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General Assembly Security Couhcil Distr General Assembly Security Couhcil Distr. GENERAL A/37/22/Md.l* S/15383/Add.l* 28 September 1982 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH GENERAL ASSEMBLY SECURITY COUNCIL Thirty-seventh session Thirty-seventh year FIRST SPECIAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL CCNMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID Recent developments concerning relations between Israel and South Africa l This is a mimeographed version of a special report of the Special Committee against Apartheid, which will be issued in printed form in Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 22A (A/37/22/Add.l). 82-25703 0342q (E) CONTENTS Paragrqbs LSE. Letter Qf transmittal . 3 I. INTRODVCTION . ..e......................... l-5 4 II. MILITARY AND NUCLEAR COLLABORATION . 6 - 12 5 III. EOJNOMIC COLLABORATION . 13 - 24 6 IV. CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC AND SPOWING aNTACTS . 25 - 29 8 V. RELATIONS WITH BANTUSTANS . 30 - 32 9 VI. MISCELLANEOUS . 33 - 34 9 ANNEXES I. REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL 03irlMITTEE ON RELATIONS BE!b?EEN ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA . 12 II. FUBLICATIONS OF THE CENTRE AGAINST APARTHEID OF THE SECPETARIAT ON RELATIONS BElWEEN ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA . 13 -2- LhTTEFf OF TRANSMITTAL 31 August 1982 Sir, I have the honour, in accordance with resolution 36/172 M adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1981, to transmit herewith a special report of the Special Canmittee againat Apartheid on recent developments concerning relations between Israel and South Africa. The Special Committee requests that this report be issued as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. (Signed) Alhaji Yusuff MAITANA-SULE Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid His Excellency Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellae Secretary-General United Nations New York. N.Y. -3- I. INTRODUCTION 1. Ebr almost a decade, the Special Canmittee against 3artheid has drawn the attention of the General Assembly to the increasing collaboration between Israel and South Africa in the military, nuclear, political , economic and other fields. The General Assembly has repeatedly called upon Israel to cease such collaboration, u but the Government of Israel has defied all appeals. In fact, the collaboration assumed increasing scope, especially since the visit of the South African Prime Minister Mr. B. J. Vorster to Israel in 1976 and the signing of a series of agreements. Moreover, both countries developed closer relations with the authorities in Taiwan and with certain other r&gimes. 2. In resolution 36/172 M, adopted on 17 December 1981, the General Assembly again expresSa grave concern about reports of continued collaboration between Israel and South Africa, in particular in the military and nuclear fields. and considered that such collaboration "is a serious hindrance to international action for the eradication of apartheid, an encouragement to the racist rbgime of South Africa to persist in its criminal policy of apartheid and a hostile act against the oppressed people of South Africa and the entire African continent, and constitutes a threat to international peace and security". It stated, in the operative part of the resolution: "1. Strongly condemns the continuing and increasing collaboration of Israel with the racist dgime of South Africa, especially in the military and nuclear fields! 2. Dsmands that Israel desist from and terminate all forms of collaboration with South Africa forthwith, particularly in the military and nuclear fields, and abide scrupulously by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council; 3. Requests the Special Committee against Apartheid to keep the matter under constant review and to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council as appropriate." 3. IXlring the same month, however, the Minister of Defence of Israel was reported to have made a secret visit to the northern borders of Namibia, a territory under illegal South African occupation for which the united Nations has assumed responsibility. It was reported that Israel would supply South Africa with, or enable it to build, patrol boats with missiles, in flagrant violation of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. 4. The Special Committee has been gravely concerned at the attitude and actions of the Government of Israel. In his address to the extraordinary meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-aligned Movement, held in Kuwait in &xi1 1982, the Chairman of the Special Committee recalled the growing collaboration between Israel and South Africa and statedr "We face a grave situation today both in Southern Africa and in the Middle East, a situation that spells the danger of wider conflagrations . "But we are faced not only with parallel situations, but with the ever-increasing collaboration between the Pretoria &gime and Israel in military, nuclear, political, economic and other fields. This collaboration has become so brazen that only a few weeks ago the Minister of Defence of Israel visited the northern borders of Namibia, a territory for which the United Nations has special responsibility, to advise the illegal authorities in their criminal plans. "South Africa and Israel have not only set up a diabolic axis or alliance, but are trying to forge a so-called sixth world alliance of outlaws and pariahs, which poses an enormous danger to international peace and security. The danger of these countries being enabled to engage in nuclear blackmail in this troubled world needs urgent attention of the international community. 'We have reason to be alarmed ,that the so-called strategic co-operation between the United States and Israel - and the emergence of a similar relationship between the Uhlited States and South Africa - will reinforce the military relationship between the rdgimes of Tel Aviv and Pretoria." 5. The present report, prepared in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 36/172, reviews developments since the previous report submitted in. September 1981. 2/ II. MILITARY AND NUCLEAR COLLABORATION 6. It was reported in August 1981 that Israel was hoping to boost arms exports by more than $2 billion from 1982 to 1985. Such a plan depended on the approval of the United States Government to allow Israel to export arms to Taiwan and South Africa, since many Israeli weapons have vital United States-made components. The Minister of Economy of Israel was reported to have appealed to the United States Government as follows: "Do not compete with us in Taiwan, do+not compste with us in South Africa, do not compete with us in the ,Caribbean or in other countries where you could not directly do it." A/ . 7. General Naton Nir, Chairman of the Association for the Welfare of Soldiers in Israel, visited South Africa for three weeks in September 1981 on a mission "to help give soldiers the feeling that they are needed and appreciated". liemet several high-ranking South African military officers and praised the recent South African raid into Angola. A/ 8. Israel's Defence Minister Mr. Ariel Sharon visited the "operational areas" in Namibia in December 1981 during large-scale aggression by South Africa against Angola and was reported to have made a strong appeal for South Africa to be supplied with sophisticated arms. According to press reports, Mr. Sharon's views were shared by American and the Ncrth Atlantic Treaty Alliance's military analysts. g 9. Rqorting on the visit of the Israeli Defence Minister, the New York Times stated that "the military relationship between South Africa and Israel, never fully acknowledged by either country, has assumed new significance with the recent lo-day visit by Israel's Defence Minister, Mr. Ariel Sharon, to South African forces in Namibia along the border with Angola". It noted that Military Fialance, the annual publication of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, had reported that the South African Navy had seven Israeli-built fast-attack craft, armed with Israeli missiles and seven more were under order. 6J 10. The Chairman of the Special Committee, in a statement on 14 December 1981, said: -5- “The report in the New York Times today on the recent visit of Israel's Minister of Defence to Namibia should cane as no surprise to those who have been following with consternation the collusion between the rCgimes in Pretoria and Tel Aviv, especially since 1976. The constant denials by the Israeli Government, repeated again by its representative in the General Assembly on 30 November 1981, have again proved to be utterly false. "The visit of the Israeli Minister to Namibia, an international Territory for which the United Nations has special responsibility, at a time when South Africa was engaged in criminal aggression against the People's Republic of Angola, is a further brazen act of encouragement to the apartheid r&ime. "It is a hostile act against the people of Namibia, South Africa and the front-line States, as well as the~continent of Africa. It is en affront to the United Nations and a challenge to the international community. "On behalf of the Special Committee, I must also express shock at the report that the Israeli Minister of Defence, 'in company with many American and NATO military analysts', called for the supply of more modern weapons to South Africa." 11. An article in Militaria, an official technical periodical of the South African Defence Force, reported in February 1982, that South Africa would possibly build or purchase six Israeli frigates, equipped with Gabriel missiles, torpedoes and a helicopter. y 12. Sunday Times,,London, reported in May 1982 that , according to a book to be published in Israel by three Israeli authors, Israel and South' Africa were developing a cruise missile with a range of 1,500 miles , a neutron bomb and various nuclear delivery systems. The three.authors were said to be very well known established figures in Israel with excellent connexions in the military and Government.
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