"TO PROrrECT AND SER"VE?" A member of the SAP protec ts a child after rightwingers attacked a passing mini- bus carry ing black passengers during a protest against State President FW de Klerk in Ventersdorp on August 9, 1991.
• Photograph by Juhuan Kuus
Me~ber of the SAP arrests a protester in Phalaborwa in
January t h is year.
Photograph The Star Indepel :;dent Board of Inquiry
PO Boo: 322QJ ) .""'*"'''''20" """""""'South Alr (;O 0 Pnone (011 1403.J2Nl17 Fa< (011) ~1360
"TO PROTECT liND SERVE ? " I
II SPECIAL REPORT ON POLICE INVESTIGATIONS INTO POL I TICALLY
MOTIVATED VI OLENCE AND CRIM ES , PREPARED BY TilE I NDE PENDENT BOARD OF INQUIRY.
BOARD MEM&RS: Plo r laurie Ackermaron. Of Alex BOfOlf'le . MrsJudv Chalmers. Rev Dr flonk Chikone. Dr Mox Coleman. Mr Blion Currin. Plof John Dugald. Mrs Sheena Doncoo. Mr Pelo. Harris. MI PeI6f KerchtK>lf. Mrs Lydia Kompe, Mrs Emma Moshinini. Br Jude P\elerle. Alchblshop Desmond lulu - i-
CONTENTS
PREFACE
"US " AND " TIIEM " ...... •. ••..• .• • ..•...... •...... 2- 3
J . INTROPUCTION ; ••••••• • •. • ••••• • •• ••• • ••• • • ••• ••••• 4-7
JJ. "TUE \tIM, TO INVESTIGATE; ••.•....••..•..••• . ...•. 8
2.1 The Trust Feeds Ma ssacre ...... 8-16
2 .2 The Bheki Mlangeni Murder ...... •...... 17-21
2.) Train Attacks ...... • ..•.. ... •...... • ...... 22-28
III. INVEST IGATING MA SSACR ES ; •...... •..• • ..•..•.. 29-32
3.1 The Sebokeng Night Vigil Massacre ...... ,32-)4
3.2 The Al exandra Night Vigil Massac r e ...... 34-37 -u-
IV. KH UTSONG " WHER E WE REST "; . ... • ••.•. •• ...... 38-4 5
V . THE SCHWEIZ ER -RENEKE CAS E; •...•••. • .••...... 46-47
VI.TIlE IIARM S COMMI SSI ON INVESTIGATI ON: ...... •... 48- 5 4
VII. RI GHT WIN G VI OLENCE ; .....•.•• • .. . • •. •. ..•.... 5 5-58
VIII. CONCLU S IONS ; •.... •• • • •• • ••• •. . •... • ... ••... 5 9 -62
FOOTNOTES ...... • .. • .. . • .. • • ..•.. • • . • • .. • . • ... i-i ii ( .
-]-
two types " Up to now the police hllve been required to perform of functions. The one is to handle typical crime and that situations ... But you also had other tasks to fulfil, ca l was a contro l function connected to a specific politi people party ... You wil l no longer be required to prevent This is from gathering to canvass support for their views. out of it. the political arena and we want to take the police r each We don't want to use you any more as instruments to full certain political goals. We as pol iticians must take we are responsibility for politics ... This Is the direction line. ""I taking and 1 want you to make peace with this new
00 police (Address by St",te President F.W. de l PREFACE "US " ANP "TIlE!1" The challenge the South Af ric an Pol ice force faces in the black community is how to c hange from a force o f "occupation" to one involved or involving the community. It is important for the police to realise that blac k South Africans live with the l egacy of the past. The SAl) is not see n as an internal resource but a mechanism of control. *2 Police are not seen as protectors but are i ncrea s ingly feared and seen as the enemy. The police's use of maximum force i s well known. This is used not o nly in c rowd contr o l but a l so i n t he day t o day fight aga inst c rime. Thus, the police are finding it hard to throw off t he ir past image of being the central ins trument in the e nforci ng of apartheid laws and des pite the post- February 1990 ref orll process they still reflect a strong political bias. I t i s against this background that a new police force has to be created and it is against this background that the Independent Board o f I nquiry attempts to playa facilitatory ( ) -3- role in bringing together witnesses a nd victims of politically motivated violence and the investigators - The South African Police . , ) -. - I. INTRODUCTION. "Eve n 1n a democratic society the powers of the police to arrest, detain, search, use legitimate force, monitor and seize are awesome. But in South Africa the controls on the use of police powers within tha law, and the restraints on the abuse of those powers outside the law are weakened by political, legal and institutional factors . The most significant of these is t he absence of political accountability by t he police to the majority of t he population in whose name they perform their duties and who are s ubjected to the due exercise of their powers. For b l ack South Africans the absence of effective c hannels, at national or local level, of influencing policing prioriti es and policies profound ly affects thei r attitude to the police. " *3 It is not the task of t h is report t o look at polici ng per se - there are experts jn this field and one only has t o point to the recent conference hosted by IDASA in October this yea r where different policing ~ethods were put under the microscope . Our brief is to reflect on OUl" o .. n experiences and those of others who on a daily basis corne into contact with the police. (' -5- 1'he report wi l l outl ine various case studies where members of the SA P have come under scrutiny. Perhaps the key feature of the report wil l be the contrast between t he public state~e nt 8 of t he police, particularly t he ir efforts in encouraging witnesses to come forward and the r eality which faces these witnesses whe n they do. Another focus wil l be t he investigation procedures followed by t h e SAP, particularly the critici sms levelled after the Boipatong massacre by po lice expert Dr P Waddingto n. Particular attention wil l be paid to t he confessi on orientated nature of investigation in South Africa. The question of suspension of police officer s is a l so canvassed in the r eport. There seems to be no uniforN approach as some mem ber s of the SAP are s us pended before they are charged, other s after they have been convicted and some who have been suspended as i n t he case of Carletonville are reinstated despite having charges still pe nding. Related to this is the question o f promotion. On several occasions pol icemen involved in serious incidents have been promoted, an exampl e, is convicted Trust Feeds killer Captain Brian Mitchell who despite s uspicions of his invol vement in the massaCre of 11 people, was promoted from l i e utenant to captain. -6- The Boards' main dealings with the SA P stem from its gathe~,i ng of statements from various communities wracked by t he c ur r e nt political violence. Our role in ma ny ways is a faci litatory one. In t hat we are a bridge between the co~munity and the police. Otten witnesses come to us as they are too afraid to approach the .police or as in the case of Boipatong believe that their was direct police i nvolvement in the massacr e . Thus ou r dealings with t he pol ice are on the level of political l y motivated crimes and violence. This is not a new phenomeno n in South Africa. The first assassinations of anti apartheid activists occurred i n t he early nineteen seventies, While mass political violence broke out for the first time in Natal in 198 5 a nd spread to the Reef in July 1990. Since 1985 at least twelve thousand people have lost their lives in political violence. Jlfter virtually every political as/ilII/ils i nation the South Jlfrican Pol ice (SJl P) assure the public that everything possible will be done to find the ~urderers. Similllrly, police constantly i ssue state~ents saying t hat perpotrators of poUtical viol e nce wi l l be trac ked down and brought to book. Yet the number of people convicted for pol i ticlllly Notivated acts of violence remains abysmal ly sma ll. <:) -,- Following the Boipatong massacr e on June 17 1992, an independent team of policemen was appoi nted by Mr. Justice R Go ldstone to make an assesment of the SAP's response to the i ncident and their subsequent investigation thereof. This was the first time that &o~e th i ng o f this n ature had been al lowed to happe n in the history of the SAP. The team was headed by Dr. P h Waddington, the other members being Commander Tom Laidlaw and Detective Superintendent Dav id Don. The report was highly cri tical of t he investigation saying that it was "woefully inadequate i n a number of respects. " *4 However Or Waddingto n ascribed this to "a n absence of s u itable orga nisat iona l structures to facilitate effective po licing. " He added t hat "olllissions arose not fro,. deliberation. but incompetence" .·S What Waddington concludes, is that the SA P have the will to investigate crimes of political vio lence but that they lac k the resources and possibly the training to do so. The SA P' s f ormal response to the report was that they had studied the report with an open mind but they d id not agree with all Waddington's c riticisms. The SAP say i t cannot" simply be accepted t hat the philosophies of policin.g methods li nd techniques which have been proved successful under British or European c irc umstances, wi ll necessari l y provide solutions for the Challenges directed to poliCing i n South Africa". -8- II. " THE WILL TO INVESTIGATE" Commiss.ioner of Po lice General 30ha n van der Merwe stated on April 30, 1992 that the police have the "will, the capability and the adaptibility to succeed" . However, the Independe nt Board believes that in a nUlllber of instances this " will" to inves tigate has indeed been lacking. This will be s hown by foc us ing on a numbe r ot case studies . 2.1. The Trust Feeds Massacre. On December 3 1988 eleven people, including women and children, were killed in the Trust Feeds a r ea near Pietennarit;o:burg in Natal. The victims had been attending a night vigil. At the time o f the attack Grey town Member of Parliament, Pierre Cronje called for a judicial com.ission of inquiry into the incident as he c l aimed t hat he had warned the pol i ce that an l.Ittl.lck was imminent in the area. The r equest was not met as the then Mipister of Law and Order, Adriaan vlok, assured Cronje that the incident was being thoro\lghly investigated. No arrests were forthcoming and in October 1 989 an inquest was held. The MS9istrate found that three policemen, Captain Brian Mitchell, Special Sergeant Dumisane Ndwalane and Special Co nstable David ~hambule mi9ht have been involved in the attack. Despite this, these men were not arres ted until early August 1991. This was two days after a new investigatin9 officer, Captain Frank Dutton was assi9ned to the case. Durin9 the course of the next few weeks two more policemen, Captain J. P. Van den Heever and Sergeant Neville Rose and two more ...... cial cO'H.toblell, Thobo Sikhollano and Kehla. Zwane were arrested. The trial of t he seven police~en be9an on october 15 1991 and on April 23 1992 Mitchell and the four special policemen were convicted on eleven counts of murder, What emerged in evidence at the trial regarding the investi9ation was shocking. Th e initial i nvesti9ating officer was Captain Patrick watrus. lie c lajmed that "he had l eft no stone unturned" in his investigation into the massacre, Ilowever under questioning from Judge Wilson he adlllitted the following: that a black SAP issue shotgun cartridge had been found at the scene of the crime but this had not been entered as a n exhibit; ) -10- that a s i~11ar cartridge had been found in the cubbyhole of a police vehicle driven by Mitchell but Watrus had attached no significance to this; that he had made no records regarding interviews which he ma de at the scene of the crime; he had not examined the door, blankets or curtains of the shack in which the killings took place ; . he had not sEmt the c l othes of the victims tor forensic tests: he had not spoken to Mitchell despite the fact that the latter was on duty in the area at the time of the killings; he had not seen the video of the crime scene made by the police video unit and he had not collected fingerprint reports. In early 1989 the investigation was handed over to Major Joseph Van Zyl. In his evidence he admitted the following: that he had not spoken to any civilians who were at the scene of the c rime; that he had not watched the video of the crime scene and that he had not read the investigation diary of Ca ptain watrus. After Making these admissions he refused to a nswer any further questions on the investigation without lega l representation. This was also the standpoint of Major Ge neral Christo Marx, who was Van Zyl's superior at the time of t he investigation. -11- The Judge commented that this was the first time in his experience that senior police officers were not prepared to give evidence for the state without legal representation. On July 29 1991 the investigation was handed over t o Captain Frank Dutton and, as set out above, arrests followed wi thin days. liowever, Du tton ' s investigatio n was not to be without inc ident. At the start of his investigation he requested the files o n t h e special policemen from Van den Heever who told him that they ha d either been destroyed or they were with o ther investigating officers. flowever when Dutton checked for himself he found the files without problem and t h e personal details of each of t he men was up to date. At t his stage Dutton alr eady suspected tha t there had been a cover up in the investigation as the per sonal d eta i ls of the suspects had not been distributed. On August 5 1991, three days after the arrest of Mitchell, a special police team from Pretoria was sent to the scene . The team wa s headed by Major General Van der Westhuizen and included a Colonel Langenhoven ( now Brigadier) and Captain Kritzinger (now Major). Van der westhuizen had said earlier to Dutton that the case against Mitchel l did not look particularly strong as it was mostly circumstantial. ) ) -12- Dutt~~ was also asked to e nsure that only one counsel would be appointed for a ll t he accused 60 as to prevent conflicting versions. Furthermore Dutton was unhappy about t he manner in which Langenhoven inter rogated Sikhosana . Whenever Sikhosana implicated policemen La nge nh ov~ n wou ld shout at hi. and call him a liar. The interrogation was conducted in the presence of the full Pretoria team. Fina lly, when asked in court whether he thoug ht the Pretoria team had come to sabotage his investigation, Dutton said that he saw it as a possibility. As a result of t his evidence which was unfol ding at the trial, the Commissioner of Police a nnounced, on March 31 1992 , that a depart.ental inquiry would be held into the police investigation of the D;a ssacre . lIowever in delivering judgement, Judge wi l son state d that a public i nquiry would have to be held. lie said that s u fficient evidence had ex isted to arrest Mitchell for a l ong time, but this had not happened and instead he had been promoted: The Judge described Watrus and van Zy l as " eithe r incompetent or not interested in investigating t he case properly". Judge Wilson expressed grave doubts about t he nature of the or iginal police i nvestigation as we l l as the s ubsequent behavi our of senior Pretoria Police officers - a Co lone l Langenhoven a nd a ( -13- Captain Kritzinger while the elise was being investi9ated afr eSh last year by Ca ptain D utton ( now Major ) . ls's Judge Wilson said it was clear fro~ Ca ptain Mitchel at t he testimony that t his oper ation was aimed speci fica l ly of United Democratic Front (UOP) a nd t hat it was t he plan nce tormer Riot Unit head, Capta i n Deon Tereblanc he ( s i t hat deceased), a nd Capt ain Mitchell to weaken the UOP so UOF out attacks could be carried out by Inkatha to drive the every of the area that night. The Judge also comme nted that single pol iceman connected with the trial, except Sergeant found it Rose had been promoted since 1988. The court the r ank incredibl e t hat Captain Mitchell wa s promoted from knew t hat of Lieut enant in J uly 1991 a l though senior officers he had concealed his presence at the scene of the crime the du r i ng 1988 and had been "anything but helpful" to that he investigation. lie told Brigad ier Harx i n January 1989 quest ions . was not prepared to make a s t atement or answer any call for lie was not s uspended. "This in our view would itself some public inquiry i n to the conduct of the officers concerned ... " J -14 - Judge Wilson said a statement by Brigadier Marx in March 1989 in which he gave reasons for accepting e statement by Captain Mitchell, rejecting those of Constable van Wyk and Burton, and outlining difficulties facing a prosecution appeared to have been "designed" to bring the investigation to an end and cause a n inquest to be held at which the verd ict would be that the murders were COllllllitted by persons unknown. Another aspect of the investigation which came under fire from Judge wilson was the SAP video unit. Judge wilson said it was clear that numerolls people were in and out of the house where the massacre had taken place, even before the police arrived. lie said the SAP video unit had filmed the scene but did not seem to want to help the investigation. They did not film broken windows or the walls or the floors or the curtain that dividad the room to see where the gunshots went, but concentrated on the bodies of the deceased. These bodies had all been carried out of the house and were lying in a straight row and ~ostly covered with blankets. Judge Wilson said it was obvious from survivors' accounts of the massacre that at no time dur ing the pandemonium could the dead people have laid themselves out in a neat row during or after the shooting. lie said therefore -15- the photographs and videos were "completely useless" as evidence. The Trus t feeds case viewed in its totality not only sheds light on what happened in Trust Feeds three years ago, but also on a security strategy to divide communities and planned violence to disrupt com~unitie s .• 6 From Mitchell, the court heard that me~bers of the Riot unit had previously assisted Inkatha by unlawful means to take over areas. He s aid t he entire force of s pecial policemen were c reated as a part of a counter- revolutionary strategy. "The specials played an important role" he told the court. "they were taken frOM the commun i ty and placed back in the community to act as a wedge against the comrades" . *7 In other words, said Judge wilson t o act against the UDF and the African National Congress (ANe). The court also heard evidence that special po licemen were recruited for the police by Inkatha leaders in each area. They were often posted at homos in towns hi ps and dressed in civili a n clothing . There were more than 100 s uc h special policemen under the command of captain Jacobus van den Heever. The Judge also found that the record pertaining to the duties of specials were unreliable and that t he people • I -16- who recorded where they were stationed had no personal knowledge of this . In other word no accurate records were kept ot- their whereabouts . The prosecution is also perhaps t he most s ignificant in the history of South Africa's so- call ed "black on black" violence as it clearly shows t he role the security forces in the area played in rermenting the conf l ict between Inkatha a nd the UOF a t t hat time. *8 -17- 2.2 The Bhek i Mlangeni Murder . Bheki Mlangeni was a J ohannesbur g based human r i ghts lawyer and a pr ominent Soweto community leader. He was part of the legal team which represented the Board in their investigations during the Ilarms Comm i ssion. On February 15 1991 he was killed when a bomb which had been bui l t into the headphones of a "walkman" type tape recor der detonated a t his Soweto home. It subsequentl y emerged that the bomb had been intended for Dirk Coetzee and had been sent to his postal address in Zambia . When Coetzee failed t o collect the device it had been returned to South Africa and eventually to Mlangeni, as the sender of the parcel was put down as " Bheki" and the despatching address was simil ar to t hat of the firm tor which Mla ngeni worked. Shortly after Mlangeni's death some of the partners a t his forme~· firm haq a meeting with the then Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok . The Minister expressed his outr age at the murder and assured the par tners that everyt hing possible would be done to ensure t hat t he cu l prits were brought to book. A special investigative team made up of captai n Andre Kr itzinger and Warrant Officer Ro bert Brockway were appoi nted -18- to investigate the incident. They were to answer to Major General Van der Westhuizen. Rritzinger and Van der Westhuizen are t 'he same policemen referred to in the previous chapter on the Trust Feeds case. At the time the Board's researchers were mandated to assist the police team in every way possible. It was also agreed that the Mlangeni family could appoint their own experts to work in cooperation with the police tea. on t he post mortem and in examining t he bomb itself. The Board's researchers assisted the police team i n the taking of statements and tests were carried out jointly as detailed above . Thereafter nothing was heard from the police team. Inquiries were met with t he response that all possible leads were being followed up. Towards the end of 1991 the investigative team announced that they were not able to identify the culprits and that the doss ier would be closed. Shortly thereafter it was announced that a Judicial Inquest would be held into the death of Bheki Mlangeni. The inquest -19- started in the last week of May 1992 and was chaired by Mr Justice B O'Donovan. It soon emerged in evidence given at the inquest that the police investigation had not been satisfactory. Captain Kritzinger r~vealed that, although the only theory that the SAP had followed was that the bomb had been sent to Coetzee by his former col leagues at Vlakplaas, h e had only vi sited Vlakplaas three months after the explosion. Fu r thermore Kritzinger admitted that h e had attempted to mislead Dr. David Klatzow, an independent forensic expert appointed by the Mlangeni fami ly, with reqards to the wh ere(lbouts of CI Colonel wi;lhl du Tui L dlld I,i .. <":ullllections with the police forens ics laboratory in Pretoria . Du Toit had been named by coetzee as the person who might have built the bomb. oth er aspects of the investigation which qave cause for concern were: the fact that Kritzinger h ad not seen a manuscript pre pared by coetzee and qiven to Van der Westhuizen which detailed c landestine operations carried out by vlakplaas operatives; and that a researcher working for Mlanqenj's lawyers traced a key witness in the space of one -20- afternoon whilst Kritzinger could not trace her in the space of fifteen months. The evidence of Kritzinger's superior, Major General Ronnie Van der Westhuisen was also disturbing. He justified the fact that Vlakplaas personnel had not been investigated on the grounds that all allegations against the unit had been investigated by himself during the course of the Harms Commission. When it was pointed out to him that Mlangeni had been killed six months after the Harms Investigation was closed, Van der Westhuisen stated that he was contusing Mlangen1's murder with that ot Durban attorney Griffiths Mxcnge. Mxenge was murdered in 1981. Finally, according to police expert, Colonel Johan Hattingh, it emerged that handwriting and fingerprint samples given to him by Kritzinger were insufficient to do a proper investigation. An example of this was that a sample of the handwriting on the cassette Which had been in the walkroan had not been given to Hattingh, nor had a fingerprint which was inside the tape player. The Judge ordered Kritzinger to -21- o btain a list ot possible police s uspects fro. the l awyers for the Ml a ngeni family and to t a ke adequate handwriting and fingerprint samples from all of theM. The l awyers provided a lis t of thirty f our policemen to Kritzinge r frolll wholll fingerprints and handwriting sampl es were taken . The samples were stud ied by lI a ttingh and Klatzow. For the reasons set out above counsel for the Mlangeni fa.ily a rgued that the police investigation into his murder had been " fata lly flawed" right froll the start. It was a rgued further that a t ho rough a nd competent investigation might have succeeded in uncovering Mlangeni's murde rers. It was 'submitted that even if a proper investigation ha d not produced t he killers, s uc h an investigation would have ensured that the public would have confidence in the SAP ' s abi lity to investigate crimes of this nature. The fami ly' s legal tea~ has requested the Judge t o censure t he police for their investiga,tion in his findings. -22- 2.3 Train Attacks. Instead, "Commut e rs should fight back lmd defend themselves. talk to they vent the ir a nger on the police. They refuse to s of the us. They do not g i ve us infor~ation or description t he attackers. As a result we can't develop a profile of We attackers to see whether t he same people are involved. have no description, no l eads, nothing. How can we who investigate properly without information trom those d of the witnessed the attacks". - Colonel Frank Sneygans Hea New-Canada based Police Mobi l e Unit . *9 first This particular ~anifesta tion of the Reef Violence occurred in August 1990. Since the n there have been hundred approximately two hundred attacks and nearl y three people ha ve been kil led a nd approximately seven hundred i njured on trains and at s tations. The levels of violence to lead to Hr Justice R Goldstone appointing a commission 4 1992 to investigate the issue. The commission sat trom Hay May 21 1992. -23- For the purposes of this report only t hose aspects of t he evidence which covered police investigations into train vi olence wi l l be dealt with. Since the first train attacks the SAP have assured the public that thorough investigations were being carried out. In September 1990 Police Commissioner , General Johan van Der Merwe, stated that the pol ice "we r e doing everything in t heir power" to apprehend the culprits. I n t he intervening time period t he police have periodically issued statements of a similar nature. However, thus far there has only been one successful prosecution in relation to train attacks. Yet, in this case the court accepted t hat the accused, Mr Nontana Matlaka, had himself been a victim of a train attack on September 11 1990 and had then killed someone on the station platform whom he had mistakenly identified as one of his attackers. Matlaka was thus not part of a group of ar~ed men who had attacked commuters at random, this being t he distinguishing charac teristic of train attackers. A !lumber of other men have been brought to court and charged in connection with train -24- attacks but, thus far, all these cases h~ve been dismissed for l~ ck of evidence. At the Commission a number of problems emerged with reg~rd to the investigation of train violence. The most important of these were: that in the three areas affected by train violence, Johannesburg, the East Rand and Soweto, investigating officers were of a junior rank and the investigation teams were undermanned; that investigating officers had failed to follow up on secondary information like press reports, despite the fact t hat such reports often contained the nallles of witnesses; that there was a l ack of co-ordinati on between the various areas and that this had lead to ~ failure on the part of the investigative teams to discern patterns and decide on common approaches; and that there w~s virtually no coordination between the investigating officers and the members of the Internal Stability Unit, even though t he latter were invariabl y the first on the scene aft er an attack and sometimes took statements from e yewitnesses. -25- Th e investigative teams blamed their lack of success on the fact that members of the public have failed to come forward with infor~at i on and assistance. However, the police the~ se lves do not see ... to have .made a n enormous effort to win public support. As far as the issue of informers are concerned major contradictions arose in t he evidence. Members of the lnternal Stability Unit claimed that they had informers who tipped the~ of from time to time about possible attacks. The investigative officers, however, said that they had no informers who could assist them in thei r investigations or provide them with information leading to arrests. 1'he evidence of a witness known as Zero One was a direct contradiction of this assertion. Zero One claimed that he had been a police informer who l ived in Nancefield Hostel in Sowcto. At first he had given police information about hostel reside nts who were in possession of firear~s. These people had been arrested and Zero One had received his rewards. Later he had given the police information about two train attac ks which took place in Soweto; the first took place on June 26 .at Kliptown Station and six people were killed and twenty· two injured ill the attack; the second took place -26- 23 a nd between Nancefield and Orl a ndo Stations on October in the attack. nine p~9p le we r e ki l led and thirty six injured of a Zero One allegedly supplied the police with the names their number of the attacke rs in both incidents as well as fu ll room numbers i n the hostel. He ~ l SO gave the police e d and details about where and when t he attacks had been plann who wa s responsible for the planning. persons In e a c h case t he police then arrested a number of the fact that wholll Zero One had identified. However, despite the ne ver he had ind icat.;ad a w i llin9ness to do s o, Zero One was lly called to court to t estity and the men were eventua evidence r eleased due to the fact that ther e was insufficient that hi s to proceed with t he i r p rosecutions. Zero One alleged the identity as a police informer was then made known to whom he Nancefield !lostel dwellers by the very policellan to a Captain had been reporting. He identified t his policeman as had given Vermaak, attached to t he Protea Police Station, who police had evidence at the Commission and had stated that the regarding no inforlllers who could supply them with i nformation osed train attacks. As a resul t of his identity being discl Zero One had to flee the hostel. - 27 - At a second s i tti ng of t he Commission , held f rom August 24 to Au gust 27 t he evide nce o f Zer o One wa s t est ed under cross examination. Throughout two days of evidence Zero one s t uck to his original ver sion, o f events. Pol i ce witnesses conc eded t hat Zero One had wo r ked as an i nfor mer but clai med that, at no time had he been prepared to ma ke a s tatement or t o g ive evidence in court. They a l so admitted that hi s ident i ty a s a police infor me r had become known to the Nancefield li ostel dwel l ers in November 1991 but were a t a loss to explain how this had happened . Accord i ng to t he police Zt!co One hlld worked as an i nformer for t hem until .January 1992 . The Commissi on a l so heard evidence from t he SAP on what had been done to tack le t r ai n violence si nce the first sitting of t he Comlllission had been held. In early August newspaper articles a ppeared about a "crack unit" wh icll had been set up to investigate tra i n violence. I n evid e nce at t he Commissi o n it emerged that no s peci a l i nvestiga tive unit had been set up, but a Central CO-ord i nating Centr e had been esta b li s hed . Ilowever , t he sole task of t hi s centre was to collect statistics relating to dead a nd i n jured on trains, to ana l yse -28- tor these statistics and to then briet those responsible preventative policing on the trains. -29- III, INVESTIGATING MA SSACRES; Police investi9~tin9 the Trust Feeds, Sebokeng , a nd Alexandra m~ssacres have a ll been strongly criticised by the presidin9 judges in each case, The recent Boipatong .assacre investigation was put under t he spotlight when Dr Wa dding ton waS invited by t he Goldstone Commiss ion to assess the police investi9ation. Waddington points to a host of i ssues and c ritic isms and describes the investi9ation as Kwoetully i nadequate",_l O Waddin9ton points out tha t the criticisMs he makes o t the SAP are made through the lens of Boipatonq. It has a l so been put to Waddington that that l e ns is dist orting, and that Boipatong is unusual. Particularly, it has been c l ~iaed that t he Boipaton9 inquiry taced unique problems arising from t he noncooperation of the towns hip reside nts , press att e ntio n amount ing to harassment and various other problems .• 11 Waddington concedes the above but stresses that even by South African standards Boipatong Whe re 42 people were s l a ughtered was a particularly ~orrendou s event, a n event whic h the SAP could h~ve been expected to respond to with the utmost vigou ~ , es pecial ly in view of the international attention it has r eceived. -30- Senior officers have confirmed that the massacre was treated seriously from the start as indicated by the appointment of a Major-general to head it from the beginning. Waddington says with all this attention one would expect that the SAP would have done everything in its power to correct any defects in the investigation process. lI owever, defects remained. "those defects that remained must be assumed to be regarded the normal practice, or at least unavoidable. " "12 It is believed that many investigations, particularly those related to political violence are confession orientated. H:eSlc1ents ot the KwaMaddl" hustel, In -ime suspect" in the Boipatong massacre have a l leged that they had been tortured a nd that confessions had been extracted by unlawful means. In both the Alexandra and Sebokeng massacres (detailed below) the presiding judges found that confessions submitted to the court were made under duress. Similar allegations are comming to light in the Swanieville massacre case where 26 people were killed in May last year_ w'addington says the manner of i nvestigation adopted in the Boipatong case gives "rise to the suspicion that the style of investigation adopted in this case, and perhaps in South Africa generally, is confession-orientated: the aim of the investigation being to - 31 - obtain confessions from suspects a nd t he incriminat i on o f others. without supporting evidence, only obtainabl e t r om t ow ns hip residents and t horough forensic examination, this i s a strategy t hat seems doomed to failure." .13 Wa ddington submits t hat the imper ative to seek contessions l ies i n the fact that there is pr ecious little prospect of obtaining evidence by other mea ns. Exam inations of cri~e scenes at Bo i patong we r e s uperfi cia l , ~ccording to waddington. It 1s nuL d lac k of expertioc but rather of ~allpower - "Un less scenes of crime are examined more effectively than those at Boipatong (and with so few forensic examiners routinely coping with so ma ny dema nds , it is difficult to imagine they are), sophisti cated analytical faci lities are of l itt le consequence."*14 It is pointl ess as in the Boipatong case t o confiscate weapons from the alleged perpetrators and place them in a pile without conducting the necessary forensi c tests to l ink the weapon to a specific i nd ividual . -32- Waddington does however end on a more positive note in t hat al l , ~is criticis. are remediable since they do not involve the replacement of individuals but the establish~ent of structures a nd methods of policing that are familiar elsewher e in the world. lI owever if these defects are to be r emedied it will require a thorough reappraisal of the e ntire organisation, backed by the political will to e ns ure sufficient f unding.*15 3.1 The Sebokeng Vigil Massacre . Early in the morning of January 12 1991 gu nmen attacked the night vigil of ANC activist, Christopher Nangalembe, in Sebokeng. In the attack t hirty five people we re killed and over fifty were i njured. A the t i.e community leaders alleged t hat des pite the fact t hat the police had been warned about the attack they had failed to respond by providing protection. Minister of Law and Order, Ad riaan Vlok, expressed his outrage at the killings and gave his assurance that "everything possible" would be done to track down the k illers. On January 14 it was announced that nine ~en and a women had been arrested in connecti on with the killi ngs. -33- The trial of seven men, Zebuse Khuzwayo, Aubrey Hyeni, Aaron Mtshal i , Daniel Mabote, Silwane Khu beka, Thomas Lok hoz i and Hunter Ndlovu began on June 1 1992 . The woma n a nd two of the men who had been arrested had the charges against t hem withdrawn and one ot the r emaining accused died before t he matter came to trial. The men faced thirty eight counts of murder, eight of attempted ~urder and counts ot unlawful possession of firearms and ammunition. On June 19 t he seven me n were acquitted of all charges. The Judge, Hr Just ice Schultz , said that the State had failed to prove its case beyond all r easonable doubt. He criti cised the police investigative team, saying that the pol i ce should have tried harder to find incriNinating evidence. Instead it a ppeared that t he police had relied on statements t aken trom the accus"ed whiCh t he Judge tound had been taken under duress .• 16 A l awyer representing one of the families affected by t he Sebokeng massacre cOMmented atter the case that the "SAP's credibility crisis in the townships had led to a situation where lawyers had to take over t he job of t he pol ice, ensuring that witnesses went to cour t, providing theN with -34 - "safe-houses" and pers uading them to testify . ".17 It is clear froM the above that the police have yet to earn the trust of the community. ANC affiliated organisations have to re-assess their current stance of not co-operating a nd the police for t heir part should review their arms-length approach to such organisations, whether the ANC , or organisations who have offered to assist i n the past like the Independe nt Board of Inquiry. 3.2 The Alexandra Night Vigil Ma ssacre. The identity parade had been (where three of the accused were identit'ied) " nothing but a charade" - Judge II Daniels (Citizen 11/08/1992). On March 27 1991 thirteen people were gunned down at ill night vigil in Alexandra . A s pecial investigative team was appointed by the SAP to investigate the ~urders. On April 4 the police announced that e ight _en had been arrested in connection with t he attack. The trial started on october 15 -35- and the five accused, Gi bso n Mbatha, Oe~rick Majo~i, christopher Mbatha, Petrus Buthelezi and John Zwake faced thirteen charges of murder and seventeen of attempted ~urder. The hearing of evidence was concl uded on June 30 1992 . One of the accused, John Zwake, was granted a discharge and the matter was postponed until August 10 for jUdgement. In his j udgement, Mr Justice H Daniels, acquitted all five mono Ho was sever e ly critical of the police investigation and said that aspects of the police evidence were "so strange as to be bizarre".18. lie f ound that the police had fabricated evidence, had influenced witnesses and had lied under oath . According to the Judge the police had failed to carry out the most basic of investigative procedures, s uch as testing the murder weapons for fingerprints. Furthermore the investigating officers had reduced the three identification parades to "charad es" by: ho lding them weeks and months after the event; by leaking information to witnesses - the jUdge added that one of the accused Gibson Mbata had been described to at least one witness by ~embers of tIm . investigating team; and by holding thelll in places - 36- could not where the lighting was so poor t hat the witnesses the three make posit ive identifications. The judge found that 1991 were identity parades on March 29, May 20 and July 5 in court held during a period when the accused had appeared found t hat seven times for " all and s undry to see". lie also case among several witnesses had been al l owed to discuss the been themselves a nd " compare notes", and that t h is had the "high ly irregular" and "rata l t o the results Of parade " fr 19 . Judge Daniel s said one wa s struck by the inherent and improbabil i tiQs a nd the number of inconsist e ncies esses discrepanci es in t he evidence of the police witn involved. Jacobus He s aid senior investigating officers, Major Johannes had take n Barnard and Detective Sergeant Stephanus Crous, t he statements, which put themselves at the scene of lled to f a bricated recovery of the AK -4 7 . . Neither were ca witnesses testify in court. "To my way of t h inking these two "Daniels could perhaps be seen as most important witnesses, e left itself said. "having decided not to c all t hem, the Stat case. " *20 open to the drawing of inrerences adverse to t he -37- In summing up the Judge concluded that "the attitude displayed by the investigation team is one ot complete disregard ot the basic approach to be adopted". If one assesses the police investigation into massacres and sees it as representative, the impression is given of an unacco untable police force. The Waddington r eport points to the difficulties his i nquiry team taced in uncovering t he most routine aspects ot the police response and investigation and suggests that systems do not exist for either internal or external accountability. "The f i rst rule of policing throughout the ~emocratic world is for police officers to 'guard their backs' : that is, to be able to furnish an account to anyone with the authority to demand.*21 "Despite the internatlonal attentlon that has focused on these events, the political significance of them for t he peace process in South Africa and t he fact that an international inquiry team was known to be en route, the po lice seemed ill-prepared for providing any k ind ot detailed descrlption of and explanation for their behaviour. If t he Boipatong investigation could be expected to be a showcase in any respect, surely it would have been in its accountability, but it was not."*22 - 38- IV . KHUTSONG " WHERE WE REST". " .. . After a while one of the po licemen J did not see placed so.ething over my head. It felt l ike plastic and I could not br eathe through it. The y then took both my arms and ha ndc uffed the m behind my back . Another set ot handcuff s were placed on my feet. I t he n felt a s hock on my l eft arm and another under my right armpit and then I f e l t a shock in my anus. All the time they asked me where the guns were a nd t he whereabouts of my younger brother .Johannes Mabitsa" .11'23 Khutsong in t he Western Trans vaal i s approximately as kilometres fro • .Johannesbur g. The Board began wor king in the area in February 1991. Prior to the Board's involvement various hUl'Q a n rights lawyers had sent letters to the then Mi nister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, urging him to set up a n investigation into t he behaviour of members of the SAP based in the area. Following thi s a special investigation unit ,under t he auspices of Major General Ro nni e van der We sthuizen was set up. The. investigation on the g round was headed by Ma jor Dirk Stear -)9- (now Lt Colonel) of Klerksdorp. lie was assisted by Colonel lIeystek, wlO Brockway, and Captain Kritzinger (now Major). II key feature of the investigation was the systematic harassment of witnesses who had come forward to IllY chllrges against members of the SAP . Prior to the investigation getting otf the ground witnesses to the deaths in custody of two youths Nixon Phiri and Eug ~ ne Hbu lawa were allegedly ki lIed by members of the SAP after making statements to t heir attorneys. When the investigation initially got underway members of t he SAP went to witnesses' homes in an attempt to take statements. At first the commu nity refused to co-operate with the police. After a series of meeting which the Board held i~ the townshjp in conjunction with the local structures residents decided to give t heir full support to the investigation. An agreement was then reaChed between the investigating team, the Board and the l ocal /INC branCh. The latter two then assisted the investigation by tracing and ferrying witnesses -40- back and forth to the police station. Over sixty witnesses Came forward resulting in over 100 charges . During the first week ot t he investigation witnesses informed the Board that they were being photographed surreptitiousl y . On t he first occasion, the Board did not report the matter to the investigating team, however, t he fol lowing day, t he Board's researcher noticed a camera in a toilet window at the Oberhoizer Police Station. It appeared as though photographs were being taken of people who had come to lay c harges against members of the SAP. The incident was immediately reported to Colonel Stear and he apprehended the person in the toilet. This person turned out to be a member of the SAP based in Potchefstroom. Colonel Stear exposed the film to the light and said t hat he WOuld report the matter to his seniors. The Board's attorneys Cheadle Thompson and Haysorn then sent a letter to Colonel Stear requesting clarificat ion on the matter. Subsequently Co l onel stear verbally informed t he Board's r esearcher Sa lly Se al ~ y t hat t he man taking pictures was a member of the SA P based i n Potchefstroom and t hat he had taken the pictures as he suspected that one or more -41- white man witnesses may have been involved in the .urder ot a Board whose body had been tound burnt in the township. The was investigated this and found that e body ot a w hite men were found in t ne township but at the same time t he pictures the being taken the deceased's brothers were appearing in death. Oberholzer magistrates court in connection with his and During the investigation several witnesses were arrested c harged. Thus far all ceses that have been heard have resulted in the c harges either being withdrawn or dismissed. of Wi l liam Falt. .. ln, a witness to t he death in detention Eugene Hbulawa, was charged with possession ot a firearm atter making a statement t o the special unit. The charge of t he against Paltein was eventually dismissed at the e nd a State's case. This year he was charged with pointing facing tirearm, this too has been dismissed. Fal~ein is now a Murder charge and this particular case has been postponed pending a Supreme Court date. in Witnesses continue to be harassed even when they appear were court. Several incidents of harassment of witnesses one reported to the investigating team in July 1992. In -42- incident' William Falte,in was giving evidence in a case of assault against eight policemen based at Welverdiend lind Oberholzer police stat.ions, when one of the accused threatened to burn his home and "eat" (ukudla) the furniture ie confiscate the furniture if Faltein continued to give evidence. The matter was reported but six policemen were acquitted at the end o : ~ the States case and the remaining two were found not guilty. During the various identity parades which took place at the Khutsong police station witnesses reported that they had been kiCked and verbally abused by members of the SAP participating in the p"rade. During the parade the witnesses had to physically point out their assailants by touching them on the shoulder. The Board is in possession of severlll statements confirming t he above. Following the initial investigation 13 policemen were suspended and faced ove r 100 charges ranging from murder to common assault. The premises of the Welverdiend unrest Unit were also closed. -4 )- To date there has only been one successful prosecution that of Constable Mzwakane who was found guilty ot assau l t on May 20 1992. He was given a fine of RJOO o r three months and a fur t iler R200 suspended tor tour months. In August this year all suspended policemen resuJlled duty, despite the tact that a l l of them are sti ll facing ser ious charges in the Oberholzer Mag i strate's Court. For example Constable Thoaas Mkhonza is still facing 18 charges of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and one ti.e head of the Welverdiend unrest Unit warrant Officer Johan van Gl-allill is ( Nyelele are facing seven c harges ot assau l t . Throughout the investigation there was a marked contrast between the attitude of Colonel Stear and that of the local police officers. Apart trom witnesses being harassed and arrested,one of the Board's researchers, Sa l ly Sealey, a nd the local " NC secretary Dan Ndzeku were charged in September 1991 with intimidating one of the local Constables, Fente Rampete. These c harges were w:ithdrawn in March 1992, after representations were made to the Attornay General. The Board has found t hat while the police investigation was underway, the SAP were grateful for any assist3nce we could offer. 1I0weve r, once the cases came to court it would appear that the prosecuti on were never ful ly briefed on the Board's role and this led to allegations that the Board's researcher forced witnesses into police vans and the e ntire inves tigation was a plot to rid Khutsong of policemen. On s:averal occl'I,:;;ons the Board has approached the prosecutor concerned and inforllled him of the Board's role In the investigation and that the Board was in possession of lists of nall1es of witnesses given to it by the investigation team. The people on the list were witnesses the polica requcsted to see in order to taka statements as well as those needed to attend identity parades. The investigation of' policemen based at WeJ vcrdicnd, Oberhol;r;er and Khuts ong has been ha iled by the SA P top brass as being a clear example of how they are prepared to investigate themseJves. WIlen the 13 policelllen were suspended they tOok cred it. -4 5 - The reality, howe ver, ia t h ~t the investigation has been undermined at every possible opportunity as is clear fro~ the exa~ples above. The Soard's experience in Carletonville and other areas is that despite police public pronouncements for help, the reality is that the SAP find it hard to accept help from organisations and individuals working in various communities. Our experience is that we have been unable to assist members of the SAP due to their negative attitude towards "outsiders" assisting thelll. Despite the many public calls for help for witnesses to come fO l-wln-d c.nd c",u;itlt the police, when attempts are made to facilitate this, we have on more than one occasion found ourselves arrested or accused of tampe ring or changing statementa. The Carletonville investigation has been plagued with threats . Many witnesses being warned that they are "not far off from tha mortuary" ~ nd Sealey a nd Ndzeku were informed that a certain police~an had plans to eli~inate thelll as they were the sole cause of his suspension and those of other members of the force. Despite the threats witnesses are determined to see justice done and continue to come forward and testify in court. -46- V. TilE SCHWEIZER-RENEKE CASE. On Decem ber 6 1991 the New Nation newspaper r evealed that th e~e ha d been a n alleged plot between two Ipe l egeng criminals and loc al po licemen to murder Ipe lege ng c ivic Association c hairperson Jerry Maine. Ipe l egeng is the township attached to Schweizer-Reneke. One of the would-be assassins, Bi l ly Dakada, wa s supposedly recruited afte r he was arrested on a breaking and e ntering c harge. He was told that a light sentence would be organised tor him it he ~ssisLti~ the police by killing Maine . Dakada suspected that he was possibly being set up to be re-arrested so he taped a number of meetings between himsel f and the policeman he dealt with. The tapes reveal plans as to whe n the assassination shOuld take place as wa ll as what weapons would be used and who was to supply them. The evidence was handed over to the Goldstone Comm ission i n early December 1991. The Commission was not expected to conduct an inquiry into the matter, but was expected to s tudy t he case and refer it to the Attorney Genaral t o decide -47- whether there were grounds for prosecution . The issue was discussed by the Commission on December 17 and it was decided t hat there was a "pr i ma facie" case Implicating certain schweizer-Reneke policemen. The matter was t hen handed to t he Attorney Ge neral of the Transvaal on December 19. The Attorney General had then decided t o hand the matter over to t he pol i ce for further i nvestigati on . On July 6 1992 Judge Goldstone issued an interim report in wh ich he dealt with a number of matters including that of Schweizer-Heneke. Ha said that the poUce investigation into the matter had " taken unacceptably long ". Yn r esponse the SAP said that they had told officer s of the COlanliss i on on a number of occasions t hat they were having difficulty in deciphering the tapes, but tha t t he investigation wa s proceeding as rapidly as possible. Subsequent to t he above a Johannesburg Magistrate has been appointed to hear the c ase in Kl el'ksdorp on December 14 1992. -48- VI'. Til E Il ARMS COMM I SS I ON INVESTIGATION. I n late 1989 two former Secur ity Policemen, Sergeant AI~ond had been NOfome l a and captain Dirk Coetzee, alleged that they of part of a unit that had been responsible for a number incl uded attacks on anti apartheid activists, attacks which in arson, assault, abduction and murder. This was followed December 1989 by the detention of a n umber of f ormer an policemen in connection wi th t he murders of David Webster, Anton academic from tile university of the Witwater srand and Lubowski, a Wi ndhoek activist and p rominent south West African P eopl e's Organisation (SWAPO) member. of a It subsequently emerged t hat these men were members s ion of clandestine unit attached to the Spt!<.:ia1 t·orces divi the South African Defence Force (SAOF), called the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCO) . a Hounting pub) ic press ure l ead to t he establ ishment of jUdicial commission of inquir y, in February 1990, t o t he SAP. investigate t he allegations made aga i ns t t he CCB and Hr. Justice Louis Harms was appointed to chair t he comm i ssion. -49- At the opening of the Commission, the Chairman raised the question of whether it was proper to use the police in the investigation, especially in respec t of that part of the investigation which dealt with allegations against the SAP. lie stated that there was no other alternative available and that, in the absence of a factual basis, the SAP as a Whole coul d not be condeMned. The police officers who were appointed to lead the investigative team were Major General R. Van der Westhuizen and Co lonel J. P. Wright. Colonel Wright was put in c harge of the investigation into the Cell, whilct CQnQral Van dar W/l!F;T_hui~.e n headed the investigation into the SAP. In the light of the concerns raised by Judge Harms, the Board decided to assign two membe r s of its staff to assist t he Board's legal team on a full time basis. These members also conducted their own investigatjon into the allegations made by Coetzee and Nofome la. In doing so, the Board in no way wished to detract from the standpoi nt tha.t the f ull burden of the investigative duty lay with the official investigative team. As a result of this "parallel" investigation the Board was able to place forty two exhibits before the Commission. -50- This w~a signific~ntly _ore th~n those brought forw~rd by the official investig~tive team. In _ost cases the info r mation which the Board's rese~rche r s uncovered was more readibly accessible to t he investigative team than to the researcher's t hemselves. What w~s even more disturbing w~s the fact that, on ~ number of occ~sions, the Commission's investiga tive team produced evidence corroborating t he ~l l egat i ons of Coetzee only a tter the Board had handed in affidavits containing evidence which corroborated such allegations. A number of examples bear out t hese f~cts . Oirk Coetzee claimed that he a nd a number of other policemen had stol e n a Vo l kswagen Kombi from a hotel i n Johannesburg in 1981 . The Kombi , which belonged to t he National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU), was allegedly stolen at Lhe request of a Colonel Van Rensburg f rom Port Elizabeth. Van Re nsburg .... as a membe r of t he Secur i ty Pol ice j n Port Elizabeth and was involved in the monitoring of trade union activities. On March 21 counsel for the Board handed in the -51- affidavit of Frederick Sauls, a NAAWU official, in which he confirmed that the vehicle had been stolen in similar circumstances to those wh ich Coetzee had described. Only on April 27 did the investigative team produce a police computer print out confi rm ing t hat the vehicl e had been reported as stolen . Another affidavit which was handed in by the Board's counsel on March 21 was that of Edwin Maepe, another NAAWU official from Port Elizabeth. Coetzee and NOfomela had given evidence of a theft of a ca r belonging to a union Official in Port El izabeth. In his affidavit Maepe set out that his personal vehicle had been stQlen in circumstances si.ilar to those which hlld been detailed by Coetzee and Hofomela. On March 15 counsel for the security Po lice, Advocate SaD Maritz, put to Nofomela t hat the p'llice had no record of s uc h a t heft. Once again, on April 27, the investigative team produced a computer print out Gonfirming t hat the vehicle had indeed been reported stolen. Coetzee and Nofomela had given evidence about a n incident in the Ea stern Cape where a number of Vehic les had been burnt. -52- On March 15 Advocate ~aritz put it to Notomela that the police had "absolutely no record ot such an occurence" a nd that Notomela was "speaking nonsense". In Apri l , i n London, Dirk Coetzee then test:i fied that the incident had taken place i n the village ot Rhodes in the Eastern Cape. Stil l the Commission ' s investigcltive team failed to provide any evidence to support t he a llegations. Finally on June 14 the Boa rd' s counse l handed in the affJdavi t s of Andrew Grewar and Onl slingsby which supported the evidence of Coetzee to a l arge extent. 'l'he most glaring omislJion ot the Comm i ssion's investigative team occurred i n regal:"d to certa in Botswana border post documents. Coetzee an(1 No tomel a had given evide nce ot a raid in Gaberone in which t he house of a certain African National Congress (ANC) orficii~l was attacked and in which a number of people were injured. Despite the fact that the incident fell outside the Comm i ssion's terms o t reference,' duc t o t he fact t hat i t had happened outside South Africa, it had become a crucial issue at the Commission duc t o the fact t hat one Joseph Mama sela had allegedl y accompanied Coetzee and Nofomcla during the -53- attack . Hama sela had been im plicated in a number of inc idents in 1981 by Coetzee and Nofoma1a, including the murder of Durban hU Ma n rights lawyer, Griffiths Hxenge. Po lice witnesses, including Mamasela, had put it in the Most emphatic terms that Mam asela did not even know of t he ex i s tence of Dirk Coetzee in 198 1 and thus it was i mpossible that Ma masela had ever wo rked with Coetzee. Board researchers uncovered Botswana border post documents that showed that Coetzee, Nofomela and M a~ase la had entered Botswana in November 1981, travelling in the same car , on the same day as an attack took place on the house of IIN C ac tivist, Joyce Di pale, i n Gaberone . The registration number of the car was traced to security Police headquarters in Pretoria . It must be pointed out that it took considerable effort to get hold of these documents from the Botswana Attorney General's office. It would have been far easi e r for the Comm i ssion's i nvestigative team to have done so. For these reasons the Board ' s legal team s ubmitte d in t heir heads of argument that, "a lIIajor purpose of the investigatio n team in relation to the activities of the South Afri can Police appears to have been to provide eXCUlpatory evidence ." -54- In his r eport Judge Ilarms found that, "The submission was not substantiated by any exa~ ples which bore scrutiny." I n contr ast to this the team lead by Colonel Wright appeared to have conducted a fairly rigorous investigation, this des pite the fact that the cco seemed to attempt to obstruct t he investigation at every turn. Ilis team participated in a number of search and seizure raids, including one o n the CCO Headquarters where Colonel Wright prevented members of the organisation from removing files from the premises. The i nvest;<);ltion into th .. CCB l .. ad to Judgo Harm" recommending investigations by the Attorney General's otfice with regard to the following incidents: the bombing of a community centre i n Athlone, Cape Town, on Aug ust 31 1989i a conspiracy or attempt to murder Cape Town Advocate Oulla Omari a conspiracy or attempt to murder Johannesburg journalist Gavin Evans i the murder of Mamelodi activists Dr Florence Ribeiro and his wife . What is disconcerting is that almost two years atter the Judge issued his report, no criminal proceedi ngs have been star ted with r egard to a ny of these incidents. -55- VII. RIGHT WING VIOLEnCE. This is one area of political violence where the South African Police have had a re~arkabl e s uccess rate in terMS of arrests and convictions. The police r esponse to the ~ajor acts of right wing terror in the las t two years clearly illustrates this: i). On October 10 1990 a Durban bus was attacked with AK 47 and Rl assault rifles . Seven black commuters were killed and eighteen were injured in the attac k. On October 17 three Richards Bay right wingers, Eugene Ma rais, David Botha and Adriaan S~uts were arrested in connection with t he i nc ident. On Apri l 4 1991 Marais wa s convicted on seven c harges of murder. The convictions of Botha and smuts followed on September 13. ii). On October 20 1990 a bo~b exploded at PC Plus Co~puter s in Durban killing one of their emp loyees Nic Cruise. On Novembe r 11 1990 three Pretoria right wlngers, Adriaan Maritz, Henry Martin and Lood Van Scha lkwyk were arrested in connection with the ~urdcr as well as in connecti on with an earlier bomb blast in Bl oed Street, Pretoria. - 56- Du e to the fact t hat the three allegedly went on a hunger strike the trial was delayed. Maritz and Martin eventually skippe d bail and fled to the united Kingdom. Van Schalkwyk was convic ted o f murder on March 19 1992. iii). On July 21 1991 a bomb went off at Hi l l view Primary School in Pretoria, causing extensive daJllage . On April 29 1992 Gerry Bezuide nhout, an a lleged Afrikaner Weerstand Beweging (AWB) Jlu~lIIber, was arrested in connection with the incident . iv). On August 2 1 1991 bombs went orf at National Party (HP) o ffice s in Ve e reniging. In late January 1992 three AWB members, Johan Frederick Kea rns, Andries Barend lI eyneke and a Seventeen year old youth were arrested in connection with t he b l asts. v ). Between DeceJllber 19 1991 and January 6 1992 t he followi ng places we r e bombed by right wingers : Congress ot South African Trade Union's (COSATU) of f i~es in Pretoria on Oecember 19 ; Melkrivier School in Ne l spruit on January 1; Verwoerdburg Post Of fice on January 2 ; and Krugersdorp Post Office on January 2. -57- On January 7 1992 Gonde volschenk, leader of the Boerekommando, was Clrrested in connection with the Melkrivier School blast. The al·rests of Dries Kriel, an official of the Mine Workers Union (HWU). Andre Odendaal, Dirk Jan Hattingh and Petros Jacobus J"udeel, in connection with the other bombings occurred on January 15 1992. The trial was postponed unti I early February 1993. vi). On April 4 1992 a l impet mine was detonated at the Rand Easter Show in Johannesburg, injuring nine people. On May 19 1992 ten people were arrested in connection with the attack. On May 20 seven of tllese people were released but the following three r emained in custody and were charged, Koos Van der Merwe, Boksburg Conservative Party (CP) Town Councillor, Johannes Visser, an alleged mel"lber of the AWB and a R Du 1'oit. Many right wing observers believe that the prompt action by the South "'(rican Pol ice to these attacks, especially the spate of bombings in late December and early January , may have nipped a full fl(!dged rig h"t wing terror campa ign i n the bud" The SliP attribut(! their success in this area to co-operat i on from the public. However right wing movements -58- believe that police suc cess can be attributed to the fact t hat t he SAP have infi.ltrated, or have informers within, al l r ight wing rOlil1tant movements . The s hort tillle lapse between i ncide nt s and arrests i n some of the above cases would seem to indicate that the l ~ l tter theory is a n e ntirely credible one. -59- vrn. CONCLUSIONS , The above case studies deal with investigations that appear to b" .. up.. rfici .. l in " number or reQards. The question remains whether this is due to basic incompetence, as Waddington found, or whethe r police are unwilling to fully investigate political crime, especially when their own members are implicated, The Board remains convinced that the latter theory cannot be discounted, Certainly there arc examples of insuff i cient investigation in the above case studies that could be attributed to incompetence, but a nu~ber of factors indicate that this cannot be the only reason, 'J'he conduct of the Trust Feeds and Blleki Mlangeni cases ra i se serious doubts about the willingness of the SAP to investigate properly. "hat such investigations can succeed wilen the jnve»l,.jYd l,.; ' ''J v(t'ice~- i .. determined enou9h i .. shown by the experience of Ca ptain Dutton at Trust Feeds, and Co lonel Stear in Khutsong, despite hostility from loca l po l icemen, It is impossible to believe that these arC! the o nly two competent pol icemen i n the SA P, -60- The investigation into the issue of train attacks is also one where the levels of incompetence, especially with regard to co-ordination, raise serious questions as to the willingness of the police to investigate these crimes. It is significant that the SAP only took steps to improve the situation after it was announced that a Commission would investigate the issue. It is also significant that, despite criticism by t he Committee no dramatic steps have been taken to address the problem thus far. Anothel· tI. .. .., .. <.:1: whi<.:h yives ri .. ", for COncel- 1l 1 .. the length ot time between incidents and pr:-osecutions. 'I'his lS illustr:-ated by t he Khutsong cases, the Schweizer:--Reneke case a nd the recommendations of the Harms Commission relating to the CCB. On the other hand ther'~ are cases where the polic e have ma d0 very speedy arrests, but when the matter comes to court the aCcused are acquitted as a resul t of shoddy inVestigations. This is what happened in both the Sebokeng and the Alexandra night vigil cases. Som,~ commentators believe that there was a great deal of pl-essure on the SAP to Solve both these cases as allegations of police complicit'y in the attacks had been made. Both cases are milrked by incompetence of the most ba!>ic kind, as well as a confession orientated approach to t he investigation. -61- confession, In other words 8S long as the police could get 8 ingness to even i f p roduced under d uress, t here was no wi ll investigate the case a ny f urther. t he I n t he case o f the Harms Commission investi gation was made question was hard l y one of incompetence. No effort der post to get certain infor mation, like the Botswana bor t he Board docume nts, or infor mation was onl y obtained aft er t he car had done the initial work, as was the case wi th t he thefts. Taking this into account and contrastin9 i nto the CeD, investigation into the Vlakpl aaa unit with t hat n investigate themselves. had in there Fina l ly, the great success that t he police have is a clear operations llgainst dght wi ng polit ica l violence, the indication of what: the SAP can do in thi s area where that necessary wil l power is present. Whilst it is accepted d it easi er the pred ominantly white security branch wou ld fin hostels, to infiltrate dght wing groups than, for example, willing to it can be ar9ued that the pol i ce have been more i fied t he act against the ri ght wi ng because they have ident Government as their lIain target. -62- Furthermore, in the nineteen e i ghtiea the police clearly had no great problems in infiltrating groups like Umkhonto we Sizwe and the evidence of Zero one indicates that the police do have sources of information inside the hostel s. The South African Police admit that they have an image and credibility problem. They argue that this ia due to t he fact that for forty years they had to impose unjust laws and there is validity to this argument . However their credibility, especially in the townohips, would take a gr eat leap were more perpetrators of pol itical violence brought to justice, especially if these perpetrators are policemen. In theit." actions against the right wing the police have shown what they IIIre capable of and have set a atandard that should be aimed <'It in all investigations into politica l viol ence. The resources, whilst stretched and in need of improvement, are there. It appears that on ly the necessary willpower is laCking. -i- FOQTNOTES *1. Address by state President F.W. de Klerk to 500 police officers at Pretoria Police College, 17 January 1990). *2. Jayendra Naidoo speech at the IDASA Conference on Policing the 1990's -towards an assessmeot ,October 5 1992. *3. Police Deviance in the Policing of South Africa by Nicholas Ilaysom Human Rights and Labour YearboQk Volume 1 1990 page 1&2. *4.Rcport of the Inquiry ioto the police response to, and investigation of, events in Boipatong on June 17 1992 by Dr P.A.J. Waddington, Director, criminal Justice Studies, University of Reading, England . Submitted to the Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation under the c hair of Mr Justice Richard Goldstone . .. Pg4 6 . * 5 . Ibid pg 47 *6. The Weekly Ma i l 24-29/4/1992 -ii- *7.Ibid *B.lbid *9 Sowetan 1B/9/ 1992 *10. Waddington Report pg 4 6 *11 Ibid pg 23 *12. Ibid pg 23 *13. Ibid pg 42 *14. I bid pg 43 *15. Ibid pg 4 7 *16. The star 22/6/1992 *17. The Weekly Mail 10/6/1992 ' -ii1- *18. Business Day 11/8/1992 *19. The Citizen 11/8/1992 *20. Business Day 11/8/1992 *21. Waddington Report pg 44 *2 2. ibid pg 45 *23. Statement by White Mabitsa following his arrest and alleged torture by members of the welverdie nd Riot unit). 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