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The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Foreign Intervention

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The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Foreign Intervention "THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT” A thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University A* In partial fulfilment of The Requirements for The Degree fOL\ Master of Science In Political Science By Dina Dawud Rantisi San Francisco. California August 2019 CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL I certify that I have read The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Foreign Intervention in the Arab- Israeli Conflict by Dina Dawud Rantisi, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree: Master of Science in Political Science at San Francisco State University. “THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT” Dina Dawud Rantisi San Francisco, California 2019 The purpose of this paper s to determine whether or not the influence and involvement by countries outside a conflict are helpful or detrimental to those directly involved. The problem in this scenario was the multitude of parties and underlining ulterior motives each may bring to the table. In other words, the Arab-Israeli conflict was not only a struggle between the two sides but rather a debate inclusive of countries with unique approaches and, unfortunately, the lack of a single compromising resolution. The approaches included proposed solutions such as the two-state solution, 2+1 solution, the multilateral solution, the one-state solution and the ultimate deal. Not one of these solutions worked for the nearly 70-year old conflict between the two nations of people. This paper concludes that the best course of action is to encourage the countries and their people to work together and only together, ignoring any outside parties that will likely halt the peace process and potentially further ignite a near century long pattern of war and conflict. I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis. Date iv TABLE OF CONTENTS: 1. Introduction.....................................................................................................................1 1.1 Background....................................................................................................... 1 2. Literature Review.......................................................................................................... 7 2.1 Structure and Scope of the Literature Review................................................7 3. History of Superpowers’ Involvement........................................................................ 8 3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 8 3.2 British Involvement..........................................................................................9 3.3 Soviet Union / Russian Involvement ........................................................... 23 3.4 United States Involvement ............................................................................25 4 Reasons for the Failure of the Two-State Solution........................................................ 27 4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................ 27 4.2 The Appeal of the Two-State Solution ........................................................28 4.3 The Failure of the Two-State Solution.........................................................30 4.4 Alternative Solutions to the Two-State Solution........................................ 34 5 Recommendations of What the Superpowers Should Have Done................................42 5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................42 5.2 Great B ritain...................................................................................................42 5.3 The United States...........................................................................................46 5.4 Current Policy and the Future....................................................................... 49 6 Conclusion......................................................................................................................... 51 6.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................51 6.2 Lessons Learned ............................................................................................ 52 6.3 A Flexible Solution........................................................................................54 6.4 Concluding Remarks......................................................................................58 7 References ......................................................................................................................... 59 1 CHAPTER 1: Introduction 1.1 Background The Arab-Israeli conflict has a very long history. The conflict began well before the state of Israel was created in 1948. Beginning in the 1890s, and in the decades that followed, Jewish immigration to the British mandate of Palestine increased exponentially as a consequence of the growth in pogroms and expulsions across Europe.1 Later, as anti- Semitism and fascism gained ground across European states, the movement for a specifically designated Jewish state gathered pace, with the 1917 Balfour Declaration representing the first hope that a Jewish homeland and sanctuary would be established.2 At the time that the 1948 partition was established, the population of the region was 1.9 million, with 68% of the population from Arab background, and the remaining 32% of Jewish origin.3 However, the partition plan, approved by the United Nations, designated 56% of the land to the Jewish population, with the remainder going to the Arabs.4 Following the resulting war, Israel essentially gained control over 78% of the partitioned land. The Six Day War precipitated in 1967, led to unification of Jerusalem, and the creation of the so-called green line,’ which delineates the border between Arab and Israeli lands.5 The resolution of the Six Day War was driven by Resolution 242, drafted and agreed by the United Nations, but peace was not forthcoming, as evidenced by continued clashes, most notably the Yom Kippur war of 1973.6 The intervening period has witnessed continued conflict as well as numerous stalled or failed attempts at achieving peace in the region. A key event in the history of the conflict was the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords, which represent the first framework for the 1 Bickerton, Ian J. The Arab-Israeli conflict: a history. Reaktion Books, 2009, p. 3 2 Ovendale, Ritchie. The Origins o f the Arab Israeli Wars. Routledge, 2015, 8 3 Ibid, 10 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid, 12 6 Ibid. 2 Palestinians to become a self-govemed people.7 It is important to note that Oslo Accords did not guarantee an ndependent Palestinian state, but rather outlined the parameters by which the Palestinians would be able to live in territory that would gradually be loosened from Israeli jurisdiction. The process would stop at Palestinian Statehood, however after seven years of meetings and conferences over peace talks, the Oslo agreements came to an end with the second intifada.8 Oslo was widely lauded as a significant step forward in the pathway towards peace. It represented the first official tabling of a proposed two-state solution to the conflict, but to date, in spite of some progress made at Camp David, Taba and the Annapolis Conferences, prospects for resolution to the problem remain low.9 Meanwhile, the region is overwhelmed by considerable economic challenges and troubles which are worsening the effects of partition, especially for the Palestinian people.10 The population for both Palestinians and Israelis increased during the years from 1990 to 1995.11 There were 3,946,700 Israelis in 1990 and jumped to 4,522,300 in 1995 while the Palestinians’ population was at 875,000 and five years later was at 1,090,000.12 Although, both populations grew rapidly, the Israelis made strict restrictions on economic policy, which included “foreign trade, research and training, land, agricultural production and the use of water.”13 In economic terms, the two major disputed territories, Gaza and the West Bank, have grown, in population, at disproportionate rates and with Israeli sanctions one of the reasons for the significant 7 El-Hasan, Hasan Afif. Israel or Palestine? Is the Two-State Soulution Already Dead? Algora Publishing, 2010, p. 54. 8 Ibid 9 Ibid 10 Daniel C. Kurtzer et al., The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989—2011 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), p. 201 11 Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society. Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre- 1948 to the Present. Ed. by Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz, Brandeis University Press, Waltham, Mass., 2008. (pp.571-572); Berman Jewish Data Bank; 12 Ibid 13 Hawari, Mahmoud. Fighting Palestinian Poverty: A Survey of the Economic and Social Impact of the Israelis Occupation on the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. War on Want, 2003 impoverishment of the Palestinian people. According to estimates reported by Daniel Kurtzer and colleagues, while 18% of the population of the Israeli-controlled West Rank currently lives below the poverty line, the equivalent figure for the population of Palestinian Gaza is more than double that figure, at around 38%.14 Furthermore, while statistics suggest that around 9-10% of West Bankers are unemployed, the unemployment figure in Gaza is estimated
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