3/17/78 [2] Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
3/17/78 [2] Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 3/17/78 [2]; Container 67 To See Complete Finding Aid: http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf •••<•··~ ·. tlr" ut aar t11611k.v... r /lJt-f· ;JitJ,e~,v' _ ~£LJ )4il!v',e:,&s . 1)11 PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER /A/ r;t;="e:.... !.. -..: l~ WAKE FOREST ·UNIVERSITY ~J7fii/R ,.V~ ... t?Je?.;ct!?.v.J"c _ . -· t$ (' MARCH 17 J 197.8 L ~Peie,r/~,~ - ~c I r.-=-<# r~• 'f ~HAfv X,vr T.e-4-PE- . '; {,J#he~/~ U/H/T~Ey - lf'/~I€.J>.ra.-./ ?,eEyo;e- 8/~~ .ltl ~p~GA!.- L.,t(J,HA-;e c:$ e,..,#6&:=-~ '#;?,e~A./ /A-L~A-.P4oc N'C- ;tl ~ Sl~. ,., 22. ONE HUNDRED NINETY-EIGHT YEARS AGOJ IN THE wf -J - -"' "" SOUTHERN PART oFyouR S~EJ FOUR HUNDRED NORTH CAROLINA MILITIAMEN TOOK UP ARMS IN OUR \~AH OF _.--·· ... ·· INDEPENDEN(E. ,//6 ,AJq,C~ £j)tl/l)t£,J AGAINST A FORCE OF THIRTEEN HUNDHED BRITISH- SOLDIERS} THE NORTH CAROLINIANS- PREVAILED -- AND THEIR BATTLE AT RAMSOUR'S ·MILL BECAME ASTEP - ON THE ROAD TO VICTORY AT YORKTOWN ONE YEAR LATER. YOUR ANCESTORS IN' NORTH CAROLINA} -MINE IN GEORGIA} AND T:HEIR NEIGHBORS THROUGHOUT THE THIRTEEN ' ~ ~ COLONIES EARNED OUR FREEDOM IN COMBAT. --- ---..... THAT IS A SACRIFICE I I I - 2 - THAT IS A SACRIFICE AMERICANS HAVE HAil TO ---MAKE TIME- AND AGAIN· lN OUR NATION'S HISTORY,- WE ~AVE LEARNED THAT STRENGTH IS THE'FINAL- PROTECTOR OF LIBERTY I THIS IS A COMMiaMENT, AND A SACRIFICE~ THAT l UNDERSTAND WELL FOR THE TRADITION OF MILITARY SERVICE HUNS D,EEP IN MY OWN FAMILY.- MY --FIRST ANCESTOR TO LIVE IN' GEORGIA~ JAMES CARTER~ FOUGHT IN THE REVOLUTION I MY FATHER WAS A FIRST LIEUTENANT- IN THE ARMY DURING WORLD WAR ONE. I I .AND MY OLDEST SON VOLUNTEERED TO SERVE IN VIETNAM. I SPENT ELEVEN YEARS OF MY LIFE AS A- MEMBER OF . THE UNITED STATES -NAVY. THIS ·Is TYPICAL OF MANY AMERICAN FAMILIES. I .I .. J]Jit ....... fll1" I JI ..&Ji&pl~ - 3 - DOWN- THROUGH THE GENERATIONS., THE PURPOSES OF OUR AHMED FORCES HAVE BEEN THE SAME: TO DEFEND- OUR SECURITY WHEN IT IS THREATENED., AND THROUGH DEMONSTRATED STRENGTH TO REDUCE- THE CHANCES- THAT WE WILL HAVE TO FIGHT AEAJ]. THESE WORDS- OF JOHN KENNEDY STILL GUIDE OUR ACTIONS: "THE PURPOSE OF OUR ARMS IS PEACE., NOT WAR -- . TO MAKE CERTAIN THEY WILL NEVER HAVE TO BE USED." T~AT PURPOSE l S UNCHANGED. BUT THE WORLD HAs; BEEN CHANGING., AND OUR RESPONSES- MUST CHANGE WITH IT. THIS NORNIN,G I WOULD LIKE TO "fALK·- TO YOU ABOUT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY -- -WHERE WE NOW STAND., WHAT NEW- CIRCUMSTANCES WE FACL AND WHAT WE ARE GO lNG TO DO IN THE FUTURE. --- LET ME DEAL AT THE BEGINNING I I I - 4 - LET ME DEAL- AT THE BEGINNING WITH SOME MYTHS.-- ONE MYTH IS THAT THIS COUNTRY SOMEHOW IS PULLING -BACK FROM PROTECTING ITS INTERESTS AND ITS FRIENDS AROUND THE WORLD. THAT IS -NOT THE -CASL AS ~/ffLL BE EXPLAINED IN THIS SPEECH-- ANfl DEMONSTRATED--- IN OUR ACTIONS- AS ANATION. - ANOTHER-- MYTH lS THAT OUR DEFENSE BUDGET IS TOO BU_RDEriSOME., AND CONSUMES AN UNDUE POJHlON OF OUR FEDERAL REVENUES. NATIONAL DEFENSE IS OF COURSE AlARGE AND IMPORTANT ITEM OF EXRENDITURESi BUT IT REPRESENTS ONLY ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF OUR GROSS NATIONAL .. PRODUCT~ AND CONSUMES APPROXIMATELY ONE-FOURTH OF OUR CURRENT FEDERAL BUDGET.--- . 8alla I Ia.._.,. tlrh JIRI .....I. - 5 - IT ALSO-- IS A MISTAKE TO BELIEVE THAT OUR COUNTRY'S DEFENSE SPENDING IS MAlliLY FOR INrERCONTINENTAL MISSILES- OR N:UCLEAR WEAPONS I tJ.-f/L 'I ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF OUR DEFEN,SE BUDGET GOES TO STRATEGIC FORCES FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. f10RE THAN 50 PERCENT OF IT IS SIMPLY TO -PAY AND SUPPORT THE MEN AND WOMEN IN OUR ARMED FORCES. FI~NALLY., SOME BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE- WE POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF G~EAT DESTRUCTIVE POWER., WE NEED- DO- NOTWING MORE TO GUARANTEE OUR SECURITY.- UNFORTUNATELY~ IT IS NOT THAT SIMPLE. ·- - OUR POTENTIAL ADVERSARIES HAVE NOW BUILT UP MASSIVE FORCES ARMED WITH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS -- TANKS., AlRCRAFT.,-- INFANTRY AND MECHANIZED UNITS. THOSE FORCES .couLD BE usED , , , - 6 - THOSE FORCES COULD- BE USED FOR POLITICAL BLACKMAIL- - AND COULD THREATEN OUR VITAL INTERESTS---- UNLESS WE AND OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDSCHAVE OUR OWN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY STRENGTH AS A COUNTERBALANCE. OF COWRSL OUR NATIONAL SECURITY RESTS ON MORE THAN JUST MILITARY PO'WER. IT DEPENDS PARTLY ON THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY oF ouR FARMS- ANn ouR FACTORIES •••• oN AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF NATURAL RESOURCES .... ON AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM ,WHICH VALUES HUMAN FREEDOM OVER- CENTRALIZED CONTROL .. II ON THE CREATIVE IDEAS OF OUR BEST MINDS •••• ON THE HARD WORK) COHESION) MORAL STRENGTH AND DETERM.INATION OF OUR PEOPLE II II AND ON THE FRIENDSHIP OF OUR -. ., -- .. .- NEIGHBORS. - 7 - OUR SECURITY DEPENDS ON STRONG BONDS WITH OUR ALLIES- .. AND ON WM:ETHER OTHER NATIONS SEEK TO LIVE IN PEACE AND REFRAIN FROM TRYING TO DOMJNATE THOSE AROUND THEM. BUT ADEQUATE AND CAPABLE MILITARY- FOR~S ARE STILL AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. WE .. LIKE OUR ANCESTORS., HAVE THE OBLIGATION TO -""' MAINTAIN STRENGTH EQUAL-- TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE. * * * LET US REVIEW HOW NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES HAVE CHANGED OVER THE PAST DECADE OR TWO. THE WORLD HAS GROWN BOTH I I I - 8 - THE WORLD- HAS GROWN BOTH MORE COMPLEX AND MORE INTERDEPENDENT. THERE IS NOW DIVISION AMONG THE COMMUNIST POWERS; I I I I THE OLD COLONIAL EMPIRES HAVE FALLEN.,- AND MANY -NEW NATIONS HAVE RISEN IN THEIR PLACE; ..... OLD IDEOLOGICAL LABELS- HAVE LOST SOME OF THE~'R MEANING. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN GHANGES IN' THE MILITARY BALANCE AMONG NATIONS. OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS THE MILITARY FORCES- OF THE SOVIETS HAVE GROWN SUBSTANTIALLY -- BOlH I'N ABSOLUTE NUMBERS., AND IN RELATION TO OUR -OWN. -' 9. - '. •-" THERE ALSO HAS BEEN AN OMINOUS INCLINATION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION TO -USE ITS MILITARY POWER -- IO INTERVENE IN LOCAL CONFLICTS WITH ADVISOHSJ WITH EQUIPMENT} AND WITH FULL LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT- FOR MERCENARIES FROM OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES}-- AS WE CAN OBSERVE TODAY IN AFRICA. THIS INCREASE- IN SOVIET ~1ILITARY POWER HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR A LONG TIME. DISCOUNTING INFLATION} SINCE --1960 SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING HAS DOUBLEDJ- RISING STEADILY BY THREE TO FOUR- PERCENT EVERY --YEARV. I I I WHILE OUR MILITARY BUDGET IS ACTUALLY LOWER- THAN IT WAS IN 1960. THE SOVIETSJ WHO TRADITIONALLY WERE -NOT A SIGNIFICANT NAVAL POWERJ NOW RANK N:UMBER TWO IN THE WORLD IN NAVAL FORCES. IN ITS BALANCED STRATEGIC. I I .............. tlrfl II £181 •flsa&H•• - 10 - IN ITS BALANCED STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITY THE UNITED STATES RETAINS IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES., ..... BUT OVER THE PAST DECADE THE STEADY SOVIET BUILDUP HAS ACHIEVED FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE IN STRATEGIC FORCES WITH THE UNITED STATES. THESE CHANGES DEMAND THAT WE MAINTAIN ADEQUATE RESPONSES-- DIPLOMATIC.,. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY. AS COMMANDER-· IN CHIEF.,- I AM RESPONSIBLE FOR MODERN:lZING., EXPANDING AND IMPROVING OUR ARMED FORCES., --·· ~ WHENEVER-'OUR SECURITY REQUIRES IT I WE HAVE RECENTLY COMPLETED A MAJOR -REASSESSMENT OF OUR NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY., AND OUT OF THIS PROCESS HAVE COME SOME OVERALL PRINCIPLES DESIGNED TO PRESERVE OUR NATIONAL SECURITY DURING THE YEARS AHEAD. to· . \'" - 11 - -- WE WILL MATCH)- TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES ANB FRIENDS) ANY THREATENING POWER THROUGH A COMBINATION OF Mli:JTARY FORCES) POLITICAL EFFORTS) AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS. ......... .. .WE WILL --NOT ALLOW ANY OTHER NAT I ON TO GAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER US. -- WE SHALL -SEEK THE COOPERATION OF THE SOVIET UNION· AND OTHER NATIONS. \ IN REDUCING. AREAS OF TENSION. WE DO --NOT DESIRE TO INTERVENE MILITARILY IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF O:fHER COUNTRIES OR TO AGG'RAVATE REGIONAL CONFLICTSJ • • • .AND WE SHALL OPPOSE lNTERVENTriON BY OTHERS. -- WHILE ASSURING OUR MILITARY CAPABILITIES) WE SHALL SEEK SECURITY THROUGH DEPENDABLE., VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS WHERE POSSIBLE. --WE SHALL USE OUR GREAT ECONOMIC., •. II - 12 - · -- WE SHALL USE OUR GREAT ECONOMIC., TECHNOLOGICAL AND DIPLOMATIC ADVANTAGES TO DEFEND- OUR INTERESTS AND TO PROMOTE- OUR VALUES.- WE ARE PREPARED., FOR INSTANCE., TO COOPERATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION TOWARD COMMON SOCIAL., SCIENTIFIC., AND ECONOMIC GOALS -- BUT IF THEY FAlL TO DEMONSTRATE RESTRAINT IN MISSILE PROGRAMS AND OTHER FORCE LEVELS AND IN THE PROJECTION OF SOVIET OR PROXY FORCES INTO OTHER LANDS AND CONTINENTS., .... THEN POPULAR SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR SUCH COOPERATION WILL ERODE. THESE PRINCIPLES MEAN- THAT .,1"/EVEN AS WE SEARCH- FOR AGREEMENT ON ARMS CONTROL.,. WE WILL MODERNIZE OUR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND REVITALIZE OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES. * * * - 13 - WE SHALL IMPLEMENT OUR POLICY IN THREE WAYS: -- BY MAINTAINING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BALANCE; -- BY WORKING-- CLOSELY .WITH OUR NATO ALLIES TO STRENGTHEN AND MODERNIZE- OUR DEFENSES IN EUROPE; AND -- BY MAINTAINING AND DEVELOPING FORCES- TO COUNTER ANY THREATS TO OUR ALLIES AND OUR VITAL INTERESTS IN ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST) AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD. - ' LET ME TAKE--- UP EACH OF THESE THREE IN TURN. OUR FIRST- AND MOST FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN IS TO PREVENT- NUCLEAR---- WAR. THE HORRORS OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT I I I .•.• ,....... .. .... Jill ........ - 14 - THE HORRORS OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT., I I .. AND OUR DESIRE- TO REDUCE-- THE WORLD'S ARSENALS OF FEARSOME NUCLEAR- WEAPONS}- I I I I DO --NOT FREE us FROM THE NEED TO AN.I\t YZE THE SITUATION OBJECTIVELY~ AND TO MAKE SENSIBLE CHOICES ABOUT OUR PURPOSES AND MEANS. OUR STRATEGIC FORCES MUST BE -- AND MUST BE KNO\~N-- TO BE -- A- MATCH FO'R THE CAPABILITIES OF THE SOVIETS. - WILL. THEY ~ NEVER BE ABLE TO USE THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES- TO THREATEN~ COERCE~- OR BLACKMAIL US OH OUR FRIENDS·- I OUiR ·CONTINUING MAJOR EFFORT IN THE SALT TALKS .