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INFORMATION to USERS the Quality of This Reproduction Is INFORM ATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely afreet reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. 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UMI A Bell & Howell Infonnaticn Company 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 UPHEAVAL IM THE ALLIANCE THE ATLANTIC POWERS AND THE REORGANIZATION OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1955-1963 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Jeffrey Glen Giauque, M A The Ohio State University 1999 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Carole Fink, Adviser Professor Michael J. Hogan Adviser Professor John Rothney Department of History Graduate Studies Program UMI Number: 9931599 C o p y r ig h t1999 b y G ia u q u e , Jeffrey Glen All rights reserved. UMI Microform 9931599 Copyright 1999, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Jeffrey Glen Giauque 1999 ABSTRACT Unlike most studies of European integration, which narrate the general origins of the phenomenon after World War II or relate the policies of one country or government toward European unity, this dissertation places European integration in an Atlantic and Cold War context of competing national policies. It situates Europe at the center of the Cold War and examines the ways that European and American leaders attempted to organize Western Europe in order to make it a bulwark against Soviet influence and an American partner in world affairs. It examines the policies o f all four of the major Atlantic powers of the era, the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany, toward the unity of Western Europe from a comparative perspective. The story of early European integration is primarily the result of the interaction of the leaders of these four countries, whether in the form of cooperation or competition. Atlantic leaders cooperated out of awareness of the need to adapt Western Europe not only to Soviet power, but also to political and economic changes such as the end of European empires and the economic recovery of the continent from World War II. However, each of the Western governments of the era, including those of Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy in the U.S., Charles de Gaulle in France, Harold Macmillan in Britain, and Konrad Adenauer in West Germany, developed its own plans for reshaping Western Europe to best advance purely national interests as well. It was these competing national interests that provided the tension among the major Atlantic powers and not only derailed many otherwise sound proposals for European unity, but also determined which institutions actually came into being, such as the European Common Market, the antecedent of today’s European Union. The comparative study of national positions on the organization of European and Atlantic relations not only illuminates the origins of the European community in a new way, it also provides insights into the long-term national attitudes and aspirations that continue to shape European and American policies today. Dedicated to my family 111 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank my parents, Brent and Susan, and my sisters, Natalie and Amy, for their support throughout my education, without which none of my accomplishments would have been possible I wish to thank my adviser. Dr Carole Fink, for her support, encouragement, and advice, as well as her patience and improvement of both my analysis and writing style. I thank the archivists in four countries and nearly a dozen archives who endured my endless requests for more files and made it possible for me to complete my research in the time available This research was supported by grants from the Ohio State University History Department and Graduate School, the Phyllis Krumm Memorial International Scholarship fund, the U S Department of Education, and the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) Crucial additional financial support was provided by my parents. IV VITA December 8, 1970 .......................................Bom-Salt Lake City, Utah, USA 1993................................................................B A History, Magna Cum Laude, The University of Utah 1995................................................................M A History, The Ohio State University 1993-present.................................................Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History TABLE OF CONTENTS A b stra a ..................................................................................................................................................................>■ Dedication............................................................................................................................................................üi Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................................. iv V ita........................................................................................................................................................................... V List of Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................................... viii Chapters: 1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................................1 2 Transatlantic Politics and the Organization of Europe: The Origins and Development o f the Com m on M arket, 1955-1960.............................................................................................................13 2.1 Introduction: the Place of “Europe” in the Plans of Germany, the U.S., Britain, and France............................................................................................................................ 13 2.2 From the EDC failure to Messina, 1955...............................................................................23 2.3 The Possibility of a Common Market and its Political Significance ............................28 2 4 Implementing the Common Market, 1958-1959............................................................... 40 2.5 The Solidification of the Common Market. I960 ..............................................................48 2.6 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................51 3. The European and American Rejection of Britain’s Alternatives to the Common Market, 1956-1960 .............................................................................................................. 56 3.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................................56 3 .2 How will Europe be Organized? July 1956-September 1957 .........................................62 3 .3 France versus Britain; Common Market versus Free trade Area, October 1957-May 1958 .................................................................................................................. 69 3.4 The Return of de Gaulle and the End of the FT A, June-December 1958....................76 3.5 Prophecy Fulfilled: the Formation of the EFTA and the Division of Western Europe, 1959-1960...................................................................... 83 3.6 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................91 4. Adenauer, De Gaulle, and the Formation of the Franco-German Entente, 1958-1960...............96 4 .1 Introduction: the Personalities and Parameters of the Franco-German Relationship.............................................................................................. 96 4.2 De Gaulle’s Return to Power, 1958.....................................................................................108 4.3 Cooperation and Distrust, 1959............................................................................................ 113 vi 4.4 Toward an Entente and Reshaping
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