BURUNDI: ENSURING CREDIBLE ELECTIONS Africa Report N°155 – 12 February 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. A LABORIOUS POLITICAL PROCESS ...................................................................... 2 A. THE TROUBLED ESTABLISHMENT OF CENI ................................................................................... 2 B. ADVANCED REFORM OF THE ELECTORAL LAW AND CONCERNS OVER THE REGISTRATION OF ELECTORS ................................................................................................................................... 3 1. Political calculations over the organisational arrangements for the vote ..................................... 4 2. A politicised voter registration process? ...................................................................................... 5 C. RESTRICTIONS ON PUBLIC FREEDOMS ........................................................................................... 6 III. THE SHORT TERM STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES .............................. 8 A. THE FORMER REBELLIONS ............................................................................................................ 8 1. THE CNDD-FDD ........................................................................................................................ 8 2. The FNL ..................................................................................................................................... 11 B. TRADITIONAL POLITICAL FORCES ............................................................................................... 11 1. FRODEBU ................................................................................................................................. 11 2. UPRONA ................................................................................................................................... 12 C. THE NEW POLITICAL FORCES ...................................................................................................... 13 1. The UPD .................................................................................................................................... 13 2. The MSD .................................................................................................................................... 14 D. THE 2010 ELECTIONS: WHAT IS AT STAKE? .............................................................................. 14 IV. THE SCALE OF THE SECURITY CHALLENGES .................................................. 16 A. THE MOBILISATION OF POLITICAL PARTY YOUTH WINGS AND DEMOBILISED FIGHTERS ............... 17 B. THE POLITISATION OF THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY STRUCTURES............................................... 18 C. THE RISKS OF AN ESCALATION IN VIOLENCE ............................................................................... 19 V. GUARANTEEING A CREDIBLE ELECTORAL PROCESS ................................... 20 A. SUPERVISING THE NEUTRALITY OF THE DEFENCE AND SECURITY FORCES ................................... 21 B. CONSOLIDATING THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY ................................................... 22 C. ENCOURAGING THE IMPARTIALITY OF THE CENI ....................................................................... 23 D. DISSUADING VIOLENCE .............................................................................................................. 24 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 25 APPENDICES A. MAP OF BURUNDI ............................................................................................................................ 27 B. GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................................... 28 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 30 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2007 ..................................................... 31 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 33 Africa Report N°155 12 February 2010 BURUNDI: ENSURING CREDIBLE ELECTIONS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Burundi has made much progress in leaving its civil war ligence Service (Service national de renseignement), which behind, but tensions are rising ahead of elections. They is already trying to destabilise the opposition. Mean- could escalate dangerously in coming months, ruining while, the main opposition political parties’ election the electoral process’s credibility and endangering a frag- strategies either have yet to be worked out or, apart from ile democracy and, ultimately, many gains of the peace those of a few new players, fail to offer an alternative process. After strong international pressure was put on political vision. Most parties simply criticise CNDD- the ruling party, consensus was reached in September FDD leaders by denouncing suspected corruption and 2009 on an Independent National Electoral Commission authoritarian practices. (CENI) and a new electoral code. The polls – commu- nal, presidential, then legislative – are scheduled between Given President Nkurunziza’s popularity in rural areas May and September, but opposition parties are facing and the financial and logistical advantages it derives from harassment and intimidation from police and the ruling control of state institutions, the CNDD-FDD is in a strong party’s youth wing and appear to be choosing to respond position to retain the presidency. It seems to fear, how- to violence with violence. Both the region and Burundi’s ever, that it could lose its majority in parliament and other partners should reinforce election violence moni- dominance over provincial administrations and thus be toring mechanisms and support deployment of a regional forced to form a coalition government, a scenario which police mission. A senior regional envoy should be ap- party hardliners, notably military leaders, strongly wish pointed to facilitate resolution of political disputes and to avoid. This prospect and the harassment of opposition party leaders warned they face sanctions if they rig elec- parties suggest it intends to win the local and parlia- tions and possible international prosecution if they com- mentary elections at all costs. mit serious violent crimes. While the present problems do not make a return to civil Although an electoral framework endorsed by the ma- war likely, Burundi’s regional and wider international jority of the political class is in place, opposition parties partners need to urgently support policies that limit the still cannot operate freely. In many parts of the country, real risk of serious election violence that would plunge local administrations are controlled by the ruling Conseil it into a new political crisis and endanger much of the national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces de recent progress. Civil society organisations should sup- défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD). These local ad- port creation of efficient electoral violence observation ministrations order the police to disrupt opposition party mechanisms, and the media should document and report gatherings and block them from opening local offices. incidents. The countries in the regional initiative on At the same time, civil society organisations and some Burundi (Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda in particular) media are harassed for denouncing the ruling party’s should boost efforts to improve the training and opera- authoritarian tendencies. tions of the national police by providing a regional po- lice mission. Embedded within the Burundian force, a The CNDD-FDD youth wing’s physical training, war few small teams in each province equipped by donors songs and quasi-military organisation raise the spectre with their own logistics and communications could of militia violence and a large-scale intimidation cam- support the planning of election security as well as ad- paign. The other former rebels, the Forces nationales de vise on and monitor implementation. libération (FNL) and the Front pour la démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) are mobilising their own youth This regional police mission should be led by a commis- wings to oppose intimidation tactics. The police have sioner working directly with the director general of the remained passive or become accomplices to the ruling Burundian police and report to a senior regional special party’s abuses. There are thus legitimate fears they could envoy mandated by the regional initiative and the African become further politicised, similar to the National Intel- Union to help resolve major political disputes arising from Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections Crisis Group Africa Report N°155, 12 February 2010 Page ii serious security incidents and allegations of electoral 10. Do not compromise the neutrality of the security malpractice. The special envoy would also coordinate services by mobilising support networks within them. international engagement, which has weakened since the dissolution of the partnership for peace on Burundi and To the Burundian media: the expulsion of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General at the end of 2009. A retired head of 11. Allow all political