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Request ID Date Received by TSA FOIA Requester Name Request Description Date on Request 2017-TSFO-00001 10/5/2016 Jespersen

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Request ID Date Received by TSA FOIA Requester Name Request Description Date on Request 2017-TSFO-00001 10/5/2016 Jespersen Date Received by Date on Request ID Requester Name Request Description TSA FOIA Request 2017-TSFO-00001 10/5/2016 Jespersen, Kirsti Request for any communications, reports, 10/4/2016 investigations, or analyses concerning the prospective increase in federal processing burden with the adoption of chip passport books and passport cards, the requirement of passport books and passport cards for inter-state air travel, the passport books and passport cards, and the requirement of passport books and passport cards for inter-state air travel. 2017-TSFO-00002 10/5/2016 Risenhoover, Paul Request for records regarding FAA, TSA, the Armed 10/4/2016 Forces, and State Department ensuring the flight safety of the Taipei Flight Information Region, given the Taipei FLIR does not directly participate in ICAO. Include any documents relating to transit through US airports by Taiwan airplanes. Also, provide documents regarding the nationality of Formosans in the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS)? Or in eAPIS? 2017-TSFO-00003 10/6/2016 (b)(6) Request for video at Cleveland Hopkins Airport since 9/30/2016 June 2016. 2017-TSFO-00004 10/6/2016 (b)(6) Request for TSA bag inspection video from New Orleans 10/5/2016 International Airport (MSY) on September 26, 2016. 2017-TSFO-00005 10/6/2016 Wagner, Ben Request for copies of all TSA explosive detection canine 10/5/2016 certification records at General Mitchell International Airport in Milwaukee, WI between January 1, 2011- October 4, 2016. 2017-TSFO-00006 10/7/2016 Jespersen, Kirsti Request for any communications, reports, 10/6/2016 investigations, or analyses concerning the prospective impact to the air travel economy and air travel industry with the adoption of chip passport books and passport cards, the passport books and passport cards for interstate air travel, the chip passport books and passport cards, and the requirement of passport books and passport cards for interstate air travel. 2017-TSFO-00007 10/7/2016 Jespersen, Kirsti Any communications, reports, assessments, 10/6/2016 investigations, or databases concerning or referring to the use of state-issued identification by illegal aliens/unauthorized residents or extremists traveling via inter-state air. Temporal scope of this request is from 2010 to September 2016. 2017-TSFO-00008 10/7/2016 Leavitt, Ashley Request the Standard Operating Procedures in place for 10/6/2016 Aviation Security, including, Screening Checkpoint SOP, Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques SOP, and Screening Management SOP during the time period of 2010 through 2011. Request any and all records and video or audio of the Boston Logan International Airport TSA checkpoint on August 11, 2011 related to the seizure of $60,000. 2017-TSFO-00009 10/11/2016 (b)(6) Request for video recording of the alleged incident that 10/6/2016 occurred on February 8, 2016. 2017-TSFO-00010 10/11/2016 Guy, David Request copies of maintenance records of a 10/6/2016 breathalyzer used under TSA for TSA screener drug testing at CHS Airport. Serial #8739. I am requesting records starting 4/29/2016 - 8/29/2016. 2017-TSFO-00011 10/11/2016 (b)(6) Requesting a copy of the video recorded at Houston 10/11/2016 International Airport on Saturday, September 10, 2016. 2017-TSFO-00012 10/12/2016 (b)(6) Request the footage of the TSA screening of my 10/7/2016 belongings at TTN airport in Trenton, NJ. 2017-TSFO-00013 10/13/2016 (b)(6) Request for a copy of a letter. 10/12/2016 2017-TSFO-00014 10/14/2016 Mannion, Patrick All records pertaining the attempted establishment of a 10/14/2016 TSA Chaplaincy Program. 2017-TSFO-00015 10/17/2016 Cook, Mary Request for a copy of the documents containing the cost 10/17/2016 per passenger and quality measures including threat image projection detection rates, recertification pass rate, wait times, and customer satisfaction for airport screening services be provided to me for 2015 for the following airports: San Francisco International Airport Logan International Airport Kansas City International Airport Salt Lake City International Airport Greater Rochester International Airport Syracuse-Hancock International Airport Joe Foss Field Missoula International Airport Jackson Hole Airport Central Illinois Regional Airport Tupelo Regional Airport Barkley Regional Airport 2017-TSFO-00016 10/18/2016 (b)(6) Request for any document showing that payment of or 10/14/2016 failure to pay child support is used as a factor in determining whether to place a person on the No Fly List or the selectee list or the terrorist watch list. Also please provide any document showing that failure to pay child support was considered or is being considered as a potential factor or reason to place someone on the No Fly List or the selectee list or the terrorist watch list. 2017-TSFO-00017 10/19/2016 Zabetta, Ray Request for any written directive, guidance or policy (if 10/18/2016 any), on public photography of TSA staff and public photography inside airport terminals of secure or non- secure areas. 2017-TSFO-00018 10/20/2016 (b)(6) Any and all video surveillance of a slip and fall that 10/20/2016 occurred in or around the breakroom/training room for Transportation Security Administration employees on the first floor of the Jacksonville International Airport on the morning of February 11, 2012. 2017-TSFO-00019 10/20/2016 Terpstra, Patrick Request for all correspondence to TSA Administrator 10/19/2016 Peter Neffenger from members of Congress and U.S. Senators from Jan. 1, 2016 to the present from these states: Washington State Oklahoma Florida Massaschusetts New Hampshire Tennessee Ohio Pennsylvania Georgia North Carolina South Carolina. 2017-TSFO-00020 10/24/2016 Hammock, Douglas Request for information regarding canines. 10/21/2016 2017-TSFO-00021 10/24/2016 (b)(6) Request for copies performance evaluationsand scoring 10/20/2016 sheets. 2017-TSFO-00022 10/25/2016 Cronin, Margarita Request for TSA Agile Services contract (TAS) No. 10/24/2016 HSTS03-16-R-CIO585 awarded to Accenture Federal Services LLC in September 2016. 2017-TSFO-00023 10/25/2016 Smirnov, Oleg Request for statistics on how many Law Enforcement 10/21/2016 Officers flied armed in past 5 years. 2017-TSFO-00024 10/26/2016 Phillips, James Request the number of Federal Air Marshals who: 1) 10/21/2016 retired in 2016, 2) were approved for retirement credentials and LEOSA card, 3) were declined retirement credentials and LEOSA Card during this same period. 2017-TSFO-00025 10/28/2016 Roy, Bijon All versions of the Transportation Security Agency's 10/26/2016 "Secure Flight Overflight Table", from version 2.0 (January 6, 2014) to the present/current version. 2017-TSFO-00026 10/31/2016 Cooper, Joseph Request for a copy of contract number HSTS04-15-D- 10/28/2016 CT3002 with Morpho Detection for maintenance of Morpho Detection EBSP checked baggage equipment with a period of performance of approximately August 1, 2015 through July 31, 2018, and contract any modifications. 2017-TSFO-00027 10/31/2016 (b)(6) CCTV recordings of from Logan Airport on 13 June 2016 10/28/2016 showing: a.) TSA agent station and adjacent ticket counters in terminal E, level 3 Departures and b.) TSA agent station in terminal E, level 2 Departures beside gate E1B. 2017-TSFO-00028 1/5/2017 (b)(6) Request for the current EEO contract between DHS / 10/28/2016 TSA and contractor “Bashen Corporation.” 2. Complete DHS and or TSA audits conducted of or on Bashen Corporation for the years: 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013 and 2012. 2017-TSFO-00029 11/1/2016 Cooper, Joseph Request for a copy of contract number HSTS04-15-D- 10/28/2016 CT3000 with L# for maintenance of L3 EBSP Checked Baggage Equipment and modifications. 2017-TSFO-00030 11/1/2016 Campbell, Ricky A copy of any and all passenger complaints filed either 10/31/2016 through TSA's online complaint form or at one of the following airports: Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP), Rochester International Airport (RST) and St. Cloud Regional Airport (STC) relating to TSA officers accused of assaults, sexual or otherwise, in 2016. Also, any incident reports related to these accusations and any memoranda issued at these airports outlining assault accusations. 2017-TSFO-00032 11/2/2016 Morabito, Nathan Request for copies of all TSA complaints related to Tri- 10/31/2016 Cities Regional Airport in Blountville, TN filed between October 31, 2015 and October 31, 2016. 2017-TSFO-00033 11/2/2016 Santos, Rose Request for a copy of the following documents identified 10/28/2016 to HSTS0314JOIA293: 1. contract, SOW and all modifications. 2017-TSFO-00034 11/4/2016 (b)(6) Requesting CCTV footage of GRR Checkpoint A, that 11/3/2016 covers the search table in Pre-Check Lane, at around on October 4, 2016. 2017-TSFO-00035 11/4/2016 (b)(6) Any video covering the baggage claim area as shown on 11/3/2016 1/11/15 at Boston Logan Airport. 2017-TSFO-00036 11/7/2016 (b)(6) Request is for the Names and ID numbers of all 11/03/2016 employees of TSA that worked the Security Check Point Area in Terminal #3 at Sky Harbor International Airport, Phoenix, Arizona, on January 14, 2014. In addition, the security tape footage on January 14, 2014. 2017-TSFO-00037 11/7/2016 (b)(6) Rquesting all records and recording of my entire 11/4/2016 movement through the line and post AIT machine and contact with security personnel after my movement through the machine. 2017-TSFO-00038 11/8/2016 Payes Martinez, Request for a copy of all decisions issued by Senior 11/7/2016 Victor Official Reviewers in response to Request for Reviews (RFR) filed with the National Resolution Center (NRC) within TSA's Office of Human Capital (OHC) pursuant TSA HCM Letter No.
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