DE RUEHBS #1666/01 3451540 ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY-ADEB6B23-MSI9027-413) R 111540Z DEC 09 FM AMEMBASSY TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9802 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC ";"S E C R E T BRUSSELS 001666

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT0

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STATE FOR EUR/WE, ISN, S/GC, AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, MNUC, BE, AF SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR BELGIAN DEFENSE MINISTER ´S DECEMBER 15-16 MEETINGS WITH SECDEF, DOS AND CONGRESS IN WASHINGTON

REF: A. BRUSSELS 1498 B. BRUSSELS 1493

Classified By: Ambassador Howard Gutman, reason 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: Belgian Defense Minister Pieter De Crem has been in office since March 2008 and is one of the ´ strongest friends in the Belgian government. Under his leadership, has returned its focus to NATO as the orienting factor in its defense policy. Now, Belgium is poised to take a leading role in Europe -- the former Prime Minister, , has just been named as the first European Council President under the new circumstances of the Lisbon Treaty, and the Belgian government is preparing itself to hold the rotating presidency of the EU Council for the six months beginning July 1, 2010. Embassy Brussels believes that properly motivated, Belgium and its government, including De Crem, can be leaders in mobilizing Europe to assist the United States in meeting two of the key challenges faced by the Transatlantic community -- and Guantanamo. The Embassy has thus urged in repeated meetings with the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister and the Foreign Minister to become more vocal in callingfor Europe to ally in its support fot U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and in European joint efforts in closing Guantanamo. Hopefully, neither coalition politics nor long-simmering tensions between the Flemish and francophone regions and linguistic communities will not distract Belgium from this opportunity. Other opportunities for cooperation exist on Africa policy, nuclear disarmament in Europe and Iran. End Summary.

TAKING A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN EUROPE ------

2. (C) For the past few months, Embassy Brussels has been working to set the stage for a change in Belgium´s self-concept as a small, meek country living in the shadow of France and , to a country that can show leadership in Europe in spite of stretched financial and material resources, mainly by becoming more vocal on the need for Europe to support America´s new Afghanistan strategy and to assist in the closing of the Guantanamo detention center. This is a theme the Ambassador has been stressing to De Crem in Brussels. De Crem´s visit to Washington is a chance for DOD, DOS and Congressional officials to forge a closer personal relationship with De Crem and to foster and encourage this transformation. In fact, of course, the transformation began at home in Belgium in March 2008 when a new government, made up of a motley coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, Liberals and Humanists from both sides of the linguistic border, came to power. The Prime Minister then, and now again with the departure of Van Rompuy to the EU, was , a Flemish Christian Democrat. Formation of the government was delayed for nearly a year because of difficult issues of power-sharing between the French and Flemish communities, many of which still remain to be solved.

STEPPING UP IN AFGHANISTAN ------

3. (C) Nevertheless, the new Defense Minister, Pieter De Crem, with sometimes grudging support from Leterme and others in the cabinet, reoriented Belgium´s defense policy. Where his predecessor had promoted a mainly humanitarian, EU and UN support role for the Belgian military, De Crem sought to re-establish Belgium as a small but reliable NATO ally. As a result, Belgium´s troop commitment to NATO ISAF operations in Afghanistan has increased from about 250 troops to nearly 540, with further increases, perhaps to 680, in the offing. provide security for Kabul airport, operate and maintain six F-16´s in Kandahar, run one Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team in Kunduz with a second due to arrive in January, and participate in a German-run PRT. This increase has been achieved against a background of declining resources which have required a thoroughgoing restructuring of the armed forces and recall of peacekeeping troops in Kosovo and . The government has also bucked critics inside and out of government who prefer a more pacifist, less NATO-oriented approach and are ever ready to make political hay out of possible casualties. Minister De Crem moreover has reacted positively to suggestions from the Ambassador that he become more vocal in his support of America´s Afghanistan strategy as a way to help shore up the support of other European partners. Belgium deserves appreciation and praise for its efforts. Further increases in military contributions to Afghanistan will occur, but Belgian military resources are reaching their limits.

4. (C) De Crem stands up well to criticism he receives for the government´s Afghanistan policy from the main opposition party, the Flemish Socialists (Sp.a), which is small but vocal, as well as some individual members of Parliament from other parties. The Sp.a´s leader, Dirk Van Der Maelen, has termed Belgium´s participation in ISAF "stupid and costly". De Crem´s response: "Belgium is not an island in the middle of the ocean and the international community counts on our country when it comes to operations abroad." De Crem has otherwise vigorously defended the ISAF mission and Belgium´s role in it, both in the Belgian press and on the floor of the Belgian Parliament.

5. (S) De Crem played a critical role during the recent NATO Ministerial and Secretary Clinton meetings in behind-the-scenes calls and contacts. In order to help him advance Afghanistan policy within the Belgian government, he provided the Ambassador with three specific requests which the Secretary could make to Prime Minister Leterme. These were to extend the Belgian deployment until 2011, add another 20% to the Belgian deployment (the Secretary requested an additional 150 troops), and add a substantial police trainer presence. The Secretary made all three requests of Leterme. Having the requests come from the Secretary will help the government move to adopting the three policies and overcome opposition within the government coalition.

6. (C) On the other hand, Belgium´s contributions to civilian development in Afghanistan have not kept pace. This responsibility and authority does not rest with Minister de Crem, but with Belgian Interior Minister Turtleboom. In April 2009, the GOB announced that it was doubling its financial assistance to the country to 12 million euros a year. This figure is only about 0.75 percent of its global budget for official development assistance. After hesitating for more than a year because of security concerns, the government has finally decided to send 2-4 police trainers and a magistrate to Afghanistan. De Crem´s colleague and Minister of Development Cooperation, , has said that Belgium will increase its assistance to Afghanistan but only with sufficient "advance guarantees from the Karzai administration of good governance and the fight against corruption." Although De Crem has direct influence only over the military, he participates in cabinet discussions of other issues, including development assistance. He hQ always fought for greater civilian assistance but further urging of more civilian assistance to Afghanistan with Minister De Crem may help equip him in his effort to increase civilian resources devoted to Afghanistan as well as military.

SPURRING ON CLOSURE OF GUANTANAMO ------

7. (C) Again, although De Crem has no direct authority to order resettlement of Guantanamo detainees, his support in the matter will be helpful. In general, the Embassy has been encouraging Belgium to take a leadership role in Europe in the closure of the Guantanamo detention center by being more vocal in urging Europe to work together to bring about the closure now. In October, Belgium resettled one detainee. We are discussing the transfer of two Tunisian detainees who have already been convicted of crimes in Belgium, not as part of the "placement" of detainees, but instead as part of our Department of Justice ongoing cooperation with the Belgian Ministry of Justice. Our hope is that that process will make it easier for Belgian society to accept the return, and also allow us to ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs separately to take others. We have also begun to suggest the possibility of Belgium stepping from the chorus line and up to the footlights on Guantanamo. Helping solve the USG´s -- and Europe´s -- problem with Guantanamo is a low-cost way for Belgium to attain prominence in Europe. There are signs that Belgium´s reticence is beginning to chafe its leadership. Complaints about Belgium´s exclusion from G-20 membership, and opposition to perceived influence of a "directoire" of large countries in the EU are examples. It is a matter of convincing Belgium that not only does it have self-interest in a more assertive role, but it also has a uniquely trusted character within Europe that permits it to be effective. Embassy Brussels suggests the time is right to ask Belgium to take more than a handful of detainees and ask in coordination with others (as led by Belgium), so that Guantanamo -- which Europeans always so roundly condemned -- is closed once and for all.

ENHANCED MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AFRICA COOPERATION ------

8. (C) Central Africa is a special interest of Belgium, as the former colonial power in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Burundi. Belgian soldiers are training Benin troops that participate in MONUC in the Congo, and some Congolese troops as well. Belgium is negotiating in the EU, over the reluctance of the French, to take leadership of the EU´s Atalanta anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia in the second half of 2010. It has agreed to provide a ship to the U.S.-led Africa Partnership Station, which conducts internationally staffed, ship-based training missions in West Africa. A Belgian officer will soon be embedded at AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart. The GOB is eager to cooperate with the United States on encouraging security sector reform in the DRC, consolidating peace in the Eastern DRC, promoting regional economic integration and cooperation among states in the region on security issues. In particular, Belgium is as interested in preventing sexual violence as we are. It would like us to encourage continued cooperation between Rwanda and the DRC to take a firmer hand with rebel groups that operate in Eastern Congo and far too often commit atrocities. In November, Belgium announced an increase in assistance to Burundi, making it the largest bilateral donor to that country. It plans to do the same for the DRC.

MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT ------

9. (S) Belgium has a special interest in nuclear non-proliferation issues because it participates in NATO´s nuclear forces at the Kleine Brogel air force base. It rejected a recent overture from Germany to join with the , Italy and Germany to propose to the rest of NATO that nuclear weapons be removed from those countries (ref B). However, Belgian MOD and MFA officials apparently had to rein in then-Foreign Minister and now Prime Minister Leterme when he initially responded too positively to the idea. Belgium´s official policy rejects a unilateral approach to disarmament and insists that the issue must be discussed among all NATO members at one time, with due regard for U.S.-Russian bilateral discussions and the NPT. The government is also opposing a proposal from the floor of the Belgian parliament to ban nuclear weapons from Belgian soil.

IRAN SANCTIONS IF NECESSARY ------

10. (C) Belgium shares our concern about Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear capability. It supports strengthened sanctions in the EU and UN if necessary. In that case, at least at first, it prefers to see existing sanctions made more effective, rather than extending them into entirely new areas, with the possible exception of a conventional arms embargo.

POLITICAL PITFALLS IN REGIONAL TENSIONS ------

11. (C) With three regions, three linguistic communities, seven parliaments and a myriad of political parties, domestic politics and the division of powers in Belgium require a complicated and delicate series of compromises. Herman Van Rompuy, though Flemish, was one politician who seemed able to gain the confidence and trust of both Flemish and francophone Belgians. His successor, Yves Leterme, is more identifiably Flemish and does not share that reputation. One difficult issue, Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, or BHV, symbolizes the divisions and carries unusual emotional power in Belgium (ref A). In essence, it is a question of whether residents of the Brussels suburbs should live and vote under Flemish control or have special francophone voting and social rights. The issue impeded formation of a government after the 2007 elections and was kicked down the road ever since. A special effort will have to be made before March 2010 to either once again delay a solution or reach a final compromise. Failure to do so could threaten Leterme´s coalition in the first part of the year. The fact that all Belgian politicians dearly want to avoid embarrassment during Belgium´s EU presidency will motivate them to find the necessary compromises, but there is no guarantee they can.

GUTMAN

OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHBS #0106/01 0271603 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 271603Z JAN 10 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9952 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC";"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000106 SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/PPD, EUR/RPM, SCA/A AND S/SRAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2020 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, PGOV, EAID, BE, AF SUBJECT: EMBASSY CONTINUES VIGOROUS CAMPAIGN OF AWARENESS ON AFGHANISTAN IN ADVANCE OF LONDON CONFERENCE

REF: A. 09 BRUSSELS 1737 B. 09 BRUSSELS 1739

BRUSSELS 00000106 001.3 OF 004

Classified By: Ambassador Howard Gutman, reason 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (U) Summary: Embassy Brussels, and particularly Ambassador Gutman, have intensified their efforts to raise Belgian public and official awareness, understanding and support for the President´s strategy on Afghanistan since the new year. The strategy has included a vigorous round of media interviews, discussions with government and opposition politicians, and an unprecedented appearance before a joint committee of the Belgian parliament. His arguments appeal to Belgium´s international credibility as an important tool in rallying support across Europe to do more to achieve peace and stability in Afghanistan as envisaged by the President´s recently announced Afghanistan strategy. In meetings with the severest critics of Belgium´s already proportionately strong military engagement in Afghanistan, the Ambassador found significant support for more civilian assistance to the country. Using requests for military protection we have received from the Belgians for their aid workers in Haiti as a metaphor, he began to develop sympathy and understanding for why security forces are needed in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Leterme, however, remains a hard sell, although even he feels the January 28 London Conference on Afghanistan could generate "new views." End Summary.

2. (U) The Belgian government, in the persons of Defense Minister Pieter De Crem, Foreign Minister , Minister of Development Cooperation Charles Michel, Interior Minister and Justice Minister , appeared before the Belgian parliament on January 13. These appearances did not break new ground, but they confirmed the Belgian government´s intention to maintain its current commitment through the end of 2010. Essentially, this consists of providing security for Kabul Airport, six F-16´s with pilots and support personnel based at Kandahar, participation in a German-led PRT in Kunduz and two OMLT´s on the ground in Kunduz. The Belgians also recently deployed a contingent as part of NATO Allied Land Component Headquarters, led by Major General Hubert De Vos as Deputy Commander for Resources, from Heidelberg to Kabul. The debate in Parliament was an opportunity for those who oppose the current Belgian commitment to Afghanistan, and even more bitterly oppose an increase in that commitment, to again make their views known. Key among these are Flemish Socialist Dirk Van Der Maelen (Sp.a) and Flemish green party member Wouter DeVriendt (Groen!). Their attitude is that "the war in Afghanistan cannot be won". Other skeptical parliamentarians include Hilde Voetmans (Open VLD) and former Defense Minister Andre Flahaut (PS), although their objections are more practical and political than ideologically or categorically opposed.

3. (U) Defending government policy, De Crem pointed out successes in Afghanistan so far, and Vanackere noted that the government´s critics had not presented any other policy solutions. Vanackere said that it is not a good idea to present a timetable for withdrawal because it will give the Afghan people the impression that Belgium is giving up on them. Although there seemed to be some support for extending Belgium´s participation in ISAF beyond 2010, there was no mention of the possibility of doing more than the measures announced in early December by the government. These consist of 2-3 police trainers and a magistrate, and an intention to increase development aid if the Karzai government can show progress in good governance and anti-corruption efforts.

4. (U) With the President´s recently announced Afghanistan strategy in mind, and with the January 28 conference in London fast approaching, the Ambassador and the Embassy wished to energize public discussion of Belgium´s role in ISAF and Afghanistan. During a public panel discussion on January 13 hosted and reported by the center-left daily , and amplified at a luncheon held for all major media outlets in the country the following day, the Ambassador laid out an argument for an increased Belgian military and civilian presence in Afghanistan. He said that he finds broad agreement that terrorism is a real threat to Europe and to Belgium. He then told the journalists that he wished to clear up some misconceptions in the public mind about President Obama´s strategy. First, he said, the President is well aware that a purely military solution to terrorism is not possible. He knows that sustainable social and economic development and an integrated civilian and military approach is necessary. It is necessary to put into

BRUSSELS 00000106 002.3 OF 004 place enough security to permit development assistance to have an effect. This is the reason for the "surge" of 30,000 U.S. and an expected 7,000 ISAF partner troops. The Ambassador urged Belgium to consider sending 50, 75, or 100 troops to the theater, although he stressed there is no specific ask in that regard. "Something like 100 troops would be noticed by the Allies," he said. He said that he recognizes that Belgium´s financial and manpower resources are smaller than other European partners´. However, he said that Belgium´s participation is important because of Belgium´s credibility as a country without a particular ax to grind in international affairs. If Belgium participates, it is and example of moral leadership that sends a strong message to other partners in Europe and elsewhere that a unified and determined response to the problem of Afghanistan is needed. The Ambassador repeated this message in public media and private meetings with key officials over the next week to ten days. 5. (U) The Ambassador´s words at the media luncheon evoked a strong reaction. The Belgian wire service Belga issued a news alert headlined "U.S. Ambassador Asks for 100 Troops for Afghanistan" within 15 minutes of the journalists leaving the Ambassador´s residence. The story under the headline correctly reported that the numbers mentioned by the Ambassador were symbolic and that no formal or explicit request has been made by the United States. Nevertheless, the headline spread and other media issued similar reports based on the Belga dispatch. Coverage of the Ambassador´s message about Belgium´s credibility and moral leadership dominated the evening television news and the next day´s print media. MP´s Van Der Maelen and De Vriendt both issued press releases. De Vriendt´s said "the U.S. Ambassador´s proposal to send 100 troops to Afghanistan is absurd." "I do not believe we will solve the problems in Afghanistan with more troops," said Van Der Maelen. On Monday, January 18, a key francophone Socialist minister, , said flatly that "there will not be anything additional for the time being given that we are already massively present in that country."

6. (U) At this point, the Embassy intensified the Ambassador´s press appearances and his schedule of private meetings with politicians, especially those opposed to an increase. It also issued a press release pointing out that in essence, we agree that there is no purely military solution to the problems in Afghanistan and emphasizing that "given Belgium´s immense credibility within the partnership of nations, Belgium´s participation in the increased civilian reconstruction and law enforcement efforts, and in the increased military effort designed to provide the security framework to allow such reconstruction efforts to proceed, would be very meaningful." The press release also offered to discuss Afghanistan at length with members of Parliament. On January 18, the Embassy received a call from the parliamentary committees that deal with foreign relations and defense inviting the Ambassador to address a joint session of the House and Committees on Defense and Foreign Relations on January 20.

7. (U) Also on January 18, the Ambassador appeared on a leading late-night political talk show, "Phara". The other guests in the round-tableinister of Defense and the newly appointed Archbishop of Belgium. That night, "Qhara´s" audience of 200,000 viewers heard the Ambassador´s explanation of Belgium´s potential ole in Afghanistan directly.

8. (C) JanuarQ 20 the Ambassador had an active schedule whch included a meeting in the city of Mons wiQh the head of the francophone Socialist Party ragraph 5. However, he toldQ Di Rupo how during the weekend the Belgian B-Fst team sent to assist in Haiti had run id called the State Department operations center and obtained additional protection from the U.S. troops in Haiti. The situation was analogous to Afghanistan, the Ambassador said, in that it was impossible to provide the needed humanitarian assistance without proper security. This idea hit home with Di Rupo and also with the Belgian politicians the Ambassador talked with over the next few days. A greater Belgian effort is "very difficult", Di Rupo told the Ambassador, but "not impossible". Di Rupo emphasized mainly the cost of such an effort, but said he would "propose something to Prime Minister Leterme" because Belgium should show it is ready to help. The Ambassador´s visit to Mons was well-covered by the local and regional

BRUSSELS 00000106 003.3 OF 004 newspapers and television stations.

9. (C) Later on January 20, the Ambassador met with the Groen! party´s De Vriendt. He then appeared before the Senate and House Foreign Affairs and Defense committees, once again emphasizing that the important thing in the Afghanistan debate is what Belgium brings to the table in credibility and support, and only secondarily in numbers of troops. De Vriendt and Vandermaelen stated their opposing views in detail. De Vriendt did say, however, that 2010 will be a "year of truth" and a new strategy will have to be developed based on results. MP Georges Dallemagne (CdH) echoed some of the themes sounded by Di Rupo. He said that Belgium needs to work hard in cooperation with the U.S. to convince other European countries that Afghanistan is important to global security. Belgium should participate in the Afghan mission in proportion to what it can contribute, he said, which should include "a more important civilian contribution". At the same time, he said that such support must be efficient and the Afghan government must show it is willigt combat corruption. Dalltings, one with Afghanistan critic Dirk Van Der Maelen (Sp.a) and the other with the president of the Belgian Senate, Armand De Decker (CdH). De Decker, who is a former Minister of Development Cooperation (2004-2007) in the Verhofstadt government, said that there is still no good policy at the EU level for development in Afghanistan. The Ambassador discussed the need for more military and civilian help at length. When the meeting ended, De Decker told the Ambassador that he would be making an announcement that would be pleasant to his ears. In fact, later in the day, De Decker released a press statement that called on Belgium to explore leading a PRT. The press reaction to De Decker´s statement noted that De Decker´s new strategy followed a lengthy meeting with the Ambassador.

13. (C) Van Der Maelen was more difficult to convince. However, the Ambassador and Van Der Maelen developed a warm personal relationship and found several areas of agreement: that one cannot leave the problem of terrorism unaddressed, that the solution to Afghanistan is not a military one, that there is a need for development in the country to achieve peace and security. Van Der Maelen said he would support the idea of more development aid for Afghanistan. However, he simply does not believe the West can succeed in making Afghanistan secure. His alternative suggestion is that troops from Muslim countries replace American and European soldiers and that a regional conference of Afghanistan´s neighbors and the Taliban be held to seek a negotiated peace.

14. (C) On January 25, the Ambassador met with Andre Flahaut (PS) in his office. The Ambassador discussed his various meetings over the previous week, noting that in spite of differences, he had found areas of agreement. Flahaut said that he had not heard a clear statement of a need for troops from the Minister of Defense. He added that he thought leading a PRT would be a good way Belgium could contribute more. He sees a need for a thorough re-thinking of Belgium´s contributions to Afghanistan that will bring not only the

BRUSSELS 00000106 004.2 OF 004 government but also the Flemish Socialists into agreement. Flahaut suggested that perhaps Belgium could do more, including adding one or two C-130 transport aircraft, medical teams, demining experts, and reinforcement of a PRT with more people. At the same time, he reiterated his misgivings about De Crem, criticizing his lack of "transparency" in putting his plans for Afghanistan into effect.

15. (C) Later that same day, the Ambassador met with Prime Minister Leterme to stress the points he had been making in the press and to other Belgian politicians. Leterme told the Ambassador that the decision on the Afghanistan deployment had been made after President Obama´s Afghanistan speech. He defended the size of Belgium´s deployment as proportional to Belgium´s social, military and economic weight. However, he did say that Foreign Minister Vanackere´s report from the January 28 London Conference could "bring new views."

GUTMAN

OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBS #1943/01 3571600 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 221600Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8404 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEFDHN/DIA DH WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE";"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001943

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STATE FOR EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2018 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MOPS, AF, CG, BE SUBJECT: LETERME´S LAST CRISIS: KING STALLS LETERME´S RESIGNATION UNTIL A NEW PM IS FOUND

REF: A. BRUSSELS 1933 B. BRUSSELS 1922

1. (C) Summary: PM Yves Leterme offered his government´s resignation to King Albert II December 19 after members of his Cabinet were implicated in attempting to influence judges. The King did not accept the resignation, and met with Flemish Christian Democrat (CD&V) Chairperson December 21, to see if a replacement for PM Leterme could be found. The five coalition parties are discussing alternatives to PM Leterme, including former PM Dehaene, House Chairman Van Rompuy, or even Ms. Thyssen, all from the CD&V. An outside possibility would be former PM of the Flemish Liberals (Open VLD). It is not yet known whether a new PM would head a transition government until new elections could be held in June 2009 at the same time as the and regional elections, or whether the new PM could govern through 2011 and complete the current government´s theoretical term in office. The king´s desire to prevent a governmental resignation stems from the precarious economic and fiscal situation Belgium faces and the need to pass a 2009 budget. Whether a likely successor can be found depends to a great degree on local politics and which top Belgian pols would be willing to take the lead under such circumstances. For the U.S., the King´s caution will likely ensure that DefMin De Crem will remain in the position of Defense Minister for most of 2009 and continue GOB support for the NATO cause in Afghanistan. FM De Gucht´s push to find a European solution to the humanitarian crisis in the Congo is another of this government´s bolder and noteworthy policies. End Summary.

The Search for a New Prime Minister ------

2. (C) After PM Yves Leterme offered his government´s resignation to King Albert December 19, the King chose not to accept it, and instead sought to find a suitable replacement to head the current government. The King met with CD&V President Marianne Thyssen December 21 to discuss possibilities, ostensibly from within the CD&V party. He met with leaders of all the majority parties December 22 to find a palatable compromise candidate. The Belgian media has focused on three main candidates. Former PM Jean-Luc Dehaene led two successful governments (1992-1995 and 1995-1999), which succeeded in converting Belgium into a federal state and revamped the nation´s finances, thus allowing it to join the Euro. The other prime candidate mentioned is Hermann Van Rompuy, the Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament. Ms. Thyssen is also an option, but has less political experience than her partisan colleagues. The well-respected former PM Guy Verhofstadt (1999-2007) of the Open VLD would be another option.

Next PM for Six Months or Two Years? ------

3. (C) A new government could either form for an interim period through June 2009, allowing national elections to be scheduled concurrently with the already planned European Parliament and regional elections. Another possibility, though less likely, would be to find a governing configuration that can endure through the end of the present government´s four year term in 2011. The King´s rationale for finding a quick replacement for Leterme stems from the need for leadership during the financial crisis; to pass a federal budget for 2009; and to complete domestic institutional reform.

All Politics is Local ------

4. (C) In Belgium, more so perhaps than elsewhere, regional politics strongly influence national politics. As the majority region, now provides Belgium´s PMs, and the Flemish parties are doing political calculations to position themselves for the coming regional elections and the possibility of concurrent national elections. The CD&V would prefer to select a PM that can serve through 2011. The CD&V has a very strong candidate for the regional elections, current Minister-President of Flanders ; if national elections are held at the same time, the problems of the national party could weaken Peeter´s expected electoral

BRUSSELS 00001943 002 OF 002 success. The Open VLD and the majority French parties support early national election. The Open VLD spies an opportunity for the return of Guy Verhofstadt to the political spotlight, while their key competitor for the Flemish vote the CD&V is discredited. For this reason, Verhofstadt is unlikely to accept an interim prime ministership when he could potentially win at the ballot box in six months. The (NVA), whose split with CD&V cost Leterme´s government a majority of Flemish (but not total) seats in Parliament, is opposed to new elections until the splitting of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, a controversial electoral district that includes the Brussels Capital Region and part of Flanders, allowing Francophone residents of Flanders to vote for Francophone parties in Brussels. The opposition Flemish Socialists (SpA) have also called for new elections, but it is unknown if they could significantly improve their current fifteen percent of the Flemish vote in the current political climate. The three largest Flemish parties (CD&V, Open VLD, and SpA) received the support of only about 53 percent of Flemish voters in the last public opinion pole. A significant portion (just over 30 percent) support the center-right Lijst Dedecker (LDD) and radical right (VB). Early elections could prove a boon to these parties, especially LDD, with its more moderate, right wing tone.

Comment ------

5. (C) For the second time in 2008, Yves Leterme has offered his resignation to the King. And, for the second time the King chose not to accept it, at least so far; he is looking for a suitable Leterme replacement to maintain some government stability during the financial crisis. Once a suitable post-Leterme PM can be found, the current government will remain minus Yves Leterme and discredited JustMin Vandeurzen. The cabinet members that have pursued policies most important to the United States are likely to remain. Pro-NATO DefMin Pieter De Crem will be able to continue his effort to ramp up Belgian involvement in Afghanistan, and outspoken MFA can continue his efforts to seek an end to the humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. What is unknown is how soon an interim configuration can be found and how long this interim government will hold. A six month term, with early elections in June 2009 is the most likely option, though a government that hobbles along until 2011 remains an outside possibility. If early elections are called, the main stream Flemish parties, especially the CD&V of disgraced Mr. Leterme and Vandeurzen, could lose a significant amount of support, creating an unprecedented opportunity for the Flemish right.

BUSH

PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL DE RUEHBS #1739/01 3651314 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 311314Z DEC 09 ZDK CTG MULTIPLE SVCS FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9866 INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC";"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 001739

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STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM AND SCA/A

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2019 TAGS: PREL, MARR, EAID, AF, BE SUBJECT: URGING BELGIUM TO STEP UP EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. STATE 120807 B. STATE 122234 C. STATE 123222 D. BRUSSELS 1622 E. BRUSSELS 1629 F. BRUSSELS 1666 G. BRUSSELS 1703 H. BRUSSELS 1737

Classified By: Ambassador Howard Gutman, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. Summary: (C) Embassy Brussels has been conducting an intense campaign to encourage Belgium to step up its efforts to extend and increase its military commitment to Afghanistan, and to increase the level of its civilian assistance, including police trainers. This has been carried out through personal contacts with high-ranking Belgian officials and through public diplomacy that capitalizes on the Ambassador´s increasingly favorable profile in the Belgian media and with the public. End Summary.

2. (C) The Ambassador has met frequently with Minister of Defense Pieter De Crem, former foreign minister and current prime minister Yves Leterme, and with former Prime Minister and now President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy. At each meeting, the Ambassador has emphasized that Afghanistan offers an opportunity for Belgium to take a leadership role in Europe. Prior to the President´s December 1 speech, the Ambassador urged De Crem and Leterme to speak up in support of a more robust presence in Afghanistan even before the President laid out his strategy and before other countries, such as the UK, took the lead (ref D). Such a speech would help to hold other NATO members, such as the Netherlands, to the tasks at hand in Afghanistan. Then-PM Van Rompuy was considering possible scenarios for a speech, but has left office to take up his EU responsibilities. Defense Minister De Crem was considering the idea actively before Gordon Brown gave his speech, saying essentially the same things. De Crem said that he still agreed with the concept of expressing strong and public support for the President´s strategy.

3. (C) Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke met on December 2 with FM Vanackere. He explained the implications of the new Afghanistan strategy and the importance of a long-term commitment to stability there. He also emphasized the need for development assistance, especially for Afghanistan´s agricultural sector. Ref E.

4. (C) Recognizing that few Belgians would have a chance to see the President´s December 1 Afghanistan speech live, the Ambassador invited print and television journalists to his residence to view the speech as it was delivered at 2:00 a.m. Brussels time. Six journalists and a photographer attended despite the lateness of the hour. Belgian news outlets covered the speech in early editions. Commentary followed soon after. Most was supportive of the speech and the strategy, although some commentators searched for a reason to criticize it. Another good result of the nighttime viewing of the speech was a four-page spread in the major Dutch-language daily , in which the Ambassador was able to re-emphasize the President´s themes.

5. (C) Following the speech, the Ambassador visited with both De Crem and Vanackere, emphasizing the importance of Belgian troops remaining in Afghanistan through 2010 and preferably longer, as needed. He also pushed for Belgium to send police trainers to Afghanistan and increase its civilian development aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan. De Crem indicated that francophone socialist politicians in the government, including Andre Flahaut, were resisting new action by the Belgian government on the basis that the United States and NATO had not formally requested more troops. The Secretary´s December 3-4 visit to Brussels was an opportunity to clarify what is needed. The Belgian government confirmed on December 4 its intention to deploy a second Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team, bringing the Belgian presence in Afghanistan up to 600 troops, from about 250 in 2008. It also promised to send two or three police and one magistrate to EUPOL Afghanistan, to appoint a special representative for Afghanistan-Pakistan and to increase development assistance, if the Afghan government provides guarantees of improved governance and a vigorous fight against corruption. In her meeting with FM Vanackere, the Secretary asked Vanackere to provide 150 more troops, and to extend the troops´ presence through 2011, and to provide more police trainers.

6. (C) The Ambassador set up a series of meetings for Defense

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Minister De Crem in Washington on December 15-16, including Secretary of Defense Gates, National Security Advisor Jones, Senator Carl Levin, Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Rep. Ike Skelton, Chair of the House Armed Services Committee. U.S. and NATO expectations for Belgium were discussed during those meetings, focusing mainly on extending Belgian participation through 2011 without stressing the need for additonal troops as mentioned by the Secretary in Brussels. Ref F.

7. (C) Subsequently, the Ambassador met with Flemish Socialist Dirk Van Der Maelen and francophone socialist Andre Flahaut, who are most often identified as opposing Belgium´s involvement in Afghanistan. He also hosted two separate luncheons for the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Belgian Senate and House of Representatives. The Ambassador repeatedly stressed the strategic importance of the Afghanistan effort and also the implications of lowered expectations for Belgium on its international reputation and prestige in Europe. Ref G.

8. (C) On December 16, the Ambassador met with Minister of Interior Annemie Turtelboom and strongly urged her to support sending more police trainers than the two or three already promised. The Ambassador and Turtelboom also explored ways to influence public opinion and counter opposition that may exist to building up Belgium´s role in Afghanistan. Ref H.

9. (C) In the new year, the Ambassador and the Embassy intend to continue to press Belgian leaders and opinion makers to increase the Belgian presence in Afghanistan, both militarily and in terms of assistance for development and good governance. The President´s Nobel Prize speech in Oslo on December 10 resonates well in Belgium, displaying how we share the same values as Belgium in terms of support for peace, but also how Afghanistan fits into that set of beliefs. The Embassy now has two sponsors in the Belgian House of Representatives to show it directly to Belgian lawmakers in the near future. We are also exploring ways to show the speech to the general public in the Park of Brussels, a central and open venue for such an event.

10. (C) Comment: In the political landscape of Belgium, the USG has a supportive presence for the President´s Afghanistan strategy in the person of Defense Minister De Crem. We view the new foreign minister, Steven Vanackere, as still finding his footing in the MFA and reticent about new contributions. Minister of Interior Turtelboom personally favors an increased role for Belgian police advisors, but is worried about perceived adverse public opinion and is sensitive to criticism by opposition politicians such as Van Der Maelen. However, based on his conversation with the Ambassador, even Van Der Maelen understands that economic and social development in Afghanistan is key to its stability and that a greater effort is needed to provide the security that will permit that development to occur. The Ambassador and Embassy Brussels will continue and expand our efforts to build official and public understanding of the importance of Afghanistan to security in its region, in Europe and in the United States, as well as to seek an increase in Belgium´s contributions. There is likely more room for expansion of its role in development and police training efforts than in new military contributions in 2010.

GUTMAN