Revolutions in German History: 1848/49, 1918 and 1989/90
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Sonderdrucke aus der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg JÖRN LEONHARD Anatomies of failure? Revolutions in German history: 1848/49, 1918 and 1989/90 Originalbeitrag erschienen in: Jörn Leonhard (Hrsg.): Ten years of German unification : transfer, transformation, incorporation? Birmingham: Univ. of Birmingham Pr., 2002, S. [21] - 55 Part I Historical and Foreign Policy Aspects I Anatomies of Failure? Revolutions in German History: 1848/49, 1918 and 1989/90 JOrn Leonhard The problem of revolutionary experience in modern German history The developments in the Eastern part of Europe since summer 1989 brought back the concept of 'revolution' to the understanding of European history. Within a short period of time, revolution changed from an object far distant from the contemporary, into a fundamental experience of the present. History, in the eyes of many contemporaries, had reached the present: contrary to the assumption that the Cold War had both frozen the political constellations in Central Europe and defined the limits of civil rights movements in the member states of the Warsaw Pact, 1989 meant the returning experience of historical change and changeability, of ' Nriintierbarkeit, as the result of a rapid erosion of political legitimacy.1 22 JOrn Leonhard In the case of Germany, 1989/90 generated a new meaning of 'revolution', a concept which hitherto seemed to have been overshadowed by the ambiguous legacies of 'failed', 'incomplete', or 'missing' revolutions in 1848 and 1918, or the negative connotation of 1933 as a 'legal revolution' by which the first German democracy was overturned within its own constitutional framework.' In collec- tive memory, the events of 1968 were not regarded as a political 'revolution', but rather as a student revolt or a symbol of a cultural transformation.' In contrast, for the collective memory of most post-war Germans, 1933 and 1945 stood for the most fundamental turning-points in modern German history. In summer 1989, just weeks before the crisis brought about by GDR refugees in the Prague embassy led to the rapid delegitirnisation of the GDR's political and social elites, France had celebrated her Bicentenaire, the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution of 1789, accompanied by intensive discussions about the revolutions character and legacy, including highly controversial debates about the terrefir and the place of 1789 in French political culture.` In contrast, the two main exhibitions on 1789 in Germany reflected a particular distance towards the meaning of revolution in modern German history. Both exhibitions focused on 1789's indirect impact on Germany, on the export of revolutionary principles to Germany as part of the Napoleonic expansion and on the different responses to this challenge in the single German states: the political and constitutional reforms in the member states of the Confederation of the Rhine, especially in Baden, Wiirttemberg, and Bavaria, and the projects of the Prussian Reform era, following the Prussian defeat against Napoleonic France in 1806. 5 However, what distinguished German and French views on revolution as part of their his- tory was that in public discussions in France, the legacy of 1789 was primarily regarded as an integral and positive part of republican and democratic identity of the modern French nation. The revolution could thus serve as a collective `lieu de memoire', providing positive and integrative symbolic codes, binding together historical experience and political expectations.6 For the German dis- cussion, however, 'revolution' in general and 1789 in particular meant a rather distant event in history with no place in contemporary German political culture. Discussions rather focused on the lack of a German 1789 as part of a deviation from a Western path of apparently successful political modernisation. As the Historikerstreit, the debate about the comparability of the Nazi Holocaust and crimes committed by the Stalinist regime, demonstrated in the 1980s, collective historical memory was almost completely dominated by the impact of National Socialist dictatorship on modern German history. Earlier attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to revive a positive commemoration of 1848 as part of a democratic tradition in German history could not alter this dominating paradigm.7 In 1934 the German historian Rudolf Stadelmann had stated that all revolu- tions in German history, from Luther's reformation to the 'revolution' against Revolutions in German History: 1848/49, 1918 and 1989/90 23 Napoleon, had failed because of the existence of the supranational Reich, which, symbolised in Charles V and Metternich, had absorbed the people's movements of the sixteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. Used to a reform-oriented state in the tradition of enlightened absolutism, Germany, according to Stadelmann, both in 1848 and in 1918 was too developed for a complete break with the past.8 His notion of a 'missed revolution' became a much debated but stable cornerstone of the historiographic paradigm of a German Sondenves in modern history: 'The heydays of our national past are not victories over the monarchy, but rather feats of glory and the achievements of statesmen, Frederick the Great and Bismarck.' Revolutions, by their very nature, seemed to be `un-German'.9 Heinrich August Winkler, in his recent history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century German history, concludes that the real 'German revolu- tion' was a revolution against Marxism and against West European democracy, which had to be defeated by those powers founded on the basis of successful revolutions in the seventeenth century, in 1776, 1789, and 1917: the Western democracies and the Soviet Union.1° What do these examples reveal about the understanding of 'revolution' in mod- em German history? Is there a justification, as still many would argue, for the lament of a lack of supposedly 'successful' revolutions or positive identification with revolutionary turning-points in modern German history? 11 If so, how far has this pattern been questioned by the experiences of 1989/90? This chapter tries to approach these questions by examining and comparing basic problems of the rev- olutionary turning-points of 1848, 1918 and 1989/90. This should not be misin- terpreted as an attempt to deny the fundamental difference in the historical contexts of these events or to formulate another theory of revolutions above and beyond essentially different contexts, 12 but as a historical comparison that can deepen the understanding of the particular meaning of revolution in modern German history and of the way this has been challenged by the events of 1989/90.13 The chapter is in five parts. An introductory section concentrates on the meaning of the concept 'revolution' in modern German history and tries to identify particular connotations. The following three sections focus on the revo- lutionary turning-points of 1848/49, 1918 and 1989/90 by means of a system- atic analysis that considers six factors: (1) origins and causes of the crisis of legit- imacy of existing regimes, (2) levels of revolutionary actions and communica- tion, (3) the relation between conflict and compromise strategies, (4) state versus society: revolutionary elements 'from below' and 'from above', (5) counter-rev- olutionary forces, and (6) levels of short- and long-term impacts as seen in polit- ical and constitutional change, social transformation and implications for nation- state building. A fifth section systematically summarises the results according to these factors and puts them into the context of changing patterns of revolu- tionary experience and its legacy in Germany. 24 JOrn Leonhard `A revolution in the positive meaning - `revolution as a political concept in Germany The primary meaning of the concept 'revolution', derived from the medieval Latin noun, is best caught by the modern English verb `to revolve'. According to this connotation, dominating in pre-1789 European political language, revolu- tion, similar to the celestial spheres in Ptolemaic astronomy or the relation between earth and planets as examined by Copernican astronomy, 'goes round and round' (John Dunn). In the course of the seventeenth century with its mech- anisation of the world of politics and the essentially imaginative role of astron- omy, 'revolution' was then first applied to examplts of political change in an explanatory framework. Thus the Glorious Revolution of 1688/89 could be regarded as a 'return' to a political and constitutional balance that had been destroyed by the Great Rebellion of the 1640s — first described as the 'English Revolution' only in the aftermath of the French Revolution — and the absolutist Stuarts after 1660.14 In contrast, 'revolution' in seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Germany retained the character of a foreign term, meaning 'revolt', 'turmoil' or else 'civil war', and, contrary to other Western European languages, entered the sphere of politics only very slowly. 15 'Revolution', according to the astronomic origin, referred to 'growth and decline, increase and decrease' of countries or states.16 Following the experience of the French Revolution, 'revolution' became a central concept of contemporary political discussion in Germany. In 1795 Konrad Engelbert Oelsner commented on the change from a circular meaning of revolution to one that described a linear historical development, transcending the seventeenth-century connotative limits: 'True, the revolution has turned in a circle, but this circle is a spiral from out