Borno - Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) Assessment of Hard-To-Reach Areas in Northeast Nigeria April 2020

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Borno - Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) Assessment of Hard-To-Reach Areas in Northeast Nigeria April 2020 Borno - Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) Assessment of Hard-to-Reach Areas in Northeast Nigeria April 2020 Overview The continuation of conflict in Northeast Nigeria has with the following typology of Key Informants (KIs): provided by the greatest number of KIs is reported for are not statistically generalisable. created a complex humanitarian crisis, rendering each settlement. When no most common response • KIs who are newly arrived internally displaced Due to precautions related to the COVID-19 sections of Borno state as hard to reach. To address could be identified, the response is considered as ‘no persons (IDPs) who have left a hard-to-reach outbreak, data was collected remotely through information gaps facing the humanitarian response 1 consensus’. While included in the calculations, the settlement in the last 3 months phone based interviews with assistance from local in Northeast Nigeria and inform humanitarian actors percentage of settlements for which no consensus • KIs who have had contact with someone living stakeholders. Remote data collection started 20 on the demographics of households in hard-to-reach was reached is not displayed in the results below. or having been in a hard-to-reach settlement April 2020. areas of Northeast Nigeria, as well as to identify their in the last month (traders, migrants, family Results presented in this factsheet, unless otherwise needs, access to services and movement intentions, members, etc.)1 specified, represent the proportion of settlements Assessment Coverage REACH has been conducting a monthly assessment assessed within a LGA. Findings are only reported of hard-to-reach areas in Northeast Nigeria since Selected KIs are purposively sampled and are 416 Key Informants interviewed on LGAs where at least 5% of populated settlements November 2018. interviewed on settlement-wide circumstances in hard-to-reach areas, rather than their individual and at least 5 settlements in the respective LGA 196 Settlements assessed Using its Area of Knowledge (AoK) methodology, experiences. Responses from KIs reporting on have been assessed. REACH remotely monitors the situation in hard-to- 15 LGAs assessed the same settlement are then aggregated to the reach areas through monthly multi-sector interviews The findings presented are indicative of broader settlement level. The most common response 6 2 in accessible Local Government Area (LGA) capitals trends in assessed settlements in April 2020, and LGAs with sufficient coverage Assessment coverage Access to livelihood Access to markets Proportion of settlements assessed: Proportion of assessed settlements reporting that most Proportion of assessed settlements reporting access to a people have access to their usual livelihood activity: functional market that the population could walk to: LGA boundary LGA boundary Abadam Abadam Niger 0% 0% 1 - 20% 1 - 20% 21 - 40% 21 - 40% Chad 41 - 60% 41 - 60% 61 - 80% Kukawa 61 - 80% Kukawa 81 - 100% 81 - 100% Guzamala Guzamala Assessed Settlement Assessed Settlement Monguno Monguno Nganzai Nganzai Marte Marte Yobe Borno Ngala Ngala Mafa Kala/Balge Mafa Kala/Balge Jere Jere Dikwa Dikwa Cameroon Konduga Bama Konduga Bama State boundary LGA boundary Under 5% or less Gwoza Gwoza than 5 settlements Damboa Damboa 5 - 10% 11 - 20% Adamawa Gombe 21 - 50% 51 - 100% Chibok Madagali Chibok Madagali km km AssessedChad Settlement 0 20 40 80 0 20 40 80 1 Where possible, only KIs that have arrived very recently (0-3 weeks prior to data collection) were interviewed. If not stated otherwise, the recall period is set to one month prior to the last information the KI has had from the hard-to-reach area. 2 LGA level data is only represented for LGAs in which at least 5% of populated settlements and where at least 5 settlements have been assessed. The most recent version of the VTS dataset (released in February 2019 on vts.eocng.org) has been used as the reference for settlement names and locations, and adjusted for deserted villages (OCHA 2020). For more information on this factsheet please contact: Informing REACH more effective [email protected] REACH humanitarian action Borno - Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) Assessment of Hard-to-Reach Areas in Northeast Nigeria April 2020 Access to food and livelihoods Proportion of assessed settlements reporting that people Proportion of assessed settlements reporting that most Proportion of assessed settlements reporting most eat wild foods that are not part of their usual diet: people eat on average one meal or less per day: people having less land for cultivation available as compared to the same time in the year before: LGA boundary LGA boundary LGA boundary Abadam Abadam Abadam 0% 0% 0% 1 - 20% 1 - 20% 1 - 20% 21 - 40% 21 - 40% 21 - 40% 41 - 60% 41 - 60% 41 - 60% 61 - 80% Kukawa 61 - 80% Kukawa 61 - 80% Kukawa 81 - 100% 81 - 100% 81 - 100% Guzamala Guzamala Guzamala Assessed Settlement Assessed Settlement Assessed Settlement Monguno Monguno Monguno Nganzai Nganzai Nganzai Marte Marte Marte Ngala Ngala Ngala Mafa Kala/Balge Mafa Kala/Balge Mafa Kala/Balge Jere Jere Jere Dikwa Dikwa Dikwa Konduga Bama Konduga Bama Konduga Bama Gwoza Gwoza Gwoza Damboa Damboa Damboa Chibok Madagali Chibok Madagali Chibok Madagali km km km 0 20 40 80 0 20 40 80 0 20 40 80 Main sources of food reported by assessed Proportion of assessed settlements reporting Main livelihood sources reported by assessed settlements: that at least one community member planted and settlements (multiple answers per settlement harvested in the previous rainy season: possible): For more information on this factsheet please contact: Informing REACH more effective [email protected] REACH humanitarian action.
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