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The Union Jack on the Upper Yangzi: The Treaty Port of Chongqing, 1 89 1-1 943

James J. Matthews

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Programme in History York University Toronto, Ontario

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by James J. Matthews a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of York University in partial fulfillrnent of the requirernents for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

There has been much debate over the question of how great the

economic influence of foreign powers such as Britain was in China in

the early days of China's modernization efforts, in the late nine-

teenth and early twentieth centuries. An understanding of Sino-

British interactions in this period continues to evolve, particularly

- at the economic level. The British attempt to penetrate the Chinese

goods and services market was based on the "unequal treaties" and a

network of treaty ports. Shanghai, the leading treaty port, has re-

ceived the most analysis, yet its position within the whole Chinese

region was fairly peripheral. Another way to consider this question

is to look at the foreign community in Chongqing, a minor treaty port

opened late, through the records they themselves left. The story

that these records show is one in which the foreign cornmunity never

close to dominating the situation economically, much less political-

ly or culturally. The port's "development" along the lines of twenti- v

eth-century Westernization waç hamstrung by its geographical iso-

lation and the difficult shipping links to the downriver ports before the belated introduction of steamships. Nearly every commercial opening achieved by British merchants was sooner or later reclaimed by their resourceful Chinese cornpetitors. The power of China's indigenous trade systern outweighed the weaknesses of its central government. Chongqing, though not similar to the leading treaty

ports, is more representative of China as a whole in the marginal position of its foreign presence. v i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the supervision of Dr. Bernard Luk and the rest of my cornmittee. I also want to thank Dr. Bettina Bradbury, whose persistence kept the project going; the London Goodenough

Trust, which enabled me to do research in London; John Swire &

Sons archivist Charlotte Haviland, who not only granted me access to that company's records, but provided some useful extra sources; and J.H. Matthews, for his continuing suggestions and valuable lay- man's perspective. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 4

Chapter 1: Sino-Western Commerce in the Nineteenth Century 42 (a) The Treaties of Nanjing and Tianjin (b) The Expanding Treaty Port Network 63 (c) The Chefoo Convention 71

Chapter 2: Nineteenth-Century Chongqing (a) Chongqing in Nineteenth-Century Sichuan (b) Trade and Finance in Chongqing

Chapter ?- Opening Chongqing (a) The Consular Residents (b) Archibald Little and the Kuling Crisis (c) The Opening Process

Chapter 4: The Missionary Presence in Sichuan (a) The 1886 Crisis (b) Unrest at the Turn of the Century (c) Social Issues

Chapter 5: Foreigners and Chongqing's Economic Development 195 (a) The New Treaty Port (b) Concessions and lmperial Rivalry 222 (c) The Advent of Steam Shipping 241 (d) The End of the Imperia! Order 257

Chapter 6: Development after 19 1 1 (a) Revolution and Financial Crisis (b) Sichuan's Descent into Warlordism (c) Economic Development in Republican Chongqing viii

(d) The Liu Xiang Regime (e) The Chiang Kai-Shek Regime

Chapter 7: Foreigners in Republican Chongqing (a) New Difficulties (b) The May Fourth Movement and the Mid-1920's Crisis (c) The Later Years

Conclusion

Bibliography

Appendix: Statistical Tables LIST OF TABLES

Chongqing Foreign Customs Overall Trade

la Transit-Pass lmports to & Exports from Sichuan, 1875-90 1b Chongqing Foreign Customs lmports & Exports, 1891-1 931 1c Transit-Pass Imports frorn Chongqing, 1 896-1 904 Id Transit-Pass Imports frorn Chongqing, 1906-1 91 9 1e Foreign Transit-Paçs lmports from Chongqing, 1920-30 1f Chongqing Foreign Customs lmports & Exports, 1935-40

Chongqing Foreign Customs Cotton Goods Imports

2a Transit-Pass Cotton Goods by Category, 1880-1 890 2b Yarn and Raw Cotton by Country, 189 1-1 904 2c Foreign Yarn, 1905-30

Chongqing Foreign Customs Opium Exports

3a By Value, 1895-1 904 3b By Weight, 1896-1 91 1

4 Chongqing Foreign Customs Bullion lmports & Exports, 1891 -1 91 9 433

Chongqing Foreign Customs Shipping Volume

Sa Shipping Entries & Clearances, 1 89 1-1 91 8 Sb By Country of Charterer, 1891 -1 905 SC 1935-40 Chongqing Foreign Custums Revenue

6a Foreign Customs Revenue in Taels, 1 891-1 931 6b In Dollars, 1930-40

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Map 1 : Chinese Treaty Ports

Map 2: Southwest China

Map 3: Chongqing & Its Neighbors MAP 1 : CHINESE TREATY PORTS

Treaty Port Openeci Nl N G BO Colony MACAO 1842 Treaty Port Opened Leasehold Dalian 1858-65 CHEF00 Treaty Port Opened Weihaiwei 1876-1 907 Yichang

(From Appendix A of Stanley Wright's Hart and the Chlnese CustomsmsNote: Only regular ports opened by treaty where a foreign customs house was opened are shown- The openings of Nanjing and Qiongzhou were delayeâ past 1858-65; Chefoo was opened in place of nearby Dengrhou; Tanshui and Tainan. dong with the rest of Taiwan. were medto Japan in 1895.) -Yichang Chongqing-r"O

Changsha

fengyue & Sirnao CANTON

HONG KONG MAP 2: SOUTHWEST CHINA CHONGQING &

(1 : 30,000)

(From a map supplied by Stephen Endicott and one in the Imperia1 Maritime Customs* 1882-91 Decennial Report, beiween pp. 108 and 109.)

Naval Canteens Foreign Union Church International Hospital Introduction

The problern of evaluating Britain's long-term commercial legacy

in China is even more complex than similar questions regarding ter-

ritories where the British Empire had a more direct presence. In

India, for example, the British not only dominated trade but for the greater part of two centuries also ruled and administered the region

in a top-down manner. Ultimately direct rule would end in national-

ist resistance and independence in the twentieth century. Dominions

like Canada and Australia, created in Britain's image, developed local autonomy, achieving real independence gradually and indirectly.

The beneficiaries of the British Empire included Britain's economic interests, exploiting a London-centred commercial structure extending to al1 parts of the world. In an empire as immense as China, foreign powers had no illusions about attempting direct rule, with its accompanying expenses and responsibilities, but hoped to use their commercial power, backed by latent military clout, to effect a simi- lady favorable trade system. Since the Ming era the Chinese state had discouraged contact between its subjects and foreigners, commercial and othennrise, and legal contacts were kept under strict regulation. "The rulers of the

Ming Dynasty were profoundly anti-commercial in outlook and they attempted to restrict this rich and variegated trade by forcing it within the frarnework of the tributary system."' This reflected their concern to ensure that overall control of externaf trade remained Sn the hands of Beijing, not the foreign or Chinese traders. In the nime- teenth century this put Beijing on a collision course with the movement toward greater, freer international trade found in the most highly developed Western economies. By the 1860's, after waging two wars with China largely over trade concessions, the West had achieved a major yet incomplete victory: the Qing regime and the

Chinese merchant class still exerted some clout in defining the terms of the foreign ascendancy. This reflected the fact that

--.- 1 . Uoyd E. Eastman, Famiiy, Fields and Ancestors: Constancy and Change in China% Social and Economic History, 7 550- 7 949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 98S), p. 123. a 6

foreign interests, unable to rule China directly, had to work through

Beijing; and the continuing strength and adaptability of much of Chi-

na's interna! trade system. The new systern of Sino-foreign rela-

tions was based on a far-reaching web of treaty ports, which in the

century of their existence actually managed to combine Sino-foreign

coexistence with a great degree of continued separation.

These commercial centres had some degree of uniformity in man-

agement and common central institutions such as the Imperia1 Mari-

time Customs, which collected the treaty ports' custorns revenue.

Originally rnanaged by a largely foreign staff, the foreign customs,

like the post office and the salt gabelle administration, was an institution created during the Self-Strengthening Movement, carrying uniform civil administration in its respective field to each province of China. Its efficiency and freedorn from corruption made it an important revenue source for Beijing, but it was later charged with handling indemnities and repaying foreign loans, rnaking it a symbol 7

of British irnperialism. But the treaty ports also varied greatly in

the size of their Chinese and foreign populations, the degree of cen- trality in their respective regional economies, the size and nature of their commerce, and the length of time they had been open. Some,

principally Shanghai, became great ports of central importance to

international trade, with thousands of foreign residents. On the other hand, Chongqing, the subject of this thesis, was opened much later and more gradually than the principal ports and was isolated by geography, lacking direct contact with ocean trade routes. Its foreign community, moreover, was dominated by missionaries and remained srnall until near the very end of the treaty-port system.

These special factors, along with the political vicissitudes of China in the early twentieth century, were central in shaping the impact of

Chongqing's foreign presence.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the degree to which

British commerce realized its goals in Chongqing, by evaluating its 8 strengths and weaknesses as seen through British eyes. It will examine what role the British merchants had, if any, in the long-term remaking of the city and its region along twentieth-century economic lines, into a vibrant commercial and industrial centre in the developing province of Sichuan, which blended many aspects of Chinese and Western economic structure. It will show that British trade, from even this perspective, was marginal and mostly of indirect importance in this modernization process. The foreign presence was not the dominant factor in this economic transformation, or even a leading one.

For various reasons that will be discussed, the process of foreign-influenced economic change in Chongqing and Sichuan was late in starting, slow in getting undeway, and soon superseded by the shock of the 1 9 1 1 revolution, the trauma of warlordism, the piecemeal changes of the Nanjing decade, and finally the regional inversion of World War II, when this peripheral city became the seat of 9

China's central governrnent. This work focuses on foreigners, most-

ly Englishmen, in and around Chongqing. Chongqing's foreign community was a mixed lot: many were there because they had failed to find their position in the downriver ports. Even those who understood the province's economic situation were often unable to find the financial backing to exploit it. Unlike major ports such as

Shanghai, missionaries far outnumbered businessmen. These sources are largely limited to the English language, a restriction which limits the scope of conclusions but also permits an assessrnent of Brit- ish involvement in the city and region. The experience of the British community in one especially unique treaty port should not be considered representative of the whole treaty-port network. Yet the conclusions about the British legacy in this particular city as seen by

British eyes give part of the whole story of the creation of modern

China, complementing the better-known Chinese and Western examinations of the major treaty ports. 10

This thesis is the story of the relative impotence of Britain's di-

rect mercantile power in Chongqing and Sichuan. But the story be-

gins with war. Starting in 1839, Britain and other foreign powers

used their rnilitary and naval strength, both in direct warfare and

indirect threats, to extract commercial concessions from the weak

Qing Dynasty. The resulting "unequal treaties" allowed foreign merchants, mostly British, to establish solid footholds for the China trade in the form of treaty ports. Encouraged by Westminster, they hoped to use these bases to gain a significant share of the Chinese markets, as was being done in many parts of the world, through the sale of exports produced through home industries and in colonial bases, using vertical integration and long-range transport. To Chi- na's Imperia1 governrnent, militarily outclassed by the foreign powers, resisting concerted foreign demands for concessions was a considerable challenge. Yet the power of China's domestic mercantile system was very great, especially in the Chinese interior far from the major treaty ports. The Chinese structure of guilds, brokerage, 11 finance and trade, which ernphasized mutual benefits as much as competition, continued to operate largely as before, adapting somewhat to Western commercial processes but limiting foreign en- croachrnent and frustrating the British merchants' ambitions of selling directly in the heartland of China.

Beijing regularly made several of the demanded concessions, in theory providing British business with opportunities to achieve economic dominance. But Chinese business then adapted to the new order, gradually clawing back whatever cornpetitive advantage the foreigners enjoyed at first. The length of this process varied, but the outcome rarely did. Only in a few cases were foreigners able to, at least ternporarily, thwart Chinese competition. One of these exceptions was kerosene, with its capital-intensive production and processing infrastructure; another, to a lesser extent, was cigarettes, due to the determined, competent marketing carnpaigns by the foreign companies. In both cases vertical integratîon and econo- 12 mies of scale gave Western firms an important advantage. In major fields such as Cotton goods, however, no long-term breakthrough was achieved, and British merchants faced strong Chinese competition even in markets close to the treaty ports.

Sichuan's geographic isolation, with its attendant high transportation costs, worked toward preserving Chinese commercial dominance. In cities like Chongqing almost al1 goods, even foreign imports, were handled by Chinese merchants. Both foreign and Chinese businessmen recognized the need for improvements in steamship and railway transportation to develop trade both within Sichuan and between this province and the rest of China and the world. By the time that these modernizations were finally underway, in the twentieth century, two new factors played a strong role in limiting the successful entry of British capital. Firstly, the intense nationalism of many citizens of republican China was often turned against foreign business, putting it in a defensive position. Secondly, Chinese capi- 13 ta1 had developed an integrai presence in the nation's economic modernization. In this situation, British commercial gains in Sichuan were smalfer and more ephemeral than in much of downriver China.

Nineteenth-century Chongqing was a local commercial and financial centre serving Chinese merchants and bankers--inciuding a large number of nonBichuanese, particularly at the higher levels- in the relatively prosperous western province of Sichuan. As a result of the Chefoo convention and the Chongqing convention, this city was "opened" as a treaty port in 1891 and remained open until the end of the whole extraterritoriality system in 1943. It was never one of the leading treaty ports, and the foreign population remained small until near the end. Nor was it totally integrated into the treaty-port network, due largely to the mountainous terrain that separated Sichuan from downriver China, forcing a great degree of - economic self-suff iciency. The provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan and

Guizhou were connected to the rest of China only by mountainous 14 borders and difficult transportation routes and, despite having some indigenous trade with the downriver provinces, were to a great extent a self-sufficient entity. Chongqing can be seen as a Janus city within China: it has always had one face looking downstream to the

Yangzi Valley trading network, and the other looking inland to western China's regional economy.

Even a question as simple as the size of Chongqing's foreign cornmunity, likely to reflect British economic strength in broad measure, resists easy answers. (Figures for Sichuan's overall population in this period are also highly uncertain.) Specific population figures for this group are hard to find. Part of the reason is the difficulty in defining the comrnunity's borders. Only Japanese residents lived in a designated settlement. Few foreigners resided in Chongqing itself.

After the first decade of opening, most lived on the south bank of the Yangzi River across from the main city. Several were scattered around the city's other suburbs. Many were marginal members of the 15

Chongqing foreign community, living close enough to the city for frequent visits but not for regular interaction with the other foreigners. At any rate, al1 but a minority of Sichuan's foreign population Iived at a considerable distance from Chongqing, in other cities such as Chengdu or in villages. Most of the available figures account for the foreign population of the whole province. This group, which numbered in the hundreds, was mostly missionaries in rural Sichuan.

The important fact is that until 1937 Chongqing's foreign community clearly numbered no more than a few hundred people, far smaller than equivalent figures in the major treaty ports.

The question arises of the degree to which the West and its commerce "dominatedn China in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Certainly, the development of ports like Shanghai was a direct product of Sino-foreign interaction and is an important part of China's history. But there was another China, a seemingly self- reliant rural, inland nation of peasants and scholar-officiais dorni- 16

nated by interna1 traditions, conflicts and changes, where foreign

influences remained marginal. Here most people continued their ex-

istence to a great degree as in previous centuries, enduring unpre- dictable hawests and periodic disorder, sometimes indirectly influenced by foreigners whose direct role was usually marginal. And

many Chinese were "in-between, " their lives affected in small ways but not fundarnentally altered by the foreign economic and cultural presence.

In several respects the relatively unknown Chongqing forms a dramatic contrast to the leading treaty port, Shanghai. Its isolated position and late opening prevented foreign domination of the city, much less the surrounding region. Until the republican era companies like Jardine, Matheson; Butterfield, Swire; and the Hongkong and

Shanghai Bank saw the new treaty port as beyond the Iimits of ac- ceptable risk and for that reason did not make significant investments there. By the time OF Cbngqing's 1891 opening, China's 17 major British firms were becoming more cornfortable and less ad- venturous than in earlier decades, shifting their new activities to different sectors of the existing treaty-port economy, even to de- veioping China's natural resources and making loans to the Imperia1 government. Foreigners in Chongqing lacked the "critical mass" of the large settlements, in several ways: their community was too small for economic leadership, self-government or serious conflict between respective national communities, though unrest sometimes erupted. Such a situation bred defensiveness, and the anti-foreign feelings of some Chinese could seem more palpable here. Economic cornpetition from Sichuanese was even stronger than downriver, as these circumstances, geographic and otherwise, preserved Chinese advantages while minimizing foreign advantages such as ready capital. Some Chinese businessmen here were quick to emulate the foreigners, combining the most practical business methods of East and

West. On the few occasions when the British achieved a lead, the

Chinese negated it before long. Minor treaty ports like Chongqing 18

were arguably closer to the "real" China and Britain's experience

there should be compared with the larger centres, in order to evalu-

ate her commercial performance in these different circumstances.

The British residents of Chongqing in the period between 1891

and 1 943--whether businessmen, rnissionaries, diplomats, sailors or others-left their own records of the foreign experience in China.

Some of these obsewers only stayed briefly and give a picture of the

place at a specific time, but others had the time to gain the depth of

understanding that can corne from long residence. Theirs is not a story of arriva1 and conquest, or one of straightforward defeat. It is a story of CO-existence in something of a standoff, with relative power fluctuating and neither side truly able to dominate, though in the long run this game favored the Chinese. It is not the story of foreigners in Hong Kong, Shanghai, or even Hankou. But it is part of the total story of Sino-foreign interaction. 19

The greater part of this work's source rnaterial is the records left by British subjects living in Chongqing, and aimost al1 of it is in

English. These records are concentrated in the 52-year period in which the port was open, a shorter time than the life span of most of the treaty ports but a period of fundamental change in Chinese civilization, reflected in the changes in Chongqing itself. In their own words and through their actions, the authors shed some light on the question of Britain's economic influence in the evolution of

Chongqing and Sichuan during the drastic changes in China from the

Qing Dynasty, through the 1911 revolution and the warlord period, into the time of the Nationalist-Communist struggles. Their perspective was informed by the "Whig history" school that emphasized linear, inevitable progress such as the shift from agriculture to industry, in a tradition different from the continuity-based Confucian scholarship and values of most Chinese. One must keep in mind that

Kenneth J. Beaton's Serving with the Sons of Shuh, for example, is a somewhat one-sided view of the interaction between Sichuanese and 20 foreigners, based on the missionary attempt to better the lives of the Chinese people.

Though sorne of the sources are translations of Chinese authon, they, like foreigners, can only give a somewhat limited view of the circurnstances examined in this study. The "unequal treaties" system irnposed on China by Britain and other nations has led some to the conclusion that the whole British presence was harmful to the people of China. Yet the Chongqing situation suggests that with a few exceptions, the British only managed a brief, partial penetration of inland China's markets and society. Britain's economic influence should be seen in two ways. On the one hand, there was the direct commercial impact of British merchants. But there was also the more gradua1 entry of Western methods of production and commerce, which Chinese businessmen adopted in varying degrees for their own enrichment, overcoming almost any temporary British advantage in trade and sewices. The profile of western China's foreign community changed over the years. Before 1891, of course, the British and other Westerners were still rare enough to be seen as curiosities by most Sichuanese.

In the first two decades of opening, though their presence was a factor in several riots, it was still minor. Contacts with Chinese society increased after 1911, partly because general interest in new ideas and foreign ways was increasing al1 over China. The nationalist movements of the 1 92OFs,with their attendant anti-foreign sen- timents and more assertive government policies, gave foreign cornmunities in Chongqing and the rest of China a defensiveness which they never completely lost. The story ends in the long war with

Japan, which transformed al1 of China and destroyed the last elements of the Sino-foreign order established in 1842.

The structure of this thesis addresses the question of how great a role British commerce played in western China's transition into 22 the twentieth century. The first part of this thesis will concern the process of opening Chongqing as a treaty port. The first and second chapters will respectively depict the situation of Bi'itain's Chinese commerce in the late nineteenth century, and the city of Chongqing and its place in the province of Sichuan at this time. The third chapter will concern the actual process of opening in the two decades after the Chefoo Convention.

The next part will concern the aftermath of opening. The fourth chapter will analyze Sichuan's missionary presence, which was much more sizable than its foreign business community. The subject of the fifth and sixth will be the history of Chongqing between 1891 and 1943, and the actual lirnited impact of the foreign presence.

(The latter will focus on the republican period.) The seventh will consider the defensive status of Chongqing's foreign residents after

191 1. The eighth will include an epilogue and state conclusions. 23

Historians continue to debate the nature of the West's short- term and long-term impact on China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. To what extent did Britain and the other foreign powers assist in the creation of modern China? The sources consulted re- ject the notion that the Chinese people were simply brought forward into the modern world by the foreign presence. The British, they argue, only had a limited effect on the Chinese economy.

Hosea Ballou Morse's three-volume International Relations of the

Chinese Empire , finished in 19 17, addresses the whole of Chinese diplornatic history between 1834 and 1 9 1 1. (His sympathies are shown by his volume subtitles: 1834 to 1 861 is "The Age of Con- flict," 1861 to 1893 "The Age of Submission," 1893 to 1911 "The

Age of Subjection." ) Essentially, this trilogy depicts a succession of intergovernmental political crises, particularly the background of the "unequal treaties," and does not study the commercial relations between Britain and China, except to the extent that they were the 24 subject of treaty negotiations. Despite its age, this source is valuable for the sheer volume of its detail.

John K. Fairbank, writing at the much later date of 1992, has argued:

Recent studies have rernade our image of imperialism in China. The Hobson-Lenin thesis at the turn of the century stressed the economic il1 effects of irnported foreign manufactures destroying native handicraft livelihood and of foreign finance ca pitalism impoverishing native governrnents. More recent research has led to a less stark economic picture, in which foreign trade, investment, and technology sometimes stimu- lated native growth and technological progress. Today's historians are more likely to stress the social disruption and psychological demoralization caused by foreign imperialism. In these dimensions the long-term foreign invasion of China proved to be a disaster so comprehensive and appalling that we are still incapable of fully describing it .... On balance I believe "imperialism" has become a catch-al1 terrn like "feu- dalism," too broad to accept or deny overall, more useful in adjectival form to characterize concrete situations. In any case, China's nineteenth-century troubles began at home with rebellion, not invasi~n.~

The contrast between the perspectives of Morse and Fairbank reflects the ongoing evolution of the question of the nature of Sino-

2. Fairbank, China: A New History (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1 992), pp. 188-9. foreign contacts.

Fairbank's synthesis is a China-wide generalization. The question to be examined here is the extent to which it appuies in Chong- qing during the latter's time as an open port. A partial answer is obtained by examining Britain's trade ambitions and results as seen in British accounts of their experience there, fully aciknowledging the limits placed on the scholarship by the lack of a direct Chinese perspective.

On the subject of the Chongqing treaty port itself, there are few

English-language publications. Most historical treatments of the

Western experience in China have naturally focused on the coastal ports in which the British presence was greatest, panicularly

Shanghai. For example, Tmde and Diplomacy on the China Coast, John

King Fairbank's authoritative account of the treaty-port system's origins in the 1 840's and early 1850's, is of necessity focused on 26 the early coastal ports. Our understanding of the foreign presence in

China has definitely also been shaped by studies of the colony Hong

Kong and the leading treaty port Shanghai.

Shanghai has been a particuiar focus for much of the historical research on this subject. Geography made it an ideal choice for an international centre of trade and cultural contacts. Occupying a sheltered coastal position near the mouth of the Yangzi and the southern end of the Grand Canal, in between northern and southern

China, it was emerging as one of China's leading ports even before

1839. After the Opium War Shanghai and Hong Kong became the bases for the leading British companies in China. Harurni Goto-Shi- bata's 1995 work Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 7 925-7 93 1 also deals with the extraterritorial system and the tense local relations between some foreign powers, encouraging Chinese efforts to play them off against each other. Not only were the Chinese divided by competing interests such as Nationalists, Communists, warlords and 27 merchants; the British community, like the Japanese, also experienced disco rd between the home government and its representatives, military forces, businessmen and the representatives of residents in

China.

Nicholas Clifford's 1991 work Spoilt Children of Empire depicts

Shanghai's foreign comrnunity as an autonomous world in itself, shaped by extraterritoriality. Its Municipal Council was elected by residents with a high combination of income and assets, ensuring effective control by British commercial interests. This local government was almost a state within a state, scarcely answerable to the Chinese or even to the British governrnent. Shanghai, Clifford remarks,

was also a city whose growth and advance seemed to point the way to China's future. Might Shanghai, under other circumstances, have played such a role in modern China? An unlikely expectation, Rhoads Murphey has argued; Shanghai, like the treaty ports in general, was simply an exotic growth on Chi- na's peripheiy that had little to do, for good or ill, with what was happening in the rest of China--the 'real" China of mar- 28

ket town and peasant ~illage.~

While Clifford differs from the Fairbank thesis that imperialisrn had

serious indirect effects on Chinese social stability, this idea does

match the marginal direct results of British business in Chongqing.

Sichuan's disorder in the early twentieth century was derived from the struggle between central government policy and regionalism and from warlordism far more than from the British presence, though the latter more than once provided the direct trigger for militant

actions such as riots and boycotts.

International Relations of the Chinese Empire is not the only source dealing with Sino-foreign diplomatic history. E.V.G. Kiernan's

1939 work British Diplomacy in China 7 880- 7 885 describes in great length both the existing Chinese trade system and the British diplomatic hierarchy which tried to prornote open access to it. Like

Morse's work, it benefits from its detail. P.D. Coates' 1998 work

3. Clifford, Spoîlt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Rev- olution of the 7 920s (Hanover: Middlebury College Press, 1 99 1 ), pp. 277-8. 29

The China Consuls is an invaluable general account of the British

diplomats who played a crucial role in China's foreign communities,

surveying al1 consulates including Chongqing and Chengdu.

Some Western historians have dealt with the region surrounding

Chongqing. S.A.M. Adshead's 1984 work Province and Politics in Late

lmperial China and Charles Herman Hedtke's 1 968 doctoral thesis

Reluctant Revolutionaries portray Sichuan in the final years of im-

perial rule. These deal with the "real" China's tendency to function

apart from the political world and resist change. The Qing Dynasty,

Adshead argues, was brought down by its own iinsuccessful efforts

to modernize.

Before the period 1898 to 191 1 Szechwan was the best province of a traditional empire; after it, it became the worst province of a half-modern republic. The pattern in both politics and ecology was one of disruptive moderni~ation.~

British commerce was peripheral to Adshead's Sichuan. Robert Kapp

depicts Sichuan under warlord rule in Szechwan and the Chinese Re-

4. S.A.M. Adshead, Province and Politics in Late lmperial China: Viceregal Govern- ment in Szechwan, 7898- 7 9 7 7 (London: Curzon Press, 1984), p. 2. public as well as the article "Chungking as a Center of Warlord

Power, 1 926-37," in the 1974 publication The Chinese City Between

Two Worlds. ln the article, he depicts Chinese cities like Chongqing

key points at which the quasi-feudal warlords tapped the flow of rural and commercial resources, and at the same time the centers of the warlords' drive toward econornic modernka- tion. The warlord, then, in the author's vision, was both a predator and an entrepreneur; and the interrelation of the two roles is developed with a nice touch of paradox?

Even under military rule, the traditional Sichuanese system of government continued to work in a largely similar way, with the militia taking over the bureaucratic role of the scholar elite. Such studies demonstrate how peripheral the foreign commercial presence was to the drarnatic events changing Sichuan during this period.

The works examined so far, with one exception, are essentially political in nature, with British commercial aspirations playing only a minor role. Only Kiernan goes to a considerable length to describe

-- 5. Mark Elvin, "Introduction," The Chinese City Between Two Worlds, ed. Elvin & G. William Skinner (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford Universiv Press, 1974), p. 1 2. 31 both the existing Chinese trade system, in addition to the British diplomatic hierarchy trying to promote open access to it.

in writing the 1988 work Family, Fields and Ancestors: Constan- cy and Change h China's Social and Economic History, 7 550-7 949,

Lloyd E. Eastman has gathered together the work of many scholars to produce a broad picture of conditions in China before, during and after the Qing era. Some historians have evaluated the Chinese economy from its difficult state in the 1930's and judged backward, resulting in an exaggeration of the region's overall poverty. In addition, there has been a tendency to emphasize China's political history, particularly upheavals, at the price of misunderstanding or even ignoring economic history. Eastman, however, manages to give us a better picture than before of the Chinese economy, and a more positive one. He demonstrates the ways in which the Empire's interna1 system of trade was more robust and less suited to foreign entre- preneurs than many Western observers believed. His synthesis fits 32

Fairbank's model in accounting for the positive results of foreign trade as well as the negative ones.

Rhoads Murphey's essay 'The Treaty Ports and China's Modern- ization," reprinted in The Chinese City Between Two Worlds, deals with the foreign business community's paradoxical relationship with the Chinese region, taking a broad view of Sino-foreign contacts. He points out the differences between the British experience in China and in South and Southeast Asia, where contact led to colonization.

China, he argues, enjoyed relative prosperity, despite a levelling off after 1850. (The economic downturn that accompanied the Taiping and other rebellions was recovered from only gradually.) And he emphasizes the economy in the 'real China," not in the largely unrepre- sentative treaty ports. Foreign statistics can be misleading in their focus on only a srnall part of the Chinese nation. Foreigners, despite the treaty concessions, remained practically excluded from some important sectors of the Chinese economy. The history of the treaty ports is also distorted by concentration on the five largest ones, which Murphey observes carried out the greater part of their trade among themselves.

Late traditional China, he argues, was strong enough politically to prevent a colonial takeover, but not strong enough to carry out the reforms demanded by twentieth-century conditions. Economically she was even stronger. Her merchants easily resisted al1 but the most limited Western econornic penetration, and so for a long time she failed to appreciate the extent of her own need for technical innovation. The result was that confrontation with the West was irritating rather than devastating; it "sharpened the Chinese sense of identity rather than destroying it?

Andrea Lee McElderry's 1976 article "Shanghai Old-Style Banks

(Ch'ien-Chuang) 1860-1 935" surveys an important facet of the Chi- nese economy, which managed to deal with the new British commercial presence. She shows how the qianzhuang turned the foreign concessions to their advantage, not only surviving but prospering through the late nineteenth century, until the new foreign-patterned yinhang banks emerged. Instead of irnposing a new financial order

6. Elvin, op. cit., p. 1 1. 34 on China, Western financiers had to work through rniddlemen such as compradors and qianzhuang to achieve indirect minor importance in the Chinese economy. Both the capital-rich British and the capital- poor Chinese benefited from the presence of this intermediary group.

Frances Wood's 1 998 work No Dogs and Not Many Chinese: Treaty

Port Life in China '1 843-7 943 relies on the written records of Brit- ish residents of the treaty ports to put a human face on their lives, using their own words to illuminate the background of war, political activity, diplomacy, business, mission work, and tourism in this period. She observes:

The treaty poits were established to promote trade but trade, eventually, had to find its own way. Despite the irritation of their presence, the Chinese often managed to control the excessive ambitions of foreign traders. This was partly due to the self-sufficient economy.... lt was also partly due to a greater intelligence than most merchants would have credited to the Chinese governments of the period.

This intelligence was seen in "divide and rule" policies such as sharing out regional railway monopolies among different foreign 35 consortia, ensuring continuing rivalry. This pattern has reappeared in recent years, after communist China's restoration of access to foreign capitaL7 Her work shows an almost complete lack of contact between foreign merchants and Chinese in large settelements like Shanghai, though this was less true in Chongqing.

Another general field is economic history. A view of China as a whole is taken in Jurgen Osterhammel's "British Business in China,

1860s-1950s," a chapter in the 1989 publication British Business in

Asia since 7 860. There are also studies of specific British companies in China. Patrick Brodie's 1990 work Crescent over Cathay depicts the Chinese operations of the originally Anglo-German Brunner

& Mond--later Imperia1 Chernical Industries--which obtained a consistent share of China's fertilizer import trade. Zhang Zhiongli, Chen

Zengnian, and Yao Xinrong tell the story of Butterfield-Swire from a

Chinese perspective in the undated but recent The Swire Group in Old

- - 7. Frances Wood, No Dogs and Not Many Chinese: Treaty Port Life in Ghina 1843- 1943 (London: John Murray, 1 998), p. 302. 36

China. Sherman Cochran's 1980 work Big Business in China de-

scribes the long competition between the foreign firm British-

American Tobacco and the Chinese firm Nanyang for a greater share

of China's cigarette market, uncharacteristic in that the foreign

Company almost consistently had the upper hand. Each of these

works, like rnany secondary sources, gives a small but important

part of the full picture of the foreign experience in China. But they

have little to Say about the role of foreign merchants in Chongqing,

except forThe Swire Group in Old China, which discusses the cornpa-

ny's policies here in the changing circumstances of the 1920's and

1930's.

What has prompted this study of British trade records in the region of Chongqing is the realization that available research into the city's open-port period has emphasized the political, without detailed study of economic and commercial activity. British merchant voices from the period give a picture of Chongqing's commerce from 37 a foreign perspective, suggesting the conclusion that direct commercial contact with Western China only benefited British interests on a minor scale. Some social ramifications also followed from the foreign presence, especially the educational and medical activities of rnissionaries, which had little connection to foreign commerce.

The most important material for this study, of course, is in primary sources. Much of this is archival material, and the records left by the successive British Consular Residents and Consuls in Chong- qing and Chengdu are of particular importance. These records are of their correspondence with London, the Beijing's British Legation, and

Britain's Consulate-General in Shanghai. They are of course limited to the perspective of the British government's representatives.

They cannot directly depict the viewpoint of Chinese or even of ordinary British residents. But they are central to understanding Chong- qing and Sichuan as the leading foreigners saw them. 38

Much information about Chongqing's trade comes from the (Impe- rial) Maritime Customs. They include the annual trade reports issued by the Chongqing Commissioner, and Chongqing's contribution to the organization's five ten-year reports. These reports are naturally focused on commercial developments, but also provide a wide range of local information. The statistical publications only rneasure trade conducted under the foreign customs' supervision, whose proportion to the region's total trade was always small. But the figures for this commerce reflect broad trends in the overall picture of

Chongqing trade. They require careful interpretation. The records do not make clear in themselves whether the goods involved were Chi- nese- or British-owned, though other evidence such as the port's small number of British merchants is telling. Chinese merchants often used the foreign customs, gaining access to the new transit- pass system in 1876 and benefiting from the system's extension to domestic goods at the turn of the century. British interests seem unlikely to have owned any but an insignificant amount of Chinese 39 goods, though they might charter junks or own steamships carrying them.

The John Swire Archives contain various correspondence related to Butterfield, Swire's business in Chongqing. The archives at

Friends House contain material on the Quaker mission in Chongqing, particularly the International Friends Institute. Back issues of the

Shanghai-based North-China Herald, to the extent that they deal with Chongqing, reflect the perspective of the downriver foreign community over the entire period in question.

In studying the life of foreigners in the treaty ports, there is no substitute for the records they themselves kept. Primay sources include the firsthand accounts of Westerners, particularly English- men, who came to Chongqing. One of thern is Archibald J. Little, himself a character in the drama, who wrote Through the Yang-tsze

Gorges. Thomas W. Blakiston's Five Months on the Yang-tsze and 40

William Gill's The River of Golden Sand describe their exploration

of the region of Western China well before Chongqing's opening, in-

dicating some of the challenges to developing its trade. George

Ernest Morrison's An Australian in China and W.E. Geil's A Yankee on

the Yangtze describe the recently opened port. Several missionaries

also published accounts of their experiences in Chongqing and its vi-

cinity. Trade missions to Chonqging by the Blackburn and Lyons

chambers of commerce published full reports on the city and the re-

gional economy. Some of the stories in W. Somerset Maugham's an-

thology On a Chinese Screen describe Chongqing, including the fa-

mous sketch "The City on a Rock." George C. Basil's Test Tubes and

Dragon Scales and Graham Peck's Two Kinds of The depict the

treaty port in its later years. Most such accounts--Peck, describing

the community's uncharacteristic last days, is a minor exception-- tell the same story. It is a tale of hardships, isolation, little contact with Sichuanese-except for periodic outbursts of xenophobia--

and almost no lasting concrete legacy. Some of these sources examine the world of treaty ports; others survey inland China. Yet few of them are concerned with the peripheral zone in which these worlds overlapped. This thesis will expand on its base material by considering one city with ties to the two worlds, and give a new perspective on both. It is consistent with the view of a basically strong Chinese commercial system, generally able to adapt to changes and respond to foreign initiatives profitably, absorbing external forces of modernization on its own terms. Chapter 1: Sino-Western Commerce in the Nineteenth Cen- tury

(a) The Treaties of Nanjing and Tianjin

Among Asian nations being opened to Western commerce in the nineteenth century, "China's uniqueness lies in the fact that it had been connected with the international economy long before it was incorporated, from 1842 onwards, into the international political system."' Before the Opium War, China's iegal foreign trade was conducted solely through the southern port of Guangzhou (Canton), almost at the opposite end of the Chinese seacoast from the seat of government in Beijing. Under the Canton system, direct contact with foreigners was limited to the Cohong, a small network of merchants administered by a Hoppo officiai. (Such a system reflected the pattern of "brokerage" which the Qing Dynasty employed to maintain indirect central control in every region of the empire.) M. Mancall con- 1 . Jurgen Osterhammel, "British Business in China, 1860s-1950s," British Busi- ness in Asia since 7860, R.P.T. Davenport-Hines & Geoffrey Jones ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 989), p. 1 90. 43

siders this system of "administered" foreign trade "perhaps the

most efficient mechanism for exchange between societies that dif-

fered in economic assumptions but were not prepared to press their

case against each other too vigoro~sly."~On the British side, al1

Chinese trade before 1833 was carried out under an official East

India Company monopoly. Foreign merchants were kept out of the in-

terior and could be subject at any time to the often arbitrary juris-

prudence of Beijing's officiais, under a legal system far removed

from what Englishmen were farniliar with. The foreign presence in

China was still extremely limited: though Jesuits rnaintained some

clandestine missions inland, Protestant missions were still a thing

of the future.

This situation was changed by the three-year Opium War, in

which Britain decisively defeated the Chinese forces. The subse-

quent Treaty of Nanjing--the first product of Western "gunboat di-

2. Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy, p. 55. (Quoted by Oster- harnmel, loc. cit.) 44 plomacy" in China--transformed China's foreign commercial relations, permanently ending the Canton systern. Implicit acquiescence in the opium trade carried on by foreign merchants, along with compensation for the opium destroyed by Beijing's officials, was only the first of the changes forced on China in this monumental 1842 pact. The Chinese negotiators, inexperienced with Western-style international law, granted concessions with far-reaching consequences. Official correspondence between the Chinese and foreign governments was now largely conducted on equal terms, replacing the tributary system which foreigners found disrespectful of them.

More irnportantly for trade, Western merchants were no longer limited to Guangzhou. As well as ceding Hong Kong to Britain as a directly-ruled colony, China agreed to establish five zones along the southeastern Coast which would gradually become "international- ized," allowing foreigners (principally Englishmen) to live in international settlements free of direct Chinese control. Indeed, Chinese 45 residents within these settlements could be kept at arm's length within enclaves, as foreigners had previously been held. The Cohong, the brokerage organization which had previously decided whom foreign merchants were allowed to trade with, was abolished and Brit- ish traders were given free rein in commerce within and between the treaty ports. A uniform rate was promised for the taxes they would pay, such as import and export duties. Beijing also agreed to develop a uniform tariff system for a transit trade between treaty ports and inland China. Each port would have a British consul, who took over the Cohong's responsibility of ensuring British subjects' payment of duties owed to the Chinese government. (Later agreements with other foreign powers, by not empowering the other nations' consuls, irnplicitly extended the British conçu 1s' responsibility to duty payrnents by non-British foreigners.) This provision was among the more significant changes in Sino-British relations, giving the British government's representative in each treaty port foremost status and leading within two decades to the fownding of the 46

Imperia! Maritime Customs.

Granting foreigners the right to reside in China and trade without molestation or constraint raised the issue of their legal status.

Westerners within the empire were now granted the privilege of extraterritorial status, which had precedents in past Chinese practice.

A foreigner charged with crimes against a Chinese now enjoyed the right to a trial in a mixed court ultimately overseen by his home country's consul. Special international courts were established to deal with Sino-foreign litigation such as criminal cases. But traditional China was rnuch less accustomed than the Middle Eastern nations to dealing with sizeable foreign communities, and the influx of large numbers of foreigners--some of dubious character--put the system under stress. Reports of Western abuses of the systern increased Chinese resentments, and extraterritoriality eventually became a major bone of ~ontention.~

3. Hosea Ballou Morse describes the Treaty of Nanjing in Chapter 1 1 of The lnternational Relations of the Chinese Empire, Vol. I (London: Longman, Green, 191 7)' pp. 298-3 18. See also En-Sai Tai's summary of the pact's commercial stipulations in Treaty Ports in China (A Study in Diplornacy) (Arlington, Va.: University Publica- Additional treaties further defined Sino-foreign relations. The

1843 Treaty of the Bogue set import and export duties as promised,

and granted Britain "most favoured nation" status, automatically

receiving the same concessions granted to other nations by China.

The other foreign powers soon received this status as well, in sirni-

lar fashion to the old system under which various tributaries were

seen as equal to each other (but beiow the Empire).

It is ironic that the Chinese-Manchu policy of equal treatment of the Western nations, although intended to keep them divided and facilitate playing off one against another, had the opposite effect of consolidating thern. Because China was the weaker side and on the defensive, the most-favored-nation clause proved to be a one-way street--any concession or privilege gained by one Western power at once accrued to all. China could never reverse the tide and, by abolishing the privileges of one power, elirninate, those of others. Treaty privileges steadily accumulated against her intere~t.~

The 1844 Sina-American Treaty of Wanghai expiicitly allowed the foreigners to build hospitals, churches and cemeteries, as well as

tions of America, reprinted 1976), pp. 8-9. 4. John King Fairbank, Tmde and Diplomacy on the China Coast= nie Opening of the Treaty Ports 7 842- 7 854 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1 953), p. 198. 48 hire Chinese to teach the varieties of the Chinese language. The

French negotiated their own agreement in the 1844 Treaty of Wham- poa, along similar Iines to the other agreements, but which also se- cured full official toleration of the Roman Catholic religion, a right soon extended to Protestant sects. As a result, China became the great new field of expansion for worldwide Christian rnis~ions.~

The first five treaty ports extended as far north as Shanghai, whose position near the mouth of the Yangzi River quickly transformed it from a leading regional port into the central entrepot of

East-West commerce, and Asia's greatest seaport. Western merchants hoped to extend their trade from these bases-4ncluding Hong

Kong-by attracting the business of Chinese merchants from the interior. In addition to opium, Britain offered Chinese consumers the products of her new steam-driven Cotton mills and other domestic industries, with uneven success. New companies like Jardine &

S. Morse describes the Treaty of the Bogue in op. cit., p. 321; the Treaty of Wangxia in ibid., pp. 329-3 1; the Treaty of Whampoa in ibid., pp. 33 1-2. Tai mentions these agreements in op. cit., pp. 9-1 0. 49

Matheson and Butterfield & Swire made fortunes and became a force to be reckoned with within the treaty ports, also influencing makers of China policy back in Britain. Foreign companies like the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, a British firm, provided their capital. The seeds were planted for the expansion of the treaty-port network, depend- ing on Beijing remaining strong enough to enforce foreign treaties but not strong enough to resist new concessions.

Unlike colonies in which Westerners were able to impose their whole legal and commercial systems, however, Qing China already had a well-developed pattern of interna1 trade based on a clearly defined relationship between merchants, officiais and middlemen, with respective obligations and responsibilities. This system, relying on CO-operation, was somewhat monopolistic in nature. Such arrangements extended beyond the local markets to regional and even nationwide systems. It was this sense of organization, more than

Beijing's resistance, that proved the greatest challenge to economic 50 penetration by the British and other foreigners. In foreign attempts at long-term economic domination of a nation as huge as China, blunt military power was of limited use. But foreign businessmen responded to failures in the China market by blaming Beijing's continuing resistance to free trade, and hoped that sufficient use of force by foreign governments would create a nationwide market suited to their enterprises.

Treaty ports were administered dually in theory, but in practice mostly through foreign-dominated structures like the consular courts and the Imperia1 Maritime Customs (foreign customs). The latter was established by Beijing in the 1850's to allow a uniform system of custorns collection for foreign trade throughout the treaty ports. Chinese goods being shipped overseas and foreign goods entering China paid a fixed, fairly low import duty and export duty respectively, regardless of the port in question. Goods could be shipped in the "coastal" trade between treaty ports, paying another 51 fixed duty in place of the new lijin, a local toll exacted on trade, often at boundaries of local jurisdiction. After further concessions by Beijing, they could move between a treaty port and an interior location either under the domestic lijin system or under the foreign customs through the purchase of a transit pass. A single body of trade regulations was applied to al1 ports, though each individual port would also have local rules appropriate to its specific situation. The foreign customs CO-existed with local lijin customs, and

Chinese merchants could choose to ship a given cargo between treaty ports under either system. A port could be considered "opened" when a foreign customs branch was established there.

The lmperial Maritime Customs was formally an organ of the Chi- nese government, returning considerable revenues to Beijing, mostly dedicated to paying the lmperial government's foreign debts, including reparations and indemnities incurred in war. As such, collecting foreign customs revenue was in the interest of both Beijing and the 52 foreign powers. For a long time Westerners predominated in the organization's staff. The durable Sir Robert Hart held the post of In- spector-General for a period of over forty years, roughly coinciding with the Dowager Empress' reign, and served more than once as middleman in Sino-Western disputes.

The Qing Dynasty's weakness was dramatically confirmed by the

Taiping rebellion and other interna1 crises in the 1850's and 1860's.

Britain and France, taking advantage of the situation, launched the

Arrow War, and China suffered an even more dramatic defeat than in the Opium War: the Emperor's sumrner palace was razed, and Beijing itself was threatened. This Western victory confirrned the new order: the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin and the 1860 Beijing Convention gradually extended the foreign presence further into the Empire. An- other dozen treaty ports were established, al1 along the seacoast and up the Yangzi as far as Hankou. Western-owned ships were now allowed to navigate China's inland waters between treaty ports, as 53 in the trade between southern Asian nations, requiring the development of special rules for Sino-foreign contact, such as inland navigation regulations. The British government, along with other most favoured nations, was allowed to establish a legation in Beijing itself, a major change from the tributary system that was one of the war's major issues. Russian and American citizens were granted the same extraterritorial status as the British and the French. Chinese subjects were given the right to emigrate on British ships, an activity previously banned. And missionaries were granted freedom of movement within China, allowing them to proselytize throughout the empire. Though the Treaty of Tianjin was not ratified, most of its provisions were incorporated into the Beijing Convention.6

Beijing also agreed to renegotiate tariffs, and agreed to simplified import and export duties, capping them at 5% ad valorem for al1 goods except tea, silk and opium, the latter import receiving a new

6. Morse describes the treaties-actually six different agreements--in op. ck, Chap- ter 24, pp. 557-70. Tai summai-izes the processes that produced these agreements, along with their important provisions, in op. cit., pp. 46-54. 54 duty which underlined this trade's de facto acceptance. And an additional 2.5% rate was set for imports shipped inland from the treaty ports under the new transit pass, though the transit trade was not immediately effected.7 These rates became another burning issue: in the early twentieth century the Chinese would demand renegotia- tion, partly as a sovereignty issue and partly to allow tariff protection for their new industries. Only in 1928 would the Chinese government be allowed to set its own tariff rates.

In agreeing to these treaties under pressure, China yielded sole control of some significant elements in her commercial, social, and foreign policies. The fact that the treaties were largely forced on

Beijing earned them the name "unequal treaties." But the Devil is in the details, and actual implementation of the agreements was as important as what was on paper. As the Chinese and Western nations were products of fundamentally different civilizations, it was impossible to make everything explicit, and new negotiations were

7. Morse, op. cit., pp. 533-5. 55

needed--often between foreigners and the leading Chinese official in

the vicinity of the treaty port in question. There were many bones

of contention in civil, criminal and commercial law, panicularly the

interpretation of contracts. In addition, the rights of Chinese resi-

dents of foreign concessions were unclear. Such issues required

years of talks between China and a host of foreign governments with

diverse and sometimes conflicting aims, before a rough resolution

was achieved. Future pacts Iike the 1876 Chefoo Convention and the

1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki would further define the rights and ob-

ligations of each side. In addition, the treaty-port network's expansion had not reached a clear limit. As Beijing licked its wounds and

attempted interna1 reform and modernization through the Self-

Strengthening Movement, the more ambitious Westerners aspired to

new fields of commercial influence.

Under this new system, China's international trade exploded: the value of imports went from 63,282 to 570,163 Haikwan taels be- 56

tween 1868 and 1 91 3, exports from 61,826 to 403,306 in the same

period.8 The British Empire commanded a consistent majority of

this trade, including an increasingly dominant share from Hong Kong-

based firms, though Japan's share was growing by the turn of the

centuryg Yet only a stable 3% of British exports went to China in

this period, compared with over 10% to India.1° Opium and cotton

goods were the leading imports, while tea and silk led exports. But

domestic commerce was also transformed, particularly the coastal

and riverine trade between treaty ports.

Foreign firms were now entering China's interior carrying trade,

on which they depended increasingly for their profit. British trade

interests ranged from manufactured imports produced at home or

Yu-kwei Cheng, Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China (Washington, D.C.: University Press of Washington, D.C., 1956), p. 19. As different regions of China had widely varying measures for the silver tael, the Imperia1 Maritime Cus- toms, and the Haikwan bank assigned to rnaintain its accounts, used a special measure of their own. Yen Chung-p' ing et al., Chung-kuo chin-tai ching-chi shih t 'ung-chi tzu-liao hsu- an-chi (Selected Statistics on China's Modern Econornic History), Tables 7,8, pp. 65-6; cited in Cambridge History of China, Vol. XI, Part 2, Table 19, p. 51. 1 0. W. Woodruff, Impact of Western Man (London, 1 966),Table VIlf4, cited in R.P.T. Davenport-Hines & Geoffrey Jones, "British Business in Asia since 1860," British Business in Asia since 7 860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 989), p. 3. 57 elsewhere in the British Empire, to lndian opium and other unproc- essed imports, to transport services such as shipping and ship repair, to banking services and port infrastructure, in many of which fields they had become accustomed to predorninance. This wide variety of commercial activities inevitably led to diverging aims on the part of British merchants. The large British traders in Shanghai were somewhat quicker than home producers in gradually realizing that the Chinese market for imports had only limited long-term potential, and seeing that commercial services, particufarly involving

British steamships, -had greater promise. The small-scale merchants, on the other hand, had to place their hopes in continuing expansion of the treaty-port network.

The post-1860 concessions had failed to transform China into a market providing easy profits for importers, and the leading British businessmen started to recognize that the great obstacle for imports was not the protectionist Imperia1 government but the Chinese 58 trading systern itself, and looked for new commercial avenues. In- deed, the transportation of indigenous goods came to constitute

more and more the focus of the major companies' operations--a strategy that had succeeded elsewhere in Asia--while large-scale imports were recognized as an area generally not promising long- term growth. Employing their capital resources, they built steamships for the Coast and the major rivers, revolutionizing local commerce through economies of scale and regularly-scheduled voyages.

In particular, Jardine, Matheson and Butterfield, Swire created commercial empires based on their respective shipping Iines, the Indo-

Chinese Steam Navigation Company and the China Navigation Compa- ny. Smaller foreign shipping firms also existed, but the large cornpanies developed cartels that largely kept out cornpetition by controlling freight rates. (These arrangements, with minor renegotia- tions, continued into the 1930's.) In the face of such stiff cornpetition, more than one small-scale British businessman saw fit to go far afield to find a new market where he could establish his own niche.

Foreign business ventures in China inevitably required assistance

from Chinese. While brokers intermediated between different Chi-

nese businessmen and between them and the Qing administration,

compradors played the same role between Westerners and Chinese.

The fact that a great many British residents could not speak the

local language with any skill necessitated the employment of these

rniddlemen, first as household managers, then as business managers.

While a broker was answerable to the lrnperial government, a corn-

prador's responsibility was to the owner of the capital he handled.

A successful business manager often accumulated enough personal

capital to start doing business on his own, sharing in the profits and

liabilities of trade and arranging deals to benefit both his foreign

employer and himself. Compradors amassed increasing amounts of capital, to the point of becoming a very important class of business-

men, so knowledgeable of commerce that they could even influence 60 national economic policy. Several were skilled enough to become near-indispensible to both foreigners and the Qing government, acquiring great power as well as wealth. They were a highly controversial group, accused by many Chinese of putting foreign interests ahead of Chinese ones and of serving themselves alone without eth- ics.

For a British merchant, one alternative to the compradors was to hire a Chinese agent under salary, or more often on a commission basis. This option was especially popular among Westerners extending their business operations to a new port. For most of the small, capital-poor foreign firrns based in the coastal ports, such agencies were the only feasible way to enter the inland markets. An agent's powers were much more limited than a comprador's, and his financial rewards were also srnaller. He often represented a firm doing only small business in his locality, necessitating diversity on his part. Agents would generally have their own business in addition to 61

the agency, but were less careful than the cornpradors to safeguard their client's interests. And while a cornprado r's rniddleman activities tended to be limited to a single foreigner, an agent might serve several firms, sometimes rnutual rivals. Such a division of responsibilities often left clients in an uncornfortable position, but most were unable to pay for an agent dedicated to their business alone.

Only the largest firms had the resources to develop their own bureaucracy and send foreign employees inland as dedicated agents.

Most agents were apt to reserve the best deals for themselves and treat their agency as the marginal business it was. In this fashion the Chinese commercial system thwarted the efforts of foreign business to extend their domain from the margins of the Chinese economy to its centre.

The Chinese at first lacked the shipbuilding technology and modern management skills needed to compete with Western shipping, and had to play a gradua1 catch-up game. But time was on their side, 62

and modern Chinese shipping firms were soon emerging. In particu-

lar, the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, managed by Chi-

nese along Western lines and subsidized by the Chinese government,

despite periodic reversals and upheavals came to take a large share

of the market. When Jardine, Matheson and Butterfield, Swire creat-

ed a cartel to control the lower Yangzi's steam trade in the 1870's,

they had to include China Merchants, which meant indirect negotia-

tions with Beijing. In this as in many cases, foreign business enjoyed temporary dominance in an important sector of the Chinese economy, until the Chinese learned enough of foreign methods to start clawing back the advantage. The British and other foreigners thus failed to corne close to long-term economic "domination" of

China even in coastal and downriver areas, and in western China the

"transformation" started decades later and was more limited and gradual. 63

(b) The Expanding Treaty Port Network

Nineteenth-century British businessrnen in China expected their commercial expertise, based on free-market principles and the new technologies of the industrial revolution, to translate into immediate, sizable profits for them and their backers. What the foreign interest groups largely failed to comprehend was the interna1 strength and even resiliency in China's domestic trade system, with its intricate interlocking of official and commercial interests. British traders, who were quick to blarne Jack of success on trade irritants such as taxation, continued to press Beijing for new concessions. But the

Chinese concessions were ultimately negated by Chinese resistance and adaptation. The CO-operationof officials and merchants often helped the militarily weak Empire resist the foreigners' economic encroachments.

In the fifty years before World War I the British Empire was at 64

its strategic and economic pinnacle. The influence of Western pow-

ers like Britain was not limited to direct colonization but also ex-

tended to economic clout in areas like the weakening Chinese Em-

pire. The world's leading empires--led by Britain but including na-

tions such as France, Germany, Russia, the United States, and later

Japan-exploited China's military weakness to force the once-insu-

lar empire into accepting their presence largely on Western terms,

creating a system based on treaty-port footholds, shipping rights,

extraterritoriality, and joint administration.

For two generations after 1860 China lay open to foreign exploitation both economically and spiritually, tied by the web of treaty rights ...The aim of the Western trading powers in China was to trade but not to govern... Britain's diplornatic leadership among the treaty powers in late nineteenth century China no more than reflected her paramountcy in the China trade.' l

This system made itself known as far inland as Chongqing, Sichuan.

Chongqing's opening was part of a third wave in the expansion of

1 1. Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 462-3. 65

the-treaty port network, which started with the 1876 Chefoo Con-

vention and continued for three decades, opening over twenty towns.

In addition to several cities in the prosperous Jiangnan region and

new ports further up the Yangzi and Xi rivers, towns were opened in

the border regions of Yunnan, Guangxi and Manchuria. Formerly iso-

lated areas like Sichuan were now exposed to foreign contacts. (In

1907 agreement was reached on paper to open another fourteen cen-

tres, but revolution intervened and none acquired a foreign customs

house.) Around the turn of the century seven other towns unilaterally

declared themselves open and became "self-opened ports." Five

Yangzi River towns were also designated "ports of call" in 1876, and

13 Xi River communities became ports of cal1 or "passenger sta-

tions" between 1902 and 1904.' And Beijing, under pressure,

leased out several strategic centres for direct foreign administration in 1898. (See Map 1.)

1 2.Stanley F. Wright compiles a complete list of these treaty ports in Appendix A of Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast: William Mullan & Sons, 1 950), pp. 894-6. 66

This third wave was to a great extent a product of the continuing

expansionary ambitions of Western commerce in the region. Home

rnanufacturers, relying on advantages in mechanized production and

shipping, hoped to improve their share of the Chinese market, de-

spite warning signs that their products did not fit Chinese demand

as well as they hoped. The Shanghai-based firms, increasingly,

hoped to increase their revenues frorn the carrying trade. And merchant adventurers hoped to find new commercial niches.

The first two advances, which by the 1860's had extended foreign trade into much of inland China, had been insufficient for the more ambitious British merchants in the region. Many Englishmen at home and abroad, undaunted by the difficulties of making their irnports cornpetitive in existing Chinese markets, envisioned new markets for British goods and huge profits for those who could exploit the consumption patterns of the empire's vast rural population.

British rnanufacturers and merchants, overlooking the infinitesimal purchasing power of the Chinese peasant, were under a persistent delusion that further into the interior, always just out of immediate reach, lay vast markets where British manufacturers could be profitably sold once restraints on access had been removed. l3

In addition to the insatiable appetite and boundless optimism of em-

pire, this expansionary urge also reflected the frustration of mer-

chants unable to crack the virtual self-sufficiency of rural China

and seIl more than a few Western products there. The expansion of

the treaty-port network, however, proved insufficient in itself to

facilitate the penetration by British business of the inland Chinese

market and its closed trading system. In Chongqing these difficul-

ties would become particularly obvious.

Sichuan was an area of particular promise to those who favored

expanding the treaty-port network, and many of their reports were

enthusiastic to the point of unreliablity. As early as 1858 a Shang-

hai correspondent from the Times of London imagined a voyage up

the Yangzi to

- - - 1 3. P.D. Coates, The China Consuls: British Consular Officers, 7 843- 7 943 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 988), pp. 1 58-9. the great city of Chung-king, the second great commercial emporium of China ....lt might be worthwhile, if they are shy of our new goods, to anchor a depot ship in the broad waters ...and accustom them to the sight of luxuries and necessaries which they rnay have in exchange for their cheap and abundant first- class teas ....the climate is variable, extremely hot and extremely cold, just suited for our woolens.

He adrnitted that the upper river contained serious rapids but insist-

ed that this was a small obstacle, "at least for us Anglo-Sax-

ons ....John Chinaman must add one other to his at present innumera-

ble canals, and English engineers must teach him the secret of con-

structing locks."14 The North-China Herald, an English-language

weekly newspaper published in the Shanghai concession that served

as a voice for China's British community, was characteristic of this

group in its enthusiasrn for future expansion. An 1878 leading arti-

cle compared the province to Eden and noted that it was often

termed "the garden of China"; an enthusiastic 1876 report errone-

ously claimed that Chongqing enjoyed wide streets?

1 4. China: Being The Times' Special Correspondence from China in the Years 7857-58 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources reprint, 1 9721, pp. 206-8. 1 5. The North-China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette, October 3 1, 1 878, pp. 41 7-8 (leading article); ibid., September 23, 1 876, pp. 296-7. Sichuan was potentially a large market indeed. Its population,

severely depleted by unsuccessful rebellions in the seventeenth century, had since been replenished by waves of Hubei and Hunan immi-

grants and risen to almost 50 million, probably the largest of al1

Chinese provinces.16 Its economy--still largely agricultural like the

rest of China--had also prospered. Some small-scale insurrections

notwithstanding, Sichuan had mostly escaped the devastation that

accompanied the larger rebellions of the 1850's and 1860's. (At one

point former Taiping Assistant King Shi Dakai attempted to invade the province, but came to grief after reportedly taking the wrong

road.)

In the mid-eighteenth century, the provincial government in

Chengdu still depended on subsidies from downriver provinces to

16. Hosea Ballou Morse mentions population estimates as low as 35 miIIion and as high as 79,500,000 in The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1907), pp. 223-4. Most estimates were between 50 and 65 million, but Parker (1903) is more conservative and Hosie, whom Morse rightly considers a leading expert on Sichuan, estirnated 45 million in 1904. Bear in mind that Si- chuan's population was then steadily increasing. 70

balance its books; by the time of Guangxu's reign, which began in

1874, it was not only sending Beijing large surpluses but subsidiz-

ing the Yunnan and Guizhou administrations as weIl.l7 The Taiping

rebellion, in interrupting China's centralized rule, did have the ef-

fect of reinforcing southwest China's traditional sense of isolation

and even autonorny. (Yunnan and Guizhou, south of Sichuan, were sub-regions within this region.) Trade and communications were

often difficult within this mountainous entity, let alone between it

and the rest of China. Besides some minor overland trade, most im-

ports to and exports from southwest China--including Yunnan and

Guizhou as well as Sichuan--moved along the Yangzi River, through the Yangzi Gorges, a most formidable barrier to shipping what with its rapids and seaçonal channel shifts.

The central entrepot for Sichuan's Yangzi commerce was Chong- qing, a Yangzi river port in the eastern part of the province. This

1 7. Yeh-chien Wang, Land Taxation in Imperia1 China, 7 750-7 9 1 7 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1 97 31, p. 1 8; S.A.M. Adshead, Province and Politics in Late Imperia1 China: Viceregal Government in Szechwan, 7 898- 7 922 (London: Cur- zon Press, 1984)' p. 1 7. 71 city of about 300,000 people was the most likely base for Western merchants in the Sichuan trade, and soon the focus of efforts to

"open" the province. Second only to Chengdu among Sichuan cities, it was located at the confluence of the Yangzi and its tributary the

Jialing, where east-west river trade routes intersected with north- south overland routes. (Sichuanese usually called the Yangzi "the

Great Riverv--Da Jiang-and often called the Jialing "the Small

Riverv--Xia0 Jiang.)

By 1876 many boosters of British trade felt disappointed, even astonished, by its limited success within the Chinese Empire in comparison to Britain's colonies, and were looking for causes to blame and for solutions. Some of the difficulties were due to foreigners striking out with inadequate information, as in the notorious 72 cases of the Englishmen who tried to make money shipping Western silverware and pianos into China? But a more fundamental obstacle was China's existing commercial network, the product of a largely agricultural economy where most trade was still local. This market system interpenetrated with the Qing administrative hierarchy, with official regulation and taxation of merchant middlemen and merchant guilds. It was not a modern market economy but was highly developed on its own terms. The separation in wealth between the merchant class and the primary producers was not so great as in Eu- rope, and the scholar-official elite would squeeze the better-off merchants in needy times, limiting the individual accumulation of mercantile capital. Transportation costs, middlemen's profits and taxation limited the range of products traded throughout the whole country. The financial system, with its many local currencies, difficulties in obtaining credit advances and clearing indebtedness, and

1 8. G.C. Allen & Audrey G. Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic De- velopment: China and Japan (London: George Allen & Unwin, '1 954), pp. 1 7-8. Cited by Lloyd E. Eastman, Famiiy, Fields, and Ancestors Constancy and Change in China's Social and Economic History, 1550-7949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 159. 73 a large number of middlernen, seemed inefficient to Westerners. A foreigner who wanted to crack this system needed large capital reserves, a network of employees close to the ground, intricate knowledge of the Chinese economy and culture, and patience.

The largest Shanghai and Hong Kong trading companies, including

Jardine, Matheson and Butterfield, Swire, had many of these at- tributes and were already finding new opportunities. By the late nineteenth century they were moving away frorn dependence on the problematic import trade, which did not always match Chinese needs, and into the more profitable carrying trade within China, rnuch as the British took a large role in the carrying trade between

Asian nations. Such shipping could only employ traditional oceango- ing vessels along the Coast; river routes required investment in the development of specially-designed ships. Similarly, they were shifting out of the commodities business into general trade-related services such as ship repairs and finance. In both transitions their existing assets were committed to long-term investments and in-

frastructural development. These companies used vertical integra-

tion to widen their business range into trade, shipping, insurance

and banking, their operations extending halfway around the world

through Britain, India and China. Management fostered a bureaucrat-

ic structure, and compradors who combined Company business with

independent ventures were gradually replaced with full-time ern-

ployees with no share of liabilities. Geographic expansion of trade

now became a lower priority than enhancing a company's economic

profile in its existing place. Jurgen Osterhammel summarizes the

new situation:

By the mid-1890s the structural foundations had been laid for the further expansion of British business in China .... Coopera- tion at various levels with Chinese merchants had been prac- tised and routinised to the extent of the emergence of a kind of symbiotic Sino-foreign commercial capitalism... However the disproportionate growth of the expatriate cornmunities of Shanghai, and the increasing concentration of foreign business there at the expense of treaty ports like Hankou or Fuzhou, was a symptom of the difficuities in penetrating or replacing the commercial institutions of a tightly organised pre-modern society.lg

19. Osterhammel, op. cit., p. 1 93. One suggested solution was to build new industry in China. In

1883 a British Member of Parliament declared:

Our trade with China has been miserably small hitherto.... Bel- gium [is] taking more of our goods than al1 China ....At the present British capital seem almost choked up. There is nothing that the country needs so much as a large field for the investment of its capital. What field in the world would equal China?20

Yet industrial investment, unlike investment in shipping infrastructure, was still not considered legal, and would not be until 1895.

Another mode of investment was to provide loans to the Imperia1 government for major economic development projects such as railways and mines, which yielded profitable returns. Before long, however, nationalist sentiment would reduce these opportunities as the

Chinese sought to control their own infrastructure, sowing seeds that would ultimately end al1 foreign intervention in China.

20. Quoted by E.V.G. Kieman, British Diplomacy in China 7 880 to 7885 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 939), p. 250. British merchants had to compete with Chinese merchants al1 over China and often felt the stigma of being outsiders. There was a great difference in attitudes gained by experience between a "free trader" Western merchant and a Chinese merchant who aspired to purchasing government licences for trade monopolies. An 1884 trade report blames British reverses on unfair commercial practices:

The whole power of trade in China reçts on combination and rnonopoly. This has been weakened by foreign influence, but every attempt at developing new branches of trade leads to an attempt to return to the old principles, by seeking Government protection against cornpetition.

(On the other hand, British businessmen sometimes united againçt

Chinese competitors.) The Chinese were wary of foreigners, often preferring to thwart their ventures while ostensibly CO-operating.

Many Englishmen, who believed in the natural superiority and inevitable triumph of British ways, had difficulty in grasping the situation. E.V.G. Kiernan summarizes:

All the interminable talking and day-dreaming about how to "get hold of the trade of China" was based on a miscompre- hension. There was a huge interna1 trade in China, but it moved in an equiiibrium evolved over many centuries; it could -net be grafted on to foreign commerce without a radical al- teration of the national economic life.21

British merchants in China had many grievances against the Chi-

nese government. One sore point was the local lijin duties on goods

in transit, a proportional toll collected at boundary points between

local jurisdictions. Under the lmperial system, revenues such as

land tax, tribute rice and salt duties had formerly been sufficient tu

provide for government expenditures, with occasional squeezes on the rich during emergencies. But the Taiping insurrection and other

rebellions in the 1850's and 1860's went far beyond any recent emergency in scale: restoring order cost a total of something like

70 million taels. ln addition to the expensive rnilitary campaigns to

restore the lrnperial order, the central government was seriously weakened. As always, state funds were often handled carelessly, with considerable skimming by unethical officials. New systems for revenue collection were clearly needed and taxing local and inter-

2 1. Ibid., p. 25 1 (including 1 884 report quote). 78

provincial trade proved convenient. The lijin was introduced in 1853

as a ternporary emergency measure, and was soon yielding 10 to 20 million taels every year. But Beijing had accumulated such a huge debt that the tax was retained even after Qing rule was restored ev- erywhere. It was now too important fiscally to be abolished.

The original purpose of the lijin duties was to ensure revenue for

China's provincial and local governments, which often had to maintain order on their own during the Taiping emergency. These governments took what they decided they needed--a proportion which tended to increase over the years--and Beijing received any surpluses, reflecting the subtle general power shift from China's central government to regional administrations in the Qing Dynasty's last decades. The provinces took responsibility for collecting the tax, and rates could Vary widely. (In contrast, the lmperial Maritime Customs used uniforrn Western methods to collect revenue for Beijing.) These duties were by no means applied evenly over space or consistently in 79

time, and corruption was predictably a widespread fact. Much de-

pended on the individual official in charge of focal collection: "Levy-

ing tolls was the ideal exercise of the mandarin--the quintessence

of Chinese poli tic^."^^ Goods transported over long distances through

several provinces, including most foreign imports and exports, found

lijin especially burdensome, as they had to cross many jurisdiction-

al lines and face new taxation at each interprovincial barrier, paying

as much as a fifth of their value in total.

Though a typical lijin charge was only 2% of the goods' value, its

unpredictability angered British commercial interests. Foreign mer-

chants complained about being subject to inconsistent, arbitrary du-

ties, and had enough clout to have the issue raised in negotiations

between the British and Chinese governments. Western demands in-

cluded a more uniform scale of import duties and the creation of an

effective transit-pass system. To deal with these complaints, after

1860 the foreign customs introduced the transit pass for foreign

-- - 22. lbid., p. 255. 80

merchants. Under this system a foreign merchant--Chinese busi-

nessmen were excluded until 1876-who planned to ship foreign im-

ports from a treaty port to a specified inland centre could purchase

a transit pass from the foreign customs and then ship the goods to

the inland centre without paying any of the normal lijin at interna!

customs barriers along the way. (While the import duty was set at

5% of the value of the goods in question, a transit pass cost 2.5% in

addition.) Transit passes could also be purchased, under similar con-

ditions, for inland goods being shipped to treaty ports, though this

trade was smaller. In its first years, before the Chefoo Convention,

transit trade had been hamstrung by arbitrary standards and local

officiais who resisted enforcement. While the money spent on tran-

sit passes went away to Beijing, lijin revenues went directly to the

provincial and local authorities. This gave an incentive for resistance, so some provinces routinely ignored the passes while in 0th- ers "ingenious devices were consistently ernployed... to frustrate the

intention of the treaty provision." Even after their 1876 inclusion, many Chinese merchants obtained passes fraudulently, in the name

of fake British firms, in the hope of receiving consular protection.

(In 1883 a Hankou consul estimated that this was the case with 99%

Many foreign merchants saw expansion of the 1860 treaty-port

network, along with modernized transportation and communications,

as one solution to the problem of finding profitable business in

China. British businessmen, des pite the failure of expected inland

markets to materialize, persisted in their belief that there was

money to be made in the interior, and hoped that access to new re-

gions in China would offer new opportunities.

There were fresh demands... because the treaty ports' business communities were coming to see new and quite different econornic possibilities in China ....The Ch'ing empire was still basically viewed as an outlet for Midlands or New England products, but by the 1860s investors were beginning to con- template extending the principle of Shanghai's international concession to the en tire country, building facto ries inland to manufacture inexpensive clothing and tools for the Chinese peasantry. They were also becoming aware for the first time

23. Coates, op cit., p. 175; p. 176. 82

of China's rich mineral resource~.~~

As the directors of the large cornpanies increasingly understood,

often due to bitter experience, the future for British business in

China lay in the provision of business services within the Empire as

much as the international exchange of goods. The need was for new

treaty ports where foreign commerce could operate freely and prof-

itably, with consular protection and relief from lijin. During the

Chefoo Convention negotiations, opening new ports "was then con-

sidered by the foreign merchants to be of great advantage to their

trade, and was then held by the Chinese officiais to be a corre-

sponding disadvantage to their inter est^."^^

Many British residents in China believed that greater success

was simply a matter of putting greater pressure on the Chinese

lmperial government to accede to a commercial systern along the

Iines that the British wanted. In the rninds of British merchants in

24,Frederick Wakeman, The Fa11 of lmperial China (New York: Free Press, 1975), p. 183. 25. Hosea Ballou Morse, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 304. the. treaty ports, the spirit of the 1858 Times correspondent was

still evident:

Give us free access to China; protect us in the exercise of our privileges until the Chinese are become accustomed to us and understand us, and fix our duty payments firmly and explicit ly, and everything else will follow. The great piracy difficulty on the Coast will find its own solution; for the coalfields will be opened, and some screw steam Company will get pos- session of the coasting trade. The custom-house bugbear will disappear, for the goods will be put down at the door of the customer. Teas and silks will be bought cheaper, for different districts will be made to compete when we buy direct from the producer; and British manufactures, with moderate energy and enterprise, will make a fair start26

While some major firms had decided that fields such as shipping

services were more profitable than the goods trade, many business-

men persisted in hoping for a future breakthrough in this area. An

opportunity to change Sino-Western commerce appeared in the mid-

1 8701s,with the negotiations that produced the Chefoo Convention.

In 1874 the British administration in lndia sent a foolhardy mis-

sion from Burma into Yunnan--a province so unstable that a Moslem

26. China, /oc. cit. 84

rebellion lasting almost two decades had only recently been su-

pressed--to survey a railway route between the two regions. it

ended in the murder of A.R. Margary, a Chinese interpreter in the

British consular service sent up frorn Shanghai. British Minister Th-

omas Wade accused Yunnan's acting viceroy of at least indirect re-

sponsibility, but the true facts never emerged.27 On March 19, 1875,

Wade sent the Zongli Yamen six demands for resolution of the matter

on March 19, 1875, and the Admiralty sent a naval squadron to back

him up. A long Anglo-Chinese negotiation process followed with

Hart mediating. The result, was the Chefoo Convention, signed on

September 13, 1876. Both sides, in addition to arranging compensa-

tion for the victim's family, took the opportunity to deal with long-

standing concerns, some of which had been dealt with in the 1868

Alcock Convention which the British Parliament had rejected. A

system of diplomatic etiquette was also formulated to prevent fu-

ture incidents to the degree possible, leading to China's first over-

- - - .. . . - . . - .- - -. -. . -- 27. Coates describes the incident in op. cit., pp. 303-5. He mentions that Li Hongzhang Iater expressed to Wade's successor N.R. OIConor his own belief in the ofYiciaI1sguilt, but suggests that Li may have just been trying to ingratiate the Minister. 85

seas legation in London.z8

n addition to these matters, trade issues unrelated to the mur-

der were dealt with. Wade saw the diplomatic crisis as an opportu-

nit) to deal with commercial issues, and one of his demands had

been the enforcement of existing treaty stipulations "by which the

freedom of British trade from al1 imposts over and above the tariff

and half tariff duty is se~ured."~~Many Englishmen were disappoint-

ed by the eventual agreement, feeling that Britain was simply in the

right and should have stuck to her guns, pushing for total accession

to her terms. (Some businessmen hoped for total abolition of the

lijin, but Britain agreed to make do with the treaty-port exemption

as part of a trade-off for new treaty ports being opened.) Hosea Bal-

lou Morse, however, argues that "hostile criticism is justified only 28. Tai summarizes the convention's various agreements in op. cit., pp. 83-4. Morse deals with the crisis in op. cit., Vol. II, Chapter 14 (pp. 283-306), including a summary, pp. 300-3. 29. Morse summarizes Wade's demands in ibid., pp. 29 1-2. 86

on the ground that England was free to impose her terms, which

must be accepted without demur by China."3O In the real world, on

the other hand, significant compromise was inevitable.

As it was, the pact took steps to overhaul the transit trade sys-

tem for foreign goods, creating uniform standards. In a particularly

important provision, Chinese merchants were now allowed to pur-

chase passes--a right explicitly granted in 1 880--though some Chi-

nese purchases happened even before the Chefoo Convention. In

practice, the new system was only gradually effected over the next

two decades. Treaty ports were to be explicitly exempted from the

lijin tax. In existing treaty ports, consuls and local officials were

to define clearly the borders of foreign settlements. The foreign

customs was allowed to collect lijin duties on imported opium, im-

proving efficiency. And four new treaty ports were opened immedi-

ately, including Yichang, the highest Yangzi port below the Gorges.

30. lbid., p. 303. The British had carried out studies of Sichuan showing its rela-

tive wealth, as well as its difficult communications with the rest

of China. A few British adventurers had visited the province but

lacked the means to establish a long-term foreign presence. Now

the British negotiators, heeding the British expansionists, called

for the "opening" of the Empire's southwestern region through a new

treaty port at Chongqing. The final agreement, however, did not in-

clude this city among the new treaty ports. But it effected a tenta-

tive compromise, offering the possibility of opening at some future

date, through rneasures such as Yichang's opening and the extension

of the transit-pass trade into Sichuan. The long-term question is dealt with in ambiguous terms in Article III, Section 1:

The British Government will further be free to send officers to reside at Ch'ung K'ing to watch the conditions of British trade in Ssuch'uan. British merchants will not be allowed to reside at Ch'ung K'ing, or to open establishments or warehous- es there, so long as no steamers have access to the port. When steamers have succeeded in ascending the river so far, further arrangements can be taken into c~nsideration.~'

3 1. A notification of the treaty, quoting it in full, appears in North-China Herald, Octo- ber 12, 1876, pp. 365-6. Under what terms steamers would be allowed to attempt the as-

cent was a question conveniently ignored at the time, with serious

consequences later on. But some Westerners were already pressing

for further advances. The Herald had already cited correspondent

F.M., who dismissed concerns about the navigability of the Gorges as

resulting from low-quality Chinese junks: "The writer says, with

perfect truth, that to stop steamers at lchang is simply to pause at

the only spot where their services are urgently required." Within a

year the newspaper was describing the Davenport report on possible

systems to prevent steamer-junk collisions on the upper Yangzi,

such as special days reserved for steam navigation or a Suez-style

"one at a time" system and concluded, "If Chung King... were opened

to foreign trade, and the dangers of navigation avoided by making use

of foreign steamers, a very considerable trade would inevitably

spring up?

32. North-China Herald, January 22, 1874, p. 62; ibid., June 30, 1877, pp. 636-7. 89

The Chefoo Convention and its aftermath reflected a common pattern in Anglo-Chinese negotiations. The British used superior power to force cessions from the Chinese authorities in the form of opening the country further to foreign goods and services. After the

British reaction came the Chinese reaction: China would yield somewhat to foreign pressure, but then claw back over the long term most of what had been lost. This could take the tactical form of boycotts, merchant-guild solidarity against foreign business, or, most importantly, adaptation to modern systems of business or technology. Chinese merchants and officials could rely on the strength of a multi-faceted indigenous trade system in which each

Chinese participant knew his place and respected the places of 0th- ers. In the end, Beijing's cessions produced only small perturbations of this system, which were mostly soon negated. This process took place in Chongqing as in the rest of China, though the cessions were generally smaller and the reversal time shorter. 90

Chapter 2: Nineteenth-Century Chongqing

(a) Chongqing in Nineteenth-Century Sichuan

Over the centuries, the system of domestic trade within the Chi-

nese Empire developed into a tightly-woven entity. Englishmen in

China hoped to apply free-market principles and new technology to

make the same sort of commercial gains they had managed in India.

But what few of the foreign interests could comprehend was the

great strength and resiliency, on its own terms, of China's interna1

commercial system, with its intricate interlocking of official and

business interests, al1 working toward broad shared ends. Western

businessmen were quick to blarne their limited success within China on Qing Imperia1 policies such as taxation, and demanded further

Chinese concessions as the solution. Britain and the other foreign powers supported them, using the threat of military power, occasionally backed with action, to pressure Beijing into trade con- 91 cessions. But almost every concession was followed sooner or later by Chinese adaptation to the new system, and yielded the British only short-term competitive advantages. Though - China was militarily and politically relatively weak in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, her interna1 system of official-commercial CO- operation was strong enough to resist foreign economic encroachment in the vast interior.

The nineteenth-century Chinese economy was still, of course, largely agricultural. By this time, under pressure from the growing population, average farm size was diminishing, and peasants increasingly supplemented their incorne with extra work such as hand- kraft production. Peasants used the local markets to seIl their surplus foodstuffs and to purchase some needed materials, and the bulk of Chinese commerce still took place at the local level. The small- scale local merchants formed a bridge between the lowest-level markets and trade at the regional level. Regional merchants, simi- 92 larly, were the link to higher market levels, progressing ultimately to great trading cities such as Shanghai, Guangzhou and Tianjin.

Even at the higher levels, nearly al1 of the goods being bought and sold were Chinese, with imports and exports playing only a very minor role. China's commercial system was highly developed, but not to the point of a modern market economy. The variety of goods traded, and the range of trading networks, were limited somewhat by the high costs of transport, middlernen's profits and taxes such as Iijin. This variety was relatively small in isolated regions like

Sichuan: trade in Chongqing, aside frorn tribute grains and monopoly salt, mostly consisted of goods with hig h value-to-weight ratios, such as opium and silk.

The Qing administration controlled directly only a small portion of the Chinese economy, but indirectly managed the nation's commerce through the brokerage system. Under this system, in Sichuan as elsewhere, the state empowered local men to serve as middle- 93 men, supe~isingtrade and keeping order in markets. (The sale of brokerage licences generated a profit for the state, in contrast to the expenses of a bureaucratic structure.) Sewing as middlemen between buyers, sellers and state, brokers used their knowledge of local conditions to supervise trade, providing transportation, ware- housing, and accurate weights and measures. They also kept trans- action records and policed the conduct of merchants, ensuring that contracts were carried out in good faith, and collected commercial taxes such as the lijin. The broker, allowed to dominate local trade in his field, was sure to profit greatly from his status. The strength of the brokerage systern lay in the mutual understanding between the different players involved. In the nineteenth century, with a growing population and increasingly commercialized agriculture as well as the mid-century rebellions, Beijing increasingly devolved its power to these local elites, raising licence prices sharply to squeeze more revenue from the system.'

1 . See Lloyd E. Eastman, Farnily, Fields and Ancestors: Constancy and Change in Chi- na's Social and Economic History, 7 550- 7 949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 130-4. The higher the market level, the more the market systern was in-

terwoven with the Qing administrative hierarchy. The bureaucratic

elite regulated and taxed both rniddlemen and the mercantile guilds.

The better-off merchants were Iiable to official pressure to make

"donations" during times of famine, natural disaster or other gov-

ernment need, thus limiting the accumulation of capital in the hands

of Chinese businessmen. The rnerchant class, traditionally the low-

est of the "four occupations" of Confucian society, had never truly

estabfished itself outside scholar-officiai domination, restricting

the development of capitalism in the imperial era. The Chinese

economy, with al1 its interconnections, may seem rigid in cornpari-

son to the West. But it was capable of dealing with long-term changes such as the increasing population, and could respond rapidly, if irnperfectly, to short-term emergencies. Its large scale could

make it slow-moving, but over the centuries it did not function as a static system. Its underlying principles were quite distinct from 95

post-mercantilist Europe: businessrnen tended to emphasize increasing their share of existing production and gaining monopolies, over innovations to increase overall incorne.

Yet the Chinese were often able to respond quickly to the new economic opportunities created by the Western presence. Many Chi- nese businessmen gained wealth and power by extending their mercantile and financial operations to the treaty ports. The Western financiers had hoped to invest in inland China on their own terms, but in the end needed middlemen. The qianzhuang banks developed their ties with foreign business so well that the final half-century of Qing rule was something of a golden age for thern. It was through these firms that much Western capital entered China: foreigners made substantial loans to them, with compradores as middlemen, and the qianzhuang would then use these funds to market short- term mercantile loans to Chinese merchants. Andrea Lee McElderry observes: The Shanghai hui-hua ch'ien-chuang are an example of a traditional institution which was strengthened by contact with a modern outside influence rather than destroyed by it ....Their close contacts with foreign banks and trading cornpanies made them essentially brokers between foreign and Chinese merchants. Along with the compradors, they bridged the gap between two different commercial systems2

This was not an "exploitativen relationship, as al1 sides benefited.

Starting in 1 897, Chinese businessmen founded yinhang institutions similar in structure to Western banks, and these institutions largely replaced the qianzhuang as channels for foreign investment after

1911. The famous Shanxi banking networks, on the other hand, were unable to adapt to the changes in the Chinese economy and disappeared along with the Qing Dynasty.

In the relatively well-off but isolated western Chinese province of Sichuan, indigenous patterns of trade were particularly resistant to change from outside. The official commercial system was fairly strong, proving a source of stability against external interventions,

2. McElderry, "Shanghai Old-Style Banks (Ch'ien-Chuang) 1 800-1 935, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies #25 (1976), pp. 1, 25. 97

coupled with some internal flexibility. The internal order in towns

like Chongqing was dominated by local trade and provincial guilds

with well-maintained official connections. The experience of mem-

bers of such groups often facilitated a quick response to new market

opportunities like opium production. Their operations allowed some

profit for all. Their members had a good knowledge of local trade

and currency problems, and as many of them came from outside Si- chuan dealing with similar groups in other provinces was not difficult. Such a situation would leave British traders the role of observers and learners--or possibly interIopers- after Chongqing was opened, despite their efforts to insert thernselves into the established trade system.

A traveler entering Sichuan from downriver China dong the

Yangzi encountered the Yangzi Gorges while still in Hubei. This part of the river was hundreds of miles long, with strong currents and three major rapids--an 1896 landslide created a fourth-which se- 98 verely limited the speed of junks travelling upstream, forcing them to employ manpower to pull them through. In addition, the river usually changed forrn between the summer floods and the dry winter, and in a bad season reaching Chongqing from Yichang could take months. (The descent could be managed in a week or two.) Ascending the rapids required armies of onshore trackers, and queues of boats were a familiar sight there. Such a situation seemed promising for

Britain's nineteenth-century steamship carrying trade, though in fact steam faced special challenges here. But after a junk passed the port of Kuizhou and entered Sichuan itself, the river became calmer.

The river below Chongqing included some important towns like

Wanxian, but Chongqing itself was the gateway to Sichuan's central, densely-populated Red Basin. (See Map 2.) The city's trade with the province's interior might move along the Jialing River to and from northeastern Sichuan, westward or eastward along the Yangzi 99

(Wanxian's downriver imports often went to Chongqing first before reversing direction), or along overland routes. Westward, the Yangzi led to Luzhou, where the Tuo River went north into the Red Basin and overland routes south to the province of Guizhou; then to Suifu (also called Xuzhoufu, now called Yibin). The Yangzi was barely navigable

West of Suifu, but soothward overland routes led to Yunnan, and the

Min River could usually be sailed northward as far as Jiading. The overland distance frorn Jiading to the capital Chengdu, the leading

Sichuan market for imports, was relatively short, and in sumrner a

Min tributary was navigable to Jiangkou, almost a suburb of the capital. There were also overland routes between Chongqing and

Chengdu, and routes combining the Jialing or the Tuo with overland stretches, though these were much longer and more expensive than the Luzhou-Suifu-Jiading route.

Chengdu and Chongqing are Sichuan's leading cities, and have long shared a certain sense of rivalry. While Chengdu was the province's 100

political, military and administrative centre, Chongqing took the

lead in commerce. S.A.M. Adshead contrasts Chongqing's curious, in-

clusive extraversion, based on the east-west Yangzi trade, with the

conservative, insular introversion of Chengdu, where overland north-

south trade was also important. Chengdu was dominated by the Con-

fucian scholar-elite; the business community was more central to

Chongqing, "its ear open for news of the Shanghai exchange, Kwei-

chow mining prospects and the situation on the Shensi-Kansu bor-

deV3

Nineteenth-century Chongqing was a city built on a hill of rock,

on a peninsula north of the Yangzi and west of the Jialing, its only

. mainland link an isthmus dominated by burial grounds. (See Map 3.)

All but one of the city gates opened onto the rivers. Townsfolk com-

pared their city's shape to "a snake on a tortoisen4: steep slopes di-

3. Adshead, Province and Politics in Late Imperia1 China: Viceregal Government in Szechwan, 1898- 7 922 (London: Curzon Press, 1 984), pp. 21 -2. 4. Arc hibald Little, Through the Yang-tse Gorges or Tmde and Travei in Western China (London: Sarnpson, Low, Marston & Co., 3rd ed. 1 898), p. 148. Little offers a second translation: "a snake around a tortoise." 101 vided Chongqing into "upper" and "lower" cities and streets were made from Stone steps, so wheeled vehicles were useless. Split- level buildings were common, with three stories each opening onto the street.5 Physical circumstances prevented the compass-grid

Street system around which many Chinese cities are built. As expansion was also impossible, Chongqing had one of the highest population densities for a preindustrial Chinese city. Little land within the city was not built on. Even the Shanhuba sandbar south-

West of the city, inundated during the summer floods, was populated by squatters the rest of the year. (See Map 3.)

Under the imperial system, the highest-ranking official in the

Chongqing area was the daotai intendant (taotai, oi fenxundao). Be- sides Chengdu--which had its own daotak-and the western districts on the Tibetan border, Sichuan was divided into four regional cir- cuits, each under a daotai North Sichuan was administered from Ba-

5. E.S. Little, Brunner-Mond "Review of Trade for 1 9 14: West China Districtn, quoted in Patrick Brodie, "Crescent over Cathay: China and ICI, 1898 to 1956" (Ox- ford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 48-9. 102 oning, West Sichuan from Yazhou, south Sichuan from Suifu, and east

Sichuan-the largest in area and hardest to govern of the four--from

Chongqing. A zhifu prefect (chih-fu) was responsible for the prefecture of Chongqing. And the city was the seat for the zhixian magistrate (chih-hsien, later xianzhang ) of Ba district. Across the

Jialing, the smaller city of Jiangbei was a ting sub-prefecture administered by a tongpan (t'u ng-p'an, or tongzhi ).

interna1 systems of government in nineteenth-century China made some adaptations to changing circumstances in Sichuan as well as downriver. While few of the early industrial developments of the "self-strengthening" period took place in Sichuan, a few innovations appeared, including the lijin tariff levied on goods entering the city. The "Old Lijinn was "ternporarily" introduced to Si- chuan in 1862, to finance a local militia for Chongqing's defense against a local insurgency. In 1878, the military emergency long over, the militia was abolished, but Chengdu continued to levy the 1O3

tax for its own ends. After 1878 a "New Lijin" was also introduced

for municipal spending, but the provincial administration seized this

revenue as well around 1890. In 1895 Old Lijin and New Lijin reve-

nue amounted to over 3 3,000 and 100,000 taels re~pectively.~Si-

chuan had two full-fledged guan (Customs Houses) for lijin busi-

ness, one at the entrance to Sichuan at Kuizhou, the other at

Chengdu. There were four other general lijin stations, at Chongqing,

Luzhou, Hezhou, and Jiading, as well as opium and salt barriers.

Chongqing itself, as well as offices for the two types of lijin, had

Iijin barriers at Xiangguoçi on the Jialing, #uilongçhi an the Yangzi

upstream, and Tangjiatuo d~wnstream.~

Sichuan, however, largely missed out on the military reorganiza-

tions that followed the Taiping emergency. Foreign observers in the

late nineteenth century would consider Chongqing's giirrison some-

. 6. See J.N. Tratman's 1 2.1 2.96 report on lijin (FO 22811 225 G.C. to Chongqing #7/96). Tratman wondered whether Beijing officiais were aware how great this revenue was. 7. See E.H. Fraser's 1.23.93 report on the new transit trade systern, FO 228/1115, pp. 26-8. 1O4

thing of a joke. In a common Chinese pattern, local regiment com-

mander~greatly overstated the size of their units so they could

skim from oversized budgets. They were also bribed into letting

squatters build shanties on the military parade ground.8 ("The

'troops' are al1 engaged in trade," a frustrated E.H. Parker claimed

during the 188 1 cri si^.^) By the middle of the nineteenth century,

the imperial bureaucracy had allowed the local gentry and merchants

largely to take charge of government at the municipal level to a

great degree, a sign that the central governrnent's top-down govern-

ment was extended to its limits, leaving local guild-based govern-

ment as a viable alternati~e.~~

------8. But the shanties were cleared out-at least ternporarily-when the Viceroy visited in 1896. J.N. Tratman, 10.31.96 Intelligence Report (F.O. 228/1225, General Correspondence from Chongqing #6A, 1 1.2.96), pp. 33-8. 9. F.O. 228/675, 7.10.81 pp. 1 28-30. 1O. Dou Jiliang, Tongxiang Zuzhizhi Yanjiu (Chongqing: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1 943), quoted by Mark Elvin, "The Administration of Shanghai," The Chinese City Between Two Worlds, (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press), p. 240. (b)- Trade and Finance in Chongqing

A small part of Chongqing's indigenous trade patterns was for-

eign imports, central to Westerners' perceived hopes for expansion

into Sichuan. Around 1860 most foreign goods were coming via

Guangzhou; before the Taipings' disruption of lower Yangzi trade, a

leading source had been Suzhou in Jiangsu." Later Hankou took prom-

inence in Chongqing's downriver trade, and Shashi took a large share

of direct trade with central China due to its proximity to north-

south trade routes. But an opened Yichang gradually took the overall

lead in Sichuanese commerce.

Visitors as early as Thomas W. Blakiston found a province en-

dowed with profitable natural resources, from coal to opium. If the

Sichuanese economy offered one obstacle to foreign trade, it can

now be seen, it was the province's virtual self-sufficiency in most

1 1. Thomas W. Blakiston, Five Months on the Yang-Tsze: With a Narrative of the Ex- ploration of its Upper Waters, and Notices of the Present Rebellions in China (London: John Murray, 1862)' pp. 228-9. commodities:

For clothing, there is native cotton for the summer, and furs from the Tibetan foothills for the winter. For ceremonial dress there is a good quality of linen and beautiful silk .... For building there is plenty of timber on the hills and lime in abundance, with splendid clay for tile and bricks. For heating there is wood and acres of coal.... There is iron and copper, salt and sulphur, gas and 0i1...~~

The one major exception was raw and processed cotton, the most

common material for Sichuanese clothing. Sichuan only grew it in a

small area, mostly northern districts like Mianzhou: its quality was

mostly poor and its quantity nowhere near Sichuanese spinners' de-

rnandJ3 For generations the province had relied on raw cotton from

Huguang, but in the mid-nineteenth century piece goods, mostly Brit-

ish, were making great inroads. Foreign cottons and woolens, par-

ticularly plain grey shirtings from Lancashire, became a leading im-

port, though they lacked the durability for peasants' daily Wear and

were largely limited to the well-off urban classes.14 The conven-

12. Kenneth J. Beaton, Sewing with the Sons of Shu (Toronto: United Church of Can- ada, 1941), p. 8. 1 3. See E.H. Fraser, 1893 Chongqing Trade Report (Diplornatic and Consular Reports # 1 3 96), pp. 6-7; Thomas Blakiston, Five Months on the Yang-tsze (London: John Murray, 1862), pp. 228-9. 1 4. Fraser, 7 892 Chongqing Trade Report (Diplomatic and Consular Reports tional wisdom among foreign merchants at this time was that piece

goods-based commerce was the future of Western business in the

reg ion.

But a second shift was already occurring by the time Chongqing

was opened in 1891. The Chinese had realized that weaving their

own cloth from cheap machine-spun lndian yarn--shipped to Shang-

hai by foreign merchants mostly in British vessels and having a

coarseness similar to the domestic product-had an economic

advantage over buying imported cloth, and Western cottons were

being displaced in their turnJ5 Already the port's trade was becom-

ing vulnerable to international trends, independent of a foreign com-

mercial presence: an 1893 upward revaluation of lndian currency,

raising lndian yarn prices, contributed to a 20% decline in imports

that year.16 Higher-quality yarn from Shanghai and Hankou mills,

using foreign technology and both Chinese and foreign capital, was

15. lbid. 16. Fraser, 1 893 report, /oc. cit. See Table 1 b for specific figures. 1O8

entering the Sichuan market by the 18903, but its price was not yet

cornpetitive. Still, it was increasing gradually. Japanese yarn found

a smaller niche. Raw Cotton imports from the lower Yangzi valley

had a brief revival, peaking in the late 1890's, then disappeared for

good.17 (See Table 2b.) A small circle of Sichuanese hongs cornbined

high volume and thin profit margins to dominate the yarn imports,

hence Chongqing's overall trade. (This was a general pattern in Chi-

na's domestic trade; cartels and monopolies often dominated mar-

kets, with the approval of the central government.) Few other indi-

vidual imports were prominent, though the Sichuanese were finding

practical uses for a few products like American kerosene, whose

sales were growing by 1891.

Exports were mostly much less buiky than imported cottons and

often small enough to carry overland--northeast to Shaanxi, east to

Hubei, southeast through Guizhou to Hunan and Guangxi-but the

17. Imperia1 Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4, "Report on the Trade of Chun- gkingn 1 89 1- 1 904 passim, Appendix III. 1 O9

great majority went through Chongqing. Sichuan's leading non-opium

export was silk, produced principally around Renzhou, Jiading, Shun-

qing, Baoning and Chengdu itself.18 Silk exports ranged frorn wild

silk--used for fishing nets and later parachutes--to refuse cocoons,

but largely consisted of raw yellow silk. In 1891 silk accounted for

just over half of the foreign customs' exports in value, raw yellow

silk forming a good three-quarters of this figure? Salt, produced

at Ziliujing wells and shipped downriver, was among the most prorn-

inent of official monopolies that Chinese merchants alone exploited:

an 1886 reorganization put 55% of the producer-to-retailer trade

into the hands of a single Chongqing consortium of Chinese business-

rnen.20 Another export was bristles, a byproduct of raising pigs,

which were turned into brushes. Several exports came from Tibet,

including wool, which reached Chongqing and downriver ports

through Songpan and Daqianlu markets. Other Tibet exports were

musk and medicines like rhubarb. (Traditional medicines were both a 18. See W.H. Burnett, Report of the Mission to China of the Blackburn Chamber of Commerce 7 896-7,Volume II, pp. 2 1 3-4. 19. H.E. Hobson, 1 89 1 Trade Report, p. 74. 20. Adshead, op. cit., pp. 40-1. major import and a major export in western China.)

At this time, only high-value export products without much bulk

could bear high transport costs and still be marketable in the rest of

China, let alone overseas. Some exports were already being under-

mined by foreign cornpetition: German aniline dyes were increasing-

ly substituted for nutgalls and safflower. And white wax, an insect

product from the Jiading area used in making candles, was already

being undercut by American kerosene. But the latter export was ternporarily revived in 1894 by the 60th birthday of Cixi the Dowa- ger Empress, commemorated nationwide with candle rituals.

By the turn of the century, however, Sichuan's most valuable export was opium, produced and exported by the Chinese themselves.

The British merchants' lndian imports proved a catalyst in the uncontrollable growth in the drug's Chinese consumption, and the

Treaty of Tianjin set a lijin duty on the substance, signaling de 11 1

facto legalization. In this open market, cheap Chinese production - increased and became more than cornpetitive with imports, which

declined somewhat after 1 890.21 In Sichuan itself opium use had a

long history but was officially suppressed, as in the rest of China,

yet local suppression efforts were proving increasingly ineffective

by mid-century here as elsewhere. In the 1 870's provincial officiais

finally gave up on enforcing a production ban. The plant was per-

fectly suited to Sichuan's hilly, sandy soi1 and proved an ideal win-

ter cash crop for rice farmers--it was worth two to four times the

value of wheat grown on the same area--so by 1881 domestic pro-

duction was satisfying local demandmZ2With an extra investment of

time and money, opium could yield a profit far greater than that of

conventional winter crops like wheat, beans, and canola. As early as

1882 Alexander Hosie saw the banks of the upper Yangzi lined with

2 1. Opium impoRs to China went from an annual average of 72,012 oeYl in the 1 880's to 58,726 in the 1 890's. Yu-kwei Ching, Foreign Trade and Industrial De- velopment of China: An Historicai and lntegrated Analyss through 1 948 (Washington. D.C.: University Press of Washington, D.C., 1956). 22. Adshead, "The Opium Trade in Szechwan 188 1 to 1 9 1 1 ," Journal of Southeast Asian History, Volume VI1 #2 (Septernber 1966), pp. 96-7, 93. See also E.H. Fras- er's 7.3.93 report on local opium production, FO 228/1 1 15 pp. 186-97. 112

the perversely beautiful flo~er,~~and it soon became the province's

predominant source of hard currency. Yunnan also became an export-

er of high-grade opium. In this case the trade was carried out al-

most completely by the Chinese thernselves.

Opium, an appropriately high-value and low-bulk commodity, was

exported both down the Yangzi and along overland routes. Between

1895 and 1904, 2 to 4 million taels worth of opium was passing

through Chongqing's foreign customs alone every year, accounting

for over a third of its overall exports. Sichuanese opium consistent-

ly formed the greater part of this trade, although the Yunnanese

product was also important. Allowing for ebb and flow, the basic

aggregate value of Sichuan's opium exports was fairly constant in

this period, with no upward or downward trend.24 (See Table 3a.) In

currency-short Sichuan, it was often used as an exchange medium.

Fouzhou, a Yangzi port a short distance downstream from Chongqing,

- 2 3. Hosie, Three Years in Western China: A Narrative of Three Journeys in Ssu- Ch'uan, Kuei-Chow, and Yun-Nan (London: George Philip & Son, 1 89O), pp. 1 1-2. 24. Imperia1 Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4, "Report on the Trade of Chun- gking" 1 8%- 1 904 passim, Appendix V. 113

became an important production and distribution centre for the drug.

Consumption, with its accompanying social problems, also increased

throughout the province. The region's growing economic dependence

on opium was a serious concern for the ruling elite, who tried to

promote and develop alternative commodities like silk and Cotton.

In contrast to the major role foreigners played in the sale of lndian

opium, the Sichuanese product was virtually an all-Chinese business.

Sichuan's existing general trade with downriver China, both im-

ports and exports, required a sophisticated credit structure. Five-

or six-month loans with monthly interest at 1.2-1.5% were common.

Many Chongqing-based firms, owned and operated by Chinese, had

long kept in close touch with Shanghai purchase agents, who often

owned a share of the business.25 Sixteen or seventeen Shanxi remit

tance banks--at least one went back to the Ming era--provided

loans, along with a Yunnan bank. They issued advances on merchan-

-- -- - 25. F.S.A. Bourne, Report of the Mission to China of the Blackburn Chamber of Corn- merce (Blackburn, England: North-East Lancashire Press, 1898), Volume 1, pp. 38- 9, 36-7. 114

dise, references from other bankers, or occasionally personal secu-

rity, but were reluctant to accept deposits. 26 A similar number of

qianzhuang cash shops supplemented the financial structure with

small-loan services. Foreign businessmen in China found Chinese fi-

nancial systems difficult to penetrate and relied on foreign banks,

but the latter were still unknown in Chongqing at the turn of the

century.

In Chongqing as elsewhere in China, one obstacle to both foreign

and Chinese commerce was the tangle of monetary variations. The

basic currency unit for business was the Chongqing tael (liang ). The

tael was not a coin but a weight unit--one Chinese ounce--for the

silver exchanged in commerce. (Silver coins were being minted

downriver, but were not circulating in Sichuan before the 1890's.)

Nationwide currency standards were still in the future, and regional

standards varied greatly. A whole group of small qianpu cash shops

2 6. H. Neville & H. Bell, ibid., Volume II, pp. 246-7. Little describes visiting a Shanxi bank in Chongqing dating back to 16 1 3 in op. cit., pp. 1 6 1-2. Sources such as Neville & Bell, Little, Isabella Bird and H.E. Hobson's 1892 Decennial Report differ on the exact nurnber of Shanxi banks in the city. 115

existed just for the exchange of the various Chinese currencies. In

the 1890's the local tael was 2.24% lighter than the Shanghai ver-

sion, but local sycee was 6.85% purer, resulting in a 4.61% premi-

urn.z7

The larger Chinese cities normally recognized many varieties of

tael from al1 over the empire, and silver was further divided into

three levels of purity. In Chongqing itself, at least 60 varieties

were in circulation, a larger number than even most Chinese citiesZ8

(Such lack of uniformity was not limited to silver. The tael for Zi-

liujing salt, which differed from the regular salt tael, was almost

4% greater than Chongqing's silver tael. Raw cotton, cotton yarn and

cotton cloth were rneasured in three different ta el^.'^) In addition,

the opium business created a considerable trade surplus, and since

Shanghai silver was too impure to be exported to Sichuan, the actual

27. Neville & Bell, ibid., Vol. II, p. 180. 28. Lloyd E. Eastman, op. cit., p. 1 10. 29. Hosea Ballou Morse, op. cit., pp. 145-6. 116

premium was as great as 1 Most people used copper cash for

everyday transactions: about 1200 cash could be exchanged for a

single tael until depreciation started around 1900. Sizing up busi-

ness opportunities according to the variety of currencies was one of

the Chinese merchants' longstanding skills that foreigners could

only gradually learn.31

Another factor that contributed greatly to the indigenous com-

mercial system's impenetrability was its internal self-government.

The Chinese guild, providing both mutual services and internal regu-

lation, was an all-important element in Chongqing's social organiza-

tion. Eight groups of Chinese but non-Sichuanese merchants formed

provincial guilds combining rnutual support with Chinese traditions,

and many government officiais consulted them on commercial policy.

The merchants trading in major commodities such as Cotton goods

30. Neville & Bell, op. cit., p. 180- 3 1. Andrea Lea McElderry discusses these monetary dealings in "Shanghai Old-Style Banks (Ch'ien-Chuang) 1800-1935," Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies #25 ( 1 9 76),incfuding "Commercial and Financial Institutions of the Nineteenth and and Twentieth Centuries," pp. 9-2 1. Il7

also formed their own guilds. F.S.A. Bourne was impressed by the

public manifestations of these groups: "The guild-houses are much

the finest buildings in this country; here the Chinese expresses his

ideal of magnificence". Gongsuo trade associations worked along

similar lines. Some had direct links to the leading guilds but the

largest two, for dealers in foreign goods and yarn respectively, con-

vened in their own temple. Only "the residuum" of trackers and wa-

ter-carriers, near the bottom end of the social scale, lacked organi-

~ation.~~

Archibald Little cites evidence of the respective guilds' many

powers and resources:

The universal interest with which al! public festivities, religious as well as secular, are regarded; the rigid thrift observed in private combined with a magnificent lavishness in public: the settlernent of al1 trade disputes by the guild, and the shunning of all laws and lawyers; the rules laid down by the guilds obeyed unquestioned, and the unwritten etiquette of business no less strictly observed; the liberal subscriptions and legacies given to the guilds, and the way in which these institutions are the first to be called upon in times of calami-

- - - 3 2. Bourne, op. cit., Volume 1, pp. 44-5. 118

ty and di~tress.~~

Co-operation, secrecy and submission to rules were hallmarks of the

guild order: each member knew his place and had to respect the po-

sitions of others in the hierarchy in order for the system to work.

Local officials respected the guilds' powers to the point of relying

on these groups to do much of the work of maintaining order and

keeping the economic infrastructure in working condition. Western-

ers might have their own commercial organizations, such as the

Shanghai Charnber of Commerce, but members retained a much great-

er degree of independence within them and emphasized competition

between fellow merchants more than CO-operation.

Some foreigners actually visited Chongqing before describing it.

One of the earliest non-missionary foreign visits to Chongqing was

made by Thomas W. Blakiston in 1861, around the time of Shi's inva-

sion. He saw great commercial potential here, described in gushing

3 3. Little, Through the Yang-tse Gorges or Trade and Travel in Western China (Lon- don: Samson, Low & Marston, 1 887, 3rd ed. 1 898), p. 202. terms in Five Months on the Yang-Tsze. He emphasizes Sichuan's

prosperity, citing "the general well-to-do state of the people, the

contrast presented by the towns, villages, temples, and homesteads

to those of other provinces we have passed through," and compares

Chongqing to Hankou, Shanghai, and Guangzhou as a hub of the re-

gion's trade routes, contending that

as a trading rnart it stands on an equality with the largest cities of the Empire; and situated as it is in the centre of the most populous and thriving part of that fertile province, and at a point on the greatest highway of China whence radiate rivers and other means of communication towards al1 parts of the country, it enjoys an enorrnous amount of mercantile business.... The immense number of junks, the greater part of very large size, which we observed collected at Chung-king, and those which we saw en route, convinced us that the mercantile importance of this place had not been overrated by our informants. 34

But Blakiston also recognized the natural obstacles to trade, in-

cluding the barriers to the new steamship technology with which

foreigners were already starting to transform the coastal trade.

After passing through the Yangzi Gorges, he wrote:

3 4. BIakiston, op. cit., pp. 190, 21 1 , 228-9. Knowing full well how unthankful an office it is to have to un- deceive persons on a point on which their previous notions have been agreeable to them, I necessarily feel sornewhat dis- inclined to divulge our discovery--if discovery it can be called--that the Yang-tsze above 1-chang, at any rate during this season of the year [April], is unsuited to steam- navigation...A would not give as a decided opinion that these rapids will altogether prevent steamers from ascending to the upper waters of the Yang-tsze, because in time light river steamers of full power, and adapted to the peculiar navigation, may be constructed... 35

The Shanghai Chamber of Commerce (an all-foreign organization,

just as Chinese merchants had their own self-interest groups) at

this time viewed the Chinese interior as a field for commercial ex-

pansion. As a result, it developed a sufficient interest in Sichuan's

trade potential to send two delegates to Chongqing in 1869, accom-

panied by two naval officers. Lieutenant Dawson's report suggested

that deploying British steamers on the Upper Yangzi up to this port,

with their advantages for Western merchants, might well be feasi-

ble despite obvious obstacles, at least in the summer months. But it

would require special craft combining shallow draught with strong

3 5. Ibid., pp. 144-5. 121

steering equipment, features which were difficult to combine.

Problems that had to be dealt with included a shallow channel with

few stretches deeper than 10 fathoms, rapids changing form be-

tween summer and winter, lack of anchorage, and the need for intri-

cate navigation. And the river entrance to Sichuan was through the

formidable Yangzi Gorges, a challenge for even the best-suited

steamers. The delegation recommended that the British Admiralty

send a pair of surveyors to map the whole upper river, suggesting

that only two winters would probably be r~eeded.~~

Other foreign visitors included Ferdinand von Richtofen in the

early 1870's, who observed that Chongqing, in contrast to Chengdu,

was "thoroughly a commercial city" with "great banking houses and

wealthy merchants who do business on a large scale." 37 Though Je-

3 6. Alexander Hosie sumrnarizes Dawson's report in op. cit., p. 21 7. 37. Richtofen, Baron Richtofen's Letters, 1870-1872 (Shanghai, 1 903), p. 200, quoted in Adshead, op. cit., pp. 20-2 1 . 122 suit missionaries had been active in Sichuan for a century, making the province one of their largest Chinese missions, the first known

Protestant expedition to the province came in 1868 under Griffith

John of the London Missionary Society. The more optimistic observers, as noted above, saw a relatively well-off region comprising a tenth of the empire and believed that they had found a considerable new market for the products of Western manufacturers.

Sichuan in the late nineteenth century was a prosperous region within China with a population able to afford some foreign imports, but also fairly self-sufficient. A British merchant attempting to do business here faced obstacles in arranging transportation and fi- nances, and particularly in competing with well-positioned Sichua- nese interests enjoying the advantages of familiarity and indigenous support. Even after full opening in 1891, only a handful of British businessmen with limited capital would try their luck in entering the Sichuan trade, while the major foreign players continued to con- 1 23 centrate their efforts in the established downriver treaty ports, where they faced much fewer risks. 1 24

Chapter 3: Opening Chongqing

(a) The Consular Residents

The Chefoo Convention permitted Britain to post a Consular Resi- dent in Chongqing to observe Sichuan's trade and oversee the actions of the few local foreigners, mostly missionaries though later including a few unofficial merchants. The larger British firms in

China, able to form shipping cartels restricting cornpetition in the major downriver and coastal regions, and emphasizing commercial diversification over geographical expansion, were increasingly reluctant ta extend their operations into the Chinese interior. As a result, remote treaty ports often attracted small-scale British businessmen unable to compete in Shanghai and Hong Kong and seeking their own niche inland. After a long downriver career, Archibald

Little came to Chongqing hoping for such a commercial breakthrough.

Central to his dream were his plans to develop a steam trade be- 125

tween Chongqing and the lower Yangzi. Such specially designed ves-

sels, he envisioned, would drastically reduce transportation costs through higher volume and speed and lower risk and give him a local

advantage over both Chinese merchants, who now dominated Sichuan trade, and the large foreign companies. But his first attempt demonstrated the difficulties a minor foreign merchant could get into in

his dealings with both the Chinese and British governrnents. His second attempt got further but showed the need for further techno-

logical developrnent.

Between 1877 and 1891, after the Chefoo Convention, British interests in Sichuan were the responsibility of a Consular Resident stationed in Chongqing. Five men--Edward Colborne Baber, EH. Park- er, Alexander Hosie, F.S.A. Bourne and Henry Cockburn--successively held this position.

Pending the opening the main consular functions at Chungking were to see that the treaty provisions about transit passes were observed and by extensive travel to find out as much as possible about West China and its resources ....The travels of the early Chungking consular agents were enormous and fruit- ful.'

The first three emphasized reconnaissance, undertaking many expe-

ditions through Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou and sending Beijing's

British Legation reports on regional commerce and the possible

trade opportunities for Britain. Baber's journeys between 1877 and

1880 were the subject of a Royal Geographical Society paper, pub-

lished under the title Travels and Researches in the Interior of

China-Vn just the first six months of 1881, Parker made five tours

outside the city. Hosie made three epic journeys between 1882 and

1 884, described in his Three Years in Western China3 He would

corne to be recognized as a leading British authority on Sichuan and

the Opium trade, and serve as Britain's first Consul-General in

Chengdu. Their reports contain basic geographic information and

speculate on future commercial possibilities.

1. P.D. Coates, The China Consuls: British Consular Officers, 7 843- 7 943 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 305, 312-3. 2. Reissued as Travels and Researches in Western China (Taipei Ch'eng Wen, 1 9 7 1 ). 3. Three Years in Western China: A Narrative of Three Journeys in Ssu-ch tuan, Kuei-Chow, and Yun-Nan (London: George Philip & Son, 1890). 127

Another duty of the Consular Resident was to observe the transit trade between downriver open ports and Chongqing. One effect of the transit trade was to mark out the most heavify involved inland centres as likely future candidates for opening, and by the mid-

1880's Chongqing had become one of the leading destinations for transit-pass imports. Foreign Customs statistics show that despite the geographical barriers, an increasingly strong transit trade existed between Chongqing and downriver China, including many foreign imports but still controlled by Chinese interests. Grey Cotton shirtings were China's principal textile import from industrial economies like Britain, and about 10% of net irnports to Shanghai in this category now ended up in Sichuan through the transit trade. For some goods the proportion was higher: woolen lastings were consistently over 20% and one year reached 40%. In an aberrant case, after

1887 chintzes and furnitures surpassed 60%. Yarn imports only started in 1888 but grew quickly. No individual product was dominant in this peri~d.~(See Table 2a.)

4. Imperia1 Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4, "Report on the Trade of At first most of Sichuan's transit trade was with Hankou, peak-

ing in 1881, but then the Hankou trade gradually declined. This re-

versal was due to cornpetition from the new treaty port of Yichang,

which equalled Hankou in 1883 and grew quickly. As a result, total

transit trade inward and outward went from 1.1 6 million taets in

1877 to 4.66 million in 1885. In the peak year of 1890, just before

Chongqing's opening ended this trade, over three-quarters of the

6.82 million-tael total went through Yichang. Judging by the Yichang figures, imports generally exceeded exports but the growing trade was fairly balanced? (See Table 1 a.) Though some of this trade went to ports below Chongqing like Wanxian, most was with Chongqing it- se lf .

Under the Chefoo Convention, British businessmen were not yet permitted to reside in Sichuan or to operate hongs there. In prac-

Ichang," 1 882-90 passim. 5. Imperia1 Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4, "Report on the Trade of Ichang," 1 875-91 passim. 1 29 tice, however, Chinese officials chose to apply the terrn hongchan only to Iicensed monopolies, and avoided comment when some foreigners opened zhuang firms employing a few local Chinese agents?

Such ventures were still small enough to ignore. Three ambitious non-British foreigners arrived in Chongqing at the end of 1883 with a shipload of foreign manufactures to seil in Chengdu, but the project proved ill-starred. The merchants hoped to seIl their wares at the retail level without middleman expenses, but their business sense was inadequate to compete with local merchants, and one soon left with their interpreter. Some of the goods sold, but expenses were too high over a stay of several months and buying prices for other goods were so low that the two remaining merchants preferred to return with what was left of their stock. The foreign custorns' encouragement of the transit trade was not enough in itself to foster British commerce in this region.

6. E.H. Parker, from a 5.28.8 1 report on piece goods irnports (FO 228/675), pp. 101-2. 7. Alexander Hosie, 1884 Trade Report (FO 228/746), pp. 11 3-4; Yichang IMC Commissioner J.L Chatmers, 1884 Trade Report, p. 55. 130

Britain's consular staff in Chongqing, as elsewhere, were charged with representing the British government's interests, both to Chi- nese officiais and to British residents and visitors. Central to these interests was developing a uniform trade system along the lines established by treaty. Before other nations opened their own consulates here, the first consulate was unofficially representing foreign interests in general. In opened ports, a leading concern for a consul was representing the interests of his nation's merchants, somewhat in parailel to Chinese mercantile guilds' representation of their members. But Chongqing still officially lacked foreign businessrnen, and the small foreign presence was dominated by missionaries.

Much of the Consular Agents' work involved observation and developing knowledge of a region still largely unknown to Europeans, in part to learn of Sichuan's economic structure and what opportunities it might offer Britain's commercial interests. Baber submitted reports on the local opium trade, Tibet's tea imports, raw silk and white wax exports, and on the feasibility of opening Ch~ngqing.~The

8. These include a 2.6.79 opium repofi on opium (FO 228f647, pp. 157-96); a 131

subjects of Parker's reports include the salt trade, the opium trade

and piece-goods imports.9

Another of their responsibilities was to keep an eye, to the ex-

tent that they could, on the Tibetan situation. Tibet was part of the

Qing empire, though Chinese rule was still feudal and indirect. Ti-

betan exports to China--including wool, hides, medicines, indigo and

musk--exceeded Chinese imports, which were led by tea.1° This

trade surplus made Tibet into a market for exports from British

lndia and potentially a target for British political influence.

(Chengdu would eventually mint rupee-style coins for the Tibet

trade.) Consular correspondence kept the diplornatic leadership

aware of Chinese policy in Tibet and of bids for influence by rival

powers like nearby Russia, though the Tibetan government was still 3.4.79 Tibet tea report (pp. 197-217); a 2.28.79 raw silk report (pp. 21 8-32); a 6.10.79 white wax report (pp. 233-50); a 5.28.79 report on opening (pp. 252- 88). 9. These include a 2.25.81 salt report that followed a visit to Hezhou (FO 228/675, pp. 7-7 1); a 4.25.8 1 opium report that followed a Guizhou visit (pp. 82-93); and a 5.28.8 1 piece-goods report (pp. 95-1 04). 1 0. W.C. Haines Watson, FO 1711 648, pp. 28-42. Watson provides figures on Tibet- an trade through Songpan, Guanxian and Maozhou as a confidential addendurn to his 1903 report on Chongqing trade, not included in the report's published edition. 132

willing and able to keep out explorers like Bela Sczechenyi, who

tried to enter at the end of 1879 but gave up after being fired on.ll

(Britain, however, persuaded China in 1892 to open the Tibetan town

of Yatung to trade with nearby India.) Chongqing's Consular Resi-

dents also inquired after incidents involving British subjects: Baber

reported in 1878 that Margary's murder was still under officia1 in-

vestigation.12

Life for a Chongqing Consular Resident was far from easy. His

job was essentially a one-man operation, along with a small Chinese

staff. The city's foreign population was still tiny, so aside from

inland tours, the crises of 1881 and 1 886 and several reports on

commercial conditions, he had little to do. "It was a post for the

hardy."I3 To lessen the possibility of anti-foreign incidents, Baber

maintained a low profile and avoided walking through the city. In

asking to be transferred, Parker cited the following reasons: 1 1. Baber describes the Sczechenyi expedition in FO 228/647, pp. 291-303; FO 228/649, pp. 164-5. 1 2. Baber, FO 228/608, pp. 130-3 (8.9.78). 13. Coates, op. cit, pp. 305-6. A filthy town; the impossibility of securing quiet by night or day; an ill-conditioned, ignorant, and inhospitable people; the necessity of a public officer of living a reserved and austere life, the absence of al1 European society except that of men filled with a solitary idea with which I have little sympathy [missionaries]; duties of a commercial nature which (though I have done rny best to accomplish them al1 satisfactorily) are of al1 official duties, the least interesting to me; the difficulty of obtaining any--not to Say healthful--e~ercise.'~

The agents also considered their residence sub-standard. Henry

Cockburn considered it so unhealthy he unilaterally decided to move

to a house with a more expensive lease, without the long process of

consulting the consular administration in Shanghai. The latter then

forced him to pay the difference out of his own pocket, which his

first successor also did? Cockburn requested leave, terming conçu-

lar life in Chongqing "unspeakably dreary" and citing the sense of

"isolation and solitude" and "one of the most depressing climates to

be found ... in China."l6 And some of the Consular Residents, like later

consuls, had to deal with the maverick businessman Archibald Little. 14. Parker, FO 227675. pp. 135-7 (7.25.81). 15. Henry Cockburn, FO 228/1044, pp. 134-58 (4.4.89); H.E. Fulford, FO 228/1050, pp. 103-4 (1 2.4.90). 16. Cockburn, FO 228/1050 pp. 95-8 (1 0.8.90). (b) Archibald Little and the Kuling Crisis

Archibald John Little made his first visit to Chongqing in 1883

and described it in detail in Through the Yang-tze Gorges, one of

Victorian Britain's most popular Chinese travel books.17 (He and his

wife Alicia were both respected writers of a wide range of works,

including fiction and drama.) Little, who had spent over 20 years in

China and developed a fairly successful mercantile firm operating in

the Hankou-Yichang steam trade, saw great potential in the Sichuan

trade. He was an ambitious but mercurial merchant whose reach

usually exceeded his grasp, and he had a talent for alienating people,

particularly British consuls. And he was unusually serious in his ob-

jective of opening Sichuan to foreign trade.

17. Little, Through the Yang-tse Gorges or Trade and travel in Western China (Lon- don: Sampson, Low & Marston, 1 887). The third edition (1 898) includes a chapter describing the Leechuen's recent ascent to Chongqing. 135

Little worked on a relatively small scale, like the majority of

China's foreign businessmen, though he had years of experience in trade within China and a fair knowledge of the Chinese trade system in centres like Hankou and Yichang. This group largely lacked the extensive capital resources and strong links with London interests that the larger companies enjoyed. In particular, unable to afford networks of direct agents, they still generally had to rely on local partnerships. With the existing major treaty ports dominated by the leading companies, those who hoped to irnprove their economic position were largely left with high-risk ventures in untested areas, and many went far afield. Little hoped to find his commercial niche in western China, and was more willing to risk capital in designing and building a special steamship than his larger cornpetitors were. Al- though a large investment was required, he hoped for huge rewards.

Soon Little, exploiting the vagueness of the Chefoo Convention, was hatching a plan to build a steamship to conquer the Yangzi Gorges and force the opening of Chongqing. His hope was to thus extend his 136

commercial niche westward into Sichuan.

Opinion was divided on the desirability and feasibility of such a

venture. In 1 882, after two sons of an important general were

drowned in a shipwreck in the gorges, the Chengdu regime considered

an official steam line from Yichang to Chongqing. l8 The next year

C.T. Gardner, Yichang's British consul, tried to ascend in a steamer

but a rapid destroyed the boat and Gardner was only saved by a local

lifeboat. '9 Back in 1881 Thomas Francis Wade, the British Minister

in Beijing, had been concerned that opening Chongqing without stearn

would leave the foreign community with poor security, and spoke to

a major British shipping firm-probably Jardine, Matheson--about

the possibility of sending steamers to the port. The Company, how-

ever, feared that its own effort and expense would ultimately only

benefit its Chinese rival, China Merchants. (The British govern-

ment's interest in the general extension of British trade throughout

18. Peking ~azettef6.9.82,cited by F.A. Morgan in Report of the Tade of Yichang for the Year 7 882, pp. 59-60. 19. Coates, /oc. cit. 137

China was sometimes in conflict with the policy of the leading Brit-

ish firms, who feared perceived risks to their existing position.)20

But Little plunged ahead and informed the British Legation of his in-

tentions. The latter, which promised to support his plans, informed

the Zongli Yamen of the scheme in December 1885.21 In 1886 Little

organized the Upper Yangtze Navigation Company, planning to raise

f 10,000 and predicting a f 6000 annual net ret~rn.~~

Little ordered the Kuling, a stern-wheeler 175 feet long and mea-

suring an imposing 200 tons, to be built in Glasgow before being

shipped in parts and reassembled in Shanghai. The new Company paid

f 18,000 for the Kuling and f 5400 for an Yichang wharf site. By

1887 reports of the plans were circulating in the region, and China

Merchants and Jardine, Matheson considered their own ventures.23

But local hostility--not least from the trackers, who feared losing

-- 20. Wade, FO 17/1173, pp. 1-2. The documents in FO 17/1173 (7 887-9) and 1 174 (1 890-3) are collected under the title "Mr. Little's Schemes." 21. Nicholas O'Conor, ibid., pp. 26-7 (1 1 .10.85); Sir John Walsharn, ibid., p. 1 5 (2.1 7.87). The report to the Zongli Yarnen was is despatch #409. 2 2. A prospectus of the cornpany is enclosed in ibid., pp. 1 3-4. 2 3. C. Gardner (British Consul in Hankou), FO 1 7/11 73, pp. 69-72 (9.21.86). 138

their livelihood--was also increasing, and Little recognized the dan-

ger of official obstruction. And the British Legation in Beijing was

becoming ambivalent. Chongqing Consular Resident Henry Cockburn

sent a report on the issue describing his September 5 meeting with

local officials and two Chengdu functionaries who seemed very hos-

tile to the proposal. Remembering the previous year's anti-mission-

ary riot, he warned of "almost inevitable" unrest if the Kuling ar-

rived. Some Chinese merchants welcomed steam but at least 20,000

junkmen were ill-disposed, and several scholars were often anti-

foreign. Cockburn favored a compromise, contending that the con-

nection between steam trade and the port's opening was "purely ar-

bitrary. "24 Little was skilled at pu blicizing his ventures back in

Britain, and in the auturnn the Manchester and Leeds Chambers of

Commerce gave him their public support.25 He also offered the Ad-

miralty facilities for a survey of the Upper Yangzi, but encountered

s kepticism.

24. Cockburn, FO 228/850, pp. 309-29. 25. FO 17/1173, p. 84 (9.29.87), p. 94 (1 1.1 8.87). The Kuling was launched in Shanghai in January, 1888, and soon arrived in Yichang, where Little applied for permission to proceed to

Chongqing. But now he faced bureaucratic delaying tactics by the

Yichang authorities, as the Legation had expected, knowing that many provincial officiais were more resistant to the Western presence than Beijing. The immediate issue was what measures to take to prevent steamer-junk collisions and to deal with them after they occurred, and the Chinese were slow to corne to terms. Beijing feared being unable to control regional disorder resulting from the

Kuling's arrivai, but admitting this would have encouraged direct foreign intervention similar to the later anti-Boxer expedition. (Of- ficials who worried that monkeys in the gorges would throw rocks at the steamer may have been hinting at this dilemma.) The British diplomats were willing to consider Chinese proposals for a post- ponement, but his company's uncertain financial situation and the limited season suitable to the ascent made Little less flexible. In 1 40

the meantirne, Little put the Kuling to work on the Hankou-Yichang

route. The ship soon needed repairs and people began to wonder

whether it was physically capable of the journey through the Gorges,

strengthening the Chinese negotiating position. Talks dragged on

into the new year.

In March of 1889 Little agreed in Yichang to a compromise under

which he would sel1 the Kuling for f 15,000 and would wait another

10 years before trying a similar venture. (The real reason for his

agreement was the ship's defects "and consequent embarrass-

ment.")26 But negotiations for an agreement on rules governing

steamer-junk collisions, part of the deal, dragged on for months: in

particular, the British considered unacceptable the Zongli Yamen's

demand that foreign steamers accept total liability for accidents as

determined by Chinese authorities. Little threatened to resume the

planned Chongqing voyage in the autumn with or without officia1

26. Walsharn, ibid., p. 326 (a confidential 3.22.89 telegrarn to the Foreign Secre- tary, Prime Minister Lord Salisbury). 141

consent, tho-ugh he stood a good chance of failing and destroying his

Company, then left for England. As in 1876, both sides turned to

Robert Hart for rnediati~n.~~

By the end of 1889 Hart arranged a compromise agreement. Little

sold the Kuling to China for f 18,000--it ended up in the China Mer-

chants fleet--along with other property for £5500, and the Upper

Yangtze Steam Navigation Company was dissolved with no losses for

its shareholders. And on March 13 Britain and China agreed to amend

the Chefoo Convention to open Chongqing as a treaty port. Under the

1890 Chongqing Convention foreign merchants would be allowed to

ship goods to and from Chongqing using chartered Chinese junks or-

an afterthought which proved rnoot-build their own junks for the

same purpose; chartered junks would operate on the same commer-

cial terms as steamships downriver; and foreign steamships would

-.. . be allowed access to Chongqing once the first --.:.; * - ' ------

27. Hart's role is described by Stanley F. Wright in Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast: Wm. MuIIan & Sons, 1 9 SO), p. 608-1 1. 1 42

Chinese steamer arrived there.z8 (Chinese officials wanted foreign

steam rights to start when the first Chinese steamer returned to

Yichang, but Britain feared that such a ship would be perrnanently

stationed in Sichuan, allowing it a monopoly within the province.)

After a London Chamber of Commerce proposai, probably encouraged

by Little him~elf,~gunprecedented provisions were also made for

specially-supervised Yichang repacking of yarn bales into smaller

packages better suited to junks, without any extra d~ty.~O

The actual opening of Chongqing was planned for late 1890. The

Chongqing daotai, Chongqing's British Consul and the foreign cus-

toms commissioners in Chongqing and Yichang had been granted

scope to determine details of the agreement's execution, allowing

for "modifications. .. by common consent," and provisional custorns

28. Sir John Walsham's original 7.10.90 draft FO 17/1 174, pp. 67-72; the re- sponding 2.9.90 Chinese draft pp. 73-9; Walsharn's 3.5.90 compromise draft pp. 81- 9. The pact alço contained arrangements to prevent native abuse of the "vessels of Chinese type" provision and to levy tonnage dues on these ships. 29. FO 17/11 74, pp. 1-6. 30. Tai sumrnan'zes the Chongqing Convention in op. cit., pp. 84-5. 1 43

rules were promulgated in November, to take effect next ApriL3'

Britain's Representative was upgraded to a full Consul in accordance

with the city's treaty-port status. Again as in 1876, some English-

men condemned the deal as a sellout: a North-China Herald article

titled "The Non-Opening of Chungking" called the negotiations a

"comedy of err~rs."~*But in view of the difficulties of steam navi-

gation on the Upper Yangzi, especially for a ship with the shortcorn-

ings of the Kuling, it is hard to imagine any better arrangement as

regards British interests.

Little's experience in dealing with the Chinese was not atypical

of small-scale Western merchants hoping to make their fortune in

remote treaty ports. Raising capital in the British business commu-

nity had been an important and fairly difficult part of his venture.

(Larger players like Jardine, Matheson and Butterfield, Swire, on the

other hand, had available funds but were too cautious to stake so 31. H.E. Fulford, FO 228/886,pp. 3 19-25. 32. "The Non-Opening of Chungking," a miscellaneous article in the 12.1 2.90 North-China Herald, p. 7 14. See also a misceilaneous article reporting the Chongqing Convention's proclamation in the 3.1 3.9 1 Herald, p. 298. 144

much capital on such a risky project.) Secondly, Little faced the bu-

reaucratic resistance of local officiais not yet resigned to the for-

eign presence in their neighborhood, and had to go over their heads,

working through Beijing's British Legation and the Zongli Yamen. He

wanted home government support not in explicitly violating previous

agreements but in going beyond what had been clearly agreed ta But

his political clout was not so great as that of the large companies,

and the British government refused to give priority to his grievance.

As a result, the Chinese were able to make the price of forcing their

agreement too high for Britain, and the two governments cut a com-

promise deal. Under pressure from both sides, Little had no chance

of realizing his original goal, and the technical challenge of taking a

steamship to Chongqing would have to await a later day.

The Chinese official-commercial bloc gained a partial victory in

limiting British economic encroachment in western China. The message to small-scale British merchants across China must have 145 seemed fairly clear: in such situations, unless a particularly important principle was at stake, they would have to play largely by Chi- na's rules and could expect little favor from either government.

(This was in contrast to the large firms doing business in Shanghai, who enjoyed considerable clout with their home governments and curried Beijing's favor by supplying capital for many of the Chinese government's projects.) Sichuan's commerce would continue to be dominated by Sichuanese institutions, which continued to look to

Chengdu to thwart foreign penetration. The steam trade was the only factor that possibly threatened that control, but was still a thing of the future on the upper Yangzi. From the perspective of Si- chuanese merchants, opening did not confer immediate benefits, though it created the possibility of future growth in trade and accompanying opportunities for enrichment. 146

To effect Chongqing's opening, the lmperial Maritime Customs

sent up a team of six foreigners and four Chinese to man the city's

new foreign customs Britain's H.E. Fulford, Chongqing's

first full consul, had to abandon his first two attempts to ascend

the difficult autumn river and was very late in reaching the port, so

the treaty was only put into operation in the new year. Chongqing

was declared open by the Chinese authorities in an officia1 ceremony

on March 1, 1891.34 Mrs. Little recalls the beginning in inauspicious

terms:

When Chungking was first made a Treaty Port, the then British Consul... was not even advised from Peking that the port was open. Consequently, he was absent from al1 public functions instituted at the formal opening, took no part in the drawing up of the regulations under which British trade was to be es- tabiished there, had no voice in the rules issued by the Chi- nese Cust0ms.3~

33- The two journaIs of their journey to Chongqing-one group under new commissioner H.E. Hobson ascended the river whiie another group went overland-were published as lchang to Chungkriig: 1890 , #17 in the IMC's "Special Series" (Shanghai: lmperial Maritime Custorns, 1 892). 3 4. The opening is described in a 3.20.9 1 NCH report, p. 335. 3 5. Alicia Little, lntimate Chha: The Chinese as l Have Seen Them (London: Hutch- 147

The first chartered junks were entering and leaving the port a few months later. But Chongqing's treaty-port status did not grant at once to British merchants the degree of autonomy they desired in steam shipping and the inland transit trade. The city, overall, would only be opened in a graduai process which took several years. In- deed, the opening appeared to make scant immediate difference to

Chongqing's small foreign community.

Part of the foreign customs' plans for the new treaty port was to create a new transit trade for foreign and Sichuanese merchants between Chongqing and inland Sichuan, as the transit trade between

Chongqing and downriver China had been created 15 years before.

But this encountered unexpected, determined obstruction from the

Sichuanese authorities. As had happened downriver before 1 876, provincial regimes wanted to protect their own revenue source and cared nothing about Beijing's foreign customs revenue. In autumn of

189 1 three foreign merchants, noticing that transit passes were 148

cheaper than the equivalent lijin for yarn, made 20 shipments of

cotton yarn from Chongqing up the Jialing to Hezhou under the first

transit passes entirely within Sichuan. The local officiais--with

the clear connivance of Chengdu--1evied a special luodishui duty on

the goods and generally put up whatever obstacles they could think

of, causing serious delays in selling the yarn. In the end, the local

duties were paid and transit fees refunded on 15 of the 20 cargoes.

The foreign merchants had stood their ground on the other five and

eventually got through without paying the tax, two after serious de-

lays, but then the local consignees were pressured into paying the

lijin themselves. 36

Fulford, disappointed in not being more effectual, encouraged the

merchants to try again in 1892 and test the local officiais' resolve,

but Chinese buyers feared a long, expensive battle during which they

would have to keep paying the luodishi, and the foreigners gave up.

In addition, Chengdu lowered the yarn lijin so the advantage of tran-

36. Fulford, FO 228/IO64, pp. 252-63 (1 2.1 6.9 1 ). 149

sit passes was reduced. This standoff continued for four year~.~~

The prospects for the introduction of steamships seemed bleak at

first to foreigners, as the Chinese showed little interest. Then the

situation was changed by Japan's military rout of China in 1895.

The resulting Treaty of Shimonoseki changed the terms of treaty-

port regulation, allowing some previously banned activities. The

Japanese were now permitted to build factories in the treaty ports,

and Chongqing was one of several ports fully opened to them, includ-

ing steamer rights. Existing foreign powers like Britain had "Most

Favored Nation" status in relations with China, so the same rights

were extended to them. This meant that British steamers now had

the unambiguous right to proceed to Chongqing. But commercial ini-

tiative was still needed.

In addition, lijin were increased to pay Sichuan's share of the

37. Fulford, FO 228/1084, p. 14 (5.10.92); pp. 35-6 (5.7 2.92); pp. 37-80 (5.13.92); pp. 81-4 (5.21.92); pp. 86-88 (6.9.92). indemnity promised to Japan, so the Consul asked the foreign mer-

chants still doing business in Chongqing to make a new attempt at

establishing transit trade. At first the merchants still felt intimi-

dated, but in 1896 a new effort was made and the system was final-

ly put into force? (Chongqing's foreign community attributed this

success to the intervention of the French and German ministers in

Beijing after their merchants were affected, and suggested the Brit-

ish Consul had "lost face" in failing to stop resistance earlie~~~)

The transit system was revised at the turn of the century, with

shippers of domestic goods gaining access to the practice, so Chi-

nese yarn was now being sent inland under transit passes, increasing

its competitiveness. Chinese merchants could now engage in an all-

Chinese yarn trade. without even indirect foreign involvement. The

Chinese government, accepting that economic concessions would re-

main for the forseeable future, had learned to revise such agree-

ments in ways that could favor its own merchants.

3 8. See H. Neville & H. Bell, "Memorandurn on the Transit Duty Question," pp. 145- 76, Report of the Mission to China of the Blackburn Chamber of Commerce 7896-7 (Blackburn: North-East Lancashire Press, 1 898), especially pp. 1 58-62. 39. lbid., pp. 320-1. Little, who had applied to introduce a steam launch in Chongqing harbor in 1893, set out to realize his old plan of bringing a steamer to the port now that this was agreed to be within his rights. He purchased the Shanghai-built Leechuen, a teakwood ship 55 feet long and measuring only 7 tons, allowing a shallow draft. Its twin screws increased its maneuverability. In early 1898 circumstances forced hirn to attempt the ascent in the low-water winter months, when the river was unsuited to steamships, without cargo or passengers. The Leechuen, which left Yichang on February 15, was supposed to reach Chongqing in 10 days but encountered several delays.

The engine proved weak. Some rapids required hauling by as many as

300 trackers. Coal ran out and two days were lost waiting for a new supply. The ship struck a submerged rock and had to be beached to repair a hole in the hull. A propeller broke, and one of the two pumps failed. In addition, a Chinese gunboat escort had to be towed, further slowing down the voyage. It was only on the morning of March 9 152

that Little and the Leechuen arrived in Chongqing after 10 days of

steaming time al~ne.~O(They were greeted by a huge, mostly local

crowd.) Little, who received a hero's welcome from the city's for-

eign community, later summarized the voyage:

It was a first experiment, which could not be hurried; it was for necessary reasons, made at a season when the rapids were at their worst and it was made with a vesse1 of insufficient power. Nevertheless my object was achieved in demonstrat- ing the possibility of navigating the Upper Yang-tse, and in drawing public attention to its ne~essity.~'

The Leechuen proved to be a false start for Sichuan's steam

trade. The expedition proved that steam transport through the gorg-

es was physically possible, but the existing steamship technology

needed further development before a regular steam trade could be-

corne economically sound. Little himself recognized his ship's limi-

tations and tried to find uses for it close to home. He obtained a

40. See Little, "The Arriva1 cf the Leechuen," in the 3.28.98 Herald, p. 520. 41. Little describes the voyage in a chapter of the third edition of Through the Yang- tse Gorges, pp. 283-300. The quote is on p. 299. He also discusses the voyage in "The New Rapid in the Upper Yang-tse and the Arrival of the First Steamer at Chungking," reprinted in Gleamings from FYîy Years in China (London: Sarnpson, Low & Murston, 1910), pp. 134-9. 153

tugboat czrtificate for the Chongqing harbor, but few junks were

strong enough for the strain of towing. A shipment of new propel-

lers was lost, preventing a voyage upstream to Suifu. In autumn of

1899 Little sent his ship to Yichang and back to bring up Joseph Wal-

ton, a British MP who supported the "open door" policy, and a pilot

called S. Cornell Plant, who would later play an important role in de-

veloping the region's steam trade. He managed to seIl the Leechuen

for 1000 pounds and was already making plans for a new steamship.

Some foreigners were buying land strategically placed on the local

waterfront, in anticipation of the steam trade's imminent arrivaL4'

Chongqing had been an established centre for Sichuanese com-

merce long before its opening, and now the foreign customs and

transit trade offered new commercial opportunities. Yet foreign

businessmen still faced great difficulties in cracking the Sichuan

market. Even treaty-established rights like the transit trade had to

be fought for. China had longstanding well-developed networks for

42. M.F.G. Fraser, 12.3 1.98 Intelligence Report, FO 228/1359, pp. 17-9. 1 54 interprovincial commerce, a system which resourceful Chinese cornpetitors continued to dominate. This reflected their great experience and knowledge of trade along Chinese lines, manifest in fields such as Cotton imports. In particular, the Westerners needed the steam trade to offset these natural Chinese advantages through the cost-efficiency of large volumes, and through greater dependability and more predictable sailing schedules. This was the central obstacle that had to be overcome before foreigners could achieve their dreamed-of commercial penetration of western China's interior.

Little's experiment showed that it could be done in theory, though technological obstacles were greater than the optimists had expected. Beyond demonstration, small firms lacked the capital essential to the steam trade's development, which would require large-scale ventures. Once again, the British hope of lucrative overnight break- throughs had turned into the reality of delayed, incremental gains by both sides. 155

Chapter 4: The Missionary Presence in Sichuan

(a) The First Missions and the 1886 Crisis

The story of British missionaries in Sichuan illustrates a theme of considerable importance during Chongqing's period as a treaty port. There was periodic social and political instability in the province at this tirne, affecting the missions much more than foreign trade. The missionaries operated on the faultline between the more sophisticated trading centres like Chongqing and the more conservative agricultural interior. As such, they were often close to the centre of such unrest, and sometimes they and their followers bore the brunt of it due to their "outsider" stigma. On several occasions they were evacuated for their own safety, aiong with the merchants.

These outbreaks hurt the merchants' interests even more than the missionaries, undermining their atternpts to create a permanent presence. The British merchant presence in Sichuan bears comparison to the Protestant missions already being established there by 1891.

The latter were always much larger in number and their security was a chronic concern to the British officials stationed in the province, particularly in four crises at the turn of the century. In corn- parison, there was often little time for promoting British economic interests as in the period of Consular Agents. Sichuan's isolation- the region was inaccessible to gunboats until the turn of the century--often made their protection difficult, and in the 1900 Boxer crisis the British Consul decided on evacuation, a precedent that would be repeated several times in the republican period. Such disturbances made the whole foreign community somewhat defensive and dampened the expansionary enthusiasm of British businessmen in western China. The mission community might seem to provide a potential local base market for Western goods, but their number was infinitesimal compared to the Chinese population. As it was, the 157 foreign business community was somewhat slow to develop this opportunity, so the missionaries had to develop their own supply distribution. While British merchants in the first years after opening had little direct influence, the missionaries promoted programs such as improved public health and education, though they could only scratch the surface.

China's foreign merchants had economic motivations; missionaries marched to a different drummer. The latter tried to fit into

China as preachers, teachers or practitioners of medicine, attempting to introduce Western ideas that might improve the lives of the

Chinese people. ln the late nineteenth century they were growing rapidly in number and spreading well into the interior despite consular misgivings over the question of missionary safety. The presence of missionaries, particularly in trying economic times, could lead to their becoming targets of mischief, not just because of their non- conformist beliefs. In addition, many Chinese saw them as "outsid- 158

ers" and a source of national humiliation in the "unequal treaties,"

resistance to which sometimes took the form of anti-missionary ac-

tions. In the case of Sichuan, their safety was protected by occa-

sional evacuations arranged by the consuls, but many converts suf-

fered greatly.

Sichuan's British community was definitely dominated by Protes- tant missions: of the 240 British subjects resident in the province in 1 897, 232 were mis~ionaries.~While businessmen had the sometimes uncertain motivation of short- or long-term profit, missionaries were out to improve the lives of ordinary Chinese, at least in their own mind, and in the nineteenth century had an expansionary zeal. The Protestant missions were already expanding into the Si- chuanese interior, joining the existing Catholic missions, at a time when the British Legation still worried about resulting security problems and refused to recognize their right to do so, to no effect.

1 - P. D. Coates, The China Consuls: British Consular Otficers, 7 843- 1 943 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 988), pp. 3 1 0-2. 159

Consul E.H. Fraser, in his report on local affairs at the end of 1892,

discusses the expansion in the missions and the difficulties of pro-

tecting the missionaries. He found the reluctance of local officials

to provide protection understandable and suggested a compromise

under which the missionaries would limit their expansion to a hand-

ful of communities besides those at pre~ent.~

Faced with a fait accompli, the Legation belatedly recognized the fact of the missionaries' residing inland, in 1896. But the potential difficulties in protecting the inland rnissionaries would be dramatically demonstrated in Sichuan over the next several years. As the missionary presence in Sichuan became more and more visible, so did anti-foreign and anti-Christian sentiment, which at first mani- fested itself in popular and officiai resistance to new missions. But soon it boiled over into pronounced unrest. Chongqing itself experienced an anti-missionary riot as early as 1886, and four crises took place between 1895 and 1902.

2. Fraser, FO 228/1084, pp. 138-41. Protestant missions, now protected by a consular presence, had

been moving into Chongqing well before the port's opening. They

joined Missions etrangeres de Paris, a mission of French Catholics

whose history in Sichuan went back for over a centuy3 The French

mission now had 100 branches across the province, and perhaps

100,000 Sichuanese practiced Cath~licisrn.~A seminary provided

somewhat rudimentary training for Chinese priests, and the church

avoided an overly stringent interpretation of its rules, allowing an-

cestral honors, footbinding, opium trading and secular weddings and

funerals. Catholic converts could hold high positions in Chinese so-

ciety, except for the civil executive. (In 1881 a Guangzhou-born

Catholic was in charge of Sichuan's salt cartel.) The French mission-

aries, who tended to stay in their own quarters and rarely mingled

with locals, disapproved of the Third Republic's secularism, but

3. A chronology in E.W.P. Mills' Notes on Szechwan (reprinted in West China Mis- sionary News, May 1939, pp. 201 -4) reports that the first Catholic missionaries arrived in Sichuan in 1753; in the Imperia1 Maritime Customs' 1882-91 Decennial Report H.E. Hobson dates the mission's start at 1696, p. 1 19. 4. Hobson, /oc. cit. 161 were willing quietly to promote French interests in the region. The mission's east Sichuan branch, with headquarters in Chongqing, was already one of the province's largest landowners, and, one Consular

Resident reported that it had "almost unlimited f~nds."~

Occasional persecution was part of the Catholic experience in Si- chuan, with incidents as early as 1785. But the situation worsened in the late nineteenth century: over a hundred acts of anti-Christian actions were recorded in the half-century before 1904, more than in any other Chinese province. This reflected an increasing breakdown in Sichuan's longstanding social order. The early Qing Dynasty had encouraged large-scale immigration to the province to repopulate it after the devastation of the mid-seventeenth century, and as population grew, reducing available land, tensions increased among the various immigrant groups and between them and the minority with more longstanding roots in the region. Growing discontent was ex-

S. E.H. Parker, from a 7.4.81 general report on Sichuan (FO 228/675), pp. 114- 7, 6. Mills, /oc. cit, 162

ploited by groups like the Gelaohui, a secret society extending

through much of China and attracting thousands of members in Si-

chuan alone. In this situation, in times of economic difficulties

such as drought, anti-foreign movements made scapegoats of fol-

lowers of heterodox beliefs like Christianity. It is no coincidence

that the anti-Christian outbreaks of 1886 and 1898 happened at a

time when grain prices were rising sharply. In Chongqing, Judith

Wyman observes, "the vast majority of the victirns of these antifor-

eign movements, either in the rhetoric or on the battleground, shared

ethnicity and race (Chinese Christians) or nationality (Manchus) with

their perpetrat~rs."~

In 1876 Jiangbei--which had a reputation as unfriendly to for-

eigners-suffered a spate of anti-Catholic rioting. In anti-Christian

outbursts the greatest damage was usually to the property and per-

sons of Sichuanese Christians. Dozens of converts were rnurdered

7. Judith Wyrnan, "The Arnbiguities of Chinese Antiforeignism: Chongqing, 1870- 1900," Late Imperia1 China, Vol. XVIII, #2 (December 1997), p. 92; pp. 88-93; p. 103; p. 1 1 6. 163

and a hospital was levelled in the riot, which was accompanied by

anti-Western placards, and unrest spread to some rural cornmuni-

ties. Xenophobic officials were often blamed for encouraging anti-

foreign acts, and in this case Sichuan's Literary Chancellor was ac-

cused of writing mernorials provoking the unrest. (The North-China

Herald correspondent was already noting the church's "proneness to

extend a semi-political protectorate over their converts.")B In the

negotiations that followed such outbreaks, the church customarily

settled for only a fraction of its compensation claims.

Consular Resident Edward Harper Parker personally experienced a

near-riot in 1881. Parker had sewed in several Chinese provinces

but was extremely reluctant to corne to Chongqing, only assenting

because Baber was going on leave and nobody else was available.

Parker tried hard but had an especially difficult tirne, dealing with rude officials and even robbers in his travels within Sichuan. In his nine-month stay, he spent a total of 24 hours in the Company of

8. See North-China Herald , 5.1 3.76, p. 448; 8.1 2.76, p. 147; 8.26.76, p. 195. 1 64 other Westerners. His dog died of poison. Then came the incident, which probably took place on July 5 and staned with rumors that the foreigner's unorthodox behavior had somehow caused a dam to break.

It resulted from his insistence, unlike Baber, on taking a daily walk along part of the city wall. After dodging some stones, Parker found himself surrounded by an unfriendly crowd who accused his servant of a clearly fabricated assault on a moaning boy. Parker kept his head, advising the crowd to complain to the Prefect or at the Consu- late, and got home safe, while the crowd attacked a nearby Prefect's runner instead. That night a rnob attacked Parker's residence, forcing the outer doors, and the Consular Resident retreated to a high wall from which he fell, breaking both ankles. (This injury, he later admitted, probably prevented him from doing something drastic.) He was carried to safety in a neighboring Christian's house, while the mob, after considerable looting and vandalism, was dispersed by soldiers.9

9. Parker gives his account in a 7.5.81 (more likely 7.67) letter (FO 228/675, pp. 122-5). Its dates are not always consistent. Hosie, who was also mobbed soon after his 1882 arrivai, alludes to the incident in On the Ti-ail of the Opium Poppy (Boston: Small Maynard, 1 9 1 4), pp. 26 1 -2. The Magistrate tried, in Parker's words, to "make light of the

whole affair" and would have scapegoated the runner except for

Parker's pressure. Officiais carried out about a dozen token arrests,

and just two ringleaders were punished with the cangue (a portable

pillory). Parker considered the original official proclamation on the

matter entirely inadequate and a version more to his liking was

gradually distributed. Because the incident had been minor, it was

thought better not to press the Chinese officials for compensation

and cause long-term complications. Parker accused the Chinese

officials of indifference, but recognized that the srnall size of the

local police force and fear of retaliation limited their willingness

to take retributive action.ll

For Parker, the near-riot was "the last straw" and he suffered

1 O. Parker gave further reports on the incident in FO 228/675, pp. 126-7 (7.7.81 ); pp. 128-30 (7.10.81 ); pp. 1 3 1-2 (7.12.8 1); pp. 133-4 (7.1 5.81 ); pp. 138-40 (9.1.81). 11. In 1880 attempts to levy a duty on pork caused riots and the Zhixian narrowly avoided a tynching. Parker mentions this in his 7.7.81 letter. 166

something of a breakdown: his correspondence after the incident be-

cornes emotional and bitter and he admits that "a determined effort

has been necessary to prevent a mental tension from degenerating

into an excitable despondency." The Legation, due to Parker's in-

somnia, head and chest pains, "nervous indisposition" and fear of

"mental derangement", sent up the Yichang Consul to take over tem-

porarily, but W.D. Spence's ascent took an incredible 58 days. Parker

was unable to wait for Spence's arrival, or even to hire a junk, and

left by a difficult overland route. He essentially ran away. (Parker

credits the Sichuanese officiais with generosityJz Recalling the in-

cident years later, he writes, "1 never quite understood what it was

al1 about."13 Parker's experience in Chongqing reflected the pres-

sures often felt by the British government's representatives in

China, who had to work with the Chinese authorities to enforce the

"unequal treaties" at a local level, and rnediate between a some-

1 2. Parker, FO 228/973, pp. 41 -2 (9.1 7.81); pp. 50-1 (1 0.21.81). Spence was lucky to arrive at all. Coates, in /oc. cit., mentions that his tardiness was caused by two pauses totalling 19 days until surnmer torrents became safe, a deadfy collision with another junk, a whirlpool that destroyed Spence's junk and almost drowned him, and his second junk hitting a rock and sinking in fortunately shallow water. 13. Parker, China Past and Present (London: Chaprnan & Hall, 1903), pp. 103-8. times pushy foreign comrnunity and an occasionally hostile Chinese populace.

A worse incident occurred in 1886. The multifaith but Anglican- dominated China lnland Mission (CIM) had arrived in Chongqing in

1877, followed by the National Bible Society of Scotland in 1879 and the American Methodist Episcopal Mission (MEM) in 1882, and the

Protestant presence created new Sino-foreign tensions despite the paucity of converts. That spring the MEM was erecting Stone premises on a newly-purchased property at "Goose's Neck" on the isthmus West of the city. Several factors came together to rnake the situation dangerous: Chengdu was between Viceregal regimes, a time when public order was always tested; bad harvests and high rice prices had made life difficult and increased discontent; rumors circulated of a new tax to pay for the recent French war; and a swarm of military students arrived in Chongqing for examinations.

Such circumstances, particularly the student presence, form the background for most serious riots in imperial China. Though the mis-

sion had taken the precaution of transporting Stone from a distance

instead of quarrying nearby, the cadets asserted that the buildings

violated fengshui by pressing down on a dragon's neck, and spread

rumors that the construction was for foreign military pur pose^.^^

(France's war on China had only recently been settled.) Magistrate

Guo Zhang later told the Viceroy in his official report on the inci-

dent:

The merchants and gentry of Chongqing al1 knew that an lmperial Decree had been issued that the English wanted to enter Tibet by way of India, and furthermore planned to occupy Dali in Yunnan and Chongqing fu in Sichuan. In the present year the Americans erected houses at Exiangjing and Liangfengya, and the English one at Congshupai. In each case the place occupied was an important point and high and strong walls were built with large Stones, like those of a fort. These strange proceedings caused alarm to everyone.15

The riot broke out on July 1. Catholic, MEM and CIM premises

were ail sacked, the Consulate lost its archives, and many converts' .. - 1 4. Miriam Levering describes the buildup to the riot in "The Chungking Riot of 1886: Justice and ldeological Diversity," pp. 1 58-83, Papers on China XYla (5.69), pp. 158-62. 1 5. Quoted in Wyman, op. cit., pp. 1 14-5. 169

houses were also looted. Most Catholics fled, but Luo Yuanyi, an un-

popular Catholic salt merchant, stood and fought--he claimed his

mother's body was in his house awaiting burial--and his guards

killed 11 rioters some distance frorn the house. (He was later be-

headed.)16 Guo personally protected British Consular Agent Frederick

S.A. Bourne at one point. Protestant missionaries took refuge in the

Zhixian's yamen, Catholics in the Daotai's yamen. A U.S. business-

man called Burnett, who wore Chinese clothes and had a Chinese lif-

estyle, was defended by his Chinese neighbors, who emphasized that

he had nothing to do with religion. Official proclamations sounded

too ambivalent to quell the unrest. A force of over a thousand troops

arrived on July 6, restoring order in the city, but as in 1876 anti-

Catholic rioting continued for a month in the c~untryside.~~

16. Bourne discusses Luo's case in FO 228/850, pp. 284-90 (2.1 7.87), after the 1.3 1 execution. Wyman describes the case in op. cit-, pp. 104-7, conchding: "Ulti- mately, it was ho's own behavior, in addition to his close association with the West- ern Church, that led to his downfall. 17. Levering depicts the riot in op. cit., pp. 1 60-7 1. Bourne reports on it in a 7.7.86 diary (FO 228/829, pp. 28 1-9Z), which he continues in a 7.1 2.86 letter (pp. 302-8). In the riot's aftermath, Bourne decided to evacuate 20 British and

American residents downriver on July 16 until conditions improved.

The Consular Resident, who hirnself had lost al1 property but the

clothes he was wearing,

spent [the next] seven months cooped up in a series of yamens, restricted to Chinese clothes, books, food, and medicines, suf- fering from lack of exercise, and getting in recompense unusual opportunities for seeing the Chinese point of view.18

British missionary losses were estimated at almost 18,000 taels;

American missionary losses at 28,000.19 Catholic losses were far

higher. In the end Bourne negotiated compensation of 18,570 taels

for British claims and 23,000 for American claims, while the Catho-

lic bishop in Chengdu accepted 220 thousand out of a daim for 500

thou~and.~~Virgil C. Hart, who investigated the incident for the MEM,

commented:

It is doubtful if there has been a riot in China during the past century which had less apparent cause for violence and rapine than had that of 1886, or one in which there was so much destruction of property with so little personal violence and loss 18. Coates, op. cit., p. 309. Coates describes the 1881 and 1886 incidents, pp. 308- 9. 19. FO 228/829, pp. 309-10 (7.12.86); pp. 31 1-4 (7.7.86). 20. FO 228/829, pp. 457-60 (10.6.86); pp. 429-33 (1 1.1 3.86). of life arnong foreigners and native Christians... the act was one of momentaty impulse and aimed at property.

The foreign community, he mentioned, suspected the complicity of

officiais who wanted to exert pressure on the missionaries but lost

controi of the situati~n.~'Conclusive evidence, however, is lacking.

The 1886 riot proved to be only a temporary inconvenience in the

growth of Sichuan's missions. The CIM was soon expanding outside

Chongqing to several inland branches, including Chengdu. The exist-

ing missions would be joined by the London Missionary Society (B rit-

ish Congregationalists) in 1889, the Friends Foreign Mission Associ-

ation (British Quakers) in 1890, and the Canadian Methodist Mission

(CMM) in 1 892. The CMM bypassed Chongqing and established itself

in Chengdu, indicating the future direction of rnissionary expansion.

The consular presence was not always sufficient to prevent mis-

understandings and troublemaking such as in 1881 and 1886. The

27. Hart, Western China: A Journey to the Great Buddhist Centre of Mount Omei (Boston: Ticknor, 1888), p. 98; pp. 98-1 07. 172

1 881 incident was minor, but showed the potential vulnerability to nativist militancy of foreign residents in centres like Chongqing.

Without gunboats and their accompanying armed force, consuls had little hope of controlling angry mobs; they could only arrange evacuation. The 1886 riot showed what could happen when circumstances such as rice shortages and unclear official policy aggravated the situation. These events showed the potential vulnerability of missionaries and even consuls to disorder. But Chongqing officials now feared the ramifications of anti-Christian riots, and avoided words and actions that would be seen as encouraging this, as well as taking more active preventative steps. As a result, there are no reports of the city being affected by the anti-foreign activity of 1891 that af- flicted treaty ports such as Yichang . Chongqing, a commercial centre where the foreign presence was only peripheral, was less iikely to be the source of unrest than inland centres where the perspective of the "unequal treaties" was a greater symbol of Chinese frustration. It would be almost 40 years before anti-foreign disturbances 173

of any significance recurred near the city itself.

(b) Unrest at the Turn of the Century

The first post-1886 crisis in Sichuan's sino-foreign relations

started in Chengdu during the Dragon-Boat Festival of 1895--festi-

vals, Iike examinations, were a particularly dangerous time for pub-

lic order--when revelers attacked a Canadian. Soon ail the city's

missions were under siege. Viceroy Liu Bingzhang, who was about to

be forced from his post because of corruption, had probably inten-

tionally encouraged anti-foreign feeling, and his police superinten-

dent Zhou Zhenjian issued a telegram giving credence to wild rurnors

of foreigners kidnapping children. Anti-foreign rioting spread to

every major Sichuan town, with one exception, and a mass downriver

evacuation of British and Americans through Chongqing follo~ed.~~

22. The North-China Herald describes the events, very rnuch from a Western point of view, in "The Outrages at Chengdun (6.7.95,p. 856); "The Outrages in Szechuen" (6.14.95, p. 906; 6.21.95, p. 967); and "The Szechuen Outragesn (6.28.95, pp. 1008-9). Once again, Chinese Christians suffered the greatest losses.

The city of Chongqing was the single exception in the unrest The

current Daotai, Li Shuchang, was highly experienced with foreign re-

lations and was intent on avoiding a repeat of 1886 in Chongqing it-

self. (Li, who had sewed overseas and recently advised Beijing to

corne to terms with Japan and end their war, was due to leave for a

promotion in the capital before the crisis detained him.) Working

through a network of teashop informers, he managed to keep a tight

grip on the city despite a continuing lack of support or even encour-

agement from Chengdu. Li was under terrible pressure, and after

several months he went out of his head and had to be restrained. The

attentions of the city's foreign doctors largely restored his ratio-

nality eventually, but his official career was ~ver.~~Near the end of

the year, Tratman negotiated a settlement of 72,600 taels against

al1 British daims, while an American-sponsored commission to

23. J.N. Tratman, FO 228/1225, 1.3 1.96 Intelligence Report (General Correspon- dence from Chungking #3a/96, 2-1-96), pp. 25-31. "Although [Li] is the only Chi- nese official in the province who did his duty during the riots, it is he who has suffered most from thern." 175

Chengdu exacted about 30,000 taekZ4The Chinese government a lso

extracted a stiff fine from Liu--slightly reducing his immense for-

tune--and, under British pressure, denied any new government posi-

tions to Z~OU.~~

Trouble recurred close to Chongqing in 1898. In March a Jiangbei

mob attacked two Sichuanese medical students guarding an MEM-

owned house, killing one, and the Daotai put soldiers on the streets

of Chongqing to keep the disorder from spreading. The consuls de-

manded justice, but Chinese officiais preferred to find scapegoats

to p~nish.~~Then, in the summer, came an uprising under Yu

Dongchen, a Gelaohui member commonly called Yu Manzi ("Wild Man

Yu"). In the unsettled Dazu district northwest of Chongqing Yu har-

nessed opposition to foreign ways into a full-fledged rebellion

24. On the formation of this commission, see George E. Paulsen, "The Szechwan Riots of 1895 and American 'Missionary Diplomacy,'" Journal of Asian Studies, Volume XX- VI11 #2 (2.69), pp. 285-98. 25. The British, however, eventually decided that Zhou was something of a scapegoat and later alfowed his rehabilitation, even letting him participate in negotiations on mining concessions. 26. The North-China Herald, 3.1 9.98, "Outports: Chungking," pp. 658-9. 176 against the Qing authorities. At first Yu and his followers largely limited their attacks to Sichuanese Catholics, and Chengdu officials were willing to look the other way despite the large nurnber being murdered. (The new Viceroy had died suddenly and his temporary re- placement was said to be anti-foreign.) In July Yu took French missionary Pere Fleury hostage and the French Consul promised to hold

Chengdu responsible if any harm came to the priest, so no officia1 dared attack Yu. Official inaction also partly reflected the fear that in a serious fight the populace might side with Yu. Chengdu offered

Yu a ransom, a pardon and an official rank if he returned Fleury but the two sides could not agree on the size of the ransom and the level of the rank.

Facing no serious resistance, Yu started to levy unofficial taxes and attack anyone with valuable property, even daring to condemn the Qing Dynasty:

The Europeans are rich, they buy our officials and soldiers who aren't ashamed to seIl the empire for a few taels ....The Christians threaten to overrun everything, the officials are their protectors, and before long you will all be their slaves! ....The Emperor and officials do not see anything, do not hear anything, do not understand anything ....There is no hope left in the people who govern us. They are sell-outs, rene- gadesmz7

This demagogy reflects the declining prestige of the Manchus in Si-

chuan, who were increasingly seen as "outsiders," with the same

status as foreigners. At his height of power in September, Yu con-

trolled several xian but no large towns. He controlled a force of

thousands and might have seized Chongqing, whose defense force

was distressingly thin, but he was afraid to attack a large city. The

city's small foreign community, however, prepared for a sudden de-

parture by living on houseboats. With a new Viceroy in place govern-

ment troops finally took coordinated action near the end of the year,

and in January Yu's army was dispersed with a single cannon volley.

Fleury, whose death had been reported more than once, was released.

Yu was allowed to live under house arrest until he tried to escape,

then was brought to Chengdu in chains and was imprisoned until

27. Fleury's summary of Yu's speeches is quoted in Wyman, op. cit., pp. 1 1 1-2. The ellipses are fiers. 178

1 9 1 1 . After France exerted diplomatic pressure Catholic victims

received some 5 million taels, a much fuller restitution than the

victims of earlier anti-Catholic riotingmZ8

Charles Herman Hedtke marks Yu's uprising as a turning point for

the Sichuanese ruling elite. Before this time the gentry was willing

to tolerate anti-Christian outbreaks because the mainstream was

not threatened and precarious social unity might actually be

strengthened by turning against an implicitly "disloyal" minority

belief. But Yu had gone too far, even challenging the Manchu "outsid-

ers." Now such persecution looked less containable and more of a

threat to general order and the authority of officials, so Christians

could expect greater protection frorn the ruler~.~~

News of the 1900 Boxer Rebellion triggered a new crisis in Si-

chuan. The first two foreign gunboats to visit Chongqing--the Brit- 28. Litton, in his 1898 Trade Report (Diplornatic and Consular Reports #2249), p. 1 3, calculates the settlement at about 1 million pounds. 29. Hedtke, Reluctant Revolutionaries: Szechwan and the Ch 'hg Collapse, 7 89 8- 79 7 '1 (University Microfilms, 1968), pp, 47-54. 179

ish ships Mloodcock and Woodlark--had arrived in May, but the Admi- ralty had soon ordered them back downriver, to the foreign community's disappointment. When news of the Boxers arrived in June the danger of local insurrection looked obvious to anyone who remem- bered what had happened in 1895 and 1898. As it was, the Chengdu regime, like most other Viceregal administrations, ignored Beijing and did what it could to protect foreigners. The situation would have been somewhat safer if the gunboats had still been present, but a new steamship conveniently arrived. The Pioneer was Little's second attempt at founding a steamship line on the Upper Yangzi, and like the Leechuen had se rious technical shortcomings. (Its arrival, piloted by S. Cornell Plant, prompted greater protests from junkmen than in the Leechuen's case.)

British Consul M.F.G. Fraser--whose behavior at this time was widely seen as hysterical--commandeered the ship and for the moment kept her in Chongqing, where her presence deterred rioting, as 180

the more ignorant locals thought she was a gunb~at.~OIn the crisis

the British Admiralty gave priority to protecting downriver inter-

ests and in telegraph communications rejected a new gunboat expe-

dition to remote Sichuan. Meanwhile, in a controversial decision,

Fraser set about evacuating the province's British population. On

August 3, after finally receiving evacuation orders from the Foreign

Office, 26 refugees left the port aboard the Pioneer, picking up oth-

ers in houseboats along the way to raise the total to 90, including

63 British and 24 Americans. Fraser brought her back on August 26

with a Maxim machine-gun and 10 sailors to pick up other refu-

gee~.~'(Little sold the Pioneer to the Admiralty to serve as a regu-

lar gunboat, renamed the Kinsha..)

The decision to evacuate was immediately blasted by the downri-

ver British community, who charged that the United Kingdom had

"lost face" by running away, and would find its position within Si- 30. Little made an 1 1.1 9.00 clairn of about 300 pounds for the deiay in shipping 276 opium cases downriver due to the detentiun. FO 1 7/1430, pp. 187 -2. 31. Fraser gives a detailed report of the crisis, explaining the reasons for his decision, in his 9.3 1 .O0 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1359, pp. 93-237). chuan ~eakened.~~The residents themselves were greatly inconve-

nienced and several questioned the evacuation's necessity. In hind-

sight, the province stayed remarkably peaceful in 1900 and the

evacuation was probably unnecesçary. But Fraser had to make a snap

judgrnent on the spot, with news from the interior only trickling in

slowly, and he arguably made the right decision given the limits of

what he knew. At a time when sorne foreigners in China were being

murdered, none died on Fraser's watch in Sichuan.

The Foreign Office took the view that although [Fraser] was a foolish and tiresorne person the action had been properly taken, but in al1 other respects his performance during the 1900 crisis met with a chorus of unqualified official disap- proval. To the permanent under-secretary he was an ass whose shrieks for gunboats which he should have known could not reach Chungking had been very discreditable, and a minute from lower down the hierarchy despondently noted the arriva1 of more of his silly dispatches. A 140-page despatch reporting to the Legation how colossal his work had been and how successfully he had carried it out was rninuted 'he is evident- ly mad'33

3 2. See, for example, the article "The Evacuation of Chungking" in The Nurth-China Herald, 8.8.00, pp. 278-9, which called the decision "unpardonabiy foolishw and tenned that description a euphemism. The Herald later printed letters from outport residents both defending (8.29.00, p. 455) and criticizing (9.5.00, p. 505) Fraser. 33. Coates, op. cit., p. 3 7 2. 182

The Boxer Rebellion reached Sichuan two years late and unex-

pectedly. While the province avoided the 1900 rebellion, it experi-

enced proto-Boxerism under Yu Manzi in 1898 and an echo of Boxer-

ism in 1902. Familiar conditions were present: the province suf-

fered from drought, and Chengdu was between Viceroys. An addi-

tional cause was widespread resentrnent against the excesses of the

Catholic missions. The Catholic Church had spent most of its repa-

rations frorn the 1898 rebellion on buying land and was exploiting

its position as a leading landowner, defending converts even in dubi-

ous legal disputes. France now had an assertive consul in Sichuan

who was quick to back up the mission's complaints against the Chi-

nese with imperialist pressure. British consul E.C. Wilton suggested

that some Chinese officials were agreeing to excessive Catholic in-

demnities and pocketing their own share. "lt is probable," he sug-

gested, "that the Roman Catholic missionaries are generally hated

throughout the province."34

3 4. Wiiton, FO 228/1403, General Correspondence from Chungking #5 (4.6.01 ). 183

Missionary behavior now led to unprecedented disagreements

within the foreign community. After the unrest broke out, the

North-China Herald Chongqing correspondent accused inland mis-

sionaries of serving as tools for their home governrnents and

spreai!iiig chaos in Chinese society, citing the case of a converted

family burning ancestral tablets going back eight generation~.~~MEM

missionary Spencer Lewis wrote a letter criticizing this correspon-

dent's ~lairns~~--possiblythe tip of the iceberg of controversy

among local missionaries--and shortly afterward the correspondent

ceased sending letters to the Herald. (It would be many years before

that newspaper again had a regular Chongqing correspondent.)

The Boxer movement in Sichuan, which operated chiefly in the

Red Basin, attacking Catholic converts, was intertwined with secret

societies such as the Hongdengjiao ("Red Lantern Society"). Chong-

3 5. "Outports: Chungking," North-China Herald, 8.1 3.02 pp. 3 1 6-7. Outport correspondent~were usually missionaries, but this one, who believed in the "elevation" of natives through trade, may have been a merchant such as Little. 3 6. This letter was also published under "Outports: Chungking," 10.1 .O2 pp. 680- 1. It was dated 9.1 5, suggesting that the Herald still took almost a month to reach Chongqing. 184

qing was again largely unaffected. As in 1898, the official response

was poorly coordinated and sometimes indifferent. By September

the Boxers had Chengdu under a loose siege, and on one day actually

took their fight into the capital's streets before being driven out.

Then Cen Chunxuan arrived to take the Viceregal position, and quick-

ly routed the rebels, executing thousands. With the autumn rains,

this movement fizzled out as quickly as it had flared up, like the

previous Boxer Rebellion. 37

In the last decade before the revolution, religious tensions would

lead to several minor incidents, particularly fighting between Cath-

olic and Protestant converts. (In a 1 91 0 case the French Legation

had removed from China a Catholic priest in Sichuan who had been

selling a cheap pamphlet calling Luther a kidnaper and Calvin inces-

tuous and suggesting that firm belief in Jesus would protect some-

- - - - 37. The North-China Herald, 9.10.02, "Outports: Chungking," pp. 562-70; 9.24.02, "Outports: Chengdu," p. 628, "Outports: Chungking," pp- 628-9; 10.1 .OZ, "Outports: Chengdu," p. 680; 10.8.02, "Outports: Chongqing," pp. 725- 6, "Outports: Chengdu," p. 726; 10.1 5.02, "Outports: Chengdu," pp. 780-1 . 185

one who defiied 100,000 women da il^.^^) Chengdu, however, became

more serious about preventing disorder, and this determination, to-

gether with the new gunboat presence, largely kept the peace.

From around the time of the port's opening, the four Protestant

missions in Chongqing itself--CIMI MEM, LMS (London Missionary So-

ciety) and FFMA (Friends' Foreign Mission Association)--made an in-

creasing effort to unite their work. Union meetings took place as

early as 1890, and the missions launched joint initiatives in fields

such as combatting opium use. In January of 1899 76 missionaries

from Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou gathered in Chongqing for the first

West China Missionary Conference, an idea suggested by Chongqing

missionaries back in 1 894 but delayed by the 1895 uphea~als.~~The 38. Coates, op. cit., p. 3 72. 39. See Records of the West China Missionary Conference at Chungking: January 7899 (Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1899). The introduction describes the background to the conference, which took place between January 16 and 186

gathering agreed to form the West China Religious Tract Society to

CO-ordinate distribution of religious pamphlets, and an Advisory

Board with representatives from each mission group to supervise

mission efforts. Under the latter's auspices, publication of the West

China Missionary News soon commenced. This periodical, which

bore the motto "ln essentials unity/ln non-essentials liberty/ln al1

things charity" was published in Chongqing until 1907, when the

Chengdu CMM press took it over. In addition, the conference also di-

vided Sichuan into Protestant missionary spheres to prevent turf

wars, an arrangement resembling the developrnent of foreign

"spheres of influence" at this time, which aroused rumors that the

whole empire would be shared out. (Chengdu and Chongqing were still

shared among several rnissi~ns.)~~

A common interest among local missions was education. Every

mission started schools providing instruction in English and the

21. Organizers had hoped for 100 delegates, but Yu Manzi's rebellion had made travelling unsafe for many. 40. Milton T. Stauffer's The Christian Occupation of China (Shanghai: China Continu- ation Cornmittee, 1922) includes a map of the spheres in his Sichuan chapter, pp. 2 1 9-34. Christian religion. Particularly prominent was a FFMA middle school

for boys, which opened in 1896 and moved to much larger south bank

facilities in 1906. (The Catholics also started a school to teach

French in 1897.) But the Protestants were not united enough to act

on Consular suggestions to found a joint secular s~hool.~~In 1898

the FFMA also took the lead in founding a Chongqing school for for-

eign children. (With no steamships reaching Chongqing, taking a child

to the Chefoo school for anglophone children and returning to Si-

chuan could take months.) But even some missionaries saw the

school as a "fad,"42 and it struggled for nine years before being

closed in 1907. Missions pooled their schooling efforts, eventually

creating the West China Union University in Chengdu in 1910. De-

spite a slow start, due in part to World war l, it gradually emerged

as an important institution, particularly its medical and dental

41. The FFMA atternpted a secular school of its own in 1898, and attracted over 400 applications before Yu Manzi's rebellion made enthusiasm for foreign ways look risky. Quaker teaching anyhow had "far too much dogmatic religion" for such a venture, according to Consul George J.L Litton in his 10.31 -98 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1284, General Correspondence from Chungking #27E), pp. 16-7. 42. Tratman, 1.31.98 lnteiligence Report (FO 22811 284, General Correspondence from Chungking #3A), pp. 10-12. Chongqing missions also took a great interest in providing medi-

cal services. J.H. McCartney and Richard Wolfendale worked tire-

lessly to develop the MEM and LMS medical missions respectively,

and built large, well-equipped hospitals. (As with education, the

Catholics also built their own hospitals.) The two missions eventu-

ally became rivals for contracts to serve the consulates, foreign

customs and g~nboats.~~

Particularly after 1 9 1 1, missionaries in Chongqing became in-

creasingly concerned with the conditions of city life, such as sani-

tation and vices. (Opium was suppressed in 1908, but liquor grew in

popularity to fil1 the temporary vacuum.) During the crisis of 1 91 3,

43. J. Beech describes the institution's early years in "University Beginnings: A Story of the West China Union University," Journal of the West China Border Re- search Society VI (1933-34), pp. 91-1 05. 44. Wolfendale mentions this rivalry in an address on the Chongqing LMS medical mission given at the CMM's 1 9 10 council, reprinted by the Canadian Methodist Mission- West China in Minutes of the Fifteenth Annual Council, pp. 65-9. From the United Church of Canada archives. 189

several Sichuanese businessmen took refuge with their families in-

side missionary compounds, improving the missions' "connections"

and facilitating some conversions. The FFMA had founded the Inter-

national Friends Institute in 1909, and this organization in particu-

lar improved Sino-foreign relations in Chongqing. By 1915 its mem-

bership had risen from two to 500.45 It founded a commercial muse-

um exhibiting Western machines--warlord Yang Sen particularly en-

joyed the place--and a Women's Institute to deal with the speciai

problems of women in a Chinese ~ity.~~But it declined quickly after

1923, due both to poor Sichuanese management and cornpetition from

the YMCA.

In 191 0 the Canadian Methodist Mission took over the LMS mis-

sion in the Chongqing area. The London Missionary Society, forced to

45. Ten Momentous Years: The Report of the International Friends institute: Chun- gking, West China: 7 909- 7 9 7 9 (Chongqing: International Friends Institute, 1 9 1 9), p- 9. 46. The International Friends fnstitute published the pamphlets Chinese Ladies in the Treaty Port of Chungking and A Work of Christian lnternationalisrn and Social Service on Behalf of Women of This Generation. The latter detailed its ambitious but unrealized plans to create a large building for the Women's Institute. 190

economize, had sacrificed the youngest and most remote of its mis-

sions. Even the official CMM publication Our West China Mission ad-

rnitted that the transfer was "a great sorrow, both to the mission-

aries and to Chinese Christians [who] felt that they had been handed

over from one foreign society to another without con~ultation."~~

The CMM was soon undertaking new Chongqing initiatives, includ-

ing building the Chungking Home to provide lodging for missionaries

passing through the city, and the Chungking Business Agency, which

supplied inland CMM missionaries with everything from groceries to

medical supplies. Another was the Young Men's Guild, founded in

1913 with about 200 members, which functioned along the lines of

conventional Chinese guilds. It maintained a four-storey building

and was managed by two presidents--one Chinese and one foreign--

and a mixed board where Sichuanese businessmen ~redominated.~8

47. J. Parker, "Station Surveys: Chungking", Our West China Mission (Toronto: Missionary Society of the United Church, 1920), pp. 224-5. The controversy was sufficiently public that ARhur S. Claxton defended the decision in a Chongqing station note, West China Missionary News, May 1 909, pp. 16-8. 48. See G.W. Sparling, "The Young Men's Guilds," ibid., pp. 281-304. 191

Like many missionary operations, it promoted night schooling and

hygiene campaigns. Its longtime foreign president, H.H. Irish, was

said to know more people in the city than any other resident, Chinese

or foreigm49 The CMM also operated a new school for foreign chil-

dren, with some interruptions between the years 1922 and 1935,

until improved transportation made the CMM's 1909 Chengdu school

preferable.S0 Of the approximately 300 Canadian missionaries in Si-

chuan between 1891 and 1941, about a quarter had medical degrees

while another quarter had degrees in educati~n.~'

MEM doctor J.H. McCartney expanded his field of activity at this

time. A consul termed him "an extremely 'difficult' person to deal

with": he had built barriers on the city wall on the edge of his mis-

sion's property and was able to stop movement along this public road

by locking the doors. That produced no immediate protest, but in

49. Kenneth J. Beaton, Serving with the Sons of Shuh: Fifty Fateful Years in West China 7 89 7 - 7 94 1 (Toronto: United Church of Canada, 1 941 ), pp. 1 06-7. 50. Canadian School in West China, Brockman Brace ed. (Toronto: Canadian School Alumni Association, 1974), includes recollections of the Chongqing sct-to~lby Lorenia Edmonds, Donald Walker and Noreen Anderson. 51. See the appendix in Beaton, op. cit., pp. 233-5. 192

1910 he planned to build a water works for his hospital by laying a

small pipeline to the Jialing across the wall, an alleyway and a lo-

cal's property. The Daotai was petitioned and warned him that pub-

lic consent would be required.52 Then an interna1 dispute led to his

leaving the mission in 1915 and setting up an independent practice.

McCartney, widely believed to be the model for W. Somerset Maugh-

am's "Dr. Mcalister,"53 founded the American-Chinese Drug Company

retail store, in cornpetition with the MEM pharmacy he had founded,

and his business interests may have extended as far as developing

Chongqing Hills real e~tate.~~He was also instrumental in estab-

lishing an international hospital in 19194ntended chiefly for for-

eigners but open to Chinese used to Western hospitals-- and a Union

Church for the city's foreigners in 1922.

The YMCA, which established a Chengdu branch in 1910, did not

5 2. J.L. Smith, 6.30.1 0 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1759, From Chongqing #27), pp. 6-7. 53. According to John Service, editor of Golden inches: The China Mernoir of Grace Service (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), p. 246fn. 54. The evidence is indirect: Maugham describes Dr. Mcalister doing this. 193

reach Chongqing until 1922. The Chengdu branch had taken several

years to overcome local mistrust, but paved the way so effectively

that the Chongqing branch was opened in response to local appeals,

in only four months, under R.R. Ser~ice.~sThe Seventh-Day Adven-

tists also established a Chongqing mission in the early 1920's. This

mission was well-heeled--like the consulates and the leading for-

eign companies, it could afford to equip its ernployees with uniforrns

to protect them from the warlords' press gangs--but it was also un-

popular with other missionaries. It encroached on existing Protes-

tant missions' "spheres," as delineated in 1899, and sometirnes even

poached other missions' staffers with the promise of better pay?

Despite anti-foreign crises and some inter-sect conflict, the

missions came to play an important role in disseminating modern

Western ideas in Sichuan. John K. Fairbank observes:

Most of these foreign-aided activities were pilot-model

55. Mrs. Service recalls their period in Chongqing in Golden Inches, pp. 245-83. 5 6. Mrs. Service recalls that she was one of the onIy missionaries on good terms with the Seventh-Day Adventists, and tried unsuccessfully to allow their inclusion in the rnissionaty statistics she was collecting for the West China Union Advisory Board. treatments, not on a scale capable of transforming China directly.. ..This superf iciality of the Western-inspired or aided projects in China was unavoidable partly because China's educated ruling-class elite, to which the foreigners were at- tached, was itself such a tiny proportion of the Chinese population.... Liberal efforts at creating a Chinese civil society must therefore be seen as points of growth, like spores growing in a biological laboratory's broth, scattered over a large surface ....Yet so massive were the people's problems that in the end only the state could take them on.='

Zhang Zhidong's famous dictum of "Western practices, Chinese sub-

stance" would truly be put into practice in the twentieth century.

As with technology and business, the Chinese people would adapt to

foreign learning in fields like education and public health and make

it serve their own purposes. Particularly after 19 1 9, they would

feel sufficient confidence in foreign ideas to employ them in resis-

tance to foreign power, as in the Western import of communist ide-

ology. The missions themselves would have to change with the

times, becoming increasingly sinicized. In the end the foreigners a

would be removed completely, but their educational efforts, by pro-

viding new examples, helped spur permanent change within China. 5 7. Fairbank, China: A NewHistory (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1992), pp. 26 1-2. Chapter 5: Foreigners and Economic Development in Pre- Republican Chongqing

(a) The New Treaty Port

The first decades after Chongqing's opening were a tirne of only slow progress for foreign businessmen. The Yangzi Gorges posed a sufficiently visible risk to discourage large-scale cornmitment by the downriver firms. After witnessing the steam powered gunboat successes in the Gorges, it took Chinese efforts, with official backing, to show that the steam trade could work profitably between

Chongqing and the downriver ports. Only after the Chinese successes did the large British interests start to take an interest in Sichua- nese commerce, eventually adding their own ships. But by this time they faced the competition of both Chinese and foreign competition, particularly the Japanese. As in the rest of China, the Sichuanese were continuing to take the economic lead in most fields, thwarting foreign expansionary attempts. Official concern over foreign control 196

of rail transport also led to the less successful attempt to extend

China's railway network into Sichuan, which ended in rebellion turn-

ing into revolution. The traditional systems of government proved

inadequate in forestalling nationalism, and decades of political chaos would ensue before the restoration of order, to the detriment of China's interna1 commerce. Even in these chaotic times, foreign

interests in Sichuan were kept at bay as the Chinese learned to corn- bine foreign rnethods with existing traditions to create a new, stronger balance of econornic and political self-interests favorable to them.

In the first years after Chongqing's 1891 opening, the development of Western commerce in Sichuan was hamstrung by the reluctance of major Sino-Western companies like Jardine, Matheson and

Butterfield, Swire to make a significant direct cornmitment, together with official and unofficial obstacles. The 1896 Blackburn trade mission cited in its repart the port's need for skilled British merchants- willing to seIl imports directly to inland merchants, and pos-

sessing capital to process exports.

This could only be done with success by firms or companies with ample resources that had come to stay, and that could afford to train in Chinese colloquial and other special knowledge, youths selected at home for their business talents.... the enterprise would be worthy [of] the descendants of England's merchant adventurers.

But by the mid-1890's the great period of British expansion in the

China trade was ending: even new British investment in established

inland treaty ports like Hankou was declining.

The result is that the whole work of finding exports and providing imports is left to the natives... Forbidden [before 18951 to manufacture, to plant, or to mine, hedged in by customs regulations strictly administered by a foreign staff they [British merchants] are confined to bare export and import, and this they found could be carried on more profitably at Shanghai and Hong Kong.'

Byron Brennan, in a general 1896 survey of the treaty ports, asserted a crucial paradox: foreign merchants had to develop Chong- qing's export trade first, but the "pioneering" type most likely to do

- 1 . F.S.A. Bourne, Report of the Mission to China of the Blackburn Charnber of Commerce 7 896-7 (Blackburn : North-East Lancashire Press, 1898), Volume 1, pp. 70-2; pp. 148-9. 198

this were also the least likely to possess the required financial re-

source^.^ Commercial risks were much greater here than in other

open ports, and new steamship technology requiring large invest-

ments was needed to conquer the Gorges and make trade cost-effi-

cient.

George Ernest Morrison, who visited the city in 1894, remarked,

"Chungking is an open port, which is not an open portw3The foreign

presence usually found in an open port was lacking here. In the first

year after opening, foreign and Chinese officiais together decided

against creating a foreign settlement--raising ongoing safety con-

cerns--and most Westerners lived in Chinese houses they found

barely tolerable. Mail from downriver could take months to arrive,

and the new Imperia1 Post Office only gradually improved standards.

Foreign residents often griped about living conditions, and Chongqing

2. Brennan, Byron, 1896 Foreign Trade of China report(Dipiomatic and Consuiar Re- ports #1909), pp. 49-50. 3. Morrison, An A ustralian in China: Being the Narrative of a Quiet Journey A cross China to Burma (London: Horace Cox, 1 895-reprinted in Taipei: Ch'eng Wen, 1971), p. 37. 199 was, in truth, not the most pleasant Chinese city for a foreigner to

live in. The climate was damp and cloudy, prompting the famous

local saying, "In Chongqing the dogs bark when the Sun cornes out."

The muggy summers--Chongqing is labeled one of China's "Three

Furnaces"--and foggy winters were interminable, separated only by brief springs and autumns. And the city environment was often unhealthy. Sewage went into crude ditches, attracting a huge rat population, until rains flushed it away. (The first rainfall after a drought would leave the city smelling much fresher.) The city's nar- row streetç left it vulnerable to conflagrations, whose flames sometimes leaped even high fire-walls. Three fires did great damage in the mid-1 8901s, but the Daotai rejected a foreign scheme to install a water-pumping system, which would have threatened the livelihood of the city's many water-carriers. (This group was the lowest on the community's economic ladder, and the most likely to disturb the peaceJ4

4. E.H. Fraser, FO ZZ8/ 1 1 54, 1.3 1.94 Intelligence Report, pp. 20-1. 200

Now that Chongqing was opened, observing foreign trade and protecting missionaries took most of a consuk tirne. (The consul now had to be available on a daily basis, and there were no more grand explorations of the regions.) British consuls in the various treaty ports often represented the interests of British businessmen in official business, somewhat in the way mercantile guilds represented their members. But a consul was sometimes equally busy restraining the excesses of the merchants he represented, who often saw fit to take the law into their own hands, and serving as middleman between Chinese official and foreign merchants. Another chore was the annual trade report, which like other consular reports was published back home but not widely circulated. (The British public and business community were so unaware of these reports that an agent of British Cotton thread manufacturers, visiting Chongqing in 1896, was surprised to learn that they were not confidential.5)

5. J.N. Tratrnan, FO 228/1225, 7.3 1.96 Intelligence Report, from Chungking #8/96, pp. 30-3. 201

For consuls, Chongqing was something of a "hardship post," with

speedy turnover. In the first two decades after opening the only

British Consul to last more than a couple of years was J.N. Tratman,

who occupied the post between 1 894 and 1898. Tratman's stint,

which included the 1895 crisis, took a heavy toll on his health and

nerves. "Chungking finished him": after a long medical furlough-

several Chongqing consuls had to follow up their stint here with

home leave--he returned to the China service a broken, indifferent

time-se~erand had to take early retirement? More than one consul

followed his service with furlough for reasons such as health. Turn-

over was likewise rapid in the foreign customs, and in the missions:

a total of 30 CIM rnissionaries (about 5% of the whole nationwide

mission) were stationed in the city at some time during the mis-

sion's first 25 years the~e.~

The port's opening did not translate into an immediate commer-

6. P.D. Coates, The China Consuls: British Consular Officers, 7 843- 7 943 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 171, 309-1 0. 7. William Edgar Geil, A Yankee on the Yangtze (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1904), p. 1 1 o. 202 cial bonanza. As it was, lijin officials kept their rates competitive and only about a fifth of the port's commerce went through the foreign customs. If foreign customs imports outweighed exports in value, that was only because the lijin customs took a less dominant share of the former. Due to opium exports, Sichuan actually had an overall trade surplus in this period. But exports and foreign imports did increase almost steadily in the first years of opening, as did domestic imports somewhat more sl~wly.~(See Table 1 b.) Most of this trade was foreign goods bought in Shanghai and shipped to Chongqing by Chinese firms, or Sichuan goods shipped to Shanghai by Chinese merchants. Some pundits argued that Chongqing's trade was too small to justify a con~ulate.~

But overall trade gradually increased, thanks both to opium and a boom in imports of lndian Cotton yarn. Sichuan was probably the leading Chinese destination for yarn imports in the first years of the

8. (Imperial) Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chung- king," 1891-1931 passim, Appendix II. 9. "1 am well aware" of this argument, Consul H.E. Sly wrote in his trade report for 1 9 0 3 (Diplornatic and Consular Reports #3 2 go), pp. 4-5. 203

twentieth- cectury, its share of the total little different from its

approximate one-fifth share of China's population. In addition to In-

dian imports, Japanese yarn found a minor niche for a few years

starting in 1897.10 (See Table 2b.) Annual aggregates of shipping

registered at the foreign customs grew in the 1890's, then largely

settled at around 50,000 tons for entries of irnports, and 20,000 to

35,000 for clearances of exp0rts.l (See Table Sa.) In the period be-

fore 1905, the great majority of the foreign customs' chartered

junks, generally over three-quarters, were chartered by British

shipping firms, at least officially. (The Chinese practice of obtain-

ing the services of foreign "name-sellers" may conceivably have ex-

tended to shipping.) This was largely the limit of British business

involvernent in the Chongqing trade: shipping agents for Chinese-

owned cargoes. Though several countries were represented, most of

the other junks were chartered by the Chinese thernselves.1~(See

10. Imperial Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chung- king," 1 891 -1 904 passim, Appendix III.) 1 1. (Imperial) Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chun- gking," 1 89 1-1 9 1 8 passim, Appendix 1. 1 2. Imperia1 Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chungking," 1 89 1-1 905 passim, Appendix 1. Table Sb.)

Due to Chongqing's "end of the line" position in the treaty-port

network, foreign imports and exports remained ovenvhelmingly part of the "coastal" trade between open ports, and direct trade with foreign nations formed an insignificant share of the foreign customs total, let alone overall trade? Already by the turn of the century local patterns of trade were undergoing transformation, particularly cotton goods, the leading import categoiy. Transit-pass cotton yarn imports, mostly Indian, became an important part of commerce, quickly reaching a million-tael annual level. This trade, allowing for fluctuations, was at its peak between 1896 and 1907. But the

Chinese trade system was resilient enough to respond to the changes by developing domestic yarn production that used the new industrial technology. At the turn of the century, after transit passes became available for Chinese yarn, the domestic trade immediately sur-

7 3. See (Imperial) Maritime Customs Statisticai Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chungking," 189 1-1 9 3 1 passim, Appendix li. 205

passed its foreign equivalent.14 (See Table Ic.) These imports went

to inland towns such as Chengdu, and occasionally to Yunnan or

Guizhou.

Before long domestic imports were taking a majority of the tran-

sit trade, and lndian yarn sales were starting to suffer from the

downriver competition, reaching a peak of 14 million taels in 1903

but almost steadily dwindling to nothing over the next two de-

cades? (See Table 2c.) As the lndian product had displaced Western

piece goods, it was in turn being largely displaced by Chinese yarn

by the time of the republican era. While domestic transit-pass im-

ports increased by a factor of 1 O between 1906 and 1914, the for-

eign equivalent almost disappeared in the same period.I6 (See Table

1d.) As a result, foreign irnports to Chongqing through the foreign

customs, which had increased steadily in the first decade of the

14. lmperial Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chungk- hg," 1 896-1 904 passim, Appendix VI.) 1 S. (Imperial) Maritime Customs Statistical Sen'es #4: "Report on the Trade of Chung- king," 1905-30 passim, Appendix III. 16. (Irnperial) Maritime Custorns Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chung- king," 1906-1 9 passim, Appendix VI.) 206

port's opening, were in the first years of the century at as high a

level as they would get: something over 10 million taels ann~ally.~~

(See Table 1 b.) Transit-pass exports, on the other hand, were al-

ways negligible. Foreigners continued to have only a minor commer-

cial presence. Chinese businessmen were quicker to learn Western

commercial methods than vice versa, taking full advantage of newly

available tools such as the transit pass. The Westerners had initi-

ated the transit trade decades before, but the Chinese soon managed

to gain most of the benefits.

In 1896, the Blackburn Mission reported only five Western firms

in Chongqing. Only one of them sold imported cottons, and that only

in a small capacity. (This was the general rule for Westerners doing

business on the Yangzi above Shanghai.) In contrast, Chongqing had

27 Chinese firms in the trade, along with three in Chengdu and one in

Jiading, a system foreigners were unable to break int~.~~For the 17. (Imperial) Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chung- king," 1 89 1 - 19 3 1 passim, Appendix II. 1 8. F.S.A. Bourne, Report of the Mission to China of the Blackburn Chamber of Commerce 7 896-7 Vol. 1, pp. 70-1 . 207

first decade after opening Little's Chungking Trading Company was

virtually the only foreign firm to operate in Chongqing under a West-

ern manager. H. Hertz was there at the beginning, but left at the end

of 189 1 after officiais thwarted Sichuan's transit trade.lg J.H. Bur-

nett, an American partner in Hankou-based Burnett and Jenkins, sur-

vived the 1886 riot and his firm briefly acted as Jardine, Matheson's

Chongqing agent before he also leW0

Entry into the Sichuan market, however, was still too difficult to

interest Shanghai's larger foreign companies. China's two leading

foreign mercantile firms, Jardine, Matheson and Butterfield, Swire,

preferred an indirect presence, working through Chinese agents who

also did business on their own account. (The Shanghai-based Macken-

zie & Company also ernployed a local Sichuanese agent until 1903,

after which it sent foreign agents to Chongqing.) Under this system

the agent was a "feeder" for the client's Yangzi shipping line, taking

19. E.H. Fraser, FO 228/1154, p. 35. 20. Fraser, FO 228/1 1 15, pp. 99-1 01. 208

financial responsibility for exported goods until they left the port in

a junk chartered by the client. The decision not to field foreign

agents reflected Chongqing's status more as a centre of trade than

of production and consumption, along with the difficulties in ob-

se~inginland markets and modernizing production: in a commission

business along Chinese lines, Chinese would likely always have a

cornpetitive advantage over foreigners2I

But the Chinese agency system had distinct disadvantages.

Agents had more autonomy than compradors and were quick to seek

their own advantage. A Chinese agent, British Consul H.E. Sly noted,

would demand large advances before making seasonal purchases of

inland exports for his client, reserve the best goods for his own

business and poorer goods for the client's, and arrange downriver

shipments according to the tael exchange rate to maximize his own

profit at the client's expense. The client had no choice but to send

2 1 .George J.L Litton, 7.30.98 Intelligence Report (FO 228f1284, GC from Chungking #19A), pp. 6-1 1. 209

advances- and accept shipments on the agent's terrns if he wanted to

do business in Sichuan at all, and had little legal redress if the

agent cheated him. (Both Jardine, Matheson and Butterfield, Swire

admitted that their agent was becoming richer while their own busi-

ness was weakening, while Mackenzie feared that a 90,000-tael ad-

vance to its agent would have to be written off.) 22 In addition, E.C.

Wilton observed, many Chinese agents were as unscrupulous as the

worst compradors and respected neither Chinese nor foreign laws,

warning fellow Chinese that the Consul would back them in legal

disputes. In Britain's case such backing seems to have been rare, but

the United Kingdom's local reputation was still harmed by the insin-

uations, not least among Chinese 0fficials.~3

22. Sly, 1 903 Chungking Trade Report (Diplornatic and Consular Reports #3 290). pp. 3-4; Sly, 1 2.3 1.O3 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1SSO, General Correspondence from Chungking #8A), pp. 1-2. Sly granted "in part" that foreign agencies in Chongqing were unprofitable. According to Sly's 9.30.04 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1550, General Correspondence frorn Chungking #7C), pp. 3-7, Mackenzie replaced its Chinese agent with a foreigner but continued to employ him until his liabilities were discharged, and 45,000 taels had already been repaid. 23. In his 7.3 1 .O0 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1403, General Correspondence frorn Chungking #35A), pp. 25-7, E.C. Wilton cites the problem of agents seeking Consu- lar support for litigation involving their own business under the cover of protecting their client's interests, and emphasizes the need for close verification. A particularly bothersome case came in 1903, when the Catholic

mission provided Butterfield, Swire with 180 taels to pay for duties

on stores purchased from the Company. Fu Jigao, the company's local

agent, connived with two Chinese staffers at the foreign customs to

Fu was surnmoned to the Magistrate's court in the ensuing investiga-

tion in which the clerks admitted fraud, but avoided prosecution by

providing restitution. Sly wrote directly to Butterfield, Swire's

Shanghai manager about the matter. Fu's reputation, he observed,

is such an evil one that I am much inclined to favour the belief that his sins are many....[ Such agents] not only cause the Cus- toms and myself endless annoyance but do not, as far as I can judge, exert thernselves in any way to push the business of the foreign houses whose agents they are .... l have had to cornplain to other firms of the crooked doings of their Chinese Agents.24

The manager replaced Fu, but the new agent also caused trouble.

Dai Guyu only presented his credentials to Sly three months after his

24. John Swire & Co. Archives, JSSll 1 /12, including a 1 1 .18.03 letter from foreign customs Commissioner W.C. Haines Watson to Sly, alerting him to the fraud; Sly's 11.20.03 reply; Sly's 11.20.03 private letter to Mr. Wright, Butterfield, Swire's Shanghai manager, with the first two letters enclosed. (Sly mentions the case in his 1 2.3 1 .O3 Intelligence Report, pp. 4-5.) 21 1

arrival, after the latter threatened to stop his business transac-

tions, and later approached him for protection against the lijin au-

thorities. Dai apparently brought some opium into Chongqing with-

out telling the lijin officials, planning to seIl it locally if prices

were high, otherwise export it through his client, but he was found

out and tried to hide behind Butterfield, Swire by altering a receipt.

Dai's own firm was called Xiangji, while his client was known as

Taigu Yanghang ("yanghang" meaning "foreign firm") and he changed

the name on the receipt from "Xiangji" to "Taigu Xiangji." Butter-

field, Swire agreed to replace Dai immediately to prevent his arrest,

and Xiangji was fined 3600 taels by the local Sichuanese authori-

ties. In a letter to his client translated into English, he placed al1

the blame on a subordinate manager, "who is an ignorant and stupid

Thomas M. Ainscough admitted in 1915 that the near-total failure

25. Ibid., incl. a 9.1 6.04 letter from Sly to Mr. Wright and a 1 2.10.04 letter from the agent; Siy, 9.30.04 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1550, General Correspondence from Chungking #7C), pp. 1-3. (Annex #1 of this report is a duplicate of the 9.1 6.04 letter). of foreign firms so far to establish branch houses in Chongqing to

seIl imports directly to inland Sichuanese appeared odd. "Such a po-

sition would have relegated the large [Chinese] Hongs, who import

direct from Shanghai, to the position of brokers, a position very

similar to that of the Chinese dealers in Shanghai." But financial

difficulties were crucial:

Under present conditions in China, where it is practically impossible to obtain accurate information as to the financial standing of native Hongs, foreign firms are obliged to insist upon cash being tendered against delivery of the goods. On the other hand, the large native houses, being closely in touch with their clients, allow six months credit, and grant a discount of 1 1 /5 per cent. per month if payment is made before the expiry of this term. Furthermore, the native organization is so specialized and complex, and so many vested interests have been built up around it, that any import of European goods into Chungking by a foreign firm is practically boycot- ted until the holders are forced to sel1 at a 10~s.~~

The cornpetitive advantage enjoyed by Chinese merchants was evi-

dent not only in their close-knit relations in comparison to British

merchants, but also in the terms on which commercial loans were

obtained.

26. Ainscough, Notes from a Frontier (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 191 S), pp. 5-6. Archibald Little's Chungking Trading Company was arguably "the

exception that proves the rule." By 1904 it had become, in Sly's

words, "an institution whose chief business is to lend its name for a

pecuniary consideration to any Chinese undertaking desiring to ob-

tain for itself British protection." Sly, in a heated moment, termed

Little and his partner J.W. Nicolson even worse than the Chinese

agents "for in their case Chinese cunning is dished up with European

duplicity and chicanery, a consomme which is bad to the ta~te."~~

One case of Little's "name-selling" came in 1898 when Sichuan's

Department of Trade pressured all the Sichuanese owners of Chong-

qing's glass factories to join the Glass Company, a newly-created

body with a 20-year monopoly. The largest plant's owner, however,

evaded this pressure by pretending to seIl out to Little, who was ac-

tually being paid 5% of its profits. The British Consul washed his

hands of the rnatte~.~~Little profited; his Sichuanese silent partner

27. Sly, op. cit., pp. 3-7. 28. J.N. Tratman, 1.3 1.98 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1284, General Correspondence from Chungking #3A), pp. 14-20. 21 4

evaded the proposed monopoly; the Chinese authorities failed to

achieve the desired stability of monopoly conditions; and the consu-

lar service, in the eyes of local Sichuanese officiais, looked help-

less.

Little had bzen more ambitious in previous years. But his busi-

ness skills were lirnited, and by 1894 he was stuck with so many

bad debts that the firm's very survival was in question. (He relied on

consuls to use their clout to ensure the collection of his debts, but

they were often powerless to do this.) His lack of profit was an

"open secret" and he reportedly offered to seIl out to Butterfield,

Swire but was turned do~n.~~It was at this time that he entered

into a protracted feud with the local foreign customs. Customs

regulations required merchants to pay export duties after examina-

tion, before their cargo would be released for shipment. As Chong-

qing's examination pontoon was located at Tangjiatuo and its Cus-

toms House within the city, a long period could elapse while the ex-

. - -- 29. Tratman, 1 0.3 1.94 Intelligence Report, FO Z28/ 1 1 54, pp. 1 1 1-2. 21 5 aminer sent the Customs House verification of the duty payment, then the customs staff sent back a release notification. The pontoon, meanwhile, was situated above a rapid and cargo was sometimes lost during the wait. As a result, customs officiais granted merchants whose guarantors could assure payment within five days the privilege of loading their cargo for downriver export immediately after the examination.

This system apparently functioned normally until an incident in early 1895 in which some of Little's goods were lost while being loaded after the examination. Little, whose business was just scraping by, deducted from his duty payment what was owed on the lost cargo, but foreign customs Commissioner F.E. Woodruff ruled that Little owed the full duty because the paperwork was already complete, and suspended Little's privilege of immediate loading until he paid the rest. Little apparently responded with several un- signed letters to Shanghai newspapers claiming great losses resulting from the suspended privilege, and attacking Woodruff's integrity,

inter alia claiming that the Commissioner had grilled Little's Chi-

nese servants for information on their boss. One North-China Herald

letter clairned that the foreign customs was biased in favor of Chi-

nese rner~hants!~~Some years later Mrs. Little commented, making

the case for her husband's firm:

The [original foreign customs] ruleç, issued in Chinese, [had been] so impracticable that successive Commissioners of Cus- toms suspended their action from the day they were published; but this suspension, it afterwards appeared, was a privilege revocable at the arbitrary will of the Commissioner for the time being, and an American Commissioner revoked them to the detriment of the only bona-fide European shipping firm as yet established there, thus doing what lay in his power to take away business from European firrns and throw it into the hands of the Chinese firms, which continued as before to enjoy a suspension of the Customs rules.3'

For his part, British Consul J.N. Tratman asserts that in a visit to

30. North-China Herald Chungking report, 2.28.96, p. 3 1 5. Though this letter, like most outport correspondence to this newspaper, was uncredited, from the letter's tone it is hard to imagine who else might have written it. The Consul suspected that some of the letters were carried downriver by Mrs. Little, who was in Shanghai in early 1 895 heIping to organize the Tianzuhui anti-footbinding society. 3 1 . Alicia Little, lntimate China: The Chinese as l Have Seen Them (London: Hutchinson, 1901), p. 77 21 7

the Consulate Little questioned Woodruff's sanity and suggested that

if both had been younger Little would have solved the problem with a

horsewhip. He used extreme fanguage on two occasions and ex-

pressed his regrets in writing, but Tratman doubted his sincerity.

Little provided the payment aeer several months, but the Commis-

sioner continued to suspend the privilege because he wanted Little

to apologize fully for his behavior. Woodruff soon moved to a new

post, but his successor continued the suspension. Tratman, who had

at first attempted to mediate, sided with the customs, and now it

was Little against both the Commissioner and the Consul.

Little appealed to the Minister in Beijing, but the latter ruled

that both were within their rights. Tratman insisted that Little's

daims of fosses were much exaggerated and told the Minister,

Mr. Little, as I think you will know, is a very troublesome subject to deal with. He is possessed with a rooted dislike of Custorns authorities generally, & Consuls occupy the next place on his black

32. Tratman gives his version in his 1.3 1-96 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1225, Gen- For his part, Little apparently told the Blackburn Mission, "lf the

whole Consular service were swept away to-morrow we should be

none the worse off."33 ln 1897 customs finally offered to end the

suspension, under pressure from the Legation, but Little could not

find any guarantors. The matter was finally resolved the next year

with a compromise, under which Little was allowed to guarantee

himself in writing, on persona1 security and a deposit in the same

bank where the foreign customs kept its a~count.'~

The year 1898 was an important one for Little. Not only did he bring the Leechuen to Chongqing, he also completed a foreign-style hong at Longmenhao on the south bank. Little had been the "pioneer" in acquiring south bank property, persisting through resistance from officials who considered the area to be outside the treaty port, and eral Correspondence from Chungking #3A), pp. 19-23; and in a 2.28.96 despatch to the Minister on the subject (FO 228/1225, General Correspondence from Chungking #3b). In the latter source he gives his reasons for the side he took, including the quote and his description of Little's horsewhip speech. 33. Blackburn mission repon , Volume II, p. 322. As with the Herald letter, Little was not quoted by name but is clearly the most likely source. 34. The new Consul, George J.L. Litton, sent a 5.6.98 despatch on the affair(F0 228/1284, General Correspondence from Chungking #1 l),enclosing Little's 5.5 letter to hirn outlining the compromise. 21 9

this area would soon replace the city itself as the central zone of

local foreign residence, though no settlement was established here.

In addition to a foreign-style residence that would remain a local

landmark long after Little's departure, the hong included facilities

for pressing wool, cleaning feathers, and processing pig bristles for

Western export, the latter enterprise employing Shanghai supervi-

sors and Tianjin workers. Little had his greatest commercial

success in bristles exports, for use in brushes, finding high-price

overseas markets, and by 1903 was exporting 10,000 dan annually,

wonh f 13,000. (A visitor remarked, "This is the one product on

which foreign merchants make rn~ney.")~~Within a decade many Si-

chuanese businessmen had built their own facilities, again showing

their resilience in response to foreign technology. Nicolson, a more

competent if not more reputable businessman, arrived in Chongqing

at this time as Little's local manager--Little spent long periods

away from Chongqing--and discovered Chengdu exports like

~ ~ 35. Geil, op. cit., p. 105. egret feathers, fine sheepskins and reeled silk for France.36

Another Little venture was in the field of insurance. Soon after

Chongqing's opening he organized the China Traders lnsurance Com-

pany to insure Chinese shippers against wrecks. Sichuanese mer-

chants, unfortunately for Little, were wary of the unseen capital

backing the venture, and preferred the Chinese system under which

they pooled small cargoes together on each junk so that risk would

be spread Little also created a fire insurance firm. Around

1 905 life insurance companies like London's Guardian Assurance,

Shanghai's China Mutual Life lnsurance and Canada's Sun Life Assur-

ance started acquiring Chongqing agents.38

Some foreigners still hoped to expand the treaty-port network

further into Sichuan. In 1904 a treaty was actually signed to found

36. Litton called him a "first rate" businessman, in contrast to Little, in his 1.3 1.99 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1323, General Correspondence frorn Chungking #GA) pp. 35-6. 37. Fraser, FO 228/1084, pp. 148-9. 38. W.P.M. Russell, 12.31.05 Intelligence Report, FO 228/1628 From Chungking #3/06, pp. 15-8. 221

a Wanxian bonch of Chongqing's foreign customs, but this was not

effected until 1917. More than one consul urged the opening of

Chengdu, which was much closer than Chongqing to most of the prov-

ince's major markets. In fact, the rule preventing foreign merchants

from doing direct business in the capital, as opposed to employing

local agents, was not always strictly obse~ed. Early in 1905 Mack-

enzie's Sichuanese Chengdu agent posted a sign advertising Brunner

& Mond wares being sold through Longmao Yanghang without putting

the word "Daili" (agent) at the front, and he was ordered to take it

down. The French merchant Coffiney and the British merchant Hol-

land, who opened Chengdu shops selling foreign goods, agreed to

change their signs t~o.~~But in the same year a British merchant

called W.J. Davey moved to Chengdu, selling literature from the Dif-

fusion Society mission. He was able to continue partly because he

was technically a missionary, until the Diffusion Society dismissed

him for abusing his missionary capacity. (He had been similarly dis-

missed from the China lnland Mission.) Another reason was his

39. C.W. Campbell, FO 228/1591, correspondence from Chengdu #6/05 (3.8.05). 222

friendliness with Chengdu officialç, possibly lubricated by bribery.

(He had enough clout to make the Viceroy suppress pirated editions

of his literatureJ40 In 1913 Chengdu considered opening itself uni-

laterally in the recent pattern of towns like Jinan, but the revolu-

tionary political order must have made the proposal unviable, as

nothing more was heard of it.41

(b) Concessions and Imperia1 Rivalry

The turn of the century saw a shift in the balance of power in

eastern Asia. In the half-century before this time Britain had been

the dominant foreign power in China, both in economic operations

and in the foreign community's respective populations. Starting

with Japan's crushing military defeat of China, she faced new corn-

petition from other empires wanting to increase their share of busi-

-- - 40. Herbert Goffe, FO 228/159 1, 9.30.05 Chengdu intelligence report, from Chengdu #51 D/05 , pp. 10-1 1; FO 228/1629, from Chengdu #101/06 (10.5.06). 41. Harold Porter, FO 228/1870, correspondence from Chengdu #133/13 (1 0.20.1 3). ness and strategic power in China.

From the 1890s...it is no longer possible to speak of British supremacy in East Asian business and diplomacy. The most significant new forms of China's integration into the international economy were henceforth pioneered by other trading nations [including] direct up-country distribution by the Americans (Standard Oil, BAT) and the Gerrnans (IG Far- ben) ....The British were no longer the foremost commercial in- novators among foreigners in China.4z

The sense of cornpetition was encouraged by interna1 developments

within the Chinese nation. In the two decades before World War l

the power of foreigners in China was at its pinnacle. The defeat of

the Boxer Rebellion made the Empire's persistent weaknesses mani-

fest, encouraging a new aggressiveness by foreign interests. Even

Sichuan was affected.

Foreign interest in Sichuan's economic possibilities already ex-

isted in the 1890's. In the single year of 1896, no iess than four

missions visited the pon to investigate trade conditions. In January

Japan sent a Commercial Mission to negotiate the purchase of local 42. Jurgen Osterhamrnel, "British Business in China, 1 860s-1950s,"British Busi- ness in Asia since 7860,R.P.T. Davenport-Jones & Geoffrey Jones ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 989), p. 2 14. 224

land for a settlement. In March 12 Frenchmen, mostly unable to

speak Chinese, were sent to Chongqing by the city of Lyon to evalu-

ate Sichuan's trade potential, including silk exports for Lyon's

mi11s.43 In April Brennan, Britain's Guangzhou Consul-General, visit-

ed as part of his tour of treaty ports. December saw the arrivai of a

three-man mission, ied by former Consular Agent F.S.A. Bourne, sent

by the Lancashire Cotton miIl town of Blackburn to examine inter

alia the Sichuanese market for British piece g~ods.~~

As the turn of the century approached, the French government

took a new interest in Sichuan. Already France had been strengthen-

ing her lndochina power base and was increasingly making south-

western China part of her "sphere of influence." Sichuan, to the im-

mediate north of this region, became a target for further French ex-

pansion. Two diplomats visited early in 1894 to make a report for

43. Their report was published as La Mission Lyonnaise d'Exploration Commercial er, Chine 7 895-7 897 (Lyon: A. Ray, 1 898). lt discusses Chongqing in pp. 136-54. 44. The cornrnissioners fater published Report of the Mission tu China of the Blackburn Chamberof Commerce 7896-7 (Blackburn, U.K.: North-East Lancashire Press, 1898). Bourne wrote the first volume; H. Neville and H. Bell wrote the second. the Quai d'Orsay, and two years later one of them, F. Haas, returned

as the first French Consul in Chongqing, acquiring land in the upper

city for an imposing consulate. (The United States also introduced a

consul before the end of 1896, but the American Consulate was soon

suspended and not revived until 1906.) Haas was ambitious in his

promotion of French interests, predicting:

When we can set up steel and iron works in Chongqing, the questions of concessions will be resolved; and this day will mark the date of the ... eventual conquest of the part of the hinterland we have the right to conquer by al1 possible rneanss45

France flexed her new diplornatic muscle in the 1898 Yu Manzi

crisis. Haas, with distasteful enthusiasrn, wanted France's Beijing

legation to press for

freedom for the [Sino-French] Company represented in Chong- qing to exploit the surrounding mines and smail rivers of Chongqing. I think the opening of Chengdu will be necessary to insure peace and [guarantee?] the French future in Sichuan.

Before the crisis was resolved he stiggested an open Chengdu, a

45. French Foreign Ministry Archives (Paris), Correspondence Commerciale, Tchongk- ing 1896-1 901, Consul Hass to Hanotoux in Paris, 1 1.10.97: 26, quoted in Judith Wyman, "The Arngibuities of Chinese Antiforeignisrn: Chongqing, 1870-1 900," Late Imperia1 China Vol. XVlll #2 (December 1997), pp. 108-9. French railway concession between Chongqing and Chengdu ("We wili

have nothing more to fear from our rivais in Sichuan ....We will be the

masters of Sichuan and Yunnan"), a French settlement in Chongqing,

and a convention extending French missionary rights within China to

Tibet. Even French Minister Pichon considered this "a program a bit

excessive with respect to the chances we have to get them accepted

and the reasons we have to demand them" and advised France's For-

eign Minister Delcasse to stick to compensation and mining conces-

In 1899 Pierre Bons d'Anty took over the French Consulate and

made it a power base within Sichuan. He spent long periods in

Chengdu and finally headed France's new Consulate-General in that

city. Unlike the rapid rotation of British Consuls, Bons d'Anty

stayed in Sichuan for over a decade and paid almost obsessive atten-

tion to French interests. Provincial officials cultivated amicable

46. French Foreign Ministry Archives (Nantes), telegram book, Haas to Beijing 7.1 '1.98,7.1 8.9 8, 9.23.98; French Foreign Ministry Archives (Paris), NS 322, Pichon to Delcasse, 2.7.99. Ail quoted in ibid. 227 relations with the French, probably in part to counterbalance the more established British presence. When Chengdu opened a new foreign relations office after the turn of the century, its first appoin- tees spoke French rather than English. (French was then the international language of diplomacy.)

In 1898, the year of the Fashoda crisis, the rivalry of Britain,

France and other empires reached as far from home as China, even western China. In that year came a new scramble for concessions, as Beijing was pressured to lease out strategic sites to several competing worldwide empires for direct administration. Russia acquired Port Arthur and Dairen as a leasehold on the Manchurian coast, which Japan had expected to gain after her 1895 victory and eventually would after defeating Russia ten years later. Germany demanded and received the Jiaozhouwan leasehold on Shandong's southeastern coast. Britain then leased Weihaiwei on the province's northeastern shore, essentially to counterbalance the first two, and 228

issued a vague declaration that the Yangzi valley, possibly as far up-

river as Sichuan, was in the British "sphere." On the southern Coast,

France acquired the Guangzhouwan leasehold while Britain expanded

Hong Kong by leasing the New Territories.

In addition to the leaseholds, new treaty ports were serving to

reinforce existing spheres of influence. In Manchuria Mukden, Jilin

and Harbin were opened to mostly Russian trade, while the opening

of Dandong and its port Donggou facilitated economic ties with near-

by Korea, increasingly dominated by Japan. (See Map 1 .)47 Longzhou in

Guangxi, near the border with French Indochina, was opened to most-

ly French trade. In addition, three new towns were opened in Yunnan,

which was strategically situated next tu both Indochina and British

Burma, raising the possibility of increased trade with both colonies.

Mengzi had been opened in 1889 to promote commerce dong the

nearby Red River, which flowed down through French territory. It

was joined in 1899 by Tengyue near the Burmese border, after an

47. Stanley Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs, Appendix A. 229

1894 Anglo-Chinese convention on Burma; and in 1897 by Simao,

which was close to both colonies, after an 1895 Franco-Chinese

convention (See Map 2). In 1901 Britain opened a consulate-general

in the Yunnan capital Yunnanfu (now called Kunming), as did France.

France now made her own efforts to influence Sichuan. One area of Anglo-French rivalry was mining concessions. Sichuan's mineral wealth had been remarked on by visitors like Richtofen, but serious development required Western capital and engineering. New companies like Pritchard & Morgan sought out a foothold, and British and

French interests obtained overlapping contracts requiring years of negotiations with Chengdu officiais. The fine between economic and political interests became blurred. (Yu Manzi was a coal miner, and the rumor of a French coal concession in the Dazu area, complete with mechanized equipment to take away mining jobs, may have played a role in his rebelli~n.~~)Little himself became heavily involved in the race, first as an independent then as a Pritchard, Mor-

48. Wyman, op cit., p. 109. 230

gan agent, and British officials spent a great deal of time defending

his deak49

But a combination of obstacles prevented realization of their

dreams. The early enthusiasm of some foreigners diminished and the

large investments needed did not materialize. The original claims

turned out to be somewhat less valuable than purported. The Chi-

nese, moreover, tended to ma ke conflicting agreements with differ-

ent foreigners, leading to disputes. (This was due in great part to

carelessness on every side, but possibly also to a Chinese desire to

limit foreign influence and play off the foreign powers against each

other.) Despite the consuls' attempts to mediate, Chengdu's new

Mining Board did little to end these bottlenecks, and in the end al-

most none of the foreign mining schemes got anywhere. Once again,

Chinese officials pursued short-term aims, and their actions seemed

to show less interest in promoting national economic cievelopment

49. See, for example records of negotiations leading to 1 2.1 1 .O3 agreement in FO 1711609, pp. 34-1 53. 231 than in restraining foreign penetration, yet they managed to prevail through bureaucratic maneuvering.

The British government developed a heightened concern for Si- chuan's strategic importance. In addition to France, Russia was then seen to be promoting her own interests in northern and western

China, and the province was also at the western end of Britain's

Yangzi Valley sphere. With so many discussions to undertake with provincial officials, Britain opened a Consulate-General in Chengdu in 1903, under former Consular Resident Alexander Hosie. P.D.

Coates includes it among several "political posts" that were established around the turn of the century as a result of imperial rivalries:

The main object in establishing it was to obtain readier access to the viceroy of Szechwan and so to counter French designs in that province. It was also the natural post at which to obtain information about Tibet and Chinese activities there.

As Chengdu was not a treaty port, Chinese officials challenged Brit- ain's rig ht to open a consulate there and at first refused recog-

nize it. Eventually a face-saving compromise was found under which

Hosie was recognized as "Consul-General to Sichuan." (A similar im-

passe and compromise had occurred in Yunnan.)so At the same tirne

the Chongqing Consulate was officially downgraded to a Vice-Consu-

late, though it retained its local importance in the eastern part of

the province. This was a natural result of Britain's political inter-

ests in the province as a whole, in contrast to the mere commercial

interests focused on Chongqing.

Another area of imperial rivalry was railway development,

prompting both British and French surveys in the region in 1898.

France was already planning to extend its Indochinese rail network

northward into Yunnan, and envisioned a further extension into Si-

chuan. Some British interests, for their part, hoped to build a line

going northeastward frorn Burma through Yunnan to Sichuan. But

both routes crossed mountainous areas and construction expenses

50. Coateç, op. cit., pp. 383-4, 394-5. 233

rendered the projects unfeasible.S1 More attention was given for

railway proposals to link Sichuan with the downriver provinces, but

Chengdu was intent on an all-Chinese venture.

With such projects afoot, Chongqing's missionary-dominated for-

eign community saw an influx of sornewhat unsavory businessmen.

Back in 1897, when Little hosted a gathering of 23 to celebrate

Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, LMS missionary J. Wallace Wilson

had publicly promoted harmony between missionaries and foreign

rnerchants, citing Little's ~harity.~~When the foreign business com-

munity had been tiny, it was somewhat easier to overlook transgres-

sions like trading in opium. But the Iarger group, who lived a "rol-

licking life of drink, gambling, and lust" was distinctly immoral by

missionary standards: Elsie Hunt, teacher in the foreign school,

caused a minor scanda1 when she invited Mackenzie merchant John

Stenhouse to a church pic ni^.^^ (They later married, which meant the 5 1. Litton discusses these plans in op. cit., pp. 1 1-1 6. 5 2. "Outports: Chungking," North-China Herald, 7.9.97, pp. 67-8. 5 3. Charles Tyzack, Friends to China: The Davidson Brothers and the Friends' Mission to China 7886 to 1939 (York: William Sessions, 1 988), p. 83. end of the school.)

But the missionaries themselves were not always above reproach.

In 1902 William Hyslop, in charge of the CIM's Chongqing business

agency, claimed that the Mackenzie agent was cheating him, and he

encouraged or coerced two of his local office boys and a fugitive to

publish a "disgraceful libel," then sheltered the group in his house

after they were sued, only surrendering them after the Consular con-

stable threatened to bring reinforcements from a gunboat. A Shang-

hai accountant who audited the agency's books found a shortfall of

at least 4000 taels, some of it invested in a semi-foreign shop, an

opium den, Guizhou silk speculation, and "alcoholic luxuries." Hyslop

left the mission in a defiant mood--he knew the CIM's reluctance to

prosecute members--and even applied to join the Catholic church to

spite his old sect. He planned to open his own firm, and was expect-

ed to engage in name-selling.S4

54. E.C. Wilton, 7.31 .O2 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1455, General Correspondence from Chungking #21 A), pp. 2-6. -

Little's final attempt at effecting rnining developrnent in Sichuan

was the 1902 indirect acquisition of a controlling 50% share in the

Longwangtong coal mines in the Jiangbei sub-prefecture. (The year

before, when Nicolson attempted to arrange the sale without provid-

ing a payment to the local fixer, the latter arranged with local ban-

dits for a farcical "siege" of a party of Westerners headed by Nicol-

son visiting the district?) The coal was stearnship-quality and Lit-

tle hoped to supply future steamers in the area as well as current

gunboats. He also made plans to build a short railway from the pits

to the riverside. Nicolson admitted to Sly, the latter asserts, that

Little's Chinese partner--a Christian banker called Wang Jingxuan

with whom most foreign residents kept their accounts--was actual-

ly wholly responsible for any 10~s.~~This makes the Mining Board's

resistance to the new concession more understandable.

55. E.C. Wilton,7.3 1 .O 1 lntellig ence Report (FO 228/1403, General Correspondence from Chungking #35A), pp. 15-21 5 6. Sly, /oc. cit. 236

As it was, Chengdu finally acceded to the Longwangtong conces-

sion in coai and iron at the end of April 1904,=' and after further ne-

gotiation Beijing ratified the agreement before the end of the year.

Little was now downriver, having left Sichuan for the last time that

spring after completing the deal. Consul-General Harry H. Fox later

contended that Little had

left the company's affairs in an almost hopeless tangle: he be- queathed to the Company [Mackenzie] a legacy of suspicion and distrust which still hampers their every undertaking: he left, deservedly or undeservedly, a bad reputation for unbusinesslike methods, for insincerity, for double dealing. This reputation shadows and clings to the c~rnpany.~~

But the conflict over the concession was far from over. As Little

tried to raise Shanghai capital for his last venture--Kiang-Pei Con-

cessions Ltd. was registered in Hong Kong in 1906--Chengdu contin-

ued to make new stipulations and raise obstacles. Little claimed

57. Hosie observes that Little's concession was granted "on more favourabie terms than hitherto obtained in Szechuen." (FO 228/1549, General Correspondence from Chengtu #9B, 5.1.04) In #1 1 (5.2.04) he encloses the 4.30.04 agreement. 58. Document #9/08 (3.1.08) from "Little's Yunnan & Szechuen Mining Concessions: 1908" (FO 228/2342). 237

that the cornpany's 500,000-tael capital was fully su bscribed, but

officials denied that the funds were in a respected bank, dernanded

official certification, then insisted that the Company had failed to

meet the deadline of May, 1906, for starting operations. As London

shareholders hesitated, nothing was heard from Little: Consul-Gen-

eral Herbert Goffe cautioned on June 7, "The suspicion is growing

here that the Co. is not bona fide and I anticipate fresh difficulties.

Little is playing into [the Mining Bureau chief's] hands and prejudic-

ing my relations with the Viceroy." Then Little finally notified Goffe

that 100,000 taels were available for immediate work. (Sichuan

banks were afraid to antagonize the Provincial government by han-

dling the cornpany's account.) Then the Viceroy insisted on a name

change to Kiangpei Ting Coal and lron Mining Company before allow-

ing work to proceed.

Finally, in November a former comprador of Little's was arrested,

- 59. Documents #9-13/06 (5.1-1 7.06); #23-4/06 (6.7-9.06);Miscellaneous Doc- ument #164/06 (7.1 6.06) from ibid. charged with failing to pay for a mine bought in Little's name, and in

November the Daotai threatened to confiscate the mine lands on the

ground that the deeds were unregistered. Little gave up and, acting

through his agent Nicolson, agreed to seIl his half of the land to the

Sichuanese-owned, Chengdu-backed Baofu C~rnpany.~~He sold out to

Mackenzie and retired to Britain, where he died in 1908.61 On January

9 Vice-Consul Russell Phillips reported that the Company was

fighting over a new adit site with a rival Jianghe Company, "a more

or less bogus concern created by the former Acting Viceroy and fos-

tered by the present Viceroy, as a hindrance to the further develop-

ment of Our Company." The Mackenzie directors also gave up and sold

the concession itself to Jianghe. As part of the settlement, Little's

impoverished widow was granted 1 2,000 taelQ2 The venture was

ultimately defeated by the continued resistance of Chinese officiais,

60. Document #3 7 /O7 (1 1.7.06) from ibid.; Document #15/07 (2.1 5.07) from ibid. 6 1. Little, possibiy after being visited by a furloughed Nicolson, let off one last round of cornplaints, wnting to the Foreign Office to protest the handling of the rnatter by British consuls. Fox's description of Little's Sichuan legacy (see Note 57) was part of a response to Little's charges. 62. This grant was made at the instigation of the Minister, who had hoped for 20,000, in recognition of Alicia's services to China in organizing and raising funds for the Tian- zuhui. Document #59/09 (7.1.09), ibid. 239 as in the Kuling crisis thirty years before, coupled with the ques- tionable acts of Little. Chengdu's reluctance to grant foreignerç rights over Sichuan's minerais, with the accompanying potential for economic dominance, caused them to undo what seemed to be the province's most promising mineral developrnent plan. The British

Consul could only arrange for compensation of the losers. As the foreign businessmen could see, Chinese bureaucracy had achieved another rather high-priced victory.

Two other nations started to develop a real presence in Sichuan after the turn of the century. Germany, itself an empire with visions of worldwide power, founded a Chongqing Consulate in 1902.

German firrns like Arnhold & Karberg and Carlowitz & Co. sent foreign agents to Sichuan. A German doctor called P. Assmy, with his government's backing, founded a private hospital in Chongqing. De- spite initial resistance--mo bs levelled h is office three times in his first six months in the city--Assmy became the first foreign doctor 240

to earn local trust to the point of performing surgery on a Si-

ch~anese.~~

Japan was also a new foreign presence. Unlike the other foreign

powers, the Japanese, bent on obtaining al1 the benefits of the re-

cent treaty, insisted on purchasing land near Tangjiatuo for a set-

tlement in 1896. But the purchase provoked a popular backlash--

partly because the land included gravesites that would have to be

levelled--1eading to an impasse that was only resolved in 1901. The

first regular Japanese Consul arrived at the end of the year and ac-

tual settlement commenced in 1 902.64 Soon the majority of Chong-

qing's foreign businessmen were Japanese, and cheap Japanese goods

63. George C. Basil's Test Tubeç and Dragon Scales (Chicago: John C. Winston, 1940) inciudes a profile of Assmy in a chapter titled "The Successful Failure," pp. 205-21. (The name is changed to Strobel, but the profile clearly applies to Assmy.) Assmy was a Prussian rnedical officer demoted due to factional politics, who moved to Chongqing to get as far away as possible from fellow Germans. He married his pregnant Chinese maid, and this blatant miscegenation earned him pariah status in the foreign and native comrnunities: "few men anywhere have ever Iived Ionelier lives." Assmy kilied himself in the 1930's. Basil greatly admired his accomplishments in blood analysis and felt "a sense of irreparable loss to the field of scientific research." 64. Six weeks of negotiation in 1896 had produced only a rudirnentary agreement. and the issue of the gravesites was deferred to later discussions between the Japanese consul and leading Tangjiatuo natives. (Tratman, 4.31 .O6 Intelligence Repon-Gen- eral Correspondence from Chungking #4a/96, FO 228/1225--pp. 14-22.) On the 241

and other irnports were providing Western goods with stiff competi-

tion. The settlement included several factories, and some Japanese

firms evaded the official monopoly on match production. But the

Japanese concession, miles from the central city and vulnerable to

summer floods, had no future: Chongqing would continue to have one

of the smallest Japanese populations among treaty ports.65 As Japan

steadily increased her economic penetration of downriver China, Si-

chuan was simply a lower priority.

The new presence of foreign steam-driven gunboats, among other

things, was crucial to the final development of a regular steamship

commerce as far upstream as Chongqing. After the Boxer crisis,

resolution of the impasse, E.C. Wilton, General Correspondence from Chungking #21/01 (7.2.01). 65. Mark R. Peattie, "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1 895-1 937," The Japanese lnformal Empire in China, 7 8%- 7 93 7 , Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 175- 6. 242

Britain became the first foreign power to station gunboats in Si- chuan, sending the Woodcock, the Woodlark, and the Kinsha (the Pio- neer, renamed for the Yangzi river above Suifu, and replaced by the

Widgeon in 1905). These ships patrolled the Yangzi above as well as below Chongqing, and in summer ascended the Min River as high as

Jiading. The gunboats and their sailors and officers did wonders for the foreign community's unexciting social life: the missions operated the Anchor Reading Room for sailors in the city for several years, and the sailors arranged picnics for foreign children. Polo matches took place on a small sandbar near Longmenhao. The Admiralty leased the anchorage space in front of Little's Longmenhao hong as berthing space, and built a Stone grid for repair work. This anchorage, to which foreign residents could be evacuated in a crisis, further grounded Chongqing's foreign community on the south bank.

The German firm Rickmer had bui!t a new steamship called the

Sui-hsiang especially for the Upper Yangzi, and she attempted to 243

ascend the Yangzi Gorges at the end of 1900, carrying 84 foreign

passengers--including many missionaries returning to Sichuan--and

an unknown number of Chinese. But Captain Breitag quarreled with

his Chinese pilots, and the ship struck a rock not far above Yichang

and sank. The river's famous network of red lifeboats worked so

quickly that the only deaths were about 15 Chinese and Breitag, who

had given his life preserver to a passenger.G6 This disaster, corn-

bined with the disappointing performances of Little's Leechuen and

Pioneer, reduced the enthusiasm of foreign shipping firms for at-

tempting an upriver extension of their Yangzi Iines and for severai

years the prospect for new attempts was very dim. Only the gunboat

operations existed to show that commercial steamships were at al1

feasible in the region. (Some experts suggested that they could only

operate above Wanxian.)

The other foreign powers were unwilling to concede the Upper

66. Spencer Lewis, who was rescued from the ship, describes the disaster in "An Upper Yangtze Tragedy, " West China Missionary News, 1 -2.0 1, pp. 4- 1 0. The report is dated 1 .%O 1. Yangzi and Sichuan as part of Britain's "sphere of influence." The

French Navy established its own presence with the Olry in 1901.

Former Pioneer pilot S. Cornell Plant signed a contract to provide

piloting services for French gunboats while he developed his own

scheme for steam trade on the Upper Yangzi. (He had hoped to be

hired by a stearnship Company but found no taker~.)~~A second

French gunboat called the Takianp-a junk with steam engines added

that was useful for su~eyingthe rivers--soon followed. French of-

ficers managed to take the Takiang up the Tuo River in 1906 and

considered going further to the very outskirts of Chengdu the next

year, but decided against it? The Olry proved to be poorly-suited to

the Upper Yangzi and was replaced by the Doudart de Lagree in 1909,

when the Takiang was disrnantled.

67. Wilton, 4.30.02 Intelligence Report (General Correspondence from Chungking #15A/02, FO 228/1455), pp. 32-5. 68. British Consul-General Hamy H. Fox, who first learned of the planned 1907 expedition from a 2.7.07 Echo de Chhe article "Echos de Setchouan," warned his Minis- ter, and probably his French counterpart, of the danger of an anti-french backlash. 3.31 .O7 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1660, General Correspondence from Chengdu #18A), p. 33. 245

These ships were joined by the German gunboat Vaterland in

1907. That ship's captain triggered a crisis the next spring when he

laid clairn to space in the Longmenhao anchorage. The harbourrnaster

agreed that there was room for another gunboat, but British Consul

Herbert Phillips denied that there was any truth to this. Britain had

no exclusive claim to the anchorage beyond its exclusive presence

over eight years, but Admiralty policy was to avoid situations like

the Hankou anchorage, where rival nations' gunboats had played chil-

dren's games over berthing space.69 In the autumn the foreign cus-

toms commissioner ordered the new, more pliable harbourmaster to

state that no new room was available, and the Germans did not press

the issue?

Plant continued to work on his plans for a steamship service. He

had written a 1901 report sketching a system of tugs to transfer

Iighters between the worst Yangzi Gorges rapids, according to the

69. Phillips, 6.30.08 Intelligence Report (FO 22811 6S), pp. 1 4-6. 70. PhiIlips, 12.31 -08Intelligence Report (FO 228/1728, General Correspondence from Chungking, #2), p. 12. 246

season. (Above Wanxian the lighters could function as independent

shipsJ7' In 1905 he developed this plan further. No ship would be

heavier than the largest junks, so trackers could take the lighters

through "unsteamable" rapids (also reducing tracker resistance to

the proposal). Plant envisioned a 100% profit, and hoped that the

scherne could be extended to the river above Ch~ngqing.?~But the

Upper Yangzi needed further surveying. In late 1902 and early 1903

the officers of the Olry surveyed the river from Yichang to Suifu. In

1904 Asiatic Petroleum civil engineer W. Meischke-Smith surveyed

the rapids of the Yangzi Gorges. In late 1906 two British officers,

Lieutenant Commander Spicer Simson and Engineer Lieutenant Black,

triangulated the Yangzi from Yichang to Ch0ngqing.~3

Not al1 foreign firms were uninterested in such ventures. In

- -- 7 1. E.C. Wilton sent a 4.29.0 1 despatch to Shanghai Consul-General Byron Brennan de- scdbing Plant's report, which he considered feasible. (FO 22W1403, General Cor- respondence from Chungking #9). Wilton encloses a copy of the report in General Correspondence from Chungking #45 (9.2 1.01 ). 72. W.P.M. Russell encloses Plant's plans in FO 228/1592, General Correspondence from Chungking #2 (2.9.05). 73. H.H. Bristow, 12.31 .O6 Intelligence Report (General Correspondence from Chungk- ing #4/07, FO 228/1659), pp. 12-3. 247

1906- the Rqthschilds were backing a proposed French Company

called "Societe Anonyme de Navigation du Haut Yangtze" to execute

Meischke-Smith's plan to create an Upper Yangzi steam trade, which

also involved tugs towing Iighters. The project was promised sup-

port by foreign customs Inspecter-General Robert Hart, and was a

high priority for the French Minister, but was opposed by the Japa-

nese, who were apparently developing their own plans.74 But the

scheme that finally got off the ground was a Chinese one. In Octo-

ber,l 907, Zhou Kechang, head of Chengdu's Commerce Bureau, con-

vened a meeting of Chongqing merchants to form the semi-official

Sichuan Steam Navigation Company with Plant as manager whenever

he was free from his French contract. (This contract extended to the

end of 1909, but the French Navy recognized the undertaking's im-

portance and avoided calling on Plant's services when the company

needed him.) The company was floated the next year with 200,000

taels capital, 80,000 of it government fund~.~~ 74. FO 228/1629, General Correspondence from Yichang #8 (4.6.06). Hankou consul E.H. Fraser asserted in an annotation that the true barrier to the stearn trade was lack of cargoes. 75. The developrnent of the company, the Shutung's first ascent, and negotiations of the In 1909 the new firm purchased the Shutung from the British firm Thorneycroft & Company. Shipped to Shanghai in parts, she consisted of a tug towing a lighter at her side. "The best local opinion [was] skeptical" about the company's profitability after earlier disappointments, and Sly characterized its Chinese management as displaying "the customary lack of decision and business order and ability characteristic of this class." Indeed, even before the ship's autumn ascent the Company had already spent al1 the available cash-

-the capital had not been fully subscribed--and had to mortgage the

Shutung to a local bank to keep running. Then the Hubei Viceroy, in a move eerily reminiscent of the Kuling, blocked the Shutung's departure from Yichang. His ostensible reason was a hostile petition by

Hubei junkrnen and clairns of official favoritisrn by the French Minis- ter, who was stiil promoting Meischke-Smith's venture, but he was more likely avenging Chengdu's failure to support the recent Sichuan

first anti-collision regulations are the subject of documents inUlnlandSteam Naviga- tion. Upper Yangtse Navigation 1 9074 9 1 1 " (FO 228/2303). circulation of copper cents from the Hubei mint.76 In any case, he

was persuaded to drop his objections and warned the ship not to re-

turn until the matter was resolved.

The Shutung finally reached Chongqing on October 27 after an

eigh t-day journey, her lighter carrying a half-load of freig ht spe-

cially discounted as promotion. She could not reach Yichang in win-

tertirne, but started fortnightly voyages between Chongqing and

Yichang in the spring, the Hubei dispute safely resolved. The crucial

question, whether the company could make a profit in Sichuan ship-

ping, was answered resoundingly in the affirmative. Cargo and pas-

senger space continuously sold out. Particularly profitable were

large-scale imports of downriver silver bullion, as Chinese and for-

eign merchants exploited the greater security of steam ~hipping.~~

The company was soon making plans for a new Upper Yangzi steam-

ship. Although the first steamers on the Yichang-Chongqing route 76. Sly, 9.30.09 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1?28, General Correspondence from Chungking #49), pp. 9-1 1. 77. J.L. Smith, 6.30.10 Intelligence Report (General Correspondence from Chungking #27/10, FO 228/1759), pp. 11-2. 250

carried only a small portion of the total trade and were not yet put-

ting junks out of business, their success indicated the direction of

the future.

It took the Chinese application of steamship technology to con-

quer the commercial challenge of the Yangzi Gorges and finally make

Chongqing a fully opened port. It took the Chinese to complete what foreigners had started but could not follow through on. This achievement reflected the downriver shipping situation. By 19 1 1, though rnost of China's larger steamers were still foreign-owned, the great majority of smaller steamers operating within the . Empire were owned by Chinese shippers.

Within 15 years steamships on the Upper Yangzi progressed from a single craft to a dominant position in Chongqing's trade with

Yichang and a cornmon presence in waters ahove the city in the mid-

1920's. J. Klubien, the foreign customs commissioner in 1921, ob- 251

served that the dominant economic trend in the previous decade had

been the growth of the steam trade.78 Commerce was revolutionized,

and foreign customs entries and clearances, which together had

never exceeded 10,000 tons before 1920, would both be well over

100,000 in the 1930'~.~~ (See Tables Sa and Sc.)

Until 1 9 14 the Chinese-owned Shutung was alone, making one

annual summer voyage upriver but otherwise working the Yichang-

Chongqing route. Then the Sichuan Steam Navigation Company also

acquired the Shuhun, the Upper Yangzi's first single-hull steamer,

and other Chinese shipping firms started to enter the market, in-

cluding the otherwise-dormant Sichuan Railway Company. Growth

levelled off between 19 1 6 and 1 9 18, due to warlord commandeering

as well as World War I. Then came a new spurt of growth starting in

1919, and in a few years steam dominated the "Lower Run" trade be-

tween Chongqing and Yichang and made great inroads in the "Upper

- - 78. Klubien, Decennial Reports: 7972-27, p. 233. 79. (Imperial) Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chung- king," 189 1 -1 9 1 8 passim, Appendix 1; "Returns of the Trade of China," 1 940. 252

Run" to Suifu, to which new, srnalier motor launches were well-

suited. As late as 1919, junk traffic going through the foreign cus-

toms had suffered little overall dirninuti~n.~~(As late as 1921

steamers were still incapable of regular winter service.) But in the

1920's, as technology improved to allow year-round service, sail

was steadily driven out of the main trade routes. Junkmen increas-

ingly had to find what business they could on the Yangzi's tributar-

ies.

The growing steam trade had to CO-exist with the remaining junks, so the need for navigational regulation increased. Starting in

1915 Cornell Plant put his experience as a local steamship pilot to work as the foreign customs' River lnspector above Yichang. Mapping of the upper river was still so limited that a steamer stopping for the night--night steaming was unsafe--would paint the ship's name and the date on a nearby rock to indicate that the anchorage was

80. An aggregate 48,873 tons of cargo were brought upstream to Chongqing, down lesç than a third from the near-record 1914 level. See Maritime Customs Statistical Se- ries #4: "Report on the Trade of Chungking," 19 14-1 9 1 9 passim, Appendix l. 253

safe- at that- time of yeaF Plant arranged a system of marks and

signal stations at the river's dangerous points, and tried to devise a

protocol to prevent junk-steamer collisions. But, as he noted in a

shipmaster manual, "To formulate hard and fast anti-collision rules

for the steamer and junk is next to the impos~ible."~~As steam

traffic expanded after World War I, Plant's system came under in-

creasing pressure.

The first foreign-owned commercial steamships to appear on the

Upper Yangzi were oil tankers owned by Asiatic Petroleum and Stan-

dard Oil around 1917. (Kerosene was one of the most successful im-

ports to China, reaching 7.1 % of the nation's total imports in 1920,

exceeded only by cottons, yarn and rnetaW3) Jardine, Matheson soon 81. An ltalian gunboat in the 1920's often wrote "Mussolini" or "Il Duce" in place of her na me. Graham Torrible, Yangtze Reminiscences: Some Notes and Recollections of Service with the China Navigation Company Ltd. 1 925- 1 939 (Hong Kong: John Swire & Sons, 1990), p. 59. 8 2. The Maritime Customs published Handbook for the Guidance of Shipmasters on the fchang- Chungking Section of the Yangtze River (the 1 93 1 edition was updated by R.G. Everest) as #34 in its Special Senes. 83. Yu-kwei Ching, Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China (Washington, D.C.: University Press of Washington, D.C., 1956)' p. 32. 254

followed, but Butterfield, Swire was more hesitant. In 1920 Mack-

enzie built the Loongmow expressly for this stretch of the river.

Measuring 440 tons and 200 feet long, it was the largest and best

equipped steamship on the Lower Run, allowing luxurious travel con-

ditions to Chongqing. She was so successful that Japanese shipping

firms like NKK soon entered the market too. Butterfield, Swire tried

to enter the Upper Yangzi market by secretly hiring Plant, who re-

tired as river inspector in 1920, but Plant died on his way to Britain

to oversee construction of a new Lower Run steameP4 The compa-

ny, after hearing reports that the Japanese-controlled Tianhua line

was spending 2 million yen on Shanghai ships specially built for the

river above Yichang, made a more successful effort in 1 923. It ar-

rived with a splash, purchasing Mackenzie's Chongqing facilities, in-

cluding the Longrnenhao anchorage, and also buying out the American

Robert Dollar Company. Little was right about the property's ulti-

mate value: an agent admitted that Mackenzie had the Company over

84. The negotiations that led to acquiring Plant are referred to in letters from the John Swire & Co. archives (JSSXII, China Navigation Co. #168-9, 179-80). 255

a barrel, as its Longmenhao holdings were so important to Butter-

field, Swire's future that the latter would pay almost any price for

thern?

Butterfield, Swire quickly increased its presence on the Upper

Yangzi, purchasing Mackenzie's ships for its China Navigation Co., in-

cluding the Loongmow--which was renamed the Wanliwand the

Upper Run ship the Shutung, and also acquiring the Robert Dollar,

which it renamed the Wantung. In the mid-1920's the Company also

built five shallow-draught ships in Hong Kong and Shanghai, specifi-

cally for the Upper Run. By 1927 there were 23 regular steamers on

the Lower Run, including the Wanliu and the Wantung, 3 belonging to

Jardine, Matheson's Indo-China Steam Navigation Co., 2 to the Nip-

pon-China Steamship Company (NKK), and 2 Standard Oil tankers.

Most of the rest were Chinese-owned. China Navigation also in-

creased its Upper Run presence, building five ships especially for

85. JSSXII, China Navigation Co., Shanghai to London #6 (4..17.23). 256

this difficult stretch of river.86 The conditions that allowed steam-

ship companies to establish a cartel on the lower river, however,

were lacking on the upper river in the 1920's. In particular the Jap-

anese, who during this period were providing the stiffest competi-

tion for British companies like Butterfield, Swire, started a freight

price war soon after their arrival. Shipowners agreed at a June 10,

1922 conference to a fixed rate only one-third lower than the previ-

ous year, but there were soon reports of Japanese shippers offering

secret rebates, and the pact collapsed quickly!'

Warlords often taxed Chinese steamships arbitrarily or comman-

deered them to transport their troops and supplies. But they re-

spected the power of foreign States enough to leave foreign vessels

alone. ' As a result, Chinese shipowners took to re-registering their

ships under foreign "flags of convenience," a practice not dissimilar

to name-selling. Britain refused protection to such ships starting in

86. Zhang Zhongli, Chen Zengnian, Yao Xinrong, The Swrie Group in Old China (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, ma.), pp. 172-3, 184-5. 87. P. Grant Jones, 6.30.22 intelligence Report (FO 228/3273), pp. 204-6. 257

1921, but at least seven local vessels quickly adopted the French

flag.88 ln 1925, of 46 steamships on routes between Hankou and

Chongqing, 21 were French, ltalian or Danish, of which "practically

all" were Chinese-owr~ed.~~Chinese capital, it is clear, enjoyed a

leading position in the steam trade both above and below Chongqing.

(d) The End of the Imperia! Order

The last decade of Qing rule was a time of new government initi-

atives in a final attempt to break the circle of dynastic decline. The

Chengdu administration, under Viceroys Iike Xijiang, like other pro-

vincial governments undertook often daring modernization programs

in a wide range of fields. If these efforts ultimately proved inade-

quate, and in some cases actually indirectiy stoked the fires of rev-

olution, this reflects the wide chasm that remained between the

88. Macintyre, "Report on Chungking-Szechwan,* p. 1 1. 89. A.B. Lowson, "Report on Chungking-Szechwan" (Hongkong Bank archives), p. 2. traditional China and the modern nation that progressives hoped for.

M uch of this modernization involved large-scale investment, raising political problems: Chinese investors doubted the soundness of many projects, while the more nationalistic Chinese disapproved of using foreign capital, fearing that China's independence would be further undermined.

New attempts were made to develop industry. Back in the 1890's

Li Shuchang had atternpted to build a yarn-spinning factory in Chong- qing, patterned after a similar plant in Wuchang, to reduce Sichuan's dependence on lndian yarn. He claimed in 1894 that such a factory could be put into operation for oniy 200,000 taels. A proposal to back the venture with an official yarn monopoly proved unfeasible.

Liu Bingzhang vetoed the proposal, but after his fall the new Viceroy revived the plan, raising the estimate to 400,000 taels. Land was bought, Shanghai machinery was ordered, and an office opened. But an 1896 attempt to pressure Chongqing merchants into subscribing 259

50,000 taels failed. Chongqing merchants were skeptical about the

project's economics: the factory would depend on Sichuan's limited

cotton production, already being displaced by opium, or on unreliable

downriver supply.90

Chongqing officials did manage in 1893 to organize a low-grade

match industry under a monopoly controlling Chinese production and

sale. This did not happen without deterrnined resistance from for-

eign officials, who considered it a violation of the city's treaty-port

status. But after 1902 Japanese firrns--or Chinese money with Jap-

anese figureheads-led the way in foreign production, often within

the Tangjiatuo settlement. By 1911 six of theçe factories were in

~peration.~'

Many of the new industrial projects were located near the pro-

vincial capital, including a new arsenal and a mint. A Chongqing

90. E.H. Fraser, 1 89 3 Trade Report (Diplornatic and Consular Reports #139 6), pp. 6- 7; J.N. Tratrnan, 1 894 Trade Report (#1598), pp. 3-4; Tratrnan, 1 89 5 Trade Re- port (# 1 T38), p. 5. 9 1 . E. Von Strauch, Decennial Reports: 7 902- 7 9 7 7, p. 269. 260

mint was being planned in 1896, at the sarne time as the Chengdu

rnint, but the project was soon suspended; it was revived in 1905,

then abandoned aRer two yean when rnoney ran out. (Moch of the

heavy equipment being irnported for the project was lost in ship-

wre~ks.).~~Construction would be resumed after the 191 1 revolu-

tion.

Another field for reformes was education. The Confucian-based

Imperia1 civil service examination system was abolished in 1905

and a new school system had to be built from scratch. Chengdu in

particular was the location for a host of advanced schools. Foreign

teachers came to teach a wide range of subjects. The new school

systern, which suffered from frequently unqualified personnel, was

very expensive. These measures, along with new military expendi-

tures to combat increasing unrest, resulted in unpopular new taxa-

tion, both on land and on commodities.

92. H.H. Bristow, 4.1 3.07 Intelligence Report (FO 228/1659, General Correspondence from Chungking #14), p.7. Bristow mentions that the complete equipment was shipped to Chengdu or sold Iocally, while partial equipment was buried "to avoid questions." The reformers recognized the need to improve China's economic infrastructure, particularly the transport of goods and people. A railway was central to breaking through the bottleneck of mountains and gorges that kept Sichuan isolated from downriver China.

Xiliang's most grandiose project was the Sichuan-Hankou railway line to Hubei, to be built without foreign capital or management.

The "Chuanhan" company was organized in 1904, and raised over 2.5 million taels, mostly in the first year. lts all-Chinese composition deterred many Sichuanese investors, who mistrusted officials and would have felt more confident if their rnoney were being spent under the supervision of reliable foreigners. But construction required more money, and more was raised by new taxation, mostly a land tax. (The payers of the land tax were in exchange granted shares in the company.) These revenues amounted to over 8 million taels by

1910, worth billions in today's dollars. For a preindustrial province, this was a grievous burden, increasing anti-imperial feeling at the local le~e1.~3

The company proved masterftil at raising mone)I and singiilarly

unsuited to spending it. Some people outside the company thought

that the only way to build the line was to start at the Chengdu end

with the Chengdu-Chongqing stretch through the flat Red Basin full

of towns. This section would require the cheapest and easiest con-

struction, and once built would start producing revenue immediately

to offset construction costs elsewhere. The disadvantage was that junks would have to transport heavy railway equipment up the Yangzi

to construction sites, and in any case connecting Sichuan to downri-

ver China was considered the highest priority. (A Jiangxi-born offi-

cial who argued for starting at Chengdu found himself frozen out by

Sichuanese coIleagues.) Beijing and Chengdu also considered extend-

ing the Iine westward to the Min River or even to Daqianlu to extend

control over the increasingly restive Tibet border, but feasibility

93. See the North-China Herald article "The Szechuen-Hupeh Railway," 4.8.1 0, pp. 72-3. It includes a balance sheet for the cornpany's operations up to 19 10. was dubious.

At first ail expenditures were on acquiring land and other proper-

ty, even establishing a school to train Chinese in the skills neces-

sary for building and running a railway. Construction was eventually

started at the Yichang end in 1907, and proceeded at a glacial pace.

This section went through mountainous Hubei terrain requiring many

tunnels and had few communities to join to Hankou and start produc-

ing revenue. Little of the company's large capital reserves was

being spent: a 1910 statement showed a balance of over 10 million

taels. The unbelievably irresponsible management, meanwhile, was

spending some f 8500 on 249 salaries alone, causing shareholders to

press embezzlernent charges and change direct or^.^^ (Similar incom-

petence occurred in several of the new Chinese railway companies.)

They also took to speculating on the Shanghai market to increase

their capital. Instead, the market crashed in 19 10, - - r/

94. J.L. Smith reports on a 1 1.O9 meeting of Chuanhan shareholders in his 1909 Trade Report (Diplornatic and Consular Reports #4489), p. 9. 264

triggering a-crisis and contributing to Beijing's decision to nation-

alize Chuanhan, along with other railways, resultiny in the Railway

League rebellion the next ~ear.~~The Chuanhan project, dominated

by the Chengdu bureaucracy rather than the business community,

demonstrated the limits of the Chinese scholar-official elite's abil-

ity to adapt to foreign business management methods.

Beijing's 1906 proclamation cracking down on opium trade and

use was enforced with enthusiasm and surprising effectiveness--at

least in the short term--in Sichuan. By this time Sichuan was expe-

riencing the common third-world problem of excessive dependence

on a single export. Opium production had grown to the point of hurt-

ing the province's rice production, increasing this all-important

commodity's price. ln the late 1890's over half of the revenue

reaching Chongqing's foreign customs was opium dutiesmg6(See Table

9 5. See Chuzo Ichiko, "The Railway Protection Movement in Szechuan in 19 1 1 ," Mem- oirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko (The Oriental tibraryf # 1 4 (1955), pp. 51-6. 96. (Imperial) Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chung- king," 1 89 1-1 9 3 1 passim, Appendix VII. 265

6a.) Officials planned a gradua1 phase-out, halving production on land

that already grew opium while outlawing it on new land. Beijing

also levied stiff new taxes on opium, payable in the Kuping taels

used by the central government. These measures proved successful,

and a total production ban was announced in 1909. Government orga-

nizations with a legal monopoly on sale and storage of the immense

existing supplies were also created.

In the short term this campaign increased opium exports, as

there was no other way to dispose of large stocks. (Local officiais were happy to send the problem downriver.) As a result, foreign customs revenue exceeded 600,000 taels in 1908. But then exports too were phased out in 1910, and revenue fell to less than 400,000. Si- chuan production was now limited to remote areas beyond the reach of government force, though suppression was very much incomplete

in Yunnan and Guizhou. Hosie visited Sichuan in 1911 and found that the same Yangzi riverbanks that had been lined with poppies only 266

eight years before had returned to growing the old cash cr~ps.~~(See

Table 3b.)

The ban, however, was a leading cause of a growing economic cri-

sis in Sichuan, affecting peasants, landlords and rnerchants. Opium

had been the province's most valuable export, and the loss of an ir-

replaceable source of exchange reduced the market for imports.

Consul H.H. Bristow had predicted as much: "Little is to be expected

from an ignorant and corrupt officialdom, and less from an unenter-

prising and easily discouraged pea~antr-y."~~Farmers who had relied

on their opium crop to supplernent their income or even provide most

of it were now in difficulties, and landlords had a harder time col-

lecting rent. Merchants were also hard hit, as opium was not only

the leading export but often a substitute for currency. Non-opium

exports did increase somewhat, partly filling the vacuum. Officials

97. (Imperial) Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chung- king," 1 89 6- 1 9 1 1 passim, Appendix V; Hosie, On the Tmil of the Opium Poppy: A Narrative of Travel in the Chief Opium-Producing Provinces of China (Boston: Small Maynard, 1 9 1 4), p. 243. 98. From an excised section of Bristow's 1905-6 trade report, FO 228/1659, General Correspondence from Chungking #53 (1 1 -23.07). 267

attempted measures to promote cultivation of alternative exports

like silk, with partial success. But evasion of the new iaws was a

chronic problem. As early as 1907 the anti-opium measures had

been one of the grievances behind rioting in Kaixian.99 In early 1910

Chongqing's Daotai had to take the Shutung to Fouzhou to deal with

resistance to the production ban. Missionary A.E. Claxton, visiting

Fouzhou, observed: "Farmers make no secret of their intention to try

and cultivate poppy next season and quantities of seed are now being

bought by them in Fouchou for the purpo~e."~~~Such resistance was

more than a minor factor in the rebellion of 191 1.

The 191 1 revolution that ended the Qing Dynasty and two millen-

nia of imperial rule in China arguably had its true beginning in Si-

chuan's Railway League uprising. Protests in many parts of China

followed the national government's decision in May of that year to

99. H.H. Bristow reported on the unrest in FO 228/1659, General Correspondence from Chungking #27 (6.8.07). 100. J.L Smith, 3.31.10 Intelligence Report (FO 22811 759, General Correspon- dence from Chungking #16), pp. 6-7; Claxton quoted by Smith in 6.30.1 0 Inteili- gence Report (FO 22811759, General Correspondence from Chungking #27),pp. 4- 6. 268

nationalize railways, including the struggling Chuanhan, but were especially widespread in this province, due partly to the inadequate compensation Sichuanese shareholders received. The company's land tax financing meant that ownership was widespread throughout the province, as was the new dissatisfaction. Sichuanese opposition came together in the Tongzhihui ("League of Comrades"), a coalition of delegates to the new provincial assembly, shareholders and 0th- ers connected to the "Chuanhan" Company, nationalist students and intellectuals, and opportunists like the Gelaohui, a secret society extending throughout the province and much of China.

Whether anti-Qing, anti-foreign or just anti-Beijing, members of this "Railway League" were united in their objection to the nation- alization and an accompanying plan to float a f 6,OOO,OOO loan from the leading Western powers to finance further construction. In a few months its activities progressed from petitions and Beijing del- egations to armed insurrection. Acting Viceroy Zhao Erfeng, who re- 269

placed the more conciliatory Wang Renwen, cut off negotiations and

treacherously arrested the movement's leaders, but the move back-

fired and he soon faced a rural rebellion comparable to the 1898 and

1902 disturbances, one particularly strong in western Sichuan.lol In

September Chengdu seemed to be beating back the rebels, but the

latter found their second wind in early October, conquering Jiading.

Then Wuchang exploded on October 10 and anti-Qing revolution was

nationwide.

News of the uprising downriver reached Chongqing about the same

time as Railway Commissioner Duanfang, sent by Beijing at the head

of a Hubei force to restore order. Unsure whether to advance inland

or return to Hubei and take on the Wuchang revolutionaries, Duanfang

hesitated fatally, spending the next three weeks in the city shoring

up his support among the local elite and trying to negotiate with the

101. That the insurrection's quick growth was wideiy unexpected is proved by the behavior of Bons d'Anty, usually very well-informed about Sichuan's political devel- oprnents. The Consul-General was caught in Daqianlu on an expedition to the Tibetan Marches and months passed before it was safe to retum to Chengdu. W.H. Wilkinson, 9.30.1 1 Intelligence Report (General Correspondence from Chengdu #103/11), p. 8. rebels, before setting out for Chengdu. With Duanfang's departure a

revolutionary conspiracy developed in Chongqing, which for some

time had been a leading Sichuan centre for revolutionary activity

under Sun Yat-sen's Tongmenghui organization. British Consul W.R.

Brown observed:

Like other towns of this province, Chungking [was] desirous of being master of its own fate, and the townspeople [would] declare themselves revolutionaries before revolution [was] forced upon them, as, by so doing, they [irnagined] that they [stood] to lose least...[ ln November, 19 1 1, the people of Chong- qing were] quietly feeling their way towards open rebellion.... lt was to be an "lnner Revolution" in the true sense of the ~ords.'~~

The Wuchang revolutionary regime forced the issue with an expedi-

tion of its own, soon closing in on the city.

On Novernber 22 a revolutionary regime under Dudu (rnilitary

governor) Zhang Liewu and Vice-Dudu Xia Zhishi took over Chongqing

in a bloodless coup. (Xia, like many of the revolutionaries, was a sol-

dier who had defected from Chengdu.) As elsewhere, motives for

102. Brown, 1 1.1 8.1 1 letter (Document #94, "RevoIution in Szechuan October- December 1 9 1 1, FO 228/2497); 1 1 .W.1 1 letter (Document #95, ibid.) 271 joining the revolution varied from republican fervor to regionalism to opportunism. The Daotai and the Magistrate acceded to a surren- der ultimatum and the Prefect only held out briefly. A horde of revolutionaries soon entered the city, and order was scarcely maintained. (Duanfang, who had only got as far as Zizhou, was murdered by his own troops after failing to bribe them.) Like a great many

Chinese cities at this time, Chongqing found itself under the rule of an enthusiastic but inexperienced republican clique. Organizations like the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, exercising their traditional stabilizing functions, helped maintain order. Once again, British subjects were temporarily evacuated frorn Sichuan.

Chengdu itself declared Sichuan independent of Beijing only five days later. Zhao managed to cut a deal with the released Tongzhihui leaders, mostly constitutionalists unnerved by the prospect of revolution, and was granted his old position of Warden of the Tibetan

Marches, though he stayed in the city. But in December rioting sol- 272

diers reduced the capital to far worse chaos than Chongqing, and

Zhao was lynched.103 The unpopular Zhao's death made negotiation

easier between the two regimes, which had both claimed authority

over the whole province. Revolution was a messy process in Sichuan:

a third regime in Luzhou claimed legitimacy, large bandit groups ran

amok, and pro-Qing forces held out in a couple of places. Troops

from Yunnan and Guizhou occupied parts of southern Sichuan, even

entering Chongqing, and were at first welcomed as peacekeepers, but

quickly alienated their hosts. (Their ostensible purpose of maintain-

ing order was overshadowed by their pursuit of regional power and

10ot.)'~~

Chengdu managed to overrun the Luzhou regime and corne to terms

103. Zhao's enemies claimed that he had had a hand in causing the rioting, but Brit- ish Consul-General W.H. Wilkinson was skeptical, noting that the resultant looting of banks had cost Zhao al1 his ready cash (Frorn Chengdu #140, FO 228/1799, 12.10.1 1 ). It seems clear that Zhao was prepared to flee to Manchuria or Hong Kong and inquired about the possibility of sanctuary on a foreign steamship (a cyphered message in Frorn Chengdu #135, FO 228/1799, 1 2.5.1 1, also in To Chungking #90, FO 228/18OO, 12.18.1 1 ) 104. Brown discusses the Yunnan force in correspondence with Chengdu Consul-Gen- eral W.H. Wilkinson, General Correspondence from Beijing #14-21/12 (3.13- S.Z.lZ), FO 228/1387. 273

with Chongqing in February, about the same time as Yuan Shikai's

agreement with the Nanjing regime declaring the Qing Dynasty abol-

ished.'05 The two regimes agreed to amalgamation, with Chengdu to

remain Sichuan's administrative centre and Chongqing to provide

headquarters for the province's military commarid. Zhang became

vice-Dudu in Chengdu while Xia was given a $30,000 payoff and en-

couraged to travel abroad.lo6 But before long the Chengdu officiais

were acting in bad faith and doing al1 they could to centralize power

in the old capital.

Sichuanese trade thrived in the decades before 191 1, fuelled by

opium. But the province's internai commerce was still, as it had al-

ways been, mostly a trade in Chinese goods, produced by Chinese,

transported by Chinese, and purchased by Sichuanese. For British

105. On January 19 Brown reported that the amalgarnation talks were "now being conducted in a rnost friendly spirit" (From Chungking #4/12, FO 228/1837). On February 10 he enclosed the draft agreement, noting: "In character [the new regime] is purely despotic and in no way representative of the will of the people." (From Chungking #7/12, FO 228/1837.) 106. S.C Yang describes the negotiations in his recollection (he was an ofTicial in the Chengdu regirne), "The Revolution in Szechwan, 19 1 1-1 9 1 2" Journal of the West China BorderResearch Society #6 (1933-34), pp. 86-9. 274 merchants, this tight system was almost impervious to entry. In contrast to India, here they failed to achieve a breakthrough in the sale of Western merchandise, despite having a presence in the carrying trade, particularly in the temporary boom in Indian yarn imports.

Starting in 1909 the steam trade, with its economies of scale and tight schedules, finally realized its promise of transforming Sichua- nese commerce, with a Sichuanese Company leading the way. But the development of rail transport was still a thing of the future, despite

Chengdu's huge efforts. Since Chongqing's opening, the foreign population had been transforrned by the growing missionary presence.

Although contact between Chinese and foreigners was starting to increase by the time of the revolution, the sort of joint efforts, commercial or otherwise, that were sometimes seen downriver--such as the cartel in which China Merchants joined Western shipping companies-were still rare in Sichuan. What is notable about Qing economic modernization efforts in this province is the near-total absence of foreign merchants and their capital, except in steam trans- 275 port. Even here, however, their role was largely that of a catalyst. 276

Chapter- 6: Development after 191 1

(a) Revolution and Financial Crisis

Sichuan was in political and financial chaos in the years after

191 1, particularly in the decade after the 191 6 Yunnan Rebellion. In

the first decades of republican rule it went from one of the Empire's

more prosperous provinces to the region most divided by warlord ri-

valry. In cities like Chongqing the main protection against anarchy

was often the local Chamber of Commerce, a somewhat weakened

continuation of the old officiai-commercial order. Despite the ar-

rival of foreign steamships and Japan's higher profile, foreign business interests remained largely uninterested in Chongqing opportunities. The arriva1 of Guomindang power in 1935, followed by the upheaval of the Japanese invasion, fundamentally changed the picture. 277

The period after the 1 91 1 revolution, in Sichuan as in the rest of

China, saw widespread questioning of traditional beliefs and a new openness to modernization, both practical and philosophical. This situation would seem to have provided an opportonity for foreigners to increase their influence in China, and in some cases they did manage this. But the period was also a time when nationalist ideology promoted independence and self-reliance and rejected foreign domination. In Sichuan, the next three decades were a chaotic tirne in which the Sichuanese endured warlordism and later Japanese aggression and yet began to regain control of their own destiny, through necessity as much as choice.

The Chengdu-Chongqing agreement prevented civil war for the time being but much disorder remained. An International Friends In- stitute report on its first decade termed 1 91 2 "The Year of Soldiers,

Shootings, Executions, and Political Parties."' In that one year

1 . Ten Momentous Years: The Report of the international Friends Institute: Chungking, West China: 7 909- 7 9 7 9 (Chongqing: lnternational Friends Institute, 19 1 9), p. 4. 278

three bandit campaigns raged in the notorious Dazu area before each

leader in turn--one was the released Yu Manzi--was captured and

put to death. Soldiers were hard to discipline, frequently choosing

mutiny, and were so eager to loot that the difference between soldier and bandit became academic. The Gelaohui secret society made

itself a force to be reckoned with, controlling a Chongqing newspa-

per at one point.' Opium cultivation was resuming in Yunnan,

Guizhou and the remoter parts of Sichuan, but elsewhere it remained invisible. (As late as 1 91 7 a premature Consular report insisted that opium cultivation in eastern Sichuan was "now definitely at an end.")3

Meanwhile, administration was simplified by the abolition of jurisdictions like zhou and ting, and different classes of magistrates were reduced to the single zhishi. But the position of daotai survived, now known as daoyin or xuanweishi. In both Chongqing and 2. W.R. Brown, General Correspondence from Chongqing #3 1/12, FO 228/1837 (5.23.1 2), p. 9. 3. Lewis King, 3.3 1.1 7 Intelligence Report (Frorn Chungking #34/17, FO 228/2007), p. 7. 279

Chengdu a Foreign Affairs Commissioner was appointed to deal di-

rectly with Westerners and Japanese, the Chongqing commissioner also serving as Customs Superintendent. In the provincial administration, civil and military affairs were divided between a Civil Gov- ernor (Shengzhang ), and a Military Governor (Dujun ), with the latter post predictably being more powerful. And the Imperia1 Maritime

Customs was renamed the Maritime Customs. The old centralized order had been removed but would only be replaced gradually.

Sichuan was again divided by the Second Revolution in 1 91 3, when Sun Yat-sen's Guomindang, which had replaced the Tongrneng- hui, rebelled against president Yuan Shikai's Beijing regime. A pro-

Guomindang faction existed in Chengdu, but it was quickly suppressed and the provincial government declared its loyalty to Yuan. ln Chongqing, however, 5th Division commander Xiong Kewu ultimately used his Nationalist sympathies as a pretext for an August campaign against Chengdu, recruiting every bandit he could entice. 280

(By this time the Second Revolution had been crushed downriver, but

Xiong, who censored incoming telegrams, managed to keep this a se-

cret!) This ill-starred venture actually made progress at first, as

towns in Xiong's path found it prudent to convert to the cause. But just as the rebels were approaching Luzhou the Yunnanese entered

the conflict in strength. (By this time Yunnanese generals had over-

run Guizhou and controlled both provinces.) Faced with a two-front war, Xiong's army crumbled and the general hurried back to Chong- qing. Unable to obtain a "loan" from the city, Xiong fled downriver on September 1 1. The Chamber of Commerce kept the peace and disarmed some of the rebels, but many headed for the countryside and

returned to banditry. The day after Xiong's flight, the city was occupied by a Guizhou army under Huang Y~ucheng.~

Shortly after the Guizhou (effectively Yunnan) occupation, a

Chengdu force under Wang Lingqi approached Chongqing. Both forces

4. Harold Porter surnmarizes Xiong's campaign in his 9.30.1 3 Intelligence Report (Generaf Correspondence from Chengdu #126/13, FO 228/1870), pp, 3-7. 28 1

claimed to be the legitimate occupier--Yuan often allowed his sub-

ordinates' jurisdictions to overlap--and Huang locked Wang out of the city, triggering one of the most serious crises in the city's history. Wang laid siege to Chongqing, inflicting privations on the refu- gee-swollen population. The Yunnan-Guizhou soldiers had quickly

become unpopular with their high-handed rule and looting--shake- down was the true purpose of their intervention--and the Chamber of Commerce apparently took the irresponsible step of encouraging the Chengdu force to confront thern? On September 16 Wang was allowed to enter the city with a small guard, but soon found his new headquarters blockaded by a siege within a siege. On the morning of the 21 st a Sichuan soldier killed one of Huang's troops and Wang's headquarters was bombarded. A long round of street fighting followed. By mid-afternoon Wang had Huang surrounded and the demor- alized Yunnan-Guizhou force was prepared to torch the city and hand

Wang a Pyrrhic victory.

5. A North-China Herald correspondent, in "The Fighting in Chungking: Extraordinary Behaviour of the Merchants" (1 0.25.13, p. 252), charged that the Charnber of Corn- merce leaders "have acted like children ... There is no doubt that the Chengdu troops were the aggressors." - At this point negotiation saved the day. The Chamber of Com-

merce, using British Consul W.R. Brown and French Consul M.A. Bo-

dard as middlemen, did the dangerous job of arranging a truce?

Wang rnoved to Jiangbei while President Yuan appointed a comrnis-

sion to investigate the matter. Huang ultimately left in early Octo-

ber after receiving a disappointing 20,000-tael payoff, enough to

pay the expenses of the retreat, but not before destroying an ammu-

nition durnp in a frightening explosion. Local charities reported 868

houses burnt down, 274 deaths among the townspeople-most mur-

dered by Huang's soldiers--and 46 wounded. In addition, 1378 bod-

ies--some soldiers, some civilians--were found in the nearby riv-

er~.~Despite this trial, Chongqing was overall unusually fortunate

among China's large cities in generally avoiding large-scale looting

and destruction. By and large, despite many interruptions in corn-

merce, life went on. In the vicissitudes that followed 19 1 1, for-

6. Brown describes the crisis in the 19 13 Trade Report (Diplornatic and Consular Re- ports #5378), pp. 4-5. 7. Brown, Frorn Chungking #?3/l3, FO 228/187O (1 1.20.13). 283 eigners in Sichuan largely stood aside, sometimes fleeing or rnediat-

ing but generally doing what they could to stay out of trouble. Al- though gunboats might show foreign flags on the main rivers, their threat was barely felt elsewhere, and they simply provided protection and evacuation for foreigners, rather than being players in Si- chuan's interna1 politics.

Financing government and military operations quickly became one of Chengdu's foremost challenges. In 191 2 Chengdu's expenditures were close to 40 million taels, military spending accounting for about two-fifths, while revenue did not surpass 14 rnilli~n.~Gener- als were quick to print paper money to pay as much of their expenses as they could, though their soldiers demanded payment in silver. In

191 3 the Chongqing mint was taken out of mothballs and started coining copper cash pieces. By late 1913 about $1 6 million in paper notes were officially in circulation, though more liberal estimates-

-including duplicate issues and forgeries--put the total close to 30

8. Brown, From Chungking #45, FO 22811 837 (8.2 1.1 2), p. 1. 284

millio ng, of which a large proportion ended up in Chongqing.

In this situation, Gresham's Law took effect and local business-

men hid their silver or sent it downriver, exacerbating the financial shock from the ban on the opium trade, formerly Sichuan's largest export. Already between 7 904 and 1907 increasing instability within the province had caused them to export over 10 million taels of bullion through the foreign customs, creating a currency shortage in

Sichuan. One of the most immediate changes effected by the introduction of steamships was the facilitation of large-scale bullion transfers. In 1910, the first full year of the steam trade, the Shu- tung imported over 5 million taels in silver ingots, a one-year aber- ration that temporarily restored the balance, in the pattern of a Pen- dulum swing. Similarly, Chongqing's bullion transfers fluctuated between import surplus and export surplus in the following years?

(See Table 4.)

9. Brown, Frorn Chungking #66/ 1 3, FO Z28/18ïO (1 0.1 9.1 3), pp. 7-8. 10. (Imperial) Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chun- gking," 189 1 -1 9 1 9 passim, Appendix B3. ln April of 1912 local Chinese offiicials enacted the first of sev-

eral indefinite bans on exporting silver, in violation of Chongqing's

treaty-port status, which protected foreign businessmen from such

trade restrictions. On such occasions the consuls and the foreign

customs comrnissioner intervened to ensure foreign merchants

would be excepted. Merchants also sent gold downriver, chiefly in

1915 when it constituted over half of bullion exports, or exported

unprofitable comrnodities to improve their balances downriver and

finance the purchase of imports. (Gallnuts were a popular export be-

cause they were durable and easy to grade.) With silver unavailable,

salt was sometimes used as an exchange medium as opium had once

been. The Chongqing Salt Commission continued to be an important

revenue source. In March of 1921 a Chongqing auditorate was orga-

nized to supervise tax deposits into the Bank of China, and within 18

months it had enough clout to insist that payments be made in sil-

ver.' '

1 1. S.A.M. Adshead discusses Sichuan's salt revenue systern, including Chongqing's role, Sichuanese officiais did what they could to alleviate the currency crisis. They tried to negotiate a loan from the French government. In June of 19 12 Chongqing's xuan weishi endorsed a Chamber of Commerce plan under which merchants would accept paper payment for 30% of any bill of exchange over 1000 taels, though important taxes and small transactions were excepted. In 1913 Chengdu enacted a program to burn $300,000 in notes every month, and even publicly burned its mint plates in front of the Provincial Assembly, but could not make businessrnen accept paper dollars except at a discount of aimost 40% against silver dollars. In August of 1914

Beijing sent financial advisers Henri Mazot and Wang Beixu to

Chengdu to investigate Sichuan's financial situation and devise a solution, and their prospective arriva1 calmed down the market somewhat. They proposed establishing a Bank of China branch in Sichuan to issue a new series of notes ($1 million at a time) and exchange

in The Modemization of the Chinese Salt Administration, 1900-7 920 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1 970), pp. 1 6 1-5, 200. 287 them for current notes at par, and destroy the latter. Beijing,

Chengdu, and the Bank of China would between them guarantee the notes. The plan's fatal flaw, Consul-General Harry H. Fox remarked, was in offering "no opportunity of bringing profit to its promoters," so the Chengdu authorities were hostile to it. Instead they cobbled together a scheme including partial redemption with no guarantee against reflotation, a bond issue which amounted to a state lottery, and a sale of government lands at a time when land prices were de- pressed. '

The monetary crisis facilitated a revolution in Chinese banking in

Sichuan as elsewhere in China. The conservative Shanxi banks, happy with their existing functions, had been reluctant to enter into business with foreigners or adopt Western-style banking methods. But their networks were hit heavily by the chaos of 1911, and they mostly ceased operations. New banks were needed to fiIl the vacuum, and the post-1911 companies were increasingly willing to emu-

1 2. Fox, From Chengdu #98, FO 228/1904 (8.22.1 4). 288

late foreign business methods. Already Beijing had created the Bank

of China and the Bank of Communications. The Bank of China opened

a Chongqing branch in 1915 and exchanged its notes at par with ex-

isting ones, which undermined the latter. The Bank of Communica-

tions arrived the next year.

The Yuan-appointed Chen Er'an regime made financial stabiliza-

tion one of its priorities, and redeemed notes at a 50% discount. By

April of 1916 fully $4.8 million had been redeemed, along with $4.9

million held by the Chengdu Chamber of Commerce and the Chongqing

and Luzhou Salt Commissions, and $1.7 million redeemed and burnt

by the Luzhou Salt Commission, in a useful but still incomplete op-

eration.13 Then Cai E's Yunnan rebellion prevented the completion of

redemption, and created a new cycle of instability. The Banks of

China and Communications had to suspend operations to avoid grant-

ing forced "loans" to warlords. Rival warlords frequently printed

13. E.W. Mead, 3.3 1.1 6 Intelligence Report (From Chengdu #58/16, FO 228/1979), pp. 8-1 2. 289

their own currency, undermining confidence further. Some missions

attempted to avoid currency problems by paying their staff in their

own scrip, without suc ces^.^

Though several new Chinese banks emerged to fil1 the vacuum

left by the closing of the Shanxi banks, only in 1922 did Chongqing acquire a foreign bank, managed fully along Western lines. Foreign- ers considered such institutions, which provided a wide range of services such as trading foreign currencies, a necessity for a treaty port to be developed completely. On April 10 the American-Oriental

Bank of Shanghai created the spinoff firm American-Oriental Bank of

Sichuan. Providing an invaluable service for foreign residents and offering banking services by mail, by the end of 1923 it was operating at a balance of just over a million dollars.15 Particularly for foreign businessmen, this was an all-important development that helped complete Chongqing's integration into the treaty-port sys-

14. In an advertisement in The West China Missionary News, October 1923, the Amen- can-Chinese Drug Company warned that its local retail store would no longer accept rnissionary scrip as payment: "Too rnuch trouble to collect." 15. The firm's balance sheet was published in an advertisement in ibid., March 1924. 290

tem. Other foreign banks, however, were slow to follow. The

Hongkong and Shanghai Bank's own studies suggested insufficient

business for them in this port, with an expectation of marginal prof-

its at best. The American-Oriental Bank was simply more willing to take the risk than its more staid cornpetition.

In the 1 9201s, Chongqing was a second-grade treaty port, about fifteenth in trade volume, providing the Maritime Customs with about 1% of its revenues, an amount which reached almost 800,000 taels in 1 926.16 (See Table 6a.) Foreign imports fluctuated in the decades after 191 1. Yarn imports from India died out by the mid-

1 920's.I7 (See Table 2c.) lmports of other foreign goods increased, however, and allowing for fluctuations the overall level of foreign imports remained stable over the long term. Meanwhile, the foreign customs' domestic trade steadily grew, particularly in imports: between 1916 and 1926 domestic imports increased by a factor of al- 16. (Imperial) Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chun- gking," 1 89 1- 1 9 3 1 passim, Appendix VII. 17. (Imperial) Maritime Customs Statisticaf Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chun- gking," 1 905-30 passim, Appendix III. most four, t-Oa level surpassing 30 million taels, almost triple the

figure for foreign imports.18 (See Table 1 b.) Domestic transit-pass

imports, principally yarn, came to surpass 1 0 million taels in 1 9 1 9,

an increase which probably reflects the protection the transit pass

offered frorn arbitrary taxation by countless warlords, as well as

the new cost-efficient steam trade.lg (See Table Id.) Foreign tran-

sit-pass imports, which almost disappeared in the first years of the

revolution, made a comeback between 1915 and 1925, then again

faded a~ay.~*(See Table 1e.) Increasingly, the port's commercial

focus was trade in domestic goods within China. This trend was due

both to China's increasing industrial production and to the foreign

customs diverting trade from the more arbitrary lijin customs.

Trade was hurt by the new European war, as foreign powers like

Britain made military production their top priority and capital be-

------. '1 8. (Irnperial) Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chun- gking," 1 89 1 -1 9 3 1 passim, Appendix II. 19. (Irnperial) Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chun- gking, " 1 906-1 9 passim, Appendix VI. 20. (Irnperial) Maritime Customs Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chun- g king, " 1 9 20-30 passim, Appendix VI, 292

came scarce. Overseas shipping was greatly reduced: while German

commercial shipping was practically eliminated, Allied shipping

was soon being jeopardized by German submarines. (Japan was an

exception to the rule, expanding its China shipping to fil1 partly the

vacuum left by the Western fleets.) Some foreign firms left Chong-

qing, and Chinese merchants suffered: some of the latter closed,

while several others only stayed open in case peace came soon. By

early 1916 some residents felt nostalgia for the better times of

1 914.21 Another effect was to curtail the foreign gunboat presence,

since China was neutral at first. The British, German and French

navies left the Upper Yangzi, as did the new Japanese gunboat Toba.

The British gunboats Widgeon and Teal were disarmed and interned

at the Mackenzie anchorage and their crews left the province togeth-

er, in muftLZ2 This departure coincided with the arriva1 of the re-

gion's first American gunboats, the Palos and the Monocacy, which

21. G.W. Sparling, "News Notes: Chungking," ibid., May 191 6, p. 18. 22. This arrangement was a compromise: while the British yielded on the mufti issue (they protested that the crews' uniforrns were their only clothes, but new clothes were found somewhere), the Chinese yieided in aliowing the officers and sailors to depart in a single group. Brown, General Correspondence from Chongqing #26-35/14 (9.6-10.23.14) 293

became Sichuan's only foreign naval presence over the next few years. The Catholic missionaries also left en masse, to serve as chaplains in the French arrny.

For three years British and German interests in Sichuan fought propaganda battles and vied for local support. (Among other things, residents on one side were discouraged from repaying debts to those on the other side before the end of the war.) But in the autumn of

1 91 7, with China one of the Allied nations, Sichuan's handful of Ger- man and Austrian residents were expelled. (Dr. Assmy had vital connections with the Sichuanese elite-he had helped form the local

Red Cross--and was able to delay his expulsion.) In the autumn of

1917 British, American and Japanese gunboats were again patrolling the Yangzi. In the 1920's over half a dozen gunboats were patrolling

Sichuan's rivers, including one from Italy. 294

(b) Sichuan's Descent into Warlordism

In Sichuan, as in the rest of China, Yuan Shikai's relative order

proved temporary. In 1915 the President had installed Chen Er'an as

Dujun in Chengdu, and Chen soon took the position of Shengzhang as

well. In addition to his financial stabilization program, Chen ar-

rested several high Chengdu officials for corruption and made new

attempts to suppress banditry. Chen had the support of three Beiy-

ang divisions, including the province's first aircraft, and he sta-

tioned most of them in the strategically-important cities, leaving

the existing Sichuan armies to garrison the countryside. In early

1 9 1 6, after Cai E launched the Yunnan rebellion, Chongqing with its

downriver steamship links became the launching base for Cao Kun's

pro-Yuan campaign. By April about 40,000 troops had passed through

the city, seizing over 10,000 local coolies to serve Cao's expedi-

ti~n.'~(Such mass impressment, a common occurrence when Cam-

paigns passed through Chongqing, caused the remaining coolies to go

23. lbid. into hiding, bringing the êity to a standstill.) Chengdu declared Si-

chuan to be independent of Beijing on May 21 and over the surnrner

rnost of the Northern soltdiers withdrew from Sichuan through

Chongqing.

The defeat of the North brought seemingly permanent instability:

by 1932, one reporter calrculated that Sichuan had undergone 478

civil ~ars.~~The Beiyang regime supported warlord allies in Si-

chuan, and after 1920 the province became a proxy battle-ground be-

tween the North and the Guangzhou regime with its Yunnan and

Guizhou allies. In theory the Sichuanese might have stayed neutral

or even played off both siides against each other, but in practice the

shortsighted rivalries of Sichuan warlords were manipulated by the

outsiders, fracturing the province. Yunnan and Guizhou had becorne

reliant on Sichuan subsidies in the years before 191 1, but this sys-

tem had broken down and their warlords used pillage as a substitute.

24. Paul K. Whang, "Szechuen-The Hotbed of Civil Wars," China Weekly Review, 10.22.32, pp. 344-5. 296

At first Yunnan dujun Tang Jiyao and Guizhou dujun Dai Gan were

able to dorninate the province through a puppet regime. Then in the

spring of 1917 Sichuan General Liu Cunhou, whose defection from

the North had proved crucial in the seesaw battle a year earlier,

turned against his new masters. He took over Chengdu, which suf-

fered two bouts of Street fighting and war-related fire~,and resist-

ed the continuing presence of the South. Convenience brought Liu

back into the Northern camp and after he was overthrown the next

year he moved to Sichuan's northern border with Shaanxi, where he

received new arms and reinforcements, becoming the dominant war-

lord in this border region. The warlord who replaced Liu was Xiong

Kewu, who had joined the Yunnan Rebellion and ultimately reclaimed

his Chongqing position.

Chongqing's position as the province's second city gave it a special strategic value, and more than one expedition to conquer

Chengdu was launched from there. The city had once again been near 297 the- focus of hostilities in late 1917, when the North launched another unsuccessful Sichuan campaign. This campaign left eastern Si- chuan in chaos, and that winter pirates ruled the Yangzi down to

Wanxian, even attacking steamships. Xiong bided his time and stayed neutral in this North-South battle, then in the new year marched on

Chengdu with the South's support, with more success than in 1 913.

But he too fell out with the South, launching a new war in 1920.

Xiong too was driven out of Chengdu and the Southern conquest seemed complete. But Xiong's rivalry with Liu, acrimonious by Si- chuan standards, was now patched up and Sichuan forces temporarily united against the invaders. Over a long summer campaign, with the slogan "Sichuan for the Sichuanese!" they virtually drove out the whole Southern force, and a new era of Sichuanese independence seemed to be at hand.

This victory, however, only meant new wars pitting Sichuanese against Sichuanese. Xiong resigned as dujun and became a sinister 298

eminence grise, spending his huge fortune to maintain his position

through bribery and support for proxy warlords like Dan Mouxin. ln

the 1920 strife two major new warlords had emerged in eastern Si-

chuan: Yang Sen and Liu Xiang. Yang (also called Yang Zihui) governed

Chongqing in the early 1920's with a social conscience, atternpting

urban renewal and improving sanitation through measures such as a

bounty on rats. He also attempted to pay his troops regularly and

enforce the rights of civilian~.~5Some foreigners considered him

the great hope for Sichuan. Liu was less flamboyant and ambitious,

but he was level-headed and knew his limits. British Consul W.

Stark Toller called Liu

a man who knows his own mind ...[ capable of] machiavellian diplomacy ... He does not strike one as being a brilliant intellect-- it is hardly an exaggeration to Say that in conversation he appears stupid, but his record leaves no question as to his abilit~.~~

Military politics would ultimately draw Liu into rivalry with Yang,

25. Dr. George C. Basil personally witnessed an incognito Yang reveal himself in a res- taurant and immediately execute two soldiers who had assaulted a waiter in an argument over a bill which t hey refused to pay. Test Tubes and Dragon Scaies (Chicago: John C. Winston, 1940), p. 1 17. 26. Toller, 1 2.3 1 -20 Intelligence Report (FO 228/3273), pp. 1 23-5. 299 whom he would outwit, but at present they were allies.

ln 1 92 1 , apparently as a result of Xiong's backroom deals, Liu was put in the prestigious but relatively powerless position of

Shengzhang. In the same year many Sichuan warlords united in an uncharacteristic downriver offensive to wrest Yichang and possibly

Shashi from Hubei warlord Wu Peifu. Chongqing stood to benefit from a successful campaign, increasing its control over its own trade, and many among the city's Sichuanese commercial interests were enthusiastic. But Liu was reluctant to participate, despite being titular commander, and preferred to stay in Chongqing while other generals took the field. In the end the expedition was stopped in Yichang's suburbs and had to beat an embarrassing retreat. Liu now se~edas scapegoat and was forced to resign as Dujun.

Wu now increased his involvement in Sichuan, backing the arnbi- tious Yang in his campaigns. At the end of 1922, flush with new 300 arms and Beiyang reinforcements, Yang started the first of several offensives aimed at Chongqing. In the fiwt half of 1923, he came close to the capital more than once, but each time was forced back.

Then the tide turned, and Yang's opponents, backed by Xiong and the

South, subjected Chongqing to four long sieges in surnmer and early autumn. In this rnelee an audacious Guizhou warlord called Zhou

Xizheng was able to occupy the south bank of the Yangzi and seize a fortune in copper from the Chongqing Mint, taking the time to produce coins from rnuch of it. In October Yang lost Chongqing, but came roaring back only two months later, continuing on to Chengdu early in 1924 and forcing Xiong to leave the province.

In power in Chengdu, Yang soon overreached himself as his ambi- tion grew beyond his power. He did take some stabilizing steps such as not rebuilding the damaged Chengdu Arsenal--the focus of much fighting--and creating the position of duban (defense commissioner) for warlords such as Liu Xiang, Liu Cunhou, and his Guizhou ally 301

Yuan Zuming. But he tried to seize revenues from the other warlords

to finance his grand plans for restoring the province, and they united

against him. Liu Xiang was a leader in the coalition that fought hirn

in another series of battles in the summer of 1924 and finally

forced him to evacuate Chengdu. At a Ziliujing conference Liu and

the other victors hammered out an arrangement that would bring a

degree of relative stability to Chongqing warlordism, including di-

viding the capital region between three generals.

Sichuan's state of intermittent war took a huge toll over the

years. By 1924 the province's cornbined armies totaled 200,000 and

cost at least 22 million yuan ann~ally.~~Opium production made a

huge comeback. Opium taxes were the simplest way to finance mili-

tary campaigns, and even peasants who failed to grow the crop were

charged a "lazy tax," with the result that even those morally op-

posed to growing were forced to do it just to pay their taxes. In

- 2 7. Jerome Ch'en, The Miiitaty-Gentry Coalition: China under the Warlords (Toronto: University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre on Modern East Asia, 1979), p. 56. 302

these circumstances, local opium consumption became visible again.

The problem became particularly severe after 1920, as production

went beyond supplying local consumption and large-scale downriver

exporting resumed.

Late in 1921 Consul J.W.O. Davidson reported that the province's

warlords had undone a decade's work in opium suppression in just 18

months. Smuggling on steamships became so rife that the foreign

customs only ordered a search when a tipoff included the contra-

band's exact position on the vesse[. Fines of 1000 taels were paid

without question, suggesting the presence of large smuggling

rings.28 The next year mobsters threatened the life of a foreign cus-

toms staffer who detected contraband with too much zeal, and kid-

napped his son. Military officials were indifferent, and the Commis- sioner paid a ransom of several thousand dollars and warned his staffers against future interference with sm~ggling.~~A customs

28. Davidson, 9.30.21 Intelligence Report (FO 228/3273), pp. 1 81 -2. 29- P. Grant Jones, 7 2.3 1.22 Intelligence Report (FO 228/3273), pp. 23 1-2- agent who tripped over a shipboard opium packet was now expected

to ignore it.30 By 1924 Yichang, which had recently staged large-

scale burnings of contraband--in itself a sign that smuggling was

increasing-gave up on suppression and started levying an open tax

on opium imports.

In the first fifteen years of the Chinese republic, with military

and political order fragmented not just in China but in Sichuan it-

self, foreigners were subject to the increasing vagaries of govern-

ment from local potentates. It is remarkable that Sino-foreign rela-

tions in this period were not more problematic than they were.

The early republican period, despite its commercial setbacks,

30. Graham Terrible, Yangtze Reminiscences: Some Notes and Recollections of Senlice with the China Navigation Company Ltd. 7925-7939 (Hong Kong: John Swire and Sons, 1990), p. 17. 304 saw the first real rneasures toward modernizing the city of Chong- qing, mostly carried out by Sichuanese. The Chongqing Electric Light

Company, a Chinese firm, commenced operations in 1908, and British and German firms vied for its equipment contracts. It expanded too quickly and was poorly managed, but in 1921 shareholders rejected a takeover bid by the U.S. firm Andersen, Meyer & Co. A telephone

Company had been formed as early as 1905, but was only put into

Iimited operation in 1 91 7. Proposais for a water works, however, did not get off the ground. Chongqing's population density was growing, what with military campaigns driving rural people to the cities and few suburbs existing as yet, and Western-style four-storey buildings were becoming common. Fengshui was diminishing in importance even before 1911, and many new buildings had foreign designs.

Industry was also increasing. The suppression of the opium trade contributed to growth in silk exports, which were increasingly pro- 305 cessed at home. By the mid-1920's most exported Sichuan yellow silk was steam-spun or at least re-reeled.3' Though Chengdu had a greater number, by 1921 Chongqing had 10 silk filatures employing over 3000 people with a combined annual capacity of 1000 dan. A

Chongqing chinaware factory with $30,000 capital employing over

100 people was established in 1 9 1 8. Other 1 921 industries included six small glassware plants, 16 leather factories, nine match works, and small hosiery ~perations.~Vhesefactories were targely Chi- nese-owned. The Chuanhan railway project, however, reached a dead end and Iittle new work on it would be done unti! the 1930's.

In 1914 the only British Company with foreign staff in Chongqing was still Mackenzie, under J.W. Nicolson's supervision until 1918.

Consul Brown, who noted that the port had attracted seven or eight

German merchants, asserted that Mackenzie's "business policy is a byword in the port for listlessness and lack of attenti~n."~~But the 3 1. See the statistics in Foreign Tmde of China, 7 926 (Maritime Custorns 1: Statistical Series #3-S), Volume II, pp. 428-3 1. 3 2. Maritime Customs' Decennial Reports: 7 9 7 2-2 7, pp. 24 1-3. 33. Brown, 1 2.3 1.1 3 Intelligence Report, From Chungking #4/14, FO 228/1905 306

British presence soon increased. By 1917 Jardine-Matheson and Asi- atic Petroleum both had agents in the city (the latter competing with the U.S. Standard Oil). Former Mackenzie agent B.M. Barry had also formed the exporting firm Barry, Dodwell & Co. In 1 91 7 enough

British firms were present in Chongqing to form a British Chamber of Commerce of their own, though only with a handful of members.

This group never enjoyed anything near the power of its Shanghai equivalent. The Anglo-German Arnhold, Karberg & Co., split up by the

Great War, returned to Chongqing as the all-British Arnhold Brothers

& Co. Brunner, Mond & Co. found a market for imported soda ash, sold both as fertilizer and raw material in the glass factories. But But terfield, Swire did not establish a direct Chongqing presence until

1 923. Advertising in The West China Missionary News reflected the wide range of goods and services--particularly insurance--now available in Sichuan.

Western business firrns made their greatest inroads into Chinese 307

markets in two commodities: kerosene and cigarettes. In the early

twentieth century Chinese homes were transformed by the cheap

kerosene lamp, not just among the urban middle class but also among the peasantry. Oil companies like Asiatic Petroleum and Standard

Oil were able to keep well ahead of Chinese competition because of their vertical integration and infrastructure, from the extraction of crude oil to the sale of the finished product. And China still depended on American and Russian imports for her oïl supply: her own oil resources were only at the beginning of exploitation. The cigarette

Company British-American Tobacco had similar advantages in vertical integration, growing much of its supply within China. In addition, it competed effectively with Chinese companies like Nanyang, waging ambitious advertising campaigns and often buying out Chi- nese firms.

BAT became the most controversial British firm in the Sichuan market. Its first arriva1 in 1907 was accompanied by a blitz of bill- 308

boards and other advertising, including a large billboard in the Yang-

zi Gorges, and thousands of sample cigarettes were given a~ay.~~

The product was less popular in Chongqing than in Chengdu, partly

because of resistance from local Methodist missionaries, who so

disapproved of smoking that they allegedly spread rumors that BAT

cigarettes contained opium.35 BAT moved to fiIl the vacuum left by

the opium ban, and the missionaries redoubled their efforts. An at-

tempt to buy Chongqing land to build a cigarette factory-Sichuan

tobacco was currently shipped to Hankou plants and reimported as a

finished product--was thwarted, partly by the missionaries. The

Consul sided with the merchants, fearing that the anti-cigarette

movement would turn into "a popular agitation directed against for-

eigners and foreign goods in genera1."36 (In 1 921 the Robert Dollar

Co., a US. shipping firm, snatched the local BAT agency account from

34. Sherman Cochran, Big Business in China: Sho-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette In- dustry, 7 890-7 930 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1 980), pp. 2 1-2. 3 5. Herbert Phillips, 3.3 1 -08 Intelligence Report, From Chungking #12/08, FO 22811 695 (4.22.08), pp. 1-4; Phillips, 9.30.08 Int. Report, From Chungking #3 1/08, FO 2281 1695 (1 O. 1 2-08), p. 1 O. 36. W.R. Brown, 6.30.1 1 Intelligence Report, From Chungking #29/1 1, FO 2281'1 800 (7.14.1 l), pp. 7-9. 309

Mackenzie,- causing bad feelings.) Despite missionary efforts, local cigarette consumption grew: between 1908 and 1930 the value of cigarettes imported through Chongqing's foreign customs jumped from 2995 to 249,866 Haikwan ta el^.^^

One Company that did not expand into western China in this period was the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank.38 This firm sent agents to observe the market on several occasions, starting in the century's first decade. A visit in April of 1921 resulted in a detailed report on the local econorny and foreign business scene. (Much of the specific information on foreign firms in this section cornes from this report.)S9 By this time the British Charnber of Commerce included five members: APC; Barry & Dodwell Ltd.; Brunner, Mond; Jardine,

Matheson; and Mackenzie. Al1 the foreign merchants were enthusiastic about the possibility of the bank coming, and most were willing

37. Cochran, op. cit., Table 4, p. 227. 38. Chongqing is rarely mentioned in Frank King's four-votume series Th,o Hongkong Bank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 98 8). 39. Macintyre, "Report on Chungking-Szechwann (SHG 11 7 7, Hongkong Bank archives). 31 0

to promise it their business, but the agent decided the expansion

was not in the bank's interest as long as Sichuan exports, with the

exception of bristles and silk, were predominantiy raw materials

not processed at home. In addition, only a tiny proportion of Chong-

qing's trade was in direct foreign imports and exports. An agent

visiting in 1 925 only confirmed his predecessor's concl~sion.~~In a

vicious circle, the absence of foreign banking networks also made

export-processing industries harder to develop. For their part, Chi-

nese banks were reluctant to enter the foreign currency exchange

market. Chongqing would remain a small player in direct foreign

commerce, but a strong force in trading domestic goods with a num-

ber of downriver ports, particularly Shanghai. This trade was al-

most all Chinese-owned, and British interests could only hope to

handle some of the shipping.

One Sichuanese firm in particular attempted to combine Chinese

40. A.B. Lowson, writing to A.H. Barlow in Hong Kong, 3.1 3.25 {archivai number ma., ibid.) . 31 1

and foreign business methods. The two Yang brothers (also known by

the Western name Young), both educated in the United States, formed

the Young Brothers Trust Company, whose operations included bank-

ing and irnporting. In 1917 the firm opened a four-storey office

building with electricity and central heating. where several foreign

firms moved their headquarters, including Mackenzie; Jardine,

Matheson; and Asiatic Petr~leum.~~But Yang Sen jailed one of the

brothers in 1923, and afterward they moved their headquarters to

Hankou. Name-selling still existed to some extent: some Chinese-

owned hotels hired foreigners to serve as figurehead management.42

(d) The Liu Xiang Regime

Between 1926 and 1 935 the dominant figure in Chongqing, as

41. The North-China Herald correspondent describes the structure in the 5.5.1 7 issue, "The Opening up of Chungking: Wonderful New Business Buildings," p. 238. 42. One hotel hired an irnpoverished British aIcoholic caIled Robert Wilson whose post- humous affairs the Consulate had to sort out. From Chungking #4/25, FO 65611 56 (3.1 9.25). 31 2

well as one of Sichuan's leading rulers, was the warlord Liu Xiang.

In this relatively stable period, half a dozen Sichuan warlords had

clear domains whose borders changed little. Liu Wenhui-Liu Xiang's

nephew, but no less fierce a rival for it--controlled the southwest,

Deng Xihou the west, Tian Songyao the north, and Chengdu was divided between the three. Yang Sen was entrenched in the east. Liu Cun-

hou and Yuan Zuming maintained smali forces on the Shaanxi and

Guizhou borders respectively, but were much diminished from their

past positions. Liu Xiang occupied a highly strategic position around

Chongqing, giving him a large degree of control over arms imports and opium exports.

Relations between Liu and the other warlords and between the warlords and the national governrnent in Nanjing were sometimes testy. On one occasion Yang Sen reportedly arrived in Chongqing for discussions with Liu and Nanjing delegates, then feigned illness and stayed in a hospital to force Liu to make the first move toward con- 31 3

ciliation. This conference resulted in Sichuan declaring its alle-

giance to the Guomindang government, which recognized Liu's lion's

share of Chongqing's customs duties and opium taxes.43 The new

order was disturbed by occasional wars, some of them particularly

serious. Yang attacked Xiang in 1928, but within a year had lost

Wanxian and was driven back to the hills. Another war started in

1932 when Wenhui buiit an aerodrome near Chengdu and Xiang re-

sponded by blocking gasoline imports to his nephew's territory.

After another see-saw war Xiang finally managed to drive Wenhui

out of Chengdu in a very expensive victory, and the latter moved to a

remote position in western Sichuan.

Under Liu Chongqing underwent new, ail-Chinese infrastructure

devel~pments.~~The principal streets were widened and flattened,

43. George C. Basil & Elizabeth Foreman Lewis, Test Tubes andhgon Scales (Chicago: John C. Winston, 1940), pp. 1 15-7- The names are changed but context makes their identities clear. 44. J.E. Spencer, "Changing Chungking: The Rebuilding of an Old Chinese City," The Geographical Review, XXIX #1 (January 1 9 39), pp. 53-8; Kapp, "Chungking as a Center of Warlord Power 1 926-1 937," The Chinese City Between Two Worlds (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 147-50. 31 4 allowing the city's first automobiles and rickshaws to function. The city's redesign included the demolition of the isthmus gravesites that blocked its expansion, and of local landmarks like the Drum

Tower. The long-planned highway to Chengdu was finally completed in 1933, and buses carried passengers along this road as well as within Chongqing. A modern waterworks was finally created, but few residents trusted the product at first. The electric Company was upgraded, providing reliable service around the clock for the first time, and the same was done with the telephone service. In the mid-1930's both utilities were being used by a large number of residents for the first time. Other modernizations were radio broad- casts and airplane service, both improving conditions for foreigners.

(An airstrip was eventually constructed on Shanhuba sandbar.) For- eign customs revenue, which had fluctuated in the first decade after

1 9 1 1 , grew almost continuously in the 1 920's. While the Nanjing regime failed to abolish the "unequal treaties" system, it did obtain some significant concessions: in 1928 the national government in Nanjing finally obtained agreement from foreign governments to set

its own rate for foreign customs duties. As a result, revenue at the

Chongqing station doubled between 1 929 and 1 93 1.45 (See Table 6a.)

Liu Xiang's fundraising policies angered foreign business inter-

ests in late 1926 and 1 927. At this time he was consolidating his

strategic position and looking for funds anywhere he could find

them. His soldiers seized a large quantity of oil from Asiatic Petro-

leum and Standard Oills Longmenhao installations, said to be worth

hundreds of thousands of dollars, and sold it on the local market

under Chamber of Commerce auspices, along with candles and BAT

cigarettes, deferring pa~rnent.~~Such squeezing was traditional for

Chinese businessmen, but not for foreigners. A trade mission was

needed to arrange compensation, but after this relations improved.

Many local warlords invested in local business as a regular income

source--in 1925 Liu's rnoney went into a steamship under a military

45. (Imperial) Maritime Custorns Statistical Series #4: "Report on the Trade of Chun- gking, " 1 89 1 -1 9 3 1 passim, Appendix VIII, 46. "Bare-Faced Felony in Chungking," Nomh-China Herald, 8.27.27, p. 36 1 ; "For- eign Installations at Chungking Robbed by Chinese Soldiers," ibid., 10.8.27, p. 50. 37 6

fiag to transport opium, and the seven local banks founded between

1927 and 1935 sewed as repositories for warlord money. Liu also

arranged for his vassals to be appointed to business positions.47

Official organizations like the West China Developrnent Corpora-

tion, established in 1931, helped foster new industrial develop-

ments. The most successful local businessman of the period was Lu

Zuofu, who transformed his Mingsheng Company into a shipping and

industrial conglomerate of great importance at the provincial Ievel.

Lu exploited his 1 929 appointment as boss of the local Navigation

Bureau to create a shipping line operating as far away as Shanghai,

restoring Chinese dominance in shipping on the Upper Yangzi. He also entered coal production, and in 1931 finally completed the Jiangbei

mine's rail line, Sichuan's first railway. He built an industrial park in the Beibei suburb, and by 1935 his ventures included an electric plant, a machine-building factory that quickly progressed to supply-

47. Kapp, op. cit-, pp. 1 53-60. 31 7

ing Liu with weapons, a cernent works and a steel

Warlordism was a heavy cumulative burden for the Sichuanese

peasantry, creating fertile ground for communist guerrilla activity.

Communists were already infiltrating northern Sichuan by 1932, and

in early 1933 Xu Xiangqian exploited the war between the two Lius

to establish a rural power base, complete with its own radio broad-

casts and c~rrency.~~(He Long had his own guerrilla force to the

east, but Liu managed to keep the two armies apart.) As in Yu Manzi's

day, Christian refugees brought tales of persecution to Chongqing.

At its heig ht, the insurrection threatened major cities like Baoning.

Faced with this enemy, Liu Cunhou retreated, leaving 60,000 rifles

and six million rounds of ammunition behind, and was cashiered.

Only af?er gaining victory over his nephew was Liu able to turn to

the leftist challenge, taking the title "Red Bandit Suppression Gen-

eralissimo." Using machine guns and bombers and accepting the

48. Ibid., pp. 150-2. 49. "Cornmunists in Szechuen," NCH, 1 0.1 8.33, p. 89. 31 8

guidance of a Nanjing agent, he cast a net around Xu and was soon

making inroads, but the rebellion persisted into 1934.

The communist insurrection laid bare the weaknesses of the warlord order much as the rebellions of 1898 and 1902 had done with

Sichuan's imperial order. Late in 1934 Liu had to turn back another communist offensive, and a new threat loomed on the horizon: the

Long March. The remnants of the Jiangxi soviet were moving westward into Guizhou, and must have been sorely tempted to tty to overrun Sichuan and establish a rival government there, a move with several precedents in China's past civil wars. In fact, such a coup, which would have required uniting the Long March army with both Xu and He, was a rather far-fetched proposition. But the possibility was more than the warlords could ignore. Liu, who had spent the greater part of a year fighting his nephew, then another year fighting Xu, had stretched his resources thin and could simply not afford to continue his campaigns without outside support. The only option 31 9 was to accept Guomindang leadership, and Liu went to Nanjing in No- vember to see Chiang Kai-shek.

Chiang did not let his anti-cornmunisrn stop him from driving a hard bargain. At the end of the year Nanjing announced a reorganization of Sichuan's government, the first step in a process that would lead to its full integration into the Guomindang state. The communist threat itself proved inflated. The leftist force suffered defeat in Guizhou and saw fit to go around western Sichuan's populated areas on a semi-circular route to Yan'an, rarely threatening important towns. But the warlord era was largely over in Sichuan, particularly in Chongqing.

(e) The Chiang Kai-Shek Regime

The Guomindang regime turned out to be far more destructive to 320

the power of Sichuanese warlords than the communists it was sav-

ing them from. Chiang set about making Chongqing his personal

power base in Sichuan, dispatching He Guoguang to the city--not to

Chengdu, where provincial interests were stronger--to serve as his

personal representative in the province. He's headquarters quickly

emerged as the central power in the province, and Liu obligingly left

Chongqing, kicked upstairs to head the provincial government again

in his last years. Some vestiges of warlordism remained: Liu Wen-

hui, a miniature Yan Xishan, remained a local potentate in southwest

Sichuan for over a decade until the communist revolution. Nanjing's

increasing appropriation of warlord powers led to a confrontation in the spring of 1937 which came close to war, but the warlords saw that this fight was unwinnable and backed down. A last crisis in national-provincial relations came in 1938 after Liu Xiang's death.

Chiang wanted "his man" Zhang Zhun to fiIl the position of Sheng- zhang, but the Sichuanese widely perceived the latter as an outsider despite his birth in the province. But Chiang was so determined that 321

he -could only be delayed, and Zhang received the appointment in

1940.

Chiang visited Chungking for the first time in March, 193 5, stay-

ing for several weeks. The new Guomindang reforms included a sim-

plified tax system, banning the military from cornpetitive business,

and starting construction on a province-wide highway system.50 Lu

Zuofu, after initial resistance, accepted a government position as

Reconstruction Commissioner. Several new banks opened in the city.

In 1936 the China Development Finance Corporation completed an

agreement with a French syndicate arranging a $34.5 million loan to

finance the long-delayed construction of the Chongqing-Chengdu

railway, but the Japanese war virtually halted the project beyond

the laying of groundw~rk.~~The Iimits of prewar modernization

were dramatically illustrated by a severe famine in eastern Sichuan

50. "New Government for Szechuen," NCH, 3.6.35, p. 370; "Szechuen's Unrest Due to Corruption," ibid., 320.35, p. 442; "Salt Surtaxes in Szechuen," ibid., 3.27.35, p. 48 2. 5 1. For details on the negotiations, see Chang Kia-ngau, China's Struggle for Railroad Development (New York: John Day, 1 943), pp. 102-7 1. that caught the governrnent unprepared in early 1937. Thousands of

sta~ingrefugees descended on Chongqing, but the unusually low

level of the Yangzi that winter stopped the steamships, preventing

necessary large-scale shipments of emergency rice from downriv-

e r. 52

Another facet of Guomindang rule was the New Life Movement.

The Sichuan branch of this movement was inaugurated on March 23,

1935, with a meeting at Chongqing's YMCA that attracted an audi-

ence of 1000, followed by a parade where members carried brooms.

It promoted group weddings and tried to suppress undesirable behav-

ior ranging from foreign-language signs on Chinese-owned shops to

publicly unbuttoned cl~thes.~~Another major ostensible Guomindang

concern was the war on opium, and over a thousand of the city's

52. The North-China Herald, "Low Water on the Yangtze River," 2.3.37, p. 1 86; "Famine in Szechuen," 2.17.37, p. 265; "Poor Relief in Chungking," 3.3.37, p. 361; "Szechuen on Verge of Starvation," 3-24-37, p. 492; "Szechuen Crop Situa- tion," 4.21.37, p. 100; "Szechuen in Grip of Serious Famine," "Chungking Beggar Relief Measures," 4.28.37, p. 141; "Famine Conditions in Szechuen," 6.9.37, p. 408. 53. "Many Changes in Chungking," ibid., 4.1 7.35, p. 94; "New Life Movement in Chun- gking" ibid., 2.19.36, p. 306. opium dens were closed on a single day in a very public rno~e.~~But

in practice Chiang's people took control of the opium trade, enjoying

a monopoly they lacked downriver, where turf wars raged with triad

competitors. Graham Torrible recalls:

The transportation of opium, allegedly suppressed, seemed to become [the M ingsheng company's] official duty. .. .The Nation- alist Governrnent's Anti-Opium Bureau had the reputation of controlling shipments rather than suppressing them and on the Upper River where srnuggling had long since passed from any need for foreign involvement, [it] now ceased (except for home consumption) to interest even the Chinese crews. The power of the Anti-Opium Bureau was too great to be chai- lenged?

Chiang's rule, for al1 his rhetoric about remaking the nation, re-

tained elements of the old warlord order. But in less than three years came the great challenge that would ultimately destroy him.

A conference in July, 1937, to resolve the national-provincial conflict coincided with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The Japa-

nese invasion, which changed ail of China, transformed Chongqing

54. In 1935 alone The North-China Herald published over a dozen reports on opium suppression in Sichuan. 5 S. Torrible, Yangtze Reminiscences: Some Notes and Recollections of Service with the China NavMation Company Ltd. (Hong Kong: John Swire & Sons, 1990), p. 17 into a national capital. After losing Nanjing Chiang officially trans-

ferred the capital to his Sichuan base even before Wuhan fell, even

while keeping Wuhan as the centre of militas. operations.

Indeed, Szechwan's potential wartime importance had been discerned in advance: Chiang Kai-shek had begun prepara- tions for an emergency withdrawal to Szechwan several years before the war. The retreat was foreseen if not fully planr~ed.~~

A flood of refugees was soon arriving from downriver, seeming

scarcely less foreign to some Sichuanese than the Westerners did.

Many spoke dialects of Chinese barely intelligible to most Sichua-

nese, and clubs using English as a lingua franca flourished. In addi-

tion, numerous downriver educational institutions were relocated to

the Chongqing area. In 1940 the Japanese occupied Yichang, causing

a mad rush upriver on every available boat. A housing shortage re-

sulted and the government ordered non-essential residents to move

to suburbs and other communities. This influx of Chinese, including

rich and poor from every part of China, some of them well-educated,

- - 56. Kapp, "The Kuornintang and Rural China in the War of Resistance, 1937-1 945," China at the Crossroads: Nationalists and Communists, 7 92% 1 949 (Boulder, Coio.: Westview Press, 1 980), p. 1 56. 325 provided a great stimulus for change in Sichuan, particularly Chong- qing.

Japanese bombers were hitting Chongqing as early as 1938, and the air raids worsened after Yichang's fall, and in late 1940 and

1941 the city faced a blitz that was rightly compared to the attacks on London happening at the same tirne. But air defense was minimal, and a civil defence system had to be created basically from scratch.

The government dug an elaborate system of undlerground shelters and tunnels, and managed to keep casualties remarkably low. But the housing shortage was seriously worsened. The raids lessened somewhat at the end of 1941, after Britain and the United States joined the war against Japan and Japanese bombers were diverted to the

Pacific. But China's vital supply conduit through Burma was lost, increasing already serious commodity shortages. Chiang paid for the war effort by printing rnc'ney liberally, fuelling uncontrollable infla- tion. But the war also prompted Chongqing's conversion into a twenti-

eth-century city. The destruction caused by Japanese bombs allowed

the city to be replanned with modern streets and buildings on a scale

that dwarfed past efforts. Chiang placed most of Sichuan's new

wartime factories in Chongqing, close to his power base. The elec-

tric company's capital resources, which had been raised from $2

million to $5 million in 1936, were raised again to $30 million in

1941; with three generating plants, its total capacity rose from 3 to

10 megawatts between 1 939 and 1 942. Chongqing, which had no

water works a decade before, now had over 1000 meters of water

mains. By 1942 it had 49 banks with cornbined capital of over $1 50

million. The city's total population was officially 41 7,739 in 1940,

but including "extra" residents such as soldiers and civil servants

raised the total to about 1 rnilli0n.5~ Ail this was done under the

strict domination of Chiang and his vassals. Chongqing was funda-

57. China Handbook 1937- 7943: A Comprehensive Survey of Major Developments in China in Six Years of War (New York: Macmillan, 1 943), p. 8 1 3; p. 8 14; p. 798; pp. 793-4. 327 mentally altered almost overnight, the human wave caused by the

Japanese advance providing the greater part of the drive behind this transformation.

By 1943, when the "unequal treaty" system was finally undone,

Chongqing had made the leap to a twentieth-century city. Foreigners were, as they had always been, largely just observers of this process despite their efforts to insert themselves into the Chinese commercial system and, to a much lesser extent, into the city's social framework. Despite the critical wartime aid the Guomindang regirne was receiving from the Allies, Westerners themselves felt less relevant to China's future than they had in years. The foreigners' opportunity to shape Chongqing was finished. The old order would clearly not return even after the Japanese were finally defeated. 328

Chapter 7: Foreigners in Republican Chongqing

(a) New Difficulties

By 1920 eastern Sichuan's foreign population was approaching

400. An lnternational Friends Institute tally that year counts 160

British subjects and 102 French subjects in the whole consular district, though only a small minority would have lived in Chongqing itself. There were also 51 Americans, 51 Japanese and about 20 citizens of other nations.' As in the past, most were missionaries.

This group was enjoying belated improvements in several aspects of

Iife. Steamships made downriver travel easier, and most pregnant women went to Shanghai hospitals to give birth. Electric generators allowed amenities like refrigeration. A foreign club had existed as early as 1906 in Plant's mansion, and the Chungking Club opened in

Longmenhao at the end of 1 922.2 Soon attracting over 50 members, 1. Friendship and Goodwill: Without Distinction of Race, Class or Religion: The Report of the International Friends Institute, Chungking, West China 1920-2 7, p. 20. 2. See "The Chungking Club: A Promising Inauguration," North-China Herald, 1.1 3.23, p. 87. 329

it dorninated the foreign comrnunity's Saturday nights. Social life

was also improved by the building of a racetrack on the polo sand-

bar.3

In 1918 local residents founded the Co-Operative Society, to pur-

chase British goods from Manchester's Co-operative Wholesale Soci-

ety Ltd. The organization raised initial enthusiasrn, attracting over

40 mernbers within 18 months--fully half were missionaries--re-

viving the tradition of outdoor summer concerts, and even publishing

a newsletter called The Co-Operative Buglem4 But skilled manage-

ment was lacking and interest had dwindled by 1925, when the con-

sular courts were asked to wind up the society, and its affairs were

such a mess that the process took up over three years of successive

British consuls' tirne? There was also a newsletter titled The Bab-

ble of Babylon."

3. "Another Race Course at Chungking," ibid., 2.9.24, p. 20 1. 4. The North-China Herald cited a report from the Bugle in "The Situation at Chungk- ing," 5.5.23, pp. 294-5. 5. From Chungking 9/25, 1 /28, 2/28, To Chungking 3/25, FO 656/156. 6 It may have been short-lived, as the only mention i have found of this newsfetter is in the North-China Herald article cited in note 3. The treaty-port system, however, was now on the defensive. The

early republican years also saw growing complications in Sichuan's

Sino-foreign relations. Extraterritoriality was increasingly controversial, seen by Chinese nationalists as violating their national sovereignty. Under this system a consul was to enforce treaty provisions including the right of foreigners and foreign ships to travel

in coastal waters, foreign exemption from many Chinese taxes, and the right of missionaries to live and propagate their religion in the

interior and buy or lease land for their churches, schools and hospital~.~What this rneant in practice was trying to reconcile two different cultures and legal systems, a challenge fraught with difficulties:

The implications of demanding an extraterritorial position for British subjects in China do not seem to have been thought through in advance, for there is no evidence that any of these pressing practical questions received the slightest consideration before consuls were confronted with thern and obliged to impr~vise.~

-- - 7. NichoIas Clifford, Spoiit Chiidren of Empire: Westerners in Shanghai and the Chinese Revolution of the 7 920s (Hanover: Middlebury College Press, 1 9 9 1 ), pp. 1 1 -2. 8. P.D. Coates, The China Consuls: British Consular Offieers, 7 843- 7 943 (Oxford: At the same time, the whole system of open ports seemed less and

less important to the British.

Paradoxically, the institution of the treaty port had eventually been accepted by the Chinese government... at a time when the announcernent was of little further interest to foreign traders ....During the- twentieth century, the treaty ports had become less and less necessary as bases for business and as havens for foreigners. China, despite civil war and banditry, was now more open and many felt that there were greater opportunities for business outside the foreign enclaves ....The treaty ports were also expensive to maintain and in the face of Chinese nationalism and Japanese aggression, they had become a political embarassment.9

The Chongqing British Consulate's correspondence with the

Shanghai Suprerne Court is sparse in its fint years: the only legal

dispute mentioned took place in 1894 when Archibald Little sold a

house to J.A. Kerr, then claimed an extra 50 taels for the furniture.'O

In late 1907 and 1908, however, the region had three legal cases in a

single year involving foreigners and Chinese. An American "adven-

Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 52 9. Frances Wood, No Dogs and Not Many Chinese: Treaty Port Life in China 1843-1943 (London: John Murray, 1998), p. 297. 10. This resulted in a 2.19.94 hearing described in a 6.30.94 letter, FO 656/75. Lit- tle seems to have los. 332

turer" called Demenil was charged with shooting Tibetans, but was

acquitted in Shanghai. A "Frenchman"--actually a French-born

Swiss citizen with a German passport--arrived in Chongqing from

Luzhou (possibly after deserting the French Foreign Legion in Indoch-

ina) and was accused of stealing 100 taels. He was arrested and

held in the Magistrate's yarnen, which attracted a mob bent on sum-

mary justice. The trembling Chinese officiai, who feared losing his

post, was saved by the arriva1 of French Consul Bodard, who extract-

ed a confession and 90 taels from the man. (He supplied the rest of

the money him~elf.)~Rejecting an immediate flogging, Bodard ar-

ranged for him to be escorted to the Hankou Consulate-General, but

the thief killed himself before his trial. Thirdly, a German formerly

employed by the Yunnan Railway who had allegedly stolen 100 taels

from an Yunnan boat arrived in Chongqing, whence the German Consul

sent him to Hankou for a trial. From there he was sent to Guang-

zhou--since the incident had happened in Yunnan, within the district

11. Herbert Phillips, 6.30.08 intelligence RepoR, From Chungking #24/08, FO 228/1695 (7.1 5.081, pp. 4-5. 333

of Guangzhoy's Consular Court--but no witnesses were expected to

testiv against him. Extraterritoriality was increasingly being seen

in Sichuan as inadequate to providing resolution of Sino-foreign con-

flicts. The Chinese had little respect for foreign justice, and the

local Prefect was "especially indignant."l2

In 1910 Consul J. Langford Smith faced a particularly vexing

legal tangle over debts owed to Brunner, Mond. The firm had hired as

local agent W.J. Davey, who set to garner large commissions by sell-

ing huge amounts of its soda ash to even the most dubious credit

risks. E.S. Little, Brunner, Mond's Shanghai manager, was happy until

he noticed how difficult many of these debts were to collect and

faced a writeoff of over 30,000 taels. China lacked a single consis-

tent systern of land-ownership deeds, and several unethical busi-

nessmen offered as collateral deeds that turned out to be unverifi-

able. Little expected the British Consul to solve the whole mess,

and Smith, faced with Davey's intransigence and what W.R. Brown

12. Phillips, 9.30.08 Intelligence Report, #37/08, FO 228/1695 (10.1 2.08), p. 6. 334 would term Little's "sharp practice," soon suffered a nervous break-

down. When Brown took over as Consul in 191 1, he received a high-

handed letter from Little faulting Smith's performance, citing the

company's high connections back in England, and demanding the set-

tling of its case with Davey partner Feng Zhongmu. When a Shanghai

representative of Brunner, Mond visited Brown's office early in

1 9 1 2, the Consul refused to meet him because Davey "had by his own

neglect stultified my action."l3

Brown's patience was also severely tried by Davey's inconsisten-

cy. The agent chose to visit Chengdu at the time when Brown wanted

to met him, and seemed thoroughly evasive.14 When a debtor called

Sun Zegao tried to offset his account with embezzled sugar, Davey

tried to use Brunner, Mond's power to defy a Chamber of Commerce

decision returning the sugar to its original owner.I5 Brown termed

7 3. Brown in a 2.28.1 2 report on the case (Frorn Chungking #10/12, FO 228/1837). He mentions that the case was largely the cause of Smith's seeking medical leave ("lt is no secret"). 14. lbid. 1 S. Brown in a further 3.5.1 2 report on the case (Frorn Chungking #1 If1 2, FO 228/1837). Davey

a man of most ill-balanced temperament... men of standing and repute avoid dealing with him with the result that unscrupulous and crafty characters are attracted to him. In these men he places implicit confidence and by their actions and mis- conduct he becomes involved.16

Then, in October of 1 91 2, a Gelaohui-backed plot was iuncovered

to assassinate Xiong Kewu, declare East Sichuan's independence and

loot Chongqing. Sun was among the ringleaders arrested and shot,

and Davey was linked to the conspiracy without any direct evidence.

(He had enough inside knowledge to secretly divulge the plot to other

foreigners, and removed certain papers frorn Sun's house said to re-

veal an overlooked conspirator.) Davey went to Shanghai to defend

his actions before the Supreme Court, and Brown suggested he be

given an "unofficial hint" not to return.17 But he beat the Shanghai

16. Brown in yet a further 6.1 3.1 2 report on the case (From Chungking #38/12, FO 228/ 1837), pp. 2-3. He also mentions (pp. 1-2) that Little offered to withdraw his letter, but Brown threatened libel proceedings unless he received a written retraction, which he later received to some extent. In Enclosure #1, pp- 2-3, he offers quotations from Davey's letters to Smith, including "Any further luke-warm delay wifl prove disastrous!!!" and "At present we are handicapped--this is not British justice." 17. Brown, From Chungking #52/12, FO 22811 837 (1 0.29.12). rap--Brunnef, Mond was afraid to let too much dirty Iinen appear in

public--and ignored any hints, so soon he was getting into new trou-

ble in Chengdu, where he returned in September of 1914 as an inde-

pendent merchant on "somewhat mysterious" business.18

In a perverse twist, the Consul-General who had to deal with

Davey's new misadventures was the recovered Langford Smith. When

a Chinese subject sued Davey over non-payment of a cheque to a

third Party, in a case involving the sale of subpar goods, Smith ar-

ranged a January trial, causing Chengdu's Foreign Affairs Commis-

sioner to protest that such trials could only take place in treaty

ports. The impasse was resolved when the Foreign Affairs Depart-

ment recognized Smith as temporary Chongqing Consul, and the suit

was settled.lg Then Davey was accused of throwing a former assis-

tant down a well over a $2800 debt, but was acquitted in a March

triaLZ0 18. E.W. Mead, 9.30.1 4 Intelligence Report, From Chengdu #12 1 /14 (FO 228/1904), pp. 18-20. 19. Smith, From Chengdu #17/15, FO 228/1942 (2.9.15). 20. Smith, From Chengdu #45/15, FO 228/1942 (4.1 1.1 5). In January the Chengdu High School, which had a large foreign

teaching staff, had hired Davey at the suggestion of Arthur W. War-

rington, a teacher in the school and a friend of Davey's who repre-

sented him in the March hearing. But the school failed to return the

contract with the president's signature and dismissed Davey with

$200 severance pay. Davey refused to leave the school and Smith re-

luctantly dernanded his reinstatement, leading to another impasse

with local Chinese officials. (Warrington soon apologized for his

role in the conflict.) Smith attributed Davey's litigiousness to his

"unbusinesslike and possibly not very scrupulous ways ...Personally I am always on tenterhooks as to what he may not do."27 In November

Davey finally accepted a $1 000 settlement under protest, leaving

Sichuan in the new year with one last round of rni~chief.~~Davey's 21. Smith, From Chengdu #5 1/15, FO 228/1942 (5.28.1 5). 22. Davey left without notiSing the Consulate, at the same time as the Yunnan Rebellion, and Chinese officials were soon protesting his "irrepressible behavior." In Yunnan- occupied Luzhou he reportedly accused two postal clerks of spying for Chengdu, Caus- ing thern to be tortured and alrnost shot. In Naqi he becarne an unofficial police chief, preventing looting but again rneddling in politics. ARer hiç raincoat, glasses and bin- oculars were stolen he extracted $1000 in compensation hmGeneral Zhang Jingyao. The local telegraph office refused to send a telegram from Davey to Yuan Shikai threatening a European press campaign unless the President restrained his Beiyang 338 story illustrates a consul's potential difficulty in maintaining order within the extraterritorial system. A suff iciently irresponsible and devious British subject could becorne impossible to control and could weave a near-impenetrable web of shady dealings. China attracted such adventurers in large number, and the consular services of more than one nation were severely tried as they wrestled with such wrongdoings. Both foreigners and Chinese often found the system's results unsatisfactory, strengthening the case for amending or even abolishing extraterritoriality.

The Consulate had to deal with mundane Sino-foreign affairs as well. In June of 1920 the Canadian Mission's Business Agency was burglarized and stolen property owned by a British subject turned up in an empty godown. The local police demanded a list from the owner to prove true ownership before they would return the goods, but that was unavailable as the owner had moved back to Canada. In-

troops. Davey also tried to mediate between North and South, but both sides rejected him. Mead, 3.3 1.1 6 Intelligence Report, Frorn Chengdu #58/16, FO 228/1979 (4.22.1 6),pp. 1 7-9. 339

stead they -Id off the goods for only $10, which was remitted to

the Consul, ând gave a clearly unreliable account. But the Consul

only learned of the case in February and was unable to obtain full

restitution in the face of likely police changes. "This case illus-

trates the undesirability, from their own point of view, of mission-

aries handling even small personal charges them~elves."~~Even rela-

tively well-intentioned foreign subjects, who outnumbered the irre-

sponsible adventurers, could get into difficulties and increase the

burden on both consuls and local Sichuanese officials.

Another consular difficulty was foreign land purchases. The revolution, if anything, increased the tendency of Sichuanese officials to delay and resist such transactions. In 1921 Jardine, Matheson attempted to purchase the Yangbatan property on Jiangbei's waterfront, whose anchorage was likely to become valuable with the growth of the steam trade. The Foreign Affairs Commissioner, however, refused to seal the deeds on the grounds that the land was ac-

23. W. Stark Toller, 4.3020 Intelligence Report (FO 228/3273), pp. 77-9. 340

tually part of Jiangbei's "interior," which the recent Harbour Regu-

lations had placed outside the newly-defined harbor limits. The

local salt guild also insisted that Yangbatan's frontage was not a

public rnooring place. (Asiatic Petroleum had reportedly also tried to

purchase the land, but was thwarted by local oppositi~n.)~~Succes-

sive consuls continued to push the issue, but the combination of of-

ficial and local resistance proved insuperable. As foreign interests

continued to press for treaty interpretations favorable to them-

selves, Chinese officials made strenuous and very often successful

efforts to thwart them.

Sichuan's civil wars expanded the market for another import:

weapons. The end of World War I left Europe with huge arms sur-

pluses, much of which was soon reaching the Chinese markets. (Brit-

ain had pushed for an international agreement to prevent these ex-

ports, but a contract between Zhang Zuolin and the British firm

24. J.W.O. Davidson, 6.30.2 1 Intelligence Report (FO 228/3273), pp. 1 57-60. Davidson regretted the failure to indude Yangbatan within the harbor's boundaries, and faulted Jardine, Matheson and the British Chamber of Commerce for not speaking out at the time. 341

Vickers set a precedent that outweighed word~.~~)Most large-scale

purchases were made by the downriver military cliques, but arms

were soon reaching the Sichuan market. Arnhold Bros.' "notorious"

comprador Luo Shengzhi tried to equip every faction but one wrong

deal got him shot in August of 1 922.26 ln the summer of 1 923 a Her-

ald correspondent reported that 250 revolver experts had recently

corne to Chongqing.27 In early 1924 the British Consul reported that

at least 10 foreigners in Chongqing were gun-runners, selling to sol-

diers and bandits alike. (To his relief, none operated under a British

passp~rt.)~~One of them was Swiss citizen Elly Widler, who had

been in Chongqing since 1912 and represented the British firm Reiss

& Co. In earlier days he had reportedly sold fox skins in Daqianlu and

tried to start a Saving Society, but found that the real money was in

arms irnport~.~~

2 5. Anthony B. Chan, Arming the Chinese: The Western Amaments Trade in Warlord China 7 920- 7 928 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1 982), pp. 59-65. 26. P. Grant Jones, 9.30.22 Intelligence Report (FO 228/3273), pp. 21 2-3. 27. "Northern Force on Upper Yangtze," North-China Herald 9.1 -23,pp. 604-5. 28. AlIan Archer, 3.31 .Z4 Intelligence Report (FO 228/3273), pp. 29 1-2. 29. That Widler was guilty of gun-running is made clear by his own account, Six Months Prisoner of the Szechwan Military (Shanghai: The China Press, 1 925?). Widler, In September of 1923 Yang Sen intercepted an arms shipment to

his rivals going through the Cosmos Club, which Widler owned, pos-

sibly as a front for his main business. Widler was arrested and the

club's assets were seized, including $3000 in cash. After facing a

Chinese military court on arms-srnuggling charges (i.e. selling to

Yang's opponents) in several inconclusive hearings, he was jailed and

marched to Wanxian during Yang's retreat from Chongqing. Widler,

whom Swiss diplornats refused to represent3*, was released unilat-

erally after six months. "That he was guilty," British Consul Allan

Archer observed, "is not disputed, but his long detention without ad-

equate trial and sentence is indefensible and is an excellent example

of Chinese judicial methods."3' At around the same tirne Chinese

troops under a lesser warlord called Tang Zimu boarded the Yiyang

who avoids admitting to or denying the charge, gives a colorful description of a female warlord called "Bigfoot" Lan tiuzang (pp. 30-2) whorn he met in the countryside in circumstances that coufd only have involved arms sales, 30. Widler was born in China to a Swiss father bcfore Switzerland had diplomatic representation in that country, and had always been registered with French consulates. Before it would represent Widler, the Swiss government demanded docurnentary proof of his father's Swiss citizenship, which was not available. 3 1. Archer, 3.3 1 .Z4 Intelligence Report (FO 228/3273), pp. 292-4. 343

Maru, a Japanese ship also widely believed to be selling weapons,

and held two Japanese for a year before the latter were ransomed.

Such incidents increased foreign resistance to renegotiating extra-

territoriality. Yet the Chinese saw a group of foreigners exploiting

extraterritoriality to protect their destructive business, and their

desire to reforrn the system was growing.

Not al1 of the Consulate's legal affairs concerned relations with

the Chinese population. In 1917 Chongqing's Consular Court held an

unusual hearing into a slander charge, a "petty case so typical of

small-port troubles."32 P.E. Nettle, the electric company's first

chief engineer and now a manager of the Young Brothers Trust Com-

pany, aliegedly told people at a social gathering that foreign cus-

toms commissioner R.C. Guernier had bribed a technician to attach a

second electric wire to his residence, allowing him to enjoy twice

as much electricity at the same price. When Guernier got wind of

3 2. Lewis King, From Chung king #4 1 / 1 7, FO 228/2007 (6.8.1 7). A copy of King's report also exists in Consular letters to the Shanghai Supreme Court, FO 656/75. 344

the accusation, he demanded a retraction and charged Nettle with

slander. Nettle refused to retract his accusation and demanded his

day in court, possibly to give the daim wider publicity. Consul

Lewis King held a hearing on May 17, and after a deposition was read

quoting Nettle's accusation, Nettle agreed to deny the statement.

King, who later regretted having chosen a criminal court to de-

cide the matter, was handicapped by the Consulate's lack of legal

resources. (In 193 1 the Supreme Court received from Chongqing a re-

quest for a book on merchant shipping law sufficiently up-to-date to

deal with the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act, and initially replied that

no spare copy was available.33) The extraterritorial system required

British subjects in China to be judged under British laws adminis-

tered by the Britain's consular service. But such cases could not al-

ways expect the expertise available at home. Some consular offic-

ers did not know al1 the subtleties of legal language, or had to han-

33. The Consulate did receive the book a few months later. Frorn Chungking #1/31, 3/31, To Chungking #1 /SI, FO 656/156. 345

dle - cases of alleged violation of a law whose Pariiamentary Act was

unavailable to them. Knowledge of Chinese law could be even more

limited. This is one aspect of the "unequal treaties" which had not

been completely thought out prior to agreement, leaving consuls to

" muddle through."

(b) The May Fourth Movement and the Mid4 920's Crisis

In the early 1 9201s, in Sichuan as elsewhere in China, a combina-

tion of factors came together to effect a crisis in Sino-foreign rela-

tions. The May Fourth Movement quickly gained currency withiri the

province's academic circles, promoting national self-assertion and

frequent anti-foreign militancy. A common outlet for the new rage

was boycotts against foreign commerce, often enforced by mob

r~le.~~Japan was the leading target of such boycotts, thanks to her

34. C.F. Remer describes the.boycott movernent in Chongqing in A Study of Chinese Boy- cotts with Special Reference to Their Economk Effectiveness (Baltimore: Johns Hop- kins Press, 1933), pp. 47-8 (1915), p. 6i (1920), pp. 61-3 (1919-20), pp. 82-5 (1923), p. 98 (1925), p. 160 (1 931). 346

new hegemonic tendencies in China: Japan's Twenty-One Dernands in

1915 had already provoked a boycott that lasted half a year in

Chongqing. Boycotters burnt Japanese goods outside the city, in a spectacle that would be repeated more than once, and defaced posters promoting Japanese toothpaste and patent me di ci ne^.^^

This boycott was revived in 1919 after the Paris Peace Confer- ence, when the Western powers ignored Chinese daims and recog-

nized the Japanese seizure of Jiaozhou as part of the postwar settlement, prompting immediate student demonstrations. Pressure from the nationalist Students Association forced the Japanese owners of the steamship Lienhua to seIl the ship to a Chinese company.

Their tactics reportedly included plotting to destroy her Japanese cargo and invading the company office to put "traitors" on parade.

The ship's pilot was killed by soldiers in Wan~ian.~~The boycott

35. "Enmity in Szechuen towards Japan," North-China Herald, 6.5.7 5, p. 71 7. The correspondent terrns such activities "childish." 36. W. Stark Toller describes the program of the group, which had long disapproved of the Lienhua's charter, in his 12.31.19 intelligence report (FO 228/3273), pp. 58- 9. 347

was past its peak within a year, but "incidents" continued. In May of

1921 a meeting between students and anti-boycott Chinese mer-

chants degenerated into a brawl. (Local Sichuanese officials were

widely understood to side with the merchants on this issue.)37 This

boycott was ternporarily revived in the spring of 1923, when stu-

dents seized Japanese goods worth 10,000 taels imported through a

Chinese firm, and again in 1 93 1 after the Japanese invasion of Man-

~huria.~~These boycotts showed the fitful strength of Chinese na-

tionalists, especially students, but also made manifest the differ-

ences between them, merchants, and officials charged with uphold-

ing treaty rights.

Tension also arose from the local increase in steam traffic, with

mostly Chinese shipowners and goods but often under foreign flags.

The displacement of junks by steam, eventually threatening the live-

37. When the students started throwing chairs, they were soon thrashed with the help of the rnerchants' coolies. J. W.O. ~avidson,6.30:~ 1 intelligence Report (ibid.), pp. 153-4. 38. Remer, op. cit., pp. 82-5, 160. Iihood of jun kmen, pro bably made " Luddism" inevitable. Around

1918 the junkrnen's guilds started agitating against the steamers

that were starting to displace them, and for a period in 1921 effect-

ed a full-fledged boycott? Despite Corne11 Plant's attempts to es-

tablish clear rules, accidents continued. The American Consular

court heard at least three cases involving Standard Oil tankers in

1918 alone. British consul W. Stark Toller predicted that "cases of

this nature will probably be comparatively numerous... there will al-

ways be difficulty in securing reliable independent eviden~es."~~In

particular, junks carrying soldiers claimed the right of way and

often behaved dangerously, preferring to rush across a steamer's

path instead of pausing until the distance was safe. Soldiers took to

firing rifles to warn away approaching steamships. Arbitrary snip-

ing was a constant threat for steamers at this time, as al! that was

- - 39. Rodney Gilbert reports on the local blackiist in his Yichang report "Steamer or Junk on Upper Yangtze" in North-China Herald, 10.8.2 1, p. 84. 40. Toller was comrnenting on a case facing the Consular court resuiting from the 19 1 8 sinking of a sait junk in the wash of the Asiatîc Petroleurn tanker Anlan, Shanghai Su- prerne Court Letters frorn Chungking 19 18-34 (FO 656/156 3/19, 2. l9.1 9). He encloses a 10. 29.18 letter from Anlan master J.G. Hannigan, who remarks: "One thing which împressed me on this river is the absolute disregard by the junks of the steamer whistle," which was ignored ninety-eight times out of a hundred. 349

needed to create an incident was one malcontent with a rifle on-

shore or on a nearby junk.

When regular winter steaming was introduced in 1922, the des-

perate junk guilds allegedly backed a conspiracy against the three

foreig n capta ins, including the Upper Yangzi River Inspector, and the

three Chinese pilots whose work was key to this development.

Threats were realized when Frederick John Brandt, captain of Jar-

dine, Matheson's Kingwe-then the only British-owned ship on the

Chongqing-Yichang route--was assassinated by pirates aboard a Chi-

nese ship on April 1, 1924. British Consul Allan Archer recommend-

ed new security measures such as allowing armed guards on Chinese

ships, but admitted that such actions could provoke controversy and

suggested suspending British shipping on the Upper Yangzi as an al-

ternati~e.~'But economic advantage meant that winter steaming

was there to stay. In such situations the British faced the dilemma

41 .Archer reports on Brandt's death and the resuking January 12 inquest in ÏbÏd., 1/24 (1.1 0.24) and 2/24 (1.15.24). Yang Sen, a friend of Brandt's, expressed feelings of personal responsibility for the rnurder. 350

of whether to use force to maintain their position and risking in-

creased Chinese militancy, including mob action, or to avoid a fight

and withdraw, but the continuing profits obtained by some British

firms led to the rejection of the withdrawal option.

In the mid-1920's Sino-British relations in particular took a turn

for the worse, leading to three evacuations. In April of 1925 Sun

Yat-sen's death prompted five days of mourning which one foreigner

called "the biggest thing of its kind I remember in Chungking." Stu-

dent nationalists were particularly visible and many anti-Christian

and anti-foreign speeches were heard on the Street, but the peace

was only disturbed on a couple of occasion^.^^ In the next month,

however, came the Shanghai Incident, in which several Chinese were

shot by British-trained police in Shanghai's International Settle-

ment, shifting the focus of Chinese anti-foreignism back to Britain

from Japan for several years. This led to an anti-British boycott in

42. The West China Missionas. News, March 1 925, p. 43. In one incident a German boxed the ean of a native detractor and had tu flee to the Yang Brothers hong. 351

Chongqing, and the militant minority became more and more hostile.

In Archer's view, "owing to the inaction of the authorities insults to

British subjects became matters of daily oc~urrence."~~A delega-

tion of Beijing students reportedly arrived in the city to back the

demands of local students. A servant boycott was declared, and ser-

vants of foreigners who stayed on the job were threatened with

tatooing.

Foreigners became defensive. A G.W. Swire report saw deep roots

in the crisis:

The cause of al1 the trouble is the nationalist feeling, which has been growing for some years under the fostering care of the student class and has been embittered by the general dis- comfort of life in the Revolution of 19 1 1. The Chinese very naturally object to the privileged position of the foreigner under his treaties with China, necessary as it is in the absence of proper Western justice and administration; and there is little doubt that the Chinese object is to bring foreign trade to a standstill and so force a revision of the treaties in the sense which they desire. The position is very serious and it is impossible to predict the ~utcorne.~~

- - 43. Archer reports on the 1 925 crisis in his 9.30.25 political report, FO 228/3273, pp. 323-4. 44. Quoted by Zhang Zhongli, Chen Zengnian & Yao Xinrong in The Swire Group in Old China (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, n.a.), p. 1 64. Even sorne of the British merchants were beginning to recognize that

local Sichuanese frustration over the slow pace of change in the

"unequal treaty" system was understandable.

On July 2 a mob gathered on the foreshore near British gunboats,

and British soldiers launched a bayonet attack against a threatening

rnob, causing one seriaus injury. The next day, again for safety's

sake, the Consul had the foreign population evac~ated.~~A group of

29 foreigners stayed behind, their compound besieged by a ragtag

force that included boy scouts.

They spent an uncornfortable two weeks surrounded by [their foreign protectors,] rifle-toting young businessmen, mostly ex-servicemen, who were itching to let fly and only restrained by the thought of other foreigners further inland.... But nothing did happen; and for al1 the noise and agitation what is so striking about this period is the essential restraint of the CI~inese.~~

Once again the danger faded. All the foreigners were expected back

45. "News Notes: Chungking News," ibid., August-September 1 925, pp. 32-3; "The An- &Christian Movement in Chungking in 1925," ibid., February 1926, pp. 1 5-8; " When Chungking Saw Red," NCH, 8.7 5.25, p. 1 58. 46. Charles Tyzack, Friends to China: The Davidson Brothers and the Friends' Mission to China 7 886 tu 7939 (York: William Sessions, 1 988), p. 1 64. 353

by-September. As the impossibility of defense against mob rule was

recognized, the British response was indefinite evacuation: in addi-

tion to gunboat diplomacy, withdrawal was a normal reaction to Si-

chuanese unrest.

Students provided the backbone of nationalist militancy. In the

early 1920's a large number of Sichuanese youth passed through

Chongqing in preparation for studies downriver or abroad, and more

than a few became radicalized. Some joined the new Chinese Com-

munist Party, whose alliance with the Guomindang added greatly to

its prestige. An anti-Christian movement ernerged in Chongqing as elsewhere, distinct from but sympathetic to anti-foreignism. Ar- cher reported that "it is not thought that in Chungking the movement is influenced by or tinged with Bol~hevisrn."~~During Sun's memori- als large Street posters demanded the abolition of extraterritoriality and the reclaiming of customs control. Student militancy spread

47. Archer, 3.31.25 intelligence report (FO 228/3273), p. 320. He had earlier described the local movement in despatch #3, 40F XXV11, p. 123. 354

to classrooms, particularly mission schools. The Chungking Middle

School was called "Middle School for British Commercial Expansion."

A handful of leaders demanded full student control over a curriculum

that had long included subjects like the Assyria-Babylon wars, and

succeeded in sabotaging the spring school term.48 The mission

schools reopened on schedule, but the radical leaders continued their

efforts, almost closing down the West China Union University in

Local commander Wang Lingqi did an effective job of preventing e violence, but hostility again flared in the summer of 1926. This was

due partly to military instability as Yang Sen launched an offensive

and Yuan Zuming proved incapable of keeping the region under his

controi. As Yuan's troops lost what little discipline they had pos-

sessed, the tuan militias that were supposed to keep the local peace

48. "My Impressions of School Work in Chungking," West China Missionas. News, Au- gust-September 1925, pp. 29-3 1; "Chungking School Problems (Spring Term, ApriI 1925)", ibid, pp. 36-8. 49. The North-China Herald, "Conditions in Szechuen Today," 1 1.13.26, p. 300. of%en themselves turned to looting and haras~rnent.~~Foreign ships

doing business upriver from Chongqing, particularly Standard Oil and

Asiatic Petroleurn vessels, faced boycotts and looting threats ac-

companied by blackmail attempts. The June murder of a Canadian

wornan by a Chengdu madman inevitably increased foreign fear~.~'

The defeated Yang Sen made a comeback in 1926 and routed Yuan

Zuming, the warlord given the run of Chongqing. Yang almost took

the city, but in the summer Liu Xiang forced him back to Wanxian.

Here Yang seized the Butterfield, Swire ships Wanliu and Wantung

and eight foreign officers, ostensibly in retaliation for the sinking

of two junks loaded with his troops. Negotiations for their return

failed, and on September 5 the British Admiralty's Yichang command

sent an armed expedition aboard the refitted Jardine, Matheson ship

Kiawo. In the ensuing battle, the Royal Navy maintained a devastat-

ing fusillade against the shore. Perhaps 3000 Chinese soldiers and

50. See Roland Graeme, "Unspeakable Deeds at Chungking," NCH, 6.1 9.26, p. 526. 51. The North-China Herald, "The Chengtu Horror," 7.3.26, p. 5. hundreds of civilians died, though the number was disputed. The of-

ficers were rescued, except for two who were killed. The ships,

however, were only returned after new negotiations, preventing an

even larger expedition. 5' At the end of the day, the British govern-

ment fell back on "gunboat diplornacy" and used force to maintain

the existing extraterritorial order from their increàsingly tenuous

position along the Yangzi valley.

The Wanxian Incident was controversial indeed. Many Chinese

blarned companies like Butterfield, Swire for egging on the Admiral-

ty, and the Wanliu captain had reportedly said before the incident

that foreign shippers hoped that the gunboats would "take a crack at

Yang Sen."53 While almost al1 British missionaries approved of the

operation, most American missionaries were more criti~al.~~The

52. NCH reports on the incident, with a predictable pro-foreign bias, in "Serious Epi- sode at Wanhsien", 9.1 1.26, pp. 481 -2; and Rodney Gilbert's "The Wonderful Epic of Wanhsien," 9.1 8.26, pp. 529-32. 53. James G. Endicott reports hearing this directly in a 10.24.26 letter to the Univer- sity of Toronto Historical Club, quoted by Stephen Endicott, James G, Endicott: Rebel Out of China (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), p. 97n. 54. Ibid., pp. 100-1. 357

Chinese reaction was so disapproving that Chongqing seemed more

threatening than ever to the foreign population, which was again

evacuated. Though this evacuation was also temporary, most foreign

bungalows in the Chongqing Hills were looted, a dozen to the point of

needing rebuilding, and one looter was skilled enough to dismantle

an electric generat~r.~~The following winter radical students

hacked through a hedge and vandalized the foreign cemetery in Zen-

jia'ai, leaïing only four tombstones standing and causing about

$2500 worth of damage. (One tombstone was exhibited as a trophy in

the nearby Agricultural S~hool.)~~In Wanxian itself a boycott of But

terfield, Swire remained in force for several years. Yet the anti-

foreign mobs after the deadly Wanxian Incident were fairly re-

strained overall.

55. W.A. Lewis (Chungking British Chamber of Commerce chair), "The Wrecking of British Property at Chungking," NCH, 10.1 6.26, p. 102. 56. British Consul H.F. Handley-Deny wrote a 4.1 7.28 report on the vandalism (FO 228/3927, #136A). Attempts to extract compensation enjoyed little success, but he mentions in a 1 2.20.28 followup (FO 228/41 13, #136A) that the foreign community raised over $2000 for restoration-including $208 from the Royal Navy to restore sailors' graves-and British firrns were expected to contribute $200 to $400 more. 358

The Northern Expedition's transformation of China's political

balance was felt as far away as Sichuan. Only a few weeks after the

Wanxian Incident Yang threw in his lot with the nationalist-cornmu-

nist coalition and rnoved downriver to seize Yichang and exploit the

chaos. But his opportunism was transparent and after a year his al-

lies turned against him and forced him to return to Sichuan. In

Chongqing itself Nationalist Shi Qingyang and leftist Wu Yuzhang or-

ganized unions of unprecedented strength, adding to the existing po-

litical mixture within the city.

As the Northern Expedition advanced, the seizures of the Hankou

and Jiujiang settlements, along with the deaths of seven foreigners

in the Nanjing Incident, led to a sense of panic among foreigners.

But there were few other foreign casualties.

Despite Shanghai, despite Wanhsien, and despite the cheapness of human life in China at this time, the small foreign comrnunities scattered the length and breadth of the country, often far from any gunboats, remained essentially unscathed. The 1920s were very far from a replay of the Boxer Risir~g.~~

57. Tyzack, ibid., p. 172. 359

British- Consul R.S. Pratt depicted Chongqing's revolutionary move-

ment as "intermingled" with the existing anti-British movement.

Its supporters were "a small minority of the population" but still

noisy, while students and the tuan "support it for what they hope to

get out of it." A coalition of eleven unions was demanding that the

Chongqing Chamber of Commerce be abolished and replaced with a

labor organization, but it lacked the power of similar groups down-

river. In late 1926 and early 1927 civil and administrative activi-

ties were limited to Guomindang members, though membership often

amounted to little more than lip service.58

After Yuan's defeat Liu had moved his headquarters to Chongqing,

principally to keep Yang out. At first he went along with the North-

ern Expedition, joining the Guomindang and even taking the post of

Shengzhang in Guangzhou's name. But Liu was only biding his time.

On November 26, after Wuhan fell to the South, he moved against the

more consewative of the Nationalists, putting Shi to flight. The

58. Pratt, 3.3 1 .Zï intelligence report (FO 228/3273), pp. 370-1. 360 communists, foolishly thinking that Liu was on side, became more

and more vocal. On March 5 the Anti-British League, a local nation-

alist consortium, organized a rally for over 100,000, with delegates from dozens of unions and schools and even six army units, where the "unequal treaties" and the "intellectual aggression" of Christi- anity were assailed. Pratt bravely insisted that the demonstration was "not a popular manifestation.... The moderate element still seem to have the upper hand in Ch~ngking."~~At the end of the month came a much larger rally. This time the foreign community was evacuated beforehand, for the third time in less than two years, and the British and American consulates were temporarily closed.

But now Liu and Wang were prepared to assert their authority.

Wang's secret police infiltrated the rally's crowd with concealed guns and opened fire the second a speaker attacked Liu himself. The crowd panicked and hundreds were killed, many by being trampled or forced to jump off the city wall. Liu suppressed the left complete- 361

ly--only 200 cornmunists were left in Sichuan by May and only 77

Nationalists by late 1929--and the Northern Expedition was finished

in Si~huan.~~The province's remoteness and turbulence still protect-

ed it from the dominance of downriver regimes.

China's nationalist movements in the 1920's achieved some real

successes, changing the political equation in most of the country and

even effecting minor changes in Sichuan. The nationalists were

often shrewd enough to direct their boycotts against one nation at a

time, and the foreign powers failed to come up with a coordinated

response. (Japan's efforts to keep expanding her military, political

and economic power within China, for example, led to rivalry with a

defensive British Empire.) Foreigners made some important conces-

sions as a result, such as the British Foreign Office's 1926 Decem-

ber Memorandum publicfy agreeing to renegotiate China's status

under international treaties. But boycotts and rioting also painted - 60. Kapp describes the crisis in Szechwan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Milita- rism and Central Power, 19 7 1- 1938 (London: Yale University Press, 1 973), pp. 76-9. 362

for the West a picture of dangerous disorder and made the foreign

powers reluctant to concede too much to a China still full of divi-

sions.G1

The foreign community in Chongqing survived the changes of the

mid-19201s, but experienced a subtle, long-term change in its sta-

tus. The British Consulate was reopened within a year of Liu Xiang's

anti-communist crackdown, though its American counterpart took

longer. The Sichuanese population now displayed far less hostility

to foreigners, almost as if the recent crisis had never happened.

W hile it had previously been dangerous to be identified too closely with the Western community, expressing hostility overtly could now lead to an equally dangerous pro-leftist label. In late 1927 a corre-

6 1 . Harumi Goto-Shibata, Japan and Britain in Shanghak 7 925-3 7 (London: MacrnilI- an, 1 995), pp. 1 44-6, 1 50. spondent O bse~ed:

There is a slight curi to the lip of 1 in 100, Say, that is not "welcome" and it is not exactly "anti." I note it as "neutrai." The majority do not notice and are indifferent. The coolies at the river are cheerful, reasonable, and hel~.~~

Some unions remained -active, and in 1930 a leftist Yichang-based

river pilots' strike lasted half a year before being broken. (Liu cre-

ated a rivai pilots guild and Captain Hughes brought the Kiawo up to

Chongqing without a pilot.)63 But by 1934 Iittie militancy was visible.

The fierce nationalism of the 1920s had disappeared to be replaced by hopelessness and apathy.... People were living in a kind of iimbo: OId China had died, the New China, it seemed, was incapable of being b~rn.~~

Yet the desire to alter the "unequal treaties" remained widespread among the Chinese, and the Guomindang was committed to reforming foreign relations eventually.

Several Western-dominated institutions were now increasingly 62. D.S. Dye, The West China Missionary News, October 1927, p. 3 1-3. 63. See Sadie McCartney, "The Upper Yangtze Pilots' Strike," ibid., July-August 1930, p. 49. 64. Tyzack, op. cit,, p. 190. 364

sinicized. In 1927 Li Kuaiyong became the Maritime Customs' first

Chinese commissioner in Chongqing. During the periods of evacua-

tion Sichuanese preachers took over the missions, and when the

Western missionaries returned many were reluctant to return their

authority, so compromises were required. The YMCA, which estab-

lished a YWCA branch in Chongqing in 1935, had a particularly strong

Sichuanese element in its leadership3

The missions continued into the 1930's, forced into cutbacks by

the economic slump back home. (As a result of a 1926 church merger

back in Canada, the Canadian Methodist Mission became the United

Church of Canada Mission, widely known simply as the "Canadian

mission.") One of the more prominent Chongqing missionaries in the

1930's was the Canadian mission's James G. Endicott? As a teacher

in Chongqing, Endicott developed a direct system of teaching English

that rivaled the existing Basic English method. He started out a sup-

- 65. See T.H. Whang, Y.S. How, "The Chungking Y.M.C.A.," West China Missionary News, May, 1939, pp. 21 1-2. 66. Stephen Endicott describes his father's Chongqing period in op. cit, pp. 1 17-92. 365

po-r of Ch-iang, advising the New Life Movement, but the latter's

autocracy and corruption eventually turned Endicott into one of

Chiang's most prominent critics.

A few Western business firms prospered to some extent during this period. Standard Oil and Asiatic Petroleum did a booming import business in the fate 1 9201s, and Imperia1 Chemical industries

(the former Brunner, Mond) found new inland markets for its fenil- izers. Express shipping between Chongqing and Shanghai, long talked about, was finally established early in the 1 9301s,but the Great De- pression hurt worldwide trade. The changes in the prevailing commercial order were particularly reflected in Butterfield, Swire's policies.

In 1929 the Company was still negotiating to end the persistent

Wanxian boycott:

the idea was to prepare now for a future which would be without extraterritoriality and, at the same tirne, provide as far as possible adequate protection of the very large and important British Shipping inter est^.^^

The boycott appeared to have crucial official backing, and Butter-

field, Swire's only recourse was to set about improving its official

contacts. British Consul H.F. Handley-Derry supported in principle an

official proposal to form the Upper Yangtsze Company, a joint ship-

ping venture cornbining Butterfield, Swire (60%) and Chinese capital.

Though he considered such projects "the only means under various guises of retaining our position in the country," foreign shipping interests were skeptical, and joint ventures could only begin in the downriver centres of foreign trade. Butterfield, Swire had been

run on a much more cut-and-dried line than other firms, not making as much allowance for the foibles and weaknesses of mankind of which the Chinese is a complete compendi- um.. .. [Now the firm's ship captains were considered] extraor- dinarily tactful and accommodating to any occasion which [might] arise ...A believe that Anglo-Chinese CO-operation is the only means of keeping in touch with this trade for--! hope, if we play our hands right--some decades more; and it is a fact that unless we do get into touch with the Chinese in some such way, it can only be a question of comparatively short time before they turn us out neck and trop?* 67. JSSXll 4/8 (Box 1080), China Navigation Co.: Shanghai to London #1 (9.7.28). 68. lbid., China Navigation Co.: Shanghai to London #4 (8.30.29), encl, Handley-Der- ry's 6.4.29 letter, pp. 1-2. This joint venture, renamed the Taikoo Chinese Navigation Com-

pany, was registered in Hong Kong in March, 1930. By May of 1933 it

was backed by $2.5 million in capital, from both Butterfield, Swire

and prominent Chinese businessmen. China Navigation sold the corn-

pany its five prominent steamships in the region, while strategical-

ly building new ships and cutting pricesP Even some of the "hard-

line" British businessmen in Shanghai were beginning to accept the

official position that the "unequal treaties" system would have to

be changed for British interests in China to survive at ail.

One example of a small-scale foreign businessman in 1930's

Chongqing is depicted in George C. Basil's Test Tubes and Dragon

Scales. Basil was the close friend of a foreign businessman whorn

he calls "Dave Parnell," who may well have actually been G.D. Litch-

field, agent for Mark L. Moody & Co.70 "Already in his brief career, he 69. Zhang Zhongli, Chen Zengnian, Yao Xinrong, The Swrie Group in Old China (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, n.a.), pp. 196-7. 70. Basil, op. cit., pp. 137-40. Litchfield was the first Chongqing resident to drive an automobile through the city in 1930 ("Field Gleamings," West China Missionary 368 had made, lost, and laughed off three or four fortunes." Despite knowing Iittle Chinese, Litchfield was able to do business throughout the province. "He could get away with murder," though local merchants managed to cheat him as rnuch he cheated them, and he relied on a chumpish young business associate to keep his ventures financed. Whenever there were rumors of underhanded dealings, Chi- nese would ask, "Was Litchfield there?" One of Litchfield's schemes was to Save a German pilot, a friend of his, implicated in a disastrous accident. (Germans and Austrians, defeated in World War 1, had lost the extraterritoriality privilege.) Liu had arranged a demonstration bornbing in one of his new airplanes, piloted by the German, but the bomb fell on the crowd of spectators, causing many deaths.

Basil blames the accident on the airplane's shortcomings and the in- experience of the Chinese CO-pilot, who was soon executed, but the pilot was also arrested and seemed doomed too. Litchfield, however, arranged for hirn to escape in Chinese clothes and be srnuggled to a

News, May 1930, pp. 33-9, and "Parnell" was certainly one of the first. (He crip- pled a native child with his vehide, but managed ta pay off his parents and avoid a lawsuit.) 369

steamship at night.71

Since their first arriva1 at the turn of the century, Japanese res-

idents in Chongqing had gradually increased their business opera-

tions and profile, usually at the expense of Western rivals. The Jap-

anese in China had become leading beneficiaries of the "unequal

treaties," and Chinese nationalists saw them increasingly as "for-

eign devils" just as much as the Europeans. In the 1930's Japan

overplayed her hand, going al1 the way to military aggression and oc-

cupation of northeastern and coastal China. In the wanime situation

of 1 937, the Japanese settlement in Chongqing was closed, the

city's Japanese community (which numbered 42 in 1935, compared

to 25,000 Japanese nationals in Shangb~ai)?~was removed, and Japa-

nese extraterritoriality was abolished. Though the Japanese in mili-

tary terms were now more powerful than ever in China, eclipsing the

7 1. Ibid., pp. 230-6. Basil managed to keep secret his own small role in the conspiracy. The accident is mentioned in "Field Gleamings: Chungking," The West China Mission- ary News, May 1930, pp. 33-5. 7 2. Okurasho Kanriyoku, Nihonjin no kaigai katsudo ni kansuru rekishi-teki chosa, Vol. XXVII, Chuoto minami Chugoku (Tokyo, 1 947), pp. 9 1-4; quoted by Mark R. Peattie in "Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1 89 5- 1 9 37," The Japanese Informai Empire in China, 1895- 1937, Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 172. 370

other foreign powers, they were no longer an obstacle to reforming

the unequal treaties.

The advent of Guomindang rule inevitably increased Western in-

terest in what had long been dismissed as a minor treaty port.

North-China Herald reports from Chongqing increased dramatically

after 1935. Then as a wartime capital the city attracted a large

dipiomatic community as national embassies were rnoved there.

This included the Soviet Union, though Russian residents avoided

fraternizing with Westerners. In accordance with the United Front,

the Chinese Communist Party opened a Chongqing office under Zhou

Enlai, with a status not dissirnilar to the embassies. By the end of

1942 China's Foreign Ministry had issued 88 red cards to diplomats,

dong with about 100 blue cards for their staffs. This raised Chong

qing's total foreign population to over 1000, including 264 Koreans,

250 British, 207 Americans and 1 22 R~ssians?~The invasion had

left Western gunboats in a murky position, and they were removed

from the Yangzi when Europe went to war in 1939.

73. China Handbook, p. 81 1; p. 795. 371

- -

The war effected fundamental changes in Chongqing's foreign

community. A new group of foreign businessmen came to Chongqing,

hoping to attract some share of the Guomindang regime's wartime

dealings. But the national government took direct control of the

most strategic imports and exports, limiting foreign opportunities

in that field. Another obstacle to trade was the tenuousness of Chi-

na's transport links to the Western world: between 1937 and 1940

the tonnage entered and cleared through Chongqing's foreign custorns

fell by over a third, and exports fell by three-quarters--they were a

relatively low priority in wartime-though imports fell only moder-

ately. Foreign customs revenue, stagnant in the early 1930's, grew

by a factor of three between 1935 and 1 940.74 (See Tables 5c, If and

6b.)

In late 1941 Japan attacked the British and Americans, forcing

thern to join the war on China's side, and the Western presence was

74. Maritime Customs Statistical Series #3: "Returns of the Trade of China," 1940. 372

removed from ports occupied by the Japanese, leaving Chongqing the

only remaining treaty port of any importance, and central to foreign

business interests. The Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, now forced

back to British and lndian bases, finally opened a Chongqing branch

at the beginning of 1943 as the first stage of returning to China.

And the established foreign comrnunity itself was now looking

somehow superannuated in the new China, and seemed to be living in

the past. Robert Payne, visiting Chongqing in 1942, sensed "some-

thing sinister" in Longmenhao's foreign houses. The Chungking Club

resembled an aquarium full of exotic fish, and the names painted on

its walls were mostly of the deceased. A cornpanion of his moved to

northern Chongqing: "lt will be safer there. The dead are not so

pre~ent."~~

The May Fourth movement fostered Chinese nationalism, and both

the communists and the Guomindang employed anti-foreign rhetoric,

though the latter also included a more pro-foreign faction. This na-

7 5. Payne, Chungking Diary (London: William Heinemann, 1 949, pp. 1 7-8. 373 tionalism reached the field of commerce in the forrn of boycotts, used most frequently against the Japanese, though mostly with little practical effect beyond the short term. Chiang Kai-shek's Na- tionalists achieved dominance in Sichuan in 1935, due as rnuch to the collapse of warlordism as to the fairly remote communist threat. Though Liu Xiang had taken some measures to develop Chong- qing, the modernization efforts of China in the Nanjing decade had largely left Sichuan behind, and now the city started to make up for lost time. Even before the Japanese invasion Chiang had started to develop the city's capacity as a personal power base and potentiai headquarters, and in 1938 he was ready to make it his new capital.

Japanese bombing raids, for al1 the damage they caused, actually smoothed the path to remaking Chongqing into a twentieth-century industrial and commercial city, though still a thoroughly Chinese one. Conclusion

Japanese aggression led to the closure of the downriver treaty

ports in 1941, removing al1 foreign interests other than Japan from the region. This reversal made the issue of the foreigners' status in

China easier to resolve, and China's wartime allies, anxious to maintain her cooperation in the war effort, decided to resolve her major

long-term grievances over the terrns of Sino-foreign relations. The

United States took the first step in August, 1942, agreeing to aboi- ish extraterritoriality after the war, and Britain made the same promise within two weeks, but events accelerated. On October 10,

1942, the British government announced that it would abolish extraterritoriality at the end of the year. (The news resulted in extra issues in the Chinese press that afternoon, but most foreigners only found out on hearing the BBC overseas radio broadcast at 6:00,a measure of the foreign community's limited communication with the city at large.') The United States took the same measure, and al1 re-

1. Mr. Blackwood, Sundries: Chungking to London #46 (1 0.1 6-42), JSSXII 4/14 (Box 375

maining nations relinquished the privilege in the Cairo Conference of

1943. The treaty port system was finished once and for all.

In 1945 the Japanese were defeated and the occupation of down-

river China was finally ended. But foreign business could not return

to its old position either in unoccupied China or in the newly-liber-

ated territory. The ensuing civil war brought to power the Chinese

Communist Party, ill-disposed both to private companies and to for-

eign organizations. Already Zhou Enlai had visited I.V. Farrner of lm-

perial Chemical Industries in Chongqing and warned hirn that under a

communist government firms like ICI could expect to have their Chi-

nese operations expropriated, though throug h buyouts rather than

confiscati~n.~Not only was foreign business rernoved, foreign mis-

sionary activity soon ceased as well. (The few missionaries who

tried to stay on under communism soon found that their continuing

presence was making their followers' position unsafe.) After anoth-

2047). 2. Patrick Brodie, Crescent over Cathay: China and ICI, 7 898 to 7 9-56(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 9go), pp. 2 1 3-4. 376 er decade, even Soviets became unwelcome. The new Chinese order as regards foreign relations, at least superficially, appeared to be a reversion to China's pre-Opium War isolation.

Only after 1976 did the Chinese government start to allow the piecemeal return of foreign business, gingerly entering joint ventures. Beijing established a group of Special Economic Zones for commercial interaction, analogous to the treaty ports of old. Fol- lowing the "Better the devii you know" principle, it made most of its first deals with firrns like Jardine, Matheson which had experience from pre-communist China. Cities like Chongqing--now one of the largest cities in China (and in the wor1d)--are now attracting a new wave of foreign capital. The Upper Yangzi as far inland as

Chongqing is now becorning unrecognizable, as construction on the

Three Gorges dam proceeds to help control fiooding and provide electricity for China's growing economy. To some extent the old interactions have been revived, but now in a clear context of equality be- 377

tween- nations- and the presumption of mutual profit.

British businessmen in China in the late nineteenth century hoped to do business there on their own terms, imposing a system of corn-

merce favorable to British interests just as had been done in India.

In the colony of Hong Kong and the great treaty ports such as Shang-

hai, dealing in commodities such as lndian opium, they did manage to a great degree to create a fusion economy. A half Western and half

Chinese system, combining free trade with cartels, sewed British and other foreign economic interests quite well. But further inland they came up against the interna1 structure of Chinese commerce, a system too vast and self-reliant to admit easy access to any foreigners. Even when the foreign powers pressured Beijing into granting concessions favoring their trade, this structure showed unexpected resilience, coupled with some flexibility and pragmatism in 378

material concepts. Chinese merchants learned to turn most of these

imposed changes to their own use before too long, clawing back any

competitive advantage the British enjoyed. Even Britain's lucrative

opium import trade had levelled off by the turn of the century, due to

competition from cheaper Chinese opium grown, transported and soid

in an all-Chinese process. Similarly, Cotton yarn processed in Brit-

ish factories in lndia and exported to China in British ships, booming

around 1900, were soon increasingly displaced by yarn production in

Chinese factories backed by both Chinese and foreign capital. This

process can be seen at the inland edge of the treaty-port system, in the Sichuanese city of Chongqing.

A great portion of Sichuan's history has been shaped by its geog-

raphy, in the period of foreign encroachment on China as at other times. The province's mountainous terrain had always somewhat restricted the central government's dominance here compared to the 379 downriver provinces. (Occasions when the central government retreated westward, such as the regional inversion that followed the

Japanese invasion, were an exception to this rule.) The same conditions also helped limit the province's foreign presence. The treach- erous Yangzi Gorges produced strong seasonal variations in navigability, while overland transportation was limited to low-bulk, high- value goods. Foreign commercial penetration required new transport methods backed by considerable investments in steamships and railways, and the large-scale British companies with sufficient capital were afraid of the risk.

Chongqing was only opened two decades before the Qing Dynasty's fall, and only gradually joined the treaty-port network. The steam trade in particular only became a regular feature of the local economy eighteen years after opening, and just two years before the republican revolution. As a result, political change jumped ahead of economic change. Chongqing's developrnent into a modern city took 380

place against the background of fractured order in the warlord peri-

od, which slowed down econornic development without stopping it

completely. The final leap into the twentieth century took the in-

tervention of the Guomindang after 1935, along with the war against

Japan.

From the start many foreign businessmen in China came with high

hopes of a commercial killing only to be thwarted by a society they

barely understood. Rhoads Murphey observes:

It was not, as the foreigners perennially complained, the resistance of Ch'ing officiais, the foot-dragging of the gentry, the "backwardness" or xenophobia of the Chinese consumer (although this had some relevance, in the sense that traditional wants persisted), the inadequacy of the railways, the continuation of the likin, or the lack of support from their home governments that aborted their dreams, but the fact that they were attempting to invade a traditional Chinese system fully able to meet and beat them at their own game of commerce, on its home gr~und.~

In Sichuan the traditional economic system, with its isolation and established trade system, was particularly suited to resisting for-

3. Rhoads Murphey, "The Treaty Ports and China's Modernization," The Chinese City Between Two Worlds (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1974), p. 35. eign commercial offensives.

Among foreign nations in China, Britain was long seen as the foremost presence. Yet the British failed to develop a presence anywhere near as dominant as in their colonies. Britain had to compete with several other empires, particularly after the nineteenth century turned into the twentieth century. Jurgen Osterhamrnel con- cludes:

From an indigenous point of view, it is increasingly more difficult, the more we approach the recent past, to identify a particuiar British impact as distinct from that of transna- tional entities .... Perhaps the only safe conclusion is that there is no other Western country... which has had as many points of economic contact with China over such a long period of time as has Great Britain, even if the British impact lost much of its intensity and distinctiveness in the twentieth centuy4

In Chongqing as elsewhere, Chinese merchants were often able to respond quickly to major market changes. The Chinese trade system was built around guilds- and business organizations and enjoyed 4. Osterharnmel, "British Business in China, 1860s-1950s," British Business in Asia since 7860,R.P.T. Davenport-Hines & Geoffrey Jones ed. (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1989), p. 2 1 6. 382 strong government support. The roots of its success were in the cornrnon understanding of the power of CO-operation and in its flexibility, allowing adaptation to changing market opportunities through the recognition of new ideas at work. Foreign merchants could make this system work in their favor when selling a product such as kerosene, which attracted strong demand at al1 levels of Chinese society and required a sophisticated structure of vertical integration which the Chinese could not emulate overnight. (In addition, China had barely begun to develop her own oil resources and still depended on imports.) But such products were the exception to the rule. The Si- chuanese economy was fairly self-sufficient, able to supply most necessities of life at a reasonable price, leaving only a small, short- term foreign advantage in a few goods based on access to mass production techniques.

One example of the Chinese advantage is the evolution of China's

Cotton goods market: in a few generations the focus of trade 383 changed from raw Cotton to imported piece goods to yarn imported from lndia to yarn spun in China. The predominance of lndian yarn lasted only one generation, as downriver Chinese factories, built with both Chinese and foreign capital, expioited the new Western technology and developed to the point of taking over the market.

(World War I and the resulting squeeze in international shipping certainly hastened this process, but it was still inevitable.) The effect of Western business was to introduce long-term changes in production, distribution and occasionally consumption of goods, yielding a short-term profitable commercial lead while their Chinese rivals learned to adapt. Through al1 the changes, the leading Sichuanese merchants continued to purchase downriver supplies at a high volume and thin but reliable profit margin and maintain their dominance of the trade.

Opium provides another example of the long-term vicissitudes experienced by Western business in China. In the mid-nineteenth 384

century, opium imports had been a cash cow for companies like Jar-

dine-Matheson and Butterfield-Swire, helping to finance their other

operations. (Many Chinese merchants and retailers also made for-

tunes from distributing and selling lndian opium.) But well before

the turn of the century imports levelied off, as domestic production

in northern and western China took a growing share of the market.

Opium became Sichuan's leading export in the decades before the

trade's 1908 suppression, which only produced a brief interruption

before the chaos of the warlord period led to a revival--and the Si- chuanese merchants of Chongqing had a leading, profitable role in it.

Part of the reason for the foreign powers' eventual CO-operation in

reducing opium exports, besides growing moral qualms, was the fact that the trade was simply less lucrative than it had once been. In the warlord era, opium became a virtually ail-Chinese business which the foreign customs became powerless to restrict.

Another field in which foreign business made temporary Chinese 385

inroads was services such as shipping and the carrying trade. The

Westerners brought the new steam technology, which provided fast,

regular and dependable transport service on a large scale, and also

efficient loading and storage facilities. Trade and communications were revolutionized, particularly over long distances, starting along

the seacoast and the lower Yangzi. The junk trade continued, but was increasingly shifting away from the treaty ports and falling

back on minor centres. At first the leading foreign companies had an effective monopoly on this stearn trade, but the Chinese gradually learned to cornpete, helped by official capital in ventures such as

China Merchants. World War 1, which made foreign ships scarce, hurt overall trade but also offered Chinese firms new opportunities in the form of reduced cornpetition. By the 1930's large shipping cornpanies like Mingsheng were emerging. Chongqing and its upper Yang- zi connection posed a special technical challenge for steam, and in the end it was a Chinese Company that established a regular steam trade along this route. Foreign cornpanies did arrive, but never 386

achieved anything near the leading role they had enjoyed downriver.

Chinese firms dominated Chongqing's trade without interruption,

though in the warlord period Chinese shipowners turned the foreign

presence to their advantage by exploiting foreign "flags of conve-

nience," in the hope of obtaining foreign protection against warlord

seizure.

The financial sector was one field in which foreign firms in

coastal China managed to set their own terms without adapting to

the Chinese system. But in this field the Chongqing foreigners could

not avail themselves of the same advantages as downriver cornmuni-

ties. For over two decades after opening, Chongqing had neither a

foreign bank nor a Chinese bank operating along Western Iines, trad-

ing in foreign currencies. Most Western merchants saw the avail-

ability of such an institution in a given treaty port as an absolute

prerequisite to successful foreign trade there. As it was, most of

Chongqing's trade in foreign goods was in irnports bought downriver 387 and shipped upriver by Chinese merchants, or exports shipped downriver by the same group. The Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, a financial mainstay of downriver treaty ports, only reached Chongqing at the very end of its treaty port period.

Simple timing was against Chongqing's foreign community.

Steam shipping only appeared in 1909, a few years before the dis- ruptions of the republican revolution and World War 1. Westerners placed great hopes in the commercial transformation effected by steam and the arriva1 of the fit-st foreign banking. Unfortunately for them, these developments coincided with the destructive parasitism of the warlordç--Sichuan was especially fractious in this respect-- and the militant nationalism of the May Fourth Movement. The fitful boycott movements and threats of anti-foreign violence, while doing little actual harm to foreign interests, put the foreigners on the defensive, and during the Northern Expedition even their continued presence in China seemed uncertain to some. Companies like Butter- field, Swire turned to Sino-foreign joint ventures in the hope of protecting their long-term position. In addition, the foreign powers were increasingly incapable of acting in concert, and Japan ultimately upset the whole balance with her push to conquer al1 of

China.

Yet the Western preçence in China had its long-term legacy.

Frances Wood observes that communist China today still fails to grant the treaty ports their due as

a conduit for those Western ideas and Western methods that were to play an important part in the country's modernization. Western armaments and industrial methods were enthusiasti- cally adopted by [China's] rnodernizers, and the modern weap- onry in use in China today owes its development to foreign in- genuity. The fact that the commercial city of Shanghai and the industrial complexes around Hankow stili lead the field in China owes much to the earlier Western presence.... Western medicine, introduced by missionary doctors, is now firmly established in China and is used alongside Chinese traditional medicine. Western attitudes towards the education of women have also been adopted, proclaimed in a political rhetoric of equality that portrays women as holding up half the sky?

5. Wood, No Dogs and Not Many Chinese: Treaty Port Life in China 7 843- 7 943 (Lon- don: John Murray, 1W8), p. 301. - - Foreign interests in Chongqing, in their own accounts, show themselves failing to lead the process of economic transformation.

The contrasts among the different treaty ports are worth emphasizing: Chongqing was not Shanghai or Hong Kong, where Westerners had sufficient control to create mixed communities in the Western image. Neither was it analogous to coastal ports like Guangzhou, which had had a history of dealing with foreign trade as part of a

"coastal economy." To some extent it can be categorized as a Yangzi port like Hankou and Jiujiang, but even then the slowness and difficulties of sailing the Yangzi above Yichang limit Chongqing's appli- cability here. Its late opening also distinguishes it from the more established treaty ports. Its isolated position made Chongqing something of a category by itself within the treaty-port network.

And here the foreign population and the number of foreign business interests remained limited until its final years, when wartime conditions were perrnanently altering the whole system of Sino-foreign relations.

If the experiences of foreigners in Chongqing ernbodied only a small part of the treaty port experience, the treaty ports embodied only part of China's history in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, albeit a part of disproportionate importance to their relatively small aggregate population. The indirect "influences" of the Western presence overall--such as mission-sponsored education, technological improvements and ideologies of international revolution--were of greater long-term consequence than the direct ramifications. In this sense, Chongqing actually bore greater similari- ties to the experience of the hinterland majority of Chinese in the period of foreign contacts than most treaty ports did. The foreign presence here even lacked the visibility of cornmunities in ports with settlernents. And existing Sichuanese institutions such as business organizations did not have much trouble adjusting to the new conditions and controlling the process of change resulting from 391 the small foreign presence. (Change resulting from interna1 conditions, in particular the 191 1 revolution, was a bigger challenge than the external presence.)

In the end, the "foreigners" who actually transformed the city were the downriver Chinese during the Japanese invasion. The central government, newly established in Chongqing, directly took over the trade in strategic imports and exports, ending foreign hopes of penetration into this trade. The influx of thousands of refugees dwarfed al1 of the region's population shifts since the Qing Dynas- ty's first years. More than a few refugees were well-educated along

Western lines, adding to an intellectual base promoting change and undermining tradition, or trained in the use of twentieth-century technology. This group did much both to create the need for change in Chongqing and Sichuan, and to plant the seeds for these changes.

The Japanese, through war, had provided the impetus for change. But it was Chinese citizens who provided the physical and intellectual 392 framework within which Chongqing would become a world-class manufacturing and trade centre. By this time, foreigners could do little more than observe.

Partly because of Chongqing's late opening, major foreign interests never developed the same capacity or desire to break through to the Sichuan market as they had in downriver China. (The greater transportation difficulties and financial risks that resulted from

Sichuan's isolation tipped the balance against investment.) The Jap- anese eventually took the lead, but even they failed to develop their

Chongqing settlement to anything near its full potential. In addition to the 191 1 revolution, foreign trade was also hard hit by the shipping criçis that accompanied World War 1, and economic transformation took years to regain what momentum it had had. The un- certainties of warlordism, particularly before 1925, also hamstrung development. But the irnpetus for economic modernization was corn- ing from the Chinese themselves. Despite the nationalism of the May Fourth period, to the majority of Chinese people the Westerners were largely a "neutral" presence, neither to be embraced as providing the door to the future, nor rebelled against as representing

Western hegemony. (The Japanese later became an exception when they turned to direct occupation of the land.) In general, the Chinese nation and its political, economic and cultural leaders took a course in between, using the foreigners and their institutions for general or individual gain without developing cornmitment--"Western practices, Chinese substancen--or sometimes having little to do with them at ali. In Chongqing this ambivalent relationship was manifest: here as elsewhere, some Western systems and ideas were adapted to a

Chinese context, while others were resisted.

This thesis has largely relied on English-language sources written by foreigners acting in their own capacity or as part of foreign- dominated organs of the Chinese government such as the foreign custdrns. Undoubtedly, the records left by the Chinese population of 394 cornmunities iike Chongqing would tell a distinct story, shedding

new light on the experience of Sichuan, particularly in areas such as indigenous trade. But the Chinese account of Chongqing's experience is unlikely to be fundamentally different in fact. (On the other hand, the story of some larger downriver centres, where a school of radi- calism and militant anti-foreignism emerged, protected from the central government by the treaty ports' international status, has prompted sharper disagreement.) Foreigners have their own story, and give accounts essential to the understanding of the interaction between the two civilizations in a period that changed the city, the nation and the world. 1. Primary Sources

(a) Diplornatic and Customs Reports

Decennial Reports

The lmperial Maritime Customs (Maritime Customs after 1 9 1 1 ) issued five ten-year reports on the treaty-port network between 1891 and 1931, with the local cornmissioner in each treaty port contributing a chapter giving an ovewiew of local conditions. These formed the sixth of the statistical series published by the organization. The first issue bore the full title Decennial Reports on the Trade, Navigation, Industries, Etc., of the Ports Open to Foreign Corn- rnerce in China and Corea, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty Port Provinces, 7882-97.(The chapter on Yichang in this issue includes a description of the junks in the Upper Yangzi trade. The chapter on Chongqing is incomplete, as the port had only just been opened.)

Trade Reports

The fourth of the (Imperial) Maritime Customs' statistical se ries is the series of annual trade reports, with the same combination of local reports from commissioners as the ten-year series. These reports contain a wealth of information on local trade and other developments, though they were simplified after 19 19, providing fewer local reports. Reports from Chongqing, of course, start in 1891 after the opening, but some Yichang reports in the 1880's mention the Sichuan situation. After 1931 the reports are limited to statistics, though a suwey was issued for the 1941-5 period. The publication Foreign Trade of China, 1926, combining information from the third through fifth statistical series, includes statistics on Chong- qing's aggregate foreign customs trade in the mid-1920's.

Special Customs Publications

The (Irnperial) Maritime Customs also published a Special Series of reports on specific subjects related to sino-foreign trade. They include Chinese Life-Boats, Etc. (#l8), written in 1 932; Handbook for the Guidance of Shipmasters on the Ichang-Chungking Section of the Yangtze River (#34), written by S.C. Plant and revised by R.G. Everest in 1931; The Collection and Disposal of he Maritime and Na- tive Customs Revenue since the Revolution of 7927 (#41), written by Stanley F. Wright in 1927.

Consular Reports

The British consuls in China and elsewhere around the world issued annual trade reports from the mid-nineteenth century until the onset of World War 1. These were published in the Diplornatic and Consular Reports series, but can also be found in the Parliamentary Papers. Like the trade reports, those from Chongqing start in 189 1. Chongqing reports were desultory for a period around the turn of the century. (b) Archival Material

The Public Record Office

Most information in Great Britain's Public Record Office on treaty ports like Chongqing is to be found in the Foreign Office papers in Volume 228, which consists of the correspondence between the British Legation in Beijing and lesser consulates in China. After a Consulate-General was established in Chengdu in 1903, its correspondence with the Legation was also included here. This correspondence was not intended for publication like the trade reports and consular reports--some of it is marked "confidential" or even cyphered-and is often remarkably candid. The political and intelligence reports between 1918 and 1927 are bound in a single volume, FO 228/3273.

Volume 17, consisting of Foreign Office correspondence, also includes some relevant information up to around 1905. In particular, FO 17/ 1 173-4 (subtitled "Mr. Little's Schemes") covers the process by which Chongqing was opened.

Volume 656, consisting of Shanghai Supreme Court correspondence, includes letters from the Chongqing Consulate to the court, in FO 656/75 (1 886-1 91 7) and FO 65611 56 (1 91 8-34).

The Admiralty papers include some reports on the first years of gunboats on the Upper Yangzi, just after the turn of the century, in Adm 125/125 to 125/127.

The United Church Archives

The United Church Archives, part of the University of Toronto, contain much information on the Canadian Methodist Mission and the later United Church of Canada Mission. This includes minutes of the West China branch's annual meetings.

The Hongkong Bank Archives

The Hongkong Bank Archives, now pan of the Midland Bank Ar- chives in the City of London, include two field reports on Chongqing by the bank's agents, in 1921 and 1925, evaluating the port's corn- mercial potential and the feasibility of estabiishing a branch there. They include some statistics on trade and customs revenue. The first, written by Mr. Macintyre on April 25, 1921, has cal1 number SHG 11 71. The second was written by A.B. Lowson on 3.1 3.25, but 1 can find no cal1 number for it.

Friends House

Friends House, located in London, possesses archival material on the Quaker mission in Chongqing, including the International Friends Institute. This includes the Institute's annual reports frorn 191 5, 1919 (Ten Momentous Years), and 1920-21 (Friendship and Goodwill: Without Distinction of Race, Class or Religion); pamphlets published by the lnstitute such as A Work of Christian Internationalism and Social Service on Behalf of Women of This Generation (on the connected Women's Institute), Chinese Ladies in the Treaty Port of Chungking, The Commercial Capital of China's Largest and Richest Province; and A. Warburton Davidson's 191 1 pamphlet The Business Men of Chmgking.

The John Swire Archives

These archives, located at the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies, contain only a lirnited amount of information on Chongqing. Aside from correspondence on the rnalfeasance of the firm's Chongqing agent, between 1903 and 1904 (JSS 11 1/12), most is "sundries" in JSSXll 4/1-14.

China: Being The Times' Special Correspondence from China in the Years 7 857-58. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Publications reprint, 1972.

The Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal. Published by the American Presbyterian Mission Press in Shanghai.

The North-China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette. Published by British residents in Shanghai.

"Plan for Industrial Development of Szechwan Province, China," United States Department of Commerce Trade information Bulletin #62 (9.1 8.22).

R.T. "One Night in Chunking," pp. 581-602, Blackwood's Magazine, Vol. CCXXXV, #1423 (1 934).

Spencer, J.E. "Trade and Transshipment in the Yangtze Valley," pp. 1 12-23, The Geographical Review, Vol. XXVII #1 (January 1938).

------"Changing Chungking: The Rebuilding of an Old Chinese City," pp. 46-60, ibid., Vol. XXIX #1 (January 1939).

The West China Missionary Journal. Published by the Advisory Board of the West China Union between 1899 and 1942. Only about half the issues survive from the period before 1907, when the Canadian Methodist Mission in Chengdu took over publication from Chongqing. The October, 1903 issue turns up as Annex #4 to Consul H.E. Sly's 9.30.04 intelligence report (FO 22811 558, Gener- al Correspondence from Chungking #7C/04), because it contains a letter from a Kuizhou missionary which Sly considered pertinent to reports of rioting there.

Whang, Paul K. "Szechuen--The Hotbed of Civil Wars," pp. 344-5, China Weekly Review, October 22, 1932.

(d) Other Contemporaneous Publications

Abend, Hallett. Treaty Ports. New York: Doubleday, 1944.

Ainscough, Thomas M. Notes from a Frontier. Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1915.

Arnold, Julean. Commercial Handbook of China, Volume 1. Washing- ton, D.C.: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1 9 19.

The consular district of Chongqing is dealt with in pp. 489-51 4.

Basil, George C. (in collaboration with Elizabeth Foreman Lewis). Test Tubes and Dragon Scales. Chicago: John C. Winston, 1940.

Beaton, Kenneth J. Serving with the Sons of Shuh: Fifty Fateful Years in West China 7 89 1- 794 7. Toronto: United Church of Canada, 1941.

Bird, Isabella L. The Yangtze Valley and Beyond: An Account of Jour- neys Ni China, Chiefly in the Province of Sze Chuan and Among the Man-tze of the Somo Territory. London: John Murray, 1899. ~lakiston, ho mas W. Five Months on the Yang-Tsze; With a Narra- tive of the Exploration of its Upper Waters, and Notices of the Present Rebellions in China. London: John Murray, 1862.

Chang Kia-ngau. China's Struggle for Railroad Development. New York: John Day, 1 943.

China Handbook 7 93 7- 7 943: A Comprehensive Suntey of Major De- velopments in China in Six Years of war. New York: Macmillan, 1943.

The Christian Occupation of China. (Edited by Milton T. Stauffer.) Shanghai: China Continuation Committee, 1 922. Sichuan is dealt with in pp. 21 9-34.

Davidson, Robert J. & Davidson, Isaac Maçon. Life in West China: De- scribed by Two Residents in the Province of Sz-chwan. London: Headley Brothers, 1 905.

Geil, William Edgar. A Yankee on the Yangtze. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1904.

Gill, William. The River of Golden Sand. London: John Murray, 1883.

Hart, Virgil C. Western China: A Journey to the Great Buddhist Cen- tre of Mount Omei Boston: Ticknor, 1888.

Hartwell, George E. Granary of Heaven. Toronto: United Church of Canada, 1941.

Hosie, Sir Alexander. On the Trail of the Opium Poppy: A Narrative of Travel in the Chief Opium-Producing Provinces of China. Boston: Small & Maynard, 1914. Three Years in Western China; A Narrative of Three Jour- neys in Ssu-ch'uan, Kuei-chow, and Yun-nan. London: George Philip & Son, 1890.

Little, Alicia. In the Land of the Blue Gown. London: T. Fuler Unwin 1901 (revised 1908).

lntimate China: The Chinese as 1 Have Seen Them. Lon- don: Hutchinson, 1 901.

Little, Archibald John. Gleamings from Fifty Years in China. London: Sampson, Low & Murston, 1 9 10. Reprinted articles inclued "Western China: Its Products and Trade," "The New Rapid in the Upper Yangtze and the Arrival of the First Steamer at Chungking," and "The Dangers of the Upper Yangtze."

- Through the Yang-Tse Gorges or Trade and Travel in Western China. London: Sampson, Low & Marston, 1 887 The third edition, published in 1898, includes an account of the Lee- chuen's ascent of the Upper Yangzi.

Maugham, W. Somerset. On a Chinese Screen. London: William Heinemann, 1922.

La Mission Lyonnaise d d'exploration commerciale en Chine 1895- 1897. Lyon: A. Ray, 1898. Issued by Lyons' Chamber of Commerce.

Morrison, George Ernest. An Australian in China: Being the Narrative of a Quiet Journey Across China to Burma. Taipei: Ch'eng Wen, 1971 (original edition London: Horace Cox, 1895).

Morse, Hosea Ballou. International Relations of the Chinese Empire. London: Longman, Green, 191 7. A three-volume history.

--- The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire. Taipei: Ch'eng Wen Publishing, 1966. (Original edition Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1907.)

Our West China Mission. Toronto: Missionary Society of the United Church, 1920.

Parker, Edward Harper. China Past and Present London: Chapman & Hall, 1903.

Payne, Robert. Chungking Diaîy. London: William Heinemann, 1945.

Peck, Graham. Two Kinds of Time. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, revised 1 967.

Pratt, A.E. To the Snows of Tibet. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1892.

Records of the West China Missionary Conference at Chungking: Jan- uary, 1899. Shanghai: American Presbyterian Mission Press, 1899.

Remer, CF. A Study of Chinese Boycotts with Special Reference to Their Economic Effectiveness. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933.

Report of the Mission to China of the Blackburn Chamber of Com- merce 7 896-7. Blackburn: North-East Lancashire Press, 1898. The first volume is written by F.S.A. Bourne; the second volume is written by H. Neville and H. Bell and edited by W.H. Burnett.

Widler, Eliy. Six Months Prisoner of the Szechwan Military. Shang- hai: The China Press, 1925? 2. Secondary Sources

(e) Books

Adshead, S.A.M. The Modernization of the Chinese Salt Administra- tion, 7 900-7 920. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970.

- Province and Politics in Late lmperial China; Viceregal Government in Szechwan, 7 898- 7 922. London: Curzon Press, 1 984.

British Business in Asia since 7 860. R.P.T. Davenport-Hines & Geof- frey Jones ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Brodie, Patrick. Crescent over Cathay: China and ICI, 7898 to 7 956. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Canadian School in West China. Brockman Brace ed. Toronto: Cana- dian School Alumni Association, 1974.

Chan, Anthony B. Arming the Chinese: The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China 7 920-7 928. Vancouver: University of Brit- ish Columbia Press, 1982.

Ch'en, Jerome. The Military-Gentry Coalition: China under the War- lords. Toronto: University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre on Modern East Asia, 1979.

Cheung, Yuet-wah. Missionary Medicine in China: A Study of Two Ca- nadian Protestant Missions in China Before 1937. New York: Univer- sity Press of America, 1988.

China at the Crossroads: Na tionalists and Communists, 7 92 7- 7 949. (Edited by F. Gilbert Chan). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. Of specific interest is Robert A. Kapp's "The Kuomintang and Rural China in the War of Resistance, 1937-1945" (pp. 151-84).

The Chinese City between Two Worlds. (Edited by Mark Elvin & G. William Skinner.) Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1974. Of particular interest are Rhoads Murphey's "The Treaty Ports and China's Modernization: -What Went Wrong?" Kapp's "Chungking as a Center of Warlord Power, 1 926-1 937," and Elvin's "The Administra- tion of Shanghai, 1905-191 4."

Ching, Yu-kwei. Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China. Washington, D.C.: University Press of Washington, D.C., 1956.

Clifford, Nicholas. Spoilt Children of Empire: Westerners in Shang- hai and the Chinese Revolution of the 7 920s. Hanover: Middlebury College Press, 1 991.

Coates, P. D. The China Consuls: British Consular Officers, 7 843- 7943. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

Cochran, Sherman. Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 7 890-7 930. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni- versity Pres, 1980.

Cook, Christopher. The Lion and the Dragon: British Voices from the China Coast. London: Elm Tree Books, 1985.

Eastman, Lloyd E. Family, Fields and Ancestors: Constancy and Change in China's Social and Economic History, 75504949. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 988.

Endicott, Stephen. James G. Endicott: Rebel Out of China. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1 980. Fairbank, John K. China: A New History. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1992.

----- Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953.

Goto-S hibata, Harumi. Japan and Britain in Shanghai, 7 925-3 7. Lon- don: Macmillan, 1995.

The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 7 895-7 93 7. Edited by Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989.

Kapp, Robert A. Szech wan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Mili- tarism and Central Power, 79 7 7 - 7 938. London: Yale University Press, 1973.

Kiernan, E.V.G. British Diplomacy in China 1880 to 7 885. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 93 9.

King, Frank H.H. The Hongkong Bank. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1988. A four-volume history of the financial institution.

Service, Grace. Golden Inches: The China Memoir of Grace Service. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989. (Edited by John Service.)

Sutton, Donald S. Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic: The Yunnan Army, 7905-7 925. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980. Tai, En-sai. Treaty Ports in China: A Study in Diplomacy. New York: University Publications, 1 9 1 8, reprinted 1976. (Frorn the Studies in Chinese History and Civilkation series.)

Tarling , Nicholas. lmperial Britain in South-East Asia. London: Ox- ford University Press, 1975.

Terrible, Graham. Yangtze Reminiscences: Some Notes and Recollec- tions of Service with the China Navigation Company Ltd. 7 925- 7 939. Hong Kong: John Swire & Sons, 1990.

Tyzack, Charles. Friends to China: The Davidson Brothers and the Friends' Mission to China 7 886 to 7 939. York: William Sessions, 1988.

Van Slyke, Lyman P. Yangtze: Nature, History, and the River. Read- ing, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1 988.

Wakeman, Frederick. The Fall of lmperial China. New York: Free Press, 1975.

Wang, Ye h-chien. Land Taxation in lmperial China, 7 750-7 9 7 7. Cam- bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973.

We hrle, Edmund S. Britain, China, and the Antimissionary Riots 7 89 7 - 7 900. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1966.

Wood, Frances. No Dogs and Not Many Chinese: Treaty Port Life in China 7 843- 7 943. London: John Murray, 1998.

Worcester, G.R.G. The Junks and Sampans of the Yangtze. Annapolis, Md.: Naval lnstitute Press, 1971. Wright, Stanley F. Hart and the Chinese Customs. Belfast: William Mullan & Sons, 1950.

Zhang Zhongli; Chen Zengnian; Yao Xinrong. The Swire Group in Old China. Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, n.a.

(f) Un published Dissertations

Hedtke, Charles Herman. Reluctant Revolutionaries: Szechwan and the Ch'ing Collapse, 7898-7 9 7 7. University Microfilms, 1968.

(g) Jou rnal Articles

Adshead, S.A.M. "The Opium Trade in Szechwan 1881 to 19 1 1," pp. 93-9, Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. VI1 #2 (September 1966).

"Salt and Warlordism in Szechwan1914-1922," Modern Asian Studies, Vol. XXlV #4 (October 1 9 90).

Chuzo Ichiko. "The Railway Protection Movement in Szechuan in 19 1 1," pp. 47-69, Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko (The Oriental Library), #14 (1 9 5 5).

Hyatt, Invin. "The Chengtu Riots (1 895): Myths and Politics," pp. 26-54, Papers on China, #18 (1 964). (Published by the Harvard Uni- versity East Asian Resource Center, Cambridge, Mass.)

Levering, Miriam. "The Chungking Riot of 1886: Justice and Ideolog- ical Diversity," pp. 158-83, ibid., #22A (May 1 969).

McElderry, Andrea Lee. "Shanghai Old-Style Banks (Ch'ien-Chuang) 1800-1 935, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies #25 (1 976).

Paulsen, George E. "The Szechwan Riots of 1895 and American 'Mis- sionary Diplomacy,'" pp. 285-98, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. XX- Vlll #2 (February 1969).

Wyman, Judith. "The Ambiguities of Chinese Antiforeignism: Chong- qing, 1870-1 900," pp. 86-1 22, Late lmperial China Vol. XVlll #2 (December 1997).

Yang, S.C. "The Revolution in Szechwan, 1 9 1 1-1 9 1 2," pp. 64-90, Journal of the West China Border Research Society, #6 (1 933-34). Appendix: - Statistical Tables

All statistics come from the (Imperial) Maritime Customs' Statisti- cal Series #4, except for 1(f), 5(b) and 6(c), which come from Sta- tistical Series #3. All tael measures are Haikwan except for opium weight in 3(b).

1: Foreign Customs Trade with Sichuan

(a) Transit-Pass lmports to & Exports from Sichuan, 1875-90 ("Report on the Trade of Ichang," 1 875-90 passim.)

(b) Chongqing Foreign Customs Imports & Exports, 1891-1 931 ("Report on the Trade of Chungking," 1891 -1 931 passim, Appen- dix II.)

(c) Transit-Pass lmports from Chongqing, 1896-1904 (d) Transit-Pass lmports from Chongqing, 1906-1 9 19 (e) Foreign Transit-Pass lmports from Chongqing, 1920-30 (al1 from "Report on the Trade of Chungking," 1896-191 9 passim, Appendix VI.)

(f) Chongqing Foreign Customs Imports & Exports, 1935-40 ("Returns of the Trade of China," 1940.)

2: Foreign Customs Cotton Goods lmports to Chongqing

(a) Transit-Pass Cotton Goods by Category, 1880-1 890 ("Report on the Trade of Ichang," 1882-90 passim.)

(b) Yarn and Raw Cotton by Country, 189 1-1 904 (c) Foreign Yarn, 1905-30 (both from "Report on the Trade of Chungking," 189 1-1 930 passim, Appendix III.) 3: Chongqing Foreign Customs Opium Exports

(a) By Value, 1 895-1 904 (b) By Weight, 1896-1 91 1 (both from "Report on the Trade of Chungking," 1895-1 91 1 passim, Appendix V;)

4: Chongqing Foreign Customs Bullion lmports & Exports, 189 1-1 9 1 9 (Including silver sycee, coin, and ingots; gold; and copper coins; from "Report on the Trade of Chungking," 189 1-1 91 9 passim, Appendix 63.)

Chongqing Foreign Customs Shipping Entries & Clearances

Chongqing Foreign Custorns Revenue

(a) In Taels, 1891 -1 93 1 ("Report on the Trade of Chungking," 1891-1 931 passim, Appen- dix VII.) (b) In Dollars, 193 0-40 ("Returns of the Trade of China." 1940.1 1a: Transit-Pass Imports to & Exports from Sichuan, 1875-90 TABLE 1a Hankou Total Yichar lrnports Yichar Exports 156 1875 O 1875 665 1876 O 1876 1157 1877 O 1877 1598 1878 1 1878 2432 1879 194 1879 2079 1880 989 1880 3187 1881 83 1 1881 1389 -1882 834 1882 2039 1883 1393 1883 1348 1884 1066 1884 1935 1885 1648 1885 1516 1886 1368 1886 1006 1887 1861 1887 980 1888 21 90 1888 792 1889 1894 1889 1584 1890 31 98 1890 544 1891 2346 1891 1b: Chongqing Foreign Customs lmports & Exports, 1 89 1-1 93 1

1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 TABLE 1b 41 5 TABLE 1b Exports lmports(Domestic) (Foreign) 1 c: Transit-Pass lmports from Chongqing, 1 896-1 904 II\\ Domestic Goods / . -.* +... 1d: Transit-Pass lmports from Chongqing, 1 906-1 9

1 1 e: Foreign Transit-Pass lmports from Chongqing, 1920-1 930 1 TABLES Ic-e Transit-Pass lmports Foreign Domest ic 1891 17 1891 O 1892 O 1892 O 1893 O 1893 O 1894 O 1894 O 1895 O 1895 O 1896 1012 1896 O 1897 81 0 1897 O 1898 858 1898 O 1899 1041 1899 623 1900 1366 1900 1584 1901 1286 1901 1315 1902 1040 1902 1989 1903 1834 1903 21 74 1 904 733 1904 1938 1905 927 1905 1906 1743 1906 847 1907 1135 1907 1 700 1908 460 1908 2968 1909 566 1909 3093 1910 765 1910 2498 1911 483 1911 4908 1912 122 1912 703 1 1913 95 191 3 5460 1914 110 1914 891 1 1915 86 1915 8708 1916 1219 191 6 81 73 1917 1006 1917 7743 191 8 61 8 191 8 5805 191 9 1256 191 9 11357 1920 1907 1921 1006 1922 1970 1923 1113 1924 1390 1925 631 1926 796 1927 50 1928 1 1929 134 1930 47 1 f: Chongqing Foreign Customs lmports & Exports, 1 93540

% Exports -. %

Sa: Transit-Pass lmports to Chongqing by Category, 1880-1 890

1882 1884 1886 1888 (% of Total Shanghai Net Imports)

1882 1884 1886 1888 (% of Total Shanghai Net Imports) 1882 1884 1886 1888 (% of Total Shanghai Net Imports) TABLE 2a Grey Shirtings White Shirtings Yarn 1880 10.24 1880 O 1880 1881 10.1 1881 O 1881 1882 7.93 1882 O 1882 1883 12.71 1883 O 1883 1884 9.09 1884 O 1884 1885 11 .28 1885 O 1885 1886 9.82 1886 3.31 1886 1887 7.46 1887 3.1 4 1887 1888 11.13 1888 4.26 1888 1889 8.71 1889 4.89 1889 1890 11.13 1890 3.3 1890 Chintzes & Woden Furniture, Etc. Lastings Long Ells 1880 9.44 1880 23 .O5 1880 17.04 1881 18.49 1881 24.63 1881 16.59 1882 9.81 1882 31 -25 1882 13.46 1883 O 1883 40.1 8 1883 31.19 1884 O 1884 37.87 1884 12.38 1885 O 1885 33.02 1885 23.93 1886 7.06 1886 23.1 3 1886 13.01 1887 19.64 1887 29.01 1887 14.26 1888 65.36 1888 28.08 1888 16.09 1889 64.9 1 1889 23.1 4 1889 12.96 1890 63.1 7 1890 29.41 1890 13.1 T-Cloths Drills Camlets 1880 5-25 1880 12.58 1880 13.48 1881 6.24 1881 7.1 2 1881 1 3.89 1882 3.94 1882 1.21 1882 9.92 1883 3.93 1883 7.05 1883 25.09 1884 2.93 1884 1.46 1884 12.1 6 1885 2.94 1885 3.3 1885 1 0.04 1886 1.48 1886 1.33 1886 7.59 1887 1.O1 1887 1.51 1887 9.61 1888 0.73 1888 O. 84 1888 10.85 1889 0.92 1889 0.42 1889 7.1 8 1890 O. 58 1890 O 1890 8.33 2b: Chongqing Foreign Customs Yarn & Raw Cotton lmports by Country, 189 1-1 904 TABLE 2b lndian Yarn Chinese Yarn Raw Cotton 1891 562 1891 O 1891 29 1892 2565 1892 62 1892 6 1893 1629 1893 8 1893 5 1 1894 2765 1894 40 1894 137 1895 2601 1895 86 1895 516 1896 3983 1896 91 1896 21 6 1897 5068 1897 941 1897 1093 1898 4556 1898 1476 1898 1312 1899 8522 - 1899 2669 1899 677 1900 7586 1900 3678 1900 114 1901 821 7 1901 1477 1901 37 1902 8902 1902 2067 1902 43 1903 14037 1903 2058 1903 45 1904 8541 1904 2681 1904 37 Japanese Yam 1891 O 1892 O 1893 O 1894 1 1895 O 1896 O 1897 247 1898 264 1899 891 1900 1014 1901 738 1902 141 1903 136 1904 449 2c: Chongqing Foreign Customs Foreign Yam Imports, 1905-30 TABLE 2c Foreign Yam - - 1905 7237 1906 9614 1907 8726 1908 7443 1909 8835 1910 7226 1911 591 9 191 2 4614 1913 5222 1914 6310 1915 5030 1916 3427 1917 4398 191 8 121 O 1919 3902 1920 2493 1921 371 9 1922 407 1923 56 1924 170 1925 90 1926 150 1927 72 1928 52 1929 7 1930 142 3a: Chongqing Foreign Customs Opium Exports by Value, 1895-1 904 TABLE 3a Sichuan Opium Yunnan Opium 1895 2596 1895 274 1896 1405 1896 249 1897 2066 1897 342 1898 1707 1898 469 1899 3335 1899 875 1900 2001 1900 1586 1901 3146 1901 1090 1902 1799 1902 960 1903 1906 1903 455 1904 2751 1904 1300 3b: Chongqing foreign Custorns Opium Exports by Weight, 1896-1 91 1 TABLE 3b Sichan Opium Yunnan Opium 1896 7025 1896 1038 1897 9392 1897 1294 1898 6075 1898 1455 1899 12287 1899 2832 1900 7170 1900 4827 1901 12266 1901 3761 1902 4387 1902 2004 1903 4830 1903 1008 1904 9395 1904 2792 1905 1 1292 1905 3233 1906 91 53 1906 2972 1907 8072 1907 2306 1908 13045 1908 3384 1909 8449 1909 4657 1910 4633 1910 2780 1911 3 54 1971 44 4: Chongqing Foreign Customs Bullion lmports & Exports, 1 89 1 -1 9 1 9 TABLE 4 -Exports 1891 O 1892 484 1893 208 1894 36 1895 5 1896 59 1897 152 1898 96 1899 85 1900 372 1901 272 1902 1009 1903 245 7 904 1321 1905 3600 1906 3465 1907 2839 1908 576 1909 323 1910 332 1911 1021 1912 1856 1913 34 1914 7101 1915 1202 1916 395 1917 669 1918 4 1919 1783 43 5

5a: Chongqing Foreign Customs Shipping Entties di Clearances, 1 89 1-1 91 8

80000 --

Junk r\E 70000 - -.

60000 ---

50000 ---

T --. O 40000 n S

30000 - -,

20000 - ..

1 0000 - .-

O -r 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 191 5 1 920 TABLE Sa Steam Entered Steam Cleared Junks Entered O Junks Cleared Sb: Chongqing Foreign Customs Entries by Country of Charterer, 1891-1 905 60000 1. TABLE Sb British Chinese Others 1891 5681 1891 O 1891 1651 1892 19201 1892 3027 1892 11290 1893 15917 1893 4976 1893 7029 1894 2681 3 1894 5946 1894 1375 1895 26243 1895 5581 1895 5057 1896 29700 1896 5096 1896 1704 1897 37900 1897 6891 1897 4245 1898 32388 1898 8805 1898 71O5 1899 52944 1899 19317 1899 3748 1900 43886 1900 18041 1900 220 1901 43692 1901 6272 1901 578 1902 42081 1902 5274 1902 4851 1903 46735 1903 5330 1903 5921 1904 41 169 1904 6622 1904 2832 1905 36328 1905 7223 1905 3038 1 Sc: Chongqing Foreign Customs Shipping Entries & Clearances, 1935-40 (

Clearances d:!\ TABLE Sc Entries Clearances - - 1935 257301 1935 2571 15 1936 271 296 1936 271 O1 6 1937 250797 1937 249700 1938 265744 1938 264207 1939 243247 1939 224540 1940 161907 1940 140080 6a: Chongqing Foreign Customs Revenue in Taels, 1891-1 931

Total Revenue 442

TABLE 6a Total Revenue Opium Duties 6b: Chongqing Foreign Customs Revenue in Dollars, 1930-40 TABLE 6b Revenue 1930 1935 1931 2384 1932 1969 1933 209 1 1934 1944 1935 231 1 1936 31 72 1937 3983 1938 3280 1939 3470 1940 6907