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1979 A Typological Analysis of Collective Political Violence. Das Gupta Kasturi Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College

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University: Miatirttms International i m i •a 31)0 N ZEEB ROAD. ANN ARBOR. Ml 48106 18 BEDFORD ROW. LONDON WC 1 R 4EJ ENGLAND 8013112

KASTURI, DAS GUPTA

A TYPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col. PH.D. 1979

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University Miadriirns International

300 \ rsss *0 ANN ARBOR Ml as 106'313! 761 4700 TYPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Sociology

by Kasturl Das Gupta B,A., Delhi University* 1970 M.A., Southern University* 1974 December, 1979 Acknowledgement

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Professor

Perry H. Howard, under whose direction this work was performed, for his guidance, encouragement, inspiration and advice which made the completion of this work possible. I lack adequate words to express my appreciation for the help and encouragement from my husband Anupam, who also typed this dissertation.

ii DEDICATION

To My Grandmothers

Subhaslnl Gupta

and

Swarnalata Barua

and to My Husband

Anupam Das Gupta

ill TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... 11

DEDICATION ...... Ill

LIST OF T A B L E S ...... vi

LIST OF FIGURES...... vll

ABSTRACT ...... viii

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Introduction ...... 1 Purpose ...... 7 Multivariate Model ...... 8

II. TOWARD A TEST MODEL OF C P V ...... 14

Introduction ...... 14 On Classifying C P V ...... 15 Review of Literature ...... 18 A General Critique of the ExistingTypologies of CPV . 50 Criteria for Satisfactory Typology...... 61 The Test Model of CPV ...... 63 Conclusion ...... 67 The Multivariate Combinations ...... 68 Guide to the Ideal Typical Test Model of CPV ...... 73

III. THE METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURE ...... 76

Introduction ...... 76 The Sampling Procedure and Sample ...... 77 The Sample ...... 60 Operationalization of Multiple Variables ...... 87 The Statistical Technique ...... 97 The Cluster Procedure ...... 100 Adjustment of Variable Scales ...... 103 Interpretation * ...... 104

IV. EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION OF THE TESTMODEL OF CPV: ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS ...... 106

Introduction ...... 106 Primary Characteristics of the Five Clusters...... Ill

iv V

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

CHAPTER Page

Towards a Comparison of the Test Model with the Five Clusters...... 124 D i s c u s s i o n ...... 128 Comparison of the Test Model with FourClusters .... 132 D i s c u s s i o n ...... 139 Comparison of the Test Model with Three Clusters . . . 140 D i s c u s s i o n ...... 141 Summary of Findings on Empirical Verification of the Test M o d e l ...... 148 Conclusion ...... 153 Outcome as an Independent Variable in Determining C l u s t e r s ...... 156 Intervening Variables DeterminingOutcome ...... 157 C o n c l u s i o n ...... 160

V. CONCLUSION ...... 161

Pointers for Future Research ...... 170

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 174

General Sources...... 175 Sources Used for Developing a Universe of CPV ...... 180

APPENDIX...... 181

Variable Content of CPVs Sampled ...... 181 Cluster Analysis of Collective Political Violence . . . 264

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR APPENDIX 276 LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Threefold Typology of Revolution/Internal War ...... 22

2. Gross' Categories and Subcategories of Revolution .... 2k

3. Classification of Patterns of Domestic Violence .... 26

4. Johnson's Typology of Revolution * ...... 29

5. Techniques of Transfer of P o w e r ...... 34

6. Classification of Domestic Conflict in Latin America. . . 36

7. Categories and Subcategories of Civil Strife...... 39

8. Types of P r o t e s t ...... 41

9. Classification of Nonrevolutionary Collective Violence . 43

10. Russell's Typology of Rebellion ...... 47

11. Checklist of Variable Criteria, as used by the authors on CPV ...... 53

12. Ideal Typical Test Model of C P V ...... 75

13. Distance M a t r i x ...... 108

14. Comparison of Cluster Primary Variables with Test Model , 125

15. Degree of Resemblance between Five Clusters and Test M o d e l ...... 129

16. Comparison of New Cluster Four with Test Model...... 136

17. Degree of Resemblance between New Cluster Four and Test M o d e l ...... 138

18. Comparison of New Cluster Two with Test M o d e l ...... 144

19. Degree of Resemblance between New Cluster Two and Teat Model...... 146

20. The New Test Model of C P V ...... 149

21. Degree of Resemblance between Final Clusters and New Test M o d e l ...... 152

vi LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. Alliances in the General Assembly...... 82

2. Cluster T r e e ...... 109

3. Histograms on Five Clusters...... 112

4. Continued ...... 113

5. Continued ...... 114

6. Continued ...... 115

7. Continued ...... 116

8. Continued ...... 117

9. Continued ...... 118

10. Continued ...... 119

11. Continued ...... 120

12. Continued ...... 121

13. Continued ...... 122

14. Continued ...... 123

15. Histograms on New Cluster F o u r ...... 134

16. Continued ...... 135

17. Histograms on New Cluster T w o ...... 142

18. Continued ...... 143

vii ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to develop a typology of collective political violence. The study was pursued from the premise that collective political violence like any other socio- historlcal phenomenon could be adequately classified only on the basis of a multivariate scheme. Review of the extant literature demonstrated the lack of a comprehensive typological scheme of collective political violence. The multivariate model which was Introduced as the basic framework of the typological scheme developed here - comprised of three sets of variables - structural variables, extent variables and extraneous variables, each of which, It was assumed, contributed towards the unique characterization of each mode of CPV.

Having developed the test model, an attempt was made to verify the scheme in terms of a sample of empirical cases of CPV.

A cluster analysis was performed on the sample of the thirty empirical cases of collective political violence, to discern any distinctive pattern comparable to the 'ideal typical* patterns of the test model.

The analysis of the data revealed three relatively distinct patterns quite comparable to the inodes of CPV identified as 'coup d'etat',

'revolution/rebellion' and 'people's war/revolt* in the test model*

A second objective of this project was to attempt to

Isolate the intervening variables which make the difference between successful and unsuccessful collective political violence. The analysis of the data reveals that the CPVs do not follow a certain

viii lx mould when successful and another when unsuccessful. There are no exclusive variables to which success or failure can be distinctively attributed. Thus* no definite formula can be suggested, pursual of which can deliver a certain Intended outcome. Chapter I

Introduction

The subject matter of the present study deals with the phenomenon of collective political violence. More specifically, the task is to formulate a typology of the various modes of collective political violence within sovereign national entitles.

Collective political violence denotes any collective report to violence which gives rise to actions, which are regarded by the power structure as lying beyond the established range of legitimacy.

Collective political violence is used here to designate the generic category, which encompasses all the various modes of struggle to capture political power. Collective political violence may be classi­

fied as the 'genus', of which revolution, rebellion, revolt, coup d'etat, mutiny, putsch, peasant war, riot - are the 'species'.

Social science literature has recently become Inundated with studies on the phenomenon of collective political violence.

However, individual researchers have addressed the subject matter with different sets of concepts and labels, chosen to satisfy their parti­ cular interests. For example, on the one hand we have social scien­

tists who refer to specific modes of collective political violence; such as rebellion (Russell, 1974), revolution (Brinton, 1938; Pettee,

1938; Hunter, 1940; Arendt, 1963; Johnson, 1964), coup d'etat

(Luttwak, 1968; Malaparte, 1932), peasant rebellion (Lewis, 1974),

1 2 peasant war (Wolf, 1969), and urban guerrilla warfare (OppenheInter,

1969), while others prefer taking a more general approach using a more generic terminology, such as- internal war (Eckstein, 1964), mass poli­ tical violence (Hibbs, 1973), civil strife (Gurr, 1968; Rosenau, 1964), and collective violent action (Tilly, 1975). No matter what the termi­ nology, the subject matter still refers to violent, political, anti­ government, collective or mass action. The result is that, there is no real consensus regarding which set of terminology is better. There is nothing necessarily reprehensible about using specific terms. It makes obvious sense if one is Interested in theorizing about one speci­ fic form of collective political violence. However, using a more general approach has its share of convincing merits. Since all cases of collective political violence indicate shared features such as, breakdown of legitimate power structure, violent behaviour, collective manifestation of anger, frustration and anti-system sentiments, a general approach would evolve theories which would aid in the explana­ tion and understanding of the overall phenomenon of collective political violence, and also the more specific manifestations of such actions

(Eckstein, 1965).

Moreover, studies which adopt an idlographlc approach by emphasizing specific modes of collective political violence are more susceptible to the problem of terminological confusion, especially when they do not define their terms adequately. As a result, they often find themselves uBing such terms as rebellion and revolution interchangeably, when technically they refer to quite different patterns of collective political violence. An example of this is 3

Johnson's (1964) simultaneous use of the terms revolution and rebel-

lion . By using a more nomothetic or more general approach such a

confusion is easily averted, since reference is made only to the

general phenomenon of political violence which encompasses all the

various patterns which It can undertake. Therefore, a general approach

is preferred since it resolves the conceptual confusion which ensues

from using inadequately defined specialized terminology.

The term which has been chosen for our presentation of

the subject matter is collective political violence. Collective political violence specifies that the type of action we are interested

in is collective action. Collective action implies the movement and participation of a substantial number of individuals. Unlike Hlbbs

(1973) we prefer the term collective over mass, because the former implies the presence of a certain degree of awareness and consciousness, whereas the latter carries the idea of blind, hypnotic following. In short, collective includes mass but is not limited to it. The impli­ cation which we derive from the terms mass and collective. cannot be substantiated. We are not familiar with any literature that draws a similar distinction. We differentiate between these two terms on the basis of the assumption that the term mass is appropriate when referring to pre-political, proto-political forms of protest such as - social banditry, gangsterism, whereas collective is used in conjunction with modern political forms of protest, such as revolution, rebellion,

We shall elaborate this problem of terminological confusion which ensues from the use of specific terms in the second chapter. 4 coup d'etat and so on (Oppenheliner, 1969). Mass movement Involves following without the understanding of the Issue Involved In the act or acts of political violence. It is blind following without any appreciation of the goal of action. However, collective Implies that the people involved in the acts of political violence have some under­ standing and appreciation of the goal(s). Therefore, their action is

'goal-directed' whereas the action of the mass is not.

In sum, our inquiry is limited to those acts of political violence which indicate collective following. Therefore, excluded from our consideration are those cases of political violence which are limited in terms of collective participation, for example, political assassinations and certain instances of political terrorism in which only individual or small-group initiative and practice are indicated.

However, whenever these acts of violence, such as assassinations and terrorisms are part of a broader act of political dissent, they will be taken into consideration. Non-collective political violence could be adequately integrated into a general study of political violence, but for our present purposes we are only interested in political violence as a collective venture.

Collective political violence also states that we are only interested in those types of collective activity which are political in character. In other words, they are activities that wield a certain power potential which are perceived by the reigning political personnel as threatening their authority and power. Acts of collective violence that do not threaten the overthrow of the regime are con­ sidered non-political and therefore, beyond the realm of the present 5

study. Our inquiry is thus limited to acts of collective violence which threaten the overthrow of the regime.

Whether a certain Instance of collective violence is poli­

tical or not can be discerned from two sets of factors. First, an instance of collective violence can safely be labeled as political when its participants openly disavow the legitimacy of the existing regime and threaten to overthrow it. However, as Russell (1974) has pointed out, it is no easy task determining whether the overthrow of the regime has been threatened when;

(a) the action is unsuccessful; and

(b) when the aims of the collective action cannot be clearly understood.

In such Instances collective action shall be regarded as political or non-political depending on its intensity. When the scale of collective action is extensive, we shall consider it to be political on the basis of the argument that the larger the magnitude of collective action, the more threatening it is to the regime, How we shall measure inten­ sity will be discussed at a later time.

For our present purposes we are only interested in collec­ tive poltical violence as it occurs within 'autonomous political systems', i.e. societies which are structurally independent of a foreign power. Therefore, we shall deal with collective political violence as it occurs within a sovereign, independent political entity. A separate study could be done at a later date to incorporate the phenomenon of political violence in non-sovereign colonial poli­ tical systems into a general study of political violence. However, at present our Interest is limited to those actB of collective 6 political violence which threaten the central government of an auto­ nomous country.

By delimiting ourselves to collective political violence as it threatens the overthrow of the central government, we are exclu­ ding all instances of collective violence for 'independence', 'self- determination', 'secession', 'autonomy' and so forth, which do not threaten the overthrow of the regime but only intend to set up alter­ native seats of government.

The phrase, collective political violence further implies that we shall consider collective political action as a violent pheno­ menon. We are interested in collective political actions which involve violence, in the form of disruption, destruction and injury to individuals and property. Our Interest in violence as a tactic for collective political action is based on the historical fact that violent political action is usually more intense in spirit and more far-reaching in its consequences than non-violent collective political action.

We can now summarize our definition of the basic subject matter- collective political violence as;

(1) involving collective following and participation;

(2) threatening the overthrow of the central regime of an autonomous political entity;and

(3) using violence as the tactic of collective action. 7

Purpose

Having delineated the basic subject matter it is now

necessary to present the purpose of the study. In conducting this

study we have a twofold purpose.

The first and foremost objective is to formulate a typo­

logy of the various modes of collective political violence. As ve

have seen earlier, collective political violence is a general social

phenomenon which finds expression in such specific forms as revolutions,

rebellions,coups, mutinies, jacqueries, putschs, riots, so on and so

forth. Each of these variations are instances of collective political

violence, because all of them are unique expressions of;

(1) collective frustrations and aggressions;

(2) which result from the insurgents' perception of the inadequacies of the socio-political system;

(3) and which involve the use of violence.

Our primary task here is to attempt to order these

various modes of collective political violence into mutually exclusive

exhaustive and homogeneous classes on the basis of a set of predeter­ mined attributes. These attributes are variables which give each

type of collective political violence its particular form and charac­

ter. Instances of collective political violence differ from each

other because they differ with regard to a number of variables such as ideas, class, extent, consequence, leadership and so on. And each

type of collective political violence is a special combination of

these attributes, each different from the other. Before proceeding 8 any further it would be helpful to elaborate the variable list which we have put together as the basis of our classification scheme.

The Multivariate Model

Any particular type of collective political violence can be distinguished from others on the basis of three sets of variables: structural variables, extent variables and extraneous variables.

In the first place we can identify the structural variables which give collective political violence its particular form and character. Note that in this study we ideas and strategy as structural in the manner of Heberle (1951) who demonstrates that an

Ideology consists of the constitutive ideas of a social movement, carried by observable collectivities. The variables under this set

Include:

1. The ideas of collective political violence (CPV). (I)

2. The strategy undertaken to carry out the ideas. (S)

3. The class character of CPV. (C)

4. The organizational structure of leadership.

5. The class character of leadership. ^ 2^

6. The degree of organization of CPV. (0)

Therefore,

CPVt - f (I,S,C,LltL2,0) (i) which describes collective political violence of type (t) as a func­ tion of the ideas, class character, class of leadership, leadership structure and the degree of organization of CPV. 9

The second set of variables refers to the degree of extensiveness of collective political violence. Types of CPV can be distinguished on the basis of their magnitude. The variables which measure the extent of CPV are:

1. The degree of participation In CPV. (p)

2. The duration of CPV. (d)

3. The amount of violence which results from CPV. (v)

U. The geographic area covered by CPV. (a)

Therefore,

CPVt - f (p»d,v,a) .... (ii) which describes CPV of type (t) also as a function of the degree of participation in CPV, the duration of CPV, the amount of violence resulting from CPV and finally the area covered by CPV.

We have entitled the third set of variables as the extraneous variables. These are the variables which determine the potential and outcome of CPV externally. They are not integral or structural aspects of CPV. The variables under this set are:

1. The government response variable. (GR)

2. The armed force disloyalty variable. (AFD)

Therefore,

CPVt - f (GR.AFD)...... (ill) which describes CPV of type (t) also as a function of the type of governmental response it calls forth and the degree of armed force disloyalty it brings about.

Therefore, according to our Multivariate model:

CPVt - f(I,S,C,L1,L2,0) (p,d,v,a)

The primary purpose of this study is to formulate a typo­ logical scheme on the basis of the assumption that any particular type of collective political violence can be distinguished from others by explicating the particular combination of values on this set of multiple variables. The information on the basis of which the typology would be developed will be gathered from a sample of con­ crete cases of collective political violence within member nations of the United Nations. Details on the sample and the data will be provided in later chapters.

Formulating such typological and classification scheme is indispensable if we are to reduce the complex to the simple, the unique to the general and order concrete data so that they may be described in terms, which make them comparable (Mcklnney, 1967). To classify the various types of collective political violence in terms of a certain attribute or criterion is also to describe them In 11 reference to that particular attribute or criterion. Typlficatlon thus lays the basis for further elaboration of existing theories of collective political violence and provide insight into the inconsis­ tencies of such theories when compared to empirical data (Mcklnney,

1967). Therefore, effective classification of various forms of collective political violence into a typological scheme is an impor­ tant precondition for developing a more sophisticated theory on the phenomenon of collective political violence, because such schemes;

(a) transfer unique cases of collective political violence into general typologies of collective political violence;

(b) describes types of collective political violence in terms of the attributes used for classifying.

Therefore to summarize: The primary task of this project is to formulate a typological scheme of collective political violence in its varied forms,

A second objective of this project is to attempt to iso­ late the Intervening variables which make the difference between successful and unsuccessful collective political violence. We shall define a successful CPV as one which overthrows the central govern­ ment and establishes its own authority. It is felt that while setting up our multivariate classificatory scheme of various types of CPV we will be able to Isolate those variables on which success­ ful and unsuccessful classes of political violence vary in degree and kind. And from this we will be able to deduce the crucial variables which determine the outcome of CPV. Social scientists are distinctly aware of the direct relationship between the 'alienation* of the masses from the sources of power (Independent variable) and 12

Che potential for political violence (dependent variable). However,

a majority of these studies overlook those intervening variables

which transform the vague sentiment of powerlessness into successful

or unsuccessful collective political violence Hopefully, due to the

nature of our primary venture, in which we draw our typology on the

basis of empirical data gathered from concrete cases of CPV, we shall have a certain insight into the way in which the variables figure in

the case of successful and/or unsuccessful collective political vio­

lence.

It is felt that if we can isolate the intervening vari­ ables which determine success and/or failure, then;

(a) it will provide us with a powerful predictive tool, and

(b) will also be able to throw a certain amount of light on thereasons why apparently potent CPVs ultimately fail.

In concluding this chapter an outline of the organiza­

tional layout of the rest of the work is presented.

In Chapter II an overview of the literature on classifi­ cation schemes of collective political violence is presented. On the basis of information gathered from these sources on the multiple variables which make up collective political violence, a test model of collective political violence is developed.

Chapter III will provide inforamtlon on the methodo­ logical aspects of the study. The variables are operationalized, the universe from which the sample of collective political violence is drawn is defined, the sampling procedure is delineated, the sample is presented and finally the statistical technique is explained. 13

In Chapter IV the data Is analyzed in order to determine its degree of relevance to the 'ideal typical* classification. The intervening variables which determine success or failure of collec­ tive political violence are also indicated.

In Chapter V general conclusions on the subject matter are presented.

In Appendix data on the thirty cases of collective poli­ tical violence are presented In a detailed manner. Information on each of the clusters as provided by the cluster analysis procedure, are presented. Chapter II

Toward a Test Model of CPV

Introduction

Two specific objectives are realized in this chapter.

First, the attempt Is made to identify the various concepts adopted to signify the diverse modes of collective political violence.

Second, the typological schemes of political violence as put forward by the various authors are reviewed In terms of their exhaustiveness and clarity.

The Idea, that collective political violence, as a social process, assumes different forms, and manifests itself through different patterns, was Introduced earlier. Each of these different patterns, it was held, was a unique combination of a set of para­ meters which were isolated as being significant in determining the form and character of each Instance of CPV. Though we can argue that each individual case of collective political violence is historically unique, so far as its particular mix of attributes is concerned- the fact remains that certain uniformities can be discerned even from these unique caseB. And the existence of such uniformities has led the theorists on political violence to lump empirical instances of

CPV under such categories as: revolution, rebellion, coup d'etat, jacquerie and so on. The underlying argument is that these cate­ gories reveal a certain 'ideal-typical' mix of relevant parameters, and that all Instances of CPV can be classified under these

14 categories, with a high level of certainty about their inclusive- * ness *

In the first part of the present chapter we shall try

to identify and define each of these different modes of collective political violence, which social scientists have identified as being 'ideal typical'. Therefore, our first objective in this chapter is to attain a certain degree of conceptual clarity so far as the various terms used to designate varied patterns of CPV is concerned.

The first part of the chapter leads quite naturally to the second one. There we shall review the categories as put forward by the social scientists and consider their validity as far as their exhaustiveness and clarity is concerned. Our second objec­ tive, therefore, is to scan the varied typological schemes on poli­ tical violence and look for any Inconsistencies and invalidities as as there may exist.

On Classifying CPV

There have been numerous attempts at classifying poli­ tical violence, in one way or the other. Many such attempts are

Such an implication can be attained from a majority of the authors of the varied typological schemes of political violence. How satis­ factory such claims are will be discussed in the second part of the present chapter, where we shall judge the schemes from the point of view of their degree of IncluslvenesB, exhaustiveness, and how far they succeed in limiting the number of residuals. 16 direct and bold ventures at formulating typological schemes; others merely imply such classifications in their expositions, without making explicit claims of having done so. In our pre­ sent effort we shall try to consider a number of these varied typologies, whether implied or openly explicated by their res­ pective authors, and offer clarification and definition for each of the 'ideal typical* categories inherent therein.

Two qualifications need to be made before we proceed.

Many of the 'ideal typical* categories of political violence as explicated by social scientists may not be relevant to our subject matter as delineated in the previous chapter. Modes of political violence, such as those which occur in response to foreign domi­ nation or those which are associated with secessionistlc and self-determination movements are not relevant for our analysis.

However, classification schemes which have such modes of politi­ cal violence as one or more category have not been discarded, because to do so would be to deprive ourselves of a whole set of important typological formulations and other categories in such schemes relevant to our analysis. Nor have we presented these schemes by eliminating such categories as may appear because, to do so would disturb the inherent continuity of these schemes and thus render them invalid. Moreover, it would not be ethical to tamper with the work of other individuals. However, in our subse­ quent analysis in the rest of the project we will simply overlook these categories.

Our second qualification deals with the particular 17

terminology which is used to refer to the general phenomenon which we

designate as collective political violence. As was indicated in the

previous chapter, social scientists have their own Individual

preferences in choosing terms to signify the general phenomenon of

collective political violence. Therefore, when we venture out into

the field of classificatory schemes of this phenomenon, we shall

discover very Boon that the theorists concerned do not utilize uni­

form terminology. Thus, what we refer to as categories of collective political violence, others may refer to as categories of 'revolution1,

'rebellion', 'civil strife', or 'internal war'. No matter how much ambivalence we have regarding the adequacy of such terminology- such differences do not inconvenience our analysis, one way or the other.

Because, as we clarified in the first chapter - no matter what the terminology, reference is usually being made to comparable phenomenon.

Therefore, differential terminology usage in reference to the general phenomenon of collective political violence does not pose any problems, so far as our analysis is concerned.

Let us now proceed to fulfill the purpose which we set out for ourselves in the beginning of the present chapter. In this part, in order to realize our objective of conceptual clarification, we shall follow these procedures:

First, classification schemes as delineated by theorists on political violence are reviewed in order of their publication. The schemes which have been chosen for this review are the ones which we came across In our review of literature, as earnest or even cursory attempts at formulating typologies of collective political violence. 18

Second, these schemes are discussed In terms of; (i) their underlying

criterion/criteria as used for the formulation of such schemes; and

(ii) the categories included therein. Third, the criteria and the

categories will be presented in the form of a table, whenever deemed appropriate.

Review of Literature

The first classification scheme which we have chosen to discuss was developed by Lyford P. Edwards (1927) in his classic work on The Natural History of Revolution. Edwards refers to three classes of revolution distinguished on the basis of the nature of factions which take part in them.

The first is composed of the abortive revolution in which moderate reformers assume power essentially peacefully. They are prima­ rily supported by the middle class of ordinary citizens. This is referred to as an abortive revolution, since the moderate reformers are unable to hold power against the threat of the conservatives or radicals.

The second class constitutes of the moderate revolution.

In this case, the moderate reformers are overthrown by the conserva­ tives. Example: Hungarian Revolution of 1848 in which Hapsburg power was restored.

The third and the most significant category refers to the radical revolution. In this case the moderate reformers are over­

thrown by the radicals. Radical revolution is by far the most violent and far reaching in its consequences. This type of revolution is 19

historically the roost infrequent. Example: Russian Revolution 1917,

French Revolution 1789.

In his classic work The Anatomy of Revolution, Brinton

(1938) makes what appears to be only a cursory attempt at typologizing

’revolutions'. He refers notably to three kinds of revolutions;

(i) The revolution Initiated by authoritarians, oligarchies or conser­ vatives - that is the rightist revolution Example: Fascist revolu­

tions In Spain and Italy.

(ii) The territorial nationalist revolution: Brinton illustrates this

category of revolution with the example of the American revolution which was "not attempting to overrun our social and economic system, but rather to set the English North American colonies up as an indepen­ dent national states" (Brinton, 1938: 23).

(ill) The abortive revolution! Abortive implies "simply the failure of organized groups in revolt" (Brinton, 1938: 24). Example: The Paris

Commune of 1871.

The problem with Brinton’s classification is self-reflec­

tive. It is not based on any uniform criteria or criterion. Each category is differentiated on the basis of quite different attributes.

Thus, the first category is distinguished on the basis of participa­

tion, the second on the basis of objectives and the third on the basis of outcome. A valid classification has to start by delineating uni­

form criteria on the basis of which the different modes of collective political violence can be compared.

Since Pettee (1938), Lasswell and Kaplan (1950) and

Rosenau (1964), have comparable modes of classification of collective 20 political violence, except for slight semantic differences - for the sake of convenience it was decided to discuss them together. This trio of sources have formulated threefold typologies of what Pettee and Lasswell and Kaplan refer to as 'revolution* and Rosenau refers to as 'internal war'. Since no specific criterion was put forward as determining the typological scheme in all the three cases, we can only guess. However, one attribute which seems to stand out in all the cases as the determining factor in developing these categories was the degree of change Intended or realized.

Therefore, the first category deals with those types of revolutions and internal wars which brings about only a limited degree of change. Such is the nature of palace revolutions, private coup d 'etat, and personnel wars. These revolutions and internal wars usually bring about change only in the occupancy of existing roles in the structure of political authority.

The second in line are the political revolutions, public coup d'etat and authority wars which bring about changes in the autho­ rity structure or in other words, which bring about changes in the arrangement of roles in the structure of political authority. Revolu­ tions or internal wars which bring about constitutional changes are appropriate examples.

Social revolutions, as Lasswell and Kaplan, and Pettee label them, or Structural wars, as Rosenau refers to them, constitute the third category of revolutions and internal wars. In these cases along with the changes in the personnel and authority structure, the entire sub-structure of society, its system of ownership, the bases of 21

power, the Institutions and so on - all undergo drastic changes. The

changes brought about by social revolutions and structural wars are

the most pervasive and far reaching. (See Table I, which follows for a

graphic representation of this typology).

William Stokes* (1952) classification of revolution is by far the most ornamental as far as terminology is concerned. Stokes developed a fourfold typology of revolutions on the basis of no really specifiable criterion. Though the basis of classification is rather arbitrary, the categories are unique:

(i) Machetlsmo: Machetismo "is a crude, primitive method of mobilizing violence primarily in local, rural politics but occasionally in national, urban areas as wellM(Stokes, 1952: 447). Machetismo - absolute authority and power commanded by the machete - the general utility knife widely used throughout Latin America, is as we infer, as much an upholder of existing authority as it is a potent source of bringing about changes in such authority.

(ii) Cuartelazo: According to Stokes, the cuartelazo is

...... a more developed, complex method of organizing and changing governments than machetismo, has its focus in the barracks (cuartel). Its classic pattern is the treason of the single barracks.... the march on centers of communication, sites of military supplies, the exchequer, government headquarters, and ultimately the capital itself (Stokes, 1952: 451).

(iii) Golpe de Estado: Golpe de Estado, frequently called the coup d'etat -

is a direct assault on power - almost always personal in Latin American countries - which means the lmmobollzatlon of the president either through assassination or detention.... The golpe de estado is distinguished from the cuartelazo by the fact that the professional military experience is less needed the golpe, is a forceful method of organizing and Table 1

Threefold Typology of Revolutions/Internal War

Typology of Degree of change intended and/or realized Revolution/Internal War Personnel/Minimum Political/Average Structural/Maximum

Palace Revolution

1 Private Coup D'etat +

Personal Wars

Political Revolution

2 Public Coup D'etat +

Authority Wars

Social Revolution

3 Social Revolution +

Structural Wars

N? to changing governments which definitely permits, even encourages civilian participation* (Stokes, 1952: 456-457).

(iv) Revolution: Revolution to Stokes -

....is fundamental change In the nature of the state, the functions of government, the principles of economic partici­ pation and distribution, the relationship of the social classes, particularly as regards the control of government - in a word a significant breaking with the past. (Stokes, 1952: 461).

George Blanksten (1958) formulated a threefold typology of revolutions quite similar to those developed by Lasswell and Kaplan,

Pettee and Rosenau. Blanksten uses objectives of revolutions as the distinguishing criterion. His three categories are:

(i) Revolutions resulting in national independence from foreign rule.

(ii) Revolutions leading to the forced removal of a president from office by a rival;

(ill) And finally, the real revolutions which bring about restructuring of the social order.

The primary criterion which Feliks Gross (1958) uses for his classification of revolutions is the structural position of its major participants, or in other words, whether the participants are primarily from the elitist sections of society, or are they primarily from the ranks of general masses. On the basis of this criterion,

Gross develops his four categories of revolutions. (See Table 2).

(i) Revolution from below: which are characterized primarily by the "mass movements agalnBt the existing government, the state, against the socio-political system". (Gross, 1958; 47). The ideologies of "revolutions from below" reflect the deep social and cultural Table 2

Gross's Categories and Subcategories of Revolution

Participation Categories Subcategories

Elite Coup D'etat/Palace Revolution

Mass and Elite Combined Seizure

Mass Revolution from below Rebellion, Civil War, Insurrection 25

changes which the Insurgents desire. Such revolutions are usually

spontaneous events, not the result of an a priori plan conceived by a

small group of elitist leaders.

Gross develops sub-categories of ’revolution from below',

on the contention that they are slight variations of the general pro­

cess, such as:

a) Rebellions: One variation of 'revolutions from below',

Rebellions are spontaneous mass movements without ideology or organi­

zation .

b) Civil War: Also a variation of a 'revolution from below’.

In a civil war, an army representing a dissenting and a significant

segment of the population fights another army - loyal to the govern­ ment .

c) Insurrection: In the case of insurrection, regular or

underground army, supported by rebels unite against foreign rule.

(11) Revolution from top or Coup d'etat: is usually accom­ plished by a small, well organized group, usually a military group.

The first tactical move is almost always the seizure of the means of violence - the military and police establishments with the aim of

Immobilizing the government. However, revolution from top seldom

results in profound (social, economic or political) change, beyond

the substitution of personnel in the positions of power.

(iii) Combined Seizure: of power occurs when a 'revolution from top' is combined with a limited 'revolution from below'. This is usually the case when action from the top is supported by large sec­

tion of the masses. 26

(iv) Palace Revolution: Involves the excahnge of power within the ruling elite through means which involve violence.

These are Gross' categories and sub-categories of 'revo­ lution', based primarily on the nature of the participants. However, as we have seen, Gross uses other attributes such as ideas, degree of planning, and so on to further qualify the categories.

Samuel Huntington (1962) developed a typology of

"patterns of domestic violence". He has two major categories: Revo­ lutionary war and coup d'etat. Coup d'etat is further classified into governmental coups, revolutionary coups and reform coups.

(i) Revolutionary War: Revolutionary war as exemplified by the Chinese civil war, the struggle between the Viet Minh and the

French in IndoChina, the guerrilla war of communist rebels in Malaya,

Phillipines, insurrection in Algeria, all reflect (a) anti-colonialist,

(b) anti-feudal, (c) alienation from central authority structure, (d) egalitarian sentiments. They indicate protracted, guerrilla warfare, terroristic tactics of violence, which finally gives way to full scale w a r .

(ii) Coup d'etat: Whereas, revolutionary war is an assault from outside, coup d'etat can be undertaken by groups which are already participants in the existing political system - as such it is an assault from inside. Coup is a short-lived strategy to overwhelm the government from support from the army,

(a) A governmental coup occurs when the leadership of the government is changed without significant changes occurring in the social structure. 27

(b) Revolutionary coups on the other hand brings about fun­ damental changes in the socio-economic and political structure of the society. Whereas a revolutionary war is revolution from outside, revolutionary coup is revolution from the Inside out.

(c) Reform coup falls between the other two. A combined military and civilian effort; it seizes power with the Intention of making reforms in the political, economic and social structure.

(Huntington's classification is schematically represented in Table 3).

The next classification scheme was developed by Chalmers

Johnson (1964). Lawrence Stone (1966) in his review of Johnson's scheme regards it as "the most fruitful typology" of revolutions. In view of the fact that Johnson uses a relatively extensive set of crite­ ria to develop this typology, we might go along with Stone's evaluation.

Johnson identifies six patterns which revolutions follow (See Table 4).

The variables selected to develop this scheme were:

(i) Targets of revolutionary activity: Does the revolution aim at replacing government personnel, the political regime or the * community.

(ii) Identity of the revolutionaries: Whether they come from the ranks of the elites or the masses.

(lii) Revolutionary goals or Ideology: Whether reformist.

"By community is meant the consciousness of human solidarity that overlays a society technically defined - i.e. people united by the division of labor - and by which men actually perceive their social life". (Johnson, 1964: 28). Table 3

Classification of Patterns of Domestic Violence

Revolutionary Wars Coups i 1 'etat ~ I n w Coups Reform o n < < n> o »-r 9 C

9 O rt a cb a n o ft c o •o c CD - 9 CD

tSJ 00 Table 4

Johnson's Typology of Revolution

Typology Targets Revolutionaries Ideology Criteria Govt. Regime Community Masses Elite Elite R ES N NF E NM Masses

Jacquerie

Mlllenarlan

Anarchist

Jacobin Communist

Conspiratorial Coup

Mass Militarized Insurrection 30 A eschatological , nostalgic, nation forming, elitist or nationalist.

The six modes of 'revolution' identified on the basis of these criteria are:

(1) Jacquerie: which is a spontaneous mass rebellion of the peasants, usually carried out in the name of traditional authorities,

Idealized king or church, with limited aims of removing local or national elites. Examples: The original jacquerie - the French peasant revolt of 1358, the Pugachev rebellion in Russia in 1773-75.

(2) The Mlllenarlan Rebellion: Also a spontaneous mass rebellion which pursues revolutionary action in order to realize a utopian dream inspired by a prophet, through the "total transformation of the social system, sweeping away the status quo and uncompromising elite, leaving the faithful in control of veritable paradise"

(Johnson, 1964: 35). Such revolutions have occurred in traditional societies under the pressure to change as a result of their exposure to industrialism, imperialism and forces of secularization. It is quite easy to confuse revolutionary millenarianism with Jacquerie if we do not explain the primary ideological differences. Whereas jacquerie, in purging the existing structure of elites, local and national, demonstrates the willingness to compromise with the tradi­ tional authority structures such as church or king, revolutionary millenarianism breaks sharply with the old order in the pursuit of their utopian dream. The ideology of revolutionary millenarianism

Branch of theology concerned with the final events in the history of mankind.(Webster's dictionary). 31 is eschatological. Examples: Talping and Boxer rebellion In China, in 1851-1864 and 1900 respectively; Mau Mau rebellion of the 1950's in

Kenya have definite millenarian overtones.

(3) Anarchistic Rebellion: Occur in response to progressive change supported by some dominant part in the population, brought about to relieve certain dysfunctions in society. Anarchistic revo­ lutions occur when a coalition of groups oppose such change, because they perceive the changes as threatening their roles in the system.

The ideology of anarchistic rebellions are nostalgic since they arti­ culate the goals for the future on the basis of experience in an idealized but increasingly redundant past. Anarchistic rebellions are made by members of the landed aristocracy and peasantry who feel that they have poor prospects for the future in view of the changing times.

Their target is the government and their ideology is based on romantic idealization of the old order. (Johnson, 1964: 40-45), Examples:

The American Civil War, 1861-65, Counter Revolution in the Vendee,

1793-96.

(4) The Jacobin Communist Revolution: Has been defined as

"a sweeping fundamental change in political organization, social struc­ ture, economic property control and the predominant myth of a social order, thus indicating a major break in the continuity of development"

(Johnson, 1964: 2). Therefore, the Jacobin Communist revolution envisages the replacement of the old order by a more progressive one.

They are made by the masses under elite guidance, and their target is the government, regime and society. Examples: French Revolution,

1789; Russian Revolution Revolution, 1917. 32

(5) Conspiratorial Coup d'etat: Attempts at revolutionary change by small, elitist, secretive groups of individuals with highly organized action framework. Examples: Egyptian coup of 1952* Ghana coup of 1966.

(6) The Militarized Mass Insurrection: Elite directed, deli­ berately planned, mass revolutionary war. They are based on the vio­ lent techniques of protracted guerrilla warfare. The ideological base is usually a combination of "xenophobic nationalism and Marxism".

Examples: China, 1937-49; Algeria, 1954-62.

William Kornhauser (1964) in his classification scheme demonstrates the relationship between authority structures and rebel­ lions which develop in response to the inadequacies of such authority structures, as perceived by the rebels. He classifies authority and the rebellions which ensue in response to them under four heads:

(i) Alien authority: Authority that is foreign rather than indigenous to the society gives rise to rebellions for political inde­ pendence. Example: Indian Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 against British rule.

(ii) Insufficient authority: Authority that is believed to be weak, ineffective and fragmented results in rebellion for centraliza­ tion of authority. Example: The Chinese revolution of 1911, which overthrew the Manchu dynasty which was Incapable of coping with

Western encroachments, as well as the internal problems.

(iii) Arbitrary authority: Authority that is perceived as irresponsible and repressive gives rise to rebellions for constitution­ alism. Example: The Nicaraguan rebellion, 1978-79 against the arbi­ trary authority of Somoza, the Iranian rebellion, 1978-79 against the 33 repressive authority of the Shah.

(iv) Exclusive authority: Authority that is believed to be inaccessible to the large sections of the population* such as certain classes, parties or ethnic groups giving rise to rebellions for citi­ zenship rights. Example: Revolution of 1848 in France, which aimed at greater political equality. One of the first acts of the provi­ sional government was to proclaim the right of Universal Suffrage.

(Kornhauser, 1964: 153).

Andrew C. Janos (1964) classifies the "techniques of the transfer of authority" in terms of the capabilities of the Insurgents so far as potential for violence is concerned. Janos contends that the capability of the rebels not only determines what kind of tech­ niques of violence he would use but would also isolate the strategic objectives for the realization of the goal of authority transfer. Thus capabilities for Janos is the independent variable, which determines both strategy and techniques of violence (See Table 5).

Janos contends that when the capabilities of the insur­ gents are low, as is usually the case in the Initial stages of a move­ ment, the range of potential choices is severly limited. "The strategic objective is attrition in military arena and mobilization in civic arena" (Janos, 1964: 138). The techniques of violence practiced are terrorisms, demonstrations, strikes and other forms of subviolence.

However, when the balance of capabilities for violence tips in favor of the rebels, the struggle proceeds from attrition to annihilation in the military arena and from mobilization to decision in the civic arena. The techniques of violence appropriate in these Table 5

Techniques of Transfer of Power

Capabilities Strategic Objectives Techniques

Attrition - Military Arena Terrorism,

Low / Initial Stage Strikes,

Mobilization - Civic Arena Demon s t rat ions

Annihilation - Military Arena Guerrila, civil war, High / Second Stage Insurrection,

Decision - Civic Arena Coups 35 instances are guerrilla war, civil war, insurrection (violent elimina­ tion of power holders), and coups de force.

In his exposition on "Dimensions of Social Conflict in

Latin America'1 , Douglas Bwy (1968) developed a typology of civil violence on the basis of the degree of planning and organization involved (See Table 6). His two categories turmoil and internal war are comparable to similar categories developed by Ted Gurr (1968), whose exposition we shall review following this.

(1) Turmoil: Refers to'spontaneous, sporadic, and essentially non-organized conflict behavior". The sub-categories under this dimen­ sion are : anti-government riots, political clashes, anti-foreign riots and demonstrations, strikes, coups, cuartelazos , assassinations, plots. Coups, cuartelazos, assassinations and plots are explained in majority of the literature on these phenomena, as activities which take place in the realm of highly organized and clandestine behavior.

Bwy's inclusion of such conflict behavior in this category requires an explanation:

Since the vast majority of Latin American coups are relatively bloodless and of short duration (generally because of the lack of interest and participation of the masses), they rarely appear to be serious challenges to the legitimacy of the systems Involved. Instead, they appear more in the form of a frequent game of rotation between the set of upper class "ins" and "outs". The coup d'etat, or palace revolution, then , as it is practiced in Latin America, appears to be as institu­ tionalized a form of challenging governments as the ballot, or as viable a mechanism of protest (although more often prac­ ticed by an elite clientile) as the manifestacion (»riot), or demonstration, or strike. As such its emergence.... in association with these events, is more than acceptable. (Bwy, 1968:208).

The point Bwy makes is that coup d'etat is a routine act in Latin American politics. And like all other routine acts it does SO Table & o < •H D C cn cn Cl to o c u cn o c CO u I- u to s o u cn o p 3 0) Cl (0 re Cl c- L- Manifestations Pltcl Clashes Political — Assassinations — Strikes — Cuartelazos Plots, Coups, — — Continuing Guerrilla War Guerrilla Continuing — Terror/Sabotage — Rvltoay Invasion Revolutionary — Action Guerrilla — Acts/Sabotage Terroristic Discrete — ‘ Anti Foreign Riots and Demonstra­ and Riots Foreign ‘Anti tions 36 37 not need a substantial degree of pre-planning or organizing, every

time it is enacted - and is therefore, classified under the category of "turmoil'* as a relatively spontaneous and routine behavior.

(ii) Internal War; Internal war, Bwy's second category

includes those forms of domestic conflict which "appear to represent organized conflict behavior, i.e., behavior that is planned with defi­ nite objectives and methods in mind " (Bwy, 1968; 209); such as

"continuing guerrilla warfare, terror/sabotage, revolutionary invasion, guerrilla action, and discrete terroristic act and sabotage" (Bwy,

1968: 210-11).

Ted Gurr (1968) formulated a threefold typology of what he refers to as "civil strife", which he defines as all collective, nongovernmental attacks on persons or property that occur within boundaries of an autonomous or colonial political unit. The criteria implied in the typology are:

a) The degree of planning that went into the organization of the strife; and

b) The extent of the strife.

The major categories of "civil strife" which Gurr evolves are:

(i) Turmoil: Relatively spontaneous, unstructured mass strife.

Turmoil usually takes the form of demonstrations, political strikes, riots, political clashes and localized rebellion.

(il) Conspiracy: Intensively organized, relatively small scale strife, which usually manifests itself through political assassination, small scale terrorism, small scale guerrilla warfare, coups, mutinies, plots and purges, on the ground that they are evidence of planned 38

strife.

(iii) Internal W ar: Large scale, organized, focussed civil

strife which is almost always accompanied by extensive violence. Such A as, large scale terrorism and guerrilla war, civil war, private war ,

and large scale riots. (See Table 7 for graphic representation).

The next typology is Martin Oppenhelmer's (1969)

classification of types of Violent protest1. Oppenhelmer uses three

dimensions of violent protest to construct his typology:

a) a historical dimension - which Involves a rural-urban

continuum determining whether the countryside or the city is the

scene of protest. If the scene of protest is the countryside -

peasants are the predominant participants, and if it is urban, the workers are the predominant actors.

b) a second dimension Involving the degree of political

consciousness - signifying whether the protest behavior Is guided by

some sort of political ideology or is it merely a pre-political

endeavor.

c) a dimension of mass participation - determining whether

the protest Involves a small number of people, an elite, effecting changes from the top down, or whether it Involves masses of people, with the strategy of change from bottom up.

On the basis of these three dimensions Oppenhelmer evolves an eightfold typology of 'violent protest', four in the rural

The category of 'private war* is ambiguous. Table •O Hi IA ■s <3 i-t LA *r4 ■ u •H 4-1 U 4J 41 & u 01 q h t- u q 41 oc 0 u m P v >

iH u ■H 1-t a c *H 4-> > I* 4) iq 5 u —i i— » o C n q u q u V u c Lre cl Revolts Scale Large — —Lre cl Terrorism Scale Large -— — Large Scale Guerrilla War Guerrilla Scale Large — War Civil — Rebellion l a c o L ^ ^Assassination War Guerrilla Small — Coups — Mutinies — Plots — — -Political Clashes -Political — Demonstration — Strike Political — Riot — Terrorism “ Private War Private

39 40

context and four in the urban, The four In one setting have analogous

caaes In the other.

Rural Urban

1. Social Banditry Gangsterism

2. Peasant Uprisings Riots

3. Guerrilla Bands Terrorism

4. Liberation Army Rebellion or 'rising

Source: Oppenheimer, 1969: 33.

Social Banditry and Gangsterism - are pre-political or proto-poli­ tical forms of protest behavior which Indicate absence of political consciousness and mass participation. Examples: Vendettas and

Hooliganism.

Peasant Uprisings and Riots - are also pre-political forms of protest behavior with the absence of political consciousness but presence of mass participation. Examples: revitalization movements, looting and vandalism.

Guerrilla Bands and Terrorism - are modern politically oriented

"revolutionary movements", which indicate the presence of political consciousness but the absence of mass participation. Examples:

Guevaristas in Bolivia, selective assassination, sabotage, kidnapping.

Guerrilla Liberation Army and Rebellion or 'rising* - Modern poli­ tical revolutionary movements possessing both political consciousness and mass participation. Examples: Chinese PeopleTs Army, Russian

Revolution. (Oppenheimer's typology presented in Table 8 ). 41

Table 8 *

Types of Political ^ Mass @ Protest Consciousness Participation

Rural

1. Social Banditry

2. Peasant Uprising +

3. Guerrilla Bands

4. Guerrilla Liberation Array

Urban

1. Gangsterism

2. Riots - +

3. Terrorism +

4. Rebellion, 'rising* +

* Source - Oppenheimer (1969: 33)

+ indicates presence

- indicates absence 42

Mark Hagoplan (1974) has developed a most comprehensive

classification of 'revolutionary' and 'non-revolutionary' phenomenon.

His categories include revolution, coup d'etat, revolt and secession -

each with subsequent sets of categories. As with quite a few of the others, no definite criterion for classification can be Isolated for

Hagoplan. (See Table 9).

(1) Revolution: Hagoplan defines a revolution as "an acute, prolonged crisis in one or more of the traditional systems of strati­

fication (class, status, power) of a political community, which involves a purposive, elite-directed attempt to abolish or reconstruct one or more of said systems by means of an Intensification of politi­ cal power and recourse to violence." (Hagoplan,1974:1).

(2) Coup d ’etat: Denotes a blow or a sudden attack on the government. It usually results in the expulsion of the existing governmental leadership. Coup d'etat can assume either of the follow­ ing forms -

a. Palace revolutions - In their classic form, as por­ trayed in the political dramas of Shakespeare, palace revolutions involve the forced abdication or assassination of a ruler by a rival, who is either a relative or a subordinate.

b. Executive coups - occur when the chief executive of a republic abolishes the existing constitution and proclaims himself king or dictator, with the intentions of founding a dynasty.

c. Military coups - are coups in which the military plays a predominant role. Military coups can lead to primary rule by the military or civilian rule under the protection of the military. Classification of Nonrevolutionary Collective Violence a: £ > 111 o o c 0) r , to tc W ■H Q - 01 > U WVl o c §■ Qi u 4> w

Rgoa Secession Regional — — Military Coup Military — Coup Paramilitary — JcurePaat Revolt Jacquerie/Peasant — Millenarianisro/Messianism — Coup — Palace Coup — Executive Urban Mobs Urban rsrcal Revolts Aristrocratlc Natlvism ooil Secession Colonial tnc Secession Ethnic Secession Religious A3 44

d. Paramilitary coups - refer to those attempts at cap­ turing power, in which a private, paramilitary group (e.g., Hitler's * Brown shirts) plays the role of prime mover.

(3) Revolt: is the next class of violent political behavior.

Revolt can be distinguished from revolution in terms of -

a. The stakes of the uprising - unlike a revolution, revolts do not threaten the existing systems of stratification, dis­ tribution of power, or the institutions of the society. Thus, the impact of a revolt on the socio-economic structure of a society is minimal,

b. The function of ideology - whereas a revolution

Implies a program, a doctrine, revolts are associated with low levels of ideology. The existence of ideology before the actual outbreak of revolutionary action, helps determine the mentality of the insurrec­ tionists. The lack of such preparatory phases in revolts helps explain why they are shortlived and easily dislntegrable by the nor­ mal procedures of internal security.

c. The role of leadership - is the final major point of difference between revolt and revolution. The point being made here is not that revolts are leaderless, but that they lack comprehensive plan or strategy to guide their action - attributable primarily to the revolts lack of definite plan or Ideology, Keeping in mind these

Hagoplan cites the Kapp putsch (1920) as an example of paramilitary coup- which definitely invalidates the classification. Anyone remotely familiar with post-World War 1 German History would be aware of the fact that the Kapp putsch was conducted by a segment of the German army. It represented the reaction of part of the German officers' corps to the treaty of Versailles. 45

points of distinction, Hagoplan regards a revolt as "the angry, vio­

lent expression of the refusal of an andivldual or group to continue

in its present condition" (Hagoplan, 1974: 11). Revolts according to

Hagoplan can assume either of the following forms -

a. Jacqueries or peasant revolts - which are further sub­

divided into; (i) Primitive collective violence - which Includes such

acts of collective violence as "feuds, brawl, and scuffles between members of guilds, communes, and religious congregations, etc.". These are primarily small scale, localized and apolitical types of collec­

tive violence. This category, as we shall see later on is quite com­ parable to Tilly's category of 'competitive collective action*.

Example: Jacquerie. (ii) Reactionary collective violence - usually occurs when a group feels that the authorities are depriving them of rights which they once enjoyed. This category is similar to Tilly's category of 'reactive collective action*. Example: Traditional peasant revolt, (ill) Modern collective violence - develops on the basis of well-defined objectives, which organizes action for the realization of "rights not yet enjoyed but within the reach".

Example; Modern peasant revolt.

b. Urban mobs - is a movement of all classes of the urban poor, a predominantly lower class phenomenon - attempting to bring about economic or political change through direct action, such as riots and rebellions, but which lack specific Ideological foundations.

c. Nativism - is another variation of the revolt. Natlvls- tic revolts occur in order to defend cultural values regarded sacred by the participants. 46

d. Millenarianism-messianism - Includes the general cate­

gory of movements which claim to replace the sinful, corrupt, or soon

to be destroyed community, with one that is directly informed and

inspired by a charismatic leader or Messiah.

e. Aristrocratic revolts - are most often violent protests

against political socialization. Aristrocratic revolts usually

emerge as traditional movements, in which the aristrocratic rebels demand the "restoration of old privileges or creation of new ones in

the guise of restoration".

(4) Secession - is the act of breaking off one part of a state and proclaiming its independence. Four forms of secession are

listed: (1) Regional, (li) Colonial, (iii) Ethnic, and (iv) Religious.

This is therefore, in a summarized form the classifica­

tion scheme of Hagoplan. It is highly comprehensive and has some important insights to offer in terms of differences between revolu­ tionary and non-revolutionary phenomena.

Russell (1974) developed a'typology of rebellion', in which the distinguishing factors are participation and the type of political system In which they take place (see Table 10 ).

(1) Therefore, mass rebellions occur within autonomous poli­ tical systems in which the participants are largely from the masses.

Example: China 1949.

(2) Military rebellions, also occur within autonomous political systems, however, the overthrow is threatened by the military forces.

Example: Egypt 1952.

(3) Anti-colonial rebellions, are intersocietal power Table 10

Russell’s Typology of Rebellion

Preconditions Social Conditions

Fora of Upheaval Military Mass Anticolonial Rebellion Rebellion Rebellion

Short Term Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful Consequences

Long Term Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful Consequences Revolution Revolution Revolution Revolution Revolution Revolution

Source: Russell (1974: 63) 48

struggles In which the overthrow of colonial systems are threatened

by violent means. Example: Algeria 1962.

Russell uses the term 'revolution', to signify the

consequences of a successful rebellion - that is one that overthrows

the regime. Substantial social change following a successful rebel­

lion is a successful revolution, whereas, nonsubstantial social change

following a successful rebellion is unsuccessful revolution.

Charles, Louis and Richard Tilly's (1975) categories of

collective action are the most abstract categories that we have encountered so far. The Tillys refer to three types of collective action - competitive, reactive and proactive, which refer more to the angle of response than to the techniques or patterns of response.

(i) Competitive collective action reflects horizontal con­ flict, in which members of one group define another group as rival.

Competitive actions which produce a great deal of violence include

"feuds, acts of rivalry between adjoining villages, recurrent ritual encounters of competing groups of artisans" (Tilly, 1975: 50).

(ii) Reactive type of collective action are vertical responses of one group which lays claims to resources under the control of another group. Tax rebellions, food riots are examples of reactive type of collective action.

(iii) Proactive collective action is also a vertical response of groups "making claims for rights, or resources not previously enjoyed. The deliberate attempt to seize control of (these resources) and the state is proactive" (Tilly, 1975: 51). 49

On the basis of his review of a number of typological

schemes of political violence, Harry Eckstein (1964) develops, what

he refers to as a 'composite* typology. He does not believe that it

is any better than the other schemes, but he claims that it "relates

the various typologies by including most of the terms of the compli­

cated schemes and adding more terms to the simple ones.."(Eckstein,

1964: 135-36).

His classification consists of:

(i) Relatively unorganized and spontaneous riots by crowds with low capabilities for violence and modest alms

(ii) Coup d'etat by members of an elite against other members

of the elite;

(iii) Full scale political revolutions to achieve important

constitutional changes;

(iv) Social revolutions to achieve large scale socio-economic as well as constitutional changes;

(v) And lastly, Wars of Independence to achieve sovereignty

in a previously dependent society.

Eckstein is quite right in his evaluation of his typo­

logy. Not only is it not an improvement over other typologies - it is also rather arbitrary in its differentiation criteria. As is obvious

ther are no uniform attributes on which these five categories could be related, except may be the idea of the respective movements.

With Eckstein's scheme we come to the end of this sec­

tion. In the next section a critical review of these typological schemes will be presented, where the schemes will be judged on the 50 following:

(1) Clarity and appropriateness of conceptual categories;

(11) Relative Inclusiveness and exhaustiveness of the schemes;

(111) Justifiableness and adequacy of the criteria used for classifying.

A General Critique Of The Existing Typologies

Of Collective Political Violence

Probably the most pervading drawback of existing typo­ logies of collective political violence ensues from their failure to develop their classifIcatory schemes on the basis of multivariate models. Most of these classifications are developed on the basis of one, two or at the most three attributes. (And as we have seen, in quite a few cases we could not even Isolate the attribute(s) used for evolving the'ideal typical' categories of revolution, internal war, domestic violence or what-have-you I) Therefore, most efforts at for­ mulating typologies of collective political violence are based on uni­ variate, blvarlate or at the most trlvariate models. There Is nothing inherently wrong with these efforts, If it can be demonstrated that the respective authors were particularly interested in certain aspects of collective political violence than in others, and that their parti­ cular concerns led them to base their typological schemes on certain attributes which they felt were more crucial than others However, how far this argument is true cannot be determined, since very few defend their choice of certain criterion(criteria) over others. 51

The problem with these types of univariate, blvarlate or trlvariate classifIcatory schemes is quite obvious. Classifica­

tion of complex historical and social phenomenon such as collective political violence entails taking into consideration a varied array of important variables. No one variable can adequately characterize and differentiate one type of collective political violence (CPV) from

the other. All elements taken together give each species of CPV Its unique form and character.

A single variable could adequately characterize any type of CPV, if its relations of covariance with other elements could be satisfactorily established. When this is achieved"conceivably, we may discover that, once the objective or participant structure or destructiveness or some other feature of an Internal war is known, everything about it is known as well" (Eckstein, 1964: 19).

However, in order to realize this objective, it is imperative that a satisfactory typology be developed, one that takes into consideration all the varied attributes which gives each mode of

CPV its distinct pattern. Because, only by developing such a typology will we be able to point out the degree and nature of correlation between the different variables, which play a significant role in determining each type of CPV. Besides by developing a multivariate model for our typology, we can apply it to concrete cases and exactly determine to what extent they resemble the ideal. And as Eckstein so rightfully contends:

If one can establish how far any given case diverges from type, one can also determine to what extent a generaliza­ tion about the type can apply to it. The most obvious means for assessing degree of divergence from type is of course a 52

close comparison of the elements of the cases involved. One case may have the six of the seven elements of the type, another five; one case may one element of a type in impure form, another two, and so forth. The more such typical ele­ ments are present in pure form, the less a theory about the type should need modification to fit the atypical case. And in the world of phenomena there will always be atypical cases to plague the theorist. Such extensions of theories about types to atypical cases (and thus to the whole of one's sub­ ject) are not possible at all unless one constructs typologies from a proper analysis of the elements in a complex phenomenon (Eckstein, 1964: 20-21).

In Table 11 an effort is made to demonstrate the degree

to which the schemes reviewed earlier exhaust the multivariate model developed for this study, in terms of their variable criterion/crite­ ria. As can be gathered from this table, a predominant amount of emphasis is placed on the variables 'idea* and 'class' for developing

the typologies. Subsequently, it also demonstrates the lack of even partial exhaustiveness of the entire list of attributes which give each type of CPV its particular form and character.

Classification and definition are two processes in the delimitation of a subject matter that go hand in hand. Classifying phenomena in terms of certain attributes entails defining them in terms of those attributes. However, in situations as we have dis­ cussed above, where no definite criterion for classification can be discerned, the resulting definitions are also arbitrary. Therefore, with no definite set of criteria to show the way, each writer has his own unique classifIcatory scheme and subsequently a unique set of ter­ minology and definitions to denote the same process or processes.

The consequence of all this has not been too good. Firstly, because this means that every time we encounter a new piece of literature on collective political violence, we are exposed to a whole new set of 53

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terms and definitions. And secondly, such a state of affairs does not

help the task of verification or replication of existing findings In

the field of CPV.

This confusion over terminology Is most rampant In two

specific areas, as demonstrated in the typological schemes discussed

earlier -

(i) First, the confusion over type and technique.

(11) Second the confusion resulting from the use of terms which are usually considered exclusive, in a manner as to give the Impression that they are Interchangeable.

Let us delineate a little more on these issues. One

area of major mix-up, as far as terminology is concerned has been the

result of the failure to distinguish between types of collective poli­

tical violence, and techniques of violence used within individual

CPV's. Thus, rebellion is a type of collective political violence, whereas riot, civil war, or guerrilla warfare are techniques, which

can be used singly or in combination to effect a rebellion. Techniques or tactics of violence are one among many attributes which give a cer­

tain mode of CPV, its distinct form. They are Integral parts of CPV but it is very erroneous to confuse them as modes of CPV. The most

Important distinction between type of CPV and techniques of CPV, is

the fact that whereas the former has a political stand or character,

the latter is politically neutral. Riots, civil war, guerrilla war­ fare, terrorism are themselves ideologically neutral, what ensues from

their utilization has an ideological stand - this way or that way.

However, each type of CPV, revolution or rebellion has an ideological character, thus we talk of Communist revolutions or Millenarian 55

rebellions.

In his work. Janos appears to be aware of this distinc-

tion, since his classification scheme categorizes 'techniques' of

authority transfer specifically. Unfortunately, Oppenheimer and Gurr

do not qualify for such clarity in their specifications. Thus, Oppen­

heimer deals with 'rebellion', 'peasant uprisings', 'riots’, and

'terrorism' - in a way to give the impression that they were all,

types of CPV, without specifying that the first two were modes/pat­

terns, whereas the other two were techniques Similarly, Gurr puts

'revolts' and 'rebellions' alongside 'riots', 'civil war' and 'guer­

rilla warfare' - all on the same level of subcategories. Putting

'type' and 'technique' in the same category, is like putting the

chicken and the egg, all on the same stage In the causal process.

Before moving into our next area of "semantic incohe­

rence", a few words need to be said about the coup d'etat, and its war-time or post-war variation the putsch. Strictly speaking, coup

d'etat (putsch) also refers to a particular technique of political violence - in which "the first tactical move is almost as a rule the

seizure of the means of violence, of the military or of the police

establishment" (Gross, 1958: 39). Or as Janos would contend, it

involves "annihilation in the military arena". But unlike other

techniques, coup d'etat possesses a definite political stand in that

it indicates the targets of action and also its immediate goals.

Thus, when reference is made to a CPV characterized as a coup d'etat we are Immediately aware of the following Information:

Target: Existing personnel in the positions of authority such as President or King. 56

(ii) Objective: Expulsion of such personnel and assumption of vacated positions by members of the coup.

(iil) Technique: Infiltration and occupation of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus* which is then used to displace the authorities from the control of the remainder.

Riots, civil war, terrorism and guerrilla warfare have no such Independent characteristics. If not specified otherwise, riots, civil wars, terrorisms and guerrilla warfare do not indicate anything beyond their specific techniques, The point being made here is that, coup d'etat is more than a technique of violence - it is an independent mode of collective political violence with an immediate goal and strategy.

Therefore, one arena of terminological confusion in the classification schemes of CPV ensues from the inability to distinguish type from technique. Furthermore, this situation is aggravated since writers cannot or rather will not follow a standardized set of termi­ nology. Everyone has to come up with his/her own set of arbitrary definitions. As a result, in its most critical phase what one refers to as a technique (Example: Jano's category of Terrorism as an initial stage technique) the other refers to as a full fledged type of violent protest (Example: Oppenheimer's use of the category 'terro­ rism' ).

Our next source of terminological disarray results from the totally arbitrary use of such terms as 'revolutions', 'rebellions' and 'coup d'etat'. A general theoretical and historical survey of the extant literature on collective political violence by specialists and laymen alike, reveals that there Is a distinct difference between 57

revolution, rebellion and coup d'etat, and that it is quite erroneous

to use then as if they were Interchangeable,

On the basis of our extensive survey of the literature

on CPV, we were able to discern a general idea, on which a majority of

the social scientists agree about the generalized 'ideal-typical'

form which these CPV's assumed namely, revolution, rebellion etc.

A revolution is generally believed to be based on the

idea of bringing about fundamental change in the socio-economic and

political strcture of the society. Significant changes in the pro­

perty system, in the distribution of power in the entire sub and

super structure of society. Thus, it is contended that revolutions go beyond the mere substitution of personnel in the positions of autho­

rity, it goes beyond the restructuring of the authority system - it attempts to bring about changes in the power base. They are generally held to be mass phenomenon. They are, therefore, prolonged, violent crisis based mainly on the spontaneity of the masses rather than a priori planning by an elitist group.

There is a general tendency among writers to charac­

terize a rebellion, as a "revolutionary outbreak that has not yet succeeded" (Oppenheimer, 1969: 18). It is generally held that a rebellion is a rising of sufficient proportion to challenge the existing authority structure seriously, but without the capacity to create an alternate authority (Bell, 1976: 7). Therefore, according to these opinions, rebellions primarily imply failure. Since they do

fail, it is very difficult to attribute specific goals and objectives

to rebellions, "except through speculation". And since there are no 58 guidelines for standard speculative procedures - It is understandable why researchers have come up with such divergent views on what rebel­ lions try to do. So, according to Arendt (1963) rebellions .... Mdo not indicate radical change .... but is a matter of only exchanging the person in authority." According to Kornhauser, (1964:142) they are, "ways of making demands on authority for the change of specific acts, rulers, structures of authority." On the other hand Lewis and

Hartford (1974) contend that they are baBed on "economic grievances of the peasantry." The Encyclopeadia of the Social Sciences, consi­ ders rebellions as "uprising intended to effect territorial autonomy or independence." And last but not least, according to Russell

(1974:56) rebellions are "violent power struggles in which the over­ throw of the regime is threatened." As we see there is little con­ sensus about the aims and objectives of a rebellion. In a situation like this, where there are no definite opinions about the idea of a

CPV, we shall have to resort to other sources. As was indicated in the first chapter, whenever we are faced with a case in which there are considerable ambiguities about the objectives which the CPV is pursuing, we shall use the magnitude or intensity of the action as an indication of whether the authority structure is threatened or not. Following this recourse we can assert with a certain degree of caution that an uprising which is relatively significant in its pro­ portions but is susceptible to rapid suppression by more than regular apparatus of the government is a rebellion which desired to over­ throw the government. On the other hand one that was relatively insignificant in its proportions and quickly suppressed by normal 59 governmental apparatus, was a rebellion with limited, non-political aims. Therefore, the primary criterion identifying rebellions are the fact that they imply failure. According to Russell (1974), the most significant difference between revolutions and rebellions are the fact that revolutions refer to changes which are made possible by a successful rebellion. A rebellion which fails never makes way for a revolution, since no changes ensue from the process.

Contrary to the case of rebellion, there is very little dissensus over the nature of coup d ’etat. It is generally recognised as a forceful, violent and sudden overthrow of the persons in the positions of authority. It often involves a secretive well organized group whose sole Intention is to simply substitute the personnel in the positions of authority. The coup in Itself does not seek to reconstruct the country's fundamental political, economic or social structure - this might follow after the replacement has been carried out in the positions of authority. The coup in itself simply aims at exchanging persons in the positions of authority with others from

Its own rank and file.

It was felt necessary to go into this consideration of these three types of CPV, revolution, rebellion, and coup d'etat - be­ cause this has demonstrated to us that they refer to quite exclusive patterns of collective political violence, and that it is highly erroneous to consider them interchangeable, or to handle the termino­ logy in a manner as to imply that they were Interchangeable.

The literature on collective political violence abounds with instances of such usage. For example, Johnson in his analysis 60 continuously juggles the terms revolution and rebellion as If they were referring to the same type of CPV, Similarly, when It comes to qualifying his category of the Conspiratorial coup d'etat' - he refers to It as attempts at revolutionary change by a small elite.

But as we have just seen, a coup d'etat's sole purpose. Its immediate objective, is simply replacement. No apriori assumptions can be made about what happens after that. And whenever a coup d'etat brings to power a group of individuals who bring about fundamental, revolutionary changes in the sub and super structure of the society- in such instances the coup is simply regarded as a technique of vio­ lence, a means to an end. Example: The October coup in Russia in

1917, which led to the realization of the revolution.

Similarly, Gross' use of the term 'revolution from above' to signify his category of collective political violence which utilizes the technique of coup d'etat - is technically erro­ neous. For, the coup d'etat does not necessarily imply revolutionary change in itself. It would be helpful at this point to recount

Huntingtons’ classification of coup d'etat. He differentiated bet­ ween the 'governmental coup' and the 'revolutionary coup'. In situations where the coup overthrows the persons in the positions of power in order to establish those persons in authority who shall effect fundamental changes in society - in such instances the coup is a technique of revolutionary violence. However, whenever the coup simply exchanges the personnel in the positions of authority with members from its own rank and file, without effecting fundamental changes, in these situations coup d'etat is an Independent mode of collective political violence or according to Huntingtons' 61 classification - it is a governmental coup.

The term*palace revolution' as used by so many writers

(Gross* Lasswell and Kaplan, Hagoplan) Is equally unnecessary and misleading. Since it never implies any fundamental changes in the social structure. Palace revolutions Involve the removal of the president or the king - in this situation the most appropriate and adequate (though less dramatic) terminology is coup d'etat.

Criteria For Satisfactory Typology

A typological scheme to be considered adequate must satisfy the following criteria:- (Eckstein and Gurr, 1975:357)

(1) Inclusiveness - A proper typological scheme must have empirical cases to justify each of its categories. Nothing theoretical can be said about empty categories.

(2) Exhaustlveness -The categories must be exhaustive enough to accomodate the varied manifestations of CPV. The larger the number of cases in a non-category, the less adequate is the classification.

(3) Unambivalence and unambiguity - "Typologies have the purpose of providing descriptive infor­ mation in short-hand ways. They can hardly achieve this goal if the classes of which they consist do not have pre­ cisely defined traits - that is, are 'ambiguous*. If the definitions of types make it difficult to determine whether a case belongs to one class or another, which is the essence of ambiguity, des­ cribing cases by the names of classes conveys more noise than Information. ... From this objective of classification it also follows that classes in a good typo­ logy must not be 'ambivalent'. (Eckstein and Gurr,1975(357-358) 62

The most appropriate way In which the adequacy of the existing typological schemes surveyed here can be ascertained In

terms of the criteria mentioned above - is by applying them to empirical cases of CPV and to determine how far they approximate the real world phenomena.

So far as 'inclusiveness' is concerned, it is quite fair to say that most of the categories evolved by the social scien­ tists in their respective classification schemes approximate to a satisfactory degree instances of CPV in the real world. This is

Indicated by the fact that each category is usually qualified by an empirical example.

However, determining the 'exhaustiveness1 of particu­ lar typological schemes is purely an empirical exercise. We can simply speculate, on the basis of their theoretical soundness, at this point. As indicated before, most of these typological schemes are not based on multiple attributes. They are usually based on the accentuation of one, two, or three attributes. It is highly unlike­ ly, therefore, that typologies with such a limited variable base can adequately accomodate or account for even slightly atypical cases.

Classification schemes based on multiple variables can account for the degree to which the 'typical' categories fit the 'atypical* empirical cases. However, since all the schemes discussed above fall to to put forward a multivariate model of classification - it Is highly unlikely that they will satisfy the criterion of 'exhaustive­ ness '.

So far as clarity and definitiveness in the terminology 63

Is concerned - our views were expressed In the previous section.

Our analysis upto this point has revealed that we are

still far from a satisfactory typology of collective political vio­

lence. It is rather surprising that given the incredible mass of

literature on the phenomenon of political violence, the typological schemes do not even partially exhaust the relevant material avai­

lable.

The typology which is being developed here, will be used in an attempt to correct the deficiencies revealed in the pre­ vious schemes. Most Importantly, it is based on a multivariate model of collective political violence. Moreover, we apply the 'ideal typical' model to a set of empirical cases of CPV - to determine how far they resemble the ideal and to what degree they deviate from the ideal.

In the rest of this chapter, we shall attempt to develop the 'ideal typical* test model of CPV.

The Test Model Of CPV

The multivariate model which we introduced in the first chapter forms the basis of our 'test typological model of collective political violence*. Logically the twelve variables and their forty different variations can be combined in N number of ways. In order to develop an exhaustive typology of CPV, it might be considered imperative to Include all the N combinations. However, in view of the fact that the forty sub-variables could be combined in almost an 64

Infinite number of ways - such an approach had obviously to be abandoned. For the purposes of simplicity, plausibility and genera- lizability, we have limited ourselves to formulating a test model of CPV by incorporating into our scheme only a certain number of multivariate combinations. We have chosen five such combinations, on the basis of the assumption that each of these combinations approximate a particular type of CPV in the real world more than others.

On the basis of our critique of the extant literature on CPV, we can generally conceptualize CPV's such as revolutions, rebellions, coup d'etat, revolt, and so on - in terms of combina­ tion of certain values on the multiple variables. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, social scientists generally agree on the overall characteristics that distinguish between revolution, rebel­ lion, coup, people's war and so on. They might disagree on the

Intricacies involved in each of these cases, but so far as a general characterization is concerned - there is considerable consensus.

Our familiarity with the literature, exposure to historical accounts, and basic intuition, have provided us with clues about their typical characteristics. These clues would aid us in deriving the 'ideal typical* combinations of the multivariables for the 'test model' of

CPV. In developing the typology of CPV, therefore, we shall follow these characterizations while attributing certain values on the variables as typical of the multivariate combinations idealizing varied types of collective political violence. Each type of CPV can be represented in terms of a combination of the multiple 65 variables. Example: Combination 1, may reflect the characteristics of a 'revolution', combination 2 may reflect the characteristics of a

'coup d'etat', and so on. The five multivariate combinations of CPV which we develop here constitute ideal types, and as such rarely exist in their pure form. However, as we discussed in our general critique of typologies - a typology to be considered satisfactory must be inclusive i.e. - it must have certain empirical cases to

Justify each category. If in the subsequent analysis, that Is,when this typology is applied to a set of empirical cases, we end up with a heap of residual cases which cannot be satisfactorily categorized under any of the categories of this model scheme, we shall conclude that the categories of this 'ideal typical' typology were in fact invalid. For, the larger the number of cases in a non-category, the less adequate is the classification scheme.

In developing the 'test model' these steps shall be followed:

First, the mode of collective political violence which we contend best typifies the particular combination of multiple varia­ bles is identified.

Second, a substantive definition of this particular CPV is offered, which essentially is a synthesis of the elements which authors on collective political violence identify as crucial In determining its form and character.

Third, the multivariate combination derived on the basis of the definition and its implications - is presented.

Lastly, the entire set of multivariate combinations and 66

the CPV'a which they characterize are presented In the form of a teat model of collective political violence. 67

Conclusion

In this chapter the classificatory schemes developed by various authors on collective political violence were reviewed.

A general critique was presented on the adequacy of such typologies.

On the basis of the multivariate model developed earlier In the work, and the characterizations which writers on political violence attribute to the various modes of collective political violence, the test model of political violence Is developed. This model presents a summary description of five types of collective political violence, In terms of their variable characterizations The Multi­ variate combinations and the test model are presented in the next few pages.

The adequacy of this test model, its degree of resemblance to the empirical categories of collective political vio­ lence, will be determined later in the work, by applying it to a set of empirical cases of CPV. 68

The Multivariate Combinations

Combination 0 1 CPV 1

Exemplar Revolution

Definition Revolutions go beyond simple substitution of personnel in the positions of authority. They usually involve substantial and fundamental change in the socio-economic and the political structure of the society. It, generally, is a prolonged, elite directed, violent crisis based on the spontaneity of the masses rather than a-priori planning.

Codesheet of CPV 1

Structural Variables

(a) Ideas - Structural/transitional (b) Strategy - Combinational (c) Class Character - Petit Bourgeois/Prole­ tarian (d) Leadership Structure - Centralized/ Decentralized (e) Leadership Class - Petit Bourgeois/Prole­ tarian (f) Organization - Spontaneous/Semi organized

Extent Variables

(a) Participation - Considerable (1000 +) (b) Duration - More than six months Week to six months Less than a week (c) Amount of violence - Considerable (d) Area - Disturbance in capital city, dis­ turbance engulfing the entire country

Extraneous Variables

(a) Government response - violent/positive (b) Armed force disloyalty - High

Example Russia, 1917 69

Combination 2 CPV 2

Exemplar Rebellion (Synonyms - Uprising, Insurrection, Commune)

Definition Typically a CPV classified as a rebellion Is a spontaneous, violent, armed uprising of suffi­ cient proportion to challenge seriously the existing regime, but that which has not suc- ceded yet and is susceptible to rapid suppre- sion by normal procedures of internal security

Codesheet of CPV 2

Structural Variables

(a) Ideas - Exchange/Structural (b) Strategy - Open (c) Class Character - Petit Bourgeois/Prole­ tarian

Extent Variables

(a) Participation - Some/considerable (b) Duration - Less than a week Week to six months (c) Violence - Some/considerable (d) Area - Provincial/Country

Extraneous Variables

(a) Government Response - Violent (b) Armed Force Disloyalty - Nil

Example Parris Commune, 1871 70

Combination 3 CPV 3

Exemplar Coup d'etat (putsch)

Definition The coup d'etat Is a forceful violent and sudden overthrow of the persons in the posi­ tions of authority. It involves quite often a secretive well organized military group which simply alms at substituting an elite by other members of the elite.

Codesheet of CPV 3

Structural Variables

(a) Ideas - Exchange (b) Strategy - Conspiratorial/Combinational (c) Class Character - Petit Bourgeois/Bourgeois (d) Leadership Structure - Centralized ( e ) Leadership Class - Bourgeois/Petit Bourgeois (f) Organization - Organized

Extent Variables

(a) Participation - Few/Some/Considerable (b) Duration - Less than a week (c) Violence - Minimum/Some (d) Area - Capital City

Extraneous Variables

(a) Government Response - Positive/Violent (b) Armed Force Disloyalty - High

Example Egypt, 1952 71

Combination 4 CPV 4

Exemplar People's War (Peasant War)

Definition People's Wars usually espouse fundamental changes in the socio-economic and political structure of the society. Its principal parti­ cipants are the peasants, and Its centerstage the country side. By employing protracted guerrilla warfare, Its final strategy is based on the Idea of encirclement of the cities by the rebel rural base areas, and the final cap­ ture or 'strangulation' of the city

Codesheet of CPV 4

Structural Variables

(a) Ideas - Structural (b) Strategy - Combinational/Open (c) Class Character - Peasant/Petit Bourgeois (d) Leadership Structure - Centralized/ Decentralized (e) Leadership Class - Peasant/Petit Bourgeois (f) Organization - Organized/Semiorganlzed Spontaneous

Extent Variables

(a) Participation - Considerable (b) Duration - Week to six months/Slx months + (c) Violence - Considerable (d) Area - Entire Country

Extraneous Variables

(a) Government Response - Violent/Positive (b) Armed Force Disloyalty - Nil/Low

Example China, 1949 72

Combination 5 CPV 5

Exemplar Revolt (Peasant Rebellion, Peasant Uprising, Jacquerie)

Definition Revolt or peasant rebellion is a spontaneous violent armed rising of the peasantry, which can challenge seriously the existing regime, but that which is susceptible to rapid suppre- sion

Codesheet of CPV 5

Structural Variables

(a) Ideas - Exchange/Structural (b) Strategy - Combinational/Open (c) Class Character - Peasant (d) Leadership Structure - Decentralized (e) Leadership Class - Peasant (f) Organization - Spontaneous

Extent Variables

(a) Participation - Some/Considerable (b) Duration - Less than a week/Week to six months (c) Violence - Some/Considerable (d) Area - Provincial/Country

Extraneous Variables

(a) Government Response - Violent (b) Armed Force Disloyalty - Nil

Example Autumn Harvest Uprising in China, 1927 73 Guide to the Ideal Typical Test Model of CPV

STRUCTURAL VARIABLES

Ideas - 1. Exchange of personnel in positions of power 2. Constitutional Change 3. Structural Chage 4. Transitional - (Ideas chage from one of the above to the other)

Strategy - 1. Open 2. Conspiratorial 3. Combination of 1 and 2

Class - 1. Bourgeois 2. Petit Bourgeois 3. Proletariat 4. Peasant

Leadership 1. Centralized (Structure) 2. Decentralized

Leadership 1. Bourgeois (Class) 2 » Petit Bourgeois 3. Proletariat 4. Peasant

Organization 1. Spontaneous 2. Semi Organized 3. Organized

EXTENT VARIABLES

Participation 1. Few (Less than 500) 2. Some (501 - 1000) 3. Considerable (1000 +)

Duration 1. Less than a week 2. Week to six months 3. Six months +

Violence 1. Minimum (Less than 50 casualties) 2. Some (50 - 150) 3. Considerable (More than 150)

Area 1. Locally concentrated 2. Disturbance in a larger province, Important city 3. Disturbance In capital city, entire country 74

EXTRANEOUS VARIABLES

Government 1. Positive (Indicating success of CPV) Response 2. Nonviolent 3. Violent

Armed Force 1. Nil Disloyalty 2. Low 3. High Table 12

Ideal Typical Test Model Of Collective Political Violence

Extraneous Structural Variables Extent Variables Variables Ideas Stra- Class LS 1 LS 2 Organi­ Parti­ Dura­ Vio- Area G.R AFD tegy zation cipa­ tion lence tion

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 12 12 3 4 12 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 3 12 3 12 3 12 3 12 3

CPV 1 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Revolution

CPV 2 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Rebellion

CPV 3 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + Coup D'etat

CPV 4 + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + People's War

CPV 5 4- 4.+ + + + ++ ++++ ++++ + + Revolt Chapter III

The Methodological Procedure

Introduction

This chapter Is divided into three major subdivisions:

In the first part we elaborate the procedure which was

followed in order to develop a universe of collective political vio­

lence. Following this the rudiments of the sampling procedure are

discussed. And finally the sample is presented.

The second part deals with the multivariate model outlined earlier in the work. Here we operationalize the variables which con­ stitute the multivariate model in a way so as to make them amenable

to quantitative analysis.

Lastly the statistical technlquef which we shall use to analyze the data in order to discern patterns (groupings) of collec­ tive political violence, will be discussed. The statistical tech­ nique of cluster analysis is regarded as the most appropriate proce­ dure to group individuals or objects into categories.

76 77

The Sampling Procedure and Sample

The Universe

The universe as designated here refers to all cases of collective political violence which have occurred in the first seventy years of the present century, in all countries which were members of the United Nations in 1973. (A total of 135 countries).

United Nations membership was used, since it ensures a certain degree of homogeneity in the sample in terms of interna­ tional political status of countries in which CPV occurs. And as was indicated in the first chapter, the definition of collective political violence requires that they occur in countries which have achieved independent political status. UN membership assures us that this criterion is being met. In the case of countries which once were under foreign domination, only those cases of CPV have been con­ sidered which occur after the country achieved independent status.

Following Russell (1974: 70) the universe of CPV was created by consulting the historical sections in the Encyclopeadia

Brlttanica (1975) of all these countries. While consulting the

Encyclopeadia Brlttanlca (EB) we made note of any reference which in­ dicated a violent political upheaval, for which an approximate date could be Inferred. This exercise resulted in a list of 205 possible cases of collective political violence, in 135 countries between

1900-1975. This, however, did not constitute our final universe. A lot more Investigation had to be done before the 'final universe' was compiled with some degree of certainty that the cases met all our definitional criteria of a successful or unsuccessful CPV.

In the second stage of our universe selection process,

each of the 205 cases were subjected to detailed scrutiny. Here we

attempted to derive further Information on each of these cases from

(1) New International Year Book; and (11) The Annual Register of World

Events. These yearbooks were selected instead of others due to the

relatively extensive Information which we found on most countries In

them, Usually Information from one had to be suuplemented with Infor­

mation from the other. As can be Imagined this was the most time

consuming endeavour In the entire project. This second stage proce­

dure doubly ensured that all cases In the universe were valid so far

as our definitional criteria were concerned.

As a result of our second stage examination of all the

cases of CPV, a number of the original 205 had to be discarded:

(1) Whenever further Investigation revealed that the CPV waB

essentially 'nonviolennt* and 'bloodless' - since this did not fit

our criterion of violent political action. Example; Nonviolent Coup

In Mall, 1968.

(2) Whenever sources indicated that the violence was seces-

sionlstic, or was primarily racial, ethnic, religion or territory oriented - In which the existing authority Is not overthrown, only

the establishment of an alternate seat of government along acceptable * racial, ethnic, religion or territorial lines Is attempted. Example:

Nigeria, 1966.

However, when such racial, ethnic or religious upheavals overlap with political violence in such a way that the existing regime la threatened then In that case the Instance of CPV in the universe would not be dis­ carded. 79

(3) Whenever it Is Indicated that a substantial amount of foreign troops were Involved either to strengthen the CPV or to sup­ press it. Example : Nicaragua, 1928.

(4) Whenever the CPV occurs before the country in question attained political Independence. Example: Malaysia, 1948.

(5) Whenever sources indicate that despite substantial violence there was no reason to believe that the regime was threa­ tened, Example: Indonesia, 1965.

(6) Whenever information was so Inadequate that no commit­ ment could be made about the validity of the case one way or the other.

After we had completed this second stage in the com­ pilation of the universe, quite a few of the original 205 cases were discarded, leaving us with a final universe of 120 cases of collec­ tive political violence, which to our best knowledge fulfilled all the definitional criteria of CPV.

Before the sample could be drawn another task had to be completed. This Involved dividing the final universe into two groups on the basis of their outcome. One group consisted of all successful cases of CPV, i.e., those which succeeded In overthrowing the regime; the other consisted of those which did not succeed.

Contrary to expectations, the sample split up into almost equal num­ bered subaanples. The subsample of successful CPVs was 61 and the subsample of unsuccessful CPVs was 59. The universe was divided into successful and unsuccessful CPVs In order to facilitate the drawing of the sample in a way such that the intervening variables deter- 80

mining outcome can be discernible.

The Sample

In order to ensure:

a) representativeness in our sample of CPV in countries with different levels of socio-economic development and professing different ideologies; and

b) subsequent control for variations which can result from having different levels of development and pursuing different ideo­ logies . a proportional stratified sampling procedure was decided upon.

In a proportional stratified sample the first step Is to divide all units in the population into categories or 'strata* in terms of a pre-designed criterion or a set of criteria and then draw

Independent samples from each category in proportion to their relative strength.

Due to the nature of our 'universe*, attempts at stratifying had to start by forming categories of the countries in which CPV occurs. Once this task was accomplished, Independent samples of CPV were drawn from each of these categories of countries.

In designating the criterion for stratifying the nations, we have been Influenced by two sets of facts.

Horowitz's theory on international stratification and the 'three worlds of development* gave us an obvious clue about the fundamental divisions in the world. Horowitz's theory explains:

the interaction and interpretation of the three main sources of economic, political and social power in the world today; the First world of the United States and Its Western allies, the Second world of the Soviet Union and Its Eastern Bloc allies, and the Third world 81 of non-aligned, but variously committed nations of Latin America, Asia and Africa, (Horowitz, 1966; vli).

U Thant's contention that the General Assembly is a

'realistic representation of the present day world' (quoted in Alker and Russet, 1965: 2) indicated that the pattern of international stra­ tification is reflected in the United Nations.

Alker and Russets' World Politics in the General

Assembly provided definite proofs for such a criterion. Their factor analysis of Issues and alignments in the General Assembly yielded cer­ tain groupings which almost converge with Jalee's (1969) division of the world on the basis of the predominant economic systems and levels of economic development In different countries.

The primary purpose of Alker and Russetts* research was to uncover alignments of nations In their stand on main and dis­ tinctive issues brought before the General Assembly. By factor ana­ lyzing the 'roll calls' on different Issues In the Assembly and plot­ ting the factor scores in terms of a graph, Alker and Russett show the degree of cohesiveness of member nations in the different groupings and alsothe direction of dissent of deviant members. Their analysis uncovers a rather distinct east-west, north-south alliance (Fig. 1).

The plotting of factor score suggests a definite north-west, north-east, south-west and south-east alliance. The only exceptions appear to be Uruguay, Ethiopia and Guatemala. Nevertheless, the existence of issue alignments in the United Nations seems too obvious to be denied.

Jalee's analysis of 'Third World in World Economy' reveals similar divisions. Jalee bases his division primarily on 82

NORTH

SOVIET 8CANI b l o c ' GROUP

MM 1.0

COMMONWEALTH M M M TV MALA WEST EAST

“ *■** w «m u u /T\ ♦ 1.0

LATH AMERICAN GROUP

mu ■ L

A R A B G R O U P

SOUTH

Figure 1

Source: Alker, H. R. and Bruce M. Russett. World Politics In the General Assembly, 1965: 50. 63

demographic data, data on indices of economic development, data on

indices of social development of the countries of the world. Jalee's

categories refer to the distinctions among the countries also in terms

of differences in the socio-economic systems. He makes, this distinc­

tion by dividing the world into countries with planned economies

(socialist) and countries with market economies (capitalist), and by

sub-dividing the latter Into developed countries with market economies

and developing countries with market economies. This research yields

the following groupings:

COUNTRIES FORMING THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM

U.S.S.R.. the People's Democracies of Europe (including Yugoslavia), China, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba.

COUNTRIES FORMING THE CAPITALIST SYSTEM

U.S.A., Canada, Europe (excluding the U.S.S.R and the People's Democracies), Japan, Israel, Australia and New Zealand.

UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES. OR THE THIRD WORLD

America (excluding the U.S.A., Canada, and Cuba), the whole of Africa, Asia (excluding the socialist countries, Japan and Israel), Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand).

Jalee's grouping of countries forming the socialist

system (excluding China) converges with Alker and Russetts' N.E.

alliance, whereas the developed countries of the capitalist system

coverges with N.W. alliance, the entire Southern alliance coverges with Jalee's developing countries of the capitalist system.

It should be noted that Alker and Russetts' work was carried out before China was admitted to the UN - hence the discrepancy. 84

The entire point In discussing Alker and Russett, and

Jalee’s work has been to prove the point that Horowitz's theory of

International stratification is reflected In the Issue alignments In the United Nations, as U Thant had contended, Proving this point was necessary since the criterion for stratifying our universe of CPV, as noted earlier had to start by dividing the countries In the United

Nations Into groups or categories. And our criterion for forming these categories was based upon the Idea of 'Three Worlds of Development'.

On the basis of Alker and Russett and Jalee's work we divide the mem­ ber nations Into three categories:

1. The First World Countries - This category comprises of the developed capitalist countries, U.S.A., Canada, Western European countries, Japan, Israel, Australia and New Zealand,

2. The Second World Countries - This category comprises of the socia­ list countries of the world. These countries are U.S.S.R., China, the East European countries, North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba.

3. The Third World Countries - This category comprises of the deve­ loping countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania.

Once these divisions were made, independent samples of

CPV were drawn from each of these categories In proportion to the number of countries In each of these divisions.

It was expected that such a sampling procedure would ensure: a) representativeness of CPV in countries with different levels of eco­ nomic development and pursuing different ideologies; b) control for intervening variables which can result from different levels of economic development and different economic systems.

In keeping with our intention about drawing a propor­ tional stratified random sample, we first had to stratify the universe 85

in terms of the three categories identified; CPVs in the First world

countries, CPVs in the Second world countries and CPVs in the Third world countries. By following this procedure we came up with 17

successful CPVs and 25 unsuccessful CPVs in the First world countries;

11 successful and 6 unsuccessful CPVs In the Second world countries and

33 successful and 28 unsuccessful CPVs in the Thirl world countries.

Following this procedure the sample was drawn. Ori­

ginally a rather ambitious sample of n ■ 60 was planned in which 30 would be successful and 30 would be unsuccessful. However, in view of

the disproportionate amount of time that would be needed to gather data

for 60 cases of CPV - it was decided to cut the original size in half and thus have a sample size n *30 (15 successful and 15 unsuccessful).

The total sample of n ■ 30 (or subsample 1, n - 15 and subsample 2, n » 15) had to be drawn from the three stratas of countries in proportion to the total number of CPVs in each. Drawing a propor­ tional random sample was necessary, since, otherwise there was a sig­ nificant probability that due to the overabundance of CPVs in the Third world countries, the final sample might be made up totally of CPVs in those countries. Therefore, It was decided that the samples would be drawn in such a manner so as to ensure proportional representation for each of the groupings of countries. Subsequently in each of the samples, 3-4 cases were from First world countries, 2 cases from

Second world countries and 9-10 cases from Thirld world countries were drawn.

The next step was the actual drawing of the samples.

Numbers were assigned to each case and a simple random sample from a 86 table of random numbers was drawn for each strata.

After the two final subsamples of collective political violence were drawn, each case was subsequently studied in great depth to acquire the necessary Information. At this point we realized that there was still a possibility that one or more of the cases In the final sample might turn out to be Invalid - and we kept the possibility of replacing these cases with other more valid ones - open. Fortunately none of the cases In the final sample were invalidated as a result of further research. Information for a few cases in the sample (espe­ cially Honduras 1933 and 1956) was rather insufficient. However, it was not felt that this plagued our research disproportionately. Sub­ sequently the cases were retained In the final sample.

Random Samples of CPV

Successful Unsuccessful

1. Portugal 1915 1. Germany 1919 2. Germany 1918 2. Greece 1935 3. France 1934 3. Spain 1934 4. Cuba 1958 4. Japan 1936 5. Russia 1917 5. Rumania 1907 6. Turkey 1908 6. Bulgaria 1923 7. Brazil 1930 7. Ethiopia 1960 8. Iraq 1958 8. Thailand 1933 9. Mexico 1910 9. El Salvador 1932 10. Afghanistan 1929 10. Peru 1932 11. Paraguay 1936 11. Honduras 1933 12. Haiti 1946 12. Turkey 1925 13. Yemen 1962 13. Panama 1958 14. Ghana 1966 14. Paraguay 1947 15. Bolivia 1952 15. Honduras 1956

The date Indicates the approximate time when the CPV succeeded or was contained. 87

After the final sample was drawn, the next task was to

go through as many historical accounts on each of these cases as was

deemed necessary to acquire data on each of the variables - specified

in the multivariate model. In all the cases, information obtained from

one source was verified with Information from others. In case of con­

flict, information supported by majority of the accounts was usually used. By following this procedure of using substantive verification

from multiple sources it was hoped to overcome the problem of relia­ bility of data derived from secondary sources - a problem which plagues most comparative historical research.

Operationalization of the multiple variables

As Indicated earlier, the multivariate model developed in this work consists of three sets of variables, which are, In fact, the building blocks of CPV. They give each type of CPV its particular form and distinctiveness. These three sets of variables are:

(1) The structural variables, (2) The extent variables, and (3) The extraneous variables.

In this section each of these sets would be elaborated, and the subvariables contained therein would be defined - in a manner that would make them observable in real world situations and amenable to quantitative testing.

Structural Variables

Structural variables refer to that set of variables which determine the primary form and character of CPV indigenously. 66

The variables included in this set are:

1. Ideas;

2. Strategy;

3. Class Character;

4. Class and Structure of Leadership;

5. Degree of planning.

Each of these variables are delineated below:

Ideas

The ideas of CPV are the reason why CPVs come into existence in the first place. They delineate the objectives and goals of CPV, They provide ’guidance and Justification’ (Leiden and Schmitt,

1968: 97) for CPV. We prefer the term 'ideas'rather than ’ideology’ - because we felt that the term 'ideas' was on a lower level of abstrac­ tion - than 'ideology'. By 'ideas' we refer to the exact changes which

CPV desires in specific aspects of the social structure, Whereas

'ideologies' can be realized more in terms of a congeries of phrases, rhetoric, vague ideas and symbols rather than a coherent guide to poli­ tical action, 'ideas' are an inherent part of 'ideology' from which it originates. However, it is easier to grasp the conceptual framework of exact ideas (such as overthrow of president), than the nuances of abstract ideological notions (such as eschatology). Therefore, for the purposes of empirical research the term 'ideas' was much preferred over

'Ideology'.

The ideas of CPV can undertake either of the following forms: 89

(a) CPV can aim at exchanging personnel In the positions of power with candidates provided by the rank and file of CPV. In such cases, CPV simply alms at replacing persons in the positions of autho­ rity. It does not desire any changes In the authority structure per se only in who occupies them.

(b) CPV can also aim at bringing about constitutional changes.

In these instances CPV aspires not only to exchange personnel in the positions of authority but also to bring about major changes in the structure of authority, I.e., In the organization of power; such as a change from Monarchy to Republic or the restoration of a constitution.

(c) CPV can strive towards bringing about structural change in society. In such cases, major reconstructing of the old order Is intended, In terms of changes in the systems of property and power distribution. CPVs with such Ideas aspire not only towards exchanging personnel In the positions of power/authority, or changing the autho­ rity structure, but also try to restructure the power base.

(d) The ideas of CPV can also take on a transitional form.

In such instances the ideas of CPV change from one of the above to the other. This is also the case when collective non-political violence

(such as food riots) transforms into collective political violence.

Strategy

The startegy of CPV Involves the techniques used to achieve the Ideas which CPV sets out for itself. This study, as was specified earlier, Is limited to only those Instances of CPV which 90 uses violence as a technique for achieving Its goals. We, therefore, exclude all those cases of collective political action which Involves non-violent techniques/strategies.

The strategies Involved In CPV can be braoadly classi­ fied Into techniques which Involve open Interaction between Insurgents and incumbents, and the other, which Involves conspiratorial or secre­ tive manoeuvres,

(a) The startegy of open violence usually takes the form of rioting (violent, disorganized, disorder - involving looting, destruction of property and injury to persons) and/or civil war (inter­ nal war between two segments of army and/or populace; one loyal to the regime, the other a rebel). In these forms of open violence, the Insur­ gents are Involved In direct, bloody confrontation with the armed forces of the Incumbents.

(b) Conspiratorial techniques of CPV represent "orga­ nized conflict behavior; I.e., behavior that is planned with definite objectives and methods In mind" (Rummel quoted In Bwy, 1968: 209).

These activities are also generally associated with a high degree of violence. Three specific conspiratorial techniques can be Identified: coup d'etat, terror and guerrilla warfare.

(i) The technique of coup d'etat Involves sudden, swift seizing, and usually killing, of the political elite. It also Indi­ cates Infiltration, penetration of critical structural points (example: military barracks, radio station, airport) in the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from the control of the remainder. (li) Terror includdes assassinations, kidnapping, boobing and sabotage Intended against the personnel and Instruments of the regime,

(ill) The essence of Guerrilla Warfare is laid down by Mao

Tse Tung &967: 82) where he writes:

"guerrilla warfare Is a protracted struggle, and the enemy is defeated more by attrition and demoralization than by decisive military confrontation",

Wrting about the essential tactic of guerrilla warfare, Mao Tse Tung contends:

"the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps we harass the enemy tires we attack; the enemy retreats we pursue"

Guerrilla warfare is always a technique employed by the objectively weaker Insurgents agalnstly the objectively stronger incumbents. Thus, they avoid positional warfare and the establishment of fixed battle lines and offers battle only 'when it will produce quick and favorable results for the guerrilla forces'.

(c) Strategy of CPV can also take the form of combi­ national tactic in which a combination of open and conspiratorial techniques Is used.

Class Character

It Is possible to classify CPV on the basis of the class character of Its participants. While there Is ambiguity Involved in the concept of class , we have no intention of getting Involved In a discussion of the pros and the cons of using one definition over the other. In the light of the fact that this study adopts a conflict 92 model of society, It Is considered appropriate to use 'class' from a

Marxian perspective. Besides, the Marxian class model is comprehen­ sive enough to accomodate both capitalistic and pre-capitalistlc societies. On the basis of the contention that the class of a person is determined by his/her relationship to the means of production, or in terms of his/her position in the social relations of production - a model of stratification is adopted in which is society is divided among the following classes; * (i) The Bourgeoisie - This class includes the major controllers of capital (big industrialists, bankers, owners of large enterprises), controllers of the land, the upper echelons of the ruling class and top ranking army/military officers with access and considerable influ­ ence in the decision making process.

(ii) The Upper Petit Bourgeoisie - This class is comprised of westernized intellectuals, civil service and white collar employees, western oriented merchants ('compradors', both native and foreign), small landowners, officials of traditional pre-western bureaucracies, the clergy, proprietors of enterprises, managerial and professional groups, and middle ranking army officers, such as Lieutenant, Captain,

Major, Colonel.

(ill) The Lower Petit Bourgeoisie - This class consists of the artisans, small local merchants, local tribal leaders, prosperous peasants, lower white collar employees (mostly clerical and sales

a Information on the constituents of each class, based on CHIROT's (1977) comparable exposition. 93 persons), trade union leaders, middle noncommissioned army personnel - such as corporal, sergeant,

(iv) Proletariat - The constituents in this class are the blue- collar workers in the industries and mines and the lowest echelons in the army, and the lower service workers, such as servants and janitors.

(v) Peasantry - Tenants or landless peasants, farm labourers, plantation workers make up this class.

Collective political violence can result from the par­ ticipation of any of these classes, singly or in combination with other classes.

Leadership Structure

The leadership structure of CPV can either be centra­ lized or decentralized.

(1) A CPV is considered as having centralized leadership when a single center of power, in terms of person(s) or group(s) can be identified (Gamson, 1975: 93).

(11) In the instance where such a power center in terms of per- son(s) or group(s) cannot be identified, the leadership structure of

CPV shall be regarded as decentralized.

Leadership Class

The character of CPV is also determined by the class origins of its leaders. The leaders of CPV could emerge from any of 94 the classes designated earlier:

(I) Bourgeoisie

(II) Upper Petlr Bourgeoisie

(ill) Lower Petit Bourgeoisie

(iv) Proletariat

(v) Peasantry

Organization

Organization implies systematic, aprlorl planning and

coordination of activities before the CPV ensues. CPVs can be differen­

tiated in terms of this variable. Thus we could have:

(1) CPVs which display high level of organization. CPVs are considered organized when a centralized leadership is Indicated, along with prior planning of strategy and targets of action, coordi­ nation of activities of large number of people, and occasionally the existence of a written manifesto of its ideas.

(II) or CPVs which are semi-organized, when the above con­ ditions for organization are satisfied only partially.

(III) or CPVs which are unorganized/spontaneous. In such cases action is totally uncoordinated and largely spontaneous. A central power center cannot be identified ; neither are there any indications of prior planning nor coordination of action. 95

Extent Variables

The extent variables measure the extent and Intensity of CPV. In evaluating the scale of the extent variables, we have adopted an index comparable to the one evolved by Russell (1974: 69).

(a) Participation

1 - few (Less than 500) 2 - some (501 - 1000) 3 - considerable (1000 + )

(b) Duration

1 ■ less than a week 2 - 1 week to six months 3 ■ more than six months

(c) Amount of violence

1 * minimum (less than 50 casualties) 2 - some (50 - 150) 3 ■ considerable (more than 150)

(d) Geographic Area

1 ■ locally concentrated (e.g., rural country) 2 * disturbance in a large province, important city, or a number of rural counties 3 ■ disturbance in capital city, several large provinces disturbance engulfing the entire country.

Extraneous Variables

The third set of variables which distinguish one CPV from the other by determining their different potential and outcome, are the extraneous variables. The variables under this set are;

(1) The Government Response Variables

and (ii) The Armed Force Disloyalty Variables 96

The government response variable determines the various types of government response, which CPV calls forth.

(a) Government response could take the positive form of resignation, abdication, dismissal, dissolution of the personnel In the positions of authority. This response Is concommltant to 'success' of CPV.

(b) Governement can respond negatively - that is by trying to contain CPV, Such negative responses could either be nonviolent, or violent. In case of nonviolent response, the government proclaims a state of emergency, martial law, or expatriates the key individuals in CPV.

(c) Government's efforts at repressing CPVs can also take violent forms. In such cases, government undertakes such actions as arrests, retributions, executions, counter-insurgency methods to repress CPV.

Armed Force Disloyalty

The variable, armed force disloyalty has been incor­ porated in our multivariate model, since it is considered very impor­ tant in determining the potential and eventual outcome of CPV. Armed force disloyalty can manifest in the following degrees:

(a) Armed force disloyalty could be nil. In this case the armed forces are absolutely loyal to the government. They have no overt sympathies for the rebel cause.

* Positive from the perspective of the participants in the CPV. 97

(b) Armed force disloyalty is considered low, when the entire/partial armed forces are unwilling to fight for the regime.

Armed force disloyalty Is also considered low, when less than 20 X of the entire armed force flghtB on the side of the rebels.

(c) Armed force disloyalty Is considered high, when the entire/partial (more than 20 X) armed forces, fights on the side of the rebels.

The Statistical Technique

As has been made quite clear in the preceedlng pages, the purpose of this dissertation is to evolve a typological scheme on the basis of the empirical data on the thirty cases of collective political violence, in order to determine how well this scheme resem­ bles the 'ideal typical test model'. Therefore, a statistical proce­ dure is needed which would help us in classifying our sample (n * 30) of CPV in terms of distinct patterns discernible in the data. The task of the statistical technique would be to reveal any groups/cate­ gories of comparable modes of CPV as there may be, and thus, determine if our sample could be classified into categories comparable to the types of CPV evolved in our test model. For the sake of clarifying the basic nature of the problem, it could be compared to a situation in which ten individuals (observations) are categorized in terms of fifteen traits (variables) such as - sex, ethnicity, color, height, weight, length of hair, color of eyes, IQ, SES, nationality, religion, language, education, rural-urban residence etc. 98

The problem undertaken by the present study is to cate­ gorize thirty cases of collective political violence (observations) In terms of the twelve variables delineated under the multivariate model.

On the basis of the review of literature on statis­ tical techniques for classifying data In terms of certain criterion/ criteria, the technique of cluster analysis Is found to be the most appropriate for this study. Because, cluster analysis Is equipped to analyze multivariate data In which given a sample of 'n' objects, cases or Individuals, each of which is measured on a set of 'v' variables, a classification scheme is devised for grouping the objects, cases or individuals into 'g' classes (Everitt,'?' : 1). Initially,

"little or nothing is known about the category structure. All that is available, is a collection of observa­ tions whose category memberships are unknown. The operational objective is to discover a category structure which fits the observation. The problem is frequently stated as one of finding the 'natural groups',In a more concrete sense, the objective is to sort the observations Into groups such that the degree of 'natural association' is high among members of the same group and low between members of different groups" (Anderberg, 1973: 2-3).

A variety of other statistical techniques have been employed in classifying data, such as factor analysis (Rummel, 1970), and multi-dlmenslonal scaling (Greene and Carmon, 1970). However, more recently the problem of classification has been successfully tackled by cluster analysis techniques, especially in the life sciences and the medical sciences.

Both cluster analysis and factor analysis are aspects of correlational analysis (Thorndike, 1976). Each procedure seeks to describe "the structure of a set of variables without reference to 99 any variable that Is not In the set M (Thorndike, 1978: 227). Cluster analysis has been called a "poor man's factor analysis" since computa­ tions Involved are much simpler than those Involved In factor analysis.

The results for each are derived from a correlation matrix of the variables which measure the observations. A positive correlation among the variables signifies that their vectores make an angle of less than 90° with each other in a scatter plot and that their vectors form a group or cluster. Thus highly correlated variables form a tighter group than do lowly correlated variables. Cluster analysis "provides a way of identifying those variables that tend to cluster In this way" by deriving a "coefficient of belonging" (Thorndike, 1978: 228).

Note that one of the Important differences between cluster analysis and factor analysis lies In the fact that "a variable

Is assigned to only one cluster, whereas factor analysis...breaks up the variance of a variable Into several additive parts" (Thorndike,

1978: 229). According to Thorndike (1978; 229-230), then, cluster analysis is the proper technique to use when the analysis goal Is to build up something (like a classification, for example) from several somethings (a number of variables). Factor analysis, on the other hand, Is used properly to break down something into several somethings

(the variance of variables into independent parts), "Both have their uses, but It Is a common mistake to consider clustering procedures to be poor relatives of the more elegant factoring ones" (Thorndike, 1978:

230).

In terms of the purposes of this study, the method of cluster analysis would seem to be appropriate as we wish to build 100 relatively Independent groupings "starting with a large number of separate observations and adding them, one by one" (Thorndike, 1978:

238). Thorndike states the case quite nicely:

Cluster analysis Is particularly appropralate for problems such as those In biological taxonomy. Ini­ tially each object (person, variable, or whatever) forms a cluster by Itself, Then, the two most simi­ lar clusters are joined, and a new value Is computed for the cluster which Is the average of the separate values for the members of the cluster. The procedure goes on combining clusters until there Is only one cluster, and It contains all the objects.

The Cluster Procedure

The 1976 manual of the Statistical Analysis System

(SAS) refers to the cluster procedure as performing hierarchical clus­ ter analysis, based on an algorithm originally used by Johnson (1967).

Hierarchical classification or clustering technique Is a sequence of classification in which larger clusters are obtained through the merger of small ones.

The basic procedure with all hierarchical clustering analysis Is similar. They begin with the computation of distance between each observation in the data set. The most commonly used distance measure is the Euclidean metric, where the distance between observation 1 and j denoted by d ^ is defined as

( P , I 1/2 - tkZ1

Euclidean distance used on raw data may be vary unsatisfactory If the scale of variables are not similar. 101

Integral to this distance measurement between obser­

vations Is the clustering of observations with minimum distance. The

two closest observations are combined Into one cluster, then the two

closest of the new set of clusters are combined into a cluster - and

so the process continues by reducing the number of successive clusters.

Ideally the process Is performed (n-1) times, at which point there will be only one cluster. This process can be demonstrated by taking

the example of a Bample of five observations (Everitt, *?’ : 9-10).

Suppose five observations are to be classified, and

the matrix of distance between the observations is as follows:

1 2 3 4 5

1 0 2 6 10 9

2 2 0 5 9 8

3 6 5 0 4 5

4 10 9 4 0 3

5 9 8 5 3 0

The number in the 1 th row and j th column denotes the distance d ^ between observations 1 and j .

As we can see the smallest distance is between 1 and

2 (D * 2). Therefore, observations 1 and 2 are fused to form one cluster. The distance between this new cluster and the three remain­ ing observations is calculated and the result of the new distance matrix is as follows: 102

12 3 A 5

12 0 5 9 8

3 6 0 A 5

D 2 A 9 4 0 3

5 8 5 3 0

The smallest number In Is 3 which is the distance between A and 5,

Therefore, A and 5 are combined to form the second cluster. The dis­

tance between the two new clusters and observation 3 are calculated, and the resultant distances are:

12 3 A5

12 0 5 8

3 5 0 A

A5 8 A 0

As is evident, the distance between 3 and 45 is the smallest and they are, therefore, merged into one group. And finally the two clusters are merged at this stage to form one cluster containing all the five observations. This procedure of hierarchical clustering can be graphically presented in the following diagram or 'cluster tree'. 1 2 3 4 5

OBSERVATIONS

Adjustment of Variable Scales

Before we can apply the cluster analysis technique to our study, a major adjustment has to be made In the scale of our variables. As was mentioned earlier, the Euclidean distance metric requires that the technique be used on data in which the scale of variables Is similar and so far as nominal variables are concerned, only when one has binary data. The variables In our data set not only have more than two levels but are also based on more than one scale type.

These problems can be easily resolved, however, by transforming our entire mixture of variable types into binary or dlchotomous variables. A binary or dlchotomous variable is a dis­ crete variable which may take only two values - 0 or 1, where the 104 numeric value 0 indicates absence and 1 Indicates presence. Example:

Observation Variables (Binary)

1 2 3

1 0 1 0

2 10 0

3 0 0 1

4 1 0 0

5 0 1 0 where 0 or 1 Indicates the presence or absence of variables 1, 2 and

3 in the observations 1, 2, 3, 4 and 3.

Having adjusted our variable scale, the basic pro* cesses involved In the application of the cluster analysis technique to our study is quite simple.

First, the distances between each case of CPV will be calculated in terms of their variable content, and the resultant information would be presented in the form of a distance matrix,

Once the distances are computed, the observations would be fused Into clusters In terms of their mutual distances. No aprlori assumption can be made as to the distinctiveness of the clusters.

Interpretation

Interpretation of the data would be quite simple If distinct clusters are revealed, In this case we can definitely con­ tend that each cluster reflects a mode of CPV. 105

However, It Is quite likely that the data may not reveal such distinct patterns, In which case no such definite patterns evolve. If the situation Is such that the clusters overlap in a manner to complicate the analysis immensely, we can only conclude that there are no reasons to believe that the modes of CPV conform to exclusive patterns.

As we said earlier, we cannot make any aprlorl assump­ tions about the results of the analysis. The results would be Instruc­ tive In themselves. Chapter IV

Empirical Verification of the Test Model of

Collective Political Violence: Analyaia of Findings

Introduction

In analyzing the findings, the discussion will be

divided into four parts. In the first part, the pattern of clustering

as revealed by the statistical analysis of the data is presented in

terms of the variable content within Individual clusters. This exer­

cise evolves variables which are significant In determining the par­

ticular structure which distinguishes one cluster from the other. In

the second part, we try to determine the degree to which these clus­

ters reflect the 'ideal typical' classification of the test model, on

the basis of their variable characterization. In the third part, we

address ourselves to the issue of outcome as an Independent variable

in determining the patterning of the clusters. From here we move on

to the last part, where an attempt is made to Isolate the possible

intervening variables which make the difference between successful

and unsuccessful CPVs - If such a determination can be made at all.

Before proceeding with the analysis, a technical Issue will have to be resolved. The program for running the cluster proce­

dure requires that the number of clusters which can be abstracted from

the data be specified. Since this issue Is Integral to the hierarchi­

cal clustering procedure employed in the study, It is necessary that

106 107

the technique be explained as It applies to the empirical data In

this study.

By following the logic of hierarchical clustering the

first stage consists of thirty clusters In which each case of CPV

(our sample observations) Is considered one cluster, thirty observa­

tions, thirty clusters. In the second stage of the hierarchy, the * two cases of CPV with minimum distance are fused Into one cluster on

the basis of their similarity to each other In terms of their variable

content. Therefore, in the second stage of the hierarchy, the number

of clusters Is NCL ■ (30-1) ■ 29, Similarly, In the third stage of

the hierarchical process the two other cases of CPV which have the

second least amount of distance are merged and the resulting number

of clusters is NCL ■ (30-2) - 28. Thus, the process Is repeated by

successively merging cases with minimum distance Into clusters, and

fusing clusters with minimum distance Into larger clusters until in

the last stage of the hierarchy after being repeated (n-1) times, one

large cluster of all the thirty cases of CPV (observations) emerge.

The distances between each case is presented In the distance matrix

on the following page, and the 'cluster tree' which graphically

represents the hierarchical clustering procedure follows the matrix.

The ' cluster tree* demonstrates the hierarchical clustering tech­

nique as it proceeds, as one can view it , from the extreme left when

NCL - 30, to the extreme right when NCL > 1 , As can be seen in the

'cluster tree', in the first stage of the hierarchical process, cases

The formula used for computing distance has already been discussed in Chapter III. Table 13

Dlntance

ID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

0 27 29 27 27 17 11 17 27 27 17 14 12 7 11 27 29 27 17 27 29 12 12 27 29 27 29 29 27 17 27 0 29 IS 21 27 27 27 20 14 27 27 27 27 27 21 29 21 27 21 29 27 27 21 29 14 29 29 14 27 29 29 0 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 9 29 29 29 27 29 29 29 27 29 16 16 29 29 27 20 29 0 21 27 27 27 14 18 27 27 27 27 27 21 29 21 27 21 29 27 27 21 29 18 29 29 18 27 27 21 29 21 0 27 27 27 21 21 27 27 27 27 27 14 29 14 27 8 29 27 27 U 29 21 29 28 21 27 17 27 29 27 27 0 17 8 27 27 7 17 17 17 17 27 29 27 11 27 29 17 17 27 29 27 29 29 27 12 U 27 29 27 27 17 0 17 27 27 17 14 12 11 10 27 29 27 17 27 29 12 12 27 29 27 29 29 27 17 17 27 29 27 27 8 17 0 27 27 8 17 17 17 17 27 29 27 11 27 29 17 17 27 29 27 29 29 27 12 27 20 29 14 21 27 27 27 18 27 27 27 27 27 21 29 21 27 21 29 27 27 21 29 18 29 29 18 27 10 27 14 29 18 21 27 27 27 18 0 27 27 27 27 27 21 29 21 27 2] 29 27 27 21 29 7 29 29 7 27 11 17 27 29 27 27 7 17 6 27 27 0 17 17 17 17 29 29 27 11 27 29 17 17 27 29 27 29 29 27 12 12 14 27 29 27 27 17 14 17 27 27 17 0 14 14 14 27 29 27 17 27 29 14 14 27 29 27 29 29 27 17 13 12 27 29 27 27 17 12 17 27 27 17 14 0 12 12 27 29 27 17 27 29 12 12 27 29 27 29 29 27 17 14 7 27 29 27 27 If 11 17 27 27 17 14 12 0 11 27 29 27 17 27 29 12 12 27 29 27 29 29 27 17 IS 11 27 29 27 27 17 10 17 27 27 17 14 12 11 0 27 29 27 17 27 29 12 12 27 29 27 29 29 27 17 16 27 21 29 21 14 27 27 27 21 21 27 27 27 27 27 0 29 5 27 14 29 27 27 11 29 21 29 29 21 27 17 29 29 9 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 0 29 29 29 20 29 29 29 20 29 16 16 29 29 10 27 21 29 21 14 27 27 27 21 21 27 27 27 27 27 5 29 0 27 14 29 27 27 11 29 21 29 29 21 27 19 17 27 29 27 27 11 17 11 27 27 11 17 17 17 17 27 29 27 0 27 27 17 17 27 29 27 29 29 27 12 27 21 29 21 8 27 27 27 21 21 27 27 27 27 27 14 29 14 27 0 29 27 27 14 29 21 29 29 21 27 21 29 29 27 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 20 29 29 29 0 29 29 29 9 29 20 20 29 29 22 12 27 29 22 27 17 12 17 27 27 17 14 12 12 12 27 29 27 17 27 29 0 3 27 29 27 29 29 27 17 23 12 27 29 23 27 17 12 17 27 27 17 14 12 12 12 27 29 27 17 27 29 3 0 27 29 27 29 29 27 17 24 27 21 29 21 14 27 27 27 21 21 27 27 27 27 27 11 29 11 27 14 29 27 27 0 29 21 29 29 21 27 25 29 29 27 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 20 29 29 29 9 29 29 29 0 29 20 20 29 29 26 27 14 29 18 21 27 27 27 18 7 27 27 27 27 27 21 29 21 27 21 29 27 27 21 29 0 29 29 5 27 27 29 29 16 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 16 29 29 29 20 29 29 29 20 29 0 9 29 29 26 29 29 16 29 28 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 16 29 29 29 20 29 29 29 20 29 9 0 29 29 29 27 14 29 18 21 27 27 27 18 7 27 27 27 27 27 21 29 21 27 21 29 27 27 21 29 5 29 29 0 27 30 17 27 29 27 27 12 17 12 27 27 12 17 17 17 17 27 29 27 12 27 29 17 17 27 29 27 29 29 27 0 108 109

CLUSTER TREE to

It,

CAM! 10 « <• I FT tt 8» *' 91 fLUWMAJifttill

F i g u r e 2 110

22 and 23 which have the least distance D • 3 (distance is measured on the vertical axis) are merged together into one cluster. In the second stage, cases 26 and 29, and 16 and 18, with distances D ■ 5, are merged into one cluster each. Accordingly the process continues by successively merging cases with relatively smaller distances until finally there is one large cluster comprising of all the cases and all the smaller clusters. Thus, in every successive stage of the procedure the number of clusters which emerge, vary.

As indicated earlier, the computer program for ana­ lyzing the cluster technique is equipped to handle only a specified number of clusters at a time. Since the test model of collective political violence developed in Chapter II refers to five 'ideal typical* combinations of the multiple variables, designating the five 'ideal types' of CPV, it was considered logical to direct the cluster procedure to evolve five clusters from the data on collective political violence. Thus, the issue was resolved by specifying that, in the first run, the cluster procedure abstract five groupings. As can be viewed from the 'cluster tree* above, Cluster 1 comprises of all the cases between case # 1, # 14, # 7 and so forth upto case # 30

(n - 13)^ Cluster 2 comprises of the cases between case # 2, # 10 and so forth upto case # 9 (n ■ 6), Cluster 3 is made up of the cases # 5,

# 20, # 16, # 18 and case # 2 4 (n • 5), Cluster 4 consists of cases

#3, # 17, # 27 and case # 28 (n - 4) and Cluster 5 comprises of caBe

# 21 and case # 2 5 (n ■ 2). Ill

However, as shall be discussed later, this specifica­

tion had to be changed twice In the later stages of the analysis to de­

rive fewer and Internally numerous clusters, In order to enhance the

analysis.

Primary Characteristics of the Five Clusters

In this part of the discussion an effort Is made to

Isolate the variables which are significant In distinguishing one cluster

from the other as depicted by the distributions of observations on the

cluster tree. These are the variables whose measurements contribute

significantly to the distance coefficients in determining the consti­

tution of each of the clusters. Henceforth these variables will be

referred to as the 'primary variables'. These variables can be easily discerned from the histograms on the following pages. The histograms provide summary description of the Impact of each variable on each of * the clusters. And since each variable Is measured on a scale of 1 to

10 representing mean values (group means), the histograms also Indicate the varlbles which have high mean values in one cluster and low mean values In another. The mean value is, therefore, used to Isolate the significant variables In each cluster, such that variables with mean a In order to spare the reader the torturous details of each case and each cluster, the more extensive part on the case and cluster des­ cription have been saved for the Appendix, IDEA CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 2 CLUSTER 3 o o —I

I ■ I 00 ao

ON — T~ r «P* "X" I rs> fvj — r- N> co n S e co H o 00 00 "T“ —T“ — T" N1 -f— N> N> 3 3 ■ Structural 2 2 ■ Constitutional 4 4 • Transitional 1 1 - Exchange For Abscissa: F i g u r e ZTT STRATEGY

For Abscissa & « 6 10 n N H tt•H U * * 6 4 8 2 C

r-4

CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 10 ' 8 6 ' ---- CLUSTER 4 CLUSTER 10 4 8 2 6 Figure 4 Figure LSE 2 CLUSTER 10 4 8 6 2 CLUSTER 5 CLUSTER 10 6 4 8 2

CLUSTER 3 CLUSTER For Abscissa CLASS (i w 00 W O « M « « O 4-I4JO 3 f4M -H 3 3 ■ 10

4 8 6 2 p M CO CM 4 2 4 2 3 e oo * ee £ M M o o -> Q • ► t • 4-1 u li H « Hi « *J e CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 3 5 4 3 2 10 4 8 6

CLUSTER 4 CLUSTER 0 - 10 8 6 ■ 4 L ■ 2 2 4 12345 12345 1 3 5 4 3 2 1 5 Figure 5 Figure LSE 2 CLUSTER

10 ■ 6 ■ 4 • 8 ■ 2

CLUSTER 5 CLUSTER 10 ■ 8 ‘ 6 ■ — ■ 4 ■

--- LSE 3 CLUSTER ----

*IT CLUSTER CLUSTER 2 CLUSTER 3 10 ■ 10

8 8 -

6 6 ■

4 4 •

2 ‘ 2

1 2 1 2

LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE CLUSTER 4 CLUSTER 5

10 ■ 10 •

8

•o 6 ‘ « N V •H N i—4 ■H « 4 «• i—1 hi e >0 4-1 a» 2 - •H c y U « » IB u o -O < 1 ■ hi 1 2 O b. iH N Figure 6 LEADERSHIP CLASS LEADERSHIP For Abscissa: i - i n n > j i Cu C (it u C D C I « P tl P S « O II # W w »—tQ tO (8 3 ■<-* M 5 m « o 1 1 1 * 1 O m 10 j - v a *j 4-» v 8 4 6 2 h h 4J o M M) o w w a a u to t J c *J * 10 CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 10 6 8 4 2 • 2 1 CLUSTER 4 CLUSTER 10 4 6 8 2 3 5 4 24 5 4 2 1 iue 7 Figure LSE 2 CLUSTER 10 4 6 8 2 - • 2 1 0 . 10 • 4 ■ 8 • 6 2

CLUSTER 5 CLUSTER 3 5 4 LSE 3 CLUSTER ORGANIZATION For Abscissa oto to u • « e « O . B o c a 1= 3 ••H n t o ■o u 00 * * B N 1 H 0 • 10 • 8 6 4 2 o •H N * 00 « a 0) C

CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 10 8 6 4 2 3 2 1 10 8 6 CLUSTER 4 CLUSTER 4 2 iue 8 Figure LSE 2 CLUSTER r 10 10 8 6 4

CLUSTER 5 CLUSTER 2 LSE 3 CLUSTER 3 PARTICIPATION For Abscissa w' 'w m •H o o x e f u « m m o a e S » a a N r * ' o O C t - p o o iH 0 B « 1 10 6 4 2 8 *> (* fH ■fl •o o o o u T—1 + a « o c n V 2 1 CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 10 4 6 8 2 CLUSTER 4 CLUSTER 10 4 6 8 2 Figure 9 Figure CLUSTER 2 CLUSTER 10 6 4 8 CLUSTER 5 CLUSTER 10 6 8 4 2

2 1 CLUSTER 3 CLUSTER 10 CLUSTER 1 10 CLUSTER 2 10 . CLUSTER 3

8 ■ 8 8 .

6 ■ 6 6 .

4 • 4 ■ 4 ■

2 ■ 2 • 2

1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2

DURATION CLUSTER 4 CLUSTER 5 10 10

8 * 8 X M u U e Q V 3 6 6 > g X (0 4 4 c X (0 u X o c g 2 2 « M « 0) ■J 3

8 8 ■ 8

6 ► 6 6 •

4 4 4

2 ■ 2 2

123 123 123

VIOLENCE CLUSTER 4 CLUSTER 5 10 10 _

8 8

6 6 V W JS « 4 e w 3 •o 8 2 • 91 n B c c o •H o CO £ u

•R R 2 3 1 2 3

CM CO Figure 11 For Abscissa iH a o u a AREA M < Pk V"* 1 • 1- u 3 e O > e a 10 A 8 6 2 u i t o p 2 1 LSE 1 CLUSTER 10 A 8 6 2 CLUSTER A CLUSTER 3 2 1 10 A 2 8 6 ■ ■ iue 12 Figure 3 2 1 CLUSTER 2 CLUSTER

r 1 10 ■ A 2 . 8 6 . 10 A 8 6 CLUSTER 5 CLUSTER • ■ ---- 23 2 1 CLUSTER 3 CLUSTER

121 , CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 2 CLUSTER 3 10 10 10

8 ■ 8 • 8 ■

6 • 6 - 6

4 ■ 4 4

2 2 2

1 2

g o v e r n m e n t r e s p o n s e CLUSTER 4 CLUSTER 5 10 10

8 - 8 ■■

6 - 6 k

e w 4 - 4 VH • • > O 4 J « •H d • u > 41 2 - * 1 H 2 i-t « c 0 o o o t I a . K

< i 1 1 t- 0 f K i H CM m 122 Figure 13 10 10 CLUSTER 1 CLUSTER 2 10 CLUSTER 3

8 8 8

6 6

4 4

2 2

1 2 3

CLUSTER 5 ARMED FORCE DISLOYALTY 10 CLUSTER 4 10 -

8 8

6 6

4 4 •

• • n o u 5 a z X X < 2 3 1 2 3 1 a i * o h CM

Figure 14 123 124 value equal to or greater than 6 are considered significant. This is based on the argument that in more than half of the cases of collective political violence included in any particular cluster - these variables are present.

The Information presented in the histograms helps In deriving a list of primary variables on which each cluster significant­ ly differs. In (Table 14) these primary variables are presented in a systematic fashion along with their respective mean values.

Determining these primary variables was considered an important step, since In the next part each of these five clusters will be compared to the five 'ideal types' of CPV developed In the test model - in terms of these 'primary variables*.

Towards a Comparison of the Test Model with the Five Clusters

Having isolated the 'primary varibles' characteristic of each cluster of observations, we are in a position to compare these clusters of collective political violence with the test model In order to determine their degree of resemblance and the corresponding validity of the test model. The process which will be followed in determining the degree of similarity between the 'ideal typical* categories in the test model and the clusters of the empirical cases of CPV, will be to compare each of these clusters in terms of their primary variables with the characteristic variables of the 'ideal typical' categories.

The more the number of 'primary variables' which resemble characteris­ tic variables of the 'ideal type' the more significant is the match and vice versa. Table 14

Comparison of Cluster Primary Variables with Test Model

Variables Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPV CPV 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Idea Exchange 8 7 8 1 1 1 Constitutional 1 Structural 10 1 1 1 1 Transitional 1 StrateRy

Open 7 10 8 1 1 1 1 Conspiratorial 1 Combinational 10 1 1 1 1 Class Bourgeois 6 1 Petit Bourgeois(I) 10 7 8 1 1 1 Petit Bourgeois(II) 10 10 8 1 1 1 1 Proletarian 8 10 6 1 1 1 Peasant 10 1 1 Leadership Centralised 9 7 6 10 10 1 1 1 Decentralized 1 1 1 1 Table 14 (Continued)

Variables Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPV CPV 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Leadership(Class) Bourgeois 6 1 Petit Bourgeois(I) 8 10 1 1 1 Petit Bourgeois(II) 7 1 1 1 1 Proletarian 1 1 Peasant 10 1 1 Organization Spontaneous 6 1 1 1 1 Seal Organized 8 10 1 1 Organized 8 1 1 Participation Few 1 Sone 1 1 Considerable 7 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 Duration Less than a week 9 6 1 1 1 1 Week-six Months 7 8 1 1 1 1 Six Months + 1 1 Table 14 (Continued)

Variables Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPV CPV 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

Violence

Minimum 1 Some 8 1 1 1 Considerable 8 10 10 1 1 1 1 Area Local Provincial 10 1 1 Country 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 Government Response Positive 7 7 1 1 1 Non violent Violent 7 10 10 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 Armed Force Disloyalty High 8 7 10 1 1 Low 1 1 1 Nil 8 1 1 1 LIX 128

In (Table 15)the variables comprising this test

model of CPV as developed in Chapter II, and the list of primary varia­

bles characterizing each cluster are compared In order to discern any

similarities.

Discussion

The match between Cluster 1 and CPV 3, which we have

designated as the 'ideal typical* representation of coup d'etat is obvious. The 15 primary variables which distinguish Cluster 1 from

the other four clusters matches 15 of the 24 variables which charac­

terizes a coup d'etat. Further analysis of the variable content of

Clusterl (See Appendix for reference) reveals at least two other relatively significant variables other than the primary variables, with mean value equal to 5, I.e., variables which are present in at least half of the cases in the cluster, which brings Cluster 1 closer to being recognized as comparable to CPV 3, or coup d'etat In the test model. These two variables are (1)'conspiratorial strategy'; and

(11)'minimum violence'. 'Conspiratorial strategy* is used in half of the cases of CPV in this cluster for realizing the objectives of

CPV. Moreover, at least 40Z of the cases also use a combination of

'conspiratorial and open* strategy to realize their objectives. Thus,

It would not be erroneous to contend that the strategies involved in

Cluster 1 and in the 'Ideal type* of CPV 3, or coup d'etat are quite comparable. The test model of CPV also mentions that so far as vio­ lence is concerned, coup d'etat involves'minimum' or some violence. Table 15

Degree of resemblance between five clusters and Test Model

Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5

CPV 1 (Revolution) 73 Z 92 X 91 Z 91 Z 55 Z

CPV 2 (Rebellion) 46 Z 69 Z 91 Z 63 % 33 Z

CPV 3 (Coup d'etat) 100 Z 84 Z 63 Z 72 Z 44 Z

CPV 4 (People's War) 60 Z 76 Z 82 Z 91 Z 88 Z

CPV 5 (Revolt) 33 Z 53 Z 82 % 54 Z 77 Z 130

50 Z of the cases In Cluster 1 also experienced minimum violence. We could, therefore, sum up that It would be appropriate to suggest that

Cluster 1 with 13 cases of CPV resembles the 'ideal typical' category of CPV 3, or coup d'etat.

As was gathered from the general definition of coup d'etat provided by the social scientists, coups involve primarily the exchange of personnel in the positions of power. It is predominantly an elite directed affair which is highly planned and secretive.

Moreover, the definitions also suggest that in majority of the coups the army Is the prime mover of events. The CPVs Included in Cluster 1 are also oriented primarily towards the exchange of personnel in the positions of power (Mean Value *8); it also reflects an elite direc­ ted (Mean value for bourgeois participation ■ 6 ; petit bourgeois participation * 8); organized (Mean value for organization * 8); secre­ tive (Mean value for conspiratorial strategy • 5) affair with consider­ able support and participation from the army (Mean value for armed force disloyalty ■ 8). Thus, the variables which give coup d'etat its structure and distinctive form, are the same primary variables which distinguish Cluster 1 from other clusters. We can contend with confi­ dence that Cluster 1 significantly resembles the 'ideal typical' cate­ gory of coup d'etat.

The resembalance with the 'ideal types' is much less distinct in the case of other clusters.

Cluster 2, for example, shows 12 out of its 13 signi­ ficant variables in resemblance of 12 of the 24 variables which distin­ guishes 'revolution', i.e., CPV 1 in the test model. However, the 131

13th variable which does not natch CPV 1 or 'revolution', is the 'Idea'

of Cluster 2. For Cluster 2, the significant idea is exchange of per­

sonnel, whereas, the significant idea behind revolutions, on which

social scientists unanimously agree is 'structural change , Therefore,

even though all the other 12 primary variables signifying Cluster 2 match the variable characteristics of CPV 1, or revolution, the very

fact that It does not match on such an important variable as idea, a variable which is so distinctive of a revolution - bars us from accep­ ting Cluster 2 as the empirical Image of CPV 1, or revolution. And we can sum up for the time being by contending that the relative resem­ blance between Cluster 2 and CPV 1, or revolution is more 'spurious* than factual.

Similarly, when Clusters 3 and A are compared with the

test model - no distinctive patterns emerge. Cluster 3 has 10 out of

11 primary variables which resemble 10 distinctive variables of both

CPV 1 or revolution, and CPV 2 or rebellion. Before giving out any final words on Cluster 3, however, let us consider the situation with

Cluster A and 5.

Of the 12 primary variables which characterize Clus­ ter A, 11 match the significant variables of both CPV 1, or revolution, and CPV A, or people's war. However, in both the cases the variable

This finding distressed us considerably. However, when the cluster analysis technique was used to merge the categories in the 'ideal typical' model (see p.lAt) the problem was resolved to our extreme relief. 132 on which Cluster 4 differs Is Idea. And as was argued In the case of

Cluster 2, Idea of a revolution or people's war, lie,, structural

change, Is probably the most Important variable distinguishing 'revo­

lution' and 'people's war' from other CPVs. Subsequently, It would be rather erroneous to contend that Cluster 4 Is comparable to CPV 1 or revolution; or CPV 4 or people's war when the divergence between them rests on such an Important variable.

So far as Cluster 5 Is concerned, 8 out of its 9 primary variables matches similar variables in CPV 4, or people's war.

The variable which does not match the characteristic variable of CPV 4 or people's war is the area covered by the CPV. Whereas, CPV 4 or people's war usually occurs In several provinces or in the entire coun­ try, the cases in Cluster 5 occurred in one province or relatively unimportant townships. Thus it failed to meet the maximum score for area as CPV 4 or people's war does. But as can be expected the 'extent variables' such as 'area' are not as significant as the 'structural variables' such as 'idea', which actually determine the internal form and structure of CPV. The extent variables only demonstrate how mas­ sive or small the CPV is in terms of scale. Therefore, divergence in terms of 'area' is not as crucial as divergence in 'ideas'. In sum, we can generally contend that Cluster 5, with its predominant peasant- petit bourgeois base, its combinational strategy, peasant leadership and so on resembles CPV 4, or people's war more than any other 'ideal typical' category.

The situation with Clusters 2, 3 and 4 is highly problematic. No conclusive statement can be made on their relation- 133

ship to Che 'Ideal Cyplcal' CPVs In Che cesC model. Therefore, In

Cerms of a solution It was decided to repeac the clustering Cechnlque

to evolve fewer number of clusters, so as to enable us to offer more definitive conclusions on the data. Since the data base at our disposal

Is a rather small one (n * 30), It was felt that the fewer the number of clusters, the more numerous each would be, and hopefully the more meaningful. Accordingly, the cluster technique was repeated twice, first to evolve four categories, then to evolve three categories/clus­ ters.

Comparison of the Test Model with Four Clusters

When the cluster technique was directed to generate four clusters, the result was that following the logic of hierarchical clustering the two clusters which among the original five clusters had minimum distance were merged into one cluster, This process Is graphi­ cally represented in Fig. 2. Since the least distance Is between

Clusters 4 and 5, they are merged together to form the New Cluster 4.

The histograms on the next page present a summary description of the

New Cluster 4, on the multiple variables. A list of the primary variables which characterize the New Cluster 4 follows the histograms in Tab: 16. As was Indicated earlier, the primary variables are vari­ ables with mean values equal to or more than 6, signifying that the variable is present in more than half of the cases In the cluster. In

Fig, 6 the test model of CPV Is compared to the New Cluster 4 in terms of the new primary variables to discern similarities. 134

irlable Information on Newcluster 4 (Original Clusters 4+5)

LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE IDEA 10 10

8

6

4

2

1 2 3 1 2 10 10 STRATEGY LEADERSHIP CLASS 8 8

6 6

4 4

2 2

1 2 3 4 5 10 10 CLASS CHARACTER ORGANIZATION 8 8

6 6

4 4

2 2

Figure 15 135

Variable Information on Newcluster 4 (Original Clusters 4+5)

PARTICIPATION AREA

10 10

8 8

6 6

4 4

2 2

1 2 3 1 2 3 10 10 G.R DURATION 8 8

6 6

4 4

2 2

1 2 3 1 2 3 10 10 ARMED FORCE VIOLENCE DISLOYALTY 8 8

6 6

4 4

2 2

Figure 16 136

Table 16

Comparison of New Cluster A with Test Model

Variables New Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPV CPV A 1 2 3 A 5

Idea Exchange 7 1 1 1 Cons ti tut ional 1 Structural 1 1 1 1 Transitional 1 Strategy Open 1 1 1 1 Conspiratorial 1 Combinational 1 1 1 1 Class Bourgeois 1 Petit Bourgeois(1) 1 1 1 Petit Bourgeois(II) 1 1 1 1 Proletarian 1 1 1 Peasant 1 1 Leadership Structure Centralized 10 1 1 1 Decemtrailzed 1 1 1 1 Leadership Class Bourgeois 1 Petit Bourgeois(I) 7 1 1 1 Petit Bourgeois(11) 7 1 1 1 1 Proletarian 1 1 Peasant 1 1 Organization Spontaneous 1 1 1 1 Semi Organized 1 1 Organized 1 1 137

Table 16 (Continued)

Variables New Cluster CPVCPV CPV CPVCPV 4 1 2 3 4 5

Participation Few 1 Some 1 1 1 Considerable 1 1 1 1 1 Duration Less than a week 1 1 1 1 Week to six months 7 1 1 1 1 Six months + 1 1 Violence Minimum 1 Some 1 1 1 Considerable 1 1 1 1 Area Local Provincial 1 1 Country 7 1 1 1 1 1 Govt. Response Positive 1 1 1 Non violent Violent 10 1 1 1 1 1 Armed Force Disloyalty High 1 1 Low 1 1 1 Nil 7 1 1 1 138

Table 17

Degree of resemblance between New Cluster A and Teat Model

New Cluster A

CPV 1 (Revolution) 75 X

CPV 2 (Rebellion) 75 X

CPV 3 (Coup d'etat) 75 X

CPV A (People's War) 87 X

CPV 5 (Revolt) 50 X 139

Discussion

As can be gathered, the New Cluster 4 resembles CPV 4 or people's war on all but one variable. And the variable on which this discrepancy exists Is again 'idea'. The significant idea for the

New Cluster 4 is exchange of personnel in the positions of power, whereas for CPV 4 or 'people's war' the significant idea is structural change. The CPV which occurred in Bulgaria in 1923 (ID # 21) is the only CPV in New Cluster 4, which advocated structural change. However, if significant variables (with mean values ■ 5) other than the primary variables are considered, a tentative conclusion can be drawn by con­ tending that relatively speaking the New Cluster 4 resembles CPV 4, or

'people's war' more than it resembles any other 'ideal type' in the test model. These variables with Mean values equalling five, i.e., variables which are present in about half of the cases of CPV in the cluster are:

Strategy: The mean value for both 'open' strategy and 'combina­ tional strategy', i.e., involving both 'open* and 'conspiratorial' techniques of violence is 5. Indicating that at least half of the cases utilized 'open* or 'combinational' strategy to realize their goals. Similarly, in the test model, CPV 4 or people’s war is charac­ terized as using an 'open' strategy or a 'combinational' one to achieve Its purposes. Therefore, the strategies significant in New

Cluster 4 are comparable to the starategies significant of 'people's war' in the test model.

2, Class Character: CPV 4 or people's war specifies class character in it as predominantly 'peasant* and/or 'petit bourgeois'. The New 140

Cluster 4 also indicates a relatively significant 'peasant1 and/or

'petit bourgeois' participation. The mean value for each 'class'

category being 5.

3. Participation and violence: Similarly when the degree of match between the 'extent' variables (such as 'participation' and 'violence')

in the New Cluster 4 ( and CPV 4, or 'people's war' is considered,

considerable participation and considerable violence is revealed in the case of both. In half of the cases of CPV in the New Cluster 4, par­ ticipation was considerable (1000 +), so was the amount of violence

(150 + casualties). Therefore, so far as the extent variables are concerned - the degree of resemblance between New Cluster 4 and CPV 4 or people's war is also considered significant.

Therefore, on the basis of the added Information provided by the variables with mean value equaling 5, it can be con­

tended that the degree of similarity between New Cluster 4 and CPV 4 or people's war is significant.

Since the situation with Clusters 2 and 3 remained unchanged and subsequently no definite comparisons could be made, the cluster analysis was performed again to generate three clusters, with the expectation that this would provide new clues for a better compa­ rison.

Comparison of the Test Model with Three Clusters

In generating three clusters from the data on collec­ tive political violence, the hierarchical clustering procedure simply 141

merged the two clusters which had the least Inter-cluster distance,

when the number of clusters equaled four. By referring back to Fig.2

(the cluster tree) it can be seen that when the number of clusters

equal 4, the least distance is between clusters 2 and 3. Therefore,

when the program is specified to evolve three clusters, cluster 2 and

cluster 3 are merged to generate New cluster 2. In sum, when the num­

ber of clusters equals 3, Cluster 1 is the same as original Cluster 1,

New Cluster 2 is the merged version of original clusters 2 and 3 and

New cluster 3 is the fusion of original clusters 4 and 3 (or New Clus­

ter 4). Refer to the Cluster tree in Fig. 2 for a graphic represen­

tation of this process. The histograms on the following page provides

a summary description of the New Cluster 2 on the multiple variables.

The primary variables generated thereby are presented in Tab. 18 on

the page following the histograms. In Tab.19 the New Cluster 2 is

compared with the test model in terms of its primary variables.

Discussion

As can be discerned from Tab.19, the degree of

resemblance is relatively the most between New cluster 2 and CPV 1 or

'revolution*. The similarity between New cluster 2 and CPV 1 or

'revolution' becomes even more apparent when we consider a few other

relatively significant variables (with mean value of 5) which distin­

guish New cluster 2 from other clusters. Thus, so far as the 'idea*

of CPV is concerned, half of the cases in New cluster 2, espoused

'structural change*. The significant cases of CPV which aimed at 142

Variable Information on New Cluster 2 (Original Clusters 2 + 3 )

10 10 IDEA LEADERSHIP 8 STRUCTURE

6

4

2

1 2 3 4 1 2 10 10 STRATEGY LEADERSHIP CLASS 8 8

6 6

4

2 2

1 2 3 1 2 3 5 10 10 CLASS CHARACTER ORGANIZATION 8 8

6 6

4 4

2 2

3 4

Figure 17 143

Variable Information on New Cluster 2 (Original Clusters 2 + 3)

PARTICIPATION AREA 10 10

8 8

6 6 .

4 4 ■

2 2

1 2 3 10 10

8 DURATION 8 G.R

6 6

4 4

2 2

1 2 3 1 2 3 10 10 VIOLENCE ARMED FORCE 8 8 DISLOYALTY

6 6

4 4

2 2

Figure 18 144

Table 18

Comparison of New Cluster 2 with Test Model

Variables New Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPVCPV 2 1 2 3 4 5

Idea Exchange 1 1 1 Constitutional 1 Structural 1 1 1 1 Transitional 1 Strategy Open 8 1 1 1 1 Conspiratorial 1 Combinational 1 1 1 1 Class Bourgeois 1 Petit Bourgeois(I) 1 1 1 Petit Bourgeois(11) 1 1 1 1 Proletarian 8 1 1 1 Peasant 1 1 Leadership Structure Centralized 6 1 1 1 Decentralized 1 1 1 1 Leadership Class Bourgeois 1 Petit Bourgeois(1) 1 1 1 Petit Bourgeois(II) 1 1 1 1 Proletarian 1 1 Peasant 1 1 Organization Spontaneous 1 1 1 1 Semi Organized 1 1 Organized 1 1 145

Table 18 (Continued)

Variables New Cluster CPV CPV CPV CPV CPV 2 1 2 3 4 5

Participation Few 1 Some 1 1 1 Considerable 10 1 1 1 1 1 Duration Less than a week 1 1 1 1 Week to six months 1 1 1 1 Six months + 1 1 Violence Minimum 1 Some 1 1 1 Considerable 9 1 1 1 1 Area Local Provincial 1 1 Country 10 1 1 1 1 1 Govt. Response

Positive 1 1 1 Non violent Violent 10 1 1 1 1 1 Armed Force Disloyalty

High 1 1 Low 1 1 1 Nil 1 1 1 146

Table 19

Degree of resemblance between New Cluster 2 and Test Model

New Cluster 2

CPV 1 (Revolution) 100 %

CPV 2 (Rebellion) 85 %

CPV 3 (Coup d'etat) 85 X

CPV 4 (People's War) 85 X

CPV 5 (Revolt) 57 X 147

structural change In New cluster 2 are, Russia 1917, Germany 1919, and

Spain 1934, The mean value for structural change as 'idea* would have been more than 5, If we consider that the CPV of Cuba In 1959 was coded

as espousing Constitutional' change instead of ’structural' change - since Fidel Castro and his cohorts advocated "free elections and restoring the 1940 constitution" as their objective before the final outcome of the revolution was realized. Thus, if we coded 'structural change* as what the Cuban CPV espoused instead of 'constitutional change', the mean value for 'structural change* as 'idea' would be definitely slginifleant, in terms of a higher mean.

Similarly, if class of leadership is concerned, the test model specifies 'class of leadership' for CPV 1 or 'revolution' as being both proletarian and petit bourgeois. As the list of the primary variables for the New cluster 2 shows, the criterion for pro­ letarian leadership is easily met. However, so far as 'petit bourgeois' leadership is concerned the mean value is 5, which determines that in at least half of the cases of CPV in the New cluster 2, leadership was also 'petit bourgeois' in character.

Another characteristic which distinguishes CPV 1 or

'revolution' is that it calls forth a high degree of armed force dis­ loyalty. In half of the cases in New cluster 2, armed force disloyalty is also high.

Therefore, on the basis of all these facts it can be quite strongly contended that New cluster 2 matches CPV 1 or 'revolu­ tion' significantly. 148

Summary of findings on empirical verification of the Test Model

We now have three clusters of empirical cases of collec­

tive political violence, of which Cluster 1 and New Cluster 2 compare

quite satisfactorily to CPV 3 or 'coup d'etat' and CPV 1 or 'revolution'

respectively. New Cluster 3 resembles the 'ideal typical* version of

*people*s war' or CPV 4, though the degree of resemblance is not as significant as it is in the case of Cluster 1 and New Cluster 2. In

sum, on the basis of this analysis, only three 'ideal typical' modes of CPV - CPV 1 or 'revolution', CPV 3 or 'coup d'etat' and CPV 4 or

'people’s w ar’ - are proven to exist in the reality, we have sampled.

Since CPV 2, or 'rebellion' and CPV 5 or 'revolt' could not compare with any empirical clusters of CPV, these categories are theoretically invalid. However, instead of discarding them as meaningless categories it was decided to follow the cluster technique and merge them with any of the other three categories in terms of their minimum distance. The five 'ideal typical' CPVs were clustered into three groups with minimum intra-group distance, on the basis of their variable characteristics.

The result was that CPV 2 or 'rebellion* was merged with CPV 1 or

'revolution/rebellion'*. Similarly, CPV 5 or 'revolt' was merged with

As can be seen in Tab.20, the variables in the new test model of CPV, are depicted in terms of 5's and 10's, Instead of l's and 0*s. This is the result of performing the clustering technique. By grouping together CPV 1/CPV 2, and CPV 4/CPV 5, it qualified each variable with a mean value. Thus for the New CPV 1, the presence of 'exchange' as an idea in only one of the two CPVs grouped is described as the presence of 'exchange* as an idea in only 50 % of the cases, in this case only in CPV 2. Similarly, since 'structural change* as idea was present in both CPV 1 and CPV 2 before they were merged into New CPV 1, the variable is qualified as present in 100 X of the cases and so on. 149

Table 20

The New Test Model of Collective Political Violence

Variables New CPV 1 New CPV 2 New CPV 3

Idea Exchange 5 10 5 Constitutional 0 10 0 Structural 10 0 10 Transitional 5 0 0 Strategy Open 10 0 10 Conspiratorial 0 10 0 Combinational 5 10 10 Class Bourgeois 0 10 0 Petit Bourgeois(I) 5 10 5 Petit Bourgeois(II) 10 10 5 Proletarian 10 10 0 Peasant 0 0 10 Leadership Structure Centralized 5 10 5 Decentralized 10 0 10 Leadership Class Bourgeois 0 10 0 Petit Bourgeois(I) 5 10 5 Petit Bourgeois(II) 10 10 5 Proletarian 10 0 0 Peasant 0 0 10 Organization Spontaneous 10 0 10 Semi Organized 5 0 5 Organized 0 10 5 150

Table 20 (Continued)

Variables New CPV 1 New CPV 2 New CPV 3

Participation Few 0 10 0 Some 5 10 5 Considerable 10 10 10 Duration Less than a week 10 10 5 Week to six months 10 0 10 Six months + 5 0 5 Violence Minimum 0 10 0 Some 5 10 5 Considerable 10 0 10 Area Local 0 0 0 Provincial 5 0 5 Country 10 10 10 Govt. Response Positive 5 10 5 Non violent 0 0 0 Violent 10 10 10 Armed Force Disloyalty High 5 10 0 Low 5 10 5 Nil 5 0 10 151

CPV 4 or 'people's war', to form the new 'ideal type' New CPV 3, or

'people's war/revolt* (see Tab.20), Semantically, 'revolution' or

'people's war' would indicate the successful outcome of a CPV with the

'ideal typical* characteristics of New CPV 1 or New CPV 3, whereas

'rebellion' or 'revolt' would Indicate unsuccessful outcome of CPV with the 'ideal typical' characteristics of New CPV 1 or New CPV 3.

This clustering exercise had a definite influence on the degree of resemblance between the New Cluster 3 and New CPV 3

(i.e., original CPV 4) or 'people's war/revolt*. The match was significantly improved. This occurred, because as a result of the merger of CPVs 4 and 5, there was now a 50 % possibility that New CPV

3, or 'people's war/revolt' would have exchange of personnel as one of its 'ideas', whereas earlier it was non-existent. The resultant was that, New Cluster 3 which had a significant mean value for

'exchange of personnel' (mean value ■ 7) as Its predominant Idea, had a definite Improvement in its degree of match to New CPV 3, or

'people's war/revolt'.

A summary description of the findings on the verifica­ tion of the test model of CPV, in terms of its resemblance to the empirical cases of CPV Is presented In Table 21. 152

Table 21

Degree of reseniblance between final clusters and

the New Test Model

Cluster 1 New Cluster 2 New Cluster 3

New CPV 1 73 X 100 % 75 % (Revolution/ Rebellion)

New CPV 2 100 % 85 % 75 % (Coup d'etat)

New CPV 3 33 % 85 % 100 % (People's War/ Revolt) 153

Conclusiont ■* ■ ■■■■

The three distinct clusters which emerge from the data

on the 30 cases of CPV validates three modes or 'Ideal types' of collec­

tive political violence - coup d'etat, revolution/rebellion, people's war/revolt. On the basis of this outcome, we may, therefore, conclude

that collective political violence can assume three distinct forms.

It can assume the form distinctive of coup d'etat, in which case changes are intended in the personnel composition of the

authority structure; the strategy Involved is conspiratorial and accor­

dingly highly organized, the action is elite directed and participated, and it calls forth high armed force disloyalty. So far as scale is

concerned, coups take place primarily In capital cities, involve sig­ nificant participation, minimum violence and are usually shortlived.

This pattern Is quite uniformly followed by the 13 cases of empirical

CPVs In the first cluster.

The second form which collective political violence may assume can be designated as 'revolution/rebellion*. The CPVs which assume the characteristics of 'revolution/rebellion', usually espouse constitutional or structural change along with the exchange of person­ nel in the positions of power; they employ 'open' strategy In realizing their goals, they are mostly spontaneous, participated and directed by the urban petit bourgeois and proletariat, and calling forth a certain degree of armed force disloyalty. So far as magnitude is concerned,

'revolutions/rebellions' engulf the entire country or at least the 154

major portions, last from less than a week to more than six months,

involve considerable support and participation and In most cases

results in massive amounts of violence.

Whereas, Germany (1918 and 1919), Russia (1917), Spain

(1934) and Cuba (1959) follow this pattern almo.st completely, other

cases such as Rumania (1907), Mexico (1910), Afghanistan (1929) would

seem more appropriately classified under New Cluster 3, due primarily

to the fact that they Indicate a significant peasant participation too!

However, since these latter cases of CPV are relatively closer to the

other cases of CPV in New Cluster 2 in terms of their total variable

distance, than to the cases of CPV in New Cluster 3, the cluster tech­

nique incorporated them in New Cluster 2 instead of New Cluster 3.

Despite this fact , we cannot vouch without a certain amount of reser­

vation that New Cluster 2 resembles the 'ideal typical' category of

New CPV 1 or 'revolution/rebellion*, in toto, as we can about the match

between Cluster 1 and coup d'etat. However, on the perspective of our

argument made earlier In the study that 'ideal types' are rarely ref­

lected in their 'ideal' form in reality - all that can be expected is

relative resemblance. Thus, New Cluster 2 even with its atypical cases

is closer to the 'ideal type' 'revolution/rebellion', than to any other

cluster.

As was Indicated earlier, the difference between

'revolution* and 'rebellion' is decided ex-priori. Thus, after a CPV with the characteristics of New CPV 1 succeeds, it is designated a

'revolution* and if it falls, it is designated a 'rebellion'. 155

Russell's (1974) distinction between 'revolution' and

'rebellion' is quite relevant to the point being made here. As was discussed In Chapter II, Russell considers 'revolution' as the funda­ mental changes which ensue following the successful completion of 'mass rebellion' - thus an unsuccessful 'rebellion' Is followed by an unsuc­ cessful revolution.(See Table 10, In Chapter II).

The third general pattern which CPV may assume Is designated as 'people's war/revolt'. The CPVs which assume the charac­ teristics of 'people's war/revolt' usually intend to bring about exchange of personnel In the positions of power and/or structural change in the distribution of the power base. They utilize 'open' and/or 'conspiratorial' means for realizing their alms, command a pre­ dominant 'peasant' and/or 'petit bourgeois' participation, (the abso­ lute lack of proletarian participation is significant) and are usually directed by the petit bourgeoisie. 'People's war/revolt' may be parti­ ally organized with a central leadership core. So far as scale is con­ cerned, 'people's war/revolt' may be short lived or protracted, with quite significant participation, occurring usually In few districts or provinces but may also engulf the entire country, both Insurgent and

Incumbent violence Is considerable. The total absence of armed force disloyalty Is significant.

As in the case of New Cluster 2, not all cases In New

Cluster 3 follow these characteristics definitely. Nevertheless, on the basis of Its total variable characteristics New Cluster 3 resembles the

'Ideal typical' category of 'people's war/revolt* more than any other cluster. 156

The difference between 'people's war' and 'revolt' is decided ex-priori on the basis of outcome. Thus, 'people's war* would refer to a successful CPV with characteristics comparable to New CPV 3, and 'revolt* would refer to an unsuccessful CPV with characteristics comparable to New CPV 3.

In sum, this analysis of the 30 cases of CPV has shown that collective political violence can assume three forms: coup d'etat, revolution/rebellion, or people’s war/revolt.

These conclusions are based on the information gathered on the thirty cases of CPV, Interms of their variable content. No claims are made as to their absoluteness, blaslessness or errorfreeness of these results. It is possible that someone else's conclusions might be quite different.

Outcome as an Independent Variable in Determining Clusters

Contrary to what was expected, the clusters do not break up in terms of outcome. All the three clusters contain Instances of CPV which are both successful and unsuccessful. Therefore, the outcome of CPV Is marginal so far as grouping cases of CPV into sepa­ rate clusters is concerned. If outcome was the only variable, then the clustering pattern would have followed that significantly. However, since outcome Is only one of the 12 variables, its Influence on the clusters la insignificant. 157

Intervening Variables Determining Outcome

Another task which was set out at the beginning of the

project was to Isolate the Intervening variables which determined the

outcome of collective political violence. The Intervening variables which are considered significant for determining outcome are variables which are present exclusively in either successful or unsuccessful CPVs.

For example, if variable X occurs In all cases of successful CPVs and

is totally absent In all cases of unsuccessful CPVs, then it can be

generally concluded that the presence of variable X is crucial for

success cetaris paribus.

At the outset It might be worth mentioning thatnot one variable In the multivariate model Is exclusively present In either successful or unsuccessful cases of CPVs. All the variables are pre­ sent In greater or lesser degree in both the groups. This Is expected, given the inherent complexity of a phenomenon such as collective poli­

tical violence. It is highly unlikely that the outcome of societal phenomenon such as collective political violence can be determined by one or by a combination of a certain number of variables. Too many factors, both obviously related and presumably unrelated influence the outcome of complex socio-hlstorlcal phenomenon such as collective political violence.

However, looking at the data on the thirty cases of

CPV, certain uniformities are discernible, for whatever they may be worth. 158

Firstf In 99 X of the cases of successful CPVs the

'Idea' has been either to exchange personnel in the positions of power

or to realize constitutional change. Only in the case of Russia (1917),

'idea* was 'structural change'. This finding seems quite logical.

Since CPVs with relatively limited alms, such as exchanging personnel have more chances to succeed than CPVs which have grandiose aims - in

the world of reality, coup d'etat which involve the espousal of limited alms, occur more often than revolutions and also succeed more often than

revolutions. Accordingly, history is full of examples of coups, whereas revolutions are difficult, if not impossible to come across. Therefore, one condition for success may be cited as espousal of limited alms (see

Gamson, 1975).

However, considering the fact that more than 50 X of the unsuccessful CPVs also espoused relatively limited aims like exchange of personnel or at the most constitutional change, the validity of the argument made earlier seems rather questionable. The only relative difference seems to be that, whereas, only one case of CPV (Russia,

1917) Intended to bring about structural change in the sample of success­ ful CPVs, in the sample of unsuccessful CPVs there are five cases espousing structural change. What may be contended therefore is that

CPVs with intentions of realizing structural change are usually unsuc­ cessful. However, whether a CPV with more limited alms will succeed cannot be positively determined.

Second, all cases of successful CPV with the exception of Russia (1917) demonstrates a certain degree of petit bourgeois par­ ticipation within its ranks. However, this variable is present in at 159

least 60 X of the unsuccessful CPVs also.

Similarly, whereas participation is considerable in all cases of successful CPV, with the exception of Turkey(1908) and

Iraq (1958), unsuccessful CPVs demonstrate similar trait too. Thus, both successful and unsuccessful CPVs have considerable participation.

Therefore, neither the degree of participation nor the presence of the petit bourgeoisie in the ranks of the rebels - determines the outcome one way or the other.

Finally, so far as armed force disloyalty is con­ cerned, 53 % of the cases of unsuccessful CPVs do not indicate any armed force disloyalty at all, whereas in the case of successful CPVs all the Instances demonstrate either high or low armed force disloy­ alty. And significantly, of the successful CPVs, 73 X indicate high armed force disloyalty and only 27 X Indicate low armed force disloy­ alty. Interestingly, 47 X of the unsuccessful CPVs also demonstrate a certain presence of armed force disloyalty. However, whereas in the case of successful CPVs armed force disloyalty is the rule rather than the exception, in the case of unsuccessful CPVs, armed force dis­ loyalty is more an exception than the rule, This finding is signi­ ficant. It partially supports the doctrines of Lenin, Chorley (1943), and Russell (1974); who have contended that armed force disloyalty is imperative for the success of CPV.

It was expected that a few other variables such as degree of planning and organization and the structure of leadership would correlate in a certain pattern with successful or unsuccessful

CPV. Thus, a CPV with a greater degree of organization and planning, 160 and which commanded a centralized leadership structure was logically believed to have greater chances to succeed than one which did not undergo planning or did not have centrellzed leadership. However, the research results have not supported either of these hypotheses.

Both successful and unsuccessful CPVs demonstrate both organization and spontaneity. And surprisingly, almost 99 X of the unsuccessful

CPVs had centrellzed leadership structures, whereas 73 X of the successful CPVs had centralized leadership. Thus, the actual results were quite contrary to expectations.

Conclusion

In sum, except for armed force disloyalty, the degree of correlation between outcome and other recurrent variables In the successful and unsuccessful cases of CPV is anybody's guess. As for armed force disloyalty, it can be concluded that a certain amount of armed force disloyalty is imperative for the success of collective political violence. Though the existence of armed force disloyalty does not automatically ensure success. Chapter V

Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to develop a typology of collective political violence. The study was pursued from the premise that collective political violence like any other socio- historical phenomena could be adequately classified only on the basis of a multivariate scheme. Review of the extant literature demonstra­ ted the lack of a comprehensive typological scheme of collective poli­ tical violence. The multivariate model which was introduced as the basic framework of the typological scheme developed here - comprised of three sets of variables, structural variables, extent variables and extraneous variables - each set encompassing such significant sub- variables as, ideas, strategy, class character, degree of organization, structure and class of leadership, the scale of the action, the degree of armed force disloyalty Involved and the type of government res­ ponse called forth - each of which It was assumed contributed to­ wards the unique characterization of each mode of CPV.

Having developed the test model, an attempt was made to verify the scheme In terms of a sample of empirical cases of

CPV. A cluster analysis was performed on the sample of the thirty empirical cases of CPV, to discern any distinctive patterns comparable to the 'Ideal typical* patterns of the test model. The analysis of

161 162

the data revealed three relatively distinct patterns quite comparable

to the modes of CPV Identified as 'coup d'etat1, 'revolution/rebellion* and 'people's war/revolt* in the test model. In Chapter IV we substan­

tiated on the degree of resemblance each of the three final clusters of empirical cases of CPV had, to the 'ideal typical* modes of CPV in

the test model. In concluding our study in this chapter, It was deemed appropriate to add a few observations and comments over and above what has already been written.

Though the analysis of the data does not directly indicate this, with a certain amount of perception it can be realized that in the final analysis, collective political violence assumes two distinctive, dlchotomous modes or patterns. One is exemplified by the 'coup d'etat* - the CPV initiated, led and participated by the

'elite* (i.e., that segement of the society which either occupies the important positions in the state apparatus, or has easy access to It), which usually Is limited to the exchange of one elite by the other in the positions of power. It, therefore, represents competitive Inter­ action for domination over the resources and positions of power within the upper classes of society. It is lntra-class dialectic, reflecting horizontal conflict between one group and another occupying the same general class position.

The other mode of CPV as exemplified In such patterns as 'revolution/rebellion' and 'people's war/revolt', signify inter­ class conflict. They usually imply vertical responses of one group which lays claim to resources under the control of another group

(Tilly, 1975). Accordingly, these CPVs are predominantly participated 163

by such classes as the 'proletariat* and 'peasantry', Initiated and

led by the 'petit bourgeoisie*. Moreover, these CPVs are mobilized to

effect fundamental, socio-structural changes. Whereas, 'coup's under­

take to alter the personnel in the positions of power, 'revolution/

rebellion*, 'people's war/revolt' Intend to redistribute the resources of power and subsequently restructure the bases of power.

Thus, essentially CPVs are either actions 'from above', with intentions to reinforce the power differential within

classes In society, or actions 'from below) with the goal of breaking

the hegemony of the upper classes by redistributing the economic and political resources and thus restructuring the stratification pattern.

This, interestingly enough, corresponds to Marx's typology of revolu­

tion based centrally on his idea of class domination. Marx theorized that, revolutions are historically led by two classes. In the case of the 'bourgeois' revolution, the capitalist class which emerges from

the womb of feudalism leads the revolution to overthrow feudalism and establish capitalism in its place. In the 'socialist* revolution, the proletariat emerging from the womb of capitalism leads the revolution

to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism. By extending Marx's categories slightly, accomodation can be made for CPVs which do not fit his characterization absolutely. Therefore, along with such

'bourgeois' revolutions such as the Turkish CPV of 1908 or the CPV in

Yemen in 1962, both of which overthrew the monarchy - the symbol of

feudallstlc forces in society, accomodation can be made for CPVs which

Involves bourgeois leadership and participation but which occur in 164 post feudal societies .

Similarly,'proletarian’ revolutions subsume CPVs with predominant peasant participation due primarily to their comparable ideological orientations, I.e., undermining bourgeois hegemony.

In short, it could quite adequately be argued that in the final analysis CPVs can assume two primary forms - CPVs which are Initiated 'from above' and those which are realized 'from below*.

At this point it Is probably appropriate to give a little thought to an issue which has haunted us throughout this study.

The Issue can adequately be expressed In the following question: how valid are our attempts at discerning uniformities in phenomena which are said to be historically and structurally unique? Social scien­ tists who espouse a structural, comparative historical approach such as Barrington Moore(1967), Immanuel Wallersteln (1974 ), Theda

Skocpol (1978), Ellen Trimberger (1978), Daniel Chirot (1977) would contend that soclo-historlcal phenomena such as revolution, rebellion coup d'etat, revolt, people's war respond to societal and historical pressures in uniquely distinctive ways. Thus, like a piece of art, they are unique and, therefore, unrepllcable. Thus, the argument goes that 'revolutions* cannot be imported or exported. They have to arise

In the context of the structural relations and historical processes distinctive of every society, Accordingly, it could be argued that any attempts at evolving patterns of a set of unique cases of revo­ lutions, rebellions, coups and so on , Is invalid, because the resul­ ting structures would reveal forced impressions rather than factual ones, This contention Is so strong and so convincing In Its logic 165 that we have to consider It, Moreover> some of the problems we had In designating clusters to certain 'ideal types' and the ambivalence, lack of assurance and security which we still feel in having them assigned

Into certain categories, Is Indicative of the fact that each case of collective political violence Is too Individualistic to be forced Into certain 'Ideal typical' abstract patterns. What we have done In our analysis has been simply to generate a certain amount of uniformity In the uniqueness of the thirty cases of collective political violence.

Similarly, prediction becomes very arbitrary when we are faced with phenomena which can assume distinctive forms. The CPVs do not follow a certain mold when successful and another when unsuc­ cessful. There are no exclusive variables to which success or failure can be distinctively attributed to. Thus, no definite formula can be suggested, pursual of which can deliver a certain Intended outcome.

The best we can do with prediction Is offer the probabilities of suc­ cess or failure given the presence of an array of variables. This point was made very aptly by Wilbert Moore (1964; 337) when he wrote that t "no social science can be expected to assign probabilities to individual occurrences within a class of events. A principal value, therefore, of systematic comparative analysis Is the establishment of common features despite detailed diversity, and thus the accumulation of an 'experience rating' or actuarial basis for prediction".

In this section of the present chapter, we Intend to substantiate on two specific variables, class character and class of leadership, in terms of the characteristics which they assume in the sample of empirical cases of CPV, in order to obtain certain genera­ 166 lizations.

A significant amount of literature exists on the behavior of different classes in instances of collective political violence (in the process of collective political violence). The pre­ sent effort does not offer a review of this literature - all that is intended here Is to provide an overview of the behavior of the classes in society identified as the bourgeoisie, the petit bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the peasantry in the respective CPVs in our sample - in order to generate certain propositions.

As was Indicated earlier the 'bourgeoisie* are repre­ sented primarily in CPVs Identified as 'coup d'etat', which usually

Involve the substitution of personnel In the positions of power. The bourgeoisie is significantly represented In 'horizontal conflict' involving the exchange of one elite by the other. As such, it repre­ sents 'Intra-class' rivalry. And as such, they do not represent class conflict as envisaged by Marx, Therefore, in short 'coups' involving significant bourgeois participation do not signify substitution of control of the state from one class to the other, but within a class

Itself. From this perspective, Skocpol (1978) argues that the state cannot be perceived as a class apparatus only. States according to

Skocpol are "fundamentally administrative and military organization that extract resources from society and deploy them to maintain order at home and to compete against other states abroad " (1978: 128) and la subsequently "not reducible to class structures" (1978: 128) and from this perspective, "coups'V'bourgeols revolutions" or "revolutions from above" ... "are based upon political reorganization within a 167

state that Is already strong and autonomous over against class forces"

(1978: 128) "Independently of existing class structures" (1978: 130).

Though Skocpol*s point Is quite well taken, It could

nevertheless be argued that bourgeois efforts at 'reorganization* of

the state apparatus usually occurs In response to class pressures existing in the general social sphere. 'Coups' or 'bourgeois revo­

lutions from above* which give the apparent impression of being Inde­ pendent of the existing pressures of the class structure - usually indicate strong undercurrents of 'class’ behavior triggered by pressure

-imagined or real felt from the general societal class structure. To take an example, the 1966 military coup in Ghana which overthrew

Kwame Nkrumah would apparently seem to be an effort at '>reorganlza- tlon* of the personnel In the states apparatus. A little Insight would indicate, however, that the 'coup* was In reality a reaction to the socialistic tendencies tolerated, encouraged and even nurtured by the Nkrumah government. So, in fact the 'coup* did not result indepen­ dently of the class structure, It In fact arose to reinforce the exis­ ting stratification structure and stave off any tendencies at restruc­ turing the social base and subsequently the system of power and privi­ lege. The point being made here is that, what might seem innocent attempts at 'reorganizing* the state apparatus, may actually reflect efforts at staving off the larger danger to the overall organization of power and the bases of power. Thus, it may be proven with addi­ tional research that even when the 'bourgeois revolutions from above* seem to be reacting independently of the existing class structure, they are, in fact, responding to the exigencies arising out of con- 168

fllcting class pressures and Interests attributable to the societal

class structure - al belt Indirectly.

The almost ubiquitous presence of the petit bour­ geoisie in the ranks of the CPV, both successful and unsuccessful, Is quite In line with our expectations. Not only have the petit bour­ geoisie been major participants in the various Instances of CPV, they have frequently played the leading revolutionary role. Unlike the bourgeoisie, who usually swell the ranks of participants only In the bourgeois CPVs from above - petit bourgeois participation is all per­ vading. They can be found in the ranks of CPVs 'from above* as well as In CPVs 'from below*. The dynamic role of the 'petit bourgeoisie*

In the 'revolutionary movements' of the world cannot be overlooked.

Usually the CPVs which they Initiate and lead, reflect their Images of the 'ideal* society, fused with such themes as modernization and Indi­ vidualism, or nationalism, democracy and egalitarianism. In sum, the contribution of the petit bourgeoisie, the central roles they have played in terms of political leadership have gone a long way in deter­ mining the antecedents, outcomes and consequences of collective poli­ tical violence. Thus, as Skocpol, so aptly puts it: "How, for example, could the processes and outcomes of the Russian, Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions be understood without attention to the contribution of

Leninist Communist Parties, or the French revolution without attention to the role of the Jacobins and Napoleon7"(1978: 125).

The revolutionary potential of the proletariat is undisputed. Juxtaposed with the tradition bound, conservative peasan­ try, the proletariat has historically been portrayed as the usherers 169

of everything that Is progressive. As exemplified in such Instances

of CPV as Russia (1917), Germany (1918 and 1919), Spain (1934) - this

contention is more than proven. In each of these instances the CPVs

were predominantly participated and partly initiated by the prole­

tariat in order to effect fundamental alterations in the societal

structures of their respective countries.

The situation of the peasantry In so far as their

participation in Instances of CPVs Is concerned Is as Interesting as

it Is unique. Marx's exposition on the limited revolutionary poten­

tial of the peasantry is well known. History has partially confounded

Marx's contention that subordinate, conservative, classes -for - them­

selves, such as the peasantry are incapable of initiating or control­

ling revolutionary processes. Their potential for political violence

is realized only in alliance with the 'hegemonic revolutionary' classes such as the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Accordingly in our ana­

lysis of CPVs as demonstrated in the thirty cases in our sample - the

role of peasantry as an allied class in the process of political vio­

lence - adds credibility to this contention. Therefore, in such

cases of CPV as in Turkey (1925) and Afghanistan (1929), the peasantry joined hands with the petit bourgeoisie to stop the pace of moderniza­

tion. These 'reactionary* CPVs occurred in response to progressive

changes in society, because such changes were perceived by the petit bourgeois elements and their peasant followers as threatening their

roles in the existing system. Quite contrarlly the peasant participa­

tion in the CPVs In Rumania (1907), Bulgaria (1923), El Salvador (1932) alongside the petit bourgeoisie and/or the proletariat, were intended 170

to realize socialistic, egalitarian principles,

The participation of the peasantry as one of the

major producing classes, in the ranks of the 'revolutionaries' is

crucial for the success of mass based CPVs from below. Similarly, for

'elitist', 'reactionary' CPVs 'from above' the sympathy and active par­

ticipation of the peasantry or their total indifference Is necessary

for positive outcome. Thus In short...."the varying outcomes of suc­

cessful social revolutions are significantly affected by the specific way in which the peasantry becomes Involved in the overall revolu­ tionary process ..... " (Skocpol, 1978: 131).

This Is not to underplay the fact that the peasantry

In itself Is a self-conscious, inltlatlveless class, Incapable of becoming an organized 'truely conscious' class-in-itself. Peasants are mobilized for revolutionary action, by the other leading revolu­ tionary classes, either through manipulation, 'persuasion' or 'coer­ cion*. However, once mobilized for action they determine the revo­ lutionary outcome.

Our effort here at explicating the role of specific classes In the various CPVs has only been a limited one. The possibi­ lity of research In this area is simply endless.

Pointers for Future Research

Too many factors influence collective political vio­ lence at every step. A sincere effort at determining the etiology of collective political violence, or its outcome will have to start by 171

considering societal, inter-societal and historical factors. With the

dally shrinkage of the world, all soclo-hlstorlcal phenomena will have

to be analyzed in the context of the 'international* system.

In our writing so far we have definitely made the

implication that we are Interested in collective political violence as

an lntra-socletal phenomenon. In our definition of CPV we had made It

clear that we were dealing with attempts to overthrow the central

government of a sovereign national entity. However, we realize that

lnsplte of our assumption of autonomy it will be highly erroneous and

naive if we totally obliviated the world inter-systemic processes. At

the present stage of development of the world capitalist and socialist

system, lntra-socletal processes cannot be isolated from inter-societal

ones.

In his recent book on "Social change in the Twentieth

Century" Daniel Chirot (1977) expands on this notion of world system.

He specifically talks about the capitalist world system. In the capi­

talist world system the countries are stratified in terms of their eco­

nomic diversification, technological development and degree of indepen­

dence from outside control. Chirot, therefore, talks about:

(i) Core Societies: which are economically diversified, powerful,

rich societies that are relatively Independent.

(ii) Peripheral Societies: which are economically overspecialized,

relatively poor and weak societies that are subject to the manipula­

tion or direct control by the core powers.

(iii) Semi-Peripheral Societies: which are midway between the core and

the periphery that are trying to industrialize and diversify their 172

economies. While they are weaker than core societies, they are

trying to overcome their weakness and are not subject to outside mani­

pulation and control as are peripheral societies. (Chirot, 1977)

Understanding the system of stratification is Impor­

tant, because the status of society as core, peripheral or semi-peri­

pheral correlates highly with their intrasocletal patterns of economic

development, social stratification, the nature of domestic policies

etc. The dynamics of collective political violence Is no exception to

the rule. A full scale research could be undertaken to study just how

the position of a country in the world capitalist system correlated

with the nature and type of political violence that occurs within It.

While this study falls within the confines of the structural and com­

parative historical approach recently advocated by Theda Skocpol (1978)

- "one which synthesizes an historically grounded, social structural

style of explanation...with a comparative historical method of hypo­

thesis testing" - our effort was more limited.

This provides us with a few guidelines for future

research. We could select three cases of collective political violence,

one each from a 'core society', a 'peripheral society* and a 'semi

peripheral society', as defined by Chirot, in order to determine the ways In which the position of countries in the capitalist world system

influences their CPVs In terms of their antecedents and consequences.

The world systemic outlook would also enable us to accomodate one important class of political violence, which we had to abandon in the present endeavour, due to our definition of the subject matter and the limitations arising thereby. These are the nationalist 173

movements attributable to the dialectics within the capitalist world

system, which gives rise' to the ideologies espousing the formation of

Independent states within the capitalist world, structurally liberated

from the hegemony of the core societies. Today, in the era of emer­

gence of the new alternate 'socialist world system', it would be

interesting to note which system the new emerging nations, offspring

of these nationalist movements, espouse in their own intra-systemic

development. This perspective would also provide ".,..a framework from which to interpret the results of revolutions, and help(s) us to under­

stand why there has been continual disillusionment when revolutionary

outcomes failed to mesh with ideological claims ..."(Skocpol, 1978: 132)

The phenomenon of collective political violence is a

researchers' gold mine. There is no end to the possible Issues which can be analyzed, studied and researched. Especially by integrating

the idea of the world system, definite theoretical gains can be expec­ ted, especially in the realm of causes, structure and outcome of col­

lective political violence. Moreover, as all the societal and inter- socletal factors are Integrated within a theoretical framework, the task of drawing uniformities within apparently unique cases of poli­ tical violence might make more sense. BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography is divided into three sections. The first part lists the General Sources consulted on the subject matter of collec­ tive political violence. The second part consists of the Sources used to Develop a Universe of collective political violence. The third part Is a comprehensive listing of the sources consulted to acquire information on each case of collective political violence.

The third part of the bibliography follows the appendix.

174 175

GENERAL SOURCES

Alker, Hayward R. and Bruce M. Russet. 1965. World Politics In the General Assembly. Yale University Press., New Haven & London.

Amann, Peter. 1962, "Revolution: a redefinition". Political Science Quarterly, 77.

Anderberg, Michael R. 1973. Cluster analysis for applications. Academic Press., New York.

Arendt, Hannah. 1963. On Revolution. Viking Press., London.

Bell, J. Bovyer. 1976. On revolt: strategies of national liberation. Harvard University Press., Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Black, Cyril E. and Thomas P. Thornton. 1964. Communism and revolu­ tion: The Strategic uses of political violence. Princeton University Press., Princeton.

Blalock, Hubert M. 1960. Social Statistics. McGraw Hill., New York.

Blanks ten, George. 1958. "Revolutions", in Harold Eugene Davis, Government and Politics in Latin America. The Ronald Press Co., New York.

Brlnton, Crane. 1938. The anatomy of revolution. Prentice Hall Inc., New York.

Bwy, Douglas P. 1968. "Dimensions of social conflict In Latin America", in Louis H. Masottl and Don R. Bowen, Riots and Rebel­ lion. Sage Publications., Beverly Hills.

Calvert, Peter. 1970. A study of revolution. Clarendon Press., Oxford.

Chirot, Daniel. 1977. Social Change in the twentieth century. Harcourt Brace Jovanovlch., New York.

Chorley, Katherine C. 1943. Armies and the art of revolution. Beacon Press., Boston.

Davies, J. C. 1962. "Toward a theory of revolution", American Sociological Review, Vol. 23.

Davis, Harold Eugene. 1958. Government and politics In Latin America. The Ronald Press Co., New York. 176

Eckstein, Harry. 1964. Internal war: Problems and approaches. The Free Press of Glencoe Colller-Macmillan Ltd., London.

Eckstein, Harry. 1965. "On the etiology of Internal wars", History and theory. Vol. 4.

Edwards, L. P. 1927. The natural history of revolutions. University of Chicago Press., Chicago.

Everltt, Brian. 1974 ? Cluster Analysis. John Wiley and Sons., New York.

Gamson, William A. 1968. Power and discontent. Dorsey Press., Home­ wood, 111.

Gamson, William A. 1975. The strategy of social protest. Dorsey Press., Homewood, 111.

Gerassl, John. 1971. The coming of the new international. The World Publishing Co., New York.

Giap, General Vo Nguyen. 1962. People's war People's army: The Viet Cong insurrection manual for underdeveloped countries. Frederick A. Praeger., New York.

Goodspeed, D. J. 1962. The conspirators: A study of the coup d'etat. Viking Press., New York.

Gottschalk, Louis. 1944. "Causes of Revolution", American Journal of Sociology, vol. 50.

Green, P. E. and F.J. Carmone. 1970. Multidimensional scaling and related techniques in marketing analysis. Allyn and Bacon., Rockleigh, N.J.

Greene, Thomas H. 1974. Comparative revolutionary movements. Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

Gross, Feliks. 1958. The seizure of political power in a century of revolutions. The philosophical library., New York.

Gurr, T. R. 1968. "A causal model of civil strife: a comparative analysis using new indices", American Political Science Review, vol. 62.

Gurr, T. R. 1968. "Psychological factors in civil violence", World Politics, vol. 20. 177

Gurr, T. R. 1970. "Sources of rebellion in western societies: some quantitative evidence", Annals of American Academy of Political Science Review, vol. 62.

Gurr, T. R. 1973. "The revolution - social change nexus", Journal of comparative politics, vol. 3.

Gurr, T. R. 1970. Why men rebel. Princeton University Press., Prince­ ton.

Gurr, T. R. and Harry Eckstein. 1975. Patterns of authority: a struc­ tural basis for political injury. John Wiley and Sons., New York.

Gurr, T. R. 1976. Rogues, rebels and reformers: a political history of urban crime and conflict. Sage Publications., Beverly Hills.

Hagopian, Mark N. 1974. The phenomenon of revolution. Dodd, Mead and Co., New York.

Heberle, Rudolf. 1951. Social movements: an introduction to political sociology. Appleton Century Crofts., New York.

Hibbs, Douglas A. 1973. Mass political violence: a cross national causal analysis. John Wiley and Sons., New York.

Hobsbaum, Eric J. 1971. Primitive Rebels. Manchester University Press., Manchester.

Hoffer, Eric. 1951. The true believer. New American Library of World Literature., New York.

Horowitz, I. L. 1966. Three worlds of development: The theory and Practice of International stratification. Oxford University Press., New York.

Hunter, Robert. 1940. Revolution: why, how, when 7 Harper and Row., New York.

Huntington, S. P. 1962. Changing patterns of military politics. The Free Press of Glencoe Inc., New York.

Jalee, Pierre. 1969. The third world in world economy. Monthly Review Press*, New York.

Janos, Andrew. 1964. Authority and violence: The political frame work of internal war, in Harry Eckstein, Internal War, Free Press of Glencoe Inc., New York and London. 178

Janos, Andrew. 1964. The seizure of power: a study of force and popular consent. Princeton University Press.» Princeton, N.J.

Janowltz, Morris. 1960. The professional soldier: a social and political portrait. The Free Press of Glencoe., Illinois.

John. J. Johnson. 1964. The military and society in Latin America. Stanford University Press., Stanford, California.

Johnson, Chalmers. 1964. Revolution and the social system. Hoover Institution Studies, vol. 3., Stanford.

Johnson, Chalmers. 1966. Revolutionary Change. Little Brown and Co., Boston and Toronto.

Kornhauser, William. 1964. Rebellion and political development, in Harry Eckstein, Internal War, Free Press of Glencoe., London.

Kllng, M. 1956. "Toward a theory of power and political instability in Latin America". Western Political Quarterly, vol. 9.

Lasswell, Harold D. and A. Kaplan. 1950. Power and Society; a frame­ work for political enquiry. Yale University Press., New Haven.

Lazarsfeld, P. F. and A.K. Pasanella. 1972. Continuities in the language of social research. The Free Press., New York.

Leiden, C. and K.M. Schmitt. 1968. The politics of violence: Revolu­ tion in the modern world. Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliff.

Lewis, J. W. 1974. Peasant rebellion and Communist revolution in Asia. Stanford University Press., Stanford, California.

Luttwak, E. 1969. Coup d’etat: a practical handbook. Alfred A. Knopf., New York.

Malaparte, C. 1932. Coup d'etat the technique of revolution. E.P. Dutton and Co. Inc., New York.

Mao Tse Tung. 1967. Selected works of Mao Tse Tung. Foreign Langu­ age Press., Peking.

McKinney, J. C. 1967. "Methods, procedures, and techniques in Sociology", in Howard Becker and A. Boskoff, Modern Sociological Theory. Holt, Rinehart and Winston., New York.

McKinney, J. C. 1966. Constructive typology and social theory. Appleton Century Crofts., New York.

Moore, B. 1967. Social origins of domocracy and dictatorship; lord and peasant in the making of modern world. Beacon Press., Boston. 179

Moore, W. E. 1964. "Predicting discontinuities in social change". American Sociological Review, vol. 29.

Oppenheimer, M. 1969. The urban guerrilla. Quadrangle books., Chicago.

Paige, J. M. 1975. Agrarian revolution: social movements and export agriculture in the underdeveloped world. The Free Press., New York.

Pettee, G. S. 1938. The process of revolution. Howard Fertlg., New York.

Roberts, R, E. and R. M. Kloss. 1974. Social movements: between the balcony and the barricade. The C.V. Mosby Co., St. Louis.

Rosenau, J. N. 1964. International aspects of civil strife. Princeton University Press., Princeton.

Rummel, R. J. 1966. Dimensions of conflict behavior within nations. Journal of conflict resolution, vol. 10.

Rummel, R. J. 1970. Understanding factor analysis. Journal of conflict resolution, vol. 11.

Rummel, R. J. 1970. Applied factor analysis. Northwestern Univer­ sity press., Evanston, 111.

Russell, D. E. H. 1974. Rebellion, revolution, and armed force. Academic Press. , New York.

Salert, B. 1976. Revolutions and revolutionaries: Four theories. Elsevier., New York.

Skocpol, T. 1976. Explaining revolutions: In quest of social- structural approach, in Lewis A. Coser and Otto N. Larson, The uses of controversy in Sociology. Free Press., New York.

Skocpol, T. and E. Trimberger. 1978. Revolutions in the world historical development of capitalism, in Barbara H. Kaplan, Social change in the capitalist world economy. Sage Publishers, Beverly Hills.

Sorokin, P. A. 1937. Social and cultural dynamics: fluctuation of social relationships, war, amd revolution. American Book Co., New York.

Stokes, W. S. 1952. Violence as a power factor In Latin American politics. Western Political quarterly. 180

Stokes, W. S. 1959, Latin American Politics. Thomas Y. Cromwell Co., New York.

Stone, L. 1966. Theories of revolution. World Politics, vol. 18.

Thorndike, R. M. 1978. Correlational procedures for research. Gardener Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1975, The rebellious century. Harvard university Press., Cambridge, Mass.

Von der Mehden, Fred R. 1973. Comparative political violence. Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The modern World system. Academic Press., New York.

Wilkinson, Paul, 1974, Political terrorism. John Wiley and sons., New York.

Wolf, Eric. R. 1969. Peasant wars of the twentieth century. Harper and Row., New York.

SOURCES USED FOR DEVELOPING A UNIVERSE OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Annual Register of World Events, 1907-1967. Encyclopedia Brltannlca, 1975. New International Yearbook, 1907-1967. Statesman's Yearbook, 1907-1967. Appendix

Variable Content of CPVs Sampled

The appendix contains information on the variable

content of the CPVs sampled. The information presented here has pro­

vided the basis for evaluating each case of CPV, and has aided the sub­

sequent analysis of the data. In presenting the information on the

variable content of the CPVs sampled, the first step has been to pro­

vide the data which was acquired from the varied historical sources.

This has been followed by our own inference about the variable charac­

ter and the subsequent assignment of a particular variable code to every one of the multiple variables for each case of CPV sampled.

1. Portugal, 1915 (ID 1t 1)

Ideas a) Information from sources:

"(The Democratic Party) accused the President of the Republic and the Ministry of having 'abused power* under the Constitution. Even­ tually they found allies in Carbonarlos, who worked secretly day and night, on the instruction of the revolutionary leaders, in an endeavor to shake off the dictatorship".(Braganca-Cunha, 1938:160)

"The Democratic organ 'Munde*, violently attacked the government and the dictatorship of General Castro, and the threats of violence and revolution were freely uttered " (Annual Register, 1915)

"In May 1915, a violent rebellion in Lisbon, backed by some army corps, the navy, and popular elements, threw the government out and reinstated the democrats," (de Oliveira Marques, 1938: 167)

181 182

b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV in Portugal intended to exchange the personnel In the positions of power. The Democrats wanted

to assume power by overthrowing the government led by the Monarchist

General Plmenta de Castro. There are no indications of constitutional

or structural changes being Intended by the CPV. We can, therefore,

code 'Idea' of the CPV in Portugal as involving the * exchange1 of the personnel in the positions of power.

Strategy a) Information from sources:

" A revolutionary committee, in which Alvaro Castro, Antonio da Silva and Captain Leotte Rego were conspicuous figures, carefully organized the Insurrection, On May 14, in accordance with the plot, the conspi­ rators on Portugese warships in the harbor of Lisbon opened fire on the town. After two days of street fighting...the success of the Demo­ cratic coup d'etat was assured". (NIYB, 1915)

" Firing broke out, the Carbonarla were mobilized on May 14, In the streets of Lisbon....The success of the coup d'etat once again placed the Democratic Party in power...,." (Annual Register, 1915) b) Inference and Variable Code: Information gathered indicate that the

CPV though initially conspiratorial, assumed the form of open conflict

in the latter stages. Therefore, strategy shall be coded as 'combi­ national/, that is involving the strategies of both open and conspira­

torial conflict.

Class Character a) Information from sources:

" The democrats had behind them the bourgeois support of the major cities..." (de Oliveira Marques, 1938: 167)

See third quote under "Idea", 183 b) Inference and Variable Coder A b can be gathered from the sources, the CPV In Portugal was primarily a joined venture between the rank and file of the Democratic party and certain elements of the army and the navy. And as such It was a power struggle between organized political factions. Since none of the sources Indicate any proletarian and/or peasant elements In the CPV, It would be safe to assume that the class character of the CPV In Portugal was predomlnatly bourgeois and petit bourgeois.

Leadership (Structure) a) Information from sources:

See first quote under 'strategy* and the quote under 'class charac­ ter'. b) Inference and Variable Codet So far as organizational leadership

Is concerned, the CPV In Portugal was Initiated and led by the Demo­ cratic party. So far as personal leadership leadership is concerned,

NIYB refers to Alvaro Castro, Antonio da Silva, and Captain Leotte Rego as the "conspicuous figures, (who) carefully organized the insurrec­ tion" (NIYB, 1915). In view of these facts we can definitely code leadership structure as being centralized.

Leadership (Class)

None of the sources consulted provide any information about the class membership of the individuals who are recognized as leaders. In such situations the class of leadership is coded according to the class of predominant participants of the CPV. Accordingly on the basis of the information on the general class character of the CPV In Portu­ gal, the class of leadership has been coded as predomlnatly bourgeois 184 an<* petit bourgeois.

Organization a) Information from Sources:

See quote # 1 under 'strategy*. b) Inference and Variable Code: NIYB (1915) very clearly notes that the

CPV was very 'carefully organized', and that action ensued "in accor­ dance with the plot". Also according to Livermore (1947: 455) "The democratic party had carefully prepared the naval forces of the Tagus.."

Following these facts we shall consider the CPV in Portugal as orga­ nized.

Participation

No definite estimate about the degree of participation is given by any of the authors consulted. Nevertheless, a rather significant following is Implied in most of the sources. If we are to take the casualty figures as any indication of the degree of participation then we can safely assume that participation was definitely more than 500.

(See information under violence). We shall thus code participation as some.

Duration a) Information from sources:

" Hostilities lasted two days." (Livermore, 1947; 455)

" After two days of fighting, the success of the democratic coup d'etat was assured". (NIYB, 1915) b) Inference and Varlble Code: The CPV in Portugal lasted * less than a week'. 185

Violence

The casualty figures range from 100 killed, 300 wounded (Annual

Register, 1915, Braganca-Cunha, 1938) to 200 killed, 500 wounded (NIYB,

1915). This does not create any problem for us, since In any case both

figures exceed our maximum category. Thus violence Is coded as consi­

derable .

Area

The area of protest Is Indicated by all sources as being the capital

city of Lisbon. This fulfills our maximum scale so far as area Is con­

cerned. Thus area shall be coded as Misturbance in capital city*.

Government Response

a) Information from sources;

"...General de Castro resigned office and was taken prisoner ". (Annual Register, 1915)

b) Inference and Variable Code: Government response is coded as posi­

tive, since the government of General Castro resigned.

Armed Force Disloyalty

a) Information from sources:

" The army had given the amplest assurance to General Plmenta de Castro that It would uphold the government, but it failed to give its promised support". (Braganca-Cunha, 1938: 161)

" ..the naval arsenal was a strong point for the revolution, and the members of the Fiscal guard and the Republican guard joined the movement." (Livermore, 1947: 455) b) Inference and Variable Code: As can be gathered from the sources not only did the army fall to give its promised support to the govern­ ment, it played an active part In the CPV. Armed force disloyalty 186

In Portugal la coded high,

2. Germany. 1918 (ID # 2)

Ideas a) Information from sources;

" Before the revolution In the closing weeks of 1918. and the esta­ blishment of a provisional government, the German Empire was a consti­ tutional Monarchy...Signs of a crisis were plain before the middle of October, the power of the Socialists becoming daily more assured... By October 20. Herr Ebert, Herr Scheidemann and other socialist deputies in the Reichstag were openly demanding peace, popular govern­ ment and the abdication of the Kaiser. By the beginning of November, the revolution throughout Germany was in full progress ..." (NIYB, 1918 249-254). b) Inference and Variable Code: A general review of the sources indi­ cate that the Kiel mutiny of November 3 signalled the beginning of the

German revolution. In itself the mutiny was apolitical. However, the success of the first efforts of the sailors led quickly to the formula­ tion of political and revolutionary policies, which included the demand for universal suffrage and the abdication of the Kaiser, And as the action spread throughout the country it assumed strictly political character with overthrow of the constitutional monarchy as its primary aim. The idea of the German CPV can thus be coded as espousing constitutional change.

Strategy

The sources indicate the use of general strike, rioting and mutiny as the strategies of violence utilized in the CPV (NIYB, 1918)

Class Character a) Information from sources;

" ..soldiers bearing red flags soon flocked into the streets from 187

the outskirts of the city. Workers from the factories joined them and some 3000 sailors from Kiel,..,11 (NIYB, 1918; 254)

b) Inference and Variable Code; Participation of petit bourgeois and

intellectual elements such as Herr Ebert, Herr Scheldemann, Dr, Karl

Llebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg Is also indicated in the sources. On

the basis of these informations we can quote class as consisting of

petit bourgeois and proletarian elements.

Leadership (Structure)

A number of personalities surface here and there in all the accounts.

However, there Is no Information In these accounts which would Indicate

that these individuals actually led the CPV. It is highly unlikely

that the entire course of action was leaderless. At the same time no

one source of leadership can be identified. We thus code leadership

structure as decentralized.

Leadership (Class)

Since leadership structure was decentrallzed,leaders,lf any,would

have originated from the ranks of the participants . Leadership class

is, therefore, coded as petit bourgeois, proletarian.

Organization

a) Information from sources;

" Although the conservatives maintained that a widespread conspi­ racy for a revolution existed since January, 1918, there Is little evidence to support this view. The Independent Socialists as a party failed to commence organized revolutionary activity...(and when unrest and revolutionary activity ensued) It was not due to the machinations of the party" (Stanford University Publication on the German Revolu­ tion , 1922). b) Inference and Variable Code; The CPV in Germany was, therefore, to

the most part spontaneous. 188

Participation

All sources (NIYBt 1918; SUP, 1922 ) Indicate massive participation which easily exceeds our maximum. Participation is, therefore, coded as considerable.

Duration

The CPV had its beginnings in the Kiel mutiny, which took place on

November 3 (NIYB, 1918: 254). It triumphed on November 10, when the

Kaiser was forced to abdicate (NIYB, 1918: 254 and S U P , 1922).

Violence

NIYB (1918: 254) points to the fact that casualties were minimum.

Most sources contend that total casualties were less than 200 with approximately 50 dead. Thus violence is coded as some .

Area

It is quite evident from the sources that the CPV had "spread throughout other parts of the country (SUP, 1922 ). It has been indi­ cated earlier that the CPV was initiated to a certain degree in the capital city of Berlin. This easily meets our maximum scale so far as area is concerned. Are Is therefore, coded as disturbance engulfing the entire country.

Governement Response

Governemnt response was initially violent, especially when it acted to repress the Kiel mutiny. However, finally it acted positively with the abdication of the Kaiser. Governement response Is, therefore, coded as both positive and violent. 169

Armed Force Disloyalty

The fact that a naval mutiny Initiated the CPV and that throughout its duration the soldiers fraternized with the rioting civilians (SUP,

1922 : 14, 31; NIYB, 1918) Indicates high armed force disloyalty.

3. France, 1934 (ID # 3)

Ideas a) Information from sourcea:

" ...L'action Francalse in blaring headlines called for a revolt of Paris against the robbers, meaning the parliament and the government." (Shirer, 1969: 209). b) Inference and Variable Code: According to Shirer (1969; 213) the

February demonstrations aimed to bring down the republican government.

No indication is given about constitutional changes or structural changes being espoused by the CPV. Therefore the CPV shall be coded as espousing exchange of personnel in the positions of power.

Strategy a) Information from sources:

" The riots did go on, increasing in violence.... It was the bloodi­ est encounter In the streets of Paris since the Commune of 1671". (Shirer, 1969: 209,220). b) Inference and Variable Code: The strategy involved was open con­ flict in the form of rioting and demonstrations.

Class Character a) Information from sources:

" Middle and upper class youths many from the universities or just out of them, formed the phalanx of the various leagues that had taken to the streets" (Shirer, 1969: 201) b) Inference and Variable Code: The fact that the demonstrators were 190

"joined by civil servants and ex-servicemen protesting pay cuts",

(NIYB.1934: 245) demonstrates the predomlnatly petit bourgeois charac­

ter of the movement.

Leadership (Structure)

Shirer Identifies certain individuals as the leaders of the leagues

which participated in the riots (Shirer, 1969: 201, 209). However,

their leadership was primarily organization oriented. There was a

definite lack of determined leadership in so far as action was con­

cerned. Nevertheless, there did exist an identifiable source of cen­

tralized power.

Leadership (Class)

All the Individuals identified by Shirer as leaders were members of

leagues such as Action Francals and the Camelots which were predomi­

nantly middle and upper class organizations which recruited mostly from

university students. We, therefore, consider class of leadership as

petit bourgeois.

Organization

The CPV in France Is considered seml-organized since the leagues

and the Communists who joined the action Issued appeals to its members

and other Parisians to "gather after day's work and march on the Cham­ ber of Deputies..." (Shirer, 1969: 213). However, beyond this Initial

appeal there is nothing to show any planning or organization of fur­

ther action.

Participation

An idea of total participation can be gained by considering the

fact that only for February 6, the estimated number of rioters 191

exceeded the 40*000 mark (Shirer, 1969: 219). This easily meets our maximum In the scale of participation. Thus participation Is coded as

considerable.

Duration

The riots started on January 9, 1934 and after reaching massive proportions on February 6, led to the fall of the second government in less than a month. (NIYB, 1934: 245, 246). Therefore, duration is coded as week to six months.

Violence a) Information from sources:

"...fourteen were killed by bullets and two died later from their wounds, some 665 were injured...The police and guards lost - 1 killed, and 1664 injured". (Shirer, 1969: 219).

" Fifteen persons were killed and hundreds wounded" (Annual Register, 1934: 169) b) Inference and Variable Code: On the basis of these figures, we can appropriately code the maximum for casualty figures, I.e., consi­ derable.

Area

Rioting and demonstrations occurred In the streets of Paris,

Thus area is coded as disturbance in capital city.

Governement Response

Governement response was initially violent, when mounted units of the mobile guards, policemen were called to control the crowd, however ultimately the government resigned In response to the consistent pro­ tests from the public. Governement response will accordingly be coded as both violent and positive. 192

Armed Force Disloyalty

a) Information from sources;

" By 1934, It was clear that the intellectual revolt of the right against the parliament had spread to large sections of the officer corps. As the street riots spread, all during January and the police seemed unable or unwilling to put them down, there were doubts In the government that the army could be counted on to restore order" (Shirer, 1969: 224). b) Inference and Variable Code: Shirer's Information does indicate

the existence of a certain degree of armed force disloyalty amongst sections of the army corps. Since they did not join the rioters in action, armed force disloyalty will be coded as low.

4. Cuba. 1958 (ID # 4)

Ideas a) Information from Sources:

" ...the alms of the revolutionary antl-Batlsta movement were pri­ marily political and not social: to restore representative democracy and the 1940 constitution" (Goldenberg; 1965: 161 and 144),

" ..'what is your programme?' the American journalist asked. Castro replied 'to restore the 1940 constitution and to hold free elections' " (Goldenberg, 1965: 156) b) Inference and Variable Code: Regardless of Its eventual outcome, we shall code Ideas of the Cuban CPV as constitutional.

Strategy a) Information from sources:

" ...disappointed In hls(Castro) hopes of a mass uprising, he shifted over to full scale guerrilla warfare- bombings, sabotage, and hit and run raids" (Draper, 1962: 14) b) Inference and Variable Code: References are frequently made in other sources consulted to "..guerrilla warfare tactics used by the 193

rebels " (Draper, 1962: 14), Macgaffey and Barnett refer to the

"much larger urban resistance movement (which) conducted terrorist activity (1962: 241), As can be definitely gathered from all these

sources, the strategy was definitely conspiratorial.

CIsbs Character a) Information from sources:

" Castro’s army was recruited primarily from the peasantry....To the Sierra Maestra also came a number of urban, middle class refugees from the Batista tyranny." (Lleuwen, 1961: 264).

" The revolutionaries were predomlnatly young intellectuals, The greatest sympathy with the movement existed amongst the middle classes. Raul Castro said that the Cuban revolution (was) a collaboration of workers, members of the liberal profession, intellectuals and business­ man..." (Goldenberg, 1965: 144).

" Those who followed Castro in 1953 were almost entirely men of the lower middle class or working class. Castro said that 90 % of his followers were workers and farmers- this seems to have been right" (Thomas, 1971: 824). b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code class character as reflecting a petlt-bourgeols. proletarian, peasant alliance.

Leadership (Structure)

According to Thomas (1971) Castro was the supreme commander (p,894).

Wolf (1969) contends similarly when he makes references to "82 men under Castro" (P. 268). Thomas (1971) also recognizes a hierarchy aboard the Granma, In which Raul Castro, Che Guevara, Juan Almeida, and others are referred to as 'captains* under the supreme command of

Fidel Castro. Therefore, a central source of leadership is recognized. 194

Leadership (Class)

The Individuals recognized as occupying the central core of leader­

ship were primarily urban, middle class, well-to-do Intellectuals and

professionals. Leadership class Is, therefore, coded as petit bour­

geois .

Organization

So far as the 26th July movement is concerned there Is enough evi­

dence to consider It preplanned. As Macgaffey and Barnett (1962) con­

tend "the plan for the attack on Moncada had evolved from meetings In

Havana"(p: 230). Moreover, the fact that the training in Mexico and

expedition aboard ^ranma’ to Sierra Maestra coordinated with acti­

vities in Havana indicate preplanning. And finally as Thomas (1971)

recognizes "most of the guerrilla tactics (were the) result of care­

ful study and planning" (p: 939). Therefore, all facts put together

points towards preplanning and organization. Organization is, thus

coded as organized.

Participation

a) Information from sources:

"Reliable sources say that on the day of the victory the whole Castro army consisted of 803 men, which together with all other groups made up a force of 1000 to 1500" (Goldenberg,1965: 159).

"The final rebel drive occured In late December as the guerrillas, now 8,000 strong and overwhelmingly supported by the civilian populace, descended from their mountain fastnesses and attacked the cities..." (Lleuwen,1961: 265). b) Inference and Variable Code: Though the references consulted provide quite different estimates so far as participation Is concerned,

this does not Inconvenience us very much. In either case our maxi­ mum scale for participation Is easily met - considerable. 195

Duration a) Information from sources;

" There is some consensus that the rebellion had its beginning on 26 July 1953, with the assault on the Moncada barracks* And in early January 1959* Castro became the new ruler of Cuba*' (Russell*1974: 164). b) Inference and Variable Code: Thus, the CPV spanned the course of six years. Duration is therefore, coded as Six months plus.

Violence a) Information from sources;

"... estimates of fatalities in the struggle against Batlata to­ taled about 1000 in the mountains, 19000 in the cities" (Macgaffey and Barnettl962: 241).

"The official legend speaks of 20000 dead. But this is a delibe­ rately exaggerated figure..." (Goldenberg,1965: 144) b) Inference and Variable Code; There exists considerable amount of disagreement about the actual number or even an approximate estimate of casualties. But nevertheless,all sources agree that it was defi­ nitely more than our maximum scale for violence. Therefore, violence can be safely coded as considerable.

Area

m The maximum score for area is easily met when we consider the fact that the CPV in Cuba which had "burst out of the Sierra Maestra ... entered The Sierra del Cristal and the province of Las Villas" (Fagg,

1965: 98). There were guerrilla activities in the provinces of Cama- guay, Plnar del Rio, the city of Sancti Spiritus, and the ports of

Calbarien, Encrucija and Placetas. (NIYB, 1958: 122) Thus, area is coded as disturbance engulfing the entire country. 196

Government Response a) Information from Sources;

" There were all kinds of prohibitions, arrests and police brutalities....many rebels were captured, tortured and murdered " (Goldenberg, 1965: 113-150).

" The BAtista government adopted...a policy of suppressing all opposition by means of increasingly brutal police terrorism " (Macgaffey and Barnett, 1962: 241), b) Inference and Variable Code: There is unanimous agreement that the Batista government responded with extreme police brutality and terrorism. However, in the end Batista was forced to relinquish power. Government response will thus be coded as violent and posi- tive.

Armed Force Disloyalty a) Information from Sources:

" Batista's armed forces began to become worried and rest­ less. Batista had to crush a navy rebellion in Clenfuegos during 1957 and in late 1958 air force pilots refused to follow his orders to bomb rebel held towns " (Lleuwen, 1961: 265).

"....the army became increasingly demoralized....many officers and still more soldiers withdrew without a fight while other officers deserted to the enemy or were persuaded to retreat " (Goldenberg, 1965: 146). b) Inference and Variable Code: The information from the sources

Justifies coding armed force disloyalty in the Cuban CPV as low. 197

5. Russia. 1917 (ID 0 5)

IdeaB

a) Information from sources:

" The masses were against the war and In favor of a radical land reform and socialization of Industry....The resolute elimination of the autocratic regime and the complete democratization of the country" (Gross, 1958: 86, 197-198). b) Inference and Variable Code: The ideas referred not only to exchange of personnel but also to the reorganization of the authority structure and more importantly, redistribution of the bases of power.

Therefore, idea shall be coded as structural.

Strategy a) Information from sources:

" Strike became a major item in Russian revolutionary Inventory" (Gross, 1958: 195).

" The first bread riots took place in the capital on March 8,,.on the 9th the rioting spread.." (The Annual Register, 1917: 237,238) b) Inference and Variable Code: As is evident from the sources, stri­ king and rioting became very important tactics in the Russian CPV. In

February 1917 alone, the sources Indicate that there were extensive riots and strikes Involving 432,000 strikers, 200,000 In Petersburg alone. Strategy shall, therefore, be coded as open.

Class Character a) Information from sources:

" Two fundamental forces, ... were the workers and the soldiers" (Gross, 1958: 199)

" The chief elements that had brought about the revolution, were., namely the working men and the soldiers" (NIYB, 1917: 599)

" The February insurrection took place without the participation of the bourgeoisie, indeed, without Its support - passive or otherwise. 198

The bourgeoisie had neither led nor even followed a movement that It treated with a deep distrust compounded of fear and hostility" (Liebman, 1970 ; 115-116).

'* The autocracy was overthrown by the combined action of the workers and soldiers who Joined them. The decisive part In the overthrow of the autocracy was played by the proletarian population of over a mil­ lion of Petrograd" (The History of the Civil War in USSR, 1936 : 93). b) Inference and variable code: On the basis of above information class character of the Russian CPV shall be coded as predominantly proletarian.

Leadership (Structure) a) Information from sources:

" It is often said that the February revolution was spontaneous, and in fact it was not organized by any party or by any political leader. The liberals did not want it, the revolutionary leaders were in far away Siberia or in political exile abroad. All alike were taken by surprise. Those who cannot imagine a strike without a leader, or a revolution without men pulling the strings behind the scenes, must find February 1917 a complete enigma; and none were mystified than those whom the revolution bore to power..." (Llebman, 1970 : 99). b) Inference and Variable Code: In considering the leadership struc­ ture of the Russian CPV it has been realized that the CPV was almost totally devoid of any central organizational leadership. We can, as such, consider leadership structure as decentralized assuming that whatever leadership arose was situational and did not transcend beyond certain localities or groups.

Leadership (Class)

In case of decentralized leadership structure, that is when no single centre of power can be discerned, the class of leadership shall be coded as the class of the predominant participants in the CPV.

Accordingly, for Russia the class of leadership I s coded as prole­ tarian. 199

Organization

a) Information from sources:

M ...the revolutionary committees neither ordered the strikes nor did they carry the leadership In the streets. The movement was sponta­ neous* it grew from the masses" (Gross* 1958: 199)

" The February revolution was begun from below* overcoming the resistance of its own revolutionary organizations'1 (Trotsky, 1957 t 50 )

b) Inference and Variable Code; The Russian CPV has been unanimously

regarded as spontaneous.

Participation

a) Information from sources:

" On the day of the opening of the Duma (Feb. 7) 100*000 workers went on strike in Petrograd and 25,000 in Moscow" (Illustrated History, 1928).

"....432,000 strikers* 200,000 in Petersburg alone" (Gross* 1958: 197, 201)

"....197,000 strikers in Petrograd" (Liebman, 1970: 100)

b) Inference and Variable Code: By all standards the estimates for

participation exceeds our maximum score. Therefore, participation

shall be coded as considerable (1000 plus).

Duration

According to Gross (1958), Liebman (1970) the strikes and rioting were most decisive and massive between February 23 and 27. These five

days are usually accepted as the time span of the February CPV.

Therefore* duration shall be coded as less than a week.

Area

a) Inforamtion from sources:

" the first bread riots took place in the capital..Moscow* Odessa and other large towns, and the army at the front Joined the revolu­ tion" (Annual Register* 1917:237-38 and 241). 200

"The large factories of Petrograd played a very Important part In the whole revolution" (Illustrated History, 1928). b) Inference and Variable Code; The riots and strikes occurred In the capital St, Petersburg and then spread to other large towns. In the front the army conducted revolutionary activity. Thus the CPV was engulfing the entire country. This fulfills our maximum score for area. We shall, therefore, code area as disturbance engulfing the entire country.

Government Response a) Information from sources;

" I warn the people of Petrograd that the military have instructions from me to use their rifles and ruthlessly to take any measures necessary to restore order....", (Warning by Lt. General Khabalov, the Commander of the Petrograd Defence Committee, as quoted In Illustrated History,1928).

"Then suddenly the mounted police charged the crowd...then came the sound of rifle shots". (Illustrated History,1928), b) Inference and Variable Code: The references indicate the violence which the government forces used to quell the disturbance. Eventually, however, the government had to relinquish power In favor of the representatives of the people. We shall, therefore, code government response as both violent and positive.

Armed Force Disloyalty a) Information from sources:

"Altogether on 27th February some 66000men, about a third of the troops in the city, defied their officers. Some of them simply went home; others merged Into the riotous crowds, which they sometimes led in attacks....The elementary fact that the soldiers were armed, where­ as... the striking workmen were not, more than made up for the dispa­ rity In numbers between the two groups. In this way what began as a workers revolt became a revolution through the Involvement of the soldiers", (Keep, 1976: 60). 201

"In 1917 the pillars of the tsarist system - the bureaucracy and the army - were disintegrating even before the workers and the people of St, Petersburg revolted", (Gross,1958: 194)

b) Inference and Variable Code; Armed force disloyalty in the Ruuslan

CPV can be safely coded as high.

6. Turkey. 1908 (ID # 6)

Ideas

a) Information from sources:

"Among the objects of the movement were .,..the abdication of Abdul Hamid, a radical change of officials, and the Introduction of a repre­ sentative system by means of a parliament", (NIYB,1908; 708)

".....object of making the empire independent of foreign control, and of establishing a constitution to secure liberty and equality for all races and religions in Turkey". (Annual Register,1908: 325) b) Inference and Variable Code: On the basis of the information de­

rived from the sources, we are justified in coding the idea of the CPV

in Turkey as constitutional.

Strategy

a) Information from sources:

" assassination of General Osman, Commander of the Turkish forces at Monastir by an officer connected with the ’Young Turk Movement'. This murder follows the assassination of General Shemsi PaBha". (New York Times, July 19, 1908)

"It Is rumored that 7000 Turkish troops in the Monastir district are in open revolt,...", (New York Times, July 20, 1908) b) Inference and Variable Code: According to the sources consulted

the strategy involved both conspiratorial tactics such as assassina­ tion, seizure of important personalities, seizure and occupation of important centres of power, and the usage of such tactics of open violence such as mutiny and revolt. We shall, therefore, consider 202 strategy as primarily combinational.

Class Character a) Information from sources;

" In general, tbe revolution was said to be the work of the higher or middle classes, specially the members of professions and the better educated element In the population. The lower classes, except when they had come directly under the influence of the young Turk officers or soldiers, were for the most part indifferent The recruits came from the middle classes specially from the junior officers of the army and the navy and from the officers from the middle and lower ranks of the civil service, the professional classes and the Ulema." (NIYB, 1908: 708) b) Inference and Variable Code: The references suggest that the class character of the Turkish CPV was predominantly petit bourgeois.

Leadership (Structure)

The leadership structure both in terms of organization and persona­ lity was definitely centralized. The Committee of Union and Progress the organizational entity of the young Turks was the prime movers of all action. Similarly so far as individuals are concerned, Majors

Niazi Bey and Enver Bey are recognized as some of the major persona­ lities so far as organization and dispersion of revolutionary activity and propaganda is concerned.("Viator", 1908: 366, Annual Register,

1908: 325, NIYB, 1908: 708)

Leadership (Class) a) Information from Sources:

" The young Turks belonged to the newly emerging professional classes; lecturers in the recently founded government colleges, lawyers trained in western law, journalists, minor clerks in the bureaucracy and junior officers trained in the western style war colleges" (Annual Register, 1908: 325) 203

b) Inference and Variable Code; Just like the rank and file, the

leaders of the young Turk movement belonged to the petit bourgeoisie.

Organization

a) Information from sources:

" The revolution....was the direct outcome of the young Turk move­ ment, which had been secretly and effectively carried on for many years....A Committee of Union and Progress was formed end a paper founded by Ahmed Reza became Its organ. Pamphlets were secretly dis­ seminated and circulated in the empire." (NIYB, 1908: 708)

" There seems to be little doubt that the general uprising was planned to take place in Macedonia on September 1, 1908 and that much blood was expected to flow before the Sultan could be made to come to heel." (Ramsaur, 1957: 133) b) Inference and Variable Code: Though the sources differ on the actual date the uprising was planned for, there is general unanimity

that the action which ensued on July 1908 was definitely organized.

Participation a) Information from Sources:

" He (Sultan) was warned...by the revolutionists, that unless he proclaimed the constitution they would march against Constantinopole at once with an array 300,000 strong" (NIYB, 1908: 709)

" ...100,000 men would march on Istanbul" (Lewis, 1961: 205) b) Inference and Variable Code: Though the figures on participation are varied, they easily meet our maximum score for participation.

Participation can, therefore, be coded as considerable.

Duration a) Information from Sources:

" The revolution began on July 22 at Resna, where Major Niazy Bey and his followers revolted" (Annual Register, 1908: 325)

" On July 24 Abdul Hamid decreed constitution for the Turkish Republic" (New York Times, July 25, 1908) 204

b) Inference and Variable Code; Duration shall be coded as less than

a week.

Violence

a) Information from sources;

" ...the whole revolution w s b accompanied by much less bloodshed than those of other countries*' (Annual Register, 1906: 326)

" ..only seven lives are believed to have been sacrificed,..." ("Viator", 1908: 354) b) Inference and Variable Code: Violence shall be coded as minimum.

Area

References Indicate that the young Turk movement spread all over the country. (New York Times, July 19-26, 1908). Thus the CPV engulfed the entire country.

Government Response a) Information from sources:

" Shemsi Pasha... received orders to put down (the) revolt imme­ diately and at all costs."(NIYB, 1908: 708)

" The secret police murdered 40,000 young Turks even before the July action had started" (New York Times, Aug 27, 1906) b) Inference and Variable Code: Governement response shall be coded as both violent and positive.

Armed Force Disloyalty a) Information from sources:

See quotation # 1 under 'class character1. b) Inference and Variable Code; Armed force disloyalty will be coded as high since the action was conceived, led and participated by the officers and soldiers in the armed forces. 205

7. Brazil, 1930 (ID # 7)

Ideas a) Information from Sources:

" We are fighting a counter revolution to reacquire liberty, to restore a pure republican regime and for national reconstruction" (Vargas as quoted in Young, 1967:54).

" The contest was ...mainly one of persons" (Annual Register, 1930: 302) b) Inference and Variable Code: The specific and the immediate objec­ tive of the Brazilian CPV was to remove President Washington Luis

Pereira de Souza and establish Getulio Vargas in his position. The idea was, therefore, primarily exchange oriented

Strategy a) Information from Sources:

" The coup d ’etat in Rio De Janeiro was accompanied by lively street fighting" (NIYB, 1930: 110) b) Inference and Variable Code: The strategy was a combination of open and conspiratorial tactics.

Class Character a) Information from sources:

" The revolution.... is supported by all classes including rich farm owners, manufacturers, the middle classes and the working men..,” (Young, 1967: 65) b) Inference and Variable Code: References indicate that the CPV was supported by the bourgeoisie, the petit bourgeoisie, and the prole­ tariat . 206

Leadership (Structure)

Certain personalities are relatively more prominent In the CPV than

others. Vargas, General Tasso Fragoso, General Mena Barreto are repea­

tedly referred to as the prime movers of the CPV. (Dulles, 1967: 70;

Russell, 1974: 105; Annual Register, 1930: 305)

Leadership (Class)

The individuals mentioned above originated from the bourgeoisie

and upper petit bourgeoisie. Vargas was a lawyer, whereas Fragoso and

Barreto occupied high positions In the military hierarchy.

Organization a) Information from Sources:

" Although the 1930 revolution may have been carried out to change the election results.... there is sufficient evidence indicating that military operations were being planned well before the Presidential election took place'1 (Young, 1967: 55) b) Inference and Variable Code: As Young and others(Russell, 1974:

106; Skidmore, 1967: 5) contend, the Brazilian CPV was jointly organized by a group of military men and civilians.

Participation a) Information from Sources:

" The number of rebel troops in the field was estimated from twenty to thirty thousand" (Young, 1967: 63)

" According to the ....revolutionists high command, 30,000 men,... had moved up from the south" (Bello, 1966: 273) b) Inference and Variable Code: Participation can be safely coded as considerable. 207

Duration

a) Information from Sources:

'* The military revolution began at 5 O'clock on the afternoon of October 3" (Young, 1967: 54)

" The struggle was terminated on October 24 when a junta of army and naval officers headed by General Fragoso deserted the government and seized control of Rio de Janeiro" (NIYB, 1930: 109)

b) Inference and Variable Code: Duration shall be coded as week to

six months.

Violence a) Information from Sources:

" It was, in fact, practically bloodless revolution" (Camacho, 1952: 46)

*' In Belo Horizonte....sixteen soldiers were killed...in Rio Grande about eight were killed, in Recife thirtyfive had been killed..." (Dulles, 1967: 68-69) b) Inference and Variable Code: On the basis of the above facts, we can code violence as some.

Area

The rebellion went smoothly in southern Brazil, in the states of Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gereas and simultaneously in the extreme north of the republic. Ten days of fighting gave the rebels control of the ten states of the twenty in the federation" (NIYB, 1930: 109)

As has been pointed out already the most significant aspect of the movement had occurred in the capital. Therefore, all information put together indicates that the CPV engulfed the entire country.

Government Response

a) Information from Sources:

" The government immediately proclaimed martial law in ...the states where revolutionary movement had made most headway" (Annual Register, 1930: 304) 208 b) Inference and Variable Coder Besides proclaiming martial law

President Luis also sent his miniscule troops still loyal to quell the

CPV, which resulted In a few Bklrmishes. Finally, however, he relin­ quished power in favour of the revolutionists. All of these would

Indicate that government response was violent, non violent and positive.

Armed Force Disloyalty a) Information from Sources:

" The majority of the lieutenants....gave their unqualified support to the revolution By eleven O'clock that night (October 3) most of the Federal troops of Porto Allegre had gone over to the rebels" (Young, 1967: 55, 63)

" ....the revolutionists began a propaganda campaign against loyal Federal troops stationed in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. The theme was that brothers should not fight brothers. It was very effective.." (Young, 1967: 59) b) Inference and Variable Code: All sources(Bello, 1966: 273; Lieuwen,

1961: 75; Camacho, 1952: 46) indicate that majority of the armed forces gave their unqualified support to the revolution. Therefore, armed force disloyalty is coded high.

8. Iraq, 1958 (ID # 8)

Ideas a) Information from Sources:

" The intention of the officers' movement, headed by Brigadier Abdul Karim Kasem, was announced as the removal of the monarchy and the previous ruling faction" (Annual Register, 1958: 320)

" ...the free officers preferred the republican system and decided to disestablish the monarchy....not only was the new regime declared to be a republic, but also a people's republic elected by and for the people" (Khaddurl, 1969: 44, 48) 209 b) Inference and Variable Code: The intention of the CPV was to

remove the monarchy and establish a popular republic. The CPV sub­

sequently carried out Its objectives. We shall code idea as consti­

tutional change.

Strategy a) Information from Sources:

" ....a sudden military movement, long contemplated In higher army circles but in complete secrecy, seized strategic points in the capital invaded the palace, and caused the instant deaths of King Feisal, the Amir Abdul Ilah, and at least a dozen members of the royal family" (Khaddurl, 1969: 51).

" The rising was military in conception, planning, organization and execution; the military character of the conspiracy was preserved" (Dann, 1969: 19). b) Inference and Variable Code: The strategy was undoubtedly conspira­ torial.

Class Character

Information from Sources:

" The officers who engaged in politics...... came from lower classes most from lower and poorer classes, but some who held higher ranks were either upper class or were older men who identified themselves with that class. The soldiers, as a rule, belonged to the peasants and working classes" (Khaddurl, 1969: 16)

" ....the new middle classes in Iraq, including the lower middle class...is particularly significant, because it is the people of these groups who made the revolution" (Caractacus, 1959: 87). b) Inference and Variable Code: On the basis of information gathered from sources, we shall code class character as primarily petit bour­ geois. proletarian and peasantry oriented. 210

Leadership (Structure)

a) Information from Sources;

" Even In Its preparatory stages, the revolution In Iraq had become a one man job, effected by Kassem with Colonel Abd-al-Salem Arif acting as his trusted personal aid" (Dann, 1969: 19) b) Inference and Variable Code: The head of the movement is recog­ nized quite unanimously as being Brigadier Abdul Karim Kassem followed by Colonel Abd-al-Salem Arif. We can thus code leadership structure as centralized.

Leadership (Class)

Both Kassem and Arif occupied high positions in the military elite, and are regarded as representing the new Iraqi upper middle class who. .

"imbued with intense nationalism, ...identified themselves with the national aspirations of their civilian contemporaries" (Khaddurl, 1969:

19). Leadership class can, therefore, be coded as petit bourgeois.

Organization a) Information from Sources:

See quotation 4 2 under 'strategy*.

" He (Kassem) held a meeting of the Central Organization in the evening of that day (July A) at his house...at which a decision to carry out the plan of occupying Baghdad was approved." (Khaddurl, 1969: 39) b) Inference and Variable Code: All the sources (Dann, 1969: 19;

Caractacus, 1959: 119; Annual Register, 1958: 320) point towards the existence of considerable amount of planning and organization before actual action ensued. Therefore, we can code that the CPV in Iraq was organized. 211

Participation

a) Information from Sources:

" The number of officers who took part In underground activities and called themselves the free officers was relatively small- only 172 according to one Informant, and 300 according to another. The latter estimate seems to include all those involved in the activities of the free officers, the former figure only those who were active in the leadership of the movement." (Khaddurl, 1969: 17)

b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code participation as few.

Duration

a) Information from Sources:

" The revolution which ....broke out in Baghdad ended in a day" (Annual Register, 1938: 320) b) Inference and Variable Code: Duration shall be coded as less than

a week.

Violence a) Information from Sources:

" A year later Kassem asserted with pride that in the glorious revo lutlon of the 14th July only 19 people were killed..there is no reason to doubt this estimate... the casualty list is very short" (Dann, 1969: 34). b) Inference and Variable Code: Violence shall be coded as minimum.

Area

According to all sources the coup occurred in Baghdad, the capital city. Therefore, area will be coded as disturbance in capital city.

Government Response

The government had no chance to respond either violently or non- violently. It was overwhelmed and forced to yield by the revolution­ ary forces before it became conscious of the true extent of the situa­ tion. Government response is thus coded as positive. 212

Armed Force Disloyalty a) Information from Sources:

See quotes under 'ideas', 'strategy' and 'class character'. b) Inference and Variable Code: The extent of armed force disloyalty

Is more than evident. Armed force disloyalty Is therefore coded as high.

9. Mexico. 1910 (ID # 10)

Ideas a) Information from Sources:

M Madero's ....suuporters demanded the resignation of Diaz, Nothing less would satisfy them" (Atkins, 1970: 61).

" The demands of Madero and his group were for political opportu­ nity to participate in the government, to stop the perpetual reelec­ tion of the dictator....It was to change the leadership, the gover­ ning group" (Tannenbaum, 1933: 146) b) Inference and Variable Code: The Mexican CPV demanded exchange of personnel in the positions of power.

Strategy

The references consulted (Johnson, 1968: 50, 61; Atkins, 1970:69 ;

Tannenbaum, 1933: 115, 119) give accounts of two major battles fought between the rebels and the Federal troops - the battle of 'Cassas

Grandes* and the battle of 'Juarez*. In addition to these there are numerous accounts of skirmishes throughout the republic between the

Federal troops and an "elusive enemy who would strike and fade away.

In to the sierra or the desert (Johnson, 1968; 50) Indicating the widespread use of guerrilla tactics. Since both open and conspi­ ratorial tactics were utilized, strategy shall be coded as combi- 213 national.

Claaa Character a) Information from Sources:

" Peasants, ranchers, school teachers, lawyers, students, and mer­ chants were oiling their rifles, strapping cartridge belts across their chests and stealing off to join self constituted jefes of the revolution" (Johnson, 1968: 50).

" The real battles of the movement were fought anonymously by little bands of peasants and soldiers to vindicate their right to overthrow the government. Small groups of Indians under anonymous leaders were the revolution" (Tannenbaum, 1933: 119). b) Inference and Varlbale Code: The Mexican CPV was primarily a peasant affair. And all sources Indicate the predominant participa­ tion of the peasantry. Other classes which participated were city labourers, cow boy population laboring on the large cattle ranches

(Wolf, 1969: 25, 26), rural school teachers, small merchants and students. We can accordingly code class as primarily petit bourgeois, proletarian and peasant oriented.

Leadership (Structure)

Tannenbaum*s (1933) contention "that the real battles of the move­ ment were fought anonymously ...under anonymous leaders" (p: 119) captures the actual nature of the leadership structure of the Mexican

CPV. Francisco Madero usually cited as the initiator of the plan and executioner of the movement, in reality provided little more than mere symbolic leadership. Individuals like Emiliano Zapata, Pancho

Villa and Pasquale Orozco provided the leadership In the field.

However, even these Individuals cannot be credited as being the sole leaders of the movement. It is therefore appropriate to adopt

Tannenbaum's contention that "it is important to understand...the 214

anonymous character of the movement, without Intellectual leadership, without military organization" (Tannenbaum, 1933: 121). We shall accordingly code leadership structure as decentralized.

Leadership (Class)

As we have done earlier, in the cases with decentralized leadership class of leadership is coded as originating from the midst of the rank and file, and in this case from among the petit bourgeois, proletarian and peasant ranks.

Organization a) Information from Sources:

" Madero accomplished the overthrow of Diaz in ten months of plan­ ning and action" (Womack, 1969: 67)

11 It was the custom of the leaders of the Mexican uprisings to publish a 'plan* on the lines of a political manifesto, announcing their intentions if the people would help them into power. Madero*s plan was Issued from San Antonio, it was given the title of The Plan of San Luis Potosl" (Atkins, 1970: 49). b) Inference and Variable Code: Though the references indicate that a certain degree of planning and coordination existed before the CPV took place, actual actions that followed barely adhered to that plan. To the most part, they were local and spontaneous in nature, without prior organization. We shall code Mexican CPV as semi-organized.

Participation

It has been impossible to ascertain the exact number of men who had participated in the CPV, However all sources Indicate that the esti­ mates definitely outnumber our maximum score. We shall, therefore, code participation as considerable. 215

Duration

a) Information from Sources;

" The first shots in the revolution were fired ....on November 18" (Atkins, 1970: 50).

" Diaz resigned on May 25" (Cumberland, 1952; 150). b) Inference and Variable Code: Duration shall be coded as b ! x month plus.

Violence

There are no exact estimates on the actual number of casualties.

Approximate estimates given for different battles and skirmishes easily add upto more than 2000. Our maximum score for casualty is safely met. Violence will thus be coded as considerable.

Area

It is unanimously held (Atkin, 1970: 73; Cumberland, 1952: 137;

Parkes, 1969: 319 ; Johnson, 1968: 50) that the CPV had spread to every state, every major city and town in the nation. Area is thus coded as engulfing entire country.

Government Response a) Information from Sources:

" ...the Federal commanders in the north fought on ruthlessly to preserve the dictatorship; all captured rebels were shot" (Atkin, 1970: 62).

" The police began shooting over the heads of the mob...In to the centre of that surging mass, the riflemen on the tower poured their fire...It killed and maimed and maddened" (Aykin, 1970: 75). b) Inference and Variable Code: Government response will be coded as both violent and positive, the latter because Diaz was forced to resign. 216

Armed Force Disloyalty

a) Information from Sources:

" 111 fed* badly clothed and rarely paid, ordinary soldiers' chief ambition was to desert and get back to the family....(he) showed no stomach for fighting against men with whom he had every sympathy" (Atkin, 1970; 55, 60).

b) Inference and Variable Code: There is nothing to indicate that

the soldiers deserted the army to Join the rank of the rebels.

Thus, we can only code armed force disloyalty as low.

10. Afghanistan, 1929 (ID # 10)

Ideas

The unrest against King Amanullah resulted from his proposals to

westernize Afghanistan causing a lot of dissatisfaction among the

populace. By the middle of January 1929 the unrest had reached

such proportions that "on the 14th King Amanullah, in the hope of

living to fight another day, thrust the crown into the unwilling hands

of his elder brother, Inayatullah and escaped out of the capital"

(Fraser-Tytier, 1967: 216). On the 17th the rebels captured the

capital and Bacha-i-Saqao the leader of the CPV was left in control

of the throne. As is evident, the unrest was ultimately geared to

the exchange of personnel in the positions of power.

Strategy

The unrest assumed the form of open battle between the rebels

and the government troops. Accounts of major battles and numerous

skirmishes (Hew York Times, November 29 through January 18, 1928-29)

add credibility to the contention that the strategy employed was one 217 of open violence.

Class Character

The rank and file of the CPV was made up of "priests, agricul­ turists, merchants and soldiers.... all seething with discontent at the new reforms" (Fraser-Tytier, 1967: 214). We shall code class character as petit bourgeois, proletarian and peasant oriented.

Leadership (Structure)

All sources (Fraser-Tytier, 1967, New York Times, 1928-29, Sykes,

1940) indicate that Bacha-i-Saqao was the primary leader of the unrest. And following the termination of hostility he was crowned the king. Leadership structure is, thus, coded as centralized.

Leadership (Class)

Bacha-l-Saqao is described as a peasant, a brigand leader of a gang of outlaws (Sykes, 1940: 314, 315). We shall, therefore, code leadership class as peasant.

Organization

There is no Information in any of the sources which would indicate that the CPV was preplanned and organized. It evidently was sponta­ neous .

Participation

The sources imply significant participation. The number of rebels is usually given in the thousands (Fletcher, 1965: 216-217). In general, therefore, a rebel population of over a thousand can be safely assumed.

Duration

The rebellion lasted for two months, starting on 14th November,

1928 and terminating with Bacha-i-Saqao assuming power on January 17, 218

1929.(NIYB, 1929: 15, Fraser-Tytler, 1967: 214), Duration will be

coded as one week to six months.

Violence

According to the New York Times (December 8, 9 and 19, 1928) at

least 10,000 casualties are reported in the different battles fought.

Violence, therefore, is coded as considerable.

Area

The rebellion engulfed the entire country.

Government Response

Before surrendering power, King Amanullah responded to the CPV

violently. He sent his troops to encounter the rebel force. The

subsequent battles resulted in significant violence. Government

response shall be coded as both violent and positive.

Armed Force Disloyalty

The most significant factor against the king was the fact that

the army was dissatisfied, ill-fed, ill-paid, and in majority of the

cases- thrown in their lot with the rebels. They fraternized with

the rebels and rose against the king (New York Times, December 18,

19, 1928). We shall thus code armed force disloyalty as high.

11, Paraguay, 1936 (ID # 11)

Ideas

The CPV resulted from the strong resentment in the Paraguayan army

against the professional politicians. This took the form of a strong

sentiment both in and outside the army in favor of establishing a

military government and overthrowing the existing government under 219

President Ayala. (New York Tines, February S, 1936) Idea can thus be coded as primarily exchange oriented.

Strategy

Street fighting and battling Indicate open violence (New York

Times, February 18, 19, 1936).

Class Character

Primary participation of army officers and men is indicated in all the sources (NIYB, 1936: Raine,1956: 248-249). They conceived and executed the plan. They also had the effective support of the war veterans, students, workers, landless agricultural workers. Thus, class character of the Paraguayan Cpv can be coded as primarily petit bourgeois, proletarian and peasantry oriented.

Leadership (structure)

The individuals who have been cited as the active plotters and leaders of the "revolution", are, Dr. Gomes Freire Esteves, Colonel

Federico W. Smith ("two real leaders"), Fecundo Recalde, Juan Stefa- nich, and so on (Warren, 1950: 9). We can thus code the leadership structure as centralized.

Leadership (class)

As is evident the leaders were high ranking military officers, and professional people (Warren,1950: 9) We can thus code class of leadership as petit bourgeois.

Organization

According to Warren (1950) the CPV was preplanned and organized before action ensued (p.10-11). Other sources do not contradict this 220

contention. We can therefore, code the CPV as being organized.

Participation

Warren (1950) and New York Times (February 5, 18, 19, 1936) specifically refer to 300 army officers and AO,000 veterans who rallied behind the CPV. Thus the rebel participation was definitely over 1000.

Duration

According to all sources the CPV started on February 17, 1936 and ended the same day with the surrender of President Ayala. Duration is thus coded as less than a week.

Violence

There is no indication in any of the sources as to the extent of casualties. A certain number are indicated in New York Times though no definite estimates are available. In these situations violence will be assumed to be less than 50.

Area

Since the CPV occurred primarily at Asuncion, the capital city. we shall code the maximum score for area.

Government Response

With only the city police to support him. President Ayala gave up after a brief fight (Warren, 1950: 10, 11). Government response shall be coded as violent and positive.

Armed Force Disloyalty

As has been quite evident, in our description so far the CPV in

Paraguay was conceived, plotted and executed by the army and navy officers and men. Armed force disloyalty was high. 221

12. Haiti. 1946 (ID # 12)

Ideas

The CPV was directed towards overthrowing President Lescot. On

January 11. Colonel Frank Levaud,army chief of staff went on air to

announce that the Prsident was a prisoner. A three men military

junta had taken over the government (Newsweek, January 21: 1946). We

shall code exchange of personnel as the idea , since that Is what was

essentially effected by the CPV.

Strategy

The strategy was combinational. Street demonstrations and riots

by primarily the students, and a coup d'etat which effected the final

blow,together constituted the strategy (Rodman : 28).

Class Character

The participants were primarily from the ranks of the students,

intellectuals and the higher echelons of the army hierarchy (Rodman:28,

Newsweek, January 21, 1946). Therefore, class shall be coded as

bourgeois, petit bourgeois.

Leadership (Structure)

There are indications that the coup d'etat was led by Colonel Frank

Levaud. However, there are no indications of any definite centralized

leadership so far as the mass demonstrations are concerned. We shall,

therefore, code leadership structure as decentralized.

Leadership (Class)

In keeping with the decentralized structure of leadership we shall

code leadership class as primarily bourgeois, petit bourgeois. 222

Organisation

There Is no Indication that the CPV was organized* Therefore, we shall code the CPV as spontaneous.

Participation

Newsweek (January 21, 1946) refers to "thousands of demonstrators

(who) took to the streets". Therefore participation was considerable.

Duration

The CPV lasted for less than a week.

Violence

According to Time (January 21, 1946), the only source which gives a definite estimate of the casualty figure, the four days of fighting resulted in at least 25 deaths. Thus violence was minimum.

Area

Since the demonstrations and violence occurred at Port au Prince,

capital of Haiti, our maximum score for area is met.

Government Response

Lescot did put up a brief fight before he gave up. Machine guns and tanks were used to fight the demonstrators before Lescot was finally forced to resign. We shall code government response as both violent and positive.

Armed Force Disloyalty

The fact that the army officers struck the death blow and the soldiers folded their arms and let the demonstrators storm the govern­ ment buildings( Rodman : 28), Indicate that the armed force disloyalty was high. 223

13. Yemen. 1962 (ID # 13)

Ideas

Yemen's CPV was based on the pronouncements of the rebels, "casti­ gating the evils of the reactionary Imamate and asserting the cause of republican government and Arab socialism" (Brown, 1963: 349-50). As is evident from the other sources (Boxhall, 1964: 201-209; Wenner, 1967:

196; Schmidt, 1968: 25-29) the CPV was based on the idea of removing the Imam and establishing a republican form of government. We shall code idea as constitutional.

Strategy a) Information from Sources:

" On the night of September 27, six tanks surrounded Imam Mohammed In al-bashayan palace at Sana and shelled It. Palace guards fought back until they were overcome. Colonel Abdullal al Sallal occupied the badly damaged palace.... captured members of the royal family and their close supporters and executed them" (Annual Register, 1962: 296).

" One truckload of men....took over the radio station, and another the airport. They met little resistance" (Schmidt, 1968t 28). b) Inference and Variable Code: The strategy evolved from a deep laid plot to overthrow the Imam. As evidenced by all the sources, the strategy involved was a coup d'etat.

Class Character

The CPV was primarily an army venture. It was conceived, planned, and executed by the top and middle ranking officers in the army. A significant portion of the army battalions were mobilized for the ope­ ration, Class character is coded as bourgeois, petit bourgeois and proletarian. 224

Leadership (Structure)

As all sources indicate, the two primary personalities in the unrest who assumed leadership were Colonel Abdullal al Sallal and

Lieutenant al Moghny. Leadership structure Is thus coded as centra­ lized.

Leadership (Class)

Both Sallal and Moghny were very high ranking officers In the army.

Sallal In fact was the General Chief of the Imam's army. Leadership class Is thus coded as bourgeois.

Organization

There is enough evidence to prove that the general idea of the CPV had been brewing for quite a while, Sallal and his followers had been preparing at least since 1959. Therefore, all evidence point to the fact that the CPV was organized.

Participation a) Information from Sources:

" General Sallal surrounded the royal palace in Sana with 4,000 troops...” (Time, October 26, 1962 : 38-40).

" ....(the CPV) enlisted the service of ...almost the entire armoured force” (Schmidt, 1968: 28). b) Inference and Variable Code: We can safely assume that participa­ tion was considerable.

Duration

The coup d'etat started and terminated in a single day. Duration,

Is thus coded as less than a week. 225

Violence

About fifteen members of the Imam's family and government were

executed during the first few hours of the republic,(Wenner, 1967:

196). Besides this about 80 men were killed In a bloody fight between

rebels and about 300 loyal officers and men (Schmidt, 1968: 29).

Therefore, the total amount of violence was about 100, We shall code

violence as some.

Area

The coup d'etat took place In the capital city of Sana.

Government Response

The rebel forces overwhelmed the loyal forces before the government

realized the real extent of the situation. Therefore, government did

not have any time to respond violently or non-violently. Its effort

was only defensive before it was finally overthrown. Government res­

ponse Is coded as positive.

Armed Force Disloyalty

Since the CPV was planned and executed by army officers and men,

armed force disloyalty is obviously high.

14. Ghana, 1966 (ID # 14)

Ideas

a) Information from Sources;

" There is ample Justification for our moves on the 23rd of Febru­ ary, 1966; and when the operation commenced we had no doubts in our minds as to the justness of our cause, ThlB conviction gave us the additional courage to carry the exercise through at all costs and if the worst came to the worst, to fight a civil war and stand our ground until the Nkrumah government was overthrown" (Afrlfa, 1966: 31). 226

" The coup of February 24, 1 9 6 6 . .overthrew the Nkrumah regime (and) brought to power army officers...1' (Aluko, 1976; 21), b) Inference and Variable Code; Exchange shall be coded as the idea behind the CPV.

Strategy

According to all sources what occurred in the early hours of Satur­ day the 24th February was a military coup d'etat which awiftly seized all key points In the capital. Strategy was thus conspiratorial.

Class Character a) Information from Sources:

M The army and police chose to take power while President Nkrumah was on a diplomatic visit to China" (Pinkey, 1972: 9). b) Inference and Variable Code; The participants in the coup came from the ranks of the highest officers in the army and police, the middle ranking officers, the ordinary soldiers and the police. Class character is thus coded as bourgeois, petit bourgeois and proletarian.

Leadership (Structure)

The leadership of the coup was concentrated in the hands of Colonel

Kotoka, commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade group, Major Afrifa of the 2nd Brigade, John Harlley, Commissioner of the police and Lieute­ nant Colonel John Addy, garrison commander of Tamale,(Barker, 1969:78)

Leadership structure can thus be coded as centralized.

Leadership (Class)

The Individuals who have been identified as the leaders occupied the higher echelons in the army and the police hierarchy. Leadership class can thus be coded as bourgeois, petit bourgeois. 227

Organization a) Information from Sources;

" Our plan for the coup was simple and most flexible. We had planned a full scale military operation lasting for a considerable period and Colonel Kotoka had made all the necessary contacts and arrangements designed to ensure the success of the operation" (Afrifa, 1966: 36),

" The plans for a coup originated and was finalized in its Initial form as early as May 1965" (Barker, 1969: 78). b) Inference and Variable Code: Both Barker and Afrifa referred to the extended and intricate planning which was carried out before the coup leading us to code organization as organized.

Participation

Both Afrifa (1966) and Nkrumah (1968) in their accounts of the coup contend that about 600 men took part in the operation. Participation was thus coded as some.

Duration

According to all sources action commenced on February 23 and by the early hours of February 24 the coup had succeeded. Duration was thus less than a week.

Violence a) Information from Sources:

" In all, the total was probably around 1600 dead and many more injured" (Nkrumah, 1968: 27).

" According to unofficial report 27 men died" (Lefever, 1970: 58). b) Inference and Variable Code: Whereas Nkrumah cites a spectacular figure, the actual figure probably is more near the estimate given by

Lefever. If we add up the isolated cases of casualties mentioned in

Afrifa (1966) and Barker (1969), the figure resembles Lefever1* more 228

than Nkrumah*s. We shall, therefore, code violence as minimum.

Area

According to all sources the CPV occurred in Accra the capital city.

Government Response

The government was caught totally unaware. It did not have the

chance to respond, Since the government was overthrown, we shall

code government response as positive.

Armed Force Disloyalty

Since it was the army officers who put the plan for the coup toge­

ther and with the help of the soldiers overthrew Nkrumah, we shall

code armed force disloyalty as high.

15. Bolivia, 1952 (ID # 15)

Ideas

a) Information from Sources:

"By a carefully prepared revolt on April 11 the Movimiento Nacio- nallsta Revolucionarlo (MNR) took its revenge for the crushing defeat it had suffered six years before. It had won a majority of seats in the General Elections of May 1951, but was ousted from power by a coup d'etat...." (Annual Register,1952).

"The end of the Military junta under General Balllvian came with unexpected swiftness and almost entirely without warning. Its over­ throw was brought about b y the MNR and the forces of organized labour" (Osborne,1964: 69).

b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV was primarily exchange orien­

ted.

Strategy

a) Information from Sourcesi

" The original plan smacked strongly of a Vlllarroel type formula. 229

that ist a rapid coup involving little civil participation,(however, in reality)... three days of strong fighting which led to progressively broader social movements...(constituted the CPV)"(Malloy,1970: J57-58).

” Workers and miners from Orruro joined the police,,,for three days of incarnadine battle" (Barton, 1968: 252),

b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code strategy as open.

Class Character

a) Information from sources:

" The uprising was the result of a conspiracy between ...the chief of the Carablneros (the National Military Police) and the MNR...The police were supported in the revolt by the workers loyal to the MNR" (Alexander, 1958: 44).

"The end of the junta ....was brought about by the coalition bet­ ween the MNR and the forces of organized labor"(Osborn, 1964: 69),

b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV was a result of bourgeois.

petit bourgeois and proletarian alliance.

Leadership (Structure)

a) Information from Sources:

" ...led by General Selene and Senor Lechin, the miners' leader, It staged one of the bloodiest revolution ever experienced in the country" (Annual Register, 1952: 344).

b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code leadership structure as

centralized.

Leadership (Class)

General Antonio Selene was the Chief of the National Military

Police and Senor Juan Lechin was the Executive Secretary of the Federa-

clon Sindlcal de Trabajadores Minerios. We can code class of leader­

ship as both bourgeois and petit bourgeois. 230

Organization a) Information from Sources:

" The National Revolutionary Movement executed a carefully planned revolution on April 9, 10 and 11" (NIYB, 1952; 68).

" By a carefully prepared revolt on April 11, the MNR took its revenge." (Annual Register, 1952; 344). b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code the Bolivian CPV as organized.

Participation

Since no precise figures on participation is available, It seems safe to assume that the number of active rebels was considerable, because it involved members of the MNR, the entire police force, the workers and miners.

Duration

The sources agree that the CPV lasted only three days from the morning of April 9 till April 11. Therefore, duration was less than a week.

Violence

There Is considerable agreement among the sources that the number of casualties was considerable.

Area

The CPV was restricted to La Paz,the capital, Cochabamba, Potosl and Oruro. The maximum score for area is easily met.

Government Response a) Information from Sources:

" The army, to protect the Junta, fought its way uptown from the military barracks in San Jorge. By utilizing artillery, mortars and planes to strafe and bomb the street fighters they at first appeared to be winning" (Barton, 1968: 253). 231

b) Inference and Variable Code; Though initially the government

tried to fight the rebels, eventually it had to give in and hand over

power to the rebels. Government response will thus be coded as vio­

lent and positive.

Armed Force Disloyalty

The Bolivian CPV is characterized by a mass disloyalty among the

police. But so far as the army is concerned all evidences show that

the bulk of the army remained loyal to the government and moved to

crush the rebellion. Since only a segment of the armed forces had

joined the rebels, whereas substantial portion of the army was still

loyal to the military junta, we shall code armed force disloyalty as

low.

16. Germany, 1919 (ID # 16)

Ideas

a) Information from Sources:

" Encouraged by ....demonstrations of the 'popular will' and by rumours of troops in Spandau joining the fresh revolt, the leaders of the Berlin Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) and the Commu­ nist Party of Germany (KPD) and leaders of the Foreman approved.... the immediate declaration of war against the Ebert regime to the bitter end" (Berlau, 1949: 243).

" The Impact of the huge mass demonstrations upon the assembled functionaries was so great that they believed sincerely that the masses were ready to overthrow the Ebert cabinet and support a new revolutionary government of the left wing radicals" (Waldman, 1938; 172).

b) Inference and Variable Code; The original idea behind the mass

demonstrations in Berlin on January 3 was to protest the dismissal of

Elchhorn by the Ebert government. However, the mass demonstrations 232

convinced the leaders that the people were ready to overthrow the

Ebert government and replace It with a radical left wing government.

As all sources indicate and as can be implied from the Ideological orientation of the parties Involved, the ultimate objective was to overthrow the Ebert government and lay the foundations for a socialist society in the image of Russian socialism achieved only two years earlier. Thus idea shall be coded as transitional and structural.

Strategy

Striking and rioting in the streets made up the general strategy of the movement(Coper, 1955: 204; Angress, 1963: 30). Strategy thus involved open violence.

Class Character a) Information from Sources:

" What happened on Monday in Berlin was perhaps the greatest pro­ letarian mass action in history" (Waldman, 1958: 177). b) Inference and Variable Code: All sources indicate that the CPV was primarily proletarian in character.

Leadership (Structure)

The Provisional Revolutionary Committee which was made up of the

USPD, the KPD and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, provided the ini­ tial Impetus and the ideological leadership to the movement. We shall therefore code leadership structure as centralized.

Leadership (Class)

The leaders who made up the Provisional Revolutionary Conmilttee emerged primarily from the ranks of the Intellectuals and trade unionists. Leadership class can thus be coded as petit bourgeois. 233

Organization

a) Information from Sources:

" It was not the product of a deliberate plan formulated by any particular political faction" (Angress, 1963; 29).

" The swiftness of the action (by government troops) waB possible because the revolutionaries had no plan, no coordination, and no direction whatsoever" (Coper, 1955: 212).

b) Inference and Variable Code; The CPV can be attributed more to

the spontaneity on part of the workers than to organized planning on

part of the leaders.

Participation

a) Information from Sources;

" Hundreds of thousands of workers demonstrated on 5th and 6th January, 1919 " (Coper, 1955: 202).

" On Sunday January 5, ....huge throngs of workers surged into the streets of Berlin " (Waldman, 1958: 171), b) Inference and Variable Code: Participation was considerable.

Duration

All sources refer to January 5, as the day when the workers demon­ strations hdd started and January 13 as the day when the uprising was completely and ruthlessly suppressed. Duration Is coded as week to six months.

Violence a) Information from Sources:

" The number of persons killed during the January uprising remains unknown. Even relaible estimates are not available " (Waldman,1958: 185).

" Halperln claims over one thousan casualties for 'Spartacus week* in Berlin, but fails to indicate on what sources he bases his figure. Stampfer stated that 156 persons were killed in addition to Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Official reports assert that approximately 200 persons were killed" (Waldman, 1958: 185). 234

b) Inference and Variable Code: Whatever the estimatet our maximum

score for violence Is easily exceeded. Violence Is coded as consider­

able.

Area

Berlin the capital city was the location of the disturbance.

Government Response

a) Information from Sources:

" The January riots had demonstrated the strength of the govern­ ment and its willingness to use It. Some of the ablest leaders of the left were killed In the struggle, notable among them were Luxemburg and Llebknecht. The struggle broke the back of the power of the Spartaclsts in Berlin " (Berlau, 1949: 244).

b) Inference and Variable Code: Government response was mercilessly

violent.

Armed Force Disloyalty

The total absence of armed force disloyalty is significant. Thus

armed force disloyalty is coded as nil.

17. Greece, 1935 (ID # 17)

Ideas

a) Information from Sources:

" In particular, the more ardent Republicans among the officers of the Fleet and army feared that, if a restoration of the monarchy took place, they would inevitably lose their commands and they, therefore, determined to forestall such a possibility by forcibly ejecting the existing government.*' (Forster, 1958: 187).

" The Flagship Averoff and several smaller naval units put to sea and summoned the garrisons of the provinces by a wireless proclama­ tion to Join the movement to overthrow the government " (Forster, 1958: 187). 235

b) Inference and Variable Code; The CPV in Greece in 1935 was geared

towards the forcible overthrow of the existing government. Thus, idea

shall be coded as exchange of personnel in the positions of power.

Strategy

a) Information from Sources:

"In February 1935 several hundred Republican Army officers attemp­ ted a coup d'etat against the Popular Party government" (Mcneil1,1947: 29).

"The uprising in Athens was quickly suppressed by troops loyal to the Tsaldaris government, after some severe fighting" (NIYB,1935: 294) .

b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV is referred to have involved

both a coup d'etat and also open uprising and fighting in Athens. We

shall, therefore, code strategy as combinational.

Class Character

a) Information from Sources:

"While republican officers in the officers' school and the Presi­ dential guard in Athens attempted to seize control of the city, a handful of naval officers occupied the naval arsenal at Salamls..." (NIYB,1935: 294).

b) Inference and Variable Code: Since most participants were army and

navy officers, it would be appropriate to code class as petit bourgeois.

Leadership (Structure)

a) Information from Sources:

"The rebellion broke out on 1 March 1935 with Plastlras.....ser­ ving as the nominal leader" (Papacosma,1977: 182).

"The insurgents (were) led by a group of retired officers" (Fors­ ter, 1956: 187).

b) Inference and Variable Code: Leadership structure can be coded as

centralized. 236

Leadership (Class)

Leadership class can be justifiably coded as petit bourgeois.

Organization a) Information from Sources:

" This revolt was better organized ....than the revolt of 1933 " (McNeill, 1947: 29).

M On 1st March, a military rising, which had been for some months in secret preparation, suddenly threw the country into turmoil" (Forster, 1958: 187). b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code the Greek CPV as orga­ nized.

Participation

No definite number of participants can be discerned from any of the sources. However, the fact that at least three different groups were acting at the same time implies that even by conservative stan­ dards participation must have been at least 500. Participation is accordingly coded as few.

Duration

According to both NIYB (1935: 294) and Annual Register (1935: 232) the CPV lasted for at least eleven days. Duration is coded as week to six months.

Violence a) Information from Sources:

" Some rather severe fighting, in which 210 were killed and some 600 wounded, took place before the republican opposition collapsed" (NIYB, 1935: 294). b) Inference and Variable Code: Violence can justifiably be coded as some. 237

Area

Area la coded as disturbance In capital city.

Government Response

As all Bources contend, the uprising was quickly suppressed by

the loyal troops with significant force. We shall thus code govern­

ment response as violent.

Armed Force Disloyalty

a) Information from Sources;

" The movement failed to enlist the support either of the majo­ rity of troops or of the general public " (Forster, 1958: 188).

" It attracted no great support among the general public or the majority of the armed forces " (Carey and Carey, 1968: 101).

b) Inference and Variable Code: It is almost unanimously agreed that

armed force disloyalty was low.

18. Spain. 1934 (ID I 18)

Ideas

a) Information from Sources:

" The Asturian uprising became, in the minds of the Spanish workers, anarchists as well as socialists, an epic example, the first attempt by the workers to seize power through class organizations " (Broue and Temlme, 1970: 63).

b) Inference and Variable Code: The Spanish CPV started off as a

protest move against the inclusion of three members of the Conserva­

tive Catholic Party, in the Lerroux government. However, it eventually

assumed civil war proportions paralyzing the economic life of the

whole country, and attempted to seize power from the existing capi­

talist regime for the workers class organizations (Araquistaln, 1935: 238

247 ; Jackson, 1965: 148 ; Madariaga, 1958: 435 ; Thomas, 1961: 80 ;

Brenan, 1969: 283; Manuel, 1938: 136). On the basis of information

derived from sources the idea behind the CPV can be coded as struc­

tural and transitional.

Strategy

a) Information from Sources:

" On October 5, the parties of the left issued a call for a general strike which was followed immediately by a revolutionary out­ break throughout the northern and central parts of Spain. For three days the fate of the government hung in the balance. There was des­ perate street fighting in Madrid and many other cities " (NIYB, 1934: 662).

" On the night of October 4, when word of the new cabinet arrived, the committees decided immediately to call a general strike. In Mleres, where Communist miners predominated, 200 militants, armed with about 30 rifles, surrounded the town hall and the barracks. Through a combination of surprise, terror, and exaggeration of their numbers they obtained the surrender of the civil and assault guards " (Jackson, 1965: 156).

" Meanwhile a general strike of the U.G.T (General Workers' Socialist Union) was going on all over Spain, the miners of the Asturias were battering their way into Oviedo and there was fighting in the streets of Madrid " (Brenan, 1969: 284). b) Inference and Variable Code: Strategy shall be coded as open.

Class Character a) Information from Sources:

" The real protagonists of the October revolution was the working class " (Araqulstain, 1935: 256). b) Inference and Variable Code: The participants came primarily from

the ranks of the Asturian miners, the workers from Oviedo, Guljon and other surrounding towns. It was during the October CPV that for the first time in Spanish history, all the working class organizations were united in a common effort (Carr, 1966: 635). Class character was undeniably proletarian. 239

Leadership (Structure)

The movement was led by the Allansa Obrera, which was a coalition of all working class parties. It was the popular front led by Largo

Caballero to provide details of revolutionary takeover and organized action (Carr, 1966: 632; Brenan, 1969: 284-85; Araqulstaln, 1935: 259).

Leadership structure shall be coded as centralized.

Leadership (Class)

Largo Caballero and the other Individuals who are recognized as playing leading roles in the CPV originated from the ranks of the pro­ letariat which they led.

Organization

The Spanish CPV lacked military organization and direction.

Most actions were spontaneous and directed by local leaders. However, it did have political organization, as evident In the coalition of the working class parties which organized the details of the revolutionary takeover. We shall likewise code the Spanish CPV as semi-organized.

Participation

Most estimates of participation ranged from 6000 to 70,000. In any case our maximum score for participation is easily met. Thus par­ ticipation is coded as considerable.

Duration

The day on which the general strike ensued, was October 5. Accor­ ding to all the references hostilities continued for two weeks and by the end of that time the CPV was completely suppressed. Duration was thus week to six months. 240

Violence

a) Information from Sources:

" With its brutal repression.... the Asturian rising reached the dimensions of a civil war with 4000 casualties and a great deal of physical destruction " (Carr, 1966: 635).

b) Inference and Variable Code: The general number on which majority

agree is between 3000 dead and 10,000 wounded. Violence was thus con­

siderable.

Area

Area shall be coded as engulfing the entire country.

Government Response

The violence, repression and brutality which the government used

in putting down the CPV is evidenced in all the accounts. Government

response was needlessly violent.

Armed Force Disloyalty

a) Information from Sources:

" Contrary to the expectations of the left leaders, the army remained loyal to the government " (NIYB, 1934: 662).

" The comportment of the army in the suppression of the revo­ lutionary insurrection of October 1934 was, as far as political res­ ponsibility was concerned, excellent. There was never either vacilla­ tion or insubordination in obeying orders " (Carr, 1971: 85).

b) Inference and Variable Code: Armed force disloyalty was nil.

19. Japan. 1936 (ID # 19)

Ideas

a) Information from Sources:

" ....the military revolt of about 1500 troops of the Tokyo garri­ son aimed at the overthrow of the parliamentary regime " (NIYB, 1936: 368). 241

” The rebels attempt(ed) to overthrow the regime and change the leadership of the armed forces..." (Shillony, 1973: 167). b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV in Japan does not indicate anything beyond simple overthrow of the regime and exchange of per­ sonnel .

Strategy a) Information from Sources:

" Directed by a handful of junior army officers and moving with great secrecy in the early hours of February 26, the troops occupied the Metropolitan Police building and other strategic centers near the Imperial Palace grounds, while a group of officers attacked the resi­ dences of six leading statesmen and governement officials " (NIYB, 1936: 368-69). b) Inference and Variable Code: Strategy shall be coded as conspira­ torial .

Class Character

As Shillony (1973) contends, the twentyone officers who took part in the CPV came from elitist, well to do families. Whereas, the rank and file came from poorer, working class and labouring families (p: 21,

22). Class character is accordingly coded as petit bourgeois, prole­ tarian.

Leadership (Structure) a) Information from Sources:

" Although the rebellion was a military operation, it had no commander and was formally led by all twentyone of the rebel officers. There existed a leadership group, which according to the trial verdict was composed of Isobe, Muranaka, Koda, Ando and Kurlhara. Yet, as in the case of Mejl restoration there was no single leader ” (Shillony, 1973: 147). b) Inference and Variable Code: A central leadership structure can be definitely identified, either in the person of the twentyone officers or the five mentioned. Leadership structure was centralized. 242

Leadership (Class)

As Indicated earlier, the leaders originated from the petit bourgeoisie.

Organization a) Information from Sources:

" The rebels did...-plan their action in advance and had some definite goals in mind " (Shillony, 1973: 123). b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV was organized.

Participation

According to Bergamini (1971), there were ”1483 mutineers..."

(p: 636). Other sources do not contradict this figure. Participation was thus considerable.

Duration

The CPV had started on February 26, 1936 and by February 29 all the troops had surrendered. Thus the CPV lasted less than a week.

Violence

The amount of violence was very small. Only four Individuals had died and about two others were seriously injured. Violence was minimum.

Area

The CPV occurred in Tokyo, the capital city.

Government Response

The government responded by proclaiming martial law, trying and executing thirteen of the rebels. Government response was thus both nonviolent and violent. 243

Armed Force Disloyalty

Since the CPV was conceived, planned and executed by the army

officers and the fact that there was much sympathy for the mutineers

in the army, we shall code armed force disloyalty as high,

20. Rumania. 1907 (ID # 20)

Ideas

The CPV advocated distribution of land, universal franchise, the

shortening of the term of the military service and the decrease in the

land tax (NIYB, 1907: 693). According to Roberts (1951) the CPV had

"explicit and obvious political dangers" (p: 4). Since the CPV attempted to transform the power base, it shall be coded as striving

for structural change.

Strategy

The strategy generally involved rioting, looting, assault and destruction of properties (Eidelberg, 1974: 1; Annual Register, 1907:

335). Strategy shall be coded open.

Class Character

The Rumanian CPV Is recognized as a "massive and violent peasant revolt" (Eidelberg, 1974: 1). Class character is thus peasant oriented.

Leadership (Structure) a) Information from Sources:

" ...the active heads of the movement, in so far as it received any direction, had been village leaders, ex-army sergeants, clerks and school teachers" (Roberts,1951: 3). b) Inference and Variable Code: In other words the leaders if there were any emerged from the lower echelons of the petit bourgeoisie and 244 the peasantry.

Organization

There are no Indications in any of the sources which would point towards any organization of the CPV. It was a spontaneous outburst.

Participation

No definite numbers are given so far as participation is con­ cerned. However, the fact that 140,000 troops were required to put down the CPV (NIYB,1907: 693; Eidelberg,1974:1), suggests that the numbers of insurgents was massive. We shall code participation as considerable.

Duration

Eidelberg*s account is the most substantive on the subject, and according to him the govrnment crushed the revolt in less than a week.

Violence

The figures on violence range from 11,000 (Roberts,1951: 3) to

20,000 (Eidelberg,1974: 1). Our maximum score is exceeded. Violence was thus considerable.

Area

The CPV engulfed the whole country (Eidelberg,1974: 1).

Government Response

Government crushed the CPV with extreme violence.

Armed Force Disloyalty

There is no Indication of armed froce disloyalty in any of the references. Thus armed force disloyalty was nil. 245

21. Bulgaria. 1923 (ID # 21)

Ideas

a) Information from Sources:

" The Central Committee of the Communists resolved to prepare an armed insurrection to overthrow the Tsankov government and replace it with one of workers and peasants." (Rothschild, 1959: 133).

b) Inference and Variable Code: Idea is coded as structural.

Strategy

a) Information from Sources:

" There was fighting during the week of September 23...terrorism was (also) carried out." (NIYB, 1923: 113).

b) Inference and Variable Code; Strategy was combinational.

Class Character

a) Information from Sources:

" The peasantry provided most of the participants and casualties of the rebellion...Even in those towns in which the fighting reached serious proportions, the major effort was made not by the local prole­ tariat but by Invading hordes of peasants from adjacent villages, frequently led by school teachers..." (Rothschild, 1959: 145).

b) Inference and Variable Code: Class character was overwhelmingly

peasant oriented.

Leadership (Structure)

There is no leadership structure which can be recognized as pro­

viding the CPV with organizational and military direction. The central

conmittee of the Communist party set up a military committee. But the

latter cannot be indicated as providing military or organizational

leadership. However, in so far as the communist party was in fact the

central organization which had called forth the CPV, we shall code

leadership as centralized in the Communist party. 246

Leadership (Class)

We shall code leadership class as petit bourgeois.

Organization

According to the sources, the CPV in Bulgaria was a mix of spon­ taneity and organized action. We shall code it semi-organized.

Participation

The rebels claimed by the Communist party sources were about

20,000 strong. Even If this figure is considered exaggerated, never­ theless the figures on violence justifies coding participation as considerable.

Duration

According to both NIYB (1923) and Annual Register (1923), the CPV lasted for about two to four weeks before it was suppressed by the government. We shall code duration as week to six months.

Violence

On the basis of his extensive research Rothschild (1959) contends that it would be reasonable to place the number of killed in the 1500 to 2500 range (p: 144-45). So violence was considerable.

Area

The CPV occurred in an area extending several large provinces in south central, northwestern parts of Bulgaria. So area meets our medium score for scale.

Government Response

Government response was ruthlessly violent.

Armed Force Disloyalty

Armed force disloyalty was nil. 247

22. Ethiopia. 1960 (ID # 22)

Ideas

a) Information from Sources:

" ...the weight of evidence suggests that this was more an attempt to seize power than to effect basic political and social reforms " (Lefever, 1970: 146).

" ...(an) attempted coup on December 13 designed to replace the emperor, Haile Selassie I, by the crown prince " (Annual Register, 1960: 330).

b) Inference and Variable Code: Idea shall be coded as primarily

exchange oriented.

Strategy

a) Information from Sources:

M The Immediate strategic objective of the plotters was to take all key points in Addis Ababa and win over or imprison principal poli­ tical leaders... Bodyguard troops seized control of communication cen­ ters and stationed themselves at key points in an around the capital city " (Lefever, 1970: 146).

b) Inference and Variable Code: The strategy used was conspiratorial.

Class Character

The participants in the CPV were made up of Commander of the

Imperial bodyguards, a subprovincial governor, the Chief of Security,

the Police Commissioner, intellectuals and the Imperial guards. It is

thus justified to code class character as bourgeois, petit bourgeois

and proletarian.

Leadership (Structure)

As all sources Indicate leadership structure was undeniably cen­

tralized.

Leadership (Class)

The leaders were the highest officers in the armed forces and In 248

the admlsnlstratlon. Leadership class was definitely bourgeois.

Organization

The intricate, long term planning of the CPV is indicated in all the sources. Greenfield (1965) gives a detailed account of the planning phase (p: 381-85). We shall code the CPV as organized.

Participation

Participation was considerable.

Duration

All sources cite December 13, 1960 as the day on which the CPV started and December 16 as the day on which it was suppressed. We shall code duration as less than a week.

Violence

The figures for casualties range from 324 dead and 785 wounded to

200 dead or wounded. In any case our maximum score is exceeded. Vio­ lence was considerable.

Area

The disturbance occurred in the capital city.

Government Response

The government responded with extreme violence to crush the CPV.

Armed Force Disloyalty

The plotters totally miscalculated the response of the army and the air force, which remained loyal and fought the CPV till it was suppressed. "The army and the bodyguards were two entirely separate military formations, which Halle Selassie kept apart In rivalry to one another; when the guard went against him, a counter-vailing military force was therefore immediately available In his support." (Clapham, 249

1968: 496). On the basis of this Information we shall code armed force

disloyalty as low.

23. Thailand. 1933 (ID tf 23)

Ideas

a) Information from Sources:

" The rebels demanded that the government tender its resignation ...and...that force will be used to seize control of the government" (Landon, 1968: 38).

b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code idea as exchange.

Strategy

The strategy indicated by the sources is definitely conspira­

torial.

Class Character

As all sources indicate, the CPV from the start to the finish was

a royalist movement. It was made up of the members of the royal

family and royal favourites who had suffered loss of prestige, influ­

ence and privileges after the 'revolution1 of 1932, including army

officers and their troops who rallied in support of the royalist move­

ment. Class character was thus bourgeois, petit bourgeois and prole­

tarian.

Leadership (Structure)

The CPV was led by Prince Bovaredej, a member of the royal family

and the former defence minister (NIYB, 1933: 746). Leadership struc­

ture was thus centralized.

Leadership (Class)

Leadership class was bourgeois. 250

Organization

According to all the sources a definite plan of the CPV, existed prior to the start of the action. Thus It was organized.

Participation

Participation can be safely assumed to be considerable (NIYB,

1933: 746).

Violence

NIYB (1933) is the only account which provides a definite figure

for violence. "By October 16, the rebels were in retreat from the capital, having lost some 500 killed and 1000 wounded " (p: 747),

Thus violence was considerable.

Duration

October 12 is given as the date when the CPV started and October

18 as the date by which It was completely suppressed. The CPV lasted for less than a week.

Area

The CPV had engulfed the entire country.

Government Response

The government proclaimed martial law and used extreme violence to suppress the CPV. Thus government response was both nonviolent and violent.

Armed Force Disloyalty

There are indications that the rebel leaders had succeeded in rallying the support of a significant section of the air force and the garrisons. The navy refused to help suppress the insurrection. All these definitely indicate high armed force disloyalty. 251

24. El Salvador. 1932 (ID # 24)

Ideas

a) Information from Sources:

" ...a communist plot to overthrow the government of provisional President Maxlmilliano Martinez " (hackett, 1932: 843).

b) Inference and Variable Code: The CPV was an attempt to overthrow

the existing government and establish Instead a workers and peasants

government, thus aiming at restructuring the power base.

Strategy

Strategy involved techniques of open violence such as looting,

destruction of property and annihilation.

Class Character

According to all the sources, the CPV was "a mass campesino

movement" indicating peasant following and participation,

Leadership (Structure)

From the account given by Anderson (1971) Augustin P. Marti seems

to occupy the central position in the leadership of the movement.

Organization of the masses, planning the movement were all carried out

according to Marti's instructions. Thus the leadership structure was

centralized.

Leadership (Class)

Marti and his principal lieutenants were all student intellectuals.

Leadership class was thus petit bourgeois.

Organization

All the sources, specially Anderson (1971) indicate that the CPV was organized and preplanned. 252

Participation

According to a source cited by Anderson (1971) at least 16,000

persons had taken part in the uprising. No other sources refer to

participation at all. On the basis of Anderson's account we can code

participation as considerable.

Duration

a) Information from Sources:

" The revolt came on the very night for which it was predicted, the night of January 22 and 23...the revolt was over by January 25, for all practical purposes, and the matanza (massacre) was well under way by that date " (Anderson, 1971: 98, 137).

b) Inference and Variable Code: Duration was less than a week.

Violence

About 10,000 rebels may have lost their lives for the hundred

they had taken in the course of the CPV. Violence was thus consider­

able.

Area

The CPV engulfed the entire country.

Government Response

It is quite evident from the sources that Martinez was extremely and needlessly ruthless in suppressing the CPV. As Anderson puts it

"the terrorism of the Martinez government on this occasion Is still

a vivid memory in El Salvador " (1971: 369). Government response was thus violent.

Armed Force Disloyalty

Armed force disloyalty w s b nil. 253

25. Peru. 1932 (ID # 25)

Ideas

No explicit account on the objectives of the Trujjilo uprising

is given In any of the sources consulted. However, in so far as the

uprising was an integral part of the Aprlsta campaign to overthrow the

regime of President Sanchez Cerro, this can be satisfactorily coded as

the motive of the Trujjilo uprising. (Werlich, 1978: 197). Idea can

be coded as exchange.

Strategy

The strategy involved both open and conspiratorial tactics of

violence. Strategy was thus combinational.

Class Character

a) Information from Sources:

" The fight started with an attack by a mob of several hundred workers from nearby sugar plantations upon part of the Trujjilo garri­ son..." (New York Times, July 9, 1932).

" Thousands of unruly sugar workers from the nearby plantations joined the movement " (Werlich, 1978: 197).

b) Inference and Variable Code: We shall code class as peasant

oriented.

Leadership (Structure)

According to Werlich (1978) the movement was led by Manuael

Barreta. We shall thus code leadership as centralized in the person

of Manuel Barreta alias 'Buffalo'.

Leadership (Class)

Barreta emerged from the ranks of the plantation workers. As such

leadership class shall be coded as peasant oriented. 254

Organization

Though the uprising In Trujjilo took place without the orders of

American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) it was to be a part of the overall Aprlsta plan for revolution. Therefore, organization was definitely there. However, the actual execution of action was sponta­ neous. We shall thus code the CPV as semiorganized.

Participation

According to Werlich’s (1978) account there was some participa­ tion .

Duration

According to NIYB (1932) the unrest started on July 6 and was suppressed by July 10. Thus it lasted for less than a week.

Violence

Both Werlich (1978) and Marett (1969) point out that casualty figures range from 1000 to 5000 persons. Thus violence was consider­ able .

Area

The outbreak occurred In Trujjilo. The rest of the country was quiet. Area shall thus be coded as disturbance in a large province.

Government Response

Government response was violent. The CPV was suppressed with much cruelty and bloodshed. Most rebel leaders captured during action were shot to death. Loyal troops quelled the uprising with much violence.

Armed Force Disloyalty

Armed force disloyalty was nil. 26. Honduras. 1933 (ID # 26)

Ideas

The Honduran uprising resulted from dissatisfaction with the

results of the election, as is the usual case In so many of the Latin

American nations. The specific Intentions of the action are not expli­

citly mentioned In any of the accounts consulted. However, overthrow

of the regime of President Carlas Is implied in every account. Power,

which the liberals lost as a result of their failure in the elections,

was to be gained through this uprising. Thus, Idea was exchange orien­

ted.

Strategy

Forcible occupation of towns and cities and the inevitable battle

with the loyal troops (NIYB, 19 33: 358; New York Times, November 15,

December 6, 1933) indicate open strategy.

Class Character

No indication is given in the accounts as to the exact class

character of the rebels. What can be inferred is the fact that a sig­

nificant portion of the rebels was made up of disloyal liberal generals

in the army and the garrisons they led. Therefore, it would be safe

to assume that class character was bourgeois, petit bourgeois as well

as proletarian.

Leadership (Structure)

After surveying our sources we can generally conclude that Gene­

ral Jose Marla Reina was the predominant leadership figure. Leadership

was thus centralized. 256

Leadership (Class)

Jose Marla Reina was a general in Che Honduran army. His class

can be coded as bourgeois.

Organization

There is no information in any of the sources which would indi­

cate any prior planning. It was probably spontaneous.

Participation

According to Russell (1974) participation was considerable.

Duration

The CPV started on November 14, 1932 and was finally suppressed

on January 14, 1933. It thus lasted for a week to six months.

Violence

According to Russell (1974), violence was considerable.

Area

As the NIYB (1933) contends, the CPV had spread throughout the entire country.

Government Response

Government response was extremely violent.

Armed Force Disloyalty

Since the CPV was initiated, led and participated by extensive sections of the army, armed force disloyalty was high.

Note: Inadequate information on Honduras plagued our research at every point. It is hard to speculate why the CPV failed despite high armed

force disloyalty. 257

27. Turkey. 1925 (ID # 27)

Ideas

a) Information from Sources:

" The Kurdish rebellion had been led by dervish Seyhs, who had urged their followers to overthrow the godless republic and restore the Caliph " (Lewis, 1961: 261).

b) Inference and Variable Code: The February outbreak was based on

the objective of overthrowing the Republic and restoring the Caliphate.

Thus the Idea was constitutional.

Strategy

Severe fighting would Indicate the strategy of open violence.

Class Character

The participants in the CPV came primarily from the ranks of the

local tribes, nomadic hunters and hills people(Toynbee and Kirkwood,

1927: 267). According to Hassan Arfa (1966) the Insurgency was also

supported by feudal landlords and chiefs of tribes. We shall thus code

class character as petit bourgeois and peasant oriented.

Leadership (Structure)

Shaikh Said is recognized by all sources as the undisputed leader.

Thus leadership structure was centralized.

Leadership (Class)

On the basis of the information from the sources Shaikh Said can

be coded as belonging to the petit bourgeois class.

Organization

Information from sources Indicate that the CPV was not completely

spontaneous. Neither was it organized or preplanned. Thus we shall

assume that the CPV was semi-organized. 258

Participation

According to Hassan Arfa (1966), the CPV originally had a parti­

cipation of 7000 but it Increased as the CPV progressed. Thus we are

justified in coding participation as considerable.

Duration

As all sources contend, the outbreak occurred inFebruary, 1925

and was quelled by the end of April of the same year. Duration can be

coded as week to six months.

Violence

Violence was considerable.

Area

On the basis of our informatlon, we can generally conclude that

the CPV had spread almost all over the country.

Government Response

The government proclaimed martial law, dispatched large govern­

ment forces to suppress the uprlsal and after it was over; executed

Shaikh Said and twentyone of his followers. Government response was

thus both non-violent and violent.

Armed Force Disloyalty

There is no indication of armed force disloyalty. Thus we shall

code it as nil*

28. Panama. 1958 (ID # 28)

Ideas

a) Information from Sources:

" The communist dominated students led a movement to try to over­ throw the de la Guardia government in mid May, 1958" (Dubois, 1964:198). 259 b) Inference and Variable Code: The Idea was predominantly exchange oriented.

Strategy

Rioting, street fighting and sniping and similar other tactics of open violence characterized the rebel strategy.

Class Character

The outbreak was pioneered primarily by students and intellec­ tuals. Thus the class character was petit bourgeois.

Leadership (Structure)

The individuals identified as leaders were Cleto Manuel Souza and Bolivar Davalos (Dubois, 1964: 199). Leadership was thus centra­ lized.

Leadership (Class)

Both the leaders are described by Dubois (1964) as "perennial students". Leadership class was thus petit bourgeois.

Organization

A certain degree of planning is implied in all the sources. We shall thus code the CPV as semi-organized.

Participation

On the basis of Dubois' (1964) account participation was not more than 1000. Thus participation was some.

Duration

The CPV lasted for less than a week.

Violence

According to official sources, the toll in the street fighting and Isolated clashes was 10 dead and between 70 to 80 wounded. This will fall in our 50-150 scale or some violence. 260

Area

Fighting occurred In Panama cltyf the capital.

Government Response

The government suspended constitutional guarantees for 30 days

and imposed censorship of the press and radio (Dubois, 1964; 199).

The government also used the National guards to restore peace with

force and violence. Government response was both non-violent and

violent.

Armed Force Disloyalty

Armed force disloyalty was ni l .

29. Paraguay. 19A7 (ID 0 29)

Ideas

As all the sources contend (Warren 1949: 350-51; NIYB, 1947: 382)

the rebel leader Major Ceasar Agulrro was seeking to overthrow the

government of President Hlglnlo Morenigo and establish a provisional

government till free elections could be held. Thus the idea was pri­

marily exchange.

Strategy

According to all the sources (Raine, 1956: 265, New York Times,

March 31, 1947) the strategy involved one of open frontal attack by

the rebel forces.

Class Character

The rebel forces were made up of the disloyal factions of the

army and navy and also a large number of workers (Raine,1956: 264).

Thus class character was petit bourgeois and proletarian. 261

Leadership (Structure)

Leadership was concentrated in the hands of Major Caesar Aguirro

and Colonel Rafael Franco. Thus leadership was centralised.

Leadership (Class)

Both the leaders were high ranking officers In the army. Thus

leadership class was petit bourgeois.

Organization

As all the sources Indicate, "the big show of 1947" was the result of a plot long prepared by the Febreristas along with the Communists.

Thus the CPV was organized.

Participation

When the uprising started Major Aguirro had more than 1500 sup­ porters. By the time it ended he had rallied an estimated number of

10,000 rebels. Thus participation was considerable.

Duration

The CPV had started on March 8, 1947 and by August 20 of the same year the rebels were completely defeated. The CPV lasted for a week to six months.

Violence

Violence was considerable.

Area

The CPV extended over the entire length of the country.

Government Response

Government's loyal troops utilized significant force to crush the

CPV. Thus government response was undeniably violent. 262

Armed Force Disloyalty

Our sources Indicate that at a point so much of the army went

over to the side of the rebels that It looked as though nothing could

save the government. This would Indicate high armed force disloyalty.

30. Honduras, 1956 (ID if 30)

Ideas

The Honduran CPV was an attempt to exchange the existing govern­

ment with one participated by the rebels.

Strategy

The strategy indicated in the New York Times (August 2» 1956)

includes the tactics of both open and conspiratorial violence. Thus

strategy was combinational.

Class Character

The participants were members of a garrison at Teguchlgalpa. It

Included both officers and men. Thus class character was both petit

bourgeois and proletarian.

Leadership (Structure)

Captain Santo Osorto Paz is recognized as the leader of the CPV.

Thus leadership was centralized.

Leadership (Class)

Leadership class was petit bourgeois.

Organization

Though there Is no definite reference to preplanning, a certain

degree of planning can be assumed without error due to the nature of

the CPV, which Included a partially conspiratorial takeover of the 263

barracks. Thus the CPV was semi-organized.

Participation

Our sources specifically refer to "300 men" in the barracks who had declared themselves In rebellion. Thus participation was less than 500.

Duration

The Honduran CPV started on August 1 and was quelled the same day after a three hour battle. Thus duration was less than a week.

Violence

About thirty casualties were reported after the battle. Thus violence was minimum.

Area

The CPV occurred in the capital city of Teguchlgalpa.

Government Response

The government called out troops from another part of the capital to quell the CPV. Thus government response was violent.

Armed Force Disloyalty

According to our sources, three hundred men in one of the Tegu­ chlgalpa garrisons rose against the regime. According to Statesman's

Yearbook for 1956, the entire Honduran army was fixed at 2500. On the basis of this figure the disloyal faction was only twelve percent of the entire force. Thus armed force disloyalty was low. Table 22

CLUSTta ANALYSIS OP COLLtCTIVt POLITICAL VIULtNCE 221 J* JUMAT, NuvtNOtM 12, l«T« A CLUSTCA LISTINC ISTEU IS rttPOALO KMgwLD THNNOHLO 1 D E A M C H I D C A C g N S U E A S i a c IDC a Th a n a t a a O P C N S 1 M A C 0 N S staaco** CLAHOUDS 0 . 0 1 . 1 1 * ! 0 . 0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 O . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 I I* !•! 2 * 5 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 I T !•! • . 0 1 . 0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 o.o 0 . 0 l . o 1 . 0 I [} ••• 0 . 0 1 * # !•* 0 . 0 O . a 0 . 0 1 . 0 O . o 0 . 0 1 * 0 I [ j o . o s * s 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 a . o 1 . 0 1 i ? 0 , 0 0 . 0 ! * u 1 . 0 0 . 0 o . a O . a 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 * 9 1 2 ) 0 . 0 O . f 1 . 0 1 . 0 o . a O.o a.a 0.0 1.0 o . o 1 . 0 1 1 2 !•! 0 . 0 M 1 . 0 f . l 0 . 0 O . a 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 >0 I a •*! o . a . 0 o . a 1 * " o . a o . a a . a a . O 1 . 0 a . O t 11 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 !•“ e.o 0.0 o.a 1.0 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 I s 0 . 0 o . o l . a o . o 1 . 0 0 . 0 o . o a . a 1 . 0 a . a 0 . 0 4 i ; !*** 0 . 0 >•£ 0.0 0.0 a.a o.o l . a a . o 0 . 0 I 3 0 i . o o . a 1 . 0 1 . 0 0.0 0.0 o.a a.a a . o I . a 0 . 0 t NCAN 0 . 2 e . o 0 . 0 O . a 0 . 2 0 . 0 o . a 0 . 2 V . 5 O . a o . a

I 2 '•! 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 o . a l . a a . o o . o a . o 2 t o « . o 0 . 0 1 * 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 O . a l . a o . o a . u o . o 2 2 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 . 0 0 . 0 o . a o . a l . a a , a 0 . 0 1 . 0 2 2 0 0 . 0 u . u 1 * 0 1.0 0.0 o.a 0.0 1 . 0 a . O a . o a . a 2 a 0 . 0 1 . 0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 o . a o . a l . a a . o a . u 2 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 o . o O . a a . o 1 . 0 o . o 2 •■CAN 0.2 0.2 O.T O.T 0.) 0.0 o.a O.T 0 . 2 0 . 2 0 . 2

3 I 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 a . O I 2 0 0 . 0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 . 0 O . a l . a 0 . 0 a . o o . o J 1 0 1 . 0 a . u 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 I . a 1 . 0 a . u a . a a . u i 1 " 1 . 0 u . o 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1 . a 1 . 0 a . u 0 . 0 0 . 0 J 2 a 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1 . 0 a . u l . a o . a o . a a . u J M f Ah. O . a O . a 0 . 2 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . a o . a l . a 0 . 0 a . o a . O

A 3 '■! 0 . 0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 a.o • IT !•* a . O 0 . 0 l > 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 a . a 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 * * 0 . 0 a 2T 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 ' ° 0 . 0 O . a l . a 0 . 0 0 . 0 o . a a 2 0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1 . 0 0.0 0.0 a . a l . a a . o a . O a . O • n e o n 0,5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 a . a 0.0 o.o o.o a . l 0.0

5 2 1 0.0 1 . 0 0.0 O . o 0.0 1.0 0.0 o . a o.o 1 . 0 0.0 s 2 b 0 . 0 0 . 0 1.11 1 . 0 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 o.a 1.0 o.o 5 m e a n 0 . 0 0 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 0.0 0 . 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 •792 Table 22 (Continued)

CLUSTLN ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE 22:19 SUNDAY, NOvl**bt« 12* 191* S CLUSTE* LISTING CLUITEA 1 0 CL.APBNA CLAPBHB CLAPWULCLAPEAS LEACENTP LEACENTDLCLBOUHG LCLPSNA LCLPBHN LCLPHOL LCLPEAS OBCtPONt

1 1 !-! 1 . 0 0 . 0 ! * 5 ' * 2 0 . 0 1 . 0 ‘ • 5 0 , 0 0 . 0 0 , 0 O . o I 1 * ! • * 1 * 2 1 . 0 o . o 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 o . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 I T 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 V . o l . o 1 . 0 0 , 0 v . o 0 , 0 0 . 0 IS 1> *. s0 1 l ' ° 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 , 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 1 1 * ■ 2 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 u . u 0 . 0 0 , 0 0 . 0 i 2 2 1 . 0 1 . 0 > • 2 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 O . u 0 . 0 0 . 0 i 2 1 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 * ° 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 u . O 0 . 0 i 1 2 1 . 0 o . u o . u 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 l . U 1 . 0 U . o O .U 1 . 0 * • 2 0 . 0 I A ' • 2 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l.U 1.0 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 1 11 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 o . o A ’ * 2 } 1 . 0 1 . 0 ! * 2 1 * 2 1 . 0 o . o 0 . 0 1 . 0 o . o o . o 0 . 0 u . O l I’!•** > • 2 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 ! ■ * 0 . 0 O . u 0 . 0 l l u 1 , 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 l.U O.o o.u 0 . 0 O.U l M a n 1 . 0 1 . 0 o . s 0 . 2 0 . 9 0 . 1 O .A 0 . 0 0 . 2 0 . 1 e . o 0 . 1

{ 2 t.o 1.0 1.0 0.0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . * 1 * 0 2 1 ° o . o 1 . 0 l . U 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 O . o 0 . 0 V .O u . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 I 2 * ‘ • 2 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 , 0 1 * 0 0 . 0 u . o u . o 0 . 0 I*A i 2 9 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 u . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 A * * 2 l * 2 i 1 . 0 1 . 0 ‘ • 2 1 . 0 1 * 2 0 , 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 l . U o . o 0 . 0 o . o 2 A V . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 o . o 1 . 0 o . u O . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 2 MAN 0 . 1 1 . 0 1 . 0 o.s O.T 0 . 3 0.2 O.S o.s 0.3 0 * 3 o . s

S 0 . 0 2 * ® 1 * ® * • 2 0 . 0 A.O O . o 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 * 9 1 2 0 O . o 0 . 0 O . o 0 . 0 o . u 0 , 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 * 0 i * ° i t o 0 . 0 t . o 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U 1 . 0 0 , 0 0 . 0 1 * 0 i 1 * 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 u . u u . o 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 9 i 2 a 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U u . u v.o 0 . 0 0 . 0 3 MAN O . o O . o O .A 0 . 9 0 . 0 O.A 0 . 0 O.A U.'A 0 . 9 0 . 2 0 . 0

A J 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 A I T 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 1. 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U l . U u . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 9 2 1 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . U t.o 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 A 2 * l.o 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 l . U o . u 0 . 0 0 . 0 O . A A M a n 0 . 0 0 . * 0 . 0 0 . 1 t.o 0 . 0 o . o 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0

1 2< 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 >•2 O . o 0 . 0 O . o 1 . 0 u . o t . o 0 . 0 s 2* 0,0 0.0 o.a 1.0 1.0 0.0 O.o V . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 5 M a n 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 o.s O . u 1 . 0 0 . 9

rs) Table 22 (Continued)

CLU9TEN »N»LfOI9 OF COLLECTIVE FQLITICOL VIOLENCE 2213 0 3U*D*V» NOvEWO 12, H TI k CLU9TE0 L19TIN6 I*TE« 10 oa&sENi OKU PtNTfEM PENT90*1 PM KQ N9 OUNOLT* t)UKtp9« DUD* IMP VIOL*INN VIOLSOME VIDLC0N9 MEM.UC 1 t c.O 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 a.O 1 i * u.r l.a U.O 1.0 u.u l.U 0.0 0.0 1.0 U.O a.u 0 .0 I T o.o l.U 0.0 O.U 1.0 U.O 1.0 V.O 0.0 1.0 a.o o .u 1 19 o.a 1.0 u.o 0.0 1.0 l.U O.U u.u U.u a.u 1*0 u.u 1 IJ i.a U.O 0.0 l.U l.U 0.0 o.u 0.0 1.0 a.o o.u I 22 O.u l.U O.U O.a l.U l.U O.U u.u a.u u .o 1.0 u.o I 2) o.a l.o o.a 0.0 l.U 0.0 o.u v .o 0 .0 l.U O.a I 12 o.a v.o O.U 0*0 !•* 1.0 0.0 a.o l.U 0.0 u.o 0.0 I k 0.0 1.0 u.o a.u 1.0 l.U 0.0 o.o 1.0 u.o u.u 0.0 1 11 o .a i.a u.u 0.0 1.0 l.U 0.0 O.U i.a 0,0 e.o a.u I a o.a l.U 1.0 o.u 0,0 l.U o.u O.U i .a 0.0 u.o a.o 1 IV 0.0 l.U U.u o.u 1.0 1.0 a.u o.u i .a o.a 0.0 0.0 i So 1.0 u.u 1.0 0.0 o.a l.U o.u o.u 1.0 a.a u.o o.a i « f u a.i 0.6 0.2 0.2 O.T o .a 0.1 U.o a.5 0.2 0.3 a.o

2 2 o .a o.u u.u o .a 1.0 a.u 1.0 0.0 4.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 5 1* o .a u.o o.a 0.0 1.0 o.u l.U o.a a.u a.o 1.0 o.a 2 2k . a.o u.o o.a 0.0 1.0 a.o l.a ! * v u.o u.o i.a 2 2* 0.0 l.o o.u 0.0 o.o 1.0 o.u o.o 0.0 l.a a.o « • o .a 1.0 o.o 0.0 1.0 a.u 0.0 l.U 0.0 u.o 1.0 o.a 2 V 1.0 a.o u.u e.o 1.0 o .u 0.0 1.0 o.u 0 .0 l.U a.o 2 ME*N 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 l.a o.o O.T 0.3 o.o 0.2 0.6 0.0 , 5 0 .0 o.a o.a 0.0 1.0 !•* 0 .0 0.0 0.0 a.o 1.4 0 ,0 1 2k o.a u.u u.u u.o 1.0 i.a a.o o.u u.o u.u 1 .a o.u 1 Ik o .a o.a 0.0 0 .0 1.0 0.0 l.U 0.0 0.0 o.a 1.0 0 .0 ■ I0 1.0 u.u 0.0 o.a 1.0 ••S *•! o.a O.o u.o l.U 0 .0 1 2* 0.0 1.0 o.a o.a 1.0 l . o V.O u.u a.o U.o 1.0 0 ,0 I •EON 0.2 U .2 0.0 0.0 1.0 o .a o.a 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0

• 1 l . o U.o 0.0 0 .0 t.o 0 .0 !•* a.o 0.0 o.a 1.0 0.0 4 IT II.0 l.U i.a o.u O.a 0.0 1.0 u.u 0.0 1.0 a.o 0 .0 • 2? l.o u.u U.U o.a i!o o.u 1.0 a.o o.a l.U a.O o.a V 2k l.o u.o u.u 1.0 u.o l.U 0.0 U.O a.u 1.0 a.u a.o • M E k N o .a O.s a . i 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.0 a.o 0.0 u.o 0.3 0.0

} 21 1.0 o.a o.o o.a l.o a .o 1*0 0.0 O.o 0.0 1.0 ••! 4 24 1.0 u.u 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 a.o 0.0 o.a a.o t.o 0.0 5 MCkN 1.0 0.0 ".0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 u.o 1.0 o.o 9 9 ? T.i!iIp 22 (Continued)

CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE 22: It SUNLAI, NLvtRbER 12. IS7S ? CLUSTER LIST INC c l u s t e r id ARCARROW ARCACNTN CORO I GHNVIOL CRVIOLAFDNJL AFOLO n AFDNIGM 1 1 «.« 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 o . u O.U 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 1 * l . U 1 . 0 o.o 0 , 0 U . u 0 * 0 1.0 7 c*s I 2 * ° . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 V.U 0 . 0 l . V 1 I S 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 U.O 1 . 0 U . u l . V V . o I 0 . 0 1 1 1 . 0 l ' Q o.o 0 . 0 v . u u . v t . o I 2 2 2 * ® . 0 O.o 0 . 0 1 . 0 u . u l . U V . o { 2 1 o.o . u 0 . 0 1 . 0 l.o u . u U.O l . U 1 1 2 2 * ® 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 v . u v . o l . o t a 0 . 0 1 . 0 } * ° 0 . 0 1 . 0 u . o V . u 1 . 0 t i i S * ° 1 . 0 1 . 0 v.o 1 . 0 U . u U . u l . U 1 • o.o 1 . 0 1 * * U . o 0 . 0 V . u U . o 1 . 0 1 i t 2 * # ! * 2 0 . 0 1 . 0 l.U U.W V . o l . V I 3 0 o.o l.o 0 . 0 0 . 0 1.0 0.0 1 . 0 0 . 0 t MEAN o.o 1.0 0.7 0.2 0 . 7 0.0 0 . 2 0 . 0

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1 % 2*2 . 0 1 * ° o.o 1 . 0 o . v O.U 1 . 0 J 2 0 ?•? . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 l.V U.U S I t o.o . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l.U l.U o.u o.u2 * ° S I t 2 * * . 0 O . o 0 . 0 l.U l.U 0,0 V . u 3 2 * 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 V . o 1 . 0 l.U V . u o . u 3 MEAN o . o 1 . 0 0 . 2 0 , 0 1.0 U.A u . o 0 . 2

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S 21 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 l.U U . u u.v S 2 5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 l.U 0.0 u.o % M^AN 1.0 o.o 0.0 0.0 1.0 l . V O . o 0 . 0 IVZ T.iblc 21

CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF .COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE 2 2 1 « 2 SUMJAY, NUVEMOEU u , IOTA CLOSTEA LISTINS C l u s t e r ID FSTNORLO SCn a ORLO THRNORLO IOEAEICH 10E AC OM S i o e a s t r c I D E AT bA N ST h a u p c n STUACONS b l N AC ON O CLASUUVG 1 1*! 0.0 o.s .0 9*® 0.0 O.V o.v 0.0 1.0 1*0 1A o.o 0.0 1.0 • ! 0.0 o.v o.v o.u 1.0 V.u l.V T ®*5 0.0 1.0 .0 0.0 u.v 0.0 0.0 u.u 1.0 1.0 IS o.5 O.o 1.0 .0 0.0 u.o o.u 1.0 O . v o.u 1.0 1) o.o 8** 1.0 l.U 1.0 v.o o.u o.v l.U V.O 1.0 li 0.4 0.0 l.V l.U V.u v.o o.v 0.0 1.0 o.v 1.0 e j v.o o.u 1.0 0.0 O.V o.v u.u l.U u.o 1.0 IE 0.0 0.0 .0 v.o 0.0 U.v o.u V.o 1.0 1.0 A v.o O.u 1 .0 1l.V 1*5 0.0 0.0 V.o u.u 1 .0 0.0 11 0.0 u.o 1.0 1.0 0.0 V.o 0.0 1.0 0.0 v.o o.o A o.u O.u l.U 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 e.o l.V v.u u .v 1.0 U.O O.u l.V u.o u.o o.u v.o l.V U.u u . o JOI'* 0,0 O.V 1.0 l.V v.u 0.0 O.v v.u u.o 1.0 u.v N £A A 0.2 o.u o.s o.s 0.2 0.0 o.u v.2 0,5 O.A 0.0

2 0.0 v.o l.V 0.0 0.0 l.V 0.0 O.U v . O IV 0.01 * ° 0,0 1.0 1.01 0.0 * 9 V.U v.u l . V u.u u.u u.v 2t> 0 . 0 o.u l.U 1.0 u.o o.u o.v 1.0 u.o o.u l.V 20 0.0 O.u i.0 I** 0.0 v.o v.o l.V u.u O.v o.v A 0.0 l . V 0.0 1.0 1*® 0.0 o.u o.o 1.0 o.v 0.0 * 0.0 0.0 1.0 l.o 0.0 0.0 o.v 0.0 u.u 1.0 u.o M(AN 0.2 0.2 O.T O.T 0.3 0.0 0,0 O.T 0.2 0.2 0.2

J 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 O.U t.o U.o u.o 0.0 24 0.0 1.0 u.u l . o v.o 1.0 0.0 1.0 U.U v.o u.o 1 A 1.0 u.o 0.0 /.o O.v 1.0 1.0 1.0 u.u 0.0 v.o h 1.0 O.u u.u u . o v.u l.U l.U l.U U.v u . u u.o 2* 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 U.v l.U u.v o.v 0.0 NCA'« O.A O.A 0.2 1.0 0.0 l . V O.A 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

J 1 . 0 0 .0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 o.v 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 I f 1.0 O.o v.o 1*0 0 ,0 0.0 0.0 U . o s * ® 1.0 v . o 2T 0.0 0.0 l . U 1l.o 1.0 0,0 0.0 t.o O.V ® *8 lb 0.0 U.O l.o L * ° 0.0 0.0 O.u l.V o.v v.o 0 .0 21 0.0 1.0 u.o ■l.o 0.0 1 * ® o.u u.v V . u ! * 9 u.v 2 b 0,0 O.o 1.0 l.U 0.0 0.0 u.u v.o u.u 1.0 O . u m£ a n 0.1 0.2 V.S I.T 0.2 0.2 0.0 0 . 5 v.o 0 . 5 0 . 0 Tahle 2 3 (Continued)

[LUSTS* itULTtl* OF COLLECTIVE FOLIUCOL VlULt*Ct 22142 Su*04Y, 12, 1ST* 5 CLUOTEO LISTINfi

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2 2 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 t . o 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 - 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 ! < o 2 ID 0.0 l.U 1.0 1 . 0 1 . 0 o . O 0 . 0 o . u O . o 0 . 0 l * o l . U 2 2 » 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 V .U 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 O.V v . u 0 . 0 0 . 0 1*0 i 2 0 1 . 0 l.V 1 . 0 u . o 1 . 0 0 . 0 u . o l . V o . u u . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 i • l . o ■ • 2 1 . 0 l . V l * 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 l . V 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 « • o . v 1 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 o.u l . V 1 . 0 1 . 0 e . o 2 * 1 4 * 4.1 l . t t 1 . 0 o.s 0 . 7 0.1 0 . 2 o.s o.s 0.3 V . 3 O.s

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0 3 M 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 • IT 1 . 0 l . V 0 . 0 O . v 1 . 0 U . o 0 . 0 l . U l . V u . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 • 2 T 0 . 0 1 . 0 O.u 1 .0 1.0 U.o 0.0 l . V l.V u . o o . v v . o •» 5e 1.0 o . v 0 .0 u . o 1.0 U.o o.o 1.0 o . u U . v u . v u . o * £ 1 U.V 0 .0 “ .0 l . V l . U 0.0 0.0 o . u l.V u . u 1.4 0.0 U it V . u 0 .0 U.U l . U 1 . 0 0 . 0 u . o u . o u . v V.o 1 . 0 U .O • ME4(. 0,3 V.S o . v V . S 1 . 0 U . o o . u V . 7 O .T 0 . 4 0 . 3 o . e

TJ \CO' Table 23 (Continued)

ClUSTttt ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE 221*2 SUNDAY, NUvEMUEN 1 2 , ) Y ) » CLUSTE# LiSTJNC

CLUSTE* t o O V 6 S E M OOOANPAHTFE* PANTSOME PAOTCUNS DUO AL T * D U U i n S M OUHA&MP VIOLMINM VIDLSUME UtOLCUNI AWEALUC I 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 U . o l . o U . o O . u u . v o . o 1 . 0 o . v t ; O . o 1.0 u.u l.U v.u l.V V.o o . u 1 . 0 U .O 0 . 0 v . u T ! * £ l . o U . o o . e 1 . 0 U . o l . U u . o o . v l . U U . U o . u S-? 1 . 0 U .O 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 o . u 0 . 0 o . v u . o 1 . 0 u . v 1 S*S 1 . 0 2 * ° 0 . 0 1 . 0 l . V 0 . 0 u . u o . u 1 . 0 U .U o . v 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 o . o 1 . 0 o . u u . v o . u o . v 1 . 0 U . v } i o . e 1 . 0 2 * ° 0 . 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 O . u 0 . 0 1 . 0 U .O u 0 . 0 O . v 0 , 0 u . o u . u u . u l . U u . u v . o u . u 4 ! • " * ' 2 X*® l . U u . u O . v 1 . 0 1 . 0 U . u u . v l . U u . o u . o u . v 4 O . U 1 . 0 U . u 1 . 0 1 . 0 u . u 0 . 0 l . U u . v 0 . 0 o . v A U.O “ • 2 !•* 1 - ® 0 . 0 l . V o . u 0 . 0 i . u u . v u . o u . o I" u . U l . U O . u o . u l . V O . u U .V l.U v.u u.v u.v *0 1 . 0 O . u 1 . 0 u . u O.U l . U o . v U . v l . U u . u u . u u . v ME AN 0 . 1 u . o 0 . 2 0 . 2 0.7 O.u 0.1 0.0 0 . 3 0 . 2 0 . 3 0 . 0

2 0 . 0 u . u 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 I * ® u . v o . v l . V 0 . 0 u . o l b 2 * ° u . u 2 * ® O . o 1 . 0 l . V 0 . 0 0 . 0 u . o 1 . 0 v . u 2U O . U O . v 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 v . o l . V O . v O . v u . o l . U v . u 2 * 0 . 0 1 . 0 O.U u . o 1.0 V.u 1.0 U.v o . e o . e l . U o . o « 0 . 0 l . U 2 * ® 0 . 0 1.0 0.0 0.0 l.U 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 u . o * 1 . 0 U.u 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 O.V l . U O .U u . o 1 . 0 0 . 0 «E»N 0.2 U.J U.o 0.0 1 . 0 o . u 0 . 7 O . i 0 . 0 0 . 2 o . a u . o

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1 1 . 0 U . o 0 . 0 0 . 0 > * 2 *•!M o . e U.O 0.0 1.0 t.o 1 T U . u ‘ • 2 1 . 0 S ' ° 0 . 0 0 . 0 1 . 0 u . o 0 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 u . u 2 7 1 . 0 u . o U.U O . o 1 . 0 V . u 1.0 U.O v.o 1.0 v.o O.u 2 4 l . U O . u 2 * ® 1.0 o.u l.V o.e u . u U . v l . V U . u u . v 2 1 l . U u . u 0 . 0 U . o 1 . 0 u . o 1 . 0 u . u u . o u . u 1 . 0 o . u 2*i 1 . 0 u . u O . u 1 . 0 O . u l . V v . o U . u U.OV.O 1 . 0 u . U n c a n o . f t u . 2 0 . 2 0 . 3 o.s 0.3 0.7 e.o o.u O . S o . s 0 . 0 270 Table 23 (Continued)

IIS OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE 2*l«2 SUNDA*, NOVEMBER U , ISIS CLUSTER LISTlNC

CLUSTER 10 AREAPROV AHEACNTR GWPflS 6RMV10L OR VIOL AF(1N JL AFULUa AFOn JSH I 1 V.O 1.0 1.0 *.« 0 .0 9.0 e.O 1.0 I 1.0 o.O 0.0 0.0 1.0 *! *•2 I «.S 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 ::* '* 2 I 15 !*** M 1:8 !•* 0.0 •*! 1 o.s > •! o.o 8:8 O.S 8:8 0.0 I JJ ole !•* 1.0 1.9 0.0 1 a o.o 1.0 0.0 1.0 O.U 0.9 1.0 1 1 1 o.o 1.0 1.0 t.o 0.0 0.9 1.9 1 s ?•* 1.0 1.0 8:8 1.0 u.u o .u l.U 1 0.0 1.0 1.0 o.u w.O *1 0.0 1.0 1 *# 8:8 8:8 O.U 1:8 f . o 0.0 1.0 O.U U.O“ •2 i : 9.0 1.0 0.0 0 .0 1:8 0.0 1 .0 8:8 MEAN 0.0 1.0 O.T 0.2 O.T o.u 0 .2 o.s

0 .0 1.0 0.0 o.u 0 .0 1.0 o.s 0 0 0.0 0.9 1.9 0.0 o.o U.u 0 .0 1.0 ll 0 .0 8:8 0.0 0.0 0.0 a 0,0 is o.o i:*1.0 0.0 1.0 8:8 a 0.0 1.0 1.0!•* 0.0 l.U 0.0 1 .0 0.0 MEAN 0.0 1.0 O.T 0.0 1.0 0.0 0 .3 O.T

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ClUSlttf ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIQllNCfc 221‘ Cl u s t e r l i s t i r s CLUSTER 10 FOtftORLO SCNWORLO TMRMORLO lOCAEiC* IOEACORS IUEASTRC IDEATRAR ATUAORtR StHACUNS ST RACQRV CLANOUR* .0 0,0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 O.U 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 i \ J o!o 0.0 o.u ! * fl 8 * ° 1.0 •:2 0.0 1:! 5:5 0.0 0.0 o .e 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0 .0 0 .0 o .o ii 0.0 5:5 0.0 0.0 v.ol *s 1.0 !•• 21 i! s * ® !•* o.o !*• .0 0.0 0.0 o.e 0.0 1.0 o.e 1,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 l. o v.o 0 ,0 1.0 0.0 o.e 0.0 5:8 1 *° o.o !•• 0 ,0 0 .0 1:8 ; 0.0 e.o 0.0 l.U *.» 0.0 ll 0 .0 .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 o .v o.e V.S I 1:8 0.0 *•£ i * # 1:8 0.0 0.0 O . v 1.0 v .o 0,0 1* 0.0 •“ 1.0 1:5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 II iO.U * O.o 1.0 0.0 1.0 v . u o . u O.v 1.1’! • “ v . o l.V ■ C A R 0.2 0 .0 0.0 0.0 0,2 e.o 0.0 0.2 o .s O.A 0 .0

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•*! £•* 0.0 0.0 i.e 0.0 o.e •*! 0.0 !•* V . o o .v >•! <1.0 l.V v . o 0.0 O.V I lo i:g o.e v .o 0 .0 1.0 1.V 1.0 v.u 0.0 V.O 8:5 v.e 0.0 0.0 1.0 !•“ M v.u !*® l *8 0.0 0.0 o.e 1.0 v.o o .v 1.0 e.o v.o 0.0 I'1 8:8 o.o e.o o . v 1*® 5:5 1*° 5:5 i * v £ •* 8:8 o le |;j 0.0 o.e o.e ** O . o o .v &v.o 5:5 o.o V.o 1:5 o.u 1.0 o.e e . o 0.0 1.0 1:5 0.0 o.o 1.0 u.o 0.0 80.0*® 2:2 1 .V oi*® . v 0.0 0.0 1.0 o . v v.o u . v 0,0 0*.o 0,0 1.0 1.0 0.0 v.e o .v o . v v.e 1.0' • 5 v .o w E a r 0.2 0.3 0.0 O.A 0,1 o .s 0.2 0.0 v . e 0 .2 0.1 2 7 2 Table 24 (Continued)

CLUSTER 1NAL7SI0 OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE 2213A SUM) AT, NOVE*OE« 12, |ATO CLUSTER LISTIW ID CLAMBA CLUOII CLAPmU l CLAPEa * LEACENTB LEACtMO LCLV0UA6 LCLPUBA LCLPOVH LCLPHUI LCLPEAS QRCOPOftT 1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 o.o o.o 0.0 7 *2 !*2 1*2 °*2 1.0 V.O l.V l.V v.o V.o o.e 0.0 ir !*2 1.0 0.0 2*2 0,0 *•2 1.0 l.V 1*0 O.V 0.0 1.0 i* •2 !*2 l.V 0.0 1.0 v.o 1.0 1.0 u.o 1.0 0.0 0.0 it •2 1.0 !*2 o.v 1.0 O.o 1.0 v.u 0.0 v.o 0.0 u.o i j •2 1.0 1*2 0.0 l *2 U.O 1.0 0.0 u.v o.u o.e O.o V 1.0 0.0 v.o 1.0 t.o 0.0 l.V l.U u.v 0.0 0,0 J*2 i*P l.V 1.0 }*! V.o u.o 1.0 o.u O.V e.o 0.0 (5 1.0 o.v 1.0 2*2 1.0 2** 0.0 l.V l.V v.v 0.0 u.o JO i*2 1*2 l.U 6.0 >•2 0.0 U.o 1.0 o.u t.o 0.0 U.o s 1.0 1.0 1.0 l.o 1.0 0.0 O.v 1.0 0.0 u.o 0.0 0.0 1* 1.0 1.0 l.V °*S 1.0 V.o 1.0 l.U o.v o.o o.u v.u 11 1.1* 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 v.o 1.0 t.o o.v U.o 0.0 v.o MC*h 1.0 O.a 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 o.v 0.2 0.1 o.o 0.1

I .0 ••2 1*2 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 l.V 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1 .0 “■2 ®*2 0.0 i*2 U.O 0.0 1.0 l.U v.o 0.0 0.0 1) .0 v.o o.o 0.0 1.0 £•« o.o 1.0 l.U 0.0 0,0 v.o • .0 O.v ■*2 ‘ *2 1.0 0.0 v.o l.V 1.0 0.0 V.C 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 u.o l.V 1.0 1.0 0.0 ****,< O.B 0.2 e.o O.A 0.0 O.A 0.0 u.v 1.0 O.A 0.2 0.2

5 S*n 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 U.v o.v 1.0 0.0 1.0 it O.u 0.0 u.o 1.0 0.0 1.0 u.o 0.0 l.U v.u 1.0 1.0 l*> t.o t.o 1 .0 O.u 1.0 v.o V.u l.U 1.0 v.u 0.0 1.0 10 t.o O.v l.U O.u 1.0 V.O 0.0 v.u o.v l.U o.v 0.0 It O.o >•2 1.0 1*° 1.0 v.o V.o v.y 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 & !*2 ‘ *2 .« ®*2 i.o 0.0 1.0 v.o U.u V.o v.o 1.0 1.0 u.o e.o 0.0 I.O 6,0 o.v 0.0 i.o 2a *•! )•! v.o >•2 0.0 1.0 1.0 o.o 0.0 1.0 t.o 6.0 e.o 0.0 it 0.0 1.0 0.0 l.U 1.0 U.O 0,0 1.0 1.1 O.o 0.0 v.e 1.0 i.o 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 O.V 1.0 O.v v.u v.o o.v it<1 '.0 u.o O.U 1.0 l.o v.o 0.0 v.u 1.0 u.v 1.0 0.0 21 o.o 1.0 U.O l.V l.V v.o V.u v.o v.u V.u 1.0 V.o MtAA 0.3 0.0 o.s 0.5 0.0 0.2 0.1 O.A O.A 0.2 0.3 O.A 7 1 27 Table 24 (Continued)

CLUSTER ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE 2*114 SUNUAT, NUVLNfctB 12* IVTS CLUSTER LIST INC CLUSTER 10 OOCSIMI ORGAN PARTFEM PANTSUME PARTCONS OURALTU duramen DURASMP o.e 0.0 1.0 0.0 1 1 1.0 .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 o . u 1 *° 0 .0 1 T o.u 1.0 u.o }•* .0 L>° u.o 0.0 1.0 O.v 1 12 0.0 o.e 0.0 0.0 1.0 .0 fi.o 0.0 0.0 u.o o . u I 15 0.0 1.0 v.u 0.0 <•8 .u o.v 0.0 W u . o 1.0 !•* 1 u.o 1.0 U.o O.u 1.0 t.o O.u o.u 0.0 0.0 !*0 O . o 1 23 O.o 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 l.U o.v o.u 0.0 0.0 i.o 1 0 0.0 1.0 o.u 0.0 1.0 t.o o.e u.u 1.0 o.u 0.0 8:8 1 11 0.0 1.0 V.o 0.0 1.0 t.o O.o v.u 1.0 0.0 0,0 1 1* 0.0 1.0 o.e o.e 1.0 [•“ 0.0 v.u u.o 0.0 8:8 1 10 1.0 u.o 1.0 0.0 e.o .0 0.0 u.u i:8 u . o 0.0 0.0 1 s 0.0 1.0 !■* 0.0 0.0 1*0 0.0 u.u u.o 0.0 v.o 1 !• o.v l.U o.o 1*° u.o .0 u.o u.o 1:8 0.0 0.0 u . v 1 13 0.0 1.0 U.o o.u l.U .0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1 mean 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 U.T 0.1 O.v 0.5 0.2 O.J 0.0

2 * 0.0 0.0 u.o o.v 1.0 0.0 1.0 u.u O.V 0.0 v . u * 3 0.0 0.0 o.u 1.0 >.0 1.0 u.u 0.0 O.U 1.0 O.o 2 IT u.u l.U 1.0 u.u U.O l.U 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 u . o U.o 2 « O.o l.U o.e 0.0 1.0 l.U 0.0 1.0 0.0 u.u 2 0 lls O.v o.o O.o 1.0 l.o 0,0 l.V 0.0 U . o 1:8 8:8 2 MEAN 0.4 0.4 U.2 0.0 U.o 1.0 o.v U.v e.o o .u o.u 0 .0

3 5 0.0 0.0 0.0 o.e 1.0 .0 0.0 0.0 o.o 0.0 1.0 ».» 1 20 o.u 0.0 U.O v.o l.V .0 u.o v.u 0,0 o . u 1.0 U.U J IV 0.0 0.0 0.0 V.o 1.0 l.U 1.0 v.o U.O u.o 1.0 0.0 1 1A 1.0 u.o 0.0 u.o 1.0 0.0 1.0 O.u 0.0 1.0 0.0 3 1 0 U.u U.u U.o 0.0 1.0 o.u 1.0 V.o 0.0 u.o'••J 1.0 0.0 1 *U O.u 0.0 U.O u.u 1.0 u.o 1.0 u.u u . u u.u l.U u.o 3 20 0.1. 1.0 u.o 0.0 1.0 U.u I*** v.u u . o u.o 1.0 V.u 3 24 0.0 l.U v.o o.u 1.0 l.U o.u U.o o . u U . o 1.0 U.U 1 27 1.0 u.u U.u 0.0 1.0 0.0 v.u 0.0 1.0 o . e !•! 0 .0 3 20 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 t*" 0.0 0.0 u.o !•* 8:« 1 21 1.0 0.0 0.0 o.u 1.0 1l.U 1*° V.o V.O o.u 1.0 3 » l.V 0.0 0.0 t.o 0.0 1.0 0.0 V.o O.o U.o 1.0 8:8 3 MEAN 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 o.s O.A o.v o.u 0.0 0.2 o.s O.V Tnhlc 24 (Continued)

CLUSTER ANALVS1S Of COLLECTIVE POLITICAL VIOLENCE 22* 3A SUNI'ftT, NOVLMitfft ). » IOTA r CLUSTER LISTING CLUSTER 10 ARCAPROV ANEACNT* GRP03 GRUVIOL 1.WV 1UL AFUML AFULOW AFOHIPH

I 1 0.0 l.U 1.0 u.o u.u v.o l.U 1 r v.o l.U 1.0 I.O 1.0 U.u v.o 1.0 1 12 0.0 l.U 1.0 u.o l.U U.u v.o 1.0 IS 0.0 l.U l.U 0.0 l.U u.o 1 .0 22 u.o 1.0 u.o l.U u.v l.U 2*#0.u 23 0.0 I.O o.u 1.0 l.U u.u u.u 1.U 0 0.0 l.V 1.0 o.o 1.0 u.u o.u 1.0 11 u.o l.U l.V 0,0 l.V u.u o.u 1*1 v.o l.U 0.0 1.0 l.U u.u v.o I .u 30 U.u l.V 0.0 u.o l.U U.U 1.0 u.u A U.u 1.0 1.0 u.o V.» v.u u.o 1.0 I* 0.0 l.V 1.0 u.o U.u 0,0 U.O 1.0 13 v.o 1.0 1.0 o.o U.U U.O u.o 1.0 MEAN 0.0 1.0 O.T 0.2 O.T u.u U .2 O.A

2 2 V.O 1.0 1.0 U.o 1.0 U.u u.o 1.0 2 i V.o l.V i.o 0.0 l.U 0.0 l.U 0.0 2 IT l.o u.o V.o 1.0 u.o 1.0 0.0 0 0.0 1.0 !

S o.o 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 v.u 0.0 1 .0 20 0.0 l.U 0.0 0.0 1.0 1 .V 0.0 0.0 10 0.0 l.U 0.0 V.o 1.0 1.0 v.o 0.0 10 0.0 l.U 0.0 u.o l.U 1.0 U.U 0.0 10 0.0 1.0 1.0 u.o l.V 0.0 u.v 20 O.o 1.0 O.U U.o I.o v.o o.u 1.0!*• 20 0.0 l.V 0.0 u.o l.U v.o 0.0 1.0 20 0.0 i.o 0.0 v.o i.o l.V o.o 0.0 2T V.o i.o o.o l.o t.o l.V u.o 0.0 29 0.0 l.U 0.0 1.0 l.U 1.0 o.v 0.0 21 1.0 o.u 0.0 2-fl 1.0 u.v 0.0 20 1.0 v.o 0,0 0.0 1.0 l.V v.o 0.0 WAN 0.2 O.A 0.2 0.2 i.o U.T 0.0 0.3 275 BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR APPENDIX

276 277

CASE STUDY SOURCES

Afghanistan

Fraser-Tytier, William Kerr. 1967. Afghanistan a study of political developments in central and southern Asia. Oxford University press., London.

Sykes, Sir Percy. 1940. A history of Afghanistan. Macmillan., London.

Bolivia

Alexander, Robert J. 1958. The Bolivian national.revolution. Rutgers University Press., New Brunswick, N.J.

Barton, Robert. 1968. A short history of Bolivia. Editorial Los Amigos del Libro., La Par.

Malloy, James M. 1970. Bolivia: The uncompleted revolution. Univ. of Pittsburgh Press., Pittsburgh.

Osborne, Harold. 1944. Bolivia; A land divided. Oxford Univ. Press., New York.

Brazil

Bello, Jose Marla. 1966. A History of modern Brazil. Stanford Univ. Press., Stanford, California.

Camacho, J. A. 1952. Brazil an interim assessment. Royal institute of International affairs., London.

Dulles, John. 1967. Vargas of Brazil: A political biography. Univ. of Texas Press., Austin.

Johnson, John J. 1964. The military and society in Latin America. Stanford Univ. Press., Stanford, California.

Lieuwen, Edwin. 1961. Arms and politics in Latin America. Frederick A. Praeger., New York*

Skidmore, Thomas E. 1967. Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964. Oxford Univ. Press., New York.

Young, Jordan M. 1967. The Brazilian Revolution of 1930 and the after- math. Rutgers Univ. Press., New Brunswick, N.J. 278

Bulgaria

Logio, George Clenton. 1936. Bulgaria; Past and Present. Sheratt and Hughes., Manchester.

Rothschild, Joseph. 1959. The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Its origins and development, 1883-1936. Columbia Univ. Press., New York.

Cuba

Draper, Theodore. 1962. Castro's revolution: Myths and Realities. Frederick A. Praeger., New York.

Fagg, John Edwin, 1965. Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

Goldenberg, Boris. 1965. The Cuban revolution and Latin America. Frederick A. Praeger., New York.

Lieuwen, Edwin. 1961. Arms and politics In Latin America. Praeger., New York.

Macgaffey, Wyatt and Clifford R. Barnett. 1962. Cuba: Its people, Its society, Its culture. HRAF Press*, New Haven.

Thomas, Hugh. 1971. Cuba: The pursuit of freedom. Harper and Row., New York.

El Salvador

Alexander, Robert J. 1957. Communism In Latin America. Rutgers Univ. Press., New Brunswick, New Jersey.

Anderson, Thomas P. 1971. Matanza: El Salvador's Communist revolt of 1932. University of Nebraska Press., Lincoln.

Hackett, Charles W. 1932. Communist uprising in El Salvador. Current History. 35.

Kantor, Harry. 1969. Patterns of politics and political systems in Latin America. Rand Me Nally and Co., Chicago. 279

Ethiopia

Clapham, Christopher. 1968. The Ethiopian coup d'etat of December 1960. The journal of modern African Studies. 6.

Greenfield, Richard. 1965. Ethiopia: A new political history. Praeger., New York.

Lefever, Ernest W. 1970. Spear and scepter: army, police and politics in tropical Africa. The Brookings Institute., Uashlngton D.C.

France

Derfler, Leslie. 1966. The Third French Republic, 1870-1940. D. Van Nostrand Co., Princeton, N.J.

Shirer, William C. 1969. The collapse of the Third Republic. Simon and Schuster., New York.

Germany

Angress, Werner T. 1963. Stillborn revolution: The Communist bid for power in Germany, 1921-23. Princeton Univ. Press., Princeton, N.J.

Berlau, A. Joseph. 1949. The German social democratic party, 1914- 1921. Columbia Univ. Press., New York.

Coper, Rudolf. 1955. Failure of a revolution: Germany in 1918-19. Cambridge Univ. Press., Cambridge.

Halperin, S. William. 1946. Germany tried democracy: A political history of the Reich from 1918-1933. Thomas Y. Cromwell., New York,

Lutz, Ralph Haswell. 1922. The German Revolution, 1918-19. Stan­ ford Univ. publications on History, economics and political science, vol. 1, no. 1. Stanford, California.

Waldman, Eric. 1958. The Spartaclst uprising of 1919: and the crisis of the German socialist movement. The Marquette Univ. Press., Milwaukee.

Ghana

Afrifa, A. A. Kwasl. 1966. The Ghana coup: 24th February 1966. The Humanities Press., New York.

Aluko, A.K. 1976. Ghana and Nigeria 1957-70. Barnes and Noble Books., New York. 280

Barker, Peter. 1969. Operation cold chop: The coup that toppled Nkrumah. Ghana Publishing Co., Accra.

Jones, Trevor. 1976. Ghana's first Republic, 1960-66. Methuen and Co. Ltd., London.

Lefever, Ernest W. 1970. Spear and Scepter: Army, police and poli­ tics In tropical Africa. The Brookings Institution., Washington, D.C.

Nkrumah, Kwame. 1968. Dark days In Ghana. International Publi­ shers., New York.

Pinkney, Robert. 1972. Ghana under military rule, 1966-69. Methuen and Co. Ltd., London.

Greece

Forster, Edward S. 1958. A short history of modern Greece, 1621-1956. Methuen and Co. Ltd., London.

Heurtley, W.A. 1965. A short history of Greece: From early times to 1964. At the Univ. Press., Cambridge.

Mcnelll, William H. 1947. The Greek dilemma: War and aftermath. J.B. Lipplncott Co., Philadelphia and New York.

Papacosma, S, Victor. 1977. The military in Greek politics. The Kent State Univ. Press.

Honduras

Stokes, William S. 1950. Honduras: An area study in government. Univ. of Wisconsin Press., Madison.

Iraq

'Caractacus* 1959. Revolution in Iraq: An essay In comparative public opinion. Victor Sollancz Ltd., London.

Dann, Uriel. 1969. Iraq under Qassem: A political history. Israel Univ. Press., Jerusalem.

Khadduri, Majid. 1960. Independent Iraq 1932-1958: A Btudy in Iraqi politics. Oxford Univ. Press., Oxford.

Khadduri, Majid. 1969. Republican Iraq: A study in Iraqi politics since the revolution of 1958. Oxford Univ. Press., Oxford.

Shwadran, Benjamin. 1960. The power struggle in Iraq. Council for Middle Eastern affairs Press., New York. 281

Japan

Beasley, W. G. 1974. The modern history of Japan. Praeger Publi­ shers., New York and Washington.

Bergamlni, David. 1971. Japan's Imperial conspiracy. William Morrow and Co., New York.

Borton, Hugh. 1940. Japan since 1931: Its political and social deve­ lopment. Institute of Pacific relations., New York.

Shillony, Ben-Ami. 1973. Revolt in Japan: The young officers and the February 26, 1936 Incident. Princeton University Press., Princeton.

Mexico

Atkin, Ronald. 1970. Revolution: Mexico 1910-20. The John Day Co., New York.

Brandenburg, Frank. 1964. The making of modern Mexico. Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.

Cumberland, Charles Curtis. 1952. Mexican Revolution: Genesis under Madero. University of Texas Press., Austin.

Gruening, Ernest. 1942. Mexico and its heritage. D. Appleton Century Co., New York.

Johnson, William Weber. 1968. Heroic Mexico: The violent emergence of a modern nation. Dobleday and Co. Inc., Garden City.

Parkes, H. B. 1969. A history of Mexico. Houghton Mifflin Company., Boston.

Tannenbaum, Frank. 1933. Peace by revolution: An interpretation of Mexico. Columbia University Press., New York.

Womack, John Jr. 1969. Zapata and the Mexican revolution. Alfred A. Knopf., New York.

Panama

Dubois, Jules. 1964. Danger over Panama. The Bobbs Merrill Co. Inc. New York.

Paraguay

Ralne, Philip. 1956. Paraguay. Scarecrow Press., New Brunswick, New Jersey. 282

Warren, Harris Gaylord. 1949. Paraguay; An Informal history. Univer­ sity of Oklahoma Press., Norman.

Peru

Bourrlcaud, Francois. 1970. Power and society in contemporary Peru. Faber and Faber., London.

Marett, Sir Robert. 1969. Peru. Praeger Publishers., New York.

VJerlich, David P. 1978. Peru: A short history. Southern Illinois University Press., Carbondale and Edwardsville,

Portugal

Braganca Cunha, V. de. 1938. Revolutionary Portugal. J. Clark and Co. Ltd., London. de Oliveira Marques, A. K. 1972. History of Portugal: From empire to corporate state. Columbia University Press., New York.

Livermore, H. V. 1947. A history of Portugal. Cambridge University Press., Oxford.

Rumania

Eidelberg, P. G. 1974. The great Rumanian peasant revolt of 1907: Origins of a modern jacquerie. E. J. Brill., Leiden, Nether­ lands .

Roberts, Henry L. 1951. Rumania: Political problems of an agrarian state. Yale University Press., New Haven.

Russia

Astrov, W. 1928. An illustrated history of the Russian revolution. Martin Lawrence Ltd., London.

Gorky, M. 1936. The history of the civil war in the USSR. Interna­ tional Publishers., New York.

Gross, Feliks. 1958. The seizure of political power in a century of revolutions. Philosophical library., New York.

Keep, John. 1976. The Russian revolution: A study of mass mobiliza­ tion. Weidenfeld and Nicholson., London.

Llebman, Marcel. 1970. The Russian revolution. Random House., New York.

Trotsky, Leon. 1957. The history of the Russian revolution. The Univ. of Michigan Press., Ann Arbor. 283

Spain

Araqulstain, Luis. 1935. The October Revolution in Spain. Foreign Affairs, vol. 13.

Bolloten, Burnett. 1961. The Grand Camouflage: The Spanish Civil War and Revolution, 1936-39. Praeger Publishers. New York.

Brenan, Gerald. 1969. The Spanish labyrinth: An account of the social and political background of the civil war. Cambridge Univer­ sity Press., Cambridge.

Broue, Pierre and Emile Temlme. 1970. The revolution and the civil war in Spain. The MIT Press., Cambridge.

Carr, Raymond. 1966. Spain: 1808-1939. Clarendon Press., Oxford.

Carr, Raymond. 1971. The Republic and the civil war in Spain. St. Martins' Press., Macmillan.

Cattell, David T. 1956. Communism and the Spanish civil war. Univer­ sity of California Press., Berkeley.

Jackson, Gabriel. 1965. The Spanish Republic and the civil war, 1931- 39. Princeton University Press., Princeton.

Madariaga, Salvador de. 1958. Spain: A modern history. Praeger Pub­ lishers., New York.

Manuel, Frank E. 1938. Politics of modern Spain. Mcgraw Hill CO. Inc. New York.

Smith, R. N. 1965. Spain: A modern history. The University of Michi­ gan Press., Ann Arbor.

Thomas, Hugh. 1961. The Spanish civil war. Harper and Row Publishers, New York.

Thailand

Landon, K. P. 1968. Slam in transition: A brief survey of cultural trends in the five years since the revolution of 1932. Green­ wood Press., New York.

Mokarapong, Thawatt. 1972. HlBtory of the Thai Revolution: A study in political behaviour. Chalemmlt., Bangkok.

Thompson, Virginia. 1941. Thailand; The new Siam. The Macmillan Co., New York. 284

Turkey

Ahmad, Feroz. 1969. The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress In Turkish politics, 1908-1914, Clarendon Press., Oxford.

Lewis, Bernard. 1961. The emergence of modern Turkey. Oxford Univer sity Press., London.

Pears, Sir Edwin. 1917. Life of Abdul Hamid. Henry Holt and Co., New York.

Price, M. P. 1956. A history of Turkey: From empire to republic. The Macmillan Company,, New York.

'Viator1. 1908. The Turkish revolution. The fortnightly review, vol. XC.

Yemen

Boxhall, P. G. 1964. The Yemen: Background to recent events. The Army quarterly and Defence journal, vol. 88.

Brown, William R. 1963. The Yemen dilemma. The Middle East journal, vol. 17.

Schmidt, Dana Adams. 1968. Yemen: The unknown war. Holt, Rinehart and Winston., New York.

Wenner, Manfred W. 1967. Modern Yemen, 1918-1966. The John Hop­ kins Press., Baltimore. Vita

Kasturi Das Gupta (nee Gupta) was born on January 17,

1951 In Shillong, India. She received her high school and college education in Delhi. In 1967 she graduated from Lady Irwin Higher

Secondary School. She received her B. A degree from Indraprastha

College (Delhi University) in 1970 with Honours in Economics. In

1974 (Spring), she received her Masters degree in Sociology from

Southern University, Baton Rouge. She joined the Sociology Dept, at

LSU in the summer of 1974. She is now a candidate for the degree of the Doctor of Philosophy in the Dept, of Sociology at LSU.

285 EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT

Candidate: Kaaturl Das Gupta

Major Field: Sociology

Title of Thai*: A Typological Analyale of Collective Political Violence

Approved:

Protestor and Chairman

Dean of the Gradual School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

Date of Examination:

November 20, 1978