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Book Reviews / Iran and the Caucasus 12 (2008) 407-410 407 Vali Nasr, The Shi‘a Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, New York: “W. W. Norton”, 2007, 310 pp., ISBN 978-0-393-06211-3, 978- 0-393-06211-3 paperback. The Shi‘a Revival is a New York Times Bestseller that will appeal to a wide audience—professors, policy makers, and popular readers alike. In it, Vali Nasr sets forth to explain “why there is a Shi‘a-Sunni conflict, why has it become more salient of late, and what it will mean for both the fu- ture of the Middle East and the Muslim world’s relations with the West” (p. 28). He succeeds on the first two counts, although it is yet to be seen if he is correct on the last. Nasr is one of the world’s foremost scholars on the Middle East. He was born in Iran, but lives in the United States, where he teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School in the United States; he is a Senior Adjunct Fellow on the Middle East at the Council of Foreign Relations, and Sen- ior Fellow at the Belfar Center of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Nasr has written numerous books and articles, mostly focusing on the Middle East and South Asia. In the first two chapters, the author gives an account of the rise and development of Shi‘a Islam, as well as an explanation of the differences between Shi‘ism and Sunnism, and between Shi‘ism and Sufism. As a ba- sic English-language introduction to Shi‘ism, there may not be a better one-stop breviary. In the third chapter, Nasr speaks of the rise and de- cline of Arab nationalism, arguing that it has lost its appeal as a driving force in Middle Eastern politics. This sets the stage for Chapter Four, in which Nasr describes the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini. He tells the story of the philosopher and jurist Mehdi Haeri Yazdi, who visited Khomeini one night during the years of the Iran-Iraq war. Haeri found his old teacher Khomeini alone, on a rug before a small pool. Haeri ex- pressed his concern about the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Muslims at the hands of other Muslims. Khomeini’s reply was: “Do you also criticize God when he sends an earthquake?” (p. 120). Haeri, in shock at Khomeini’s implicit comparison of himself to God, got up and left the room never to visit Khomeini again. In another vignette, Nasr tells the story of a parliamentary deputy who asked Khomeini if he was the Twelfth Imam. After Khomeini did not answer, the MP repeated the question, at which point Khomeini refused once again to deny that he was the promised Mahdi. These stories, interpolated by his commen- tary, set forth Nasr’s view that, while outsiders might see the leader of the Iranian Revolution as the epitome of traditionalism, in reality Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008 DOI: 10.1163/157338408X406164 408 Book Reviews / Iran and the Caucasus 12 (2008) 407-410 Khomeini’s Shi‘ism is a historical and doctrinal aberration. However, in several points, at least with regard to Khomeini’s metaphoric answer to the question about Muslims slaughtering each other, Nasr’s interpreta- tions look biased. It is hardly possible that Khomeini could compare himself to God, although in the case of the Mahdi such implications might exist, indeed. The answer of Khomeini had a transparent explana- tion, namely, that he considered the war and all post-Revolution bru- talities the result of God’s Will, of divine predestination, like an earth- quake. It is obvious that Haeri Yazdi’s protest was, rather, an emotional reaction, influenced by his personal preoccupation towards Khomeini. In Shi‘a contexts, Khomeini polished his Shi‘a image. However, out- side of Shi‘a contexts, he sought to appeal to Sunnis: “Khomeini’s ambi- tions also extended beyond Shi‘ism. He wanted to be accepted as the leader of the Muslim world” (p. 137). Even his anti-Americanism, argues Nasr, was primarily a by-product of his ambition to win the Sunnis to his leadership. As a result of Khomeini’s rise to prominence, the Sunni world awakened. The House of Saud promoted and mobilised Sunni fundamentalism as a counter to Shi‘a fundamentalism. They worked closely with the Wahhabi ulema to build mosques and seminaries, and to mobilise preachers, writers, and activists who would reduce or elimi- nate the influence of Shi‘ism in general and Iran in particular. In Chapter Six, “The Tide Turns”, Nasr recounts the narrative of the fall of Saddam’s regime. This shifted the balance of power in the favour of the Shi‘a, opened up Iraq’s seminaries and holy cities, brought in Shi‘a pilgrims to Najaf and Karbala, and contributed to the rise of the Grand Ayatollah Sayyid ‘Ali al-Sistani. Sistani is the hero of this chapter and, indeed, of the book. Nasr describes him: “Sistani is from the old school. He is first and foremost a scholar, intelligent and well read, with a keen appreciation for history and a gift for seeing the big picture. He rose in the ranks in Najaf owing to the quality of his scholarship” (p. 171). But more importantly, unlike Khomeini, he sees the ulema primar- ily as teachers and defenders of Islam. For Nasr, Sistani is the single most important figure in the Muslim world in that he is capable of building consensus, supports accountable and representative govern- ment, and holds an approach to politics that “stands as the most com- pelling and most credible challenge that fundamentalism and other forms of authoritarianism have ever had to face” (p. 173). Sistani is the leader most likely to work with the United States and support democ- ratic change. In the rest of the book, Nasr continues his narrative of the post-Sad- dam Middle East. He chronicles the early days of the U.S. invasion, .

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