Máster en Democracia y Gobierno Departamento de Ciencia Política y Relaciones Internacionales Universidad Autónoma de Madrid Working Papers Online Series http://www.uam.es/ss/Satellite/Derecho/es/1242658791834/listad oCombo/Working_Papers.htm Estudio/Working Paper 165/2014 Accountability as a determinant of Quality of Democracy (Impact of the economic crisis on accountability on the examples of Poland and Spain) Anna Marta Sroka University of Warsaw 1 1. Introduction A large number of scholars around the world are presently taking on the challenge of conceptualization and operationalization of the concept of quality of democracy, in both its quantitative and qualitative dimensions. Various means of conceptualizing research on quality of democracy have been developed, as well as associated methods for its measurement. In most operationalizations of quality of democracy, accountability may be identified as a primary determinant. In this article an analysis of accountability will be conducted based on the examples of two countries, Poland and Spain. It will explore the level to which the global economic crisis that began in 2008 impacted accountability in both countries. The analysis of Poland encompasses the period of 2007-2011, i.e. the 6th term of Parliament, while 2008-2011 is the frame of reference for Spain. Each country represents groups of nations that have undergone the process of democratization in recent decades. Spain is among the countries of southern Europe in which the process of democratization began in the mid-1970s, and in reference to which we may speak of a consolidated democratic system. Poland is a member of the group of countries at the most advanced stage of forming stable democratic structures within the states of central and eastern Europe, and which set out along this path at the beginning of the 1990s. Of significance is the fact that both of them are European countries and members of the European Union. On the one hand, this is associated with the introduction of general European standards for accountability (such as the 2001 White Paper on European Governance). On the other hand, however, membership in a structure which has been assigned a portion of the competencies typically reserved for a state leads to diffusion of responsibility. Thus in the case of both Spain and Poland we may observe the influence of similar external factors on mechanisms of accountability. Something that doubtlessly serves to differentiate Poland and Spain, apart from differences in their respective political systems, is the impact of the global crisis that began in 2008 on the economies of the two countries. Spain is one of the countries hit hardest by the crisis, while Poland is referred to as a "green island" as one of the EU Member States that went through it practically unscathed. This makes it interesting to compare these two countries and to seek an answer to the following research questions: firstly, has the economic crisis affected accountability in Poland and in Spain?Secondly, to what extent did the economic crisis influence accountability in both countries, if we take into account that it affected the Spanish economy more severely than it did the Polish economy? 2 2. Theory, terms, definitions and preliminary analysis One of the first to develop the concept of accountability was G. O’Donnell, who, at the end of the 1990s, introduced a distinction between two types of accountability: vertical and horizontal (O’Donnell, 1997: 143-167). His theoretical proposition inspired a number of scholars who then undertook to operationalize accountability (Morlino, 2004; Roberts 2009; Morlino: 2009; Levine, Molina, 2011; Bühlmann, Merkel, Müller, Wessels, 2011). In spite of these efforts, accountability continues to be used as a conceptual umbrella under which various terms and definitions can be found. This concept often becomes a general term applied in the case of all institutions vested with authority and responsible to the public, which in consequence leads to the loss of its analytical value. This occurs for such reasons as the fact that accountability is understood as a synonym of many loosely-defined concepts. This paper adopts the definition of accountability offered by M. Bovens, according to whom accountability is the nexus between an actor and a forum, in which an actor is obliged to explain and justify his/her behaviour while the forum may pose questions and pass judgments whose consequences must be accepted by the actor (Bovens, 2007: 7). G. O'Donnell's division of horizontal and vertical accountability is also applied. Horizontal accountability is understood in categories of the existence of state entities and institutions imbued with both the legal authority and operational capacity to initiate activities stretching from general supervision to sanctions of a criminal nature, and even impeachment in relation to the activities or omissions of other state authorities and institutions. The author differentiates two types of institutions: balance institutions and mandated institutions. Vertical accountability, otherwise referred to as electoral accountability, consists not only in the guarantee that citizens may choose their representatives, but also that they have the possibility to observe, to settle accounts and to sanction them (O’Donnell, 2000)1. In analyzing horizontal accountability in Poland and in Spain, it is difficult to observe an influence of the global economic crisis on the institutional architecture of its mechanisms or the dynamics of the use of instruments facilitating accountability (Sroka, 2014)2. In Poland, this likely results on the one hand from the conviction that the country is managing quite well in the face of the global economic crisis. Indeed, this image of Poland has been reinforced in 1 In later work G. O'Donnell also introduced a sort of social accountability, including it within vertical accountability. For more, see: O'Donnell G. (2004) Accountability horizontal: la institucionalización legal de la desconfianza política, “Revista Española de Ciencia Política” no 11, pp. 11-31. 2 A. Sroka, Rozliczalność w badaniach jakości demokracji. Na przykładzie Polski i Hiszpanii, Wydawnictwo Elipsa, (in print). 3 the mass media. On the other hand, the Smolensk catastrophe of 10 April 2010 resulted in the death of many of Poland's leading political figures, including President Lech Kaczyński. This topic essentially dominated the public debate during the entire run-up to the elections of 9 October 2011. In Spain, however, the government initially poured water on the idea of a global economic crisis, and it was not until 2010 that this issue took over political life in the country. Nonetheless, the steps taken by the government, including the passage of legislation intended to stimulate the Spanish economy and reform the labour market, failed to deliver the expected effects (IDE, 2011: 29-49). In spite of this, the very poor economic situation did not result in changes to the architecture of mechanisms of accountability. However, the mass media saw an increasing number of calls for reconstruction of the political system in Spain. As for the dynamics of the use of instruments of horizontal accountability, they also exhibited no changes in comparison to previous parliamentary terms of office (Sroka, 2014). Even the shortening of the Cortes Generales' term by four months did not result from a vote of no confidence against PM José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, but was rather the result of his own decision. Undoubtedly, however, it was a consequence of the charge of inaction in the fight against the economic crisis. The results of elections in Poland and in Spain in 2011 may, however, demonstrate that the economic crisis influenced vertical accountability in both the former and the latter country. Indeed, analysis of election results in Poland beginning from 1997, thus from the moment at which the Polish political system may be acknowledged as having achieved consolidation, reveals that the 2011 elections were of an exceptional character – for the first time, the same party (Civic Platform - CP) succeeded in winning two elections in a row3. It therefore may be supposed that this is associated with the crisis, or rather the lack thereof, considering the previously-mentioned minor impact of the crisis compared to other countries. In Spain, however, the governing Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (SSWP) lost the 2011 elections. It should be kept in mind that, in contrast to Poland, since the moment of Spain's democratic consolidation in 1982 the same party managed on several occasions to generate enough of an advantage to form successive governments (SSWP in 1982-1996, the People's Party (PP) in 1996-2004, SSWP in 2004-2011). This allows for the assumption that Spanish voters decided not to elect SSWP again due to the poor economic situation. 3 Civic Platform (CP) was the only party that succeeded in receiving enough votes to form a government during the entire period of 1989-2011. It is worth adding, however, that in 2007-2011 it did not receive enough votes to govern independently, and entered into a governing coalition with the Polish People's Party (PPP). 4 One of the potential means for examining the extent to which the global economic crisis affected vertical accountability in Poland and in Spain in 2011 is to examine whether voters made use of economic retrospective voting. In this manner it is possible to determine whether voters were motivated by the desire to reward or to punish incumbent parties