Security Council Report

SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Monthly SEPTEMBER 2006 31 August 2006 This report is available online and can beFORECAST viewed together with Update Reports on developments during the month at www.securitycouncilreport.org OVERVIEW FOR SEPTEMBER CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE Greece will have the Presidency of the huge amount of high level lobbying by Status Update since our August Council in a month when the Council will Guatemala and Venezuela (competing for Forecast��3 have to manage not only a large number of the Latin American seat) and Indonesia, Lebanon ��3 mandate renewals (ten), but also high pro- Nepal and Republic of Korea (competing file and politically charged issues such for the Asian seat). (See our Special Iran��6 as the selection of the next Secretary- Research Report of 14 August 2006.) Darfur/Sudan��7 General, the Secretary-General’s proposals n The Security Council will move into the Democratic Republic of Congo ��9 on Lebanon, the Iranian nuclear pro- next phase of its selection process for Côte d’Ivoire�� 11 gramme and Darfur. In addition Greece the next Secretary-General. With four proposes to take up, in an open Council candidates still in the race, and wide Somalia�� 13 debate on 20 September chaired by its For- expectations that additional candidates Burundi�� 15 eign Minister, the subject of cooperation will yet emerge, this will also be a major Kosovo�� 17 between the UN and regional organisations. focus of attention and lobbying. (A number of Council members are disappointed Liberia�� 18 Meanwhile, deterioration of three situations at the first round of straw balloting in July in Africa means that the Council will need to Iraq�� 19 and feel that it would have been more devote time to: Ethiopia/Eritrea�� 20 effective in achieving the goal of encour- n Burundi (where tension is growing as a aging withdrawal of the less favoured Sierra Leone�� 21 result of concerns that the recent coup candidates if the process had been more Review of Security Council allegations, human rights violations and open.) It now seems that withdrawals will arrests indicate a wider breakdown of the Mandates�� 22 be unlikely until there is a clear trend democratic process); established from a number of straw polls Notable Dates for September�� 24 n DRC (where post election violence and a that a candidate cannot succeed. The Important Dates over the Horizon�� 24 further round of presidential campaign- other thing that might precipitate a ing for the run-off election threaten to >>page 2 destabilise the peace process); and n Côte d’Ivoire (where failure to meet the Council road map benchmarks makes a Aide-Memoire further postponement of elections inevi- Important matters pending for the Council Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has table. It also opens the possibility—and are: not been published. the Special Adviser on Genocide, Juan n In October 2004 the Council requested a n A draft resolution on Small Arms circu- Méndez, has issued clear warnings—of report on the practical steps the UN could lated by Argentina in March 2006 has not resort to large scale violence). take to strengthen its action in support for been adopted. Argentina continues with High level visitors attending the General transitional justice and the rule of law in bilateral consultations. Debate of the UN General Assembly usually conflict and post-conflict situations. This n The World Summit in September 2005 asked overshadow other issues in the UN in Sep- has not been submitted. for “fair and clear procedures for listing and tember. This September, however, the n The December 2004 report by the Secre- de-listing individuals for targeted sanc- Security Council will be very much on the tary-General on human rights violations in tions.” This issue remains to be addressed. minds of many of those high level visitors. Côte d’Ivoire, requested by a presidential n Also in September 2005 the World Summit The reason for this is that: statement, has not been made public yet. asked the Council to consider reforms to Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 the Military Staff Committee. This has not n There are two hotly contested elections for seats in the Council. There will be a report by the Secretary-General’s Special yet been taken up by the Council.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org OVERVIEW FOR SEPTEMBER(continued) reduction in the field is for the position of 1559 and 1595 and subsequent resolutions now be applied to the situation in Darfur. the permanent members to become the Council demonstrated it could act effec- But while there remains optimism that con- transparent. There is increasing talk tively and decisively. In the post 1701 sent arrangements will be negotiated, the amongst Council members that the pro- environment, where it seems that all parties reality on the ground for civilians remains cess should now be adjusted to permit have a vested interest in being able to show bleak and is deteriorating. Many observers that. For their part, it seems that none of that 1701 was the right path, the opportu- sense a disaster looming and are looking the four declared candidates see any rea- nity may exist for the Council to take up a for a Council “Plan B” if the resolution and son to withdraw. To the contrary, it is wider active role as it suggested in para- follow-up diplomacy do not produce a result possible that, for reasons of equity, all of graph 9 of the resolution. within a few weeks. them will insist on staying in the race until Our brief on Lebanon canvasses the range all potential candidates are declared. As Iran of very difficult substantive issues that for the timing, the Council is so far being There is no doubt that the month of Sep- this will involve and discusses some of the cautious. But most observers seem to be tember will see a major focus on Iran and its implications. expecting a number of straw polls to be response to the package of incentives conducted over a period of days in late Darfur regarding negotiations on its nuclear pro- September. Also there seems to be much It seems, as this Forecast goes to print, that gramme. Much of the action may play out in less confidence that the process will be the Council will adopt before the end of New York, especially at the high level in the concluded in early October. August a resolution on Darfur. It is important margins of the General Assembly. But, as Lebanon in two respects. has been the case for most of this year, it n It establishes clearly the mandate for the seems that very little of the discussion will The Secretary-General’s current visit to the desired UN presence in Darfur, which take place in the Council. Indeed, it is Middle East is in response to the Council’s may remove some of the uncertainty and entirely possible that the only involvement request in resolution 1701 that he consult anxiety that the authorities in Khartoum of the ten elected Council members will be with “relevant international actors and the seemed to harbour about the exact mis- occasional informal briefings. concerned parties” and come up with “pro- sion the UN would have. It should now posals” to: Against this background our Iran brief be possible to discuss consent con- n implement resolutions 1559 and 1680 examines the options that the P5 plus Ger- cretely, rather than on the basis of (which call for the disbanding and disar- many might bring back to the Council. It abstract ideas. mament of militias in Lebanon) and the also discusses the conditions under which n It provides an innovative and generous Taif Accords reached by the Lebanese a basis might exist for proceeding to the approach to cooperation with the African parties; and negotiating stage, as well as a possible Union in support of their mission in n delineate the Lebanese border, espe- compromise “last chance” resolution. Darfur, AMIS. This is particularly impor- cially in the Sheb’a Farms area. tant because AMIS is vulnerable, not only Given the stakes involved, and the history of The Council will have these proposals on to an upsurge of violence directed against very lengthy negotiations on this issue to the table. In addition it expressed in 1701 its it, but also to increased disenchantment date, it seems unlikely that a Council deci- “intention to be actively involved” in the by the civilian population in Darfur and sion will be made in September. search for a “long term solution” and asked also because of serious funding prob- the Secretary-General to support that as lems. The resolution is a clear signal of Other Issues well. No doubt he will also have observa- international support for AMIS at this time. The Council will also have on its plate a tions on this. It serves as a trigger not only for UN assis- range of other big issues: tance, but also as a rationale for donors n Kosovo: an important briefing by Special Resolution 1701 in addition reminded to continue support for it so that there is a Envoy Ahtisaari everyone that the long term perspective proper foundation on which transition to n UNIIC: a briefing from Commissioner also requires “a comprehensive, just and a UN operation can be based. Brammertz lasting peace in the Middle East based on n Somalia: important Contact Group and all its relevant resolutions.” But the resolution does not of itself solve the sanctions developments underlying issue of securing consent from n Iraq: briefings on MNF, UNMOVIC and There was much criticism of the Council for Khartoum. The brief on Darfur/Sudan out- possibly UNAMI its relative inaction as the recent crises, first lines issues and problems associated with n Ethiopia/Eritrea: mandate renewal in Gaza and then in Lebanon, unfolded. His- this. One new factor, which carried weight n Liberia: mandate renewal and sanctions torically, and certainly for the past two with many of Sudan’s friends and neigh- issues decades, this has largely been the default bours in recent weeks, is the strong support n Review of Mandates: report of Working position, with the Council taking a back seat for the UN playing the lead role in peace- Group and possible phase out of certain on Middle East issues to other processes keeping in Lebanon. The reason for mandates and groups. In recent years (2004-05) supporting the UN was that it would be impar- n Counter-terrorism: report on resolution Lebanon was an exception. In resolutions tial, fair and objective. The same logic could 1624 n

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Status Update since our August Forecast

Recent developments on the situations cov- specific UN mandate but with a supportive statement SECURITY calling for COUNCILcooperation REPORTbetween ered in our August Forecast are covered in reference in the preamble. The Secretary- WestMonthly African governments, the UN, ECOWAS the relevant briefs in this issue. However, General is requested to undertake a review andSEP the 2006 AU in order to consolidate peace in other interesting Council developments in of the military arrangements by 25 October. West Africa by addressingFORECAST illicit trafficking of August (but not due for consideration by the In addition, the Council reaffirmed the small arms, the illegal exploitation of natural Council in September) include: need for credible accountability for the seri- resources. It underlined the importance of n Timor-Leste: On 18 August the Council ous human rights violations of 1999 and DDR programmes (S/PRST/2006/38). adopted a week-long technical rollover of incorporated relevant provisions into the n Cyprus: Under Secretary-General for Politi- UNOTIL (S/RES/1703). Upon its expiry, reso- UNMIT mandate. cal Affairs Ibrahim Gambari briefed the lution 1704 established a new integrated n Haiti: The Council adopted resolution 1702 Council on 29 August about his recent visit mission (UNMIT) with a strengthened police on 15 August extending MINUSTAH’s to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. A brief press component, up to 34 military liaison and staff mandate for six months. (The Secretary- statement was issued by the Council officers, but no UN troops. The Secretary- General’s report had recommended a year (SC/8820). General’s proposal, which was also Timor- (S/2006/592).) The mandate slightly n Interpol: Resolution 1699, sponsored by Leste’s preference, for the international increased the mission’s troop and interna- the US, UK and Denmark, was unani- military force to be under UN command and tional police levels. The Council urged the mously adopted on 8 August and called control was strongly opposed by Australia, completion of local elections. upon the Secretary-General to increase the US and UK, causing real bitterness in the n Peace Consolidation in West Africa: cooperation between the UN and the Inter- Core Group. Compromise proposals by Ghana, the Council president for August, ini- national Criminal Police Organization to New Zealand and Japan failed. As a result, tiated a thematic debate on West African better enable sanctions committees to ful- the Australian troops will remain without a issues. The outcome was a presidential fill their mandates.

Lebanon Key Recent Developments n called for Israel and Lebanon to support a The cessation of hostilities took effect in long-term political solution; Expected Council Action Lebanon on 14 August. n requested the Secretary-General to make The Security Council will take up the Secre- proposals within thirty days on disarma- tary-General’s proposals, requested in The 33-day war resulted (in Lebanon and ment of militias and the delineation of the resolution 1701, for implementing the Taif Israel) in over 1,150 civilian deaths, more international borders of Lebanon (and Accords and resolutions 1559 and 1680 than 4,000 civilians injured and approxi- especially in the Sheb’a Farms area); mately 1.5 million civilians displaced. The concerning the disbanding and disarma- n established an arms embargo on transfer ment of militias in Lebanon, as well as on Secretary-General, requested by the Coun- of arms to any entity or individual in Leba- the delineation of the Lebanese border, in cil to report on one particular incident (the non other than the government; 30 July bombing in Qana), concluded that particular the Sheb’a Farms area. n authorised UNIFIL, in addition to monitor- there could be a pattern of violations of ing the cessation of hostilities and helping The Council will also be acutely interested international law committed during the ensure humanitarian access and the safe in the wider aspects of implementation of course of the hostilities. return of displaced people, to support the 1701, including the Secretary-General’s Lebanese armed forces to deploy in the observations flowing from paragraph 9 of On 7 August the Lebanese government, in south, and assist Lebanon with securing the resolution, on the “long term solution” an attempt to stimulate agreement on a the border and establishing in the south as well as the operational progress with the ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal, announced an area free of armed personnel and deployment of additional troops for the UN a decision to deploy 15,000 troops in south weapons other than those of the Govern- Interim Force in Lebanon II (UNIFIL II). Lebanon to prevent a security vacuum when the Israeli army withdrew behind the Blue ment of Lebanon; and What is unclear is whether the Council will Line. Lebanon also requested, as part of a n authorised the use of force to prevent step into the leadership role in carrying for- seven-point plan adopted by the Lebanese hostile activities and to resist threats to its ward the agenda of resolution 1701, or Council of Ministers, that a counterpart inter- mandate. whether it will retreat to the minimalist national force be authorised to assist it. The Secretary-General subsequently approach which characterised its response revised the UNIFIL rules of engagement to the crises in Gaza and Lebanon in 2006, On 11 August, the Council adopted resolu- providing for more robust powers consis- and which attracted much criticism. tion 1701, which: n called for an immediate cessation of hos- tent with the new mandate. The Council is also expected to receive and tilities followed by the deployment of In a report on implementation of resolution note the fifth report of the UN International Lebanese troops; 1701 on 18 August, the Secretary-General Independent Investigation Commission n authorised an expanded UNIFIL (rather said that the parties were generally comply- (UNIIIC) which is due on 26 September. than a Chapter VII coalition which Israel ing with the cessation of hostilities. He also Serge Brammertz may brief the Council on had preferred) to assist the Lebanese reported that the deployment of the Leba- the progress of the investigation. Due to the forces and to be deployed in parallel with nese armed forces together with UNIFIL conflict little progress is expected. the progressive Israeli withdrawal; and the Israeli withdrawal were underway.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org After a hesitant start, EU countries have on Council processes—especially to issue, which may come into play as a bal- pledged about 7,000 troops for UNIFIL II. ensure that other agenda issues are not ancing element, is whether the 1701 Others, such as Morocco, Jordan, Saudi crowded out. Nevertheless, the post 1701 embargo should be reinforced via a sanc- Arabia, Nepal and Turkey, may also contrib- environment is also one which may be tions committee and a panel of experts, ute. Israel has opposed the participation of unique in the recent history of the Middle and perhaps with an advisory input from countries with which it has no diplomatic East situation. Israel seems to be in a UNIFIL II. relations, but it remains to be seen whether position where, for domestic reasons, its n Fifthly, whether to address the issue of this position will prevail. France will keep the government has a vested interest in see- the Sheb’a Farms by a binding decision leadership of UNIFIL II until the end of Feb- ing the UN and the Security Council on the delineation of the border in this ruary 2007. Then Italy will take over. It may succeed. The same is true of the Leba- area. This would be hard for both Israel be two to three months before the whole nese government. And, given the and Syria, but hugely helpful for Lebanon force is deployed. However, the Lebanese disillusionment with past mechanisms, it in helping it secure implementation of army has already deployed south of the Lit- may be much easier for the parties, 1559 by political means. Whether this ani River, including in some areas vacated neighbouring states and other protago- should be achieved as a “one-off early by the Israelis. nists as well if the next phases are centred action measure” or as part of a larger on the UN. framework is also a major issue. At press time, Kofi Annan is visiting the Mid- n Finally, the issue of the disbanding and dle East, undertaking consultations with a Key Issues disarmament of militias is at the heart of view to the proposals that resolution 1701 There are many key issues arising from implementation of 1559. It seems clear requires him to make. His itinerary includes resolution 1701. that all parties now accept that transfor- Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Territories n First, the strategic choice for the Security mation of Hezbollah cannot be achieved and perhaps Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Council about its future role in develop- by force alone. A political process seems Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Iran. ing and leading the process for a “long to be accepted as essential. The issue is term solution.” Options what mix of incentives and disincentives n Secondly, whether to approach the “long The Council has two strategic options at are likely to be effective in that political term solution” on an incremental basis or this stage. process and over what period. Many of under a more comprehensive framework. n First, it can take a reactive and essentially the above issues seem likely to have a A related issue is whether the latter should minimalist approach to its role in carrying major bearing on that question, as will the include, in addition to provisions on some forward the broad agenda set out in reso- role of UNIFIL II in Lebanon, because the or all of the issues outlined below, more lution 1701. This would entail leaving the force is now mandated to assist the Leba- detailed arrangements on a zone free of primary role to major powers (or the nese in achieving this goal in the area of weapons and militia in the south, on the Quartet), in conjunction with the Secre- southern Lebanon. release of prisoners, on the respect for tary-General, and only becoming the Blue Line, and on confidence building The Council is unlikely to take up the issues engaged at the margins via briefings and and security arrangements designed to raised by various potential troop contribut- the occasional formal action when one or prevent the resumption of hostilities. ing countries regarding the mandate and another party sees a need to use the n Thirdly, whether to include concrete steps rules of engagement of UNIFIL II. It is Council as an instrument for exerting to follow up paragraph 18 regarding a unclear whether these issues were real pressure. This has essentially been the “comprehensive just and lasting peace,” problems or may have been misunder- default setting for the Council for many which brings onto the table also the standings. In any event, they seem to have years in the Middle East context. The only Golan issue, the occupation of the West been largely resolved and it would be real exception has actually been Leba- Bank and the situation in Gaza. (There unprecedented for the Council to formally non, in 2004/05, where the Council took a seems to be increasing pressure from EU take up rules of engagement. proactive policy role on resolutions 1559 members, as well as others, in this direc- and 1595. tion). In September the issue of the impact of the n The second option is for the Council to n Fourthly, whether to take up Syria’s chal- war on the Hariri investigation and on the assume the leadership role envisaged in lenge to close the border with Lebanon (a establishment of the tribunal will also appear the Charter, and which it actually plays in measure sure to impose huge economic on the agenda. Clearly there have been many other conflicts on its agenda. The and humanitarian costs on Lebanon) if impacts in the form of delay to the work of post 1701 environment, with its emphasis UNIFIL II assists in monitoring the border Commissioner Brammertz. Possibly issues on “long term solutions”, is one which to prevent smuggling of weapons con- relating to loss of evidence will be raised, as may require bringing together threads trary to 1701. Already the Syrian position well as perhaps impacts on witnesses and which go much wider than just the imme- seems to be affecting Lebanon’s readi- their cooperation. The Council will want to diate situation in Lebanon. The challenges ness to utilise UNIFIL II in this regard. A ensure that the investigation does not fall off of this cannot be underestimated both in related question is whether this issue is the radar screen. terms of the substantive issues them- linked to a requirement on Israel to lift the selves and the demands it would place sea and air blockade. Another related

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org UN Documents on the Hariri UN Documents on Israel/Lebanon Assassination Selected Security Council Resolutions SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Security Council Resolutions • S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called Monthly • S/RES/1686 (15 June 2006) extended for a cessation of hostilities, autho- UNIIIC’s mandate by one year. rised a reinforcement of UNIFIL and SEP 2006FORECAST • S/RES/1664 (29 March 2006) extended the mandate until 31 August requested negotiation with Lebanon 2007. • S/2006/608 (4 August 2006) was the on a tribunal of an international • S/RES/1697 (31 July 2006) extended letter from Malaysia including the character. the UNIFIL mandate to 31 August Putrajaya Declaration on the situation • S/RES/1644 (15 December 2005) 2006. in Lebanon adopted by the Organisa- authorised expanded technical assis- • S/RES/1655 (31 January 2006) tion of the Islamic Conference. tance to Lebanon and requested extended the UNIFIL mandate to 31 • S/2006/582 (27 July 2006) was the let- reports on the progress of the investi- July 2006. ter from the Permanent Observer of gation every three months. • S/RES/426 (19 March 1978) approved the League of Arab States regarding • S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005) urged the report of the Secretary-General on the follow-up of the resolutions Syria to cooperate with the investiga- the implementation of resolution 425. adopted by the Council of the League tion and established sanctions against • S/RES/425 (19 March 1978) called for of Arab States on 15 July 2006. suspects in the Hariri killing. strict respect for the international • S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005) established integrity, sovereignty and political For Historical Background and Other Rele- UNIIIC. independence of Lebanon, urged vant Facts, please refer to our: Israel to withdraw from Lebanese terri- n Report on Lebanon/Israel in our August UN Documents on the Implemen tory, and established UNIFIL. 2006 Forecast; tation of Resolution 1559 Selected Presidential Statements n Update Report on Lebanon/Israel of 20 July; Security Council Resolutions • S/PRST/2006/35 (30 July 2006) n Report on Lebanon (UNIIIC) in our June expressed shock and distress at the • S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) encour- 2006 Forecast; aged Syria to respond positively to the Qana incident. n Report on Lebanon (resolution 1559) in • S/PRST/2006/34 (27 July 2006) Lebanese request to delineate their our April 2006 Forecast; and common border and called for further expressed shock and distress at the n Report on the Golan Heights (UNDOF) in killing of four UN observers in south efforts to disband and disarm Hezbol- our December 2005 Forecast. lah and to restore fully Lebanon’s Lebanon. control over all Lebanese territory. • S/PRST/2000/21 (18 June 2000) Other Relevant Facts • S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) recognised that Israel withdrew from Current Troop Pledges to UNIFIL II urged Syria’s withdrawal from Leba- all of Lebanese territory. • France: leadership and 2,000 troops non and the disbanding of militias Selected Secretary-General’s Reports • Italy: 2,000 / 3,000 troops Selected Presidential Statements • S/2006/670 (18 August 2006) was the • Bangladesh: two battalions (up to • S/PRST/2006/3 (23 January 2006) report on the implementation of reso- 2,000 troops) welcomed the second report on lution 1701. • Malaysia: one battalion implementation of resolution 1559. • S/2006/626 (7 August 2006) was the • Spain: one mechanised battalion • S/PRST/2005/26 (22 June 2005) wel- report on the Qana incident. • Indonesia: one battalion, an engineer- comed the parliamentary elections. • S/2006/560 (21 July 2006) was the lat- ing company • S/PRST/2005/17 (4 May 2005) wel- est report on UNIFIL. • Nepal: one battalion comed the first report on • S/2000/590 and Corr.1 (16 June 2000) • Denmark: at least two ships implementation of resolution 1559 concluded that Israel withdrew com- • Poland: 500 troops Secretary-General’s Reports pletely from Lebanon. • Finland: 250 troops • S/2006/248 (19 April 2006) third semi- Selected Letters • Belgium: 302 troops, later rising to 392 annual report • S/2006/675 (21 August 2006) was the • Germany: maritime and border patrols • S/2005/673 (26 October 2005) second letter from the Secretary-General on but no combat troops semi-annual report the parties’ obligations with respect to • Norway: 100 soldiers • S/2005/272 (29 April 2005) first semi- the cessation of hostilities. Useful Additional Sources annual report • S/2006/639 (14 August 2006) was the Israel/Palestine/Lebanon: Climbing Out of • S/2004/777 (1 October 2004) report letter from Lebanon including the Leb- the Abyss, International Crisis Group, Mid- pursuant to resolution 1559 anese prime minister’s seven-point dle East Report No. 57, 25 July 2006. plan to end the conflict.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Iran On 22 August, Iran presented a 21-page Key Issues response to the P5 plus 1 package of incen- The main issue is whether the Iranian Expected Council Action tives. Iran requested that the document response now represents the end of the The report from the Director General of the remain confidential and at press time, the road in terms of a diplomatic solution and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) contents were still being “studied” by the P5 that resorting to coercive actions, such as on 31 August assessing Iran’s compliance plus 1. It seems that it may contain some sanctions, is now inevitable. Resolution with resolution 1696 will provide a focus for positive elements including specific Iranian 1696 stated that sanctions would be the the informal contacts which have already proposals to resume negotiations on its next step in the event of a negative response begun among the P5 plus Germany (P5 nuclear programme. But, as foreshadowed by Iran. There are clearly negative aspects plus 1) on how to respond to the 22 August in our August Forecast, it seems Iran is not to Iran’s response but some P5 members Iranian counter-proposals. prepared to accept the precondition that it are already pointing to positive elements should suspend uranium enrichment activi- including Iran’s willingness to resume nego- Intense and high profile interaction between ties. In public, Iranian officials reiterated tiations. the P5 plus 1 are expected. But formal deci- their rejection of suspension as a precondi- sions by the full Council seem unlikely in tion. But it is unclear whether the confidential A second issue, therefore, is whether a win- September. Indeed it seems possible that document left open the possibility that dur- dow of opportunity for negotiation still exists. the issue may not come back to the Council ing the course of negotiations Iran might In this regard, the issue is whether in the at all. If the P5 plus 1 can reach agreement consider suspension or some other satis- negotiating process Iran would accept limits on an approach for negotiations leading to factory alternative. on its nuclear programme which would a diplomatic solution, it is probable that this establish international confidence that the would not involve a role for the Council. On Since 22 August, P5 plus 1 reactions have programme is exclusively civilian and not the other hand, if discussions between the been cautious and low-key. The US and military. It may be that this cannot be tested P5 plus 1 breakdown and there is no agree- Germany stated that the Iranian proposal until negotiations are actually entered into. ment on sanctions, the P3 may choose to was not satisfactory because it did not The question then becomes whether the keep the issue out of the Council if vetoes envisage a suspension of uranium enrich- preconditions can be adjusted a little in are inevitable. One situation in which further ment and remained vague on transparency order to permit commencement of negotia- Council action might be expected, is if the issues. But the US acknowledged that Iran tions. A strictly verified cap on the number of P5 plus 1 agree on one last Council resolu- considered its response as a serious offer. centrifuges at existing levels and other oper- tion responding to the Iranian proposals France reiterated its readiness to negotiate ational limits and controls during negotiations and setting a final deadline for Iran. with Iran, but said that the return to negotia- is a possible example of a framework which tions was linked to uranium enrichment might permit both sides to say that their In September, therefore, Council meetings suspension. China urged further negotia- essential requests had been met. on this subject may be limited to P5 informal tion and Russia asked for a thorough briefings to the elected ten. The major examination of this proposal and said it was On the other hand, if the US, the UK and action is likely to involve high-level meet- premature to talk of sanctions. France decide that it is really the end of the ings among the P5 in capitals and on the road, the issue will be to convince Russia margins of the General Assembly to discuss Options and China that sanctions are necessary. In whether to move to the adoption of mea- The Council again faces the now familiar that event, lengthy discussions throughout sures under article 41 of the UN Charter (as situation on this issue with the real discus- September—and probably longer—are threatened under resolution 1696) or to sion taking place outside the UN structures. likely to follow. modify the strategy to get negotiations for a Among the options which the P5 could diplomatic solution started. bring back to the Council are: Another issue which may weigh in the minds of all involved is the impact on the nuclear n a “last chance” resolution responding Key Recent Developments affirmatively to the positive elements of issue of recent events in the Middle East and On 31 July the Council imposed a binding the Iranian response but setting a final what elements of that situation to factor into obligation on Iran to comply with IAEA deci- deadline for suspension or some alterna- decisions regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. sions regarding its uranium enrichment tive giving equivalent confidence that the activities. It also endorsed the long-term Council Dynamics enrichment would be capped during the arrangement offered in June by the P5 plus Russia and China are clearly reluctant to negotiation phase; 1 which would allow cooperation with Iran immediately move forward with sanctions. n rejecting the Iranian response and decid- and establish confidence in the peaceful The position of the US, UK and France is ing that Iran’s nuclear activities constitute nature of its nuclear energy programme. less clear. a threat to international peace and secu- The resolution also requested the Director rity and imposing diplomatic and The ten elected members remain outside General of the IAEA to submit a report by economic sanctions; the loop. Some of them seem less comfort- 31 August on Iranian compliance with the n endorsement of some compromise able with this situation than others. The resolution and expressed the Council’s arrangement under which diplomatic three EU members Greece, Denmark and intention to “adopt appropriate measures negotiations are commenced; and Slovakia seem more or less satisfied with under article 41 of Chapter VII of the Char- n stalling Council action in September and the input they receive from France, Germany ter of the United Nations” in case of perhaps longer. and the UK via EU coordination. Several non-compliance. other members, however, have expressed more frustration.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Underlying Problems Council enclosing the proposals of the Iran is reported to be building more P5 plus 1 for a comprehensive long- advanced P2 centrifuges that could speed term arrangement with Iran. SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT up the production of nuclear fuel. In addi- • S/2006/305 (31 May 2006) was a letter Monthly tion, Iran has inaugurated a new heavy from the League of Arab States to the SEP 2006 water nuclear plant. Secretary-General enclosing a state- FORECAST ment issued by Arab leaders on the Iran has also stepped up military exercises n extend the mandate for UNMIS in south and launches of missiles to introduce a new question of making the Middle East Sudan which expires on 24 September defensive doctrine. region into a zone free of WMDs. (The Secretary-General’s quarterly report Other on Sudan is expected by mid-Septem- Some observers have identified a possible • Press statement on the P5 plus 1 deci- ber); link between the Iranian nuclear issue and sion to bring the issue back to the n renew the mandate of the sanctions Panel the Lebanese conflict. Security Council (12 July 2006) of Experts by 29 September and consider n First, Iran’s confrontation with the West • US-EU Summit Declaration ( 21 June the Panel’s report; on its nuclear programme may have influ- 2006) n decide whether to change the Panel’s enced Hezbollah’s decision to initiate a • IAEA Director General’s Introductory mandate to include violations of the Dar- crisis in Lebanon through the kidnapping Statement to the Board of Governors fur Peace Agreement (DPA); and of Israeli soldiers (at the time the Security (12 June 2006) n decide whether to impose targeted sanc- Council was considering resolution • Statement from UK Foreign Secretary tions measures. 1696). on P5 plus 1 package of incentives to n Second, Iran’s potential for destabilisa- The Council is also expected to pay close Iran (1 June 2006) tion in the Middle East through its link attention to the ongoing contribution that AMIS can make in Darfur. AMIS’ mandate with the Hezbollah, as well as with Iraqi For Historical Background, Other Relevant will expire on 30 September and Council and other Shia, has become more trans- Facts and Useful Additional Sources, please members are likely to be encouraging the parent. On the other hand, if there were a refer to our February 2006 Forecast. successful resolution to the current AU to extend the mandate till December. nuclear issues with Iran, given its influ- Key Recent Developments ence in the region, this could also play a Fighting in Darfur has escalated consider- stabilising role. Darfur/Sudan ably since the signing of the DPA on 5 May, n Third, the Lebanese war raised the stakes Expected Council Action primarily between signatories and non-sig- and risks of Iran’s acquiring nuclear At time of writing, it seems that a draft reso- natories. A complicating factor has been weapons given its alleged support to lution establishing the mandate in Darfur for the expelling of non-signatories from the Hezbollah and its vow to destroy Israel if the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and Ceasefire Commission at the request of the attacked. authorising UN assistance to the AU Mis- government on 16 August. As a result of Most Recent Documents sion to the Sudan (AMIS) will be adopted by this round of violence, 50,000 civilians were Security Council Resolution 1 September. China, Russia and Qatar are displaced. Nine humanitarian workers as uncomfortable with passing the resolution • S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded well as two AU peacekeepers were killed in without prior consent from Sudan. However, that Iran suspend all enrichment- recent weeks. There has been a sharp it seems that at least the first two may related and reprocessing activities, increase in gender-based violence, with abstain in view of the fact that Khartoum’s requested a report from the IAEA by 200 cases—up from four in previous prior acceptance of the transition from AMIS 31 August and expressed its intention months—reportedly documented in Kalma to UNMIS is not essential for adoption and to adopt measures under article 41 of alone (Darfur’s largest camp) in the past because implementation of the transition is the UN charter in case of Iranian non- five weeks. not final and will require further negotiations compliance. Observers also note an increase in lack of to obtain consent from Sudan. Security Council Presidential Statement confidence in and animosity against AMIS • S/PRST/2006/15 (29 March 2006) In September, therefore, the Council is in camps. expected to have on its plate two major Latest IAEA Board Resolution Under Secretary-General Jan Egeland has issues: warned of an impending humanitarian • GOV/2006/15 (4 February 2006) n implementation of its decision to gradu- disaster in Darfur (there are now 1.6 million Latest IAEA Reports ally replace AMIS by transition to UNMIS civilians cut off from aid and some NGOs and applying strategies to secure con- • GOV/2006/38 (8 June 2006) have indicated that they may need to pull sent from Khartoum; and • GOV/2006/27 (28 April 2006) out of north Darfur on security grounds). • GOV/2006/15 (27 February 2006) n alternative strategies (a “Plan B”) in the event that consent is not forthcoming. AMIS is being increasingly constrained by Selected Letters limitations imposed by Khartoum and the At the practical level, the Council is also • S/2006/521 (13 July 2006) was a letter rebels. Its ability to carry out its mission to expected to: from France to the president of the protect civilians is being rapidly eroded.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org The mission’s funds will run out by the end Options To date, AU members have given solid sup- of September. Troops are due to rotate start- The options before the Council in Septem- port to the need for and appropriateness of ing 1 September. At least one troop ber seem to be: the transition. On the other hand, Arab contributor has already indicated that it will n applying public pressure on Khartoum countries seem uncomfortable with the not send new troops without assurances of (and its friends and supporters) for con- direction the issue has taken. An aspect of new funding. In those circumstances, the sent, including signaling willingness to this may be related to the overall Council AU seems reluctant to renew the mandate. impose sanctions and rejecting Khar- dynamics during the recent Gaza and Leb- toum’s “stabilisation” plan; anon crises. An issue, therefore, is whether On 17 August, Assistant Secretary-General n engaging Khartoum privately, perhaps recent developments since resolution 1701, Hédi Annabi reportedly informed the Coun- offering some positive incentives and which have shown the positive potential for cil that Khartoum is building up military face-saving options such as imposing impartial UN peacekeeping, can be por- forces in Darfur, possibly in preparation for targeted sanctions against DPA non-sig- trayed in a manner which is convincing in a major offensive. This seems consistent natories. This last option could mean that Khartoum. It may be that the positive sup- with a document sent to the Secretary- a more prominent role will be required port in the region for a UN role in Lebanon General by the President of Sudan and from Arab states and China, for example. may help encourage Sudan to rethink its circulated to the Council on 17 August It may also imply a clear positioning of the scepticism about the UN in Darfur. detailing Khartoum’s Plan for Darfur. Council against the rebels; Time itself is an issue. For practical reasons, The Sudanese plan is to send government n concentrating efforts on guaranteeing the Secretariat is already working with the troops to “stabilise” Darfur and implement that the full package of UN assistance to scenario that transition will only take place the DPA. It has attracted sharp criticism, AMIS recommended by the Secretary- in the first quarter of 2007. If the transition is being interpreted as an attempt to delay the General is quickly implemented in order authorised but consent is significantly transition and impose a military solution to reinforce the prospects for a positive delayed, not only does the humanitarian cri- prior to any transition to a UN force. AU decision on extending the mandate, sis persist, and possibly worsen, but Sudan encouraging UN members to commit may begin to implement its “stabilisation” An important development in the lead up to the funding to AMIS, perhaps with the inten- plan and its military offensive. In those cir- draft resolution was the attempt to create room tion that over time a gradual blending of cumstances, even with the adoption of the for quiet diplomacy. Although there remained UNMIS and AMIS will occur; and some in the Council who championed a policy UN assistance package, the position of n playing a larger role in force generation AMIS may become untenable and it may of continuing to apply public pressure, agree- activities rather than leaving this task to need to be extracted. ment was reached on holding a private meeting the Secretariat (especially bearing in of the Council at which Sudan would have a mind the recent problems over the troops Finally, there is the issue which is likely to privileged opportunity to discuss the issues to be sent to Lebanon). play out in donor capitals rather than in the associated with the transition, the implications Council, of future financial assistance to of the draft resolution and assistance to AMIS. Key Issues AMIS. It seems that for some donors, com- The key issue for the Council is how to mitting funds for AMIS before September These initiatives attracted criticism, especially devise a clear and coherent strategy for would play into Sudan’s hands and only from the NGO community, for not presenting obtaining consent. If the conclusion is encourage further delay in granting con- a clear political path to achieving Sudan’s reached that consent will not be forthcom- sent. The issue for the Council, however, is consent. In the end, however, Khartoum’s ing, the key issue is then what strategy will whether things have now reached a point decision to spurn the 28 August private ses- the Council adopt. sion probably reinforced the case for that the overriding need is to keep AMIS in proceeding with adoption of the resolution. The approach so far has been to engage place so that there is something to transi- the government but it has also involved a tion from. Although at press time the draft was still spectrum of positions articulated by Coun- Council and Wider Dynamics being finalised, it seems that it will contain a cil members ranging from overt pressure to There is consensus within the Council that mix of things that Khartoum wants (assis- quiet diplomacy. One issue that has the transition as currently envisaged will tance to AMIS) with things the UN and the emerged is that there seems to be an require consent. Nonetheless, divisions on AU want (transition to the UN later in the incompatibility between, on the one hand, how best to obtain Khartoum’s consent are year). It sets 1 October as the deadline for pressuring Khartoum, while, on the other likely to linger. Some favour continuing the beginning of assistance to AMIS with a hand, conceding that transition will not take pressure on Khartoum until consent is view to a phased transition. place without consent. obtained, perhaps with a threat of sanc- The draft mirrors UNMIS’ original mandate Another issue seems to be the incompatibil- tions. They seem to consider that the in resolution 1590. Both set out the Mis- ity between allowing room for diplomacy, on language in the resolution and the invitation sion’s various responsibilities, and, in the one hand, and on the other hand having to the 28 August meeting already repre- separate paragraphs, authorises UNMIS to no clear positive incentives for Khartoum. sented concessions to Khartoum. protect civilians expressly under Chapter VII. It also authorises the opening of regional A related issue is how to mobilise support Others, however, are likely to support the offices, particularly in Chad, but leaves from countries enjoying good relations with continuation of private talks with Khartoum open the question of how the regional and access to the Sudanese government. in September, with a view towards finding dimension could be effectively addressed.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org some face-saving options for the Govern- • S/2006/637 (11 August 2006) con- ment of Sudan. These members argue that tained an agreement between Chad it is unclear how pressure alone will bring and Sudan on the renewal of commit- SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT about a change in Khartoum’s position in ments under the Tripoli Agreement. Monthly sufficient time to make a difference for the • S/2006/461 (29 June 2006) was the letter affected civilians. SEP 2006 from the AU Chairman presenting the FORECAST Underlying Problems findings of the joint assessment mission. There is an interest in the Council in devot- Democratic Republic of Congo Historical Background ing more attention to DPA implementation, 16 August 2006 Non-signatories were Expected Council Action but the consent issue crowds out the avail- expelled from the CFC. The Council is expected to renew the man- able space for this. date of the UN Mission in the Democratic 8 August 2006 Sudan and Chad decided to On the ground, implementation of the DPA Republic of Congo (MONUC), which expires normalise bilateral relations. continues at a slow pace and with little pop- on 30 September. The issue of the long- term future of MONUC will linger in the ular support. The killings of AMIS personnel 7 August 2006 Former rebel leader Minni background, but is unlikely to be seriously are widely regarded as retaliation for the Minawi was sworn in as Senior Assistant to addressed until after the presidential run-off expelling of non-signatories from the CFC. the President. The rebel umbrella group National Redemp- elections in October. A simple extension of tion Front has declared that the move has For the full historical background, please the mandate seems likely, but it is still meant that the AU has denied its neutral sta- see our February and July 2006 Forecasts. unclear for how long. tus and has undermined the ceasefire. Other Relevant Facts Renewal of the mandate of MONUC’s temporary reinforcements, along with that of the Observers note that both government and UNMIS: Special Representative of the troops borrowed from the UN Operation in rebels are preparing to consolidate gains Secretary-General and Head of Mission Burundi (ONUB) and of the European Union before the situation is frozen by an eventual Jan Pronk (Netherlands) transition. Force in the DRC (EUFOR RDCongo) until UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost of after the second ballot is also expected. UN Documents Mission The renewed potential for tension is likely to • Maximum authorised strength: up to Selected Security Council Resolutions prompt the Council to continue to closely 10,000 military personnel follow events in the DRC throughout Sep- • S/RES/1679 (16 May 2006) was • Strength as of 30 June 2006: 10,224 tember and October. In the event of further adopted under Chapter VII, setting uniformed personnel, including 9,573 violence, a Council statement should be new deadlines for the assessment military and 651 police expected. mission and threatening sanctions. • Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, • S/RES/1672 (25 April 2006) imposed India and Pakistan Other issues, such as foreign armed groups targeted travel bans and assets freeze. • Cost: 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: and security sector reform, are likely to be • S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) estab- $1,126.30 million (gross)UNMIS: considered only after the run-off elections, lished UNMIS. Selected Duration possibly in the context of discussions on Secretary-General’s Reports MONUC’s post-election strategy. • S/2006/662 (17 August 2006) was a 24 March 2005 to present, mandate report on children and armed conflict expires 24 September 2006 Listing individuals for targeted sanctions is in the Sudan. UNMIS: Fatalities also an issue that will continue to be on the • S/2006/591 (28 July 2006) made rec- • seven, including two military and five minds of some Council members, but it is ommendations for UNMIS’ mandate in civilian staff unclear whether progress will be achieved Darfur and for UN assistance to AMIS. in September. Head of AMIS The report was complemented by an update, S/2006/645.Latest Panel of Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe (Nigeria) Key Recent Developments Elections in the DRC took place on 30 July. Experts’ Report AMIS: Size, Composition and Cost of President Joseph Kabila gained about 45 • S/2006/250 (19 April 2006) Mission percent of the votes, and Vice-President • Total authorised strength: 6,171 mili- Other Jean-Pierre Bemba 20 percent. The run-off tary and 1,560 police personnel • S/2006/685 (23 August 2006) was is scheduled for 29 October. • Strength as of 22 June 2006: 5,738 Sudan’s request for the postponement military and 1,458 police personnel of the 28 August Council meeting. The first presidential ballot showed a divide • Key troop contributors: Nigeria, • S/2006/683 (22 August 2006) was a between eastern and western provinces of Rwanda, Senegal and The Gambia Sudanese letter requesting that the the DRC. Ethnicity and language seem to • Cost: until 30 September 2006: about Council allow time for Khartoum to have been behind much of the support for $181 million pledged resolve the situation in Darfur. Kabila in the more populous east and • S/2006/665 (17 August 2006) con- AMIS: Duration Bemba in the west, especially Kinshasa. tained the Sudanese Plan for Darfur. 25 May 2004 to present, mandate expires 30 September 2006

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Tensions arose following logistical difficul- who will then appoint the cabinet. If it is the sector reform and curbing illegal armed ties during the counting and following full parliament, the situation becomes much groups. There is an interest in a re-configu- complaints of fraud from almost all contend- more complex since the senate will only be ration of MONUC’s operational priorities ers and hate messages in the media. This elected by provincial assemblies reportedly along those lines as soon as possible after culminated in open fighting in Kinshasa on 29 December. the elections. between militias loyal to Bemba and Kabila A set of related concerns also looms large: when the result was announced. EUFOR In general, members are sensitive to the view n security sector reform, and the disarma- RDCongo reserve forces, already pre- that decisions regarding MONUC’s future ment, demobilisation and reintegration or deployed in Gabon, were rushed to the should be taken as part of a broad, coherent repatriation of Congolese and foreign Congolese capital on 22 August. strategy for UN involvement in the DRC. armed groups; Eventually, under MONUC leadership, the n good governance; Underlying Problems situation was stabilised. But in response to n conduct and discipline of Congolese and The 18 July report of the Group of Experts this development, the Council adopted a MONUC forces (especially after reports recommended that the Council declare ille- press statement on 22 August expressing of child prostitution involving MONUC gal exploitation of natural resources a serious concern about the clashes and personnel); sanctionable act. It also noted difficulties demanding restraint and immediate imple- n lists of targeted sanctions; and with cooperation from Uganda. mentation of the ceasefire. n illegal exploitation of natural resources The Council adopted a landmark resolution and sanctions enforcement. The final results of the parliamentary elec- on sanctions on 31 July that, inter alia: tions are expected by 4 September. Council Dynamics n strengthened targeted sanctions through The Council is not divided on the issue of the inclusion of political and military lead- Options renewing MONUC and other mandates until ers responsible for recruiting children Because of lingering tensions and the need after the election process is finalised. Some and individuals who target children in for run-off elections, the options for the members will be pushing for a six-month conflict; Council at this stage are limited. However, renewal, bearing in mind the precedent n directed special attention to the financing they could include: in Liberia. of illegal armed groups and the illegal n continue work on a list of individual viola- exploitation of natural resources; and tors; and Most members expect that the future of n expressly mentioned the issue of Ugan- n start some preliminary thinking on a more MONUC is likely to create divisions linked da’s cooperation with the Group of integrated, forward-looking strategy that to pressures for containing peacekeep- Experts. would include not just sanctions, MONUC’s ing costs. mandate and costs, but a discussion of the UN Documents Some are conscious that sustained com- spectrum of the DRC’s needs after the mitment will be needed for the long-term. Selected Security Council Resolutions transitional phase and what role the Coun- They believe that MONUC should only be cil could play in conjunction with MONUC, • S/RES/1698 (31 July 2006) strength- modified after the transitional phase is over donors and stakeholders. ened sanctions, expressed the and are concerned with the possibility of intention to consider measures over Key Issues pressure for downsizing MONUC too natural resources, and renewed the The key issue right now is how best to quickly. This view seems to have gained sanctions regime and the mandate of ensure that the transitional period is momentum since the experiences in Haiti the Group of Experts until 31 July finalised, particularly given the renewed and, more recently, in Timor-Leste. 2007. potential for election-related violence. • S/RES/1671 (25 April 2006) authorised Positions on the post-election period are the deployment of EUFOR RDCongo. MONUC’s future is likely to become an still being formulated, especially given the • S/RES/1669 (10 April 2006) authorised issue after the election. But given the recent current volatile situation and the potential the borrowing of ONUB forces. events in Kinshasa, and bearing in mind the for future violence. Should this trend con- • S/RES/1649 (21 December 2005) Council’s recent experience with Burundi, tinue, the position of members interested in strengthened sanctions and requested there will be nervousness about acquiesc- reducing MONUC’s size and cost will the report on foreign armed groups. ing too quickly in phasedown suggestions, become difficult. Council members are also • S/RES/1635 (28 October 2005) and whether from within the Council or from the likely to bear in mind the precedent in the 1621 (6 September 2006) authorised newly elected government. less complex situation in Liberia, in which temporary increases in MONUC’s the Council displayed a significant degree A further issue that may arise stems from strength for the elections. of caution with downsizing and postponed uncertainty as to when the government will • S/RES/1565 (1 October 2004) revised any decisions until months after the conclu- be able to be seated. There are problems MONUC’s mandate set forth in S/ sion of the transitional phase. with interpreting the constitution as to RES/1493 (28 July 2003) and 1291 (24 whether the national assembly alone or the Other members are interested in the sub- February 2000). full parliament—including the senate—is stance of MONUC’s future mandate and the Selected Presidential Statement competent to appoint the prime minister, mission’s post-election priorities. Key • S/PRST/2006/36 (3 August 2006) wel- aspects would be MONUC’s role in security comed the first round of elections.

10 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Selected Secretary-General’s Reports • Main troop contributors: Pakistan, • S/2006/478 (29 June 2006) was the India, Uruguay and South Africa SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT report on the Ugandan rebel group, • Cost: 1 July 2006 – 30 June 2007: US$ the Lord’s Resistance Army, which has 1.138 billionDuration Monthly operated in the DRC. • 30 November 1999 to present, man- SEP 2006 • S/2006/390 (13 June 2006) was the date expires on 30 September 2006 FORECAST latest MONUC report. Fatalities technical reasons relating to non-compli- • S/2006/389 (13 June 2006) was a • 92, including 66 military personnel ance with the roadmap, it was no longer report on children and armed conflict and nine military observers possible in practice to hold an election on in the DRC. 31 October. • S/2006/310 (22 May 2006) was the Useful Additional Sources report on foreign armed groups in n Elections and Security in Ituri: Stumbling Tensions between the Forces nouvelles reb- the DRC. Blocks and Opportunities for Peace in the els and government forces had already been mounting, anticipating that the 31 Other Democratic Republic of the Congo, Forum on Early Warning & Early Response/Africa October election may be delayed. President • SC/8814 (22 August 2006) was a and Africa Initiative Program, 30 May 2006. Gbagbo—whose term has already expired press statement expressing serious and who is currently in office only on a tran- concern with the recent election- sitional basis—claims that he and the related violence. parliament would remain in office until the • S/2006/525 (18 July 2006) was the lat- Côte d’Ivoire next presidential and legislative elections. est report of the Group of Experts. Expected Council Action The leader of the Forces nouvelles, Guil- • S/PV.5482 (6 July 2006) was the laume Soro, has rejected this assertion. record of a meeting on the report of The next Secretary-General’s report is the Council’s mission to the DRC. expected to confirm that there has been On 7 August the Council welcomed the • S/2006/434 (22 June 2006) was the insufficient progress in implementing the progress made in implementing the road- report of the mission to the DRC. roadmap, established by the Council, for map but expressed concern at the lack of the elections to be held as scheduled on 31 deployment throughout the country of the Historical Background October. The Council is likely to: Independent Electoral Commission’s struc- 28 August 2006 The International Criminal n await the proposed meeting in late Sep- tures and condemned July’s violent protests Court Prosecutor formally charged Ituri mili- tember, during the General Assembly, directed at the mobile courts. The Council tia leader Thomas Lubanga with recruiting between the Secretary-General, the Ivo- also set a benchmark for 150 mobile courts child soldiers. rian President Laurent Gbagbo and AU to be deployed throughout the country and leaders before adopting a definitive the cantonment of combatants to be com- 20 August 2006 Final results of the first round response to the situation; pleted before the end of August. of presidential elections were posted. n signal in the interim the importance of Because too few weapons were being sur- 30 July 2006 Parliamentary polls and the first maintaining calm and progress with the rendered, the disarmament process for round of presidential elections took place. roadmap (perhaps in a presidential statement or perhaps in an early resolution pro-government militia groups in the west 10-12 June 2006 A Council mission visited adopting targeted sanctions against addi- was temporarily suspended on 4 August. the DRC ahead of the elections. tional individuals responsible for blocking Options the roadmap’s progress and for spread- For the full historical background, please The Council has the following options in ing hate messages in the media; and refer to our April 2006 Forecast. early September: renewing the mandate for the Group of n adopting a presidential statement keep- Experts monitoring the sanctions regime, Other Relevant Facts ing up the pressure on the parties in which will expire on 15 September). Special Representative of the Secretary- advance of the high-level meeting in New General and Head of Mission Council members are also expected to York in September; William Lacy Swing (US) begin discussing contingency plans for a n increasing deterrents against spoilers by definitive response to the anticipated formal imposing additional sanctions against MONUC Force Commander postponement of the presidential elections. individuals blocking the peace process Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye and adopting a resolution transferring (Senegal) Council members will also have in mind that additional troops and police units from Size, Composition and Cost of Mission the mandate of UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to rein- (UNOCI) will expire on 15 December. • Authorised maximum strength: 17,000 force UNOCI; and military personnel, plus about 2,000 Key Recent Developments n beginning an open discussion of the consequential issues from postponement of EUFOR RDCongo (with a reported On 23 August the Special Representative of the election, including the status of Presi strategic reserve of about 1,500 in the Secretary-General in Côte d’Ivoire, - Europe) and 800 ONUB forces Pierre Schori, advised the media that for dent Gbagbo. • Strength as of 30 June 2006: 16,587 military personnel

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 11 Key Issues Council Dynamics they fear they could lose the next elections. The most significant issue is how to handle Some Council members seem ready to The rebels, on their part, fear increasing the practical reality that the elections will not begin discussion of contingency plans insecurity after they disarm. Therefore, the be possible on 31 October. The dilemma for immediately, including on the period for Forces nouvelles have insisted that identifi- the Council is whether to act immediately to postponement. There are views that the cation of the entire population be completed deter backwards movement, in light of the period should be long enough to complete before the collection of weapons, while the fact that implementation of the roadmap the roadmap, but short enough to avoid giv- national armed forces wanted the identifica- has been seriously compromised, or to ing the Ivorian parties a pretext to slow tion of combatants to be conducted during defer to the outcome of the high-level meet- down the process, in any event significantly the pre-cantonment stage. On 9 August, ing in late September. A related issue is how less than a year. Guillaume Soro said the rebel side was pull- to maximise the incentives for positive out- ing out of disarmament talks in protest comes from that meeting. With respect to the renewal of President against Gbagbo’s position on disarmament Gbagbo’s mandate there are various views. and the handing out of identity papers. The issues involved if the Council moves Some Council members are in favour of an quickly to undertake responsible contin- alteration of the power equilibrium in favour One issue remaining to be addressed is the gency planning in light of the inevitable of the prime minister, and perhaps some fact that there are not enough Ivorian judges formal postponement of the election are changes in the mediation. Other members to conduct the identification. Another linger- complex. prefer a simple rollover of the current ing problem is the shortage of UN troops to n The Secretary-General’s Special Adviser arrangements with no modification, believ- perform disarmament operations. on the Prevention of Genocide, Juan ing that any change could trigger a negative Missing the 31 October deadline will Méndez, has warned about the inherent impact on the peace process. fragility of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. increase the risk of renewed hostilities. The n In terms of setting a new date, an assess- On the issue of sanctions, even the most Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the ment of the time needed to complete reluctant Council members are now com- Prevention of Genocide, Juan Méndez, who identification and disarmament through- ing to the view that additional targeted visited Côte d’Ivoire at the end of 2005, out the country will be necessary. sanctions have proved to have some effec- stated that the ethnic orientation of the con- n There is a question of whether the current tiveness for the political process. They flict could lead to “massive and serious transitional political arrangements (made remain wary, though, about targeting impor- violations of human rights.” through resolution 1633 of 2005 and pre- tant political figures, believing that this UN Documents vious peace agreements) should remain would impair the peace process. There is the same or whether an adjustment of the unlikely to be any disagreement about Most Recent Council Resolution power sharing will be needed. (If those renewing the mandate of the advisory • S/RES/1682 (2 June 2006) increased responsible for obstruction of the road- Group of Experts. the strength of UNOCI by 1,500 per- map are punished it would imply some There is growing support for an increased sonnel. further diminution of the executive pow- role for the Council in the management of • S/RES/1652 (24 January 2006) ers of President Laurent Gbagbo and the the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, with the Inter- extended UNOCI’s mandate to 15 influence of the current parliament.) national Working Group (IWG) playing more December 2006. n The degree of involvement of the UN and of a local monitoring role. • S/RES/1633 (21 October 2005) the Council in future processes will need endorsed the decision of the AU to be considered. The Security Council The US had been reluctant to shift troops Peace and Security Council of 6 Octo- has, for most of 2006, tended to follow from the UN Mission in Liberia to Côte ber 2005, extended President the recommendations of the AU and play d’Ivoire, because of destabilisation risks in Gbagbo’s term by 12 months, estab- a supportive role. The recent obstruction Liberia, especially while Charles Taylor was lished the roadmap to be supervised of the roadmap raises the issue of whether still in Africa. With Taylor’s extradition to by the IWG, called for the designation the Council should again play a more The Hague in June 2006, it remains to be of a prime minister and reaffirmed its proactive role to avoid a further postpone- seen what position the US will adopt on readiness to impose sanctions ment of the elections. that issue. Selected Presidential Statements Finally, an issue that might arise is a trans- Underlying Problems • S/PRST/2006/37 (7 August 2006) confer of troops from UNMIL to UNOCI in order An estimated 3.5 million people do not have demned the July disturbances, to support the disarmament programme identity papers in Côte d’Ivoire; this includes reaffirmed its support for the imple- once it is launched at the national level, as 1.8 million people of voting age who there- mentation of targeted sanctions, already recommended by the Secretary- fore cannot vote. In fact, the question of encouraged the prime minister to take General. The UNMIL mandate will expire on national identity is at the core of the conflict action to deploy 150 mobile courts 30 September, and a battalion might be since many of those without papers are before the next IWG meeting and withdrawn by the end of the year. The from the north and considered foreign. called on the IWG to monitor such Council might consider transferring these progress. Some of President Gbagbo’s followers troops to Côte d’Ivoire. oppose the identification process because

12 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org • S/PRST/2006/32 (19 July 2006) wel- ister acceptable to all parties with comed the Yamoussoukro meeting of executive powers Ivorian leaders, requested the Secre- • The establishment of a roadmap SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT tary-General to produce a report on supervised by an International Work- Monthly the implementation of the parties’ ing Group responsible for the SEP 2006 commitments before a subsequent evaluation and monitoring of the FORECAST meeting in September, underlined the peace process Islamic Courts (UIC) and continuing to urge Council’s readiness to impose tar- • A new type of mediation to be con- dialogue. geted measures and endorsed the ducted daily by a subgroup of the IWG eighth communiqué of the IWG. composed of the Secretary-General’s On the regional dimension, the most likely Most Recent Secretary-General’s Report Special Representative in Côte action is to continue with indirect warnings d’Ivoire, the Secretary-General’s High against Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, • S/2006/532 (18 July 2006) was the Representative for the elections, members may increase pressure on one latest report in which the Secretary- ECOWAS and the AU or both should the situation continue to General stressed the need for targeted • The implementation without delay of deteriorate. sanctions as a way for the interna- the disarmament and dismantling of tional community to exercise pressure government militias and of the rebels The Sanctions Committee is expected to to move the peace process forward. throughout the territory, and of the receive an oral midterm briefing from the Selected Letters identification process Monitoring Group on the arms embargo by 6 September and there is a possibility that • S/2006/584 (27 July 2006) was the • The end to all incitement to hatred and the Sanctions Committee Chairman will ninth IWG communiqué violence in the media • Investigation by Ivorian authorities of brief the Council on the Committee’s activi- For Historical Background please refer to human rights violations ties in September. our 1 December 2005 Update Report. • The strengthening of the threat of Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf is sanctions against individual spoilers Other Relevant Facts expected to visit New York for the General Previous Agreements Assembly in September. Special Representative of the Secretary-General • AU Peace and Security Council deci- Key Recent Developments sion (6 October 2005) Pierre Schori (Sweden) After two postponements, talks between • Pretoria Agreements (11 April 2005) the UIC and the TFG are scheduled for 31 High Representative for the Elections • Accra III Agreements (30 July 2004) August. Gérard Stoudmann (Switzerland) • Linas-Marcoussis Agreements (24 Serious divisions emerged within the TFG, Size and Composition of UNOCI January 2003) pitting President Yusuf and Parliament • Authorised strength since 2 June Speaker Sheikh Hassan Aden against 2006: 8,115 military personnel and Somalia Prime Minister Ali Mohammad Gedi over 1,200 police officers Gedi’s reluctance to attend the talks with • Current strength as of 6 July 2006: Expected Council Action the UIC. 6,896 military personnel and 728 The Council may moderate the tilt which it police officers. The reinforcements made in early August in support of the Tran- The divisions were exacerbated by the res- authorised under resolution 1682 were sitional Federal Government (TFG). In the ignation of 21 ministers in July and early deployed in July 2006. absence of an established peace process August. An Ethiopia-mediated understand- • Key troop-contributing countries: Ban- involving consent from all parties, it seems ing within the TFG led to the appointment of gladesh, Morocco, Ghana and unlikely at this stage that the Council will a new cabinet on 21 August. Pakistan support the proposed African Union/Inter- Continuing reports Ethiopian troops’ pres- governmental Authority on Development Cost ence in Somalia have led to increasing (IGAD) mission. 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $438.17 tensions between the UIC and the TFG, and million A resolution creating targeted sanctions within the TFG itself, due to opposition to UNOCI Mandate Expiration against peace spoilers now seems likely. It the prime minister’s reported reliance on is also expected to include modifications to Ethiopian military assistance. 15 December 2006 (S/RES/1652) the arms embargo to allow training and Those tensions have also been aggravated Current Political Arrangements as capacity-building to enable Somalia to Defined in S/RES/1633 (2005) by the controversial issue of an AU/IGAD develop its security sector, as well as non- mission to Somalia. On 18 August, IGAD • President Gbagbo remaining in power lethal equipment. for a maximum of twelve months after members reportedly decided that the mis- his term ended on 30 October 2005 The Council seems likely to seek to main- sion will comprise about 7,000 Sudanese • The appointment of a new prime min- tain balance in its approach by avoiding and Ugandan troops, and should be measures that may alienate the Union of

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 13 deployed on Kenya’s border with Somalia TFI and UIC; The question of whether to seriously act to by the end of September. Nonetheless, it is n identifying a list of individuals based on curb Eritrean and Ethiopian activities is also still unclear whether this plan will materi- that criteria; and an issue. There is the risk that a passive alise. There are still questions relating to the n modifying the arms embargo to support approach to external interference could concept of operations and funding. training for the Somali security sector, stimulate further deterioration in relations especially for non-lethal equipment on a between the UIC and TFG and undermine Special Representative of the Secretary- case-by-case basis. the peace talks. On the other hand, there is General François Lonseny Fall briefed the the issue that, without Ethiopian assistance, Council on the recent developments in In order to maintain balance in its approach, the TFG may collapse altogether. Somalia on 16 August. The Council presi- the Council may also look at the option of dent for the month of August, Ghanaian neutral criteria that would apply to spoilers The AU/IGAD request for exemptions from Ambassador Nana Effah-Apenteng, from the TFI side as well. (There are prece- the arms embargo once the mission plan is expressed concern about outside interfer- dents for this sort of balanced approach in submitted raises an equally complex issue. ence in Somalia in a statement to the the Council’s actions against spoilers in Criteria for consideration of this were set out media. Côte d’Ivoire). It may also consider the in previous Council statements, including option of balancing the package with some that the mission plan be detailed on funding The Sanctions Committee held a meeting in political signals designed to encourage the and mandate and that it be based on the early August as a follow-up to the 13 July UIC to cooperate. This could include more national security and stabilisation plan presidential statement, in which the Council overt criticism of the Ethiopian presence. (NSSP). The NSSP is required to contain “a supported the Transitional Federal Institu- Specific threats of sanctions seem less comprehensive and verifiable ceasefire tions (TFIs) “as the internationally likely. agreement, as well as plans for the restora- recognised authorities to restore peace, tion of public safety and security institutions stability and governance to Somalia” and There is also the option of deciding to lean and the implementation of disarmament, indicated the possibility of a modification of decisively for the TFG and against the UIC, demobilization and reintegration.” Observ- the embargo to allow the building of the but this possibility seems to have decreased ers note, however, that the NSSP falls short Somali security sector and of measures to given the apparent results of the 29 August of those criteria. Moreover, the dynamics on strengthen the embargo. Contact Group meeting. the ground have changed radically since At the meeting, members expressed sup- The option of taking up the Monitoring these previous Council statements. In par- port for case-by-case exemptions from the Group’s proposals for measures on charcoal ticular, the UIC has declared that it will treat arms embargo for the TFG and for the and fishing seems less likely at this point. the AU/IGAD mission as hostile. The issue establishment of targeted sanctions. Other therefore seems to be whether the mission Key Issues options, such as an integrated sanctions should be an end product of a power shar- The key issue is whether to maintain the regime with measures over fishing and ing agreement with the UIC, with the Council’s stated support for the TFIs, and, charcoal exports (following the recommen- consent of the parties, rather than without in that context, what position to take vis-à- dations of the Monitoring Group) and consent. vis the UIC. A closely related issue is what exemptions for the AU/IGAD mission, were position to take on the regional dimension, Council and Wider Dynamics also discussed. given Ethiopia’s support for the TFI, and the Consensus on providing Somalia with the But a new trend may have emerged at a 29 AU/IGAD mission which is perceived as tools to strengthen its institutions and build August meeting of the International Contact support for the TFI. its security sector while at the same time Group for Somalia in Stockholm. Swedish encouraging dialogue was consolidated in The consequential issue is whether Council State Secretary Annika Soder was quoted August. There is wide support for targeted support for the AU/IGAD mission (and for as saying that the TFG has been weakened sanctions and for a modification of the TFI security sector capacity-building) would and that aid will only be forthcoming when embargo to allow capacity-building on a result in seriously alienating the UIC and, in there is a legitimate and legal government in case-by-case basis. the long run, be dangerously counterpro- place. In that context, she reportedly noted ductive. But divisions continue on the issue of the that both sides will have to reach a power- AU/IGAD mission. Some members— China, sharing arrangement, given the increased The UIC’s possible intentions are also a key Tanzania, the Republic of Congo and Qatar public support enjoyed by the UIC. issue. Reports of its interest in making in particular—are supportive of the mission Options Somalia an Islamic state and its increas- and feel that, once the plan is presented, ingly hard line lead some to question the The most likely option is to reinforce the and given the TFIs’ support, the arms genuineness of its willingness to negotiate. peace talks and a possible power-sharing embargo exemptions should be granted. The position of Hassan Dahir Aweys (the process through the sanctions regime by: UIC leader) is also an issue. Aweys is Other members are more cautious, both n designing criteria for targeted sanctions already on the Council’s targeted sanctions because of the UIC’s reaction and the need (including a travel ban and/or an assets list established by resolution 1267 of 15 to verify whether the NSSP and the plan freeze) against individuals resisting a October 1999. conform to Council demands. This position negotiated path to peace between the may be reinforced by the results of the last Contact Group meeting.

14 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Underlying Problems 30 July 2006 Prime Minister Gedi very nar- Observers note that, despite the new date rowly survived a no-confidence vote. for talks between the TFG and the UIC, the SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT 21 July 2006 The Contact Group called on negotiating process could very easily the TFG and UIC to resume talks and to Monthly unravel. The ongoing consolidation of the make them more inclusive. UIC military position in southern Somalia SEP 2006FORECAST and in parts of the north indicates that 13 July 2006 The Council expressed sup- negotiation may not be the only option at port for the TFIs and willingness to consider Burundi this time. the AU’s request for an exemption to the arms embargo. Expected Council Action The TFG, on the other hand, seems increas- The Council is expected to consider the ingly weaker with reported defections from 5-9 July 2006 A joint fact-finding mission establishment of a United Nations inte- existing security forces. And there is uncer- made up of the EU, the AU, IGAD and the grated office in Burundi to take over from tainty over the prospects of the new cabinet. Arab League visited Somalia to assess the current peacekeeping mission when its the possibility of deploying troops to the mandate expires on 31 December, as rec- UN sources on the ground have noted an country. ommended by the Secretary-General in the increase in the flow of arms, which they addendum to his June report on the United read as a further risk of impending armed 22 June 2006 The first round of talks Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), pub- conflict. between the TFG and UIC, facilitated by the lished on 14 August. At the time of writing it Arab League, took place in Khartoum. UN Documents was unclear whether this action would take 15 June 2006 At its first meeting, the Con- place in September or October. Selected Security Council Resolutions tact Group expressed support for the TFI The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is • S/RES/1676 (10 May 2006) renewed framework and for dialogue. the Monitoring Group’s mandate for likely to have its first country-specific meet- six months. 14 June 2006 The NSSP was adopted by ing on Burundi early October and the • S/RES/733 (23 January 1992) the Transitional Federal Parliament. Council may wait until after that meeting. imposed an arms embargo.Selected However, the recent tensions may prompt 13 June 2006 IGAD decided to make a list of Presidential Statements earlier consideration. individuals “involved in illegal use of arms” • S/PRST/2006/31 (13 July 2006) and to apply individual sanctions (such as Key Recent Developments expressed support for the TFIs and assets freeze and travel bans) against “all Acting Special Representative Nureldin willingness to consider the AU’s warlords.” Satti briefed the Council on 25 August on request for an exemption to the arms the Secretary-General’s addendum. Coun- embargo. Early June 2006 The UIC had seized control cil members expressed general agreement Selected Letters of Mogadishu and Jowhar from the coali- with the proposal, but requested more pri- tion of warlords known as the Alliance • SC/2006/442 (29 June 2006) was the oritisation with respect to the mandate and for the Restoration of Peace and Counter- letter from the Arab League with the structure of the office. The Council also Terrorism. results of the first meeting between the approved a press statement expressing its TFG and UIC on 22 June. For the full historical background and a serious concerns about the reports of a possible coup attempt and called for the Selected Secretary-General’s Report more complete list of UN documents, please consult our January, May and July government to follow the rule of law in the • S/2006/418 (20 June 2006) was the 2006 Forecasts. investigations. latest report. On 30 August the situation further deterio- Latest Report of the Monitoring Group Other Relevant Facts rated when the Burundi government made • S/2006/229 (4 May 2006) Special Representative of the Secretary- accusations against Satti and requested his General for Somalia Historical Background removal. François Lonseny Fall (Guinea) 29 August 2006 The Contact Group met in The drawdown of ONUB’s military compo- Chairman of the Somalia Sanctions Stockholm. nent has continued as scheduled and the Committee number of military personnel currently 21 August 2006 The new 31-member cabi- Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser (Qatar) net was appointed. stands at less than two-thirds of its autho- Useful Additional Sources rised military strength of 5,650. 7 August 2006 A compromise among Presi- n Can the Somali Crisis Be Contained? dent Yusuf, Parliament Speaker Aden and The Secretary-General’s June report rec- International Crisis Group, Africa Report Prime Minister Gedi led to the dissolution of ommended the establishment of a UN No. 116, 10 August 2006. the 42-member Prime Minister’s cabinet. integrated office in Burundi to be known as Bureau Intégré des Nations Unies au Burundi (BINUB). The integrated office would consolidate and reinforce the human-

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 15 itarian and development activities currently sion, especially if there is a risk of the • S/RES/1545 (21 May 2004) estab- undertaken by ONUB and would initially be situation destabilising or for the democratic lished ONUB and set out its mandate established for 12 months, starting 1 Janu- process to take an undesirable turn. On the Selected Press Statement ary 2007. other hand, unnecessary delay could lead to administrative problems for the transition • SC/8818 (25 August 2006) called on The Secretary-General and Council mem- from ONUB to BINUB. the government and all parties in bers have expressed concern at recent Burundi to preserve peace and developments in Burundi following the The lack of an agreement between the national reconciliation and encour- arrest of opposition political figures and Burundi government and FNL overshadows aged the government to follow due allegations of a possible coup. Former both the general stabilisation efforts and the process in its investigations into the President Domitien Ndayizeye was among Council’s decision on ONUB troop with- possible coup attempt. those arrested. drawal as well as possibly the mandate of Selected Secretary-General’s Reports the integrated office. The government of Burundi and the Forces • S/2006/429/Add.1 (14 August 2006) nationales de liberation (FNL) signed the Council Dynamics provided specifics on the mandate Agreement on Principles towards Lasting There is wide agreement in the Council that and structure of the integrated office in Peace, Security and Stability in Burundi on an integrated office is an important step in Burundi. 18 June; however a ceasefire agreement the peace process and in the transition to a • S/2006/429 (21 June 2006) proposed has not yet been concluded. peacebuilding environment. However, the establishment of a UN integrated some Council members would like to see in Options office. the plan for BINUB more prioritisation as Council members have the following Peacebuilding Commission well as a clearer coordination with current options: donor efforts on the ground to avoid dupli- • PBC/OC/1/2 (21 June 2006) was a let- n delay a decision on BINUB until there is cations. ter from the president of the Security greater clarity on the situation in the coun- Council to the Secretary-General refer- try with respect to the alleged coup Underlying Problems ring Burundi to the Peacebuilding attempt. Possibly, Council members Burundi faces many challenges in the area Commission. would like to wait until the PBC has had of civilian disarmament, transitional justice its first meeting on Burundi; and human rights violations. Key underly- Historical Background n monitor the security situation more ing problems are concerns about the rule of For a historical background and more closely and, in the event of increasing law and accountability. These have been a details, please refer to our March 2006 tensions, adopt a presidential statement lead theme within the Council for some Forecast. calling for calm and restraint; time, an example of which was resolution Other Relevant Facts n delay the downsizing of ONUB troops; 1606, in which the Council requested nego- and tiations on the establishment of a Truth and ONUB Special Representative and Head n proceed in September and authorise the Reconciliation Commission and a Special of Mission establishment of BINUB. Court Chamber. However, negotiations To be appointed; Nureldin Satti is Acting between the UN and Burundi government Special Representative Delaying a decision on the transition from are still at an early stage while the recent peacekeeping to an integrated office would Force Commander developments show that a lot still needs to allow the Council to monitor the political Major-General Derrick Mbuyiselo Mgwebi be done on these issues. developments in Burundi and possibly (South Africa) reconsider the current speed of troop UN Documents Size and Composition of Mission reduction. Since ONUB’s mandate does Selected Resolutions • Total authorised strength: 5,650 mili- not expire until the end of this year, there is tary personnel, including 200 military time for such a strategy. • S/RES/1692 (30 June 2006) extended ONUB’s mandate until 31 December observers Key Issues 2006 and requested further details on • Strength as of 31 July: 3,478 total uni- The main issue for the Council is the main- the Secretary-General’s recommenda- formed personnel tenance of stability in Burundi so that the tion to establish a UN integrated office. • Key military contributors: Nepal, Paki- last stage of the peace process can be • S/RES/1669 (10 April 2006) authorised stan and South Africa completed. The transformation of the UN the temporary redeployment of mili- Cost presence in the country from a peacekeep- tary and civilian personnel from ONUB 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $82.39 mil- ing operation to an integrated office should to MONUC. lion (gross) facilitate this. A related issue is the govern- • S/RES/1606 (20 June 2005) requested Duration ment’s strong wish for the transition to take negotiations on the establishment of a place as soon as possible. A second issue Truth and Reconciliation Commission June 2004 to present, current mandate is the impact of the recent developments. and a Special Chamber within Burun- expires 31 December 2006 Too rapid a transition could accelerate ten- di’s court system. Mission Casualties 23

16 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Useful Additional Sources attempt to push forward the negotiations n Website of the Peacebuilding Commission and get clear positions on the key issues. http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/ SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Tensions in the north prompted the Contact n An appeal from Human Rights Watch to Group (the United States, Britain, France, Monthly the government of Burundi of 4 August Italy, Russia and Germany) to issue a state- 2006 to stop torture of the suspects of the SEP 2006 ment on 3 August calling on all parties to FORECAST alleged coup attempt http://hrw.org/eng- “take steps to ensure northern Kosovo lish/docs/2006/08/04/burund13916.htm ter Vojislav Kostunica is said to be pushing remains a stable region.” However, the situ- for an April 2007 date. n Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rein- ation deteriorated on 26 August with a tegration During the Transition in Burundi: grenade attack on a Serb café in Mitrovica Another issue which bears on timing is how A Technical Analysis, Henri Boshoff and which injured nine people. the presence in New York of high-level rep- Waldemar Very, Institute for Security resentatives for the General Assembly in Studies, Monograph No 125, August Three municipalities broke ties with the Pro- September will play out on this question. 2006. visional Institutions of Self-Government There will be opportunities for bilaterals at a (PISG) on 13 June and organised parallel ministerial level and Kosovo may figure on security structures using former Serb army the agendas for these, as well as perhaps a Kosovo officers. NATO troops recently reopened a high-level meeting of some or all Contact military camp in the north. Expected Council Action Group members. In the third week of September the Secre- At the time of writing, a Kosovo Contact A related issue is whether there is a role for tary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Group meeting was expected to take place Council members to assist Ahtisaari in get- Status Process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, in September before Ahtisaari’s briefing. ting the two parties to compromise on their is expected to brief the Council on the positions. Serbia’s Foreign Affairs Minister Montenegro’s declaration of independence Kosovo status discussions at a closed Vuk Draskovic suggested in March that Ser- on 4 June and admission to the UN on 28 meeting with some ministerial-level partici- bia might consider Kosovo being a member June had an impact in the region and was pation. No Council action is expected at this of various international organisations, seen by Kosovo as a harbinger of its inde- meeting. Ahtisaari is unlikely at this stage to except for the UN. There may well be other pendence. present final recommendations on Koso- compromise formulas that could be vo’s eventual status, although his briefing The Special Representative of the Secre- explored, but at this stage members are may suggest some eventual parameters tary-General in Kosovo and head of UNMIK, likely to be cautious about the Council get- with a view to testing members’ reactions. Søren Jessen-Petersen, resigned on 12 ting involved in the substance. June; Jessen-Petersen had been the lon- The Secretary-General’s periodic report on Council Dynamics gest-serving head of UNMIK. On 14 August, the United Nations Interim Administration in The US and the UK, both members of the Joachim Ruckar was appointed as Special Kosovo (UNMIK) is expected in the first Contact Group, still strongly support con- Representative and head of UNMIK and will week of September but may not be taken up cluding discussions on Kosovo’s status by take up the post on 1 September. for discussion in the Council at this stage. the end of 2006. There is some cautious Key Recent Developments Options optimism that Ahtisaari will want to float Status talks moved into high gear on 24 Substantive options are unlikely to be for- some tentative conclusions soon—perhaps July when the leaders of Kosovo and Ser- mally on the table at the September meeting. even in September—although it seems bia met in Vienna for the first time for But given the intensification of Ahtisaari’s likely that this would first be done at a Con- specific discussions on status. The two work, it is possible that the Council may contact Group meeting. sider the option of a more regular focus on delegations presented their diametrically Russia, another member of the Contact the Kosovo issue, perhaps instituting a cycle opposed positions. Belgrade is willing to Group, has presented a consistent position of monthly briefings on Kosovo’s status. allow for everything but independence, on basic principles including: no return of and Pristina is holding out for full indepen- Key Issues Kosovo to the pre-1999 situation and no dence as the only option. While the meeting The key issue in the minds of Council mem- partition of Kosovo. But Russia has also was an important step, no breakthrough bers will be the timing for discussion of the said that that Kosovo’s future status must was achieved. final status decision. There are signs that a not be imposed, nor should talks about Throughout August and into the middle of negotiated solution by the end of the year Kosovo’s future have a time limit. Russia September, Ahtisaari and his team will be may not be possible. This timeframe was may want to buy more time. It also has in involved in a spate of meetings on decen- suggested by the Kosovo Contact Group in the past drawn linkages with the situations tralisation, minority rights and culture. its 31 January ministerial statement, which in Southern Ossetia and Abkhazia in Geor- Ahtisaari in late August met with interna- said that “all possible efforts should be gia and Transdniestria in Moldova. Russia’s tional and local officials in Kosovo and made to achieve a negotiated settlement in potential veto over future decisions, such as visited Mitrovica in northern Kosovo in an the course of 2006.” Ahtisaari has made it an independent state’s admission to the clear that he is working towards finding a UN, will also be a factor to be weighed. solution this year. But Serbian Prime Minis-

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 17 cil is in a cautious mode particularly in the Council members not in the Contact Group, Liberia have little information about the state of the light of recent events in Timor-Leste.) status talks. Regular briefings are therefore Expected Council Action Longer-term options include: seen as important, especially if the Council The Council is expected to extend the man- n developing integrated approaches to is going to have to make the final decision date of UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) at peace consolidation, such as a sub- on Kosovo existing force levels and to provide security regional reserve force as previously for the Special Court for Sierra Leone Underlying Problems suggested by the Secretary-General; (SCSL), probably for six months. The situation in the northern Kosovo town of and Mitrovica is potentially explosive given eth- The Secretary-General’s recommendations n greater Council support for collaboration nic divisions and high unemployment. Any for a drawdown plan for UNMIL, expected between UN missions in West Africa, solution for Kosovo needs to be sensitive to to involve the phasing out of one battalion especially following the Council debate these problems. Serbs in the north have by year’s end and possibly another in the on 9 August and presidential statement threatened to secede if Kosovo is given first half of 2007, are likely to be approved. on West African issues. independence. The Chair of the Sanctions Committee will Options for the timber sanctions will depend Another potential problem is the political report on progress following the decision to on whether key benchmarks have been scene in Belgrade. Serbia’s minority govern- suspend timber sanctions for ninety days. met. If met, the Council may permanently lift ment faces pressure from the ultranationalist Diamond sanctions, set to expire 20 Decem- the timber sanctions. If not, the following Serbian Radical Party (Srpska radikalna ber, come up for review in October. options are possible: stranka, or SRS) which is the largest single n extend the suspension for another ninety force in parliament. Key Recent Developments days; and On 12 July the Council authorised an n reinstate the timber sanctions contained There is concern that a decision on the sta- increase in UNMIL’s civilian police compo- in resolution 1521. (The Council would tus of Kosovo may lead to unrest like that in nent by 125 and decreased the military prefer to avoid this given the importance March 2004 when riots killed 19 people and component by 125, reflecting the Secretary- of timber in developing Liberia’s econ- displaced 2,000 Serbs. General’s advice that police resources will omy.) better enable UNMIL to respond to security A future problem would be how to guaran- needs. Key Issues tee safety for the Serbian minority. The key issue before the Council is the On 2 July the Secretary-General visited UN Documents speed of the drawdown and the timing for Liberia and reiterated the UN’s commitment the adjustment of UNMIL’s mandate. Given Security Council Resolution to Liberia’s efforts to rebuild the country. Liberia’s “stable but fragile” status, the • S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) autho- Liberia’s Humanitarian Mid-Year Appeal Council is aware of the risks of moving the rised NATO to secure and enforce the was launched on 18 July in Geneva by Jan troops out too quickly. A related issue is that withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces Egeland, the UN’s Emergency Relief Coor- the Secretariat is reluctant to develop from Kosovo and established UNMIK. dinator. detailed drawdown plans at this stage, Selected Presidential Statements believing that any drawdown needs to be in At the time of writing, the forestry legislation tandem with actual improvements in the • S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) proposed by the Liberian Forest Reform security situation. declared it was time to begin the politi- Monitoring Committee (FRMC) was cal process to determine the future expected to be considered by the country’s Linked to this is the issue of progress on status of Kosovo. legislature in the last week of August. reforming the Liberian National Police (LNP) • S/PRST/2004/13 (30 April 2004) reaf- and Armed Forces of Liberia. So far UNMIL firmed strong support for the policy of Options has trained 1,800 LNP officers. The Secre- “standards before status.”Selected The Council has the following options with tary-General’s Special Representative for Secretary-General’s Reports / Letters regard to UNMIL: Liberia, Alan Doss, recently said that the aim n maintain the current troop ceilings but is to have 3,500 officers trained, equipped • S/2006/657 and S/2006/656 (16 authorise the Secretary-General to begin and deployed throughout the country by August 2006) were letters between the a phased drawdown at his discretion as August 2007. But as recent events in Timor- Secretary-General and the president the situation permits; Leste have shown, even extensive police of the Security Council regarding the n insist on a concrete timetable and detailed training is not of itself an indicator of prog- appointment of Joachim Rucker as security benchmarks for the drawdown ress in security-sector reform. the Special Representative and head with each step to be approved by the of UNMIK. Council; and The issue on timber sanctions is likely to • S/2006/45 (25 January 2006) noted n encourage a quicker drawdown and hinge on the extent of progress in revising that progress in the implementation of release of resources for neighbouring the forestry legislation. A related issue will the standards was slower than all missions. (But this is unlikely as the Coun- be the capacity for monitoring the imple- other reporting periods. mentation of the forestry reform package.

18 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Council Dynamics Other Relevant Facts The US and the African members are clearly concerned with the long-term ramifications Special Representative of the SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT Secretary-General of winding down UNMIL too quickly. Even Monthly members like Japan, which in the past were Alan Doss (United Kingdom) SEP 2006 keen to see UNMIL’s resources moved to Size and Composition of Mission FORECAST either UNOCI or SCSL, are not currently • Total authorised strength (till Septem- pushing for an accelerated phase-down. ber 2006): up to 15,250 military the basis for UNMOVIC’s continued exis- Underlying Problems personnel and 1,115 police tence was tenuous and that the timeline for Security is still a problem in Liberia. Liberian • Strength as of 31 July 2006: 14,569 its conclusion would not be derived from President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf recently military personnel and 1,011 police the mandate review process. • Key troop contributors: Bangladesh, admitted to “irregularities within the security Options Pakistan, Ethiopia and Nigeria apparatus.” In July there was a fire at the The Council could: Cost executive mansion, and in August a shoot- n respond positively to the Iraqi govern- out at the residence of the newly appointed 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $745.57 ment’s desire for UNMOVIC’s conclusion, director of the Special Security Service. million freeing for other uses the US$1 million The volatile political situation in region, par- Duration per month taken from Iraq’s escrow account to cover UNMOVIC’s expenses; ticularly in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire, September 2003 to present, current n delay action—the Council’s preference could threaten stability and progress in mandate expires 30 September 2006 Liberia. A future problem may be the lack of for more than two years now; or resources for the Truth and Reconciliation n adopt a concrete plan for concluding Commission and other key projects. Iraq UNMOVIC and harnessing its expertise in a permanent form. UN Documents Expected Council Action Key Issues Recent Security Council Resolutions No formal Council action is expected. Many issues relating to the situation in Iraq However, • S/RES/1694 (13 July 2006) increased will be on the minds of Council members as n the United Nations Monitoring, Verifica- UNMIL’s police component and they listen to Ambassador Bolton’s MNF tion and Inspection Commission decreased UNMIL’s military compo- briefing. But formal proposals tend not to (UNMOVIC) Acting Executive Chairman, nent. be raised at these briefings. Therefore it is Demetrius Perricos, will brief the Council • S/RES/1689 (20 June 2006) lifted the unlikely that any issue will be on the table following the quarterly report of the Com- timber embargo for ninety days and for decision. mission due 1 September; renewed the diamond embargo for six n the quarterly report of the Secretary-Gen- months. The issue of UNMOVIC will likely come up eral on the United Nations Assistance • S/RES/1683 (13 June 2006) partially at a separate briefing. The underlying issue Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is due by 8 Sep- lifted the arms embargo for the new seems to be whether action by the Council tember; and security forces of Liberia. would open the possibility of public dispute n the Council will be briefed by US Ambas- • S/RES/1667 (31 March 2006) renewed in the Council regarding weapons of mass sador John Bolton on the operations of UNMIL’s mandate as well as the destruction (WMDs) in Iraq. At worst, it the Multinational Force (MNF). deployment of UNMIL troops to pro- could reawaken the intense divisions within vide security for the SCSL until 30 Key Recent Developments the Council of March 2003. A final account- ing of what UNMOVIC had—and had September. On 10 August, UNAMI’s mandate was not—discovered could provoke a discus- • S/RES/1509 (19 September 2003) renewed for one year. The International sion that some Council members are eager established UNMIL. Compact for Iraq, a five-year plan involving to avoid. Latest Secretary-General’s Report Iraq’s neighbours and foreign powers to revive the Iraqi economy, was launched on • S/2006/376 (9 June 2006) contained Specifically, there is a question of whether it 27 July. The effort is co-chaired by the UN plans for UNMIL’s drawdown and rec- would be necessary for the Council to con- and the Iraqi government, but no significant ommended an additional police unit. firm the completion of Iraq’s WMD developments are expected by September. disarmament. While most Council mem- Other Relevant Documents bers are content to accept the final report of In August, US military leaders confirmed • S/SPRST/2006/38 (9 August 2006) the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) and the state- that sectarian violence in Iraq has been was the presidential statement made ment by the current Iraqi government that worsening. after the debate on Peace Consolida- disarmament has been achieved, others tion in West Africa. The Council discussed a possible review of would like a multilateral confirmation of the UNMOVIC’s mandate in consultations on 8 ISG’s findings via an analysis of the report June. This process, however, drew no con- by UNMOVIC. clusions, beyond general agreement that

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 19 Some Council members are keen for the UN Documents letter to the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Com- UN to maintain UNMOVIC’s expertise mission, rejected the amendments as giving through either a subsidiary Council body or Latest UNMOVIC Quarterly Report concessions to Ethiopia. The standoff con- a unit in the Department of Disarmament • S/2006/342 (30 May 2006) tinues. Ethiopia still refuses to accept the Affairs that would maintain and manage Latest UNAMI Quarterly Report final decision of the EEBC on border demar- UNMOVIC’s archives and roster of experts. cation. Eritrea is not willing to lift the • S/2006/360 (2 June 2006) A secondary issue is what, if any, regime is restrictions on UNMEE until demarcation needed to ensure Iraq does not develop Key Resolutions commences. WMDs in the future, with Council members • S/RES/1546 (8 June 2004) endorsed The Council received a midterm oral brief- divided over whether to retain a strong, the formation of the interim governing on UNMEE on 27 July by Dmitry Titov, Council-based control mechanism or not. ment and the holding of elections by director of the Africa division of the Depart- January 2005, welcomed the end of In the absence of any proposals on this ment of Peacekeeping Operations. He occupation by 30 June 2004, issue, which would have to be carefully reported on progress with the force draw- endorsed the proposed timetable for crafted and consulted, it seems that the down and that the position of the two parties the political transition, detailed the likely outcome in September will again be had not changed. At the time of writing, mandate of the Secretary-General’s no decision. downsizing of the mission was expected to Special Representative, UNAMI and be completed by 31 August. With respect to UNAMI, the Council may the MNF, and requested quarterly decide that, given the recent mandate reports. The EEBC talks scheduled for 24 August renewal, it is unnecessary to schedule con- • S/RES/1511 (16 October 2003) reaf- took place without Ethiopia and Eritrea sultations. The ongoing civil strife in Iraq firmed the temporary nature of the since the two parties did not respond posi- and its effects on both UNAMI’s capabilities Coalition Provisional Authority, tively to the invitation. and the UN’s role in the Compact for Iraq endorsed the interim administration, Options are constant concerns. While the issue of called for a political timetable, autho- The most likely option is a simple rollover of improved airlift for UNAMI has been rised the MNF to maintain security and UNMEE with language exhorting the parties addressed, a larger UN role in Iraq depends stability. It also determined the status to resolve the underlying issues. The Coun- on an improved security situation that has of the MNF and its relation to the UN, cil is preoccupied with other events and not yet materialised. In the background is and asked the US to report every six there is little appetite to further reconfigure the issue of how long resolution 1546, which months. UNMEE. was meant for the period of political transi- • S/RES/1500 (14 August 2003) wel- tion in Iraq that has now concluded, should comed the establishment of the Other possibilities are: “broadly representative” Governing continue to serve as a framework for UN n extend UNMEE’s mandate for a short assistance. In the absence of new ideas or Council of Iraq and created UNAMI. period as a possible stimulus for the par- proposals, there is unlikely to be much • S/RES/1284 (17 December 1999) ties to meet; established UNMOVIC. appetite for taking this up at this time. n set a deadline for resumption of demarcation with the understanding that Council Dynamics For more extensive background information harsher measures would then be a pos- The US and UK appear to be hinting that & relevant UN documents, please see our sible option. (Resolution 1640 indicated they will take up the issue of UNMOVIC’s February, June and August 2006 Forecasts. that the Council would consider “further conclusion by the end of the year. Russia is appropriate measures” under article 41 reluctant to rubberstamp the ISG’s findings, of the UN Charter.) and has previously supported greater Ethiopia/Eritrea examination of the ISG report by UNMOVIC. Key Issues Russia is also more eager to maintain Expected Council Action A key issue in the minds of Council mem- UNMOVIC’s capacity through a formal A rollover of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and bers is not only the risk of renewed conflict bureaucracy. The US opposes these mea- Eritrea (UNMEE) mandate is expected. The on the border between Ethiopia and sures and will want assurances via an report of the Secretary-General on UNMEE Eritrea, but also the risk of their involve- agreement among the permanent mem- is expected in mid-September. ment either directly or by proxy in bers that no revisiting of the March 2003 neighbouring Somalia. debates will occur with UNMOVIC’s closure. In addition, the Peacekeeping Operation France has proposed that UNMOVIC pro- (PKO) Working Group under Japan’s chair- The issue of finding a way to break the cur- duce a final report presenting its views on manship may discuss UNMEE before the rent deadlock remains critical. However, the ISG report without raising questions expiry of its mandate on 30 September. since the Council took the decision to downsize UNMEE on 31 May there has been no about it. Key Recent Developments progress on the border demarcation or lift- Eritrea boycotted the Ethiopia-Eritrea ing the restrictions on UNMEE. The US has Boundary Commission (EEBC) talks on 15 continued its diplomatic initiative but with June after the Boundary Commission sug- little impact. Eritrea is increasingly express- gested possible amendments to the ing unhappiness at a perceived bias demarcation decisions of 2003. Eritrea, in a towards Ethiopia.

20 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org Another pressing issue is how much longer UNMEE could lead to difficulties in maintain- the Council can afford to keep committing ing the security of the Temporary Security resources to this situation. With pressing Zone (TSZ) between Ethiopia and Eritrea. SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT needs for troop generation in other parts of Monthly the world, more Council members may UN Documents become open to a further downsizing or SEP 2006 Selected Security Council Resolutions FORECAST withdrawing in order to free up resources. A • S/RES/1681 (31 May 2006) extended related issue that may affect the size and UNMEE until 30 September and Sierra Leone mandate of UNMEE is the suggestion, downsized the mission to 2,300 which has come up in discussions among Expected Council Action troops. Council members, that the three peace- The Secretary-General’s report on the • S/RES/1640 (23 November 2005) keeping missions in the Horn of Africa United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra demanded border demarcation and should work together. Leone (UNIOSIL), scheduled for 31 August, the lifting of restrictions to UNMEE. is the first since the Council decided to refer A possible future issue is the reaction of • S/RES/1320 (15 September 2000) Sierra Leone to the Peacebuilding Commis- troop contributing countries (TCCs). increased UNMEE and authorised it to sion (PBC). It is expected that the Council Already curtailed, and possibly endangered monitor the TSZ. will delay consultations until the PBC has by Eritrea’s restrictions, some TCCs show • S/RES/1312 (31 July 2000) estab- had its first country-specific meeting on increasing frustration with the Council’s lished UNMEE. Sierra Leone, which was originally sched- inability to change the situation. Selected Letters uled for early September, but may now be Council Dynamics • S/2006/362 (5 June 2006) was the let- postponed to early October. ter from the president of the EEBC to Some pressure from the US, and perhaps The mandate of the United Nations Mission the Secretary-General containing a from France, to further downsize UNMEE is in Liberia (UNMIL) to provide security for the report on the EEBC meeting of 17 possible. But most members do not feel the Special Court for Sierra Leone will expire on May 2006. time is right for major changes to its size or 30 September. Council members are likely • S/2006/328 (26 May 2006) was the let- mandate. Council members like Japan and to renew it in the context of discussions on ter from the Legal Counsel to Ethiopia the UK are keen to ensure that UNMEE is UNMIL’s mandate. (See our brief on Liberia to the president of the EEBC. able to carry out its tasks effectively, particu- in this issue.) larly given the situation in neighbouring Selected Secretary-General’s Reports Key Recent Developments Somalia. Both China and Russia appear • S/2006/140 (6 March 2006) was the The PBC has had a number of preliminary cautious about further downsizing. Greece, latest report. discussions on Sierra Leone and is likely to the lead country on this issue, is also keen • S/2005/142 (7 March 2005) contained have a country-specific meeting in early to maintain the status quo for now. the EEBC’s appraisal of the stalling of October. The Council is therefore still divided on how the demarcation, a historical summary to handle this situation in the long-term. The of the process, and the 2002 Demar- Charles Taylor has been transferred to the lack of movement has left many Council cation Directions. Netherlands, where he will be tried in a spe- members reluctant to commit further energy • S/2004/973 Add. 1 (27 December cial outpost of the Special Court for Sierra and resources. Members have been wait- 2004) contained the five-point Ethio- Leone located at the International Criminal ing to see if the downsizing will affect the pian proposal. Court. The United Kingdom has agreed to parties and also its impact on UNMEE’s provide prison facilities after his trial if he is ability to carry out its mandate. The latter Other Relevant Facts convicted. issue, expected to be addressed by the Special Representative of the Secretary- Key Issues General and Chief of Mission Secretary-General, is likely to be the major The key issue for the Council will be factor in considering further changes. Vacant, pending appointment whether the security situation on the Underlying Problems Size and Composition of Mission ground remains stable. Provided the cur- The alleged involvement of Ethiopia and • Authorised maximum strength: 2,300 rent calm continues, the Council is likely to Eritrea in Somalia’s internal conflict has led troops. prefer leaving the remaining issues in the to concerns that the conflict in Somalia • Strength as of 31 July 2006: 2,014 mili- hands of the PBC. could escalate into a regional conflict. Proxy tary personnel. Underlying Problems activities in Somalia may have kept Ethiopia • Key troop contributing countries: The Secretary-General’s April report men- and Eritrea occupied, perhaps creating the India, Jordan and Kenya. tions a number of potentially destabilising illusion that their border area is relatively Cost factors which include corruption, high calm. In the longer-term, however, it could Approved budget: 1 July 2006 - 30 June unemployment rates and increasing mean greater instability for the Horn of 2007: $182.24 million (gross) tension in areas along the Sierra Leone- Africa as a whole. Guinea border. In light of the upcoming Duration The combination of a smaller troop size with elections in 2007, the elimination of corrup- 31 July 2000 to present; current mandate the continuing restrictions imposed on tion in the police force is also likely to be a expires 30 September 2006 critical point.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 21 UN Documents Review of Security Council tinue outside of the Committee. (See the brief on Iraq in this Forecast.) Selected Security Council Resolutions Mandates The Committee expects to proceed with • S/RES/1688 (30 June 2006) requested In the July 2006 Forecast we outlined the phase two of its review process between the Secretary-General to assist in the criteria established by the Security Coun- September and December. transfer of Charles Taylor to the Spe- cil’s Ad Hoc Committee in its review of cial Court’s special outpost in the Security Council mandates. At the end of Mandate of the Special Representa- Netherlands. June, consensus had been reached to rec- tive of the Secretary-General for the • S/RES/1626 (19 September 2005) ommend that the Secretary-General phase Great Lakes Region mandated UNMIL to provide security out the vacant position of Special Envoy for The Committee is expected to recommend for the Special Court. Ethiopia and Eritrea. that this mandate be phased out. However, • S/RES/1620 (31 August 2005) estab- there is no consensus as yet on the timing The Committee intends next to address two lished UNIOSIL. for this phase-out. issues in September. Recommendations • S/RES/1315 (14 August 2000) called are likely to be put to the Security Council for the Special Court for Sierra Leone There appears to be frustration among for action, covering: some Council members that the prepara- Selected Secretary-General’s Report n phasing out the Special Representative tion for the International Conference on the • S/2006/269 (28 April 2006) was the of the Secretary-General for the Great Great Lakes Region (the second Summit) first report of the Secretary-General on Lakes Region (see below for more has taken too long, and a strong view that UNIOSIL. detailed analysis of this issue which may the mandate of the Special Representative Selected Presidential Statement be controversial); and of the Secretary-General should be phased n the duplication of the functions of the • S/PRST/2006/38 (9 August 2006) was out. The Summit has already been post- Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on peace consolidation in West Africa. poned several times and it was most on Africa, based in Geneva, with other recently scheduled for September 2006. Peacebuilding Commission members of the Secretariat, including The Summit is now set to take place 14-15 • PBC/OC/1/2 (21 June 2006) was a let- the Under Secretary-General for Political December 2006 in Nairobi, Kenya. ter from the president of the Security Affairs and the Special Adviser to the Council to the Secretary-General refer- Secretary-General on Africa, based in In resolution 1653 the Council unanimously ring Sierra Leone to the Peacebuilding New York. commended “the positive role played by Commission. the Secretary-General” and others “in orga- A number of other issues are up for nising and participating in the First Summit.” Historical Background discussion. The Council also encouraged the countries For a complete historical background, n Possible adjustments to the UN Truce of the Great Lakes region “in partnership please refer to our April 2006 Forecast. Supervision Organization (UNTSO) that with the Special Representative and other would allow the Secretariat to better stakeholders to finalise the preparations for Other Relevant Facts utilise resources and take advantage of the second Summit…with a view to adopt- UNIOSIL Executive Representative of the resources in the region. (The Committee ing a Security, Stability and Development Secretary-General had intended to carry out consultations Pact for the countries of the Great Lakes Victor da Silva Ângelo (Portugal) with interested parties. However, the situ- region.” In its earlier resolution 1493 of 2003 ation in the Middle East may have set the Council reaffirmed that the international Size and Composition of Mission back these consultations. The Commit- conference “should be organised at the • Total budgeted staff of 298, compris- tee received a detailed briefing on appropriate time.” However, uncertainty in ing 82 international staff, 192 local staff UNTSO from the Secretariat at its 26 the region, in particular in the DRC, has and 24 UN volunteers June meeting.) contributed to the delay in the staging of the Cost n Adjusting the frequency of reporting from conference. Estimated resource requirements for the Secretary-General on the United Nations Other Council members share the view of 2006 are $23.3 million Peace-Building Support Office in Guinea- Bissau (UNOGBIS). (This coincided with a the Secretary-General that significant prog- Duration recommendation by the Secretary-General ress has been made so far and that there is 1 January 2006 to present, current man- in his report (A/60/733).) still important work to be done by the Office date expires 1 January 2007 of the Special Representative. They argue The Committee decided that it should not that the future of the Office beyond the sec- Useful Additional Sources take up the issue of the UN Monitoring, Ver- ond Summit should be contingent on the n Trying Charles Taylor in The Hague: Mak- ification and Inspection Commission Summit’s outcome and not just on the holding Justice Accessible to Those Most (UNMOVIC), whose mandate is to verify ing of the Summit itself. Hence, the mandate Affected, Human Rights Watch, June that pre-invasion Iraq was rid of weapons of should be extended beyond the conclusion 2006 mass destruction. Due to the sensitivity of of the second Summit and assessed when n Information on the Charles Taylor trial on the issues surrounding this mandate, it was there is a greater clarity on the direction of the Special Court website http://www.sc- agreed that discussion of this should con- the entire process in the region. sl.org/Taylor.html

22 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org The Council’s concern was explicitly Region at the earliest opportunity and to which a landmark Declaration on Peace, reflected in an exchange of notes between include a clear focus on peace and secu- Security, Democracy and Development the Secretary-General and the President of rity issues; in the Great Lakes Region (the Dar-es- the Security Council in the past year. The n facilitate adoption by the countries in the Salaam Declaration) was adopted. reluctance to extend the mandate was region of a security, stability and develop- n The Office has submitted two reports so apparent. On 15 November 2005, the Sec- ment pact; and far: retary-General informed the President of n support the core countries in ensuring • November 2003 following the launch the Security Council of his intention to that the planned, regionally led follow-up of the preparatory process; and extend the mandate of his Special Repre- mechanism is fully operational by the • January 2006 on the progress sentative until 31 December 2006, and time of the second Summit and to take achieved since the first report, and, in asked that the matter be brought to the the necessary steps to transfer residual particular following the first Summit. attention of the members of the Security United Nations responsibilities to the core n The Office also briefed the Security Coun- Council (S/2005/793). The Secretary-Gen- countries. cil Missions to Central Africa and the eral indicated that the core countries would Great Lakes Region in 2003, 2004 and The Council members also requested that continue to require the support of the inter- 2005. there should be an opportunity to review national community up to and beyond the n Since the first Summit the Office has been the Special Representative’s mandate if the proposed second Summit. helping the core countries to prepare the second Summit did not take place in Sep- projects to be included in the Security, In response, the President of the Council on tember 2006. Stability, and Development Pact to be 15 December 2005 informed the Secretary- Background adopted at the second Summit. General that the Council members n The Office of the Special Representative requested further information and clarifica- of the Secretary-General was established UN Documents tion in writing on the proposed extension of in 1999. Selected Security Council Resolutions the mandate, detailing the activities n The idea to hold an International Confer- expected to be performed by the Special • S/RES/1653 (27 January 2006) on the ence on the Great Lakes Region was first Representative and the Office in 2006 to Great Lakes region mooted in a Council presidential state- support the process of the proposed sec- • S/RES/1493 (28 July 2003) on the ment on Rwanda of 14 October 1994, ond Summit, based on an assessment of DRC and endorsed in subsequent statements his role and performance over the past eight Selected Presidential Statement and resolutions. years (S/2005/794). n The Office is headed by Assistant Secre- • S/PRST/1994/59 (14 October 1994) The Secretary-General’s January 2006 tary-General Ibrahima Fall and includes encouraged the Secretary-General to report (S/2006/46) provided details of the seven international staff; and is supported consult and prepare for a conference progress made. Among other things, he primarily through temporary secondment on the region; this was the first men- pointed out that the Special Representative of staff by UNDP and UNIFEM, as well as tion of an international conference on had provided assistance to the core coun- other UN agencies, and by the Group of the Great Lakes region. tries in preparing projects and plans of Friends of the Great Lakes Region. Selected Letters action in the fields of peace and security, n The cost of the Office for 2006, as esti- • S/2006/193 and S/2006/192 (29 democracy and good governance, eco- mated by the Secretary-General in a March 2006) was an exchange of let- nomic development and regional December 2005 report (A/60/585), was a ters between the president of the integration, and humanitarian and social little over two million dollars. Security Council and the Secretary- issues� In the meantime, the Secretary- n The core countries launched the prepara- General regarding the extension of the General extended the mandate of the tory process for the Conference at the Special Representative’s mandate to Special Representative only to 31 March meeting of National Coordinators held at 30 September 2006. 2006. Nairobi, Kenya in June 2003. • S/2005/794 and S/2006/793 (16 n The eleven core countries are: Angola, Following a further exchange of letters December 2005) was an exchange of Burundi, the DRC, the Republic of the between the Secretary-General and the letters between the president of the Congo, the Central African Republic, president of the Security Council in March Security Council and the Secretary- Kenya, Rwanda, the Sudan, Uganda, the 2006 the mandate of the Special Represen- General regarding the extension of United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. tative was extended to 30 September 2006. Special Representative’s mandate The Republic of the Congo and Tanzania It was expected at that time that the second Secretary-General’s Reports are current members of the Security Summit would be held in September 2006. Council. • S/2006/46 (25 January 2006) was the Members of the Security Council encour- n It was decided that the Conference would second report on preparations for an aged the Special Representative to focus include two Summits, with the anticipa- international conference on the Great on three priorities in fulfilling his mandate: tion that the first would be held June Lakes region. n assist the countries of the region to con- 2004. • 17 November 2003 (S/2003/1099) was vene the second Summit of Heads of n Together with the AU, the Office helped to the first report on preparations for an State and Government of the Interna- organise the first Summit, held 19-20 international conference on the Great tional Conference on the Great Lakes November 2004 in Dar-es-Salaam, at Lakes region.

Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org 23 Notable Dates for September Important Dates over the Reports Due for consideration in September Relevant Document Horizon 30 August Final report of the Panel of Experts of the 1591 n The process for the appointment of next Committee concerning the Sudan S/RES/1665 Secretary-General is expected to inten- 31 August SG report on UNIOSIL (UN Integrated Office in sify in September and October. Sierra Leone) (every four months) S/RES/1620 n Elections for the 2007-2008 members 31 August Report of the IAEA Director General on Iranian compliance S/RES/1696 of the Security Council are scheduled early September SG report on ONUB (UN Operation in Burundi) (quarterly) S/RES/1692 for 19 October. early September SG periodic report on UNMIK (UN Interim Administration in Kosovo) S/RES/1244 n The first country-specific meeting of the 1 September Chairman’s report on UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Peacebuilding Commission on Sierra Verification and Inspection Commission) (quarterly) S/RES/1284 Leone is expected in early October. 8 September SG report on UNAMI (UN Assistance Mission for Iraq) (quarterly) S/RES/1619 (delayed from 7-8 September) 10 September SG report on UNMIS (UN Mission in the Sudan) (quarterly) S/RES/1663 n An open debate on women, peace and 11 September SG proposals for the implementation of resolutions 1559 security following up on resolution 1325 and 1680 and for delineation of Lebanon’s international borders S/RES/1701 is expected in October. 14 September Counter-terrorism Committee report on states’ implementation n Run-off elections in the DRC are sched- of resolution 1624 (prohibition of incitement to commit a terrorist act) S/RES/1624 uled for 29 October. 15 September SG report outlining obstacles to the implementation n The annual report of the Security Coun- of the road map in Côte d’Ivoire S/PRST/2006/32 cil to the General Assembly is expected 15 September SG report on Somalia (every four months) S/PRST/2001/30 in October for debate in the General 15 September SG report on MONUC (UN Mission in the DRC) (semi-annual) S/RES/1635 Assembly in November. 15 September SG report on UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) (quarterly) S/RES/1667 n A NATO summit will be held on 28-29 15 September SG report on UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) November in Latvia. (every four months) S/RES/1681 n The first annual report of the Peace- 23 September SG report on UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in building Commission is due in Afghanistan) (semi-annual) S/RES/1662 26 September Commissioner’s report on UNIIIC (UN International December; it will be subject to a Coun- Independent Investigation Commission) (quarterly) S/RES/1686 cil debate. (S/RES/1645 and 1646) 29 September SG report on Darfur (monthly) S/RES/1590 n An open debate on Protection of Civil- September 2006 Mandates Expire Relevant Document ians in Armed Conflict is expected in December. 15 September Group of Experts of the 1572 Committee concerning S/RES/1643 Côte d’Ivoire S/2006/135 24 September UNMIS S/RES/1663 SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT STAFF 29 September Panel of Experts of the 1591 Committee S/RES/1665 Colin Keating, Executive Director 30 September AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) PSC/MIN/Comm.(XLVI) Joanna Weschler, Director of Research S/2006/156 Curtis A. Ward, Senior Research Consultant 30 September MONUC S/RES/1635 Anne-Gaëlle Claude, Research Analyst 30 September MONUC’s temporary reinforcements S/RES/1693 Fernanda Rafaela Fernandes, Research Analyst 30 September EU Force in the DRC (EUFOR RDCongo) S/RES/1671 Shamala Kandiah, Research Consultant 30 September SRSG for the Great Lakes S/2006/193 Amanda Roberts, Programme Coordinator 30 September UNMIL S/RES/1667 Anthony Smith Jr., Administrative Assistant 30 September UNMEE S/RES/1681

September 2006 Other Important Dates Security Council Report is published with 12 September The 61st General Assembly convenes, the General Debate commences on the support of the Government of Canada, 19 September. the Government of Norway, The Rocke- feller Foundation, the John D. and Catherine 18 September The second regular session of the Human Rights Council is scheduled for T. MacArthur Foundation and the William 18 September to 6 October. and Flora Hewlett Foundation. It is incorpo- 20 September A Security Council open debate on cooperation between the UN and rated as a not for profit Organisation and regional organisations will be chaired by the Foreign Minister of Greece. operates in affiliation with the Center on 20 September The 1521 Committee will review the previous suspension of timber International Organization in the School of sanctions in Liberia as per resolution 1689. International and Public Affairs at Colum- bia University in New York. Also expected in September: • The Council will be briefed by US Ambassador John Bolton on the operations of the Multinational Force in Iraq. The material in this publication is subject to copy- • The Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, is right ownership. Material in this publication may be expected to brief the Council with some ministerial-level participation. freely used as in the public domain. You are free to • The 1267 Committee concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban, the Counter-terrorism Committee, and the copy, distribute, or make derivative works of the 1540 Committee will brief the Council. work under the following conditions: you must attri- • Under Secretary-General Jan Egeland may brief the Council on the humanitarian situation in Africa. bute the work to Security Council Report, Inc.; you • A high-level meeting on the recently postponed elections in Côte d’Ivoire is planned for late Septem- may not use this work for commercial purposes; if ber in New York on the margins of the 61st General Assembly. you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you • Media reports indicate a possible ministerial-level meeting of the Council on the Israeli/Palestinian may distribute the resulting work only under a peace process, at the request of the Arab League, in late September. license identical to this one.

24 Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue, 31st Floor, New York, NY 10017 T:1 212 759 6327 F:1 212 759 4038 www.securitycouncilreport.org