan Project-sized expen­ ditures. The limitation on improvement to crypt­ analysis was not funding, DoD stated, but a short­ age of qualified personnel. Having said this, the Department noted it had authorized DIRNSA to bring in the "best possible analytic brains" from (U) President Eisenhower (left) and Dr. James outside NSA to help attack the problem.17 Killian (right)

~he three respondents agreed that it was (U) After further meetings, Killian and ODM desirable to seek ways to achieve a higher level of suggested creating a special task force to study communications security. However, they noted defense, striking power, and intelligence. that NSA and the military services kept this prob­ Eisenhower thereupon asked Killian to take lem under review ·•at all times." 18 charge, studying American "technical capabilities to meet some of its current problems." (U/ ~)The Hoover Commission result­ ed in no direct institutional or procedural (U) Killian's panel had a subcommittee on changes at NSA It did, however, start adminis­ intelligence, chaired by Edwin Land, of Polaroid tration and NSA officials thinking about neces­ fame, and included prominent figures from uni­ sary changes; in a sense, it prepared the way for versities and private industry. Killian was indoc­ acceptance of change in the future. trinated for COMINT by the CIA in August 1954. 19 Nine members of the group, including Killian and Land, visited NSA for orientation on

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October 13, 1954,20 beginning five months of crisis would negate any COMINT warning capa­ study. bilities.

(U) Although its actual title was "Meeting the ~ NSA's communications group, in Threat of Surprise Attack," the final report was response, considered the assumption the Soviets known throughout the intelligence community as would undertake wide-scale jamming "not neces­ the "Killian Report," the "TCP [for Technical sarily sound." NSA, on the other hand, did sup­ Capabilities Panel] Report," or the "Surprise port the TCP call for research and upgrading of Attack Report."21 communications.25

(U) When Killian published his own account ('l'S1- When the TCP study expressed concern of these years, he discussed at length the portions about the number of persons with access to of the TCP Report that dealt with continental COMINT, USCIB responded that the number of defense, missile programs, and aircraft recon­ persons cleared for COMINT was under constant naissance. However, he noted that "[a]t the time review. USCIB also said that all member agencies of this writing, only part of the report has been were enjoined to keep the need-to-know principle declassified (a restriction of which I approve)."22 a priority.26

(U) Four of the TCP Report's five sections (U) In later years, recalling the TCP, Killian dealt with continental defenses and the effect of expressed a belief that its worth went beyond any technology on the military. The first section, how­ practical recommendations it had made. He ever, read: believed the panel had helped restore trust between scientists and the government. He also Increasing our capacity to get more noted that Eisenhower was pleased that, unlike positive intelligence about the other panels, there were no leaks from the TCP. 27 enemy's intentions and capabilities and thus to obtain, before it is (U) The Killian panel gave Eisenhower confi­ launched, adequate foreknowledge dence in its chairman, and put Ki11ian in a posi­ ofa planned surprise attack. 23 tion to make further recommendations. Dr. Killian became an influential figure in further (U) The intelligence study said the United studies of the intelligence community. In fact, the States "must find ways to increase the number of next step, initiated by Dr. Killian, had far-reach­ hard facts on which our intelligence estimates are ing effects on NSA. based." The U.S. should have the "best-informed government in the world," it read, not only for (U) Baker Panel defense, but also to help resolve the debates between "contending views and fantasies" that (U) When Killian, by then Eisenhower's sci­ appear in the democratic process.24 This meant ence advisor, presented a report to the NSC in increased COMINT efforts. January 1957, the president discussed the need for survivability of intelligence organizations in (~) Since the TCP's task was to examine case of war, and the need to save money. As dis­ intelligence as a tool to provide warning of a cussions progressed, Eisenhower agreed with a Soviet surprise attack, it paid less attention to recommendation to seek ways to save money by communications security. However, it did com­ keeping NSA's costs from going up. Treasury ment on communications, since a communica­ Secretary Humphrey said he was "numb" at the tions failure due to malfunctions or jamming in a rate at which COMINT expenditures were

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increasing. DCI All en Dulles interjected that had no prior concepts of the specifics of cryptog­ "great value" was received from NSA activities. raphy or cryptanalysis. Panel members met with When Defense Secretary Wilson questioned senior and mid-level supervisors at NSA to dis­ Dulles's assertion, Eisenhower sided with Dulles. cuss cryptanalysis and other topics, such as ELINT. 31 (U) Killian con1emplated a group of about fif­ teen scientists to study COlVIINT, probably for ('f~//31) Dr. Baker summarized his findings four to six months. Eisenhower agreed and in front of the president, members of the NSC, expressed the hope that the group would ad\ise and other officials, including the DIRNSA, 28 NSA how to remain productive in COMINT. General Samford, on February 10, 1958. He argued that the cryptographer had won over the +rS//31t As a result of these recommenda­ cryptanalyst, and this situation was likely to con­ tions from Killian , Eisenhower appointed a spe­ tinue. Nevertheless, Dr. Baker said, "there is no cial panel under Dr. William 0. Baker of Bell doubt that NSA has paid its way." Telephone Laboratories to study the state of cryptanalytic proficiency. For administrative pur­ (TS//SI) Baker first stated it would be neces­ poses the panel members were consultants to the sary to reevaluate government COMINf activities Office of Defen se Mobilization, although the and separate cryptologic research from actual Department of Defense - NSA's parent organiza­ exploitation of enemy communications. Second, tion - footed the bill. 29 Baker recommended, the government should establish a separate organization on the model of a university department to undertake fundamen­ tal research in mathematics and cryptanalysis.

("fS/;'SI) Discussing this, Eisenhower said his understanding was that a research organization meant hiring experts who "wouldn't have to do anything but think." He asked whether the research organization would be over NSA or sub­ ordinate to it. Baker replied that the panel envis­ aged the institute as tied to NSA and able to uti­ lize its facilities, but not superior to it.

~ N ext, Baker claimed there was "'ride (U) Dr. William 0. Baker acceptance of the concept of putting ELINT and COM INT together in one organization. DCI Allen (U) Baker had received his Ph.D. from Dulles agreed that this should be done, but Princeton University, and joined Bell Undersecretary of Defense Donald Quarles Laboratories in 1939· He had served as Bell's vice reminded the group that many military com­ president of chemical and metallurgical research manders depended on ELINT for enemy order of from 1951 to 1954, and would serve as vice presi­ battle information. He urged a six-month delay dent ofresearch from 1955 to 1980.30 before taking any action.

(TS//SI) Over a period of months the panel studied all phases of COMINT production from the general to the specific; most members had

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(TS//SI) Eisenhower approved prompt ff'S//81) IDA in fact made some significant implementation of proposed presidential actions contributions to cryptanalysis, communications generated by the Baker Report.32 security, and computer development. Looking back at it, long-time NSA deputy director Dr. (TS//SI) NSA cryptanalysts found Baker's Louis W. Tordella, in an interview after his retire­ evaluation of their activities too pessimistic. They ment, commented that IDA "has paid for itself let it be known that they considered a proposal to several times over."38 separate basic research from production danger­ ous. NSA argued that the two supported each (U) PBCFIA other, and when separated "both suffer."33 (U / ffOUO) The President's Board of ('FSffSI) The Baker Panel's report began a Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities process of change to NSA's organization. As it was established by executive order on February 6, happened, despite the president's approval of 1956. Its members were to be knowledgeable peo­ immediate implementation, the change did not ple from outside the government and were to occur exactly as the panel recommended. serve without compensation.39 In a "more explic­ it" letter to the board, Eisenhower told them their (U) Cryptology responsibility was to review all foreign intelli­ gence activities, not just those of CIA. The board .f+S//~ Despite its initial reservations, NSA was to report on "over-all progress," training, eventually warmed to the Baker Panel recom­ security, research, funding, and effectiveness and mendations for a cryptologic think tank. This was general competence in carrying out assigned particularly so after the idea evolved, when it no tasks.40 longer meant dismantling NSA but creating a group to supplement the Agency's activities. -(£//~) The Board met eighteen times over the next five years to consider numerous ques­ (l'Sf/Sit The director of NSA, General tions of intelligence doctrine and practice. Over Samford, with DoD approval eventually, selected this time, it followed up important issues relating the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in to COMINT, ELINT, and NSA. Princeton, New Jersey, where an existing DoD contract could be used.34 (U) In late February 1958, at the chairman's request, Eisenhower replaced Killian with (U) When the IDA Board of Trustees met in General John Hull. Killian had asked to be late 1957, NSA deputy director Dr. Howard relieved as chairman because of the burden of his Engstrom presented them with a proposal to do duties as special assistant for science and tech­ directed research on behalf of the Agency. nology, but would continue as a member of the Subsequently, after "considerable discussion," board.41 Eisenhower had known Hull as an excel­ centering on the need for more detailed proposals lent planning officer in the Pentagon and at on specific projects and whether commitments to NATO. NSA would interfere with other obligations, IDA accepted. 35 CTS//SB PBCFIA's first concern was getting warning of a possible enemy attack; the problem (TS/fSO IDA accepted in June,36 and the was to redesign the government communications NSA-IDA contract began in October 1958.37 to get critical information to the president in a

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~ timely way. The existing network was cumber- to the secretary of defense, who would further some, with delays in processing and priorities.42 delegate its management to NSA.

l1S//fflThe Hull Committee's reviews, pro­ "ff'S//SB- The National Security Council took posals, and follow-ups accelerated changes to up Draft NSCID #7, "Critical Intelligence many facets of NSA's organization and mission, Communications," at its meeting of August 27, 1958. 1 particularly communications and ELINf. DCI Allen Dulles said there was little pur­ pose in developing intelligence collection until its (U) Communications product could be sent back to Washington rapid­ ly. Dulles said that critical intelligence should (U) As on-going discussions determined reor­ reach Washington within ten minutes; he dubbed ganizations and support for the intelligence com­ this communication network the "CRITIC sys­ munity, the administration realized that commu­ tem." nications support was critical to support the other fields. ffS//Sn Dr. Louis Tordella, deputy director of NSA, briefed the NSA proposal for the CRITIC (U) At a meeting with the president in system. He explained that it would include full October 1957, Dr. Killian, then still chairman of automation of the existing COMINf communica­ PBCFIA, restated the board's first recommenda­ tions system, and critical information would have tion about better communications for early warn­ "overriding priority." Tordella expected the sys­ ing of a Soviet attack. His group had found delays tem would be completed in the FY 1962-65 peri­ and "extraordinary blockages" in the communica­ od, and would require funding of $29 million in tions channels, both in reporting from the field addition to the $16 million already expended.46 and in successive stops in the Washington report­ ing chain. t'fS//SI) Eisenhower asked no technical ques­ tions about the briefing. Tordella remembered (U) Eisenhower asked if this problem were the decision went quickly thereafter - a matter of due to duplication of effort. Killian told him that Eisenhower asking, "Can we do it?" With an affir­ it was due to system overload and a lack of effec­ mative answer by the deputy secretary of defense, tive ways to prioritize messages. 43 The president the president responded, "Let's do it."47 directed formation of a committee under the NSC to study crisis communications. ~As the government moved to implement the presidential decision, Dr. Baker, on May 1, C'fS//~ The resultant NSC Committee 1959, worried that the work on communications defined critical information as that requiring the systems, including CRITICOMM, was "superfi­ immediate attention of the president.44 cially impressive," but really was fragmented and unlikely to result in the integrated system neces­ (TSf/SI) The committee noted that commu­ sary.4s nications to support COMINf activities had capa­ bilities that met the president's requirement for (TS//~I) The PBCFIA, in a report to the pres­ rapid communications. This was because the ident, also had "misgivings" about the CRITI­ COMINT ;;ystem had to be ready to respond to a COMM effort. Although improvements had been crisis at any time and its communications system made in message handling and from the field, the had operated continuously since the war.45 Thus, board felt that would be impossible to complete the new presidential system came to be assigned the system by the target date of October 1961. The board recommended a thorough review of

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the system, followed by a reorganization of it, and Ralph Canine that NSA was authorized to spend more frequent system tests. 49 an extra $5 million per year for five years to develop a high-speed computer. Thereafter, (T5//~) The CRITIC system began initial FREEHAND was to become a regular NSA budg­ limited operations on July 21, 1959. Substantial et item. However, Robertson disapproved any time savings for crisis messages were achieved: budget increase for the overall NSA effort.53 average time for messages was one and a half hours, compared with an average of nine and one (TS//SI) Projects FREEHAND and LIGHT­ half hours, as measured two years earlier. A NING were briefed to the president in January majority of messages were received in less than 1957. Eisenhower agreed with the concept of an hour.50 increasing computer speed for cryptology and authorized use of his name in connection with ~ A report of November 1959 listed the recruiting for the projects.54 establishment of traffic control points around the globe, as well as significant upgrades to equip­ ~With DoD funding in late 1956, and then ment. Occasionally, message time approached presidential support, NSA and its science advi­ eleven minutes from origin to Washington, but sors took up Projects FREEHAND and LIGHT­ most still required twenty-four to twenty-nine NING. They sought new ideas from commercial minutes.51 consultants and various universities that were doing related work.55 00 The desired improvements in time were not achieved until the early 1960s, during the tf'S//SIJ- The magnitude of computer devel­ Kennedy administration. opment sought was considered audacious by many scientists. Even Dr. Killian thought the 56 (U) Computers proposed leap in computing power "infeasible." l The only point of agreement among those ('t'S/fSI) An advisory group of scientists involved was the desirability of pushing technolo­ ( formed by NSA to study its own operations took gy to the limit. In fact, with no agreement on a 1: computer development as a primary interest. At single best path, general research progressed on an October 1954 briefing by NSA staff, members several divergent computer technologies, abetted asked about technical aspects of collection and by at least six corporations under contract and cryptanalysis. Among the questions was "what two universities. c T are things you dream about but do not dare hope J. for?" Dr. Howard Eachus, replied "more speed in "tslA LIGHTNING test machine was not con­ .. 52 . smaller boxes." This led to an active program to structed until 1962; in practical terms, the project ti develop advanced computers. resulted in HARVEST, NSA's first general-pur­ s pose high-speed computer system. Beyond this, e (~ An effort to develop a powerful general­ NSA proudly pointed to the fact that research purpose computer eventually became known as results in this area had been shared with other Project FREEHAND. Associated with it was government agencies, academia, and commercial g Project LIGHTNING, an effort to increase com­ firms, driving the high-speed computing revolu­ puter speed 1,000 times. tion.57 r: C1 "('IS//$) Project FREEHAND was approved w at the DoD level in early October 1956. Deputy Oi Secretary Reuben Robertson informed DIRNSA

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(U)ELINT problem came up again with the other studies of the intelligence community. .,kf!'j ELINT (electronic intelligence) is infor­ mation derived from electronic signals that do '(TS//~) Although the report of the Baker not contain speech. As an intelligence discipline it Panel concentrated on COMINT, it made a clear has two aspects: the study of the characteristics of statement about ELINT: "We recommend that signal emitters such as radars or beacons, and the responsibility for and control of ELINT process­ location of specific emitters. Because specific ing and analysis be assigned to the National emitters are associated with specific weapons, Security Agency."6o ELINT thus provides accurate order-of-battle data. "('l'S1.A special ELINT task force, chaired by Philip G. Strong of CIA, responding to a presiden­ ~Among the problems was the relation­ tial directive of February 1958, concluded that it ship of CO MINT producers to ELINT production; was "essential" to have a single operational and in many ways, organization and production activ­ technical authority for ELINT. 61 USCIB approved ities overlapped. Both COMINT and ELINT were the task force's conclusions in mid-August 1958 performed by the individual services with similar and sent them to the president. They proposed technologies. Both resulted in information making the secretary of defense executive agent required by both services, but each was processed for ELINT; he, in turn, would assign NSA an and reported by different organizations. ELINT mission equivalent to its existing COMINT responsibilities.62 (U) The services understandably hoped to preserve their control over an asset vital to their ~ The assignment of ELINT analysis to war-fighting capabilities. Split responsibility in NSA under this presidential decision produced production and reporting, however, frequently mixed results and reactions. meant wasteful duplication of effort, and, worse, carried with it the risk that commanders in com­ (U //POU~ At an NSC conference on bat would not get data as quickly as needed or not December 16, 1958, General John Hull pointed get it at all. out that the decision had improved coordination. He emphasized, however, that NSA needed "max­ ~The first major study of the intelligence imum support" from DoD. Eisenhower agreed community, the Clark subcommittee of the with this, and noted that the arrangements were Hoover Commission, examined ELINT along correct.63 This sentiment was repeated at an NSC with other sources of intelligence. It found affini­ meeting in mid-January 1959. Eisenhower said ties between ELINT and COMINT because of he fully endorsed NSA's COMINT-ELINT similarities of intercept operations, and because efforts.64 each helped in interpreting the other. tTS//Stj In a review of COMINT and ELINT ~ The Hoover Commission had favored at the end of August 1960, just six months before giving most responsibility for ELINf to NSA.58 the Eisenhower administration was to leave NSA would have control of analysis, as well as office, DCI Allen Dulles noted that improvements responsibility, for "guidance and coordination" of had been made and were continuing. The DCI's collection and dissemination. Tactical ELINT report concluded "COMINT, and to a lesser would remain with local commanders. 59 This rec­ extent ELINT, continue to provide one of our best ommendation was not implemented, and the

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potentials for early warning" against a surprise term signals intelligence (SIGINT) was coined to attack.65 describe a mission that included both.

(U) Observations

(U) There are no startling revelations about President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his relation­ ship with NSA or his fostering of communications intelligence. Eisenhower was the consummate staff chief, one who had mastered the art of dele­ gation for research and action. Thus, we find few direct fingerprints from him on intelligence developments.

(lJ) Yet, it is clear from the record that he understood COMINT, had knowledge of NSA operations, and acted in positive ways to improve (U) Allen Dulles both.

(U) Eisenhower had greater involvement with fFS//el} The PBCFIA disagreed. In two sum­ the burgeoning reconnaissance programs mary reports near the end of the Eisenhower because these were essentially new activities, and, administration, the Board, although noting moreover, programs that had the potential for progress in coordinating COMINT and ELINT causing an international incident. With NSA and under NSA, felt it had been too slow. The director COMINT, it was not a matter of creation; of NSA was not exercising positive control but Eisenhower was dealing with institutions, struc­ deferring frequently to the individual services. tures, and processes already in existence that The Board recommended that DoD promote needed reforming. greater continuity in the term of office of the director of NSA, that tactical control of ELINT be (U) The principal tool for his actions in regard given from the services to NSA, and that to COMINT and NSA was a chain of panels that COMINT and ELINT planning be done at the studied the important intelligence issues. USIE level. Eisenhower initiated many of their studies, con­ sidered their recommendations, and took appro­ Eisenhower issued no instruc­ priate actions based on them. Not infrequently, tions about the problem, but directed that a copy the actions taken were the commissioning of of th is report be given to incoming president John additional panels for further study. Kennedy, and this was done.66 (U) Eisenhower put first-rate minds from the (U //P'OU91 NSA's assumption of responsibil­ government or academia on the panels to study ity for some aspects of ELINT, by the way, result­ the intelligence community and NSA. Their ed in a new term to describe one of the Agency's involvement attracted other top people to the principal missions. Since communications intelli­ panels and ensured that NSA and its component gence dealt with messages that contained speech, disciplines would get the best analyses possible. it did not encompass electronic intelligence, which dealt vvith non-speech signals. Thus, the

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... (U) In many cases, such as the CRITIC com- (U) Notes munications system and ELINf, the results were not apparent during his administration. Change was slow for a variety of reasons. In the case of 1. {U) Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand ELINT, for example, the military services had Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic sound reasons for objecting to structural changes Books, 1982). to an intelligence source and opposed them. The 2. (U) Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike's Spies: CRITIC system moved steadily toward imple­ Eisenhower and the Intelligence Establishment (New mentation, but the technical challenges were York: Doubleday & Co., 1981). great, and the physical challenges of emplacing 3. (U) Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: the the system on a global basis were daunting. Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 1990). (U/ /P(9YO.) Change did come, however. The 4. (U) Philip Taubman, Secret Empire: major areas in which he fostered change were Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of those that most affected NSA's intelligence mis­ America's Space Espionage (New York: Simon & sion - cryptanalytic research, communications Schuster, 2003). improvement, computing power, and ELINf - 5. (U) "Note by the Executive Secretary to the would not have happened naturally; they National Security Council on Basic National Security required Eisenhower's concern and intervention. Policy," Washington, October 30, 1953, marked "TOP SECRET," in Lisle A. Rose & Neal H. Peterson, editors, (U) The changes Eisenhower initiated, even if Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, not fully realized during his time, had profound Volume II: National Security Affairs, part 1 impact in keeping NSA ahead of the technological (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), 577- curve, and ensuring that SIGINf would be avail­ 78. able to help keep the American people secure in 6. (U) "Statement of Policy," 582. the decades to come. 7. (U) New York Times Oral History Program, Eisenhower Administration Project, interview of General Andrew J. Goodpaster by Ed Edwin, 25 April 1967, interview no. 1, 9, 13, 24, 31. 8. (U)Richard Kovar, "An Interview with Richard Lehman," www.cia.gov/csi/studies/sum­ meroo/ arto5.html. 9. (U) Hatch telephone interview with General Goodpaster; Goodpaster interview by Edwin. 10. (U) Task Force on Intelligence Activities of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, "Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government," hereafter, "Report on Intelligence Activities," Appendix I, 11. Center for Cryptologic History Series File, VI.C.1.8. 11. (U) LtGen John A. Samford, Director, NSA, let­ ter to General G. B. Erskine, 10 July 1958. NSA ARC ACC #26030 CBOl.48. 12. (U) G. B. Erskine, Memorandum for Deputy Secretary Quarles, "Director of National Security

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Agency," i? July 1958. NSA ARC ACC #26030 as it Pertains to NSA Communications," enclosure in CBOLJ8. Powers, DF, "Report by the Technological Capabilities 13. (U) William H. Jackson, Special Assistant to Panel," 7 June 1955. NSA ARC ACQ #30235. the President, Memorandum for Sherman Adams, 26. (U) No author, n.d., "Interim Statement for Assistant to the President, "Weekly Report of William Killian Board." NSA ARC, ACQ #2944. H. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President," 28 27. (U) Columbia University, Oral History July 1956. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Subject Collection, Part VI, "Killian, James P., Jr.," 29, 36. Series, White House Subseries, Box 1-7, file: Jackson, 28. (U) Memorandum, "Discussion at the Special William H. (3); William H. Jackson, Special Assistant Meeting in the President's Office on Thursday, to the President, Memorandum for Sherman Adams, January 17, 1957. Eisenhower Presidential Library. the Assistant to the President, "Reorganization of the 29. (U) Gordon Gray, director, ODM, letter to National Security Agency," 1August1956. Eisenhower Donald H. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 10 Presidential Library, Subject Series, White House June 1957. NSA ARC ACC#34106 CBLG36; G. B. Subseries, box: 6, file: Jackson, William H. Erskine, Assistant to the President (Special 14. (U) George F. Howe, "The Clark Report," Operations), Memorandum for the Executive unpublished manuscript, Center for Cryptologic Secretary, NSC, "Report to the President by the History Series File, VII. i.9. President's Board of Consultants on Foreign 15. (U) "Report on Intelligence Activities," Intelligence Activities, dated December 20, 1956," 26 Appendix I, 20-24, 27, 36, 46-49. April 1957. CCH SERIES FILE XVI.D.i.2. 16. (U) Untitled, undated response to the "Report 30. (U) "The Bell Laboratory Cronies: The on Intelligence Activities," 1-2. CCH Series File William 0. Baker Page," http://ourworld/com­ XVI.D.i.2. puserv.com/homepages/CarolASThompson/Baker.ht 17. (U) Untitled, undated response to the "Report ml. Other Baker Panel members included L. W. on Intelligence Activities," 3. Alvarez of the University of California, H. W. Bode and 18. (U) Untitled, undated response to the "Report J. R Pierce of Bell Labs, R. L. Garwin and N. Rochester on Intelligence Activities," 3. of IBM, D. A. Huffman of MIT, J. W. Milnor of 19. (U) LCDR P. J. Karl, USN, Memorandum for Princeton University, 0. Selfridge of Lincoln Mr. Hugh S. Erskine, "The President's Science Laboratories at MIT, A. M. Gleason of Harvard Advisory Committee," 9 March 1955. NSA ARC ACC# University (part-time), and J. W. Tukey of Bell Labs as 20659 CBJG 16. a consultant. 20. (U) William F. Friedman, Special Assistant, 31. (U) James S. Lay, Executive Secretary, memo­ memorandum for the Chief of Staff, "Visit to NSA by randum for the Secretary of Defense and Director, Members of the Special Subcommittee of the Scientific Office of Defense Mobilization, "Report to the Advisory Committee," 6 October 1954. NSA ARC ACC President by the President's Board of Consultants on #28690, CBT1<57. Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated December 20, 21. (U) James R Killian, Jr., SPUINIK, SCIEN­ 1956," 19 April 1957. NSAARC, ACC: 46033; James S. TISTS, AND EISENHOWER: A Memoir of the First Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Director of Central Intelligence, "Recommendation Technology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT No. 4 - Report of the President's Board of Consultants Press, 1977), 64-70. on Foreign Intelligence Activities dated October 24, 22. (U) Killian, SPUTNIK, 70. 1957, 28 October 1957. NSA ARC, ACC #46033; 23. (U) Killian, SPUTNIK, 71. Gordon Gray, Memorandum for James S. Lay, Jr., 24. (U) Killian, SPUTNIK, 79-80. Executive Secretary, NSC, "Study of Soviet High­ 25. (U) John A. Skinner, A/Chief, Grade Ciphers," 25 April 1957. Eisenhower Communications, "Analysis of Technological Presidential Library, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee box: 7, file: President's Board - 1st Report (8); l

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~ jhen L. David, ADV A, Memorandum for the 36. (U) Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of C:l."tor, NSA, 'The Baker Committee," 16 September Defense, letter to Major General James McCormack, Ji· NSA ARC ACC#34106 CBLG36; Howard C. Jr., USAF (Ret), President, Institute for Defense ~low, Memorandum to Mr. Austin, "Parallel," 4 Analyses, 24 April 1958. NSA ARC, ACC # 34285; H. ~ruary 1957. NSA ARC ACC #34106 CBLG36. T. Engstrom, [Deputy]Director, NSA, letter to Major 32. (U) J. Patrick Coyne, Memorandum re General James McCormack, Jr., USAF (Ret), ~eeting Held in the President's Office from 10:30 a.m. President, Institute for Defense Analyses, 17 June _:• u:30 a.m., February 10, 1958, "The Baker Report' 1958. NSA ARC, ACC #34285. Recommendation No 8-a of the Report of the 37. (U) A. G. Hill, Memorandum for File, 12 ~ident's Board of Consultants on Foreign September 1958. NSA ARC ACC #26030 CBOL48. intelligence Activities, dated December 20, 1956, 10 38. (U) Oral History, Dr. Louis W. Tordella, inter­ February 1958. CCH Series File, XVI.D.i.2. viewed by Robert W. Farley, 28 July 1990, OH-08-90, 33. (U) Unsigned Memorandum for the Executive Center for Cryptologic History, 90. Secretary, USCIB, "comments on the Baker Study," 39. (U) Press release and Executive Order With ink notation "Dr. Engstrom's," n.d.; Untitled "Establishing the President's Board of Consultants on response signed by Arthur J. Levenson, Chief, ADVA; Foreign Intelligence Activities," 6February1956. NSA Memorandum "General Comments on the Baker ARC ACC #34187 CBPD47; Colonel A. J. Goodpaster, Committee Report," signed by initials FCA. NSA ARC "Memorandum of Conference with the President, 20 ACC #31003 CBOE53. December 1956 - 3:00 PM," 20 December 1956. CCH 24. (U) John A. Samford, Director, NSA, Series File, XVI.D.1.2. Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 40. (U) BG John F. Cassidy, Staff Director, "The "NSA Research Institute," 21 February 1958. NSA President's Board of Consultants on Foreign ARC, ACC #34285; G. B. Erskine, Assistant to the Intelligence Activities," 13 January 1956. NSA ARC Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), ACC #34187 CBPD47. Memorandum for the Director, National Security 41. (U) BG John F. Cassidy, Staff Director, PBC­ Agency, "NSA Research Institute," 4 March 1958. NSA FIA, Memorandum for Captain E.W. Knepper, USN, ARC, ACC #34285; John A. Samford, Director, NSA, Chief of Staff, Production, NSA, 7 March 1958. NSA Memorandum for General Erskine, "NSA Research ARC ACC #34187 CBPD47. Institute," 6 March 1958. NSA ARC, ACC #34285; G. 42. (U) President's Board of Consultants on B. Erskine, Assistant to the Secretary of defense Foreign Intelligence Activities, Report for the (Special Operations), Memorandum for the Director, President, "Recommendations of the PBCFIA," 24 National Security Agency, "Baker Panel October 1957. Eisenhower Presidential Library, NSC Recommendation on Research Institute for Soviet Series, Subject Subseries, box: 7, file: President's High-Level Problem," 13 March 1958. NSA ARC ACC Board - 2nd Rpt (1). #34106 CBLG36 Ho1-0111-7; John A. Samford, 43. (U) A. J. Goodpaster, "Memorandum of Director, NSA, Memorandum for the Secretary of Conference with the President, October 24, 1957, 8:30 defense, "NSA Research Institute," 4 April 1958. NSA a.m.," 28 October 1957. Eisenhower Presidential ARC, ACC #34285. Library, White House Office, Office of the Staff 35. (U) "Institute for Defense Analyses, Special Secretary, Alphabetical Subseries, box no. 6, file: Meeting of the Board of Trustees, October 31, 1957." board of Consultants [on Foreign Intelligence Eisenhower Presidential Library, White House Office, Activities] (5). Office of the ,Special Assistant for Science and 44. (U) William A. Tidwell, Chairman, Ad Hoc Technology (James R. Killian and George B. Committee, Memorandum for the Chairman, Kistiakowsky): Records 1957-61, box: 11, file: Institute Intelligence Advisory Committee, "Report of the Ad for Defense Analyses [December 1959]. Hoc Committee on Communications," 29 April 1958. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Subject Series,

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Alphabetical• Subseries, box: 14-15, file: Preparation 55. (U) Minutes of the NSA Scientific Advisory for Intelligence Communications Test and Exercise. Board Meeting Held on 8 October 1956. NSA ARC 45. (U) "Annex D, Points of Origin for Critical ACC #26093 CBOL56; Minutes of the NSA Scientific Intelligence," SC 02305/58. Eisenhower Presidential Advisory Board Meeting Held on 9 October 1956. NSA Library, Staff Secretary, Subject - Alpha, box: 15. ARC ACC #28690 CBTK.57. 46. (U) Memorandum of the 378th NSA meeting, 56. (U) Second Quarterly Briefing of the Deputy 38 August 1958; Captain Arthur Enderlin, USN, Chief, Secretary of Defense, Presentation by General Erskine, .• Office of Telecommunications, Memorandum for the 1030, 2 August 1956. NSA ARC ACC #26097, Record, "NSCID #7, Action on the 'CRITICOMM' CBNC62. Plan," and insert "The CRITICOMM Plan," 27 August 57. (U) NSA, "Progress in Management: Report 1958. NSA ARC ACC#10149 CBND73. No. 12, LlGHTNING," November 1964, 1-9. NSA ARC 47. (U) Oral History, Dr. Louis Tordella, inter­ ACC #22251 CBJL73. viewed by Robert Farley, 28 July 1990, OH-08-90, 58. (U) "Report on Intelligence Activities," Center for Cryptologic History, 22, 66. Appendix I, 41-45. 48. (U) W. 0. Baker, MEMORANDUM FOR DR. J. 59. (U) "Report on Intelligence Activities," R. KILLIAN, JR., "Coordination of Military Appendix I, 48-49. Communications Development with Particular 60. (U) Captain Allyn Cole, Jr., USN, Reference to the CRITICOMM System," 1 May 1959. Memorandum for the members of USCIB, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Subject Series, "Presidential Action on Baker Panel Report," enclo­ Alphabetical Subseries, box: 14-15, file: Preparation sure "Digest of Report," 13 February 1958. NSA ARC for Intelligence Communications Test and Exercise. ACC #44403N. 49. (U) John E. Hull, Chairman, PBCFIA, Report 61. (U) Philip G. Strong, chairman, ELINT Task to the President, 12 August 1959. CCH SERIES FILE, Force, Memorandum for Chairman, USCIB, "Report XVI.D.i.2. of the USCIB ELINT Task Force," 9 June 1958. NSA 50. (U) Draft Memorandum For the President, ARC ACC #36348 CBNA16. "Transmission of Critical Intelligence," 19 January 62. (U) Colonel W. Shepard, USAF, Chief, Plans 1959. Enclosure in Assistant Director, Current and Control Group in Production, disposition Form, Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, MEMO­ "Recent USCIB Developments," PROD-042/s-4639, RANDUM FOR General Andrew J. Goodpaster, 21 August 1958. NSA ARC ACC #35271 CBPD54. "Transmission of Critical Intelligence," 19 January 63. (U) John S. D. Eisenhower, "Memorandum of 1959. Eisenhower Presidential Library. Conference with the President, December 16, 1958 - 51. (U) Admiral Dorsey, "CRITICOMM Briefing 9:00 AM," 22 December 1958. CCH Series File for The President's Board of Advisors on Foreign XVI.D.1.2. Intelligence Activities," 19 November 1959. NSA ARC 64. (U) Memorandum, "Discussion at the Special ACC# 43510. Meeting held in the Cabinet Room of the White House 52. (U) Capt. I. T. Mcdonald, USAF, Memorandum following the 393rd NSC Meeting, Thursday, January for the Record, Memo Routing, 18 October 1954. NSA 15, 1959," 19 January 1959. Eisenhower Presidential ARC ACC #21479 CBJH52. Library, Box 7. 53. (U) Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., Deputy 65. (U) "Developments and Trends in the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Director, COMINT and ELINT Fields during Fiscal Year 1960," National Security Agency, "Project FREEHAND," 1 Annex to USIB-D-3.2/10, 30 August 1960, enclosure October 1956. NSA ARC ACC #23666 CBOG5i. to Allen Dulles, Director, CIA, Memorandum for the .. 54. (U) LTG John A. Samford, DIRNSA, Executive secretary National Security Council, "Report Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense on 'Developments and Trends in the COMINT and (Comptroller), "Project LIGHTNING," Serial: N2145, ELINT Fields During Fiscal Year i960,'" 31 August 3 April 1957. NSA ARC ACC #34105 CBLG36. 1960. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

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~. (U) John E. Hull, chairman, PBCFIA, report to . president, 24 May i960. CCH SERIES FILE, n.1.2; John E. Hull, chairman, PBCFIA. report to president, S January 1961. CCH SERIES FILE, -D.I.2. A handwritten marginal note states that the :irt was handed to President Kennedy as per · ;-1hower's instructions_

(Ul/F'Ot:J9J Dr. Hatch is currently Technical Director of the Center for Cryptologic History (CCH) and is also the NSA Historian. He has worked in the CCH since 1990. From October 1988 to February 1990, he was a Legislative Staff Officer in the NSA Legislative Affairs Office. Previously, Dr. Hatch served as a Congressional Fellow. He earned a 8.A. degree in East Asian languages and literature and an M.A. in East Asian studies, both from Indiana University at Bloomington. Dr. Hatch holds a Ph.D. in international relations from American University.

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