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Sweden: Right-Wing Populist Yet EU-Friendly

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Sweden: Right-Wing Populist Yet EU-Friendly Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Sweden: Right-wing Populist Yet EU-friendly SWP Comments The Electoral Success of the Sweden Democrats Overshadows the Increasing Approval of the EU in Sweden Peer Krumrey / Carsten Schymik The outcome of Sweden’s general election held on 19 September 2010 was widely seen as yet another example of a right-wing populist party on the rise in Europe. However, Sweden’s case also shows that growing right-wing populism does not necessarily go hand in hand with growing opposition to the EU. Although the Sweden Democrats advocate both anti-immigrant and anti-EU ideas, the latter hardly contributed to their success at the polls. On the contrary, Swedish society – often referred to as traditionally eurosceptical – has “mentally” joined the European Union. On 5 October Sweden got a new government, A European trend towards which in fact is a well-known one. Fredrik right-wing populism Reinfeldt is the first centre-right prime min- Many commentators took the electoral ister in almost 90 years who has succeeded success of the Sweden Democrats (SD) as the in being re-elected for a second term. How- latest evidence of a European trend. After ever, his Alliance for Sweden – a four-party Belgium and the Netherlands, Sweden coalition formed by Reinfeldt’s Conservative seemed to provide another example of a Party (Moderata samlingspartiet) together with right-wing populist party making a break- the Liberals (Folkpartiet liberalerna), the Centre through in a country that was long known Party (Centerpartiet) and the Christian Demo- for its liberal immigration and integration crats (Kristdemokraterna) – will be forced to policies. Sweden had indeed been the last act as a minority government. Due to the Scandinavian country without a significant success of the right-wing populist Sweden right-wing populist party. In Norway, the Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna), there are Progressive Party entered parliament for no clear-cut majorities in parliament. The the first time almost 30 years ago, and in party managed to gain 5.7 per cent of the the 2009 general elections it became the vote in the general elections, thereby sur- second largest party. The Danish People’s passing the 4-per cent threshold and enter- Party has been supporting a centre-right ing the Riksdag for the first time ever. minority government for almost 10 years Peer Krumrey is a doctoral fellow in the EU Integration Division of SWP SWP Comments 25 Dr. Carsten Schymik is a researcher in the EU Integration Division of SWP October 2010 1 now, thereby forcing through increasingly 2009, just prior to the country’s second restrictive immigration policies. presidency of the EU, an absolute majority The rise of right-wing populism in Europe of Swedes endorsed EU membership for the is perceived as a threat not only because it first time. At the same time, the proportion is conducive to xenophobic and racist atti- of people who reject any transfer of power tudes, especially in respect of Islam, but to the supranational level has diminished also for its negative views on European inte- significantly. The EU’s impact on Sweden’s gration. Most right-wing populist parties economic, environmental and employment are anti-EU parties. Their continued politi- policies has been rated ever more positively cal ascent could weaken the already crisis- by the respondents over the past 12 years – ridden European Union even further. a trend that can be observed in all social The equation of xenophobia and scepti- groups and political camps alike. By the cism towards the EU does not apply to the same token, Sweden’s possibilities to in- Swedish case though. Certainly, the Sweden fluence European decision making have Democrats’ success must be seen as an ex- been deemed ever more optimistically. pression of xenophobic attitudes in parts of Increasing support of the EU also became Swedish society. However, it is hardly proof evident in the European elections in 2009. of growing EU scepticism in the country. While the June List failed to be re-elected Quite the opposite is true. The European and the EU-critical Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) Union has in recent years continually lost almost half of its support, more pro-EU gained acceptance among both politicians parties like the Liberals gained in strength. and in the Swedish population at large. In addition, Sweden was one of the few member states where electoral turnout did not fall but increased, by eight points to Growing support for the EU nearly 46 per cent – well above the EU aver- Swedes are often referred to as reluctant age. In light of these figures, there is hardly Europeans. This image is essentially based reason to speak of sustained EU-scepticism on two landmark decisions on Europe in Sweden. On the contrary, 15 years after taken by referendum. While accession to its accession, the country now seems to have the EU was supported by just a narrow “mentally” joined the European Union. majority of 52 per cent of the electorate in 1994, a clear majority of 56 per cent rejected the introduction of the euro in Dwindling potential for dissent 2003. Moreover, Sweden was long to be The more positive image that the EU enjoys found among the EU member states that in Swedish society today has also been showed the highest shares of critical or translated into politics. The pro-EU turn negative attitudes towards the EU in opin- was fostered by changing dynamics of party ion polls like the Eurobarometer. Swedish competition and parliamentary majority euroscepticism also became evident in the building. It has become a rule in Swedish 2004 elections for the European Parliament politics to form party blocs with a view to when a party called June List, which cam- securing majority governments. This is in paigned against the Constitutional Treaty contrast to the traditional way of minority and for a permanent opt-out for Sweden governments, which tried to get support from Economic and Monetary Union, man- from all parties represented in the Riksdag. aged to secure 15 per cent of the vote and In doing so, minority governments were 3 of 19 Swedish mandates in the EP. able to maintain a certain degree of strate- Against this background, there have gic freedom. The need for programmatic been remarkable changes in Swedish public conformity was limited because, in case of opinion in the last years. EU membership is conflict, one could simply turn to another hardly controversial any longer. In summer partner. The main beneficiary of this SWP Comments 25 October 2010 2 system was the Social Democratic Party made a precondition to secure a broad (SAP), which used to cooperate with parties consensus in parliament and society in on both sides of the political spectrum. favour of the euro. This caveat was tanta- The emergence of a centre-right coali- mount to an objection in principle because tion, which led to the replacement of the the popularity of the single currency in Social Democrat minority government Sweden has suffered in recent months. By under Göran Persson in 2006, deprived the means of devaluating the crown, Sweden SAP of this option. In return, the party managed to get through the global finan- formalised cooperation with the Greens cial crisis comparatively well. The con- (Miljöpartiet) and the Left Party with a view tinued precarious situation of the euro and to forming a coalition government with its the fact that two important partners of own parliamentary majority. Hence, in the Sweden – Denmark and the United King- last elections voters were offered a clear-cut dom – remain outside the euro zone con- choice between two party blocs. tributes to the persistence of Swedish euro- The emergence of party blocs has effec- scepticism. tively reduced the degree of polarisation over EU issues. In the past the Greens and the Left Party had been promoting EU-scep- Implications of the success of the tic views as part of their ideological profile. Sweden Democrats Yet joining a left bloc together with the Unlike in Denmark there was no intense more pro-EU Social Democrats put tremen- public debate on migration policy prior to dous pressure on the Left Party to adapt the success of the right-wing populists. In and harmonise positions. the case of Sweden, it was instrumental The development had already started in that a marginalisation strategy pursued by autumn 2008 when the Greens removed all mainstream political parties and the the demand to leave the EU from their media turned out to be ineffective, paving party programme in order to prepare the the way for the SD. Given the parliamentary ground for a common campaign platform representation the Sweden Democrats now with the SAP. Although the Left Party post- possess, it seems questionable whether poned a similar decision to its next party sticking to this strategy of marginalisation congress in 2011, it did not pursue its is appropriate. anti-EU stance during the election cam- This, in turn, leads to two possible sce- paign. Instead, both parties endorsed a narios for future handling of the Sweden joint red-green manifesto on Europe in Democrats. One option could be to con- which they accepted, for the first time, tinue marginalising the SD and putting all fundamental aspects of European integra- hope into a factional dismantling process tion. The Greens acknowledged the prin- driven by internal conflicts and dismay. ciple of supranationality, albeit restricted History would repeat itself, as another to environmental policy and fighting right-wing populist party – New Democracy cross-border crime. The Left Party, in turn, (Ny Demokrati) – suffered a similar fate in the accepted the principle of solidarity within early 1990s when the party disappeared the Union, even in military issues.
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