DOCSLIB.ORG

First External Review of the OBR

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
First External Review of the OBR External review of the Office for Budget Responsibility Kevin Page September 2014 External review of the Office for Budget Responsibility Kevin Page Presented to Parliament pursuant to Schedule 1 Section 16 of the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 September 2014 © Crown copyright 2014 You may re-use this information (excluding logos) free of charge in any format or medium, under the terms of the Open Government Licence v.2. To view this licence visit www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open- government-licence/version/2/ or email [email protected]. uk Where third party material has been identified, permission from the respective copyright holder must be sought. This publication is available at www.gov.uk/government/publications and http://budgetresponsibility.org.uk Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us at [email protected]. Print ISBN 9781474110594 Web ISBN 9781474110600 PU1690 Printed in the UK by the Williams Lea Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office ID 28081411 09/14 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum Contents Page Foreword 3 Executive summary 5 Chapter 1 Introduction 17 Chapter 2 Methodology 19 Chapter 3 Context 21 Chapter 4 Inputs 31 Chapter 5 Outputs: technical assessment 41 Chapter 6 Outputs: transparency assessment 53 Chapter 7 Outcomes 63 Chapter 8 Conclusions and recommendations 75 Annex A Review team biographies 79 Annex B External review terms of reference 81 Annex C Selection of IFI evaluation framework paper for OECD 83 Annex D Letter from OBR Chairman confirming access to data 95 Annex E Stakeholder survey and methodology 97 Annex F Survey of Parliamentarians and guidelines for reissuing 103 Annex G Media tracking methodology 109 Annex H Acknowledgements 111 Annex I Abbreviations and glossary 113 Annex J Bibliography 115 1 Foreword The Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 requires the Non-executive members of the United Kingdom’s (UK) Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) to commission an external review every five years, to examine the content and quality of the reports published by the OBR. On 4 April 2014, I was officially appointed by the two Non-executive members of the OBR, Lord Burns and Dame Kate Barker, to undertake the organisation’s first independent review. Prior to the appointment by the Non-executives, Mr Robert Chote, the OBR Chairman, had approached me in the summer of 2013 to inquire as to whether I would be available (and interested) to undertake such a project. At the time, I had just completed my five-year mandate as Canada’s first Parliamentary Budget Officer and had begun a new assignment at the University of Ottawa (Faculty of Social Sciences), as the Jean-Luc Pepin Research Chair (JLP). I was principally interested in the project because, from afar, I had been aware of both the quality and perceived impact of the work of the OBR. Independent fiscal institutions (IFI) like the OBR or Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) tend to have relatively small budgets and, contrastingly, significant mandates. So, as practitioners, we tend to look abroad to see what our peers might be doing. We look for references, for instance in the provision of fiscal forecasts or sustainability analysis and the resulting impact that these reports might have on political discourse, transparency and accountability. At about the same time as I received the appointment for the OBR review, I had also been tasked by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to develop a framework for the evaluation of IFIs, whose numbers had grown rapidly in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. Within this new community of practice, some of the IFIs, like that in Canada, had experienced trials and tribulations towards political acceptance even though the gains in fiscal transparency for legislatures and other stakeholders had been significant. The remit of the OBR is clear and includes as its main duty ‘to examine and report on the sustainability of the public finances’ and the responsibility to carry out that work ‘objectively, transparently and impartially’. The terms of reference for the external review are equally clear and include the examination of the quality of the OBR’s main publications, the effectiveness of its methodologies and governance, and the capability of the OBR team. It is my view that the UK Parliament should be commended for including the provision of a periodic external review in the OBR’s founding legislation. Periodic external reviews should be considered a best practice to be emulated by other IFIs. The approach taken in the evaluation framework, which includes four distinct elements (context, inputs, outputs and outcomes), follows a performance framework approach used by governments around the world. It starts with context – in this case, the institutional structure and objectives of the organisation. The OBR has a very distinct structure given its dual accountabilities to both the executive branch and legislative branch (i.e. Parliament). Capability, methodology, governance (i.e. inputs) and products (i.e. outputs) are assessed against benchmarks in other OECD countries and, where possible, against observable counterfactuals. Two separate detailed surveys were conducted for Parliamentarians and stakeholders to assess the impact and quality of OBR work from an outcome perspective. This work was supplemented by expert interviews. The interview list and the survey questions are provided in the annexes to this report. 3 I also wish to attest that the evaluation effort was undertaken both with complete independence and with the full cooperation and support of the entire OBR team and the Non-executives. The interactions included in-person interviews, the exchange of documents as well as other data and information. An embargoed draft copy of the evaluation was shared with the two Non-executive members on 20 August 2014, the Budget Responsibility Committee on 26 August 2014 and senior civil servants in HM Treasury on 27 August 2014. The purpose of sharing the embargoed document was to enable these parties to prepare their respective official responses to the published report, if they deemed it necessary. The evaluation team included my two colleagues from the University of Ottawa, Sahir Khan and Helaina Gaspard, as well as a former colleague from Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Office, Randall Bartlett. Mr Khan is a former Assistant Parliamentary Budget Officer in Canada and Dr Gaspard is a senior research associate with JLP Chair. The team also included two seconded (but independent) civil servants from Her Majesty’s Treasury, Victoria Jones and Naomi Adams. Their work was invaluable and the result of their tireless effort and dedication to the project. Kevin Page Jean-Luc Pepin Research Chair University of Ottawa Canada 4 Executive summary The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) was established in 2010 ‘to address past weaknesses in the credibility of economic and fiscal forecasting and, consequently, fiscal policy’.1 Its legislative foundations lay in the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act (2011) (the Act) and are operationalised through the Charter for Budget Responsibility (2011) (the Charter). Accountable to the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Chancellor) and to Parliament (namely through the Treasury Select Committee), the OBR has five principle responsibilities arising from the Act and the Charter: 1 the production of economic and fiscal forecasts; 2 an assessment of the extent to which the government’s fiscal targets have been, or are likely to be, achieved; 3 an assessment of the accuracy of its previous fiscal and economic forecasts; 4 an assessment of the long-term sustainability of the UK public finances; and 5 scrutiny and certification of the government’s policy costings (the OBR itself does not produce costings). To fulfil its mandate, the OBR produces reports and related documents, supports the Chancellor and his/her department in their management of the public finances and responds to stakeholder questions, including those of Parliamentarians. The OBR is required to lay its legally mandated reports before Parliament and to provide testimony and evidence to Parliamentary committees related to budgetary and fiscal matters. The terms of reference for this review require that the quality of the OBR’s publications, the effectiveness of its methodology and governance, and the capability of its staff to fulfil its mandate be evaluated, pursuant to its legislation. For this first evaluation, the OBR was assessed using a framework generally recognised among governments, via a methodology being developed by the University of Ottawa’s Jean-Luc Pepin Research Chair, with the supporting sponsorship of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This IFI evaluation framework is comprised of four categories – context, inputs, outputs and outcomes – defined below. 1 Context: The unique political and institutional environment housing the independent fiscal institution (IFI) as well as its legally defined mandate. For IFIs there are both domestic and international contexts for their operations. 2 Inputs: Quantification and quality assessment of the IFI’s resources (both financial and human). It is necessary to consider organisational inputs as a factor for comparison and possible influencers of institutional capacity, productivity and relevance. 3 Outputs: The quality of products developed and released by the IFI based on the functions defined in its mandate (i.e. economic and fiscal forecasting, fiscal sustainability, costing, budgetary advisory). 1 HM Treasury (2014) Charter for Budget Responsibility, ch.2.2. 5 4 Outcomes: Stakeholders’ perceived confidence in the IFI’s work and their use of its products. This evaluation is based on: data collected from the OBR, government departments and agencies, and international organisations; expert stakeholder interviews; a stakeholder survey; media tracking analysis; and an evaluation of the OBR’s products. Context The OBR’s domestic context is composed of its legislative mandate and its political and institutional environments.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Annual Report N O Ti a Ch a Derniz O Access Outre M 2012 2013 Contact the Library of Parliament
    2012 2013 ACCESS OUTREACH MODERNIZATION Annual Report Contact the Library of Parliament Library of Parliament Ottawa, Canada K1A 0A9 Email: [email protected] Telephone: 613-995-1166 Fax: 613-992-1269 Public line: 613-992-4793 Toll-free: 1-866-599-4999 Web: www.parl.gc.ca/library © Library of Parliament, 2013 Cat. no.: YL1-1/2013E-PDF ISSN 2292-1745 II Annual Report 2012–2013 Contents Message from the Parliamentary Librarian . 2 The Library at a Glance . 4 The Year in Review . 8 Commitment to client service during a year of change . 8 Customized research and analysis . 10 The specialized work of the Parliamentary Budget Officer . 13 The Library by the numbers . 14 Our Key Accomplishments . 15 The Library’s strategic plan supports continuous service improvement . 15 Improving access and service . 17 Preserving Parliament’s documentary heritage . 19 Creating more streamlined operations . 22 Improving outreach and awareness . 24 Keeping parliamentarians up to date . 27 Management Team . 30 Financial Review . 31 1 Message from the Parliamentary Librarian 2 Annual Report 2012–2013 The Library can be very proud of the work it accomplished in 2012–2013 . Despite confronting a number of challenges throughout the year, we continued to deliver high-quality services to our clients and make significant progress on our strategic priorities . My first year of tenure as Parliamentary Librarian was one of change and of transformation in how we serve parliamentarians and Canadians . Indeed, in 2012–2013, the focus was on examining our priorities and re-evaluating the current and future needs of our clients, which resulted in changes to our workforce and how we operate .
    [Show full text]
  • 2017 Thunder Bay Convocation Program
    53RD CONVOCATION 2017 THUNDER BAY, ONTARIO The Arms of the University were granted by the Earl Marshal, the Duke of Norfolk, on June 20, 1959 The heraldic description is: Coat of Arms “Barry wavy of six Argent and Azure on a Chief Gules in front of a rising Sun issuant from the base of the Chief Or between two Candles enflamed proper each surmounted of an open Book also proper edged and bound Gold a Portcullis chained Sable” Crest “On a Wreath Or and Azure on Water Barry wavy Argent and Azure in front of a Rock growing therefrom a Pine Tree a Canoe paddled by an Indian Brave and Canadian Trapper.” Motto Ad augusta per angusta Achievement through effort About our Friday, June 2, 2017 at 2pm Faculty of Engineering CEREMONIES Faculty of Law Faculty of Medicine Saturday, June 3, 2017 at 9:30am Faculty of Business Administration Faculty of Health & Behavioural Sciences Faculty of Natural Resources Management Saturday, June 3, 2017 at 2pm Faculty of Education Faculty of Science and Environmental Studies Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities WELCOME TO LAKEHEAD UNIVERSITY’S 53RD CONVOCATION CELEBRATION! Convocation is a traditional ceremony during which the University University – the Chancellor, who presides at convocation, the President officially grants the degrees and diplomas earned by its students. and Vice-Chancellor and the Chair of the Board of Governors – The word “convocation” means “calling together.” It is a are all of the Oxford cut and trim. Each has its own distinctive ceremonial meeting of the entire University community. colour. The colourful gowns worn by the individuals who are receiving honorary degrees are of the same design as are the black gowns worn by the student candidates.
    [Show full text]
  • A Different Normal
    www.policymagazine.ca September—October 2020 ›› featured section Canadian Politics and Public Policy The Conservative Race A Different Normal $6.95 Volume 8 – Issue 5 Essential to the Economy Serving exporters, importers, retailers, farmers and manufacturers, CN’s transportation services are integral to modern life, touching the lives of millions of people every day. $250B 25% WORTH OF GOODS OF WHAT WE TRANSPORT TRANSPORTED IS EXPORTED 26,000 $2.9B RAILROADERS CAPITAL INVESTMENTS EMPLOYED (2020) cn.ca Essential_Economy_Policy_Magazine.indd 1 8/19/2020 4:11:07 PM CanadianIn ThisPolitics Issue and Pub lic FromPoli cythe Editor / L. Ian MacDonald 2 A Different Normal and the Tory Leadership Canadian Politics and 3 Kevin Lynch and Paul Deegan Public Policy Preparing for Canada’s Next Normal 7 Kevin Page EDITOR AND PUBLISHER A Fall Budget 2020 Strategy: Drive Toward the Future L. Ian MacDonald Shachi Kurl [email protected] 10 The Mood of Canada: Beyond the Coronavirus Summer ASSOCIATE EDITOR of our Discontent Lisa Van Dusen [email protected] Bob Kirke and Elliot Lifson 13 CONTRIBUTING WRITERS The Way We Wore: The COVID Crisis in Canada’s Thomas S. Axworthy, Clothing Industry Andrew Balfour, Yaroslav Baran, Vianne Timmons James Baxter, Derek H. Burney, 15 Catherine Cano, Margaret Clarke, A Summer Road Trip: Resilience and Hope on The Rock Rachel Curran, Paul Deegan, Lori Turnbull John Delacourt, Susan Delacourt, 17 The Politics of Prorogation Graham Fraser, Dan Gagnier, Helaina Gaspard, Martin Goldfarb, Sarah Goldfeder, Patrick Gossage, The Conservative Race Frank Graves, Shachi Kurl, Brad Lavigne, Kevin Lynch, Jeremy Kinsman, Yaroslav Baran Peter Mansbridge, Carissima Mathen, 20 The Conservatives and Post-Pandemic Politics Elizabeth May, Velma McColl, David McLaughlin, David Mitchell, 23 Geoff Norquay Don Newman, Geoff Norquay, Job One for A New Leader—Putting the Party Back Together Fen Osler-Hampson, Kevin Page, Jaime Watt Robin V.
    [Show full text]
  • Enabling First Nations Children to Thrive
    ENABLING FIRST NATIONS CHILDREN TO THRIVE Report to the Assembly of First Nations pursuant to contract no. 19-00505-001 Institute of Fiscal Studies and Democracy at the University of Ottawa December 15, 2018 December 15, 2018 Jonathan Thompson Director, Social Development Assembly of First Nations 55 Metcalfe Street, Suite 1600 Ottawa, ON K1P 6L5 Dear Mr. Thompson, Pursuant to contract no. 19-00505-001, the Institute of Fiscal Studies and Democracy at the University of Ottawa is pleased to submit the report: Enabling First Nations Children to Thrive. We trust that this report meets the expectations set out in the terms of reference for this project. We are grateful for the support of the Assembly of First Nations, the National Advisory Committee, and the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, as well as to our expert panel and reviewers. We especially wish to thank the First Nations child and family services agencies, their leadership and their staff for their exceptional work. Yours sincerely, Kevin Page President & CEO Enabling First Nations Children To Thrive IFSD ENABLING FIRST NATIONS CHILDREN TO THRIVE Helaina Gaspard, Ph.D. This report was prepared under the supervision of Kevin Page, President & CEO of the Institute of Fiscal Studies and Democracy (IFSD). The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sahir Khan, Azfar Ali Khan, Janoah Willsie, Taylor Rubens-Augustson, Xin (Vivian) Liu, Salma Mohamed, Eli Dzik, and Stephanie Seiler. COPYRIGHT Copyright © 2019 National Indian Brotherhood. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, electronic, mechanical, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder.
    [Show full text]
  • The Case of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO)
    Accountability and Financial Oversight Reform: The Case of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) by Daniel McKenzie A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University of Manitoba in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Studies University of Manitoba Winnipeg Copyright © 2012 by Daniel McKenzie Abstract The Conservative Government came to power in 2006 on a platform of accountability. One aspect of this platform was the creation of a Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO). The PBO was intended to contribute to a higher level of accountability in government budgeting. This thesis seeks to explain why the PBO was created, what it does, and contemplates whether the PBO has been able to help Parliamentarians hold the Executive to account. In addition, the thesis questions how the PBO itself is held accountable. Finally the study considers potential changes to the PBO and what might become of the PBO after its conspicuous first leader Kevin Page passes from the scene. Minor changes to the PBO’s legislation and placement within the institutions of government may improve the results of the PBO. However, the PBO’s effectiveness, independence and accountability will still depend on the office’s structural characteristics and leadership. 2 For Mom and Dad 3 Acknowledgements I am forever indebted to my parents. Without them this project would never have been completed. I am very fortunate to have loving parents who have always been there to support me emotionally and financially in whatever endeavours I have taken on. I am also grateful to those members of the faculty of the University of Manitoba who have advised me during this project, in particular Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • REFORMING FISCAL INSTITUTIONS in CANADA Mostafa Askari,* Kevin
    REFORMING FISCAL INSTITUTIONS IN CANADA Mostafa Askari,* Kevin Page* and Stephen Tapp* 1 Persistent structural deficits and the lead-up to the 1990s fiscal crisis Canada experienced a fiscal crisis in the mid-1990s. The crisis came to a head due to a confluence of factors, but ultimately occurred because successive governments failed to address significant structural deficits that persisted for decades. Some statistics help convey the gravity of the problem: prior to balancing the budget federally in 1997, Canada ran 27 consecutive deficits (Figure 1). The PBO estimates that the federal government’s structural deficit – which attempts to adjust for the fiscal impacts of the business cycle – averaged 5.3 per cent of GDP in the two decades prior to the crisis (Figure 2). With these large deficits, the federal debt-to-GDP ratio rose steadily over two decades, from 18 per cent in 1974 to a post-WWII high of 68 per cent in 1994. As government debt grew, so did public debt charges. At more than 6 per cent of GDP, debt charges represented 38 cents of every dollar in federal government revenue and increasingly crowded out the resources available to deliver public services. Prior to the fiscal crisis, some partial corrective policy actions were taken that modestly improved the federal government’s structural budget balance.1 However, while government budget forecasts repeatedly predicted falling deficits in the early 1990s, these failed to materialize due to high domestic interest rates (aimed at reducing inflation) and the effects of a lingering recession. Concerns about the credibility of the government’s forecasts eventually led to an external review (Ernst and Young, 1994).
    [Show full text]
  • Background Note
    Parliament of Australia Department of Parliamentary Services Parliamentary Library Information, analysis and advice for the Parliament www.aph.gov.au/library 19 July 2010, 2010–11 Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration Inquiry into the Parliamentary Budget Office Bill 2010 Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 Mandate....................................................................................................................................... 4 Institutional location ................................................................................................................... 6 Resources and method of financing ............................................................................................ 7 Appointment processes ............................................................................................................... 9 Relationship with other agencies .............................................................................................. 11 Outputs and confidentiality ....................................................................................................... 12 Attachment 1 ............................................................................................................................. 14 Introduction The process of budgeting is getting more difficult as countries face emerging issues such as ageing populations, climate
    [Show full text]
  • Speaker Biographies
    Our Children, Our Future: First Nations Child and Family Services and Self-Determination Dr. Helaina Gaspard, Director, Governance and Institutions, New Institute of Fiscal Studies and Democracy, University of Ottawa Helaina is a researcher, advisor, teacher and convener. Her work focuses on the state institutions that incentivize and govern the behaviour of actors, influencing the performance of organizations and public policy outcomes. Kevin Page, Chief Executive Officer, New Institute of Fiscal Studies and Democracy, University of Ottawa Kevin Page is the current Chief Executive Officer of the New Institute of Fiscal Studies and Democracy at the University of Ottawa. Prior to this position, he was the Jean-Luc Pepin Research Chair in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ottawa from 2013 to 2016. He was Canada’s first Parliamentary Budget Officer from 2008 to 2013. He has 27 years of experience in the federal public service with most of those years spent at three central agencies responsible for budgeting. He was the Assistant Secretary to Cabinet for Macroeconomic Policy at the Privy Council Office before becoming Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer. He has a Master’s degree in Economics from Queen’s University. He was born in Fort William (Thunder Bay) Ontario. He is married and a father of three children. Cindy Blackstock, PhD, Executive Director, First Nations Child and Family Caring Society A member of the Gitxsan First Nation, Cindy is honoured to serve as the Executive Director of the First Nations Child and Family Caring Society and a professor at McGill University’s School of Social Work.
    [Show full text]
  • Core 1..32 Committee (PRISM::Advent3b2 10.50)
    House of Commons CANADA Standing Committee on Finance FINA Ï NUMBER 024 Ï 3rd SESSION Ï 40th PARLIAMENT EVIDENCE Thursday, June 3, 2010 Chair Mr. James Rajotte 1 Standing Committee on Finance Thursday, June 3, 2010 Ï (1530) For the first hour of discussion on this bill, we have with us the [English] Parliamentary Budget Officer, Mr. Kevin Page. We also have three of his colleagues with us: Mr. Sahir Khan, Mr. Mostafa Askari, and The Chair (Mr. James Rajotte (Edmonton—Leduc, CPC)): I Mr. Jason Jacques. Thank you for being with us. call to order the 24th meeting of the Standing Committee on Finance. In our orders today, pursuant to the order of reference of As a committee, we also want to thank you for your letter and Wednesday, March 3, 2010, we are continuing our study of Bill your work in costing out this private member's bill, particularly your C-290, An Act to amend the Income Tax Act (tax credit for loss of letter of May 14, 2010. Thank you very much for doing that work on retirement income). behalf of the committee. We certainly appreciate it. This afternoon we have a panel from 3:30 until 4:30 and then Mr. Page, you have time for an opening statement regarding this clause-by-clause consideration from 4:30 to 5:30. bill, and then we'll have questions from members. I have two items I want to deal with at the beginning of the Mr. Kevin Page (Parliamentary Budget Officer, Library of meeting. First of all, Monsieur Paillé would like the floor to present a Parliament): Good afternoon.
    [Show full text]
  • No. 2 Canadian Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer
    Submission No 2 INQUIRY INTO THE PARLIAMENTARY BUDGET OFFICE Organisation: Canadian Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer Name: Mr Kevin Page Position: Parliamentary Budget Officer Date Received: 12/08/2011 Submission to the Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office Parliament of New South Wales* By Kevin Page Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer August 11, 2011 * Please note this paper was submitted to the Joint Select Committee on the Parliamentary Budget Office – Parliament of Australia in December 2010. 2 The purpose of this paper is to describe the mandate and the first two years of experience of Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) starting from the appointment of the Budget Officer on March 25, 2008. The paper reviews the Canadian context, the legislation, the operating model and lessons learned. A number of issues are highlighted to facilitate discussions on how to strengthen the role of a legislative budget office in Canada. The views expressed are those of the author, Kevin Page, Canada’s first Parliamentary Budget Officer. Canadian Context There are a number of factors that are important to understand the context for the creation of a Parliamentary Budget Officer position in Canada including the nature of Canada’s parliamentary system, the recent evolution of Canadian public finance and the passage of the Accountability Act in Canada in December of 2006. Canadian Parliamentary System and Financial Procedures Canada is both a parliamentary democracy and a constitutional monarchy1. The Constitution Act provides that there will be one Parliament for Canada consisting of the Crown, the Senate and the House of Commons. The Senate is composed of people appointed by the Governor General to represent Canadian provinces and territories.
    [Show full text]
  • The Parliamentary Budget Officer Two Years Later: a Progress Report
    The Parliamentary Budget Officer Two Years Later: A Progress Report Brooke Jeffrey In March 2008 Canada’s newest watchdog, the Parliamentary Budget Officer, was appointed with considerable fanfare and widespread support. Two years later the record of achievements is considerable – five economic and fiscal updates and more than twenty research reports, all of which have been widely praised – but both the post and its first incumbent, Kevin Page, have also proven highly controversial. This article explores the development of the office and the problems that have surfaced since the Parliamentary Budget Officer was appointed. he proposal for a Parliamentary Budget Officer When he became Prime Minister in 2004, Mr. Martin was first put forward by the Conservatives in responded to these concerns by commissioning Ttheir 2006 election platform, but the original economist and former Bank of Montreal executive motivation to create such a post can be traced to the Dr. Tim O’Neill to review the federal government’s fiscal legacy of the Mulroney Progressive Conservatives fiscal forecasting practices. The O’Neill report, more than a decade earlier. The Mulroney government tabled in June 2005, identified Mr. Martin’s own 1998 had made deficit reduction a focal point of its policy introduction of a no-deficit rule as “the major cause of agenda but ultimately presided over a period of the persistent upside surplus surprises at the end of exponential growth in the federal debt and deficit. each fiscal year.”2 However the report also stressed Meanwhile forecasts by the Finance Department there were no real technical problems with the Finance consistently underestimated the extent of the problem Department’s forecasting procedures, and reiterated and served to heighten the concerns of economists and that the surplus phenomenon was a predictable opposition politicians about the state of the nation’s result of prudence.
    [Show full text]
  • The Case of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO)
    Accountability and Financial Oversight Reform: The Case of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) by Daniel McKenzie A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of The University of Manitoba in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Studies University of Manitoba Winnipeg Copyright © 2012 by Daniel McKenzie Abstract The Conservative Government came to power in 2006 on a platform of accountability. One aspect of this platform was the creation of a Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO). The PBO was intended to contribute to a higher level of accountability in government budgeting. This thesis seeks to explain why the PBO was created, what it does, and contemplates whether the PBO has been able to help Parliamentarians hold the Executive to account. In addition, the thesis questions how the PBO itself is held accountable. Finally the study considers potential changes to the PBO and what might become of the PBO after its conspicuous first leader Kevin Page passes from the scene. Minor changes to the PBO’s legislation and placement within the institutions of government may improve the results of the PBO. However, the PBO’s effectiveness, independence and accountability will still depend on the office’s structural characteristics and leadership. 2 For Mom and Dad 3 Acknowledgements I am forever indebted to my parents. Without them this project would never have been completed. I am very fortunate to have loving parents who have always been there to support me emotionally and financially in whatever endeavours I have taken on. I am also grateful to those members of the faculty of the University of Manitoba who have advised me during this project, in particular Dr.
    [Show full text]