Máster en Democracia y Gobierno

Departamento de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Working Papers Online Series http://www.uam.es/ss/Satellite/Derecho/es/1242658791834/listad oCombo/Working_Papers.htm

Estudio/Working Paper 165/2014

Accountability as a determinant of Quality of Democracy (Impact of the economic crisis on accountability on the examples of and Spain)

Anna Marta Sroka

University of

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1. Introduction

A large number of scholars around the world are presently taking on the challenge of conceptualization and operationalization of the concept of quality of democracy, in both its quantitative and qualitative dimensions. Various means of conceptualizing research on quality of democracy have been developed, as well as associated methods for its measurement. In most operationalizations of quality of democracy, accountability may be identified as a primary determinant. In this article an analysis of accountability will be conducted based on the examples of two countries, Poland and Spain. It will explore the level to which the global economic crisis that began in 2008 impacted accountability in both countries. The analysis of Poland encompasses the period of 2007-2011, i.e. the 6th term of Parliament, while 2008-2011 is the frame of reference for Spain. Each country represents groups of nations that have undergone the process of democratization in recent decades. Spain is among the countries of southern Europe in which the process of democratization began in the mid-1970s, and in reference to which we may speak of a consolidated democratic system. Poland is a member of the group of countries at the most advanced stage of forming stable democratic structures within the states of central and eastern Europe, and which set out along this path at the beginning of the 1990s. Of significance is the fact that both of them are European countries and members of the European Union. On the one hand, this is associated with the introduction of general European standards for accountability (such as the 2001 White Paper on European Governance). On the other hand, however, membership in a structure which has been assigned a portion of the competencies typically reserved for a state leads to diffusion of responsibility. Thus in the case of both Spain and Poland we may observe the influence of similar external factors on mechanisms of accountability. Something that doubtlessly serves to differentiate Poland and Spain, apart from differences in their respective political systems, is the impact of the global crisis that began in 2008 on the economies of the two countries. Spain is one of the countries hit hardest by the crisis, while Poland is referred to as a "green island" as one of the EU Member States that went through it practically unscathed. This makes it interesting to compare these two countries and to seek an answer to the following research questions: firstly, has the economic crisis affected accountability in Poland and in Spain?Secondly, to what extent did the economic crisis influence accountability in both countries, if we take into account that it affected the Spanish economy more severely than it did the Polish economy?

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2. Theory, terms, definitions and preliminary analysis

One of the first to develop the concept of accountability was G. O’Donnell, who, at the end of the 1990s, introduced a distinction between two types of accountability: vertical and horizontal (O’Donnell, 1997: 143-167). His theoretical proposition inspired a number of scholars who then undertook to operationalize accountability (Morlino, 2004; Roberts 2009; Morlino: 2009; Levine, Molina, 2011; Bühlmann, Merkel, Müller, Wessels, 2011). In spite of these efforts, accountability continues to be used as a conceptual umbrella under which various terms and definitions can be found. This concept often becomes a general term applied in the case of all institutions vested with authority and responsible to the public, which in consequence leads to the loss of its analytical value. This occurs for such reasons as the fact that accountability is understood as a synonym of many loosely-defined concepts. This paper adopts the definition of accountability offered by M. Bovens, according to whom accountability is the nexus between an actor and a forum, in which an actor is obliged to explain and justify his/her behaviour while the forum may pose questions and pass judgments whose consequences must be accepted by the actor (Bovens, 2007: 7). G. O'Donnell's division of horizontal and vertical accountability is also applied. Horizontal accountability is understood in categories of the existence of state entities and institutions imbued with both the legal authority and operational capacity to initiate activities stretching from general supervision to sanctions of a criminal nature, and even impeachment in relation to the activities or omissions of other state authorities and institutions. The author differentiates two types of institutions: balance institutions and mandated institutions. Vertical accountability, otherwise referred to as electoral accountability, consists not only in the guarantee that citizens may choose their representatives, but also that they have the possibility to observe, to settle accounts and to sanction them (O’Donnell, 2000)1. In analyzing horizontal accountability in Poland and in Spain, it is difficult to observe an influence of the global economic crisis on the institutional architecture of its mechanisms or the dynamics of the use of instruments facilitating accountability (Sroka, 2014)2. In Poland, this likely results on the one hand from the conviction that the country is managing quite well in the face of the global economic crisis. Indeed, this image of Poland has been reinforced in

1 In later work G. O'Donnell also introduced a sort of social accountability, including it within vertical accountability. For more, see: O'Donnell G. (2004) Accountability horizontal: la institucionalización legal de la desconfianza política, “Revista Española de Ciencia Política” no 11, pp. 11-31. 2 A. Sroka, Rozliczalność w badaniach jakości demokracji. Na przykładzie Polski i Hiszpanii, Wydawnictwo Elipsa, (in print).

3 the mass media. On the other hand, the Smolensk catastrophe of 10 April 2010 resulted in the death of many of Poland's leading political figures, including President Lech Kaczyński. This topic essentially dominated the public debate during the entire run-up to the elections of 9 October 2011. In Spain, however, the government initially poured water on the idea of a global economic crisis, and it was not until 2010 that this issue took over political life in the country. Nonetheless, the steps taken by the government, including the passage of legislation intended to stimulate the Spanish economy and reform the labour market, failed to deliver the expected effects (IDE, 2011: 29-49). In spite of this, the very poor economic situation did not result in changes to the architecture of mechanisms of accountability. However, the mass media saw an increasing number of calls for reconstruction of the political system in Spain. As for the dynamics of the use of instruments of horizontal accountability, they also exhibited no changes in comparison to previous parliamentary terms of office (Sroka, 2014). Even the shortening of the Cortes Generales' term by four months did not result from a vote of no confidence against PM José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, but was rather the result of his own decision. Undoubtedly, however, it was a consequence of the charge of inaction in the fight against the economic crisis. The results of elections in Poland and in Spain in 2011 may, however, demonstrate that the economic crisis influenced vertical accountability in both the former and the latter country. Indeed, analysis of election results in Poland beginning from 1997, thus from the moment at which the Polish political system may be acknowledged as having achieved consolidation, reveals that the 2011 elections were of an exceptional character – for the first time, the same party ( - CP) succeeded in winning two elections in a row3. It therefore may be supposed that this is associated with the crisis, or rather the lack thereof, considering the previously-mentioned minor impact of the crisis compared to other countries. In Spain, however, the governing Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (SSWP) lost the 2011 elections. It should be kept in mind that, in contrast to Poland, since the moment of Spain's democratic consolidation in 1982 the same party managed on several occasions to generate enough of an advantage to form successive governments (SSWP in 1982-1996, the People's Party (PP) in 1996-2004, SSWP in 2004-2011). This allows for the assumption that Spanish voters decided not to elect SSWP again due to the poor economic situation.

3 Civic Platform (CP) was the only party that succeeded in receiving enough votes to form a government during the entire period of 1989-2011. It is worth adding, however, that in 2007-2011 it did not receive enough votes to govern independently, and entered into a governing coalition with the Polish People's Party (PPP).

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One of the potential means for examining the extent to which the global economic crisis affected vertical accountability in Poland and in Spain in 2011 is to examine whether voters made use of economic retrospective voting. In this manner it is possible to determine whether voters were motivated by the desire to reward or to punish incumbent parties for their actions in the first years of the crisis. In respect of the foregoing, the following hypothesis is posited: the economic crisis exerted an influence on vertical accountability in both Poland and in Spain; in Poland, economic voting was not used owing to positive economic results, whereas the poor condition of the economy in Spain led voters there to punish the government in power at the time. 3.The economic voting model applied

For determining the extent to which we may speak of economic voting in Poland and Spain, and thus whether the punishment/reward mechanism functions in both countries, three independent variables have been adopted: retrospective assessment of the country’s economic situation, prospective assessment of the country’s economic situation and retrospective assessment of the political situation. The application of these independent variables was necessitated by the following conditions. Firstly, the decision to apply a sociotropic retrospective assessment of the economy while excluding an egotropic assessment was determined on the one hand by the high level of difficulty in capturing the effect of a government’s activities on the economic situation of individual citizens; indeed, improvement or deterioration of their situations may result from personal experiences, and need not be associated in any way with decisions taken by authorities (Kramer, 1983: 92-111). On the other hand, results of research conducted by both P. Grzelak and M. Fraile demonstrate that in both countries the practice of egotropic voting is practically non-existent (Fraile, 2002; Fraile 2005; Grzelak, 2003). However, by capturing within the model not only a retrospective assessment of the country’ economic condition but also a prospective one, the common criticism raised against economic voting associated with a lack of realism in interpreting voting behaviours is met head-on. This criticism is associated with the fact that the presence in models of only retrospective assessments concerning the economy would indicate a situation in which voters did not give consideration to proposals for resolving particular issues in the future by political parties (Kinder, Kieweit 1981; Rattinger, 1991: 49-62). For this reason as well, the most recent literature concerning electoral accountability assumes that elections exhibit a prospective element and do not only serve to punish or reward the party in power, but also

5 serve the purpose of selecting the party offering the best political programme. This is also why the model discussed herein additionally contains a prospective assessment of the country’s economy, which serves to indicate the expectations of voters. Expanding the analysis with a retrospective assessment of politics results from the fact that the dependency between the condition of the economy and the popularity of the governing party is not as clear-cut as some may assume. Analysis of previous research results allows us to discern that periods of economic growth are not necessarily beneficial to governing parties, nor do they contribute to their re-election; the reverse is also true, that periods of recession are not inevitably linked with the infliction of punishment on the government and election of the opposition. One potential explanation may be the dependency empirically ascertained by M. Fraile using elections in Spain during the period 1979-1996. She demonstrated that voters’ negative or positive assessment of the incumbent party during times of crisis is dependent on whether that party offers compensation to voters in the form of social policy. Thus we are dealing here with an assessment of the government based not only on the condition of the economy, but also for the type of social policy it conducted (Fraile 2002: 129-151). This is also why, in analyzing the link between the state of the economy and public opinion, the political and social context must be included in the equation, which has led to the model also capturing retrospective assessment of the political situation. Additionally, as argued by P.C. Magalhăes, L. Aguiar-Conraria and M. Lewis-Beck, an assessment of a country’s political situation may be used as a rough indicator of the popularity of the government because, as the authors emphasize, the aggregate-level correlation between opinions on the general political situation in the country and approval of the government is high (Magalhães, Aguiar-Conraria, Lewis-Beck, 2012: 770).4 This enhanced model of economic voting, something more than a mere punishment and reward hypothesis, allows for the distinguishing of various types of links between public opinion and the economy. The applied model of multinomial logistic regression is expressed in the following equation5:

Formula 1: Y= (retro. econ. op. + prosp. econ. op. + retros. polit. op. + control variables)

4 P. C. Magalhães, L. Aguiar-Conraria and M. Lewis-Beck examined the level of correlation between opinions on the general political situation in a country and approval of the government. In Spain during the period 1993- 2009 it was r=0.81. 5 Election decision = β0 + β1 retrospective assessment of economic situation + β2prospective assessment of economic situation + β3retrospective assessment of political situation + β4 political self-identification + β5 age + β6 sex + β7 jobless + β8 housewife + β9 student + β10 pensioner + β11 vocational education + β12 secondary education + β13 higher education +ε. 6

The dependent variable Y signifies declared voting levels for parties presently in government or opposition parties. It should be emphasized, however, that due to particular clusters of respondents it was not possible to distinguish all of the opposition parties, which is why some of them were placed in the "other" category6. The primary independent variables, e.g. retrospective general economic opinion, prospective general economic opinion and retrospective political opinion, are of a dichotomous character. For those who felt that the economic/political situation had improved over the preceding year the value of (1) was assigned; for those feeling that the situation had deteriorated or remained unchanged, the value assigned was (0). Similarly, for those declaring that the economic situation would improve in a year, the value of (1) was assigned, while the value assigned for those declaring either that the situation would not improve or would remain unchanged was (0). Also, ten control variables were introduced of those typically captured in analyses regarding individual-level voting determinants. It should be added that the model does not capture respondents who did not vote in elections. Doubtlessly, it can not be excluded that electoral absence may constitute a sort of punishment of incumbent governments as well, particularly when we consider that Poland is home to one of Europe’s highest rates of electoral absence while Spain records high rates of voter participation7. Nonetheless, interpretation of the motivations for electoral absence will not be placed under analysis, as this would significantly exceed the scope of this work.

Poland Spain Variables applied in the model PGSW 20118 CiS no. 29209 Independent variables Retrospective assessment of the x x economic situation Prospective assessment of the x x economic situation Retrospective assessment of the x x political situation Control variables

6 The basis for selection was the small number of individuals declaring they had voted for a given party, or the occurrence of blank fields at the intersection of levels of dependent and independent variables making it impossible to perform a proper multinomial regression analysis. 7 Average voting frequency in Poland during the period under review (1997-2011) was 47.52%, while in Spain it was 73.46%. From data available at: http://pkw.gov.pl/ and http://www.congreso.es/consti/elecciones/generales/index.htm. 8 Polskie Generalne Studium Wyborcze: http://www.isppan.waw.pl/subpage/pgsw/index.html. 9 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, http//www.cis.es.

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Political self-identification x x Age x x Sex x x Jobless x x Housewife - x Student x x Pensioner/Retiree x x Vocational education x x Secondary education x x Higher education x x

4. The macro-political economic situation

The points of departure for interpretation of results generated by the applied model are the economic and political situation from the parliament’s previous term in Poland of 2007- 2011, and in Spain of 2008-2011. In analyzing Poland’s economic situation it should be emphasized that in 2007-2011 a drop in GDP was noted of -2.5%, as well as a very slight decline in unemployment of 0.01%, along with a drop in the level of inflation of 9%. In Spain, however, the period of 2008-2011 saw the most serious crisis in the history of Spanish democracy. This is demonstrated primarily by a drastic increase in the unemployment rate of 10.4%, as well as declines in GDP of 0.5% and inflation of 1.4%.

Table no.1: : Leading macroeconomic indicators in Poland 1997-2011 Poland Spain Unemploymen Year GDP t Inflation GDP Unemployment Inflation 2007 6.8 9.6 4.0 - - - 2008 5.1 7.1 3.1 0.9 11.3 2.4 2009 1.6 8.2 3.7 -3.7 18 0.1 2010 3.9 9.6 1.4 -0.3 20.1 0.4 2011 4.3 9.7 3.1 0.4 21.7 1.0 Source: Statistical Annex of the European Economy: Autumn 2012, European Commission, 19 October 2012, pp. 35, 49, 77.

In summarizing the levels of macroeconomic indicators in Poland and their effects on electoral behaviours, it should be added that a typical characteristic of the economy in the

8 years immediately following the systemic transformation that took place in Poland was dynamic economic growth. Nonetheless, such strong economic growth need not necessarily lead to the perception by citizens that the economic situation was improving, as the initial condition of the Polish economy was very poor. The same level of GDP growth in highly- developed economies would be felt differently, as it would bring with it a significant increase in the general welfare. GDP levels in 2007-2011 require additional comment. In analyzing the slight growth in GDP, one might expect the government would be blamed for it during those years. It must be kept in mind, however, that 2008 saw the beginning of a global economic crisis, which is why that level of economic growth was recognized not as a failure, but rather as a significant accomplishment. In summarizing the economic situation in Spain, the selected macroeconomic indicators demonstrate that the economy worsened significantly. For this reason as well, in accordance with the responsibility hypothesis the year 2011 should see the use of the economic retrospective vote. All the more so considering that, as previously mentioned, unemployment is correlated with economic voting, and in 2011 the level of unemployment grew by 21.7%, which represented a rise in unemployment of 10.3% compared to 2008. Proceeding to an analysis of the political situation, it should be mentioned at the outset that the parties attempting to win re-election in the two countries were facing diametrically different situations. In the 2007 elections, CP received 41.51% of the votes, translating into 209 seats in parliament, while PPP received 8.91% of votes and 31 seats. holds the position of Prime Minister, i.e. head of the government. A characteristic aspect of D. Tusk’s cabinet, differentiating it from all previous governments since the restoration of the democratic Republic, is that it managed to maintain its parliamentary majority for its entire term of office. In addition, the first coalition between a post-solidarity group and a post- communist group was formed. The governments of the CP-PPP coalition were regarded as stable ones, in spite of the Smolensk disaster, which is no mean feat in Polish conditions. In addition, Poland continued to be portrayed in the media as an "economic miracle" against the backdrop of a Europe mired in recession. In Spain, the 2008 elections were won by SSWP, as they had been in 2004. Election results of 46.5% of votes allowed J. L. Rodríguez Zapatero to form a minority government. In contrast to the previous term, none of the nationalist parties offered support to the socialists. The new prime minister was selected in a second round of voting by a simple majority. In the face of widespread criticism concerning the absence of a government reaction to the Spanish economy’s descent into crisis, early elections were held.

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Thus in 2011 the parties in Poland battling for enough votes to constitute another government were CP and PPP. Opposition parties included LDA (Left Democratic Alliance and LJ (). The results of research for the main coalition party, CP, are given, as they do not differ significantly in both the first and the second case, and this interpretation of the results would seem to be more transparent. In Spain, the party attempting to receive yet again the necessary number of votes for forming a government was SSWP. Opposition parties were PP, UL (United Left)-ICV and UPD (Union for Progress and Democracy). For each election a separate category of "other" has been created, applying to parties that received votes from fewer than 50 respondents in a given survey study. The results given below allow for a comparison of the degree to which the economy stepped into the ballot box in Poland and in Spain during the first phase of the economic crisis, both in the retrospective and the prospective dimension, and also the importance of the role played by assessments of the political situation.

5. Results During the elections of 2011 in Poland, the party vying for re-election was CP (which constitutes a reference category in the model), which governed in 2007-2011 in a coalition with PPP. Analyses also included LJ, LSA, PP and PM (Palikot Movement). In analyzing the results of the study it should be stated that economic retrospective voting was not used during the 2011 elections, and by the same token the responsibility hypothesis was not verified. The situation was different in the case of economic prospective voting. The prospective assessment of the economic situation turned out to be a statistically significant variable for those casting their votes for LJ, PPP and PM; the only exceptions were the voters of LDA. A positive assessment of the future condition of the economy increased the likelihood of voting for CP. Only in the case of LDA was this a variable that did not differentiate that party’s voters from those of CP. A negative assessment of the political situation was only statistically significant for LJ voters, as in their case a negative assessment of the current political situation reduced the probability of voting for CP. Ideology was also of importance to voters of all political parties except for PPP. In the case of LDA and PM, the greater the degree to which voters described themselves as ‘left-wing’, the smaller the probability that they would vote for CP. In respect of voters of LJ, this relationship was exactly the opposite; the more they felt themselves as ‘right-wing’ on the left/right spectrum, the smaller the chance that their vote would go to CP.

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Table no. 2: Economic voting in Poland during the 2011 elections Vote for CP Vote for CP Vote for CP Vote for CP Variables versus LJ versus PPP versus LDA versus PM Retrospective assessment of economic -0.48 (0.30) -0.69 (0.47) -0.56 (0.50) -0.37 (0.35) situation Prospective assessment of economic -1.21 -0.83 -1.38 (0.28)*** 0.03 (0.37) situation (0.43)*** (0.32)*** Retrospective assessment of political -1.63 (0.35)*** -0.60 (0.44) -0.85 (0.49) 0.31 (0.32) -0.54 -0.21 0.35 (0.05)*** -0.11 (0.06) Ideological self-identification (0.07)*** (0.06)***

N……………………………………………………………821 Log likelihood………………………………………………888.943 LR Chi²(48)………………………………………………… 989.63 Prob>Ch²……………………………………………………0.000 Pseudo- R²…………………………………………………...0.183

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05. Standard error given in parenthesis.

In summarizing the results of multinomial regression from 2011, it should be emphasized that the responsibility hypothesis was not confirmed. Voters did not engage in economic voting despite the deteriorating economic situation. Perhaps this occurred as a result of the government’s informational campaign and constant comparisons to the economies of the European Union mired in recession. Set against the backdrop of those reports, Poland appeared to be a "green island" in spite of a slowing rate of economic growth. On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that the primary theme of the election campaign was not the economy, but rather the Smolensk catastrophe. As a result the rivalry between the two strongest political parties, CP and LJ, oscillated around issues unrelated to the economy. In Spain the party seeking re-election, as it had in 2008, was SSWP. Here as well, the responsibility hypothesis failed to be confirmed in 2011, which comes as a surprise considering that during the period of 2008-2011 Spain experienced its most serious economic crisis since its systemic transformation. This does not mean, however, that voters were uninterested by the subject of the economy – in fact, it was quite the opposite. In reviewing responses contained in CiS survey no. 2920, it turns out that the condition of the economy evolved into a valence issue for voters of all political parties, and the numbers of positive and negative assessments concerning the condition of the economy during the previous government’s term were quite similar for the electorates of the most important political parties. As a result, this variable was statistically insignificant, considering that it neither increased nor decreased the probability of voting for the party seeking re-election. Practically

11 all voters offered a negative assessment of the economy, including those who again cast their votes for SSWP. This is why another variable would seem important, that of the prospective assessment of the economy, which turned out to be statistically significant in the case of those voting for the most important opposition party PP. However, a retrospective assessment of the political situation was not statistically significant for the voters of any party, which most likely indicates that the political scene was dominated by the economy. In accordance with tradition, political self-identification was statistically significant. The dependencies were the same as those in previous years, meaning that the more strongly voters identified themselves as right-leaning, the lesser the chances they would vote for SSWP; in respect of UL, the circumstances were exactly the opposite.

Table no. 3: Economic voting in Spain during the 2011 elections Vote for Vote for Vote for Vote for SSWP SSWP versus SSWP versus SSWP Variables versus PP UL UPD versus other Retrospective assessment of economic situation -0.62 (0.45) -1.17 (0.67) -0.44 (0.69) -1.02 (0.58) Prospective assessment of economic situation 0.48 (0.24)* -0.33 (0.33) 0.53 (0.38) -0.35 (0.28) Retrospective assessment of political situation 0.58 (0.34) -0.25 (0.50) -1.57 (1.05) 0.14 (0.38) 1.52 -0.35 0.31 Ideological self-identification (0.09)*** (0.08)*** 0.80 (0.12)*** (0.07)***

N…………………………………………………………….1269 Log likelihood………………………………………………1189.970 LR Chi²(52)…………………………………………………1064.96 Prob>Ch²……………………………………………………0.000 Pseudo- R²…………………………………………………...0.309

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05. Standard error given in parentheses.

Summarizing the above deliberations, it is worth emphasizing that the data cited run contrary to the widespread opinion that Zapatero’s electoral disaster was solely the result of poor economic policy. As it turns out, the loss of power by SSWP resulted from the conviction of voters that the opposition party would prove far better at managing the exit from the crisis, as both voters of SSWP and of all opposition parties held a negative view of the economy’s condition – this was not the decisive factor in the 2011 election victory by PP.

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6. Conclusions

On the basis of the research results presented above, it may be ascertained that the hypothesis in both Poland and Spain the economic crisis exerted an influence on vertical accountability; in Poland, economic voting was not applied due to positive economic results, while in Spain the statement that the poor condition of the economy led voters to punish the incumbent government is only partially accurate. In respect of Poland, the hypothesis is accurate in that economic retrospective voting was not used, which is a landmark in the history of democratic Poland. Indeed, by applying the same model of economic voting in 1997, 2001, 2005 and 2007, thus from the moment of Polish democracy's consolidation, it turns out that this hypothesis was confirmed in the case of all elections (Sroka, 2014). By the same token, economic retrospective voting was used. In each case the party seeking re- election lost power. However, the use of economic retrospective voting was not always associated with a real worsening of the condition of the economy, such as in 2005 and 2007. In Spain, however, economic retrospective voting was not applied in 2011, which may be surprising considering the economic situation in that country. All the more so when observing that by applying the same model in studies of voting behaviours in 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008, it turns out that economic retrospective voting was primarily made use of by voters of the leading opposition party (depending on the year this was either PP or SSWP) in the years 1989, 2000 and 2004 (Sroka, 2014). That said, only in 2004 did the incumbent party lose power. Similarly to the case of Poland, the use of economic retrospective voting was not always associated with a real decline in the economy. This was the case in the elections of 2000 and 2004, during which an objectively positive economic situation was viewed negatively by voters. A contrary scenario occurred during elections in 1986, 1993. However, in analyzing the results of the research in the context of the global economic crisis' impact on vertical accountability, rather than merely the use of the reward/punish mechanism, it turns out that this impact was profound. In Poland it may have contributed to the re-election of the same political party, which represents a milestone in the context of the entire democratic period. In Spain, however, while voting behaviours may not be interpreted as punishment for bad governments, in the eyes of Spanish voters it was clear in 2011 that the opposition PP was more equipped to deal with the crisis. In conclusion, the economic crisis influenced electoral accountability in both cases. The aforementioned results do not, however, allow for a determination as to the impact of the level of diffusion of responsibility existing as

13 a result of both countries' membership in the EU on the use of economic retrospective voting, and by the same token on punishment directed towards incumbent governments.

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