Entrenchment, Field Fortifications, and the Learning Process in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-15
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University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2014-05-21 "The men have learnt at last to dig and burrow like rabbits": Entrenchment, Field Fortifications, and the Learning Process in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-15 Dykstra, Bodie Dykstra, B. (2014). "The men have learnt at last to dig and burrow like rabbits": Entrenchment, Field Fortifications, and the Learning Process in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-15 (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/28247 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/1538 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY “The men have learnt at last to dig and burrow like rabbits”: Entrenchment, Field Fortifications, and the Learning Process in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-15 by Bodie D. Dykstra A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY CALGARY, ALBERTA May 2014 © Bodie D. Dykstra 2014 ii Abstract Academic historians have in the past three decades largely dispelled the notion that British generalship in the First World War was plagued with incompetence and have instead explained the heavy casualties of the conflict as the by-product of commanders learning to overcome the tactical difficulties of static trench warfare. Such analyses have inevitably focused on the British army’s offensive role, since it was in the attack that Britain suffered its heaviest losses. The role of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the defensive in 1914 and early 1915 has consequently gone largely overlooked. Trench warfare contained both offensive and defensive qualities, the latter of which revolved chiefly around the construction and employment of field fortifications. In terms of its theories and ideas about how to use earthworks on the battlefield, the BEF was well prepared for war in 1914. Barring some temporary setbacks, most notably during the First Battle of Ypres, the British army between September 1914 and March 1915 continuously adapted its field fortification techniques and gradually improved its methods of training inexperienced officers in new methods, until the change in its operational-strategic posture from defence to offence resulted in the British gradually falling behind the Germans in terms of both defensive theory and field fortification quality. iii Acknowledgements Mom, our conversations about this project were crucial to my formulating ideas. The end product owes much to your genuine interest and unwavering support. iv Table of Contents Abstract .................................................................................................................................. ii Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents .................................................................................................................. iv List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................. v Maps ...................................................................................................................................... vi Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 1: Developing a System after South Africa ............................................................ 16 Chapter 2: Response and Adaptation on the River Aisne .................................................... 34 Chapter 3: Overcoming Setbacks at La Bassée and First Ypres .......................................... 54 Chapter 4: Consolidation and the Test of Second Ypres ..................................................... 76 Postscript and Conclusions .................................................................................................. 97 Bibliography ...................................................................................................................... 111 Appendix A: Prewar Trench Designs and Specifications .................................................. 118 Appendix B: Prewar Designs of Machine-Gun Emplacements and Redoubts .................. 119 Appendix C: Forward and Reverse Slope Trench Sites .................................................... 120 Appendix D: Field Fortifications, September 1914 – May 1915 ...................................... 121 v List of Abbreviations BEF British Expeditionary Force GHQ General Headquarters IWM Imperial War Museum LAC Library and Archives Canada Ms Manuscript NAM National Army Museum TNA The National Archives of the United Kingdom Ts Typescript vi Map 1 Battle of the Aisne, 14-21 September 1914 vii Map 2 Battle of La Bassée, 19-29 October 1914 viii Map 3 First Battle of Ypres, 29-31 October 1914 ix Map 4 Second Battle of Ypres, 22 April – 3 May 1915 x Map 5 Second Battle of Ypres, 3-13 May 1915 1 Introduction In the United Kingdom, the image of the First World War as a grand national tragedy perpetrated by an ill-prepared and largely incompetent British generalship remains pervasive one century later. Academic historians have in the past three decades largely dispelled this notion and explained the losses of the war as the by-product of commanders learning to overcome the tactical difficulties of static trench warfare, but such analyses have inevitably focused on the British army’s offensive role, since it was in the attack that Britain suffered its heaviest losses. The Battle of the Somme in the summer of 1916 and the fighting around Passchendaele in the summer and autumn of 1917, in particular, have attracted considerable attention from both popular and academic historians because of the enormous losses sustained in return for only a few miles of ground. Consequently, the offensive aspects of trench warfare, namely the weapons and tactics necessary to overcome the deadlock on the Western Front, have received the bulk of attention from historians of the British army in the First World War. Trench warfare had both offensive and defensive elements, however, the latter of which revolved chiefly around the construction and application of field fortifications. Focus on the large-scale British offensives and the development of the army’s capacity to successfully attack German positions between 1915 and 1918 have overshadowed the role of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the defensive and, by extension, its use of field fortifications during the early phases of the war in 1914 and early 1915. Although Franco-British forces spent the majority of the war attempting to dislodge the occupying Germans from Belgium and parts of northeastern France, in 1914 the Entente was on the strategic defensive in the west. The war opened in early August with the French and Germans developing simultaneous offensives, but the French push to recover the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine (Plan XVII) failed to produce any substantial results. On the other hand, the German drive through Belgium, spearheaded by the disproportionately strong First and Second Armies on the right wing, made relatively good 2 progress. Obstructing the Germans’ advance was therefore the Entente’s primary objective. With the German right wing crossing the River Marne and threatening to advance on Paris in early September, General Joseph Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, orchestrated a flanking manoeuvre with the newly-organized French Sixth Army. Seeing his position as compromised, General Helmuth von Moltke, the chief of the German General Staff, ordered his armies to retire on 9 September. Joffre and his British counterpart, Field Marshal Sir John French, failed to capitalize on their victory and the German First and Second Armies safely withdrew, digging in on the north side of the River Aisne on the 12th. Although Moltke had temporarily assumed the defensive, his replacement, General Erich von Falkenhayn, remained committed to securing a quick victory in France and launched fresh attacks in Champagne, Artois, and finally Flanders. Joffre, frustrated by his inability to catch the retiring Germans between 9 and 12 September, likewise ordered his armies to advance. The result was that in late September and early October 1914, both sides were attempting to outflank one another in a series of operations that has become known, rather erroneously, as the “race to the sea.” Strategically, however, the Allies remained on the defensive in the West since their principal goal was to prevent the Germans from renewing their drive toward Paris.1 The BEF mounted only two brief offensives in 1914, both of which resulted in largely defensive engagements. The first, launched in cooperation with the French as part of the Marne battle, was slow, cautious, and ended in the army’s introduction to static trench warfare on the Aisne in mid-September. After the initial attempt to wrestle the high ground from the entrenched Germans failed on 14 September, Sir John French resigned the army