AK IV

Lessons Learned

The Treatment of ’s Non-Majority Communities During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Mitrovica 2020 Contents

I. Introduction ...... 3 II. Lesson 1 ...... 7 III. Lesson 2 ...... 17 IV. Lesson 3 ...... 28 V. Conclusions and Recommendations ...... 40

Author’s Note:

The overriding purpose of this paper is to analyse the nature of the relationship between the government, its institutions, and non- majority communities in Kosovo in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and to assess its ability and readiness to ensure the equal treatment of all citizens, regardless of ethnic or national belonging. In other words, to describe a set of lessons that this ongoing emergency has taught us about the position of those communities, and how they are treated by central authorities. As will be outlined throughout the course of this document, the pandemic did not, in and of itself, create a problem but rather served to highlight a range of issues in the implementation of legislative and constitutional provisions that regulate the rights granted to non-majority communities. It indeed exposed the government’s shortcomings in communicating and providing equal access to information and services to all of its citizens, something that is problematic in normal circumstances but that now constitute a very tangible threat to public health and security.

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I. Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has presented a unique set of challenges to governments across the world. While the most obvious of these challenges is the great risk that the virus poses to public health, it has also served to put a great deal of strain on economies, state institutions and has had a vast impact on the day-to-day functioning of governments. Along these lines, a question that has frequently arisen during the course of this global crisis is how to balance the need for extraordinary measures to protect citizens from the spread of this deadly disease while at the same time maintaining respect for basic human rights and legal and constitutional norms. The frightening dimensions of the pandemic have demanded a comprehensive response, one that nonetheless many states have successfully balanced with a commitment to maintaining their given constitutional/legal orders: Many, if not necessarily all, have accepted the necessity for what would normally be objectionable interruptions to daily life, that is, restrictions on movement, public (and private) gatherings, lockdown measures and the mass closure of schools, offices, commercial operations, transport hubs and borders. The logistics of this challenged even the most advanced and developed countries, as evidenced by the difficulties faced by, for example, the United States. This has been yet more arduous for structurally fragile states to undertake and has served to seriously strain financial resources and endanger already-weak economies.

The countries of the Western Balkans responded to the COVID-19 pandemic in a similar manner to other European countries; by passing strict and sweeping measures that included lockdowns, border/airport closures, and a shuttering of commercial activity. As

3 the first cases of the virus emerged in Kosovo in early March of 2020, the government passed a series of strict measures (beginning with the declaration of a state of public health emergency) aimed at mitigating its effects and slowing its spread.12 The state of public health emergency was in place until the 6th of May, 2020, when it was revoked by the Kosovo Assembly, meaning that while some measures remained in place, curfews and other similar restrictions were lifted.3 This coincided with a fall in the number of infected and by early June borders began to re-open for normal traffic.4 All of these happened more or less in parallel with events in , where the government also loosened restrictions in early May of 2020. Since then, cases have once again begun to rise, but measures similar to those seen between March and May have not been re- imposed.

The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic placed the Kosovo Serb community in a uniquely difficult position: straddled between two governments, and faced with already-challenging social, political and economic dynamics, their interests are often lost in the political crescendo. What’s more, the relative fragility of local institutions have made responding to a large-scale public health crisis all the more difficult: Shortly after the lifting of restrictions issued in March of 2020, cases once again began to rise sharply in Kosovo Serb communities (at a much higher rate than they did between March and May) and there were widespread reports of serious strain on local healthcare institutions in Serbian communities throughout

1https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-kosovo/kosovo-confirms-first- coronavirus-cases-an-italian-and-a-kosovar-idUSKBN21039A 2https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-kosovo/kosovo-to-declare-state-of- emergency-to-counter-coronavirus-idUSKBN21445J 3http://radiomitrovicasever.com/2020/05/06/ukinuto-vanredno-stanje-vanredne-mere- ostaju/ 4https://kossev.info/kosovska-vlada-potvrdila-ukidanje-mera-o-slobodi-kretanja/

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Kosovo.56 Furthermore, the crisis served to aggravate pre-existing issues in the relationship between central governing institutions and Kosovo . A lack of integration, poor communication between and Serb-majority municipalities, and the uneven application of legislation governing community/minority rights were pre-existing, but nevertheless were intensified by the pandemic. It can be difficult to segregate problems that are faced by all communities of Kosovo from those that are specific to the Kosovo Serb community: With its still-developing institutional structures, this crisis has invariably tested the limits of the ability of government bodies to adequately respond to the needs of its’ residents. That having been said, the ongoing emergency has shone light on many deficiencies within Kosovo’s institutions, and in some cases, exposed an inability to respond to the needs of non-majority communities.

This paper will attempt to highlight a key number of “lessons learned” from the pandemic from the point of view of the Kosovo Serb community. It will not seek to analyse the situation from an epidemiological perspective, but rather to examine what COVID-19 has taught us about the position of non-majority communities in Kosovo, and the dynamics of the relationship between them and centre(s) of political and institutional power. For each ‘lesson learned’ a set of conclusions will be posited that are based on research and monitoring carried out by NGO Aktiv between March and August of 2020. These monitoring activities were expansive, and included interviews with relevant stakeholders, contact with

5 Based on interviews with healthcare workers in clinics and the Clinical Hospital Center in 6https://www.kosovo-online.com/koronavirus/krizni-stab-km-neophodno-je-striktno- postovanje-mera-i-odgovornost-gradjana-13-7-2020

5 focal points based in municipalities north and south of the Ibar river, and close scrutiny of government communiques, public statements and press releases.

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II. Lesson 1

Information is Key: The Kosovo Government failed to communicate effectively with Kosovo’s non-majority communities, which in turn resulted in the spread of disinformation and rumour, potentially endangering public health.

During the course of a public health crisis is it of crucial importance that the general public is kept abreast of developments and is aware of steps that can be taken in order to protect itself; a lack of access to such information is reflective of a systematic failure on the part of a government to communicate effectively.

Beginning in mid-March 2020, Aktiv began to closely monitor the flow of information from key public institutions (i.e. the Ministries of Health, Interior, Foreign Affairs etc.) One of the most glaring problems that was noted was the lack of translations made available from Albanian into Serbian.

Something that should be noted here is that, when it comes to questions of public health, most Serb communities in Kosovo utilize services provided by healthcare institutions that operate under the legal framework of the Republic of Serbia, and only in very rare cases seek care from clinics or hospitals that serve Albanian-majority areas. That having been said, many Serbs, particularly those who reside south of the river Ibar, were unable to obtain information on government measures, restrictions on freedom of movement and other essential information regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. This occurred for a number of reasons, chief among them the fact that the vast majority of government press releases and public

7 statements were made in the , and it was therefore left up to local media outlets to seek translations of their own volition.7Despite the fact that local media transmitted information that they received from the government to their readers, the information that filtered through to the general public was often incomplete8, which fostered a situation where citizens were forced to separate rumour from fact:

The Government of Kosovo failed to ensure equal access to information for all of Kosovo’s communities.

The The Kosovo Government, from the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March of 2020, did not invest significant effort into ensuring that members of non-majority communities that speak Serbian, received consistent and relevant information on the pandemic and the measures adapted to prevent the spread of the virus. As has been previously noted, NGO Aktiv recorded a large number of cases where various public institutions failed to provide Serbian translations of official instructions, orders and other forms of communiques and public statements91011. This included government directives restricting freedom of movement, quarantine

7 Based on interviews conducted with journalists working with Kosovo Serb media outlets between June and August of 2020. 8 IBID 9 On the 2nd of June, 2020, the National Center for Border Management issued instructions on procedures for entering Kosovo on its Facebook page which it did not translate into Serbian http://www.ngoaktiv.org/news/lost-in-translation-izgubljeni-u-prevodu-te- humbur-ne-perkthim 10 Statement on language issues and the package of ’15 measures’ on financial relief http://www.ngoaktiv.org/news/the-ombudspersons-institution-initiates-a-complaint- based-on-ngo-aktiv-s-memorandum 11 Statement on the issuing of new restrictions on movement without Serbian translations http://www.ngoaktiv.org/news/new-restrictions-of-movement-in-kosovo-entered-into- force-without-official-translation-into-the-serbian-language

8 and lockdown measures as well as rules and procedures for entering and exiting Kosovo. The lack of information coming from government institutions available in the led to a situation where the Kosovo Serb community received conflicting information regarding various measures issued by the government and found themselves in a position where they can be penalised for violating rules that they were unable to familiarize themselves with. As can be illustrated in photos below of SMS alerts sent out to subscribers of mobile networks in Kosovo, notices disseminated by the government were not made available in Serbian.

Fig.1 12 Fig. 2 13 Fig. 314

12SMS message received by an IPKO user on the 23rd of May 2020 from the Ministry of Health. The message contains numbers for government hotlines for psychological assistance, health assistance and assistance in cases of domestic violence. 13SMS message received by an IPKO user on the 6th of May 2020 from the Ministry of Health with information on psychological assistance/counselling. 14SMS message received by an IPKO user on the 14th of March 2020 from the Ministry of Health advising citizens on protection measures and COVID symptoms with a number to call for advice/assistance.

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The fact that direct communication between the citizenry (general public) and institutions took place almost exclusively in Albanian meant that and members of other non-majority communities were excluded and locked out from receiving information that was of vital importance. As one local resident in North Mitrovica stated “we had no idea what was going on, if we could go to central Serbia, when we could leave our homes, they kept changing the rules and no one informed us.”15Other interviews with residents of both municipalities of north Kosovo and Serb-majority municipalities in the south revealed similar levels of confusion and lack of clarity. During the course of the lockdown, the only consistent sources of information regarding government measures were not state institutions themselves but rather local Serbian-language media outlets. Despite this, it is difficult to ascertain the scope and depth of the reach of this kind of reporting as much of the information in question was most easily obtained online and via social-media networks, which meant that many residents (particularly pensioners) who don’t necessarily have access to the internet or do not use it as a tool to inform themselves were left largely in the dark.16

This begs an invariable question: What would the situation have looked like had it not been for the pro-active stance undertaken by many non-governmental organizations and media outlets?

15 Interview conducted with a resident of Serb nationality of North Mitrovica in July of 2020. 16 Based on interviews conducted between July and August of 2020.

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The failure to provide equal access to information and to communicate effectively contributed to the spread of disinformation and fake news.

Research carried about by NGO Aktiv in July of 2020 yielded results that were reflective of widespread distrust in institutions and a high degree of weariness towards official information and data regarding the COVID-19 pandemic.17 While it cannot be argued that the fault lies exclusively with the Kosovo government and its institutions, inadequate communication during the state of emergency shed new light on pre-existing problems between the central government and Serb-majority areas. In fact, the relatively passive stance taken on by both Kosovo and Serbian public institutions18 when it comes to informing the general public has had consequences in terms of how the danger of the COVID-19 virus is perceived, and on how seriously the public takes recommendations issued by health authorities.

This is illustrated by the results of the above-mentioned public opinion research conducted by NGO Aktiv; only around 31% of all respondents said that they ‘completely’ followed recommendations issued by relevant (health) authorities, a number that reflects a high level of mistrust towards ‘official’ information.

17http://www.ngoaktiv.org/news/covid-19-between-reality-and-disinformation 18 This refers to so-called ‘parallel’ or ‘soft’ institutions operating in Serb-majority municipalities that are financed by the Republic of Serbia.

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Figure 1

Do you abide by the recommendations/measures prescribed by institutions regarding the COVID-19 virus?

Figure 2

In your opinion, is there a connection between the spread of the corona virus and 5G networks?

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Figure 3

Do you believe that COVID-19 is as dangerous as the media and the World Health Organization say it is?

Perhaps even more alarming is the notable number of respondents who either do not believe that COVID-19 exists (9%) or who believe that it does not pose the danger that the media claims it does (21%.). What’s more, as can be seen in Fig. 2, a significant number of local residents appear to believe that there is a connection between COVID-19 and 5G networks, indicating a high level of susceptibility to disinformation currently circulating on the internet, especially on social media networks such as Facebook.

While these problems cannot be solely attributed to the lack of consistent communication between local communities and central- level governing authorities, the fact that neither the Kosovo government nor Serbian institutions have launched a comprehensive public information campaign or initiated sustainable channels of communication have engendered an atmosphere where

13 gaps in public knowledge about COVID-19 are filled with rumour, false or misleading information, and fake news. The fact that many seem to believe that the virus does not actually exist, or is the product of 5G networks, has a decidedly negative impact on the general public’s willingness to abide by the recommendations of public health authorities: a visible percentage population in non- majority areas in Kosovo do not heed calls for mask-wearing and other social distancing measures pushed by public health experts and epidemiologists, something that does not bode well for those hopeful that the virus be kept under control.

Serbian-language media outlets have been left with a diminished ability to inform the public due to restricted access to information

Journalists in Kosovo of Serb nationality have for years faced a kind of de-facto discrimination in that when try to report on central-level political developments, particularly in the Kosovo Assembly.1920 They have related, in the past, that Assembly sessions and meetings of Assembly Committees frequently take place in the complete absence of translations.21 Furthermore, journalists have repeatedly reported that press conferences are held exclusively in the Albanian language and that public statements and other official communiques are left untranslated, resulting in a situation where Serbian-language media outlets in Kosovo do not have equalized access to information. Throughout the pandemic, Serbian-language media have faced widespread difficulty in communicating with

19https://kossev.info/u-kosovskoj-skupstini-prevod-na-srpski-samo-za-poslanike/ 20https://kossev.info/u-skupstini-kosova-bez-prevoda-za-srpske-novinare/ 21 Assembly rules state that translations must be provided (during committee meetings) upon request of an Assembly/Committee member. If no such request is received then no translation is provided, whether or not a Serbian-speaking journalist is present to observe the proceedings.

14 public institutions (as one journalist put it the communication has been ‘very limited’)22 and have been frozen out of the possibility to access information of the same breadth and scope of their Albanian- speaking colleagues.23 A case in point would be the mailing list for media created by the Ministry of Health, where information was sent, for the most part, in Albanian without any form of translation.24 This changed slightly after an intervention from the Office of the Language Commissioner, however the problem persisted after the formation of the Avdullah Hoti Government.25 In other instances, journalists found themselves in a position where they were left confused as to how government restrictions on movement such as curfews applied to them.26 In this sense, media freedom has been restricted by virtue of the government’s lack of readiness to ensure that access to information is equalized for all journalists, regardless of their language.

The problems faced by journalists are in fact similar in nature to those encountered by members of the general public in that they receive partial or second-hand information. Limited access to information is of course a challenge in normal circumstances, but during a pandemic it constitutes a dangerous situation because they are unable to provide their readers/users with accurate and up-to- date information on the epidemiological situation.

If it can be argued that a journalist’s primary motive, and indeed duty, is to inform the public, particularly in times of crisis, then these

22 Interview with a Serbian-speaking journalist in Kosovo on the 28th of July 2020. 23 Based on various interviews conducted with journalists in July and August of 2020. 24 IBID 25 IBID 26 IBID

15 circumstances prevent them from performing the most basic functions of their jobs.

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III. Lesson 2

Safety is paramount: The pandemic has had a negative impact on public safety and exposed authorities’ lethargy in responding to security issues in Kosovo-Serb communities

The following section will analyse the security situation in Kosovo Serb communities during the pandemic, with a particular focus to be placed on perceptions of safety and how this has affected the relationship between law enforcement and local residents. The Kosovo Police, occupied and perhaps overburdened with enforcing COVID-19 measures (i.e. curfews) meant that Serbs were left largely to fend for themselves in dealing with issues of personal and public security.

The state of emergency has aggravated an atmosphere of impunity, particularly in many Serb communities south of the river Ibar.

Security has always been a top concern for members of the Kosovo- Serb community. Whether that concern stems from the potential for inter-ethnic or ethnically motivated incidents, or crime that takes place within the community itself (i.e. organized and/or street crime), the sense that criminality and delinquency is on the rise has been widespread for a number of years.27 What’s more, there is a generalized sense in many non-majority communities that public

27 See: NGO Active Trend Analyses Reports for the years 2019 and 2018, available at: http://www.ngoaktiv.org/publications

17 institutions do not adequately respond to or investigate criminal acts in a manner that is reassuring to the general public.

With local and central authorities pre-occupied with a growing public health emergency, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic seemingly provided additional space for criminal acts to take place: Between March and June of 2020, NGO Aktiv recorded more than twenty (20) incidents of a criminal nature that took place in Serb- majority communities throughout Kosovo.2829 These incidents targeted, for the most part, more isolated enclaves in Western Kosovo as well as communities in Vushtrri/Vučitrn and Obiliq/Obilić municipalities. Furthermore, a significant number of incidents occurred in returnee villages and settlements, further feeding into a sense that these communities, otherwise vulnerable, are particularly susceptible to ethnically motivated violence and intimidation. As opposed to other regions, Serb-majority municipalities in Eastern Kosovo remained less affected by the rise in criminal activity.30

This is part of a larger trend that marked a deterioration in security situation in many Serb enclaves and villages in Kosovo, which began in November of 2019 and that gradually intensified with the onset of the pandemic. Local residents in the Gračanica/Graçanicë municipality began to report a rise in the number of personal thefts that took place. This was preceded by reports of vandalism/destruction of property in the village of Černica/Cërnicë (/Gnjilane Municipality) and was followed by similar acts

28http://www.ngoaktiv.org/news/rapid-response-civic-group-incidents 29 This refers to incidents that Active recorded, using its own resources, from March until August of 2020. This list is not necessarily comprehensive, in that there is a strong possibility that more have occurred. 30 Based on interviews with residents of Šilovo, and Parteš, held in July and August of 2020.

18 recorded to have been committed against ten returnee homes in the Novake village in the Municipality. The as-yet-unresolved case of arson that occurred when a home in JanjinaVoda (Obiliq/Obilić/) was burnt down constituted the first in a long series of attacks on the private property of Serbs throughout Central and Western Kosovo.31 During the months of April and May, the incidents took on an increasingly aggressive and even violent nature, with reports of physical attacks taking place in municipalities such as North Mitrovica, Pejë/Peć, Istog/, Obiliq/Obilić and Prishtinë/Priština.

As illustrated by the tables below32, incidents can be placed into three (3) broad categories:

• Graffiti; • Vandalism/theft (burglaries and robberies); • Physical assault and/or in intimidation

31http://ngoaktiv.org/news/empirica-appeal-in-regards-to-recent-incidents 32A small number of incidents that occurred between January and March of 2020 have been included

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Graffiti as a form of intimidation33

Location Municipality Date Source Pasjane/Pasjan Parteš/Parteshi 07.01.2020. Kosovo Onlajn Preoce/Preoc Gračanica/Graçanicë 18.02.2020. KosSev Preoce/Preoc Gračanica/Graçanicë 08.03.2020. Radio KiM Gojbulja/Gojbul Vushtrri/Vučtrn 29.04.2020. Radio KiM ë Gojbulja/Gojbul Vushtrri/ Vučitrn 30.04.2020. Kosovo ë Onlajn Gornje Kusce/ /Novobërdë 10.05.2020. Kosovo Kufcë e Epërme Onlajn Ljubožda/Luboz Istok/Istoku 25.06.2020. Kosovo hda Onlajn Klinë/ Klinë/Klina 26.07.2020. Radio Mitrovica Sever

34 Incidents of Physical Violence or Intimidation

Location Municipality Type Date Source Heavy bodily injury inflicted on 02.02.2020

North Mitrovica North Mitrovica a Serb youth by a KosSev . group of Albanians

33Compiled by Igor Marković, Researcher, NGO AKTIV. 34IBID

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Grizime/ Serb attacked by 26.02.2020 Radio Kamenica Grizimë an Albanian . KIM

A group of Albanians attacked Suvi Do/ a Kosovo police 17.03.2020 Kosovo North Mitrovica Suhodoll officer of Serb . Onlajn nationality with an excavator

Bošnjacka A group of Albanians attacked Mahala/ 10.05.2020

North Mitrovica two minors of Serb KosSev . Lagjja e and Bosniak Boshnjakëve nationality

Attack/threats made against a Radio Drenovčić/ returnee – 26.05.2020 Klina/Klinë Kontakt Dranashiq resolved after . Plus intervention from Kosovo Police

Drenovac/ Physical attack on 27.05.2020 Kosovo Klina/Klinë Drenoc a returnee . Onlajn An Albanian blocked a car driven by a Kosovo Serb and verbally Radio 16.05.2020 Pejë/Peć Pejë/Peć insulted him – The Goražde . police intervened vac successfully, and the perpetrator was fined Donja Five Albanians Gušterica/ Gračanica/Graça 31.05.2020 Kosovo attacked a group

. Onlajn Gushtericë e nicë of three Serbs Ulët Radio Opraške/ A returnee was 12.06.2020 Istok/Istogu Goražde Oprashka beaten . vac

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According to unconfirmed reports, two Serbs suffered bodily injury inflicted by 28.06.2020 Radio Gazimestan Pristina officers of the

. KiM Kosovo Police in a combi (after being arrested during Vidovdan celebrations) A group of 6 Albanian youths Babin Most/ 29.08.2020 Kosovo Obiliq/Obiliq physical attacked a

. Onlajn Babimoci group of 4 Serb youths

Attacks on private and public property and cultural heritage sites35 Location Municipality Type of Incident Date Source

Branko Radičević 09.01.2020. KosSev Obiliq/Obili ć Obiliq/Obilić Primary School burgled Cernica/Cërnic Gnjilane/ Unlawful 18.02.2020. Kosovo ë Gjilan destruction of Onlajn private property Žač/Zallçi Istok/Istogu Desecration of 22.02.2020. Kosovo

headstones in local Onlajn graveyard

Novake/Novak Prizren Ten homes 23.03.2020. KosSev u burglarized in returnee village

35IBID

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Novake/Novak Prizren Three homes 25.03.2020. Radio KiM u burglarized in returnee village Banja/Bajë /Sr Burglary of a 27.03.2020. Radio bica private home Goraždevac Osojane/Osoja Istok/Istogu Theft of an n automobile Janina Voda Obiliq/Obilić Home set on fire 16.04.2020. Gračanica/Gr (arson) açanicë

Onlajn

Babin Most/ Obiliq/Obilić Theft of agricultural 24.04.2020. KosSev Babimoci equipment Novake/Novak Prizren Home set on fire 25.04.2020. Radio u (arson) Kontak Plus

Crkolez/ Istok/Istogu Burglary of a 26.04.2020. KosSev Cerkolezi private home

Gojbulja/ Vučitrn/ Attempted burglary 27.04.2020. Radio KiM Gojbulë Vushtrri of local church

Cernica/Cërnic Gjilan/Gnjilan Home set on fire 28.04.2020. KosSev ë e (arson)

Gojbulja/ Vučitrn/ Window at primary 29.04.2020. Radio KiM Gojbulë Vushtrri school broken (vandalism)

Berkovo/ Klinë/Klina Returnee home set 23.05.2020. Gračanica/Gr Bërkovë on fire (arson) açanicë

Onlajn Sušica/Shushic Gračanica/ Electro-Technical 24.05.2020. Gračanica/Gr ë Graçanicë school burglarized açanicë

(computers stolen) Onlajn

Ljubožda/ Istok/Istogu Returnee home 26.05.2020. Radio Lubozhda stoned Goraždevac / Orahovac/ Youths of Albanian 28.05.2020. Radio Rahovec Rahovec nationality remove Kontakt Plus a street sign

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Ljubožda/ Istok/Istogu Returnee home 31.05.2020. Jedinstvo Lubozhda stoned Crkvena Obiliq/Obiliq A total of 85 31.05.2020. Kosovo Vodica/ chickens stolen Onlajn from various Caravodicë households Home burglarized

Osojane/Osoja Istok/Istogu Two house 02.06.2020. Radio KiM n burglarized Оrahovac/ Orahovac/ House set on fire 14.06.2020. Kosovo Rahovec Rahovec Onlajn

Belo Istok/Istogu Home of a returnee 22.06.2020. Radio KiM Polje/Bellopojë burglarized Veliko Klina/Klinë Agricultural 23.06.2020. Kosovo Kruševo/ equipment stolen Onlajn from a returnee Krushevë e family Madhe Dubrava/ Istok/Istogu Home of a returnee 25.06.2020. Kosovo Dubravë burglarized Onlajn Gračanica/ Gračanica/ Burglary 27.06.2020. Kosovo Graçanicë Graçanicë Onlajn Gračanica/ Gračanica/ Burglary 02.07.2020. Gračanica/Gr Graçanicë Graçanicë açanicë

Onlajn

Prilužje/ Vučitrn/ Agricultural 04.07.2020. KosSev Prelluzhë Vushtrri equipment stolen /Lipjan Lipljan/Lipjan Two pensioners 17.07.2020. Kosovo

robbed Onlajn Vidanje/Videjë Klina/Klinë Shots fired at a 04.08.2020. Kosovo

returnee home Onlajn

Ljubožda/ Istok/Istogu Incident of 28.08.2020. KosSev/OEB Lubozhda unknown nature S (successful police intervention)

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Požaranje/ /Vitia Electric cables 21.08.2020. RTV Puls Pozharan stolen from private property Sredska/ Prizren Damage to the 22.08.2020. Gračanica/Gr Sredskë Church of the açanicë

Assumption of the Onlajn Blessed Virgin

What should be noted here is that it is difficult to ascertain the specific motives behind such acts, and it is impossible to ascribe intent in the absence of a criminal trial or investigation. That having been said, the fact that they took place in isolated communities, often without prosecution and during a state of emergency, gives the impression that authorities not take seriously public safety in those areas.

Of the incidents listed above, only a relatively small number have seen successful police interventions.36 To local residents in areas where these incidents occurred, this appeared to be the result of a certain level of indifference on the part of local authorities.37 Whether or not this is true is a matter of discussion, but the reality of the situation is that the spike in vandalism, physical assaults and other similar violations is reflective of a wider pattern that was made worse by the pandemic; with other, more pressing issues at hand, institutions were simply unwilling and/or unable to mount a comprehensive response. This lack of political will to address the matter is not merely the result of COVID-19 but rather an echo of pre-existing obstinance when it comes to questions of public safety in Kosovo Serb communities. Taking this into consideration, and

36 In a limited number of instances, the police reacted immediately and successfully apprehended or penalized 37 Based on interviews conducted with residents of municipalities in western Kosovo.

25 from the perspective of local residents, it is not completely unreasonable or unrealistic to come to the conclusion that this provides a certain amount of space for perpetrators to carry out the acts without having to worry about an aggressive response from the police or legal system.

That having been said, a number of state institutions have responded to the rise in incidents. On a number of different occasions, the Ministry of Communities and Returns issued statements condemning specific episodes of violence and took steps to raise the matter both at the central level (Office of the Prime Minister), the Kosovo Police as well as with international missions such as KFOR.3839 During a meeting held in June of 2020, the Ministry took steps to ensure that both KFOR and Kosovo Police were aware of the security situation and there was general agreement that there exists a need for greater coordination between the three bodies in order to address the situation.40 Furthermore, Ministry representatives have expressed an interest in increasing the scope and depth of their cooperation with other institutions and the non- governmental sector in order to respond to the rise in incidents in a more effective and holistic manner.41 Despite this, the response from many political actors has been tepid, with no consensus emerging as to how to move forward or even on how to formulate a common response.

38http://mzp-rks.org/sr-l/aktuelno/item/574-cernica-na-udaru-paliku%C4%87a.html 39http://mzp-rks.org/sr-l/aktuelno/item/545-reagovanje-ministra-na-kra%C4%91u-u- babinom-mostu.html 40 IBID 41 Interview held with a representative of the Ministry of Communities and Returns in July of 2020.

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Notwithstanding a certain amount of readiness to identify ways of improving the situation, prosecutions and investigations have yielded only very limited results. The atmosphere of fear and perception of impunity have not dissipated and will only worsen if the state is not able to effectively address the concerns of local residents. Furthermore, it would be optimistic to think that this issue will go away when COVID-19 begins to recede – it will undoubtedly remain a source of great apprehension and distress for many of Kosovo’s most vulnerable communities unless the government shows a willingness to act.

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IV. Lesson 3

Access to Services is Unequal: The Government is not in a position to provide equalized access to public services to all of Kosovo’s communities.

The situation in terms of the provision of social and other public services (welfare, healthcare, schooling etc.) in Serb-majority areas in Kosovo is complicated and mostly handled by institutions that operate under the legal and financial frameworks of the Republic of Serbia. The COVID-19 pandemic fostered a situation that strained service providers and created conditions in which those who were already vulnerable were left exposed to a worsening of their socio- economic status. It therefore changed local dynamics to the extent that, for the first time, Kosovo Serbs sought economic/social assistance from the Kosovo government in numbers not previously seen.

This section will analyse the state of public services and the provision of public assistance during the pandemic, starting from the healthcare sector.

The pandemic severed essential links between Kosovo and Serbia – without provision of alternatives. The confusing manner in which border closures were carried out and the lack of clear information provided on exceptions to rules applied to border crossings had, at the beginning of the pandemic, a de-facto effect of blocking access to healthcare services.

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Healthcare in particular is a domain that is very nearly exclusively handled by so-called ‘soft parallel’ institutions, and only in relatively rare instances do Serbs seek treatment from providers in Albanian- majority areas. This institutional duality has meant that the link(s) (both institutional/political and geographical) between Kosovo and Serbia are an essential aspect of public life for Serb communities. This is particularly true when it comes to the provision of healthcare; patients are frequently sent for treatment in Serbia, something that is handled and financed exclusively by the Serbian state. As was seen when the Government of Kosovo levied a 100% tax on goods from Serbia, any interruptions to these links can prove to have drastic and indeed very negative effects on local socio-economic and political dynamics. Serbs in Kosovo who find themselves in need of treatment for more serious or chronic illnesses (such as cancer), or who need care and/or procedures that hospitals and clinics in Kosovo are not equipped to provide, they are sent for treatment in cities such as , , and Niš. As will be illustrated in the passages below, border closures and restrictions on movement can have potentially-life threatening consequences:

In mid-March of 2020, Kosovo closed its border crossings and airports to international traffic as part of a set of measures designed to mitigate the spread of COVID-19.4243 This made the flow of persons between Kosovo and Serbia practically impossible and posed immediate problems for patients seeking treatment in Serbia as well as for medical personnel and ambulance drivers. Among the requirements introduced when borders were shut was a

42https://prishtinainsight.com/kosovo-govt-responds-following-first-confirmed-cases-of- coronavirus/ 43https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/13/balkan-countries-close-border-crossings-to-stop- coronavirus/

29 requirement for anyone entering Kosovo to spend fifteen (15) days in quarantine44, but no specifications were made as to who would be exempt from this. At some point after this, it was clarified that this would not apply to ‘drivers’ and diplomats.45 Nevertheless, the situation remained confused, and a number of Serb drivers were nevertheless allegedly placed in various quarantine sites in Prishtinë/Priština.46

This resulted in a potentially dangerous situation for many residents of Kosovo, particularly those living in and around Gjilan/Gnjilane (Eastern Kosovo), who are, due to their geographical location, particularly reliant on healthcare services provided to them in Serbia. It was reported that approximately twenty (20) Kosovo Serbs from that area regularly receive dialysis due to kidney ailments in the southern Serbian city of Vranje two-to-three times per week.47 As travel between Kosovo and Serbia became virtually impossible, they found themselves in a situation where they were (at least temporarily) unable to access dialysis, something that had the potential to greatly endanger their health. It was stated by the Director of the Clinic in Pasjane/Pasjan that while they had managed to avoid placing the patients in question in quarantine, they were unable to reach Vranje due to the fact that their drivers who normally transported them to the hospital there had been placed in quarantine by Kosovo authorities.48 It was also reported that Kosovo

44http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a579991/KoSSev-Putnici-sa-Jarinja-kazu-da-moraju-u-Pristinu- u-karantin.html 45http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a580495/Karantin-15-dana-za-svaki-ulazak-na-Kosovo- izuzetak-vozaci-i-diplomate.html 46http://rs.n1info.com/Vesti/a579991/KoSSev-Putnici-sa-Jarinja-kazu-da-moraju-u-Pristinu- u-karantin.html 47 https://www.kosovo-online.com/koronavirus/problem-bubreznih-bolesnika-iz-kosovskog- pomoravlja-20-3-2020 48 https://www.radiokontaktplus.org/vesti/bubrezni-bolesnici-sa-kosova-moraju-na-dijalizu- a-njihovi-vozaci-u-izolaciju/24831

30 authorities did not work with local institutions in Kosovo-Serb communities to identify potential alternatives, such as the provision of treatment in healthcare centres operating under Kosovo’s institutional framework. While this situation was later rectified, it was nonetheless reflective of the insufficient level of communication and the weak institutional links between Serb communities and central- level governing authorities.

It must also be mentioned here that access to healthcare services was unclear due to alleged practices pursued by providers in Kosovo Serb communities. It was reported that clinics and hospitals began to accept patients only if they presented with symptoms of the COVID-19 virus:49 Widely circulated among media outlets in Serbia was the story of a medical student from Kenya (resident in Belgrade) who died after complaining of stomach pains but was denied treatment there due to the fact that he did not have COVID symptoms.50 Although there seems to be no written policy that instructed healthcare institutions (run and financed by the Republic of Serbia) to delay or refuse assistance for problems other than COVID-19, it appears that there was an assumption circulating among some of the general population that this was the case.51 In the absence of more concrete and comprehensive research, it is difficult to determine whether or not this had a serious effect on public health, but the fact that many were under the impression that such a practice existed does speak to the level of strain under which healthcare providers operated.

49 Based on interviews held between June and August of 2020. No official information was provided that can confirm this, but anecdotal evidence suggests that a number of persons seeking assistance for other ailments were turned away. It is difficult to confirm how widespread this practice was. 50 https://nova.rs/vesti/drustvo/tragicna-sudbina-studenta-iz-kenije-ceka-se-uzrok-smrti/ 51 Based on interviews held between June and August of 2020

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Economic aid/relief was not distributed equally.

In late-March of 2020, the newly formed Kurti government passed a package of measures52 (known as ‘Measure 15’) aimed at alleviating the negative socio-economic effects of the lockdown and the ensuing cessation of most commercial activity.53 This foresaw the doubling of social welfare payments, individual payments of €170 for the months of April and May (to cover lost or reduced salaries), as well as additional supplemental payments of €100 for employees in food shops (including bakeries), pharmacies and higher payments of €300 for workers who are exposed to the risk of infection.54 On top of this, the package included monthly payments of €130 to those who lost their jobs as the result of the pandemic.55 These monthly financial assistance payments (for April and May) were geared at citizens in difficult social conditions, who are registered by relevant institutions as being unemployed and who are not beneficiaries of any monthly welfare payments from Kosovo’s budget. The then-government (Kurti) budgeted a total of €3,000,000 (three million) for this aid.56

The Ministries and government charged with distributing this aid launched an online platform through which potential beneficiaries can apply and be approved for assistance, depending on their

52 https://www.danas.rs/politika/vlada-kosova-usvojila-15-mera-za-prevazilazenje- ekonomskih-posledica-pandemije/ 53 i.e. the shutting down of restaurants, cafes, shops, shopping centers and other commercial enterprises and businesses. 54 https://kossev.info/kosovska-vlada-usvojila-veci-novcani-paket-pomoci-za-gradjane- zbog-posledica-pandemije/

56 Information compiled by AndjelkaĆup, Gračanica Online

32 individual circumstances and eligibility. Soon after this happened, a large number of problems were noted that included a lack of or low- quality information in the Serbian language that was distributed across a confusing array of websites of ministries and government agencies.57 In other words, there were long delays in the translation of information and instructions on the technical details of application procedures (from Albanian into Serbian), making it difficult for potential beneficiaries in Kosovo-Serb communities to seek and apply for payments envisaged as part of Measure 15. Furthermore, it was reported that social welfare centre(s) in Serb- majority municipalities were unable to offer assistance.58 Although it should be noted that the system in place was confusing and numerous technical problems were reported by members of all communities, the fact that the low quality of information provided in Serbian language to Serbian residents and Serbian media outlets meant that non-Albanian speakers found themselves at a very distinct disadvantage. These issues were not limited to the Serbian communities: numerous complaints were also reported from the Gorani and Bosniak communities, whose representatives reported that their members faced widespread difficulties in submitting applications for economic assistance.59

57http://www.ngoaktiv.org/news/issues-of-non-majority-communities-with-the- implementation-of-a-package-of-measures-to-counter-the-economic-impact-of-the- coronavirus 58 IBID 59 Information compiled by NGO Aktiv

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Timeline of Events60:

- On the 30 March, 2020, the government led by Albin Kurti (which had already fallen after a vote of no-confidence), launched a financial aid package geared those who were left most vulnerable due to the COVID-19 pandemic’s economic consequences, which envisaged: monthly financial assistance payments to the tune of €130 in April and May to citizens in difficult social conditions, who are registered by relevant institutions as being unemployed and who are not beneficiaries of any monthly welfare payments from Kosovo’s budget. The then-government budgeted a total of €3,000,000 (three million) for this aid. - A statement made to the media was not made available in Serbian until the 3rd of April, which contained information that instructed citizens that forms and data that is sent by e-mail or that is delivered physically must be clear and complete and that all applications that are not will be denied. - On the 21st of May the Kosovo Postal Service announced to Albanian-language media outlets that it had begun distributing payments of €130 to beneficiaries. However, Serbian-language media were not informed directly but were forced to translate texts from Albanian-language outlets in order to transmit this information to their readers or listeners. - On the 22nd of May 2020, the Ministry of Finance and Transfer announced that they had launched a hotline (080 044 440) where those who applied for assistance can track

60Information compiled by Andjelka Ćup, Gračanica Online

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the status of their request/application or to appeal a decision. As was stated, appeals will be reviewed by an Appeals’ Commission and the deadline for their submission is the 15th of June. An e-mail address (ankesa.mft@rks- gov.net) was also opened for the receipt of appeals to rejected applications. - The Kosovo Finance Minister, HikmetaBajrami, stated on the 29th of June that payments within the framework of Measure 15 had been made to ‘families that do not have a single member currently employed.’ On her Facebook profile, she added that those whose requests for financial assistance had been approved would be able to access funds the following day. Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti confirmed this, adding that funds could be withdrawn until the 12th of August. - In Mid-August some citizens began receiving SMS alerts that they can withdraw the money from any branch of the Kosovo Post, which were immediately followedby notifications that the alerts in question had been sent erroneously.6162

61Message 1 reads: “Dear Sir or Madam: We’d like to inform you that in accordance with Measure 15, you are a beneficiary of 130 EUR in monthly support for June of 2020. Funds can be withdrawn starting from the 12th until the 20th of August at the nearest branch of the Post Office. 62Message 2 reads: “Dear Sir or Madam: The SMS that you received on 11.08.2020 was technical mistake in the lists of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. We’d like to inform you that your application for 130 Euros in monthly assistance under Measure 15 is denied and it is therefore unnecessary that you visit a post office branch. We apologize for this oversight.”

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- A new statement that was issued shortly thereafter only in the Albanian language by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare informed citizens (if they didn’t receive an SMS) that they can file an appeal to municipal social welfare centres until the 31st of August. - Payments of €130 were made beginning on the 12th of August for May and June. While no final deadline was specified by the Kosovo Government for the withdrawal of funds, the Finance Ministry informed beneficiaries via SMS messages that payments would be made by the 21st of August. However, that same day, the Director of the Kosovo Treasury, Ahmet Ismaili, made a statement (that was only in Albanian) the deadline had been pushed back until the 28th of August. - As of the 12th of September 2020, there is no official statement available in Serbian that clarifies whether or not the payments covered by Measure 15 have been completed, how much money has been paid, or how many applications for assistance were rejected.

As is illustrated in the above timeline, the Kosovo Government did not make a concerted effort to ensure that non-majority communities in Kosovo were fully aware of the technical procedures necessary for access to economic assistance. This is perhaps the

37 result of already-weak channels of communication between various communities as well as between central institutions and Serbian- language media outlets. This resulted in a situation where access to relief measures was unequal and uneven and where there was de-facto favoring Albanian-speaking citizens due to linguistic and other similar issues.

Many Kosovo Serb communities are overly reliant on aid and assistance from international organizations and the Republic of Serbia.

Due to weak institutional linkages and inadequate communication, many Kosovo Serb communities, particularly more isolated ones, have found themselves in a position during the COVID-19 pandemic where they are heavily reliant on assistance provided to them by international organizations and the government of Serbia. Although often facilitated by the Ministry of Communities and Returns, the aid packages that were distributed in various communities scattered throughout Kosovo were largely financed either by international organizations or NGOs (such as International Organization for Migration and the European Union) or by Serbian government agencies. These initiatives included:63646566

63http://mzp-rks.org/sr-l/aktuelno/item/584-podeljeno-253-prehrambenih-i-higijenskih- paketa.html 64http://mzp-rks.org/sr-l/aktuelno/item/527-dopremljeni-lekovi-i-insulin-za-istok-i- klinu.html 65http://mzp-rks.org/sr-l/aktuelno/item/572-najugro%C5%BEenijima-na-severu-kosova- uru%C4%8Dena-pomo%C4%87.html 66http://mzp-rks.org/sr-l/aktuelno/item/584-podeljeno-253-prehrambenih-i-higijenskih- paketa.html

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- 300 hygiene and 300 food packets were distributed in April of 2020 throughout the four municipalities of northern Kosovo; - Hygiene and food packets were distributed to 253 families living in thirteen (13) municipalities in Kosovo (as part of the EU-funded project ‘Return and Reintegration in Kosovo – 5th Phase); - Distribution of medicine to residents of the Istog/Istok and Klinë/Klina municipalities;

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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

This paper attempted to provide a broad overview of the challenges faced by the Kosovo Serb community during the COVID-19 pandemic and to analyse what the crisis has taught us about the relationship between non-majority communities and central-level governing authorities and institutions. As has been stated on a number of occasions in this text, the emergency has not created but rather highlighted a range of pre-existing problems in that relationship. It also shed light on those issues in a very stark manner because in times of crisis the health and wellbeing of the citizenry hinges on their ability to seek essential information and, when needed, assistance from state institutions. If this ability is hindered, and lines of communication are not established, then the level of risk faced is ever greater. In this sense, the Kosovo Serb community faces a situation where they are faced with a form of de-facto discrimination in that they do not receive the same treatment that the majority does: Their media does not receive information in their language, institutions do not follow the law and issue instructions in the absence of official translations, aid is distributed unevenly and the legal system and law enforcement agencies do not invest the time and energy into addressing questions of public safety. All of these feed into a widely held perception that Kosovo Serbs are ignored and that the challenges they face are not taken seriously. If this is not addressed in a comprehensive, structural and holistic manner there is potential for long-term damage to be done to for the overall future of Serbs in Kosovo.

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Recommendations:

Communication

1. The Government of Kosovo needs to adopt clear principles for communication with non-majority communities and to respect constitutional and legal provisions for the use of the Serbian language as one of Kosovo’s official languages. All written statements and decisions must be available to the media and wider public in both official languages and press conferences should have simultaneous translation available. Government agencies must also improve their bi-lingual presence on social media, using as an example the Ministry of Local Self-Government, whose social media posts are almost always translated into Serbian; 2. For the Office of the Language Commissioner to fully utilize all mechanisms at its disposal to monitor communication between the general public through major channels such as social media and SMS messaging. It should immediately draw attention to failures to disperse information in Serbian language, and indeed be proactive in alerting institutions to these failures and in identifying those responsible in order to generate additional impetus to respect language rights, particularly in emergency situations where the provision of pertinent information is key;

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3. Taking into consideration the fact that the vast majority of the adult population is in possession of a smartphone, the government should, as soon as possible, launch a bi-lingual Android/iOS application that would act as an information/resource hub. This would streamline communication from all state agencies and act as a means of creating institutional linkages. This application should be created and made available before winter of 2020-2021. 4. The Government of Kosovo and its Ministries need to establish clear and sustainable channels of communication with Serbian-language media outlets in order to ensure that they receive the same information that their Albanian counterparts do. Having this in mind, a permanent liaison mechanism should be established to facilitate effective and fruitful communication. This should take place by November of 2020, in advance of any potential ‘ next wave’ of infections; 5. For public institutions to, as soon as is feasible, organize a public information campaign through traditional and social media that will be developed based on common misconceptions about the COVID-19 virus. This campaign should directly address unverified rumours, and work to encourage citizens to respect and follow measures recommended by public health authorities. This group should also include representatives of healthcare institutions operating in Kosovo Serb communities. Any public information campaign needs to be tailored to the specificities of Kosovo’s multi-ethnic context with a specific focus on the most-used social media platforms (Facebook, Twitter etc.) ;

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6. For civil-society organizations, media outlets and public institutions to form a working group that will monitor social media platforms and identify disinformation as it arises. This group would work in consort with institution in order to develop an effective public information campaign;

Public Safety

1. For the Government of Kosovo and law enforcement agencies to immediately step-up the quality and depth of their channels of communication with Kosovo Serb communities and to take public safety seriously and to respond more effectively to incidents as they occur. In order to achieve this, a commission (working group) should be established that will be comprised of members of local police forces, political representatives of the Kosovo Serb communities (local and central level) and civil society. This group should be created under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Communities and Returns and hold regular meetings. This would be a means of creating a direct line of contact between local communities and central governing authorities; 2. Local police forces should increase the number of patrols in vulnerable communities, particularly in returnee villages in Eastern Kosovo as well as in smaller and more isolated enclaves in municipalities such as Vushtrri/Vučitrn, Obiliq/Obilić, Pejë/Peć and Skenderaj/Srbica. 3. Local police forces should liaise more frequently with community members in the forms of monthly town-hall

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meetings, particularly in smaller and more isolated communities in order to have more effective direct contact with those communities and to build trust; 4. The central government (particularly the Ministry of Communities and Returns and the Ministry of Interior), international missions and civil society organizations should work to facilitate trust-building mechanisms between local citizens and the Kosovo Police. This should also include trainings for members of the police force on how to deal with potentially ethnically motivated incidents and defuse low-level inter-ethnic conflict and incidents; 5. The central government (particularly the Ministry of Communities and Returns and the Ministry of Interior), international missions and civil society organizations should work to address perceptions of impunity by encouraging the swift investigation and prosecution of incidents.

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