1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION
Case number: 101/2017
In the matter of:
REOPENED INQUEST: LATE AHMED TIMOL
FRANK KENNAN DUTTON
I, the undersigned
FRANK KENNAN DUTTON
do hereby make oath and state:
1. I am an adult male South African citizen with 10 Number 4905204085086 and I
reside in Durban.
2. I am an International policing and investigation expert and provide expertise on
a consultancy basis internationally as well as locally. I have played leading
roles in complex investigations in South Africa and many other countries such
as Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Sudan (Darfur), Afghanistan, Demo~epublic 2
of Congo ("the DRC"), Cameroon, Uganda, Nigeria, Rwanda, Kyrgyzstan,
Liberia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Brazil and East Timor. I have 38 years of
policing experience in South Africa and I was the first head of the former
Directorate of Special Operations (also known as the Scorpions).
3. In 2012 I was awarded the Order of Baobab in Gold by the President of South
Africa for my policing work both locally and abroad. The citation to this award is
as follows:
Frank Kennan Dutton: THE ORDER OF BAOBAB IN GOLD. Awarded for his exceptional contribution to and achievement in his investigative work as a dedicated and loyal policeman, for exposing the apartheid government's "Third Force':· for his role in working for peace in KwaZulu-Natal; his international work in investigating and exposing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Bosnia, Kosovo and Darfur; and assisting in establishing the causes of violence in East Timor and Sudan.
EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE
4. My experience and expertise is as follows:
4.1. I joined the South African Police ("the SAP") on 1 August 1966. After
undergoing a year's police training in Pretoria, I was posted to KwaZulu
Natal ("KZN") where I performed general policing duties at Greenwood
Park, Glendale and Tongaat police stations. 3
4.2. Whilst serving at Tongaat in 1971 I was appointed as a detective. Since
then I have worked as a detective/investigator for the rest of my career.
4.3. I was transferred to Pinetown Detective Branch in 1979 and held the
rank of Detective Warrant Officer.
4.4. In 1983 I was promoted to a Commissioned Officer. I was appointed as
the Head of the Durban West Field Unit. This Unit was responsible for
investigating serious violence related cases.
4.5. Political violence escalated in KZN from the mid-1 980s and in
consequence the unit which I headed investigated many cases of
political violence. Hundreds of political violence cases were
investigated under my command. Some of these cases exposed the
hidden hand of the then South African government and its security
forces in instigating and fuelling political violence.
4.6. The most prominent of these investigations was the murder
investigation and conviction of Samuel Jamile (the former Deputy
Minister of Interior for the KwaZulu Government); and the Trust Feed
case in which South African Police Captain Brian Mitchell and four
KwaZulu police officers were convicted of thirteen counts of murder.
4.7. In an address to the Organisation of African Unity Ad Hoc Committee for
Southern Africa on 28 April 1992 in Arusha, Tanzania, President of th~ qf} 4
ANC, Nelson Mandela, highlighted the Trust Feed case and the
contribution that this case had made towards the successful
negotiations for a democratic South Africa.
4.8. In 1992 I was appointed to head the KwaZulu-Natal investigation team
of the Goldstone Commission. This led to, among other things, the
exposure of the secret operations of the Security Branch's activities
under the command of former Colonel Eugene de Kock at Vlakplaas as
well as the role of the SAP's top command in political violence.
4.9. In March 1994, after the Goldstone Commission published its report on
"State Sponsored Violence" implicating senior government officials,
including cabinet ministers and the command structures of the security
forces, I was appointed to serve on a Special Investigation Team
headed by the then Attorney General of the Transvaal, Dr Jan
D'Oiiviera. This team was charged with conducting criminal
investigations into the findings of the Goldstone Commission. I assisted
in debriefing witnesses in Denmark and taking comprehensive affidavits
from them. This resulted in the arrest of Eugene de Kock and others.
4.1 0. In August 1994, I was appointed by the Minister of Safety and Security,
Sydney Mufamadi, to establish and command the Investigation Task
Unit ("the ITU") to investigate hit squads within the KwaZulu Police. In
1995 I was promoted to the rank of Colonel. 5
4.11. In 1996 President Nelson Mandela seconded me to the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("the ICTY"),
where I assisted in the ICTY's investigations into genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity in Bosnia and Croatia. At the end of 1997
I was appointed to head the ICTY Office in Sarajevo where I facilitated
all ICTY investigations (including the exhumations of mass graves) in
Bosnia. In 1998 I was promoted to the rank of Commander (a P5
position with the UN) and I commanded all field investigations in Bosnia,
Croatia and Kosovo.
4.12. Early in 1999 I facilitated the initial field investigations into the forced
evictions of Albanians from Kosovo by the Serb Security Forces. To
achieve this I established Investigation Units in Tirana, Albania and
Skopje, Macedonia. I headed these initial investigations. These
investigations resulted in indictments being issued against President
Milosevic and other senior officials for crimes against humanity .
• 4.13. I returned to South Africa in December 1999 after being recalled by the South African Government and was appointed as a Director General
within the Department of Justice and tasked to establish and head the
new Directorate of Special Operations (also known as the "Scorpions")
a specialised investigative unit. I remained in this position until my
retirement from the South African Government Service in April 2004
after 38 years of service. 6
4.14. Since my retirement I have worked both internationally and locally as a
policing expert and private investigator.
4.15. The work that I have done for the past thirteen years is summarised
below:
4.15.1. I was selected by the United Nations Security Council appointed
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to investigate the causes of • violence in Darfur during the latter part of 2004 . 4.15.2. I was appointed in 2005 by UN Mission in the DRC ("MONUC") to
investigate incidents of sexual abuse against women.
4.15.3. I investigated incidents of violence for a Security Council appointed
Panel of Experts for Sudan in 2005/2006.
4.15.4. On behalf of the UN Development Program ("UNDP") I
investigated the cause of an explosion in the living quarters of UN
staff members in Afghanistan during 2006.
4.15.5. I headed an Investigation Team for a Commission of Inquiry
appointed by the United Nations General Assembly to determine
the causes of violence in East Timor during 2006. 7
4.15.6. I investigated and recovered missing SAM 6 missiles in
Afghanistan during 2007 on behalf of UNDP.
4.15.7. I was selected to serve on a South African panel to review the
evidence against South African Police National Commissioner,
Jackie Selebi during 2007 and to make a recommendation to the
Director of National Prosecutions in respect of prosecution.
4.15.8. I conducted an investigation on behalf of the World Bank into
procurement irregularities in the awarding of a multi-billion US
dollars hydro-electric power contract in the DRC. The contract was
shown to be corrupt and was subsequently withdrawn.
4.15.9. I conducted investigations on behalf of UNDP into incidents of
serious staff corruption in South Africa, Mozambique, Brazil,
Liberia, Cameroon, Ghana, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe at various • times between 2006 and 2011 . 4.15.1 0. Working from Geneva I conducted an investigation into
embezzlement of funds from the malaria programme of "The
Global Funds" in Kyrgyzstan, India and various African countries
in 2009 and 2010. 8
4.15.11. In September 2011 I was appointed by United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime ("UNODC") to conduct an assessment on the
Seychelles Police Service.
4.15.12. In January 2012 I was appointed by the Seychelles Government
and tasked to re-structure the Seychelles Police Service to bring
about a reduction in spiralling national crime. Over a two-year
period these efforts resulted in a 30% decrease of serious crime in
the country; and a significant increase in police productivity.
4.15.13. While serving in the Seychelles I headed the investigations into
international piracy incidents which occurred on the high seas
surrounding Seychelles. As a result of these investigations more
than a hundred Somalian pirates were convicted in the Seychelles.
4.15.14. In September 2015 I was appointed as a Commissioner to serve
on the South African government's National Planning Commission.
4.15.15. On 17 January 2017 I was appointed to serve on a Task Team to
advise KZN Provincial Government on steps to reduce rhino
poaching in KZN.
MY INVOLVEMENT IN THE AHMED TIMOL MATTER
5. On 6 February 2015, I attended a meeting between the Executive Director of 9
Varney ("Mr Varney") and lmtiaz Cajee ("Mr Cajee"). We discussed the death
in detention of Ahmed Timol ("Mr Timol") which had occurred on 27 October
1971. Mr Cajee expressed the pain of his family over the finding of the Inquest
Court that his Uncle Ahmed Timol had committed suicide and that the Security
Branch ("the SB") policemen concerned with Mr Timol's detention and
interrogation were absolved from blame. It was suggested that he seek the
reopening of the inquest. I was asked to carry out an investigation to ascertain
whether this was feasible.
6. Mr Cajee provided me with electronic documents concerning the matter.
These included a partial record of the inquest, the original statements and
other documents that were handed to the Inquest Court, a copy of the
judgement in English, newspaper clippings and other material. I was also
provided with a book that Mr Cajee had written, "Timol A Quest for Justice". I
also acquired a book written by George Bizos, "No One to Blame" and studied
it- in particular the chapter concerning Mr Timol titled "Indians Can't Fly''.
7. This material convinced me that further investigation was necessary and that
there were good prospects of establishing that there had been a cover-up in
the original Inquest which suppressed material evidence in respect of Mr
Timol's death. I reported my preliminary conclusion to Ms Sooka, Mr Varney
and Mr Cajee and was instructed to conduct such an investigation.
NEW EVIDENCE 10
8. My first step was to interview Salim Essop ("Mr Essop"). According to
documents I had read, he had been arrested and detained with Mr Timol and
had been so severely tortured and assaulted he required hospitalisation. This,
if true, flew in the face of the SB account to the Inquest court that they had
treated Mr Timol (and the other detainees) with "care and consideration" and
had not assaulted or tortured them.
9. Mr Essop lived in the UK and through a trusted intermediator, Mr Prema
Naidoo, I eventually managed to meet with Mr Essop on 24 November 2015 • when he visited Johannesburg on personal business. I interviewed Mr Essop and he reported that he had been severely tortured whilst detained in October
1971 by SB members. His account of events during his detention sharply
contradicted the SB version. There was no reason to believe that Mr Timol
would have been treated any differently to Mr Essop.
10. Mr Essop told me that he had not previously testified about his experience in
detention in October 1971. He had not been asked to make a statement nor
was he called to testify before the Inquest Court. Similarly, he had not testified
before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("the TRC"). It was apparent
to me that he was a crucial witness to the death of Mr Timol and that his
evidence, because it had not previously been heard, was new evidence.
11. I traced and conducted interviews with other persons who had been detained
by the SB, at John Vorster Square in the period 23 - 27 October 1971. They were Professor KC Naik, Ms. Dilshad Jetham and Dija Chothia. also r /) 11
interviewed Mohammad Timol, the brother of the deceased, who had initially
been detained in Durban in October 1971 and later transferred to John Vorster
Square where he was held for several months.
12. They should have all been material witnesses in the first inquest, but the
original investigators had not recorded their statements, nor had they been
made available to the Inquest Court. These persons all subsequently made
affidavits to the Timol family's legal team in which they described their
experiences whilst held in detention by the SB at John Vorster Square, and in • the case of Mohammed Timol in Durban and John Vorster Square.
PRESENTATION TO THE NDPP
13. As a result of these investigations Howard Varney and I prepared a
presentation for the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions ("the NDPP").
On 19 January 2016 we met with State Advocate Nomgcobo Jiba ("Ms Jiba"),
The Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions and State Advocate Dr
Pretorius, Senior Deputy Director of Public Prosecution, and presented the • reasons why we believed the Inquest into Timol's death should be reopened. Present at this meeting were Mr Varney, Mr Moray Hathorn (instructing
attorney from Webber Wentzel), Mr Cajee and Advocate George Bizos SC
who had been invited to attend because of his intimate knowledge and
connection with the case.
14. The reasons we presented for reopening the Inquest were: 12
14.1. The SB version of treating Mr Timol with care and consideration was
untrue. There is prima facie evidence that they tortured Mr Timol.
14.2. That important, relevant witnesses were not made available to the
Inquest Court. Had this evidence been presented it is likely at the
Inquest Court would have arrived at a different finding.
15. At the end of the presentation Ms Jiba undertook to instruct the Hawks to
conduct additional investigations to allow the National Prosecuting Authority
("the NPA") to make a decision as to whether they would recommend the
reopening of the Inquest to the Minister of Justice.
16. After this presentation, I arranged a meeting between Mr Essop and the Timol
family's legal representatives for consultation purposes. His affidavit was
subsequently recorded and signed on 14 October 2016 and submitted to State
Advocate Pretorius.
17. The National Director of Public Prosecutions subsequently recommended that
the Timol Inquest be reopened.
TORTURE EVIDENCE
18. Since I wanted to establish whether torture was routinely practiced by the SB
prior to 1971, I traced and interviewed persons who had been detained prior to
Mr Timol's detention and death in October 1971 . I spoke to former detainees about their experiences whilst detained by the SB. ~ 13
19. It was apparent from their reports that torture was a routine method of
extracting information from detainees by the SB from at least as early as 1963.
Furthermore, I noted that there were similarities in the methods of torture that
were inflicted on all the victims through the time period of 1963 to 1971.
20. Several former detainees were prepared to make affidavits concerning their
torture. They are:
20.1. Laloo lsu Chiba - detained in 1963
20.2. Abdulhay Jassat - detained in 1963
20.3. Dr Peter Magubane- detained in 1969
20.4. Shantavothie Tweedie (previously) Naidoo - detained in 1969
20.5. Dr Snuki Zikalala - detained in 1969
21. The Timol family's legal team obtained affidavits from all these persons and
submitted them to this Court. The methods of torture described included inter
alia:
21.1. physical assault;
21.2. forced long periods of standing on one spot;
21.3. suffocation by placing a bag over the head;
21.4. strangulation;
21.5. holding heavy objects above the head or with arms outstretched;
21.6. sleep deprivation; 14
21.7. electrical shock;
21.8. assuming difficult body positions (the imaginary chair);
21.9. suspending victims in painful positions (the aeroplane);
21.1 0. solitary confinement; and
21.11. derogatory and degrading treatment.
THE DEATH OF TIMOL OUGHT TO HAVE TRIGGERED TWO INVESTIGATIONS
22. The SB version of Mr Timol's death is that whilst in detention he jumped
through one of windows of room 1026 and fell 10 floors to his death.
23. This ought to have triggered two investigations:
23.1. An Inquest investigation to establish the cause of Mr Timol's death, and
whether any person was responsible for his death.
23.2. An administrative inquiry into the 'escape' of Mr Timol.
24. Regulations made under the Police Act 7 of 1958 prohibited a member of the
police from allowing a prisoner or detainee to escape. This was a disciplinary
offense. Mr Timol's alleged jump through the window constituted an 'escape'
from police custody.
25. An administrative inquiry in terms of Police Regulations ought to have been held to determine whether a police member (or members) had contravened the or- regulations by allowing Mr Timol to exit the building while in police detention"of) 15
Factors such as how Mr Timol was restrained and guarded ought to have been
considered. The Inquiry ought to have resulted in a formal decision by police
management as to whether disciplinary steps should be instituted against any
members of the force.
26. Captains van Niekerk and Gloy as well as Sergeant Rodrigues should have
been the subjects of such an inquiry as they were apparently the persons in
control over Mr Timol. Mr Timol's arrest was regarded as a major
breakthrough by the SB in their efforts to combat communism in South Africa.
The Inquest Magistrate said in his judgement:
"In accordance with the testimony he was a valuable find that the police wanted to keep".
The Importance of Timol's death in Detention
27. The South African government, in its efforts to maintain its policy of apartheid,
enacted repressive laws. The detention of persons in solitary confinement for
extended periods without charge or trial, legal assistance, or visitation rights
was particularly draconian and attracted severe criticism both locally and
internationally. Deaths of detainees were generally regarded with extreme
suspicion and reinforced opposition to apartheid locally and abroad.
28. My investigation considered whether the investigation that was conducted at
the time amounted to a cover up of the truth. 16
INVESTIGATION INTO TIMOL'S DEATH
29. It is important for an investigation into a death of a person to be considered
impartial and thorough. To achieve this, it needs to meet at least the following
basic requirements:
29.1. The investigators must be independent and as impartial as reasonably
possible.
29.2. All available evidence must be collected, preserved and presented to
the Inquest court, including:
29.2.1. All potential witnesses must be interviewed, their statements
obtained and they must be made available to the court.
29.2.2. There must be a thorough "Scene of Crime or Incident
Investigation."
29.2.3. A thorough impartial post mortem examination must be conducted
on the deceased.
29.2.4. All relevant material evidence must be collected, logged and
preserved. 17
Independent and Impartial
30. Choosing an independent and impartial investigator for this matter, presented
a challenge to the SAP in 1971. However, considering the importance of the
investigation this could have been partially achieved by selecting an
investigator from elsewhere in the country, who had a proven track record, and
who had an established level of credibility with the judiciary and public .
• 31 . The impartiality of the investigator could have been enhanced by linking him to
an independent observer, possibly a credible lawyer or an international
policeman. Although this was not the practise in South Africa at the time, but
in view of the negative political impact of Mr Timol's death, this could have
been achieved.
32. The SAP however selected General Buys, the Head of the Detective Branch
from Police Head Quarters to lead the investigation. The investigation had
hardly commenced when General Buys expressed a view to the Rapport
newspaper on 31 October 1971 that Mr Timol had committed suicide. Clearly,
he was not impartial, nor did he have an open mind as to the cause of death.
Statements of all potential witnesses
33. It is imperative that when investigating a death (or other matter), the ~
statements of all available witnesses must be recorded. This was not done in
the Timol investigation. 18
SB Members
34. In the Timol matter, only the statements of SB members who were directly
involved, in one way or another, with Mr Timol were obtained. The statements
of many other SB members who worked on the 1oth floor of John Vorster
square were not recorded. Those working or present on the 10th floor were all
in a position to testify as to sounds they may have heard, what they may have • seen, as well as to other observations they may have made . 35. Mr Timol was held in the SB offices on the 1oth floor for almost five days. It is
inconceivable that in these busy offices there were not dozens of witnesses
who could comment on what they saw or heard over those five days.
36. In the Timol matter the statements of seven interrogators were submitted. By
contrast in the investigation into the alleged assault of Professor Naik, twenty
six statements of SB interrogators of Professor Naik were recorded (Exhibit Vol
G3, Kantilal Naik- Directorate of Security file, pp 8- 15).
Detainees
37. The statements of other detainees who were held in the SB offices on the 10th
floor were not recorded. What they heard and saw, as well as their
experiences in regard to their treatment by the SB was highly significant to the
Timol matter. These detainees ought to have been interviewed, their 19
statement recorded and made available to the Inquest Court. The following
persons were detained and were all material witnesses:
37.1. Amina Desai;
37.2. Kantilal Naik;
37.3. Dilshad Jhetham;
37.4. Amina Cajee;
37.5. Hassan Jooma;
37.6. Fatima Wadee;
37.7. lndres Moodley.
Black SB Members
38. It is surprising that no black SB members featured in this investigation. There
1 were a number of black SB members employed by SB on the 10 h Floor - yet
none of them were required to make statements.
39. It was alleged by the police that a SB policeman (identified only as Mr X) came
into room 1026 where Mr Timol was, and announced that he knew where
Quentin and Henry Jacobsen were. The SB members said that they had
reason to believe that the deceased and Jacobsen were co-conspirators.
According to the SB they believed this announcement prompted Mr Timol to
commit suicide by jumping out of the window. 20
40. On this version, Mr X was obviously a critically important witness for the
Inquest Court to hear, yet his statement was not recorded, neither was he
identified or made available to the court 'for reasons of State Security', not
even on an in camera basis.
41. In my view, the decision not to use Mr X as a witness, to the extent that he
existed, was irrational. It was fairly common during the 1970s and 1980s for
trial courts in 'terrorism' matters to hear the evidence of 'secret' witnesses in a
manner which kept their identities secret. Similarly, this could have been done
in the Timollnquest.
42. In any event, it was wholly illogical for an 'undercover' SB member to 'expose'
himself to Mr Timol in the manner alleged. Quite obviously by Mr X doing this,
1 Mr Timol (and possibly other detainees on the 10 h floor), could later reveal him
as an undercover agent.
43. This calls into question whether Mr X in fact existed and whether the Mr X
story was a concoction devised by the police to explain the "suicide" of Mr
Timol.
Bystanders
44. Inquiries ought to have been conducted to determine whether other people
saw Mr Timol fall, or heard sounds related to his fall. These may have been
police witnesses in other portions of the building or on the ground; visi~ 21
John Vorster Square; or people who were nearby in the street or other vantage
points.
45. The original investigation did not find such witness. Perhaps they did not seek
these witnesses. They ought to have conducted office to office inquiries at
John Vorster Square. Had they done this several witnesses would have been
found. Street inquiries are also likely to have revealed witnesses. • 46. Some 45 years later investigations have revealed such witnesses, including: 46.1. Advocate Ernie Mathis;
46.2. Mr Ali Thokan; and
46.3. Mr Adam Ahmed.
47. In my opinion, the investigation in terms of finding witnesses to the fall and
death was wholly inadequate. Equally woeful was the failure to find additional
witnesses to the events on the 1oth floor over the five day period.
Scene of Crime or Incident Investigation
48. A basic and important investigation requirement is to preserve and record the
scene of crime or incident. Once secured, the scene must be carefully and
thoroughly examined for evidence and clues.
49. In the Timol matter there were different scenes of crime: 22
49.1. The place where he fell;
49.2. The office where he was held and from where he allegedly jumped; and
49.3. The 1Oth Floor of John Vorster Square.
Place where Timol fell
50. Mr Timol was moved from this scene of his fall within minutes of his fall. If
there were compelling reasons to move Mr Timol, the position he lay in ought
to have been marked using paint or tape. The body where it lay and the wider
scene should have been photographed immediately. The fall scene was only
photographed the following day.
51. Evidence by W/0 Deysel is that Mr Timol's shoe came off during the fall and
lay close by. This shoe was removed without photographing it or recording its
position.
52. A number of basic and elementary steps should have been taken:
• 52.1. A plan of the fall scene ought to have been prepared showing precisely
the position that Mr Timol lay in, together with measurement between
key points. A plan was not prepared.
52.2. Brigadier Pattie mentions that he found an indentation in the earth which
indicated to him where Mr Timol had fallen. The depth and position of
the indentation was important and ought to have been loren ~
recorded. This was not done. 23
52.3. There was a blood stain on the earth where Mr Timol had fallen - the
shape and extent of the blood stain should have been recorded. It was
not.
52.4. A sample from the bloodstain ought to have been compared forensically
to blood removed from Mr Timol's body to ensure that it was similar by
blood group (DNA testing was not available in 1971 ). This was not
done.
52.5. The position of windows (open or closed) in the building above Mr
Timol's body should have been recorded. This was not done.
52.6. The entire scene (including the surroundings) ought to have been
carefully photographed to accurately record the scene as it was. This
was not done.
Trajectory of the fall • 53. Expert evidence ought to have been secured to determine whether the position of Mr Timol's body was consistent with the likely trajectory of such a fall.
Room 1026
54. Photographs and plans should have been prepared for every aspect of the
office, including the window. 24
55. The office ought to have been forensically examined for fingerprints and blood
stains.
56. The office ought to have been searched for items such as food, food wrappers,
drink containers and clothing.
57. Recovered clothing should have been forensically examined for signs of
violence (tears, rips) and blood.
58. The content of the wastepaper basket ought to have been carefully examined
and if necessary preserved.
59. The phone and last numbers dialled ought to have been noted and
investigated.
60. The window through which Mr Timol jumped ought to have been forensically
examined for fingerprints, blood, and traces of shoe polish or mud from shoes.
61. The precise position of the window ought to have been carefully recorded. If
open, the angle of the window opening. The window latch and locking
mechanism ought to have been examined for ease of operation and this
information recorded.
10th Floor
62. An inspection ought to have been conducted for any unusual or suspicious r 1 items on the entire 10 h floor. {I 25
63. Mr Timol was held on this floor for almost five days. Evidence of his presence
and nature of his detentions should have been closely examined, including the
food he ate, clothing, toiletry items such as tooth brushes, the presence of
stretchers, any mattresses and bedding ought to have been checked for blood
stains and signs of violence.
64. Bathrooms and toilets should have been forensically examined for the • presence of blood, especially in the basins . 65. Floors of offices and passages ought to have been carefully examined for
blood splatters.
MOVING OF TIMOL'S BODY
66. SAP members received First Aid training during their basic police training.
When I received police training in 1967 I was taught basic first aid. We were
trained not to move persons who had suffered serious injuries but to keep
them warm and comfortable, attend to bleeding and ensure that their airways
were unobstructed.
67. Moving a seriously injured person by a 'first aider' was strictly forbidden as this
could be life threatening. We were taught that this should only be done by
properly trained medical personnel who would stabilise the patient before
moving him or her. 26
68. In my view, the policemen involved in moving him ought to have known, or
indeed did know, that they should not move him; and that moving him could
result in his death, or at least aggravate his condition.
69. In view of the police training, I question why Mr Timol, if still alive after the fall,
was moved and carried into John Vorster Square and then taken up to the
ninth floor (allegedly after no pulse was detected when taken for a second
time). He should only have been moved if it was critically important to do so.
Examples might be if he was lying on a busy road; or where the patient was in • imminent danger from another source.
70. It is perhaps unsurprising that there is no evidence of an ambulance ever being
called, even in the moments after his fall when it was presumably not known if
he was alive or dead.
71. Since Mr Timol was lying in a garden only a few meters from the road, where
an ambulance could easily stop, his removal to the foyer and then the ninth • floor, is curious to say the least, if not downright suspicious. The gth and 1Oth floors were restricted to SB personnel only and this is the likely reason why he
was carried up to the gth floor. In my view, the SB wished to remove Mr Timol
as quickly possible from the public eye in order to avoid as much scrutiny as
possible. 27
72. In my considered view the moving of Mr Timol by the police is consistent with
an intent on the part of the police to ensure that Mr Timol did not survive the
fall. It is also conduct that is consistent with a cover up.
73. Even if Mr Timol was already dead on the scene then it is well known and
standard police practice, even in those days, not to move a body until the
scene of crime investigation has been fully completed. This is the case, no
matter how long the crime scene investigation takes.
QUENTIN JACOBSEN
74. SB witnesses told the Inquest Court that Mr Timol was the head of the main
unit of the South African Communist Party ("the SACP") and that Quentin
Jacobsen ("Quentin") was a co-conspirator. It was therefore important for the
SB investigators to locate Quentin. SB testimony was that when Mr Timol
heard that the SB had located Quinten, it startled and shocked him and this
prompted him to commit suicide.
75. Quinten was subsequently arrested and detained by the SB. In a letter of
motivation to the Secretary of Justice from the SB dated 8 November 1971, it
is said that Quinten (and his group) had been found in possession of document
"lnkululeko No 1" (letter from Brigadier Kruger to the Secretary of Justice- pp
77 - 78 Quinten Jacobsen - Directorate of Security File, Exhibit Vol L). This
claim was repeated in a letter from the Secretary of Justice to the Minister of
Justice dated 16 November 1971 (letter from the Secretary of Justice to tha;t---- 28
Minister of Justice - pp 73 - 7 4, Quinten Jacobsen - Directorate of Security
File, Exhibit Vol L).
76. Evidence during the Timol Inquest established that Mr Timol produced and
distributed "lnkululeko No 1". If this document was found in the possession of
Quinten, it established grounds for believing that Mr Timol and Quinten were
linked. "/nkululeko No1" was a Communist document and the possession of it
in 1971 was illegal in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950.
Possession of this document was a serious offence and the possessor was • likely to face a term of imprisonment of several years.
77. Quinten was subsequently charged under the Terrorism Act 83 of 1967 and
was tried during April 1972. He was not charged for the possession of
"lnkululeko No 1", nor was he linked to Mr Timol during the trial. Mr Timol did
not feature in the case against Quinten (Judgement Case No 144/72- pp 5-
45, Quinten Jacobsen - Directorate of Security File, Exhibit Vol L). Quinten • was acquitted of all charges . 78. The SB version that the mention of the location of Quinten prompted Mr Timol
to suicide is not a believable contention. It is most likely a crude fabrication on
the part off the SB.
INKULULEKO N01 AND INKULULEKO NO 2
79. It was established during the Inquest that "/nkululeko No 1" was produced and
distributed by Mr Timol. This document was properly received by the original 29
Inquest Court as an exhibit. There is however no record of how "lnkululeko No
2" came before the Inquest Court. Neither does it appear on the list of exhibits.
80. It is further noted that according to SB evidence before the first Inquest Court
that Mr Timol's typewriter was seized by the SB soon after his arrest. The
typewriter was forensically matched to "lnkululeko No 1" and to other
documents found in Mr Timol's possession. It is possible that the possession
of this typewriter allowed the SB to reproduce documents, or add insertions on • documents and to attribute these to Mr Timol. 81. "lnkululeko No 2" bears a date February 1972. This date is subsequent to Mr
Timol's death on 27 October 1971. In the Inquest Judgement, concerning
document "lnkululeko No 2", the Magistrate made the following comment:
"This is the document which this deceased, in accordance with the evidence, was involved in distributing. It reads as follows: "Harass your enemy by going on hunger strikes, act insane, lodge complaints, whether true or false, resort to civil and criminal actions in courts as often as possible, make sure your complaints and actions the suppressors get the utmost publicity. [sic] Rather commit suicide than to betray the organisation". Issued by the Communist Party of South Africa." • (Emphasis added)
82. The Magistrate was clearly mistaken since there was not a shred of evidence
linking Mr Timol to "lnkululeko No 2", which in any event post-dated Mr Timol's
death by several months. There was only evidence linking Mr Timol to the
production and distribution of "lnkululeko No 1", which does not contain the
paragraph which the Magistrate refers to in his finding.
RODRIGUES LETTER OF COMMENDATION 30
83. It was claimed by the police that an administrative clerk, one Sergeant Joao
Anastacio Rodrigues ("Rodrigues"), was the sole person with Mr Timol when
he allegedly committed suicide by jumping from room 1026. According to
Rodrigues, Mr Timol was able to exit the window, notwithstanding his best
efforts at trying to stop him.
84. He bought his discharge on 5 June 1972. On 20 June 1972, he received a
Letter of Commendation for 'Service to the State' from Commissioner of Police,
General G.J. Joubert. This was just 2 days before the Magistrate issued his
finding into the death of Timol on 22 June 1972, which exonerated the police
from any wrongdoing.
85. In this letter the Commissioner expressed his "appreciation" for the "dedicated
service" of Rodrigues to the State as well as his "exemplary' behaviour which
was demonstrated by his "unblemished record' which he served in a "faithful
and competent manner'.
86. I find this letter particularly curious in the light of the following, which emerges
from his member file:
86.1. He joined the SAP on 9 February 1956 and on 27 June 1956, he was
convicted of Statutory Perjury for contravening Section 9 of Act 16 of
1914 and given a suspended sentence for five years provided he was not again convicted of an offence involving dishonesty ~ 31
86.2. He spent his entire career in clerical positions in the Finance Section at
HQ. During 1969 he transferred to the Salary section of SB HQ,
Pretoria.
86.3. According to his SAP 28 he took 301 days sick leave between 9
February 1957 and 15 November 1971, including 53 days sick leave he
took for sport related injury. This is in my opinion an extraordinary high • number of sick days . 86.4. He failed to stop Mr Timol from escaping from room 1026,
notwithstanding Timol's dire condition after nearly 5 days of torture,
abuse and sleep deprivation. According to his member file he was 6ft
high and weighed 142 lbs in 1956 and in 1975 he was 1m 89cm high
and weighed 87 kg. This contrasts sharply with Timol's size as
recorded in the Post Mortem Report, which was 1m 60cm high and 65
kg in weight. According to Rodrigues's file, he was active in the
following sports: karate, boxing, wrestling and athletics.
86.5. He was issued with no letters of recommendation, recorded
achievements, medals for bravery or good service.
87. On Tuesday 18 July 2017 I attended an inspection of member files at SAPS
HQ. I inspected some 28 former SB members who were present at John
Vorster Square in October 1971. None of their files contained such letters of
commendation. ~ · ~ 32
88. His letter of commendation as well as his certificate of service which described
his police service as "exemplary" with an "unblemished record" seems wholly
irrational to me. In the circumstances it has to be asked whether Rodrigues
was being commended for his role in the Timol matter.
COVER-UP
89. An examination of the investigative steps taken by the police in the aftermath
of the fall, and in the formal investigation by General Buys, reveals a most
substandard investigation. Virtually none of the elementary investigative steps
one would have expected to see were taken. In my considered view these
multiple lapses are consistent with an effort to suppress the truth, that is, a
cover-up.
90. Regrettably there has been a long and consistent pattern of cover-ups by the
SB, particularly in respect of police crimes committed against political activists.
I became aware of this when I discovered evidence of flagrant SB cover-ups in
political violence cases in KZN, such as the Samuel Jamile and Trust Feed
cases. While working on the Goldstone Commission I was again exposed to
the propensity of SB members to cover-up, especially in respect of the
Vlakplaas investigation.
91. In all these matters the SB were more than willing to perjure themselves to
misdirect courts or judicial inquiries in order to protect themselves and the police as an organisation. My view is reinforced by the following: r:f)==r 33
91.1. My debriefing for the Goldstone Commission of Mr. Paul Erasmus in
Denmark.
91.2. My debriefing of the Vlakplaas SB members Willie Nortje, Chappies
Klapper and Brood van Heerden for the Goldstone Commission and
later the recording of their statements for the criminal charges against
Eugene de Kock.
91.3. SB members admitted before a TRC amnesty Committee that they had
lied to and misled the Inquest Court into the death of Steve Biko. (TRC
REF: AC/99/0020 Steve Biko: Applicants: Harold Snyman (AM
3918/96), Daniel Petrus Siebert (AM 3915/96), Jacobus Johannes
Oosthuizen Beneke (AM 6367/97) and Rubin Marx (AM 3521/96))
91.4. Eugene de Kock and other SB members have admitted that they
deliberately misled the Harms Commission (TRC Amnesty Hearings at
Pretoria on 13 July 1999).
91.5. The numerous admissions by SB members before different the TRC
Amnesty Committees of deceptions and cover-ups they practised to
prevent the truth from becoming known (TRC Amnesty Case
No.C2000/0059: Applicants: Johannes Velde Van Der Merwe (AM
4157/96) and others; C2001/0124: Applicants: Hendrick Johan~ Petrus Botha (AM4117/96) and others). :f) 34
92. In the circumstances I submit that the version of the police of what happened
to Ahmed Timol must be viewed with considerable suspicion and caution. In
my respectful view, the police version is most likely a fabrication.
FRANK KENNAN DUTTON
The Deponent has acknowledged that he knows and understands the contents of this affidavit, which was signed and affirmed before me at Government Notice No R1258 of 21 July 1972, as amended, and Government Notice No R1648 of 19 August 1977, as amended, having been complied with. SOUTH APRlC.t\N POLICE SERViCE -~Lil:!.H SER\/!CE CENTRE S.'\'.\DTON Z5 JUL 2017 .rn cPESI~ATION: v "r- c....52.._ ~A fll.:;t.. .-, ADDRESS: