Changing dynamics of digital media in

Chunmeizi Su

Master of Arts in Communication (Zhengzhou University) Bachelor of Arts in Communication and Journalism (Henan University of Technology)

A thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Creative Industries Faculty

Queensland University of Technology 2019

ii Abstract

The Chinese online behemoths , Alibaba and (also known as BAT) dominate on the market for the Chinese mainland in fields that include e-commerce, digital entertainment, e-finance and artificial intelligence (AI). To understand BAT’s corporate power and their strategic role in screen industry – in this case the streaming platforms —this thesis examines the capabilities of these three oligopolies, and their integrated power in production culture. The synergy between BAT and the streaming services is mutually beneficial. However, with the rising of global distribution platforms such as , the question to be asked is will BAT help China develop innovative screen media industry systems similar to those of (western countries) like US and elsewhere in the world?

Drawing from the theoretical framework of media industry studies, media economics and media globalisation, this thesis is structured around the analysis of platform capitalism and platform convergence theory, to investigate the implications on the transforming screen ecology. Based on television genre and format studies, as well as the newly established online entertainment studies, this thesis analysed the transformations on various content forms, in the context of contemporary digital screen industries. Case studies are adopted as the main research approach, where interviews were one of the primary sources during data collection process.

According to Srnicek (2016), the combination of and YouTube, and

Amazon Prime, BAT and streaming platforms are means to establish market monopolisation.

BAT is rising as a new digital power, however, as they rise into national giants in China and beyond, tensions between capital and state power is becoming a global phenomenon. BAT oscillate between business strategies and policies, as government struggles to regulate and support the domestic as well as global development of these behemoths.

iii New production culture is a content professionalising process, that reconfigures power distributions of media industries, it has ended the age where ‘few people often decide what audiences should watch on a national scale’ (Chan, 2017). BAT and Chinese streaming services contribute to the new production culture, where confrontation between youth culture and high culture, synergies between capital and state power are being addressed. As China challenges the state-owned media systems, international success of Netflix, threatens the Hollywood system as well. Therefore, the overarching argument of this thesis is: as BAT rise into new digital power, they are increasingly empowering and empowered by streaming services, which transforms production culture in content distribution, monetisation, and production, that reconfigures power distributions of media industries in the content professionalising process.

Keywords

Digital entertainment media

Digital platforms

Streaming platforms

Screen productions

Cultural innovation

Digital power

iv Contents

ABSTRACT ...... III

KEYWORDS ...... IV

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES ...... IX

STATEMENT OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP ...... XI

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... XIII

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH ...... 1

1.2 KEY INTRODUCTORY POINTS ...... 2

1.2.1 Cultural influence ...... 2

1.2.2 Advent of the online industry ...... 3

1.2.3 Rise of the digital giants ...... 4

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND APPROACH ...... 6

1.4 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE ...... 8

1.5 THESIS OUTLINE ...... 10

CHAPTER 2: CHANGES IN CHINA’S MEDIA INDUSTRY ...... 15

2.1 THE MEDIA INDUSTRY IN CHINA ...... 16

2.1.1 Media economics ...... 16

2.1.2 The media industry ...... 17

2.1.3 Production culture ...... 19

2.1.4 The traditional screen industry in China ...... 21

2.1.5 The transformation of the Chinese screen industry ...... 24

2.2 THE ONLINE VIDEO INDUSTRY IN CHINA ...... 28

2.2.1 The future of TV ...... 28

2.2.2 Streaming services ...... 31

2.3 THE RISE OF NETFLIX AND ITS IMPACT ON NEW PRODUCTION CULTURE ...... 34

2.3.1 The development of Netflix ...... 34

v 2.3.2 The global strategy of Netflix and its impact on local production ...... 37

2.4 CHINA’S CULTURAL SOFT POWER AND ITS ‘GOING OUT’ AMBITIONS ...... 40

2.4.1 Soft power and national strategy ...... 40

2.4.2 ‘Going out’ strategy ...... 41

2.4.3 Cultural discount ...... 43

2.5 CONCLUSION ...... 46

CHAPTER 3: BAT – THE RISE OF THREE KINGDOMS ...... 48

3.1 DIFFERENTIATING THE WESTERN AND CHINESE MARKETS ...... 48

3.1.1 The service integration spree ...... 48

3.1.2 Catching up the game ...... 55

3.2 THE THREE KINGDOMS: THE BAT ...... 59

3.2.1 The BAT and online media...... 59

3.2.2 BAT and its vision for media empire...... 61

3.3 CONCLUSION ...... 75

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY ...... 77

4.1 CASE STUDIES AS THE MAIN RESEARCH APPROACH ...... 78

4.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AND CONTRIBUTION TO MEDIA INDUSTRIES STUDIES ...... 79

4.3 DATA-COLLECTION METHODS AND PROCEDURES ...... 80

4.3.1 Selection of case studies ...... 81

4.3.2 The use of case study documentation ...... 81

4.3.3 The use of case study Interview ...... 82

4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN ...... 83

4.4.1 Selection of cases ...... 84

4.4.2 Implementation of semi-structured interviews ...... 86

4.5 CONCLUSION ...... 90

CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CHINA’S STREAMING SERVICES ...... 91

5.1 BACKGROUND ON STREAMING SERVICES IN CHINA ...... 91

5.1.1 UGC, original, self-made and PGC ...... 94

vi 5.2 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MAJOR PLAYERS ...... 97

5.2.1 Development strategies ...... 97

5.2.2 Profitability ...... 104

5.2.3 Content ...... 108

5.2.4 Comparative analysis ...... 114

5.3 DISRUPTORS AND DISRUPTION ...... 116

5.3.1 BAT and the disruptive force ...... 120

5.3.2 The second war ...... 125

5.4 CONCLUSION ...... 128

CHAPTER 6: CONTENT MONETISATION AND CULTURAL INNOVATION ...... 130

6.1 NEW PRODUCTION CULTURE AND NEW SCREEN ECOLOGY IN CHINA ...... 130

6.1.1 In between content – a mixture of everything ...... 132

6.1.2 Categorising the online sector...... 133

6.2 NARROWED DIFFERENCE AND HEATED COMPETITION ...... 135

6.2.1 Youth culture and the initial success of self-made drama: A profile of Unexpectedness ...... 140

6.2.2 Youth culture and high culture ...... 145

6.3 CONTENT MONETISATION ...... 150

6.3.1 Cultural exports as a signal of ‘going out’? ...... 154

6.4 CONCLUSION ...... 156

CHAPTER 7: FROM ‘EDGE BALL’ TO NEW INDUSTRY STANDARDS: CHANGES IN ONLINE VARIETY SHOWS .. 158

7.1 TV GENRE AND FORMAT STUDIES ...... 158

7.1.1 TV format trade ...... 162

7.2 ‘EDGE BALL’ STRATEGY ...... 166

7.2.1 Forming industry new standards...... 169

7.3 THE MAKING OF THE HIT SHOW: A PROFILE OF ...... 174

7.3.1 Dramatic conflict ...... 177

7.3.2 Community engagement ...... 180

7.3.3 The manifestation of content monetisation ...... 182

vii 7.4 VARIETY SHOWS AS THE CULTURAL INDEX...... 185

7.4.1 Online variety shows vs traditional variety shows ...... 186

7.4.2 Restoring the authoritative voice: The case of National Treasure ...... 191

7.4.3 Youth culture against high culture? ...... 193

7.5 CONCLUSION ...... 195

CHAPTER 8: THE SHORT-VIDEO INDUSTRY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONTENT CREATORS ...... 197

8.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AMATEUR-PROFESSIONALISED PROCESS ...... 200

8.1.1 The rise of platform-initiated channels (zi pin dao) ...... 202

8.1.2 The creator economy...... 205

8.2 THE ORBIT OF THE MOST FAMOUS CONTENT CREATORS IN CHINA: A PROFILE OF MISS PAPI ...... 208

8.2.1 As content creator, as wang hong ...... 209

8.2.2 The means of survival: Content monetisation...... 212

8.3 THE CONUNDRUM AND DILEMMA FACING SELF-MEDIA PRACTITIONERS ...... 216

8.3.1 Platform facilitation ...... 218

8.3.2 YouTubers and their Chinese counterparts ...... 220

8.3.3 The prospect of worldwide YouTubers ...... 224

8.4 CONCLUSION ...... 227

CHAPTER 9: THE CHANGING MEDIA SPHERE IN CHINA ...... 230

9.1 OVERVIEW OF THESIS ...... 230

9.2 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE CHINESE AND WESTERN MEDIA SYSTEMS ...... 236

9.2.1 Characteristics of the Chinese screen industry ...... 236

9.2.2 New production culture ...... 237

9.3 THE BAT: A NEW DIGITAL POWER? ...... 240

9.4 GLOBALISATION OR GLOCALISATION...... 241

9.5 CONCLUSION: REIMAGING THE NEW PRODUCTION CULTURE AND ITS RELATIONS WITH CULTURAL DISSEMINATION ....243

REFERENCES ...... 246

APPENDIX A: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT RESEARCH PROJECT……………………………………………..………276

APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM FOR THE INTERVIEWEES………………………...……………………………………………..…….278

viii List of figures and tables

Figures Figure 1: Tencent revenue composition ...... 68

Figure 2: Alibaba revenue composition ...... 70

Figure 3: Baidu expenditure ...... 72

Figure 4: Introduction to iQIYI ...... 97

Figure 5: Introduction to ...... 98

Figure 6: Introduction to LeTV ...... 99

Figure 7: Introduction to ...... 100

Figure 8: Introduction on Video ...... 101

Figure 9: Revenue Composition of China’s Online Video Industry ...... 103

Figure 10: Most viewed genres on online platforms ...... 108

Figure 11: Catalogue of TV drama on major players in China ...... 109

Figure 12: Catalogue of variety shows on major players in China ...... 110

Figure 13: Catalogue of movies on major players in China ...... 111

Tables Table 1: Interviewees ...... 86

Table 2: Difference in concepts between Chinese and Western markets ...... 94

Table 3: Overview of China’s online video industry ...... 102

ix Abbreviations and acronyms

BAT Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent

OTT TV Over the top TV

PGC Professional-generated content

SAPPRFT State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, and Television

SME Social media entertainment

UGC User-generated content

x Statement of original authorship

The work contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted to meet requirements for an award at this or any other higher education institution. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due referenceis made.

Signature: QUT Verified Signature

Date: os/ ot I -µ11

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xii Acknowledgements

If a PhD is sailing at sea during the endless darkness, my journey has not been alone or disoriented. I am sincerely grateful for the guidance and support I have received from my supervisors, who have illuminated the course for me. I am also genuinely thankful for the love and care of my beloved families and friends during the process. More importantly, I truly appreciate every encouraging soul I have met during the journey; they have shared their knowledge, experience and expertise, benefiting me in more ways than one.

To begin with, my gratitude and thankfulness to my supervisors, Professor Terry Flew,

Distinguished Professor Stuart Cunningham, and Dr Mark Ryan, are literally beyond words.

Their professional guidance and suggestions, and their impeccable teamwork, are integral to the completion of the thesis. Terry has shared his academic knowledge, insights and experience on many accounts – he has been nothing but supportive. As a principal supervisor, Terry has helped me a lot in my academic work (through comments on manuscripts, suggestions for conference applications and publications), as well as with other administrative matters

(applications of funding, research ethics, etc.). Stuart has also been very helpful, especially when my project has not been on track. He was unfailingly incisive about my work and always asked the right questions. He commented on almost all my manuscripts and shared suggestions.

Mark was my mind reader from day one: he would emphasize my ideas and facilitate discussions with Terry and Stuart. He also paid close attention to details. The thesis presented to you today came about because only because of the hard work and endless support of my supervisory team. Special thanks to Terry and Mark for co-authoring journal articles with me.

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Michael Keane, who initiated this PhD journey. Michael has supported me in many ways, and he was almost an external supervisor

xiii and a mentor to me. He has offered opportunities to co-publish book chapters and has continued to share his knowledge and insights.

I am very grateful to QUT for the Postgraduate Research Award and Tuition

Sponsorship. I am also appreciative for the environment provided by QUT and DMRC, where

I have received much help and friendship from my fellows and friends: Eddy, Ethan, Silvia,

Wilfred, Avi, Fiona, Xu, Qiong, Yi, Shan, Xiaoting, Jing, Jiajie, Felix, Callum, Guy, Rachel,

Smith, Ariandna, Stephanie and Katherine. To those I cannot mention in this list due to limited space, thank you all! I am also grateful to the CI HDR team for their administration support and to the DMRC for their workshops and seminars.

My thanks goes to Professor Patrik Wikstrom and Professor Liangwen Guo (

Jiaotong University), who has encouraged me in the pursuit of my academic careers, and has offered advice and help in such matters, as well as to Dr Nina Li, Dr Elain Zhao and Dr Yu

Hong, who shared their thoughts during confirmation as well as at other academic seminars. I would also like to thank my postgraduate supervisor Professor Guangan Dong (Zhengzhou

University), and my undergraduate teacher Associate Professor Liya Yang, who encouraged me in the pursuit of my PhD study. Furthermore, I would like to extend my gratitude to my copy editor Sue Jarvis, who has accomplished an excellent work.

I am truly grateful for the 18 interviewees, including Shuya Yang, Bo Liu, Nifang Huo,

Shuai Xie, and the anonymous participants – thank you all for your generous insights. My thanks also go to friends and contacts who offered their help during the recruiting process.

Finally, I am deeply indebted to my parents, and to my husband Qixin Li. Thank you for your caring and understanding along the way.

This has been the most challenging and pleasant journey, thanks to you all!

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH

According to the History of Chinese Television (zhong guo dian shi yi shu fa zhan shi, 1994),

1994 was a milestone year. Prior to that point, TV dramas from the United States, England,

Germany, France, Japan, Korea and even Australia were screened on Chinese Central

Television (CCTV) in prime time. Since 1994, though, the situation has changed. Instead of being dependent on foreign cultural productions because of insufficient domestic supply,

CCTV has finally been able to broadcast Chinese drama in prime time, due to a successful market. The consecutive attempts to draw Chinese audiences from foreign productions has therefore been the theme of Chinese television history since then.

A decade later, in 2004, online video platforms began to proliferate. LeTV was established in 2004, followed by .com in April 2005, Youku in November 2005 and iQIYI in 2010. This was followed by another wave of enthusiasm for foreign cultural productions, due to their increased accessibility. By 2014, online streaming platforms had begun to produce platform-commissioned productions. multiple services are in play, streaming services are rising inexorably to become a major force that not only threatens the traditional broadcasting system but also transforms the media landscape.

In 1994, CCTV was the most popular TV channel in China, and broadcasting television was the most pervasive distribution channel. Prime-time television witnessed the golden times of linear programming. Even today, watching the Spring Festival Gala with one’s family on

New Year’s Eve is still a tradition – one that has been sustained since the 1980s. Yet such traditions are becoming increasingly rare. Online video platforms have brought the age of non- linear programming, where media content can be consumed via multiple screens, at any time,

and anywhere. In order to keep up with the overwhelming tide, CCTV presented the Internet

Spring Festival Gala in 2011, to cater to the younger generation. This unprecedented evolution of a national festival program manifested the changes brought by online platforms, and the digital entertainment media more broadly. As a transformative media form, digital entertainment media are reshaping the media in numerous ways.

Digital entertainment media, including various forms of digital media with a key focus on entertainment, are proliferating due to the facilitation of multiplatform distribution. For instance, distribution of a particular cultural production on a variety of channels not only increases the chance of monetisation and recognition, but also magnifies the expansion of cultural influence. Digital media are a disruptive force that challenges traditional norms of media production, distribution and consumption; above all, though, they confer opportunities for global media systems to proliferate. World-renowned digital platforms such as Facebook,

YouTube and Netflix are dissolving the boundaries between nations, cultures and limits, encouraging cultural diversity and broadening the scope of the media.

1.2 KEY INTRODUCTORY POINTS

1.2.1 Cultural influence

Soft power is what Nye (1990) refers to as the ability to get what one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payments, ‘it builds attraction and encompasses nearly everything other than economic and military power’ (Cooper 2004, as cited in Wilson III, 2008, p.114). As

China struggles to counteract foreign cultural influence, it is determined to increase the nation’s cultural soft power. Extreme measures were taken against the ‘Korean Wave’ in 2016, in order to constrain the popularity of Korean culture as well as its cultural productions. These measures confirmed the penetration of Korean culture in China, and also forefronted the imperative to increase Chinese cultural influence. China’s economic achievements are recognised globally,

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yet while it is a giant in economic terms, it remains a dwarf where cultural influence is concerned.

Today, China is paying more and more attention to raising its level of cultural soft power so it is commensurate with the nation’s rising economic power. It is not surprising to see the influence of Korean and Japanese media productions in China, when there are increasing numbers of Korean and Japanese TV programs available to Chinese audiences.

Consequently, the cultural trade balance of China is likely to remain in deficit, both regionally and globally, for some time. China is eager to disseminate Chinese culture, as it has recognized the importance of raising cultural influence and its implications for soft power. The government understands the influence of foreign cultural products, but despite a cultural deficit in international markets, the Chinese government has chosen to apply strict regulations (such as restrictions on the ‘Korean Wave’) through the State Administration of Press, Publication,

Radio, Film and Television of the People's Republic of China (SAPPRFT), rather than finding ways to better promote Chinese content in international online markets. The question to be asked in this thesis is how online entertainment media would reshape the media sphere in China, and whether China be able to disseminate Chinese culture internationally.

1.2.2 Advent of the online video industry

Following the establishment of online video platforms in 2004, streaming services became increasingly prevalent over the next decade. Non-linear programming exhibited a variety of advantages over traditional television systems, and viewing preferences began to change from traditional TV to online screens. This phenomenon was manifested through the percentage of advertising that went to TV. As of December 2015, China’s online video industry has beaten the traditional TV industry in its market share of advertising revenue, taking up 23.3 per cent, whereas traditional TV accounted for 17.3 per cent (Meng, 2016). These figures refer to advertising related to screen productions, which represents 40.6 per cent of the market share of

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advertising, in addition to other forms of advertising, such as web advertising, mobile app advertising and so forth. This is the first time in history that the market share of online advertising has surpassed traditional TV, demonstrating the growing popularity of online screens and a stagnation of traditional platforms.

Meanwhile, the overall number of Chinese online video users who watch content on streaming services is growing rapidly; among these, the scale and utilisation rate of mobile- phone video users are aggregating at a surprising rate. These figures showcase the popularity of streaming services across multiple screens, and the increasing preference for mobile screens, which signify greater changes ahead for the screen industry. The digital entertainment media have gained huge numbers of users, and have shown great potential in the screen industry. They have therefore become a powerful force in China, one that is causing colossal changes to occur in the online media sphere: screens are getting smaller, content is becoming briefer and choices are increasingly numerous.

The online video industry has brought a wider array of foreign cultural productions, which makes it much more difficult to raise China’s level of soft power, as China struggles to attract Chinese audiences to locally produced material (Fung, 2008). At the same time, foreign online companies find the Chinese market difficult, due to the various political and cultural barriers to entry. Chinese screens have been filled with imported TV formats for quite some time; concurrently, the development of cultural export productions has endured some tough times (Chunyang , 2010; Y. Li, 2011; C. Zhu, 2012). The awkward dilemma facing the

Chinese government is that China tries to keep others from coming in, yet finds few ways of going out.

1.2.3 Rise of the digital giants

Information technology began to prosper after 1998. Thanks to numerous technological breakthroughs, digital services were made available to Chinese users, with streaming services

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established once the required technological advancements had occurred. Emulating Google,

Facebook and Amazon, Chinese digital companies were battling in similar markets. After some fierce competition that spanned more than a decade, the Chinese digital giants were finally born; these internet oligopolies in China are known as the BAT, standing for Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent.

From 2015, the digital market is dominated by the BAT (Jinjin, 2015). Despite the fierce competition in other adjacent areas, the BAT have unanimously decided to march into streaming. The online video industry was transforming the screen industry in various ways; however, the strategic move of the BAT into the online video industry poses new threats and opportunities, which will reconfigure the future competition. The BAT have made acquisitions on various streaming platforms. The online streaming service iQIYI belongs to Baidu, the

YouTube-like platform Youku belongs to Alibaba and Tencent Video belongs to Tencent.

Other online streaming services include LeTV and Sohu Video.

Academic analysis in China has focused on the advent of online video services, with most scholarly work analysing the influence, threats and future trajectories of these services.

One notable contention has been that iQIYI and LeTV harbour the greatest potential for international success (Ning Zhao, 2015; Y. Qian, 2016). However, along with various international competitors, the BAT are becoming a new variable in the equation. With the growth of international streaming services – especially Netflix – changing the media sphere globally, how are services such as Netflix helping to reshape the new screen ecology, which is

‘being shaped by a set of increasingly global online screen entertainment platforms, most prominently Google/YouTube, Apple, Amazon and Netflix’ (Cunningham, 2015), worldwide?

How will China face the new media sphere, and how will the BAT facilitate China’s interests in TV internationalisation and the development of new soft power?

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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND APPROACH

Over two decades from 1994 to 2014, screen media in China has transformed from the traditional linear programming to digital non-linear streaming services. Changes in technology have led to a diversified viewing experience, distribution channels, media practice and, most importantly, new production cultures. The overall objective of this study is to discover the changes that have occurred in media production cultures in China following the advent of digital streaming platforms.

The thesis will begin by examining China’s digital entertainment media industry, both domestically and internationally, in the context of media globalisation, and will look at how

China might learn from successful international platforms, such as Netflix. The necessity for and possibilities of China’s digital entertainment media industry contributing to the enhancement of China’s soft power will be examined. The general research aims require asking the following questions:

• What is the new screen ecology like?

• Will the BAT become a new form of digital power?

• What changes are taking place in Chinese media production system (the rise of self-

made and UGC productions, where individuals are encouraged to create or participate

in the media production process)?

• What is the potential of the BAT, especially with regard to Chinese media globalisation?

• What are the implications of Chinese media innovation for global media production and

dissemination?

This study will examine the evolution of Chinese media in terms of the development of digital entertainment media in China; the influence of the emerging tech giants – BAT and streaming services in China – and the ways they are reshaping China’s media sphere; and what China can

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learn from the rise of the BAT and the emerging screen ecology, as well as how far soft power has advanced.

These contexts will be structured in terms of a past–present–future logic, with all three aspects examined. Based on this structure, the study will examine both the international and national developments of major Chinese digital media platforms and systematically uncover their developing modes and strategies, and their differences and similarities. Questions relating to how these changes might help to reshape the media sphere in China or even the world, and the potential impact in terms of disseminating Chinese culture and increasing China’s soft power will be illustrated. Future challenges and opportunities brought by the BAT and the new production culture will also be investigated throughout the thesis.

The main research question guiding this research is:

RQ1: Will the BAT help China to develop innovative screen media industry

systems similar to those of (Western countries) like the United States and

elsewhere?

Secondary questions are:

RQ2: How does the Chinese screen ecology – which importantly includes the

regulatory system – differ from that of major Western markets and what are the

implications of this for the BAT and streaming services?

RQ3: How does Netflix influence online media in China? How will the BAT

result in the rise of a new soft power?

RQ4: Is there potential to expand these streaming services internationally?

What are the implications of this for cultural globalisation?

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This research employed qualitative methods, including case studies and semi-structured interviews, as the main research approach. Both case studies and semi-structured interviews operate as a research method throughout the thesis. Case studies were featured on two levels: the platform level of streaming services, and the production level of online content. This research conducted case studies on the major streaming services in China, and delivered a comparative cross-case analysis on these major players. Additionally, in order to understand the fierce competition in the online field, semi-structured interviews were conducted with internet practitioners, to investigate the implications of the BAT on streaming services. Case studies of online productions include online drama, online variety shows and creative content.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted to facilitate and inform the analysis of the transformations in Chinese online screen. Interviewees were recruited in China, across three major metropolises: , Hangzhou and Shenzhen. This research has recruited

18 interviewees in total, with various career backgrounds, including but not limited to staff from the BAT and streaming platforms, traditional and online media practitioners, producers, directors and content creators.

1.4 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE

The constantly shifting environment of the Chinese media forces online companies to adapt to various challenges, ranging from state policy and technology improvement to user preferences.

Dealing with these variables, major streaming services manifest great advantages over small- scale companies, and oligopolies are becoming increasingly dominant in the market. Other services will have to go through acquisition, merge with oligopolies or simply disappear in the process. Due to this phenomenon in China, it is common to witness super apps (these refer to those apps that converge different functions into just one platform, so users can manage to accomplish most tasks without leaving the app) (Sun and Gong, 2015), such as WeChat,

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and Baidu map. But what is the relationship between the current state of online companies and cultural dissemination in China, and how do they affect China’s soft power policy?

The most conspicuous characteristics of China’s online companies is their innovation: they break with traditional ways of doing business to seek and cultivate advantages that could easily triumph over traditional companies. With innovation being the basis for Chinese media, online video platforms have transformed into producers, distributors, advertisers and even e- commerce providers. While it is uncertain whether they are marching towards the ‘super app’, it is clear that streaming services in China are evolving into something quite different from those in the rest of the world, considering China’s efforts to bring different types of services under the umbrella of just one platform. Meanwhile, original productions commissioned by online platforms have enjoyed great success in China, given that they have been distributed and broadcast by traditional broadcasters. The threat facing China’s media regulation today comes from the creative online sector, which is disrupting a regulated cultural dissemination system – a well-established system that has controlled cultural productions (Mou, Wu, and

Atkin, 2016; Peng, 2016; Xue and Klandermans, 2016; G. Yang and Jiang, 2015; E. J. Zhao,

2016c). For the Chinese government, however, threats also represent alluring opportunities.

Although the Chinese government has consistently attempted to increase China’s soft power by disseminating its political ideology through cultural production, it is unclear whether online productions have the capacity to facilitate China’s soft power policy.

One of the significant aspects of this research is its rendering of a Chinese context regarding the development of digital platforms. From 2014 until 2018, the BAT and online video services have undergone various transformations. Although a few scholarly works have noticed these changes, little academic literature has illustrated them to any great extent. Most media research in China is content oriented, with scholars often emphasising the importance of content in terms of cultural exports; little research focuses on changes taking place on online

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platforms. This research project is intended to bridge this gap by providing a comprehensive analysis of the transformations occurring in the Chinese screen industry as well as on digital platforms, particularly in terms of an industry perspective.

The development of Netflix and the emerging new production culture are also significant phenomena that have received little attention to date. An investigation of the

‘Netflix effect’ is worthwhile (McDonald and Smith-Rowsey, 2016); streaming services began commissioning their own cultural productions and developing other features, both of which would allow them to be more than ‘just a platform’. It is also valuable to study this global tendency, and to uncover its influence on local productions. Further research questions may explore the impact on local creativity, such as how this tendency would facilitate/inhibit content homogenisation, and to look at the future possibilities of media production. Another significant aspect of this research, therefore, is that it provided a comprehensive industry- focused as well as academic account for the emerging production culture, considering the

Netflix effect and China’s soft power scheme. Finally, this industry-based research has the potential to contribute to critical media industry research, as well as to global media studies.

1.5 THESIS OUTLINE

There are nine chapters in this thesis.

This introductory chapter aims to provide a research background in order to illustrate where this study is situated, and to briefly outline the historical background. It is imperative to identify new factors and elements, such as the new players. An overview of the study is provided, with the research significance, research objectives and research questions fully discussed.

Chapter 2 is the first chapter of the literature review. Following a brief introduction, the research gaps are identified, based on previous studies. This study is designed to investigate

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changes in media industries across the levels of enterprise, platform and content. The literature review examines media industry and media economics theory, as well as the transformation of the Chinese screen industry. Narrowing down from the enterprise level, platform development is illustrated via an examination of the development of online video industry in China.

Literature on Netflix explores the changes that have occurred in content and production, and provides an overview of ‘going out’ strategies that indicates the political significance of cultural production.

Chapter 3 is the second chapter of the literature review. It provides a contextual review of the BAT enterprises, exploring their history and development, business ecosystems and strategies, to unveil their ultimate pursuit of profit and data. The theoretical framework is based on platform capitalism and platform convergence strategy. A historical background of these enterprises not only explains the changes that have occurred in the media sector, but also provides a contextual analysis for the methodology discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 4 explains the research approach and methodology adopted throughout this study. As qualitative research, this study adopts case studies as its main research method. Issues such as how the case study method facilitates this research, and how this research method is applied through the investigation, are addressed in this chapter. Apart from documenting these matters, this study values first-hand data obtained from fieldwork – predominantly interviews.

The research design, including the case selection process and details of interviewees, is elaborated.

Chapter 5 focuses on the development of major streaming services in China. In classical business theory, an industry’s lifecycle typically is mapped in four stages: pioneering

(fragmentation), shakeout, maturity and decline (McGahan et al., 2004). China is now in the shakeout phase (Cunningham and Silver, 2013). As the most promising market leaders, will iQIYI and LeTV be the eventual winners? This chapter illustrates the current background of

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the development of video-on-demand services in China. The comparative study of major players is investigated through content, developing mode and production, to determine how these platforms are helping to building the new production culture, and how they impact local creativity. The influence of the BAT on streaming services is discussed in the latter part of this chapter, in order to investigate the synergies between enterprises and platforms.

Chapter 6 identifies China’s online streaming services as a ‘mixture of everything’. By categorising the Chinese online productions from user-generated content (UGC) and self-made to professionally generated content (PGC), this chapter provides a conceptual analysis of

Chinese and Western1 screen productions to distinguish the two markets from one another. In this chapter, a case study is selected from Youku self-made (platform-commissioned) drama to represent the original prevalence and transformation of platform-commissioned productions.

This chapter is dedicated to investigating the changes that have occurred in content production and content monetisation between online media and traditional industries, in order to explore the motives and facilitations of online productions.

Chapter 7 provides a case study of online variety shows. As a particular genre of TV productions, variety shows – and particularly reality shows – have showcased the evolution of the TV industry. A brief literature review regarding TV genre and format studies is provided to illustrate the development of reality shows, and their interrelations with cultural dissemination. Based on the general discourses of the Korean Wave and format trade, Chinese reality shows come up against another inevitable force: the regulative power. Thus, as a counteracting force to online censorship, ‘edge ball’ strategy is examined to differentiate

Chinese screen ecology from that of its counterparts – mostly Western countries. One of the

1Western: This thesis acknowledges the diversity of media systems, noting that the concept of ‘western media system’ refers to a wider range that well expands the geographical boundaries of US. However, in this thesis, the term ‘western’ refers to US-based platforms. The comparative notion of China and Western is designed to highlight the uniqueness of Chinese media systems, comparing to other western media systems in general.

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most contentious online variety shows of 2017 – The Rap of China – is used as a case study.

The reasons for its success – including interactive program publicity and vertical integration – are investigated to manifest changes initiated by BAT-supported streaming services.

Additionally, the clash of youth culture and high culture is mentioned with regard to the tensions caused by the new production culture.

Chapter 8 analyses the changes occurring in the UGC sector. Previous chapters have examined the new production culture in the PGC sector through online drama to online variety shows, from initial success to innovative broadcasting level productions. However, the business strategies of the BAT and platform affordances of major streaming services have promoted the development of amateur-professionalised content. Borrowing from Cunningham and Craig’s notion of Social Media Entertainment (SME), this chapter investigates the professionalising process of amateur content, as well as the entrepreneurship and precarious labour of content creators. Centred around the most predominant case study of this chapter – internet influencer Miss Papi – a three-level framework is constituted to illustrate transformations in the UGC sector. Fieldwork data discussed in this chapter were generated from entry-level live streamers, leading internet influencer Miss Papi (wang hong) and a former practitioner who worked at one of the iQIYI channels. In an effort to map out the general outline of the UGC sector, each interview is considered as representative of a broader collective. One of the observations would be that the BAT facilitated a systematic process of ‘mining the content’.

Chapter 9 looks at the vast landscape of Chinese media, focusing particularly on changes taking place in the Chinese media sphere on the basis of the findings detailed in previous chapters. By comparing the Chinese situation with Western platforms, such as Netflix and YouTube, differences and similarities are able to be identified; it is noted that Chinese platforms may currently be inferior to their Western counterparts, but they are evolving rapidly.

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Existing dilemmas and problems (such as how to disseminate Chinese culture internationally) are explored, and the way the media sphere in China has evolved over time in the digital age is examined. The conclusion of this thesis is based on observations and analysis of the previous study, with the rise of new digital power and the relationship between production culture and international cultural dissemination discussed in this chapter. Interpretations of cultural globalisation and localisation in the context of media globalisation are identified as future research questions.

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Chapter 2: Changes in China’s media industry

This chapter presents an academic literature review that moves across four sectors: the media industry in China; the development of the online video industry in China; the Netflix effect; and China’s cultural soft power. The current literature in each field is reviewed, revealing a changing media landscape in China and identifying ‘change’ as the over-arching research gap in current media industry studies relating to China. The scope of this literature review is focused primarily on Chinese media studies; however, there is a focus on Netflix – the global streaming service. Adding Netflix into this study is imperative, not simply due to its easily identifiable influence in China, but to enable comparative studies on a global scale.

The first two sections explore the development of the Chinese media industry, from traditional screen to online platform. In the first section, the media industry and media economics are investigated for the establishment of a theoretical framework. The literature on the traditional screen industry in China is reviewed in order to provide an historical background to the development of the Chinese television industry. Finally, the literature relating to the current Chinese screen industry is reviewed to identify the changes and transformations that have occurred in recent years. In the section on China’s online video industry, the development of TV (as a terminal) and the advent of streaming services are investigated to account for the proliferation of streaming services.

The final two sections focus on the impact factors, both nationally and internationally.

Internationally, the literature review on Netflix focuses on the algorithmic culture and the recommendation system, and its implications for screen production culture on a global scale.

Internally, China is eager to disseminate Chinese culture through national strategies; however,

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Chinese cultural production still suffers from severe cultural constraints. These opportunities and dilemmas continue to confront the Chinese screen industries today.

2.1 THE MEDIA INDUSTRY IN CHINA

2.1.1 Media economics

Media industries differ from other types of business (Albarran, Mierzejewska, and Jung, 2006): the media product is transient; employees are expected to be creative; the structure is organisational; the role of the media is social (it has the power to influence and raise awareness); and the lines of traditional media are constantly blurring (Lavine and Wackman,

1988). These characteristics outline the distinctiveness of media industries at an economic level, delivering a combined knowledge of media industries and media economics. These two entities need to be linked for a comprehensive understanding of the field: they are co-evolving and dependent on one another. One argument was made by Robert Picard, who laid out the imperative to investigate media firms and media industries as economic and business entities:

‘whether a media company is a commercial or a non-commercial operation, it faces a variety of economic and financial forces and must be operated as a business entity in order to respond to and manage those forces effectively’ (Picard, 2011). This accounts for a substantial understanding of the relationship between the media industry and media economics. Similarly, a number of works focus on the economics of traditional media industries, including Doyle’s

(2013) Understanding Media Economics. However, distinguished media economics scholars consistently emphasise the changes in this field due to the advent of online media and technology. Doyle suggests that ‘media industries are heavily reliant on technology and as such are regularly affected by new advances in how media may be produced or distributed’. She states (Doyle, 2013, p. xi):

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There has been a time of considerable change and, to some extent, of upheaval

for media industries and market. New technologies, changing consumption

behaviors and greater competition have impacted significantly on the

organisation and economics of media and this has created a need for a fresh

analytical approach to questions and themes that, in the digital era, are essential

to an understanding of the economics of the contemporary media industries.

Because of the digital revolution, or digitisation, media economics has garnered a considerable amount of attention in recent years. Albarran (2002, p. 44) further illustrates the relationship between technology, media industry and media economics: ‘because media industries are heavily dependent on technology for the creation, distribution, and exhibition of various forms of media content, changes in technology affect economic processes between and within the media industries’. These authors suggest that the study of the media industry and media economics evolves as technology advances. Three stages of technology improvement have been identified by Albarran (2002, p. 72): ‘the initial evolution of computers; the technological area, coupled with the rise of computing technology, which has involved the transition from analogue to digital content; and the technological impact was and continues to be with the development of the Internet’. Media economics publications have identified the significant changes brought by the internet and online media, comparing these with traditional media and

‘old business models’. The question that needs to be asked concerns the extent to which this is so.

2.1.2 The media industry

Digitisation has transformed the media industry and media markets. facilitated media abundance, which put an end to media scarcity; meanwhile, the cost of reproduction has decreased as the availability of internet and online media has increased.

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Additionally, the boundaries of traditional media are eroded due to ‘the digital convergence and the growth of internet’ (Doyle, 2013, p. 142). In general, the ways of producing and distributing media products are changing, but the fundamental principles of the media industries remain the same. Online media have merely provided diversified methods of making and consuming media, unlike the advent of print media, or radio, or television, where a completely new form of information messaging was made available, from texts to sound to images. Whether it is or online media that is the focus, the provided media content and service remain the same. Picard (2011, p. 35) observes that:

These functions, however, are not new. They represent convergence of

products and services provided by mail, telephony, Internet, positioning and

mapping, printed schedules and brochures, radio, and narrowcasting. There are

advantages in being able to access and use these services in a mobile

environment, but the ideas and concepts of the services are not new. As with

digital television, the supply and demand for many of these services will be

interrelated to their supply and demand in their original forms.

Although advances in technology have changed the ways in which media productions are being produced, distributed and consumed, they have not generated ‘new products and services’:

Their primary effects are increasing the speed and flexibility of

communications, producing economies of scope and integration that change

the economics of content production and distribution, and permitting the

combination and integration of existing means of communications to allow

readers, viewers, or listeners more control and choice and easier use of

functions in a single integrated product. These are important improvements to

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existing media products and services, but they are not truly new products and

services (Picard, 2011, p. 36).

Holt and Sanson (2013) use the term ‘connected viewing’, to describe digital distribution with a particular focus on user engagement. They contend that the growing importance of connected viewing in selling, streaming and sharing ‘is especially resonant with Jenkins’s emphasis on the increasing blurred boundaries between producers and consumers and distinct delivery systems’ (Holt and Sanson, 2013, p. 3). Elsewhere, Lotz (2018) explores via a historical perspective how the internet revolutionises the television industry, tracing its development from the introduction of cable systems. Lobato (2019) investigates the development of Netflix to comprehend the transformations and revolutions exerted upon the global television culture.

Moreover, the concept of ‘network externalities’ emphasized the network effects of digital distribution, where more users means more value (Bauer and Latzer, 2016). This is different from broadcasting Television, and the dynamics between users and platforms is also what makes streaming services worth researching. These well-established media industry scholars have turned the focus onto the transformations of media industries in the context of digital disruption. Although a few studies explore the impact of digital disruptions on media industries, these have been conducted on a global scale, and to my knowledge there are still few scholarly works dealing with the transformation of the Chinese screen industry.

2.1.3 Production culture

Scholarship on media productions dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century.

Sullivan (2009) provides a modern perspective on understanding Rosten’s (1930) study, stating that it is essential to look behind scenes, through media producers and practitioners, in order to understand the potential ‘power of film in shaping cultures’. Powdermaker’s Hollywood production studies turned a focus on the working status of ‘social class workers’, with the

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theory of ‘alienation’ adopted to illustrate the detachment between workers and industry.

Mayer (2009, p. 16) concludes that:

Movies were arguably the most powerful products that United States produced

through a vast economy of labourers whose existence depended upon this

product, which surpassed the value of the labour and devalued the work of the

labourer. Looking back on early media production studies, we can see that Leo

Rosten and Hortense Powdermaker in particular theorized the concept of

alienation through their empirical studies of Hollywood labour, work practices

and subjective experience.

Production studies provided a political-economic as well as a sociology perspective, which

‘uncovered the personalities, organisations, and social dynamic behind them’ (Sullivan, 2009, p. 15). Apart from leading scholarship in Hollywood film industries, Gitlin (2005) published an industry-level analysis of the American television industry in 1983 – Inside Prime Time – which explores the complex forces and components of production, the political-economic factors in ideology dissemination and the significance of contextualising producers in understanding ‘the practices and structures that affect cultural creation’ (p. 100).

Borrowing from Caldwell’s (2008) ‘production of culture approach’, the four key registers of analysis are interviews with film/television workers; textual analysis; ethnographic field observation; and economic/industrial analysis. This thesis adopts the ‘production of culture’ approach to account for political-economic structures and industrial practices in the context of the digital entertainment industries. The advent of digital media and streaming services promoted industry practices and business models. Research has called for a repositioning of production studies in today’s digital era:

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Streaming thus introduced extensive change to the experience of television. As

well as freeing it from the network-defined schedule, streaming also enabled

greater use of subscription as the primary funding mechanism for television.

This allowed for a viewing experience not structured by regular commercials

and encouraged the creation of television content notably different from that

supported by advertising. (Herbert, Lotz, & Marshall, 2018)

2.1.4 The traditional screen industry in China

Structurally, the screen industry can be categorised into four sectors: television; cable services; online media; and motion pictures (Picard, 2011). Due to the independent production line and distribution mechanisms of , the discussion of the screen industry here focuses primarily on the former three – that is, traditional TV and online streaming services. Traditional TV contains various forms of television, such as digital TV, IPTV and cable services, which operate through traditional distribution platforms instead of online platforms. The prevalence of different TV forms is contingent on the development of screen industry in a certain region.

For instance, cable services are popular in Western countries where high-quality media products are valued, and subscription is a well-implemented and well-accepted revenue strategy to sustain services such as HBO and (Küng, 2008). In contrast, cable services have never been the mainstream services in China, with subscription-based services only becoming prevalent quite recently. Instead, China adopted an advertising-supported system that centres on television services instead of cable or subscription-based systems. The advertising-supported systems in China are easily seen on CCTV during the famous annual advertising bidding campaign, where the top ten highest offers end up in the tabloids because of their astronomical numbers.

Western scholars such as Lotz (2018) have analysed the revenue streams of cable and broadcasting television; Lotz (2018, p. 52) contends that ‘most cable channels derived revenue

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from both advertising and subscriber fees while broadcasters had only advertising’; however, in China, where the media are heavily regulated, the Chinese screen industry systems evolved from a combination of government subsidiary and advertising-supported systems to an advertising-supported system exclusively (Keane, 2015), then to a mixture of advertising- supported and subscription-based system, such as online streaming services. The innovation of digital technology, along with the boom in new media forms and long-lasting government regulation exhibited two important characteristics that have challenged the Chinese screen industry. These two factors are theorised in Western literature, with Amanda Lotz (2014) framing the media industry through a detailed investigation of regulation, economic conditions, digitisation and media globalisation. Despite differences in time and regime, these four factors cover the backbone of the media industry, as well as the screen industry, in China.

Regulation shapes the media industry from the governmental level, not just in China, but across the globe. The making of government policies may be subject to legislation agencies, but it may also be influenced by other groups (Havens & Lotz, 2012). In general, the government strives to keep the balance in the media industry, to prevent monopolies and remain wary of media consolidations; it does this by exerting government-imposed policy or through copyright and licensing barriers. The crucial factor of regulation, however, is to remain objective, as an excessive amount of regulation may lead to a ‘cultural interventionist approach’

(Havens and Lotz, 2012), where – as is the case in China – excessive government censorship of cultural products has hindered the development of media, particularly the screen industry

(W. Sun, 2009).

In fact, the media industry in China has been widely discussed as part of the political agenda or as a means to an end – in other words, the mouthpiece for propaganda. CCTV has established itself as the official media representative of China, and although it is making an effort to market a positive image of China, much of its effort has been in vain. Some Western

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scholars believe that this strategy – coercion instead of appeal – is encountering setbacks (Barr,

Feklyunina, and Theys, 2015; Callahan, 2015; Edney, 2015; W. Sun, 2009; Jian Wang, 2011).

It is not viable to sell your points when the audience is well aware of your intentions. The arrival of online media disrupted the well-established regulation system, due to the advent of various media platforms for accelerated flexibility and time sensitivity; this is presenting a major headache for the regulators.

However, every coin has two sides: online media can be both a challenge and an opportunity. The online space is not easy to manage, but its innovation and creation may just become an unexpected vehicle for ‘selling points’ – a silver lining for China’s media globalisation. Nevertheless, online players still suffer from cultural, technological and regulatory barriers in terms of media globalisation – especially those in China. The online space has not only provided Chinese media with the chance to incubate hybrids, but also the opportunity to embrace an outbreak of creativity. Even if China still fails at media globalisation and cultural dissemination, Chinese online content is connecting overseas diasporas and

Chinese communities (Keane, 2016b).

On an economic level, online media have brought challenges to advertising-supported systems, with China experiencing a drastic decline in the amount of traditional advertising and a surprising increase in online advertising (Lv and Jiang, 2016). This phenomenon extends beyond nations. Advertising has taken a strategic position in the media industries, concluding with the finding that advertising will look different in the future – the new norm is yet to come.

The revenue composition of the media industries in the digital age is a relatively new territory in current research, one that will be of considerable importance in the future (Napoli, 2009).

Digitisation has gone through various shifts in content production, distribution and user preference in digital media, where innovation of technology has been central. Media globalisation is mentioned extensively in the media industry literature (Curtin, 2009), where

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barriers and social consequences are examined. Previous scholarly works provided readers with comprehensive structural perspectives, and shed some light on the changes taking place in the digital media age. As technology advances, new frontiers are constantly reconfiguring and shifting. With online media becoming our new constant, the concept of ‘new’ is transforming into a relative projection. It is clear that the implications of online media for regulation, revenue composition and globalisation are still uncertain in the constantly evolving screen industry.

2.1.5 The transformation of the Chinese screen industry

Keane (2015, p. 299) points out that ‘China’s changing media environment is crucial to the destruction of old political hierarchies, even while such hierarchies are busy reforming into new business empires’. As the most comprehensive and well-recognised monograph about

Chinese television in Western scholarship, Keane’s work provides a scope for reflection on the development of Chinese TV from the very early years of the twentieth century to the first decade of the twenty-first century. Along with much Chinese and Western scholarship (Birch,

2014; Brady, 2015; Clode, 2003; Hong, Lu, and Zou, 2009; Yong Zhong, 2001), the acknowledged characteristic of Chinese media is and has always been regulation and ideological propaganda.

One strategy that stands out is the affiliation of the media with the Chinese government’s propaganda agenda – the ‘Channel before Content’ policy, in Keane’s (2015, p.

312) words: ‘the aim was to extend reach to all population. Satisfying the audiences, demands came later … The first and ultimate goal is to cover most audience possible.’ Such a strategy underlies political control over information and media flows with the intention of ideological governance, which is why it is mentioned less frequently in Chinese scholarship. Back then,

Chinese audience weren’t given much choice about television content, with most of the content filtered (as it still is). Such regulatory implementation could potentially damage the quality of media productions; however, the advent of online screens gave audiences the power of

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choice, which is of great significance when compared with the linear age of programming.

Prior to the prevalence of online media, the primary censorship agency in China was the State

Administration of Press Publication Radio Film and Television (SAPPRFT). However, the power of the internet has been so transformational that a brand-new agency, the Central

Network Security and Information Leading Group, has been established to regulate the online space. Such a gesture is evidence of the unexpected disrupting power brought to regulatory systems by the internet and online media upon regulatory systems. So what are the other implications of this new force?

By breaking the boundaries of content, timeframe and accessibility, online screens make it possible to watch any content at any time on any devices. The obsession of Chinese audiences with online content is believed to be attributable to the availability of foreign content online (Keane, 2015). This may have been true in the early stages, when online content was more culturally diversified than traditional content, but things have changed in contemporary times.

With the development of online media, online content is proliferating, the online population is growing and distribution platforms are providing a dedicated space for online content. By and large, viewing preferences are changing from TV to online screens. There is an undeniable and growing tension between online and traditional media, as discussed by

Jenkins (2006), who predicted that the term ‘convergence’ would be heard more frequently in the years to come; as he points out, ‘media industries are undergoing another paradigm shift’

(p. 5). Similar patterns have been seen historically, when new media have threatened the old, but so far no media form has been eliminated: newspapers have survived and television has remained. To face the crisis, traditional media have sought ways to aggregate functionality.

New media and new technology are not so much a diminishing power against traditional media, but a pathway to a newly forged orbit, created by technology and realised by

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convergence (Jenkins and Deuze, 2008). This newly forged union could take many forms across multiple industries (Chon, Choi, Barnett, Danowski, and Joo, 2003; Lawson‐Borders,

2003), those who succeed would retain transformative strength and unlimited potential. Online media are not the counterpart of traditional media, but rather an updated service created by technology. A notable tendency appears as scholarly attention and news headlines are all drawn to the online field (Shen, Wang, Guo, and Guo, 2009; Zhao and Keane, 2013). The bulk of the literature provides various discussions of online competition, suggesting that the online media are busy dealing with competition among themselves, and their war with traditional media is a less urgent matter for them (Evans, 2008; X. Liu, 2013; E.J. Zhao, 2016c).

The power of the internet goes beyond the media industries, as new alliances and mergers are being forged across industry boundaries. The most prominent combination is internet oligopolies or high-technology companies with streaming platforms, such as Google with YouTube, Amazon with Amazon Prime, Netflix, Alibaba with Youku, Baidu with iQIYI,

Tencent with Tencent Video and so forth. For large internet companies, it is common to launch acquisitions and investments across different areas of internet businesses (Albarran, 2002).

Every internet company has its own core business and market niche that differentiates it from others, but the services largely supported by most of these companies are cloud services and online streaming (Barr, 2011). This thesis will narrow the scope to the combination of internet oligopolies and streaming platforms, through examining cases in China. The combination of internet giants and screen platforms – in China’s case, the BAT internet oligopolies and screen platforms – is curating a disrupting power in screen industries that has impacted media regulation, revenue composition and globalisation.

Streaming platforms provide more space for online content, from platform- commissioned productions such as Netflix Originals (Funk, 2006), to less professional content such as YouTube channels (Cunningham, Craig, and Silver, 2016), to the content made by

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internet influencers such as Miss Papi (Shen et al., 2009). These spaces are becoming the incubators of innovative online content that is posing new threats to censorship, especially in the case of China. Western media markets are clearly defined: Netflix is focused on PGC and

YouTube is known for UGC. However, in China the streaming platforms are hybrids of both and even more. Based on this observation, it is evident that competition in China is likely to be fiercer. Chinese online screen media are disrupting the original revenue structure and, in the meantime, fighting for various ways to make a profit. As mentioned previously, the advertising-supported system was the pillar of China’s revenue strategy until the advent of online media. Chinese online streaming platforms finally gained another stream of income after a prolonged cultivation of audience participation in subscription-based services.

The mutation of online screen media is attracting scholarly discussion in both Chinese and Western literature. One example is the concept of SME (social, media and entertainment): built upon social media platforms, SME provides amateur content creators with the space to incubate individual media brands (Cunningham, 2015). Another is the professionalisation of amateur production on online screens, where Zhao (2016b) illustrates the development of UGC and pathways to centre stage. Studies in 2014 (Cunningham, 2015; Zhao, 2016b) anticipated the potential of online platforms, especially in terms of converging and producing innovative production lines that could potentially narrow the gap with global online markets. Inadvertently, a space dedicated to curating online content was made available, where amateur- professionalised content was able to gain popularity and raise influence. A few media industry scholarships demonstrated the progress of online content, projecting the rapidly changing online environment in China and throughout the world. It is necessary to further investigate changes taking place in China’s online space to gain a better understanding of this vast landscape.

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2.2 THE ONLINE VIDEO INDUSTRY IN CHINA

2.2.1 The future of TV

Over a brief period of time, digital technology has swept the entire world. Similar to the previous Industrial Revolution, everything is being challenged, questioned and transformed.

Viewing the transition of Chinese TV in terms of technology improvement, many scholars began to comprehend and illustrate the changing landscape, leading to comparative, descriptive studies of characteristics, technology improvements or limitations, and the future development of recent TV forms – digital TV (Xu Lou, 2012), the set-top box (Yao, 2011) and IPTV (Huang,

2010) – which have been discussed explicitly (Jin, 2010; Qi Xu, 2013). However, very little literature was found that dealt with over-the-top (OTT) TV (L. , 2014), and that which did generally emphasized its predicament (Yifan Liu, 2008; Wen, 2010).

TV can be divided into smart TV, digital TV and analogue TV from a configuration and technological perspective. Smart TV has a built-in smart operation open system that allows different value-added services, such as a set-top box, IPTV and OTT TV. This means that these services are not internal services, but are provided by a third party. For instance, IPTV is made available through a set-top box, while OTT TV can be accessed through a set-top box or by a smart TV. Set-top boxes are used to provide services including program recording, replay and pay TV channels. Compared with traditional TV, the set-top box has improved the screen definition and viewing experience; however, the updated version of the set-top box, which is now known as smart set-top box, makes it possible for users to turn digital TV into smart TV via a built-in operating system that functions as smart TV, but with less stability and a lower price.

China began to adopt and develop digital TV technology in 2012, and it had been adopted in most areas by 2015. Speculative data suggested that by 2017, the age of analogue

TV would finally have come to an end across all territories of China (Friedman, 2014; Asia

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Pacific Insight, 2015; Asia Pacific Telecommunications Insight, 2016;

Nilsson Helander, 2013). With the rise of digital TV, external services like set-top box TV and

IPTV became more and more popular in China because of the abundance and diversity of content available online: OTT TV is becoming increasingly popular, while IPTV is gradually being replaced (X. Chu, 2008; C. Huang, 2009; Yanan, 2009). Before China started to implement digital TV in 2012, the internet was developing at an incredible rate. The first popular online video platform, Tudou, was founded in 2005, then seeing the potential of an online platform, Hunan TV established Sunshine Media in 2006; this then created Mango TV.

CCTV founded China Network TV (CNTV) in 2009.

The emergence of newly established online video websites was in part a national strategy to counteract video piracy, to control illegal or infringing online resources and to protect copyright provisions. As Zhao and Keane (2013, p. 730) mention, ‘by December 2008,

SAPPRFT had granted 332 licenses to online video service providers (SAPPRFT, 2008), the majority of which were state-owned TV stations, radio stations, and news media at national, provincial and local levels’. Consequently, licensing requirement proved to be successful in accelerating the industry shakeout, ‘under the Provisions, SAPPRFT had closed down 341 websites that did not obtain legal licenses to operate by 31 March 2009’ (Zhao and Keane,

2013, p. 731).

While online companies struggled to survive during the shakeout, the war of traditional media and online platform continued. Interestingly, digital TV technology was considered a great opportunity for the development of traditional TV (Guangping Song, 2006; Qi Xu, 2013;

S. Zhao, 2016). TV stations like CCTV, Hunan TV and other provincial TV stations began to establish their online websites – CNTV, Mango TV and so forth (Wang and Bao, 2007; S. Zhao,

2016) to provide content of their own. As they endeavoured to create a connected viewing experience, they were making a great effort to cater to their audience’s new media consumption

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habits. Traditional broadcasting services sincerely believed that this would give them the best chance of emerging victorious over the online video services. However, this proved to be wishful thinking, since online distribution platforms and IPTV were thriving (X. Chu, 2008;

Honglei Jue, 2009; Yanan, 2009).

If we look at the timespan from 2012 to 2015, there are several milestones that should not be ignored. The presence of smart TV became a new threat to the traditional media. Digital

TV was fully adopted by 2015, then the market share of smart TV rocketed from 50 per cent to 69 per cent between 2013 and 2014; by 2016 the penetration rate was expected to be over

85 per cent (iUsertracker, 2016b). These data suggest that before digital TV reached a larger population in China, it was replaced by the new technology – smart TV, which brought revolutionary changes to Chinese living rooms (Nilsson Helander, 2013). TV transformed from media to a platform, where it was possible to watch broadcast TV and online streaming video, play interactive video games, access the internet and much more.

This fundamental change would later prove to be a critical turning point for online streaming services. The multi-channel access to OTT content made IPTV less attractive; the only difference was that IPTV used a special transmitting channel, whereas OTT used the public channel – internet (C. Huang, 2009; Q. Wu, 2010; L. Zhang, 2014). If the audience is going to watch the same content on both channels, IPTV might be more stable than the internet because of technology limitations; however, these can be solved over time with the development of technology (Zachariah, 2013). The difference between IPTV and

OTT TV is like the difference between HBO and Netflix, where HBO is delivered through a traditional broadcasting channel and Netflix is fully dependent on online distribution. As one way to distinguish these services, IPTV and OTT TV use different networks. IPTV and OTT

TV used to be content providers; however, with the development of online streaming services,

OTT TV was made into hardware, referring to TV that was manufactured solely by or in a

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corporation with online distribution platforms, such as Tencent Video, iQIYI and LeTV. From a historical perspective, digital TV is destined to be replaced by smart TV, IPTV is gradually being taken over by OTT TV and online streaming services will act as the biggest content providers. Thus the future of TV belongs to smart TV, OTT TV and online video services.

2.2.2 Streaming services

Through co-productions, online media discovered the potential of streaming in 2010, when

Youku and China Film Group Corporation co-produced the Bright Eleven Series, consisting of

11 low-budget movies. One of the movies, Old Boys (Lao Nan Hai), became legendary, and became the most talked-about film of the year (Yi Chen, 2011). The Bright Eleven Series was distributed exclusively on online video platforms Youku and iQIYI. The length of these films is shorter than a standard movie, and the scale of investment and production is smaller than for traditional movies but much bigger than for previous online movies. Although the directors of this series are relatively famous (although still not in the A-list), most actors cast in the films are amateurs. Just like the slogan of this series, ‘this is a silent feast without audience and applause, for everyone is the protagonist, every movie is made by you, and for you’.

Sharing a common theme, the key focus of this series is on celebrating and documenting youth. Thanks to their online movie features, these exquisite, short and touching stories connected with audiences directly; among them, Old Boys (Lao Nan Hai) resonated with audience members who were born during the 1980s and 1990s. Actors in these films were not known to the general audience; however, because of their ordinary appearance and well- designed, lifelike plots, most audiences reviewed the movies in the series as ‘seeing my own story and reliving my youth’. Even today, Old Boys (Lao Nan Hai) is still one of the most topical and classical online movies in China’s film history. Due to this successful venture, online media witnessed the potential of self-made content (Song Leng, 2015); however, streaming platforms were still lacking sufficient confidence to invest in self-made content, or

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to dare to compete with traditional TV content (Hong Yin, 2014). From 2011 to 2013,

SAPPRFT issued its Opinions on Strengthening the Program Management of Satellite

Television Channels four times, implementing strict regulations on the entertainment TV shows broadcast on traditional media platforms. This proved to be a setback for TV, but provided an unexpected opportunity for the development of online services.

In 2013, following in the steps of Youku, iQIYI and Henan TV station co-produced the hit show Hero of the Chinese Character (Han Zi Ying Xiong), which has enjoyed huge success nationwide. As the first co-production of traditional media and an online video platform, the quality of Hero of the Chinese Character was equivalent to that of many TV productions. Ma

Dong, producer and chief content executive of iQIYI, said, ‘This show brought resources and advantages of two platforms together, meanwhile, we devoted our money and effort in post- production and stage effects.’ Behind the screens were the well-recognised production team that had produced hit shows like The Voice of China and China’s Got Talent. This semi self- made production from iQIYI set a high standard for self-made productions and made a good impression with audiences. By co-producing with broadcasting stations, iQIYI brought professional standards to self-made content and proved that self-made content could be screened on traditional media, and be even be more popular than traditional TV shows.

The popularity of this show lies in multi-screen interactions and ‘gamification’.

‘Gamification’ is the key factor that has attracted young audience to watch this seemingly tedious show with their parents and even grandparents. By downloading the mobile app on their phones, audience members are able to compete with contestants in real time; moreover, those participants who score the highest points in the game are invited to compete with contestants on a TV stage. This unprecedented, innovative program interaction attracted viewers of different ages, and generated a success that was beyond replication. Unleashing the possibilities of two platforms cooperating with each other was not the primary agenda; instead,

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iQIYI successfully advertised itself through this program nationwide. More importantly, streaming services like iQIYI were delivering the message that online streaming services are capable of making high-premium, self-made productions with or without the assistance of traditional media. Apart from this message, the other thing being disseminated nationally at the same time is people’s curiosity about self-made content. Conveniently, later in 2013 the self- made TV drama Unexpectedness was screened on Youku, touted as a pioneering production and one of the most popular online dramas in China. The year 2013 was thus a milestone of the ‘self-made era’ in terms of Chinese online streaming services (Z. Zhou, 2013). After a series of experiments in 2014, online streaming services gained enough confidence to finally began to invest, acquire premium content and even bid for exclusive copyright of foreign formats. Such full-scale investment signifies the upheaval and fierce competition that is set to occur in the near future.

Research on China’s online media is focused mainly on major streaming platforms, investigating development mode and self-made content, among which LeTV and iQIYI generated a heated discussion in the Chinese academic field (Deng, 2015; D. Li, 2016). A great deal of research on LeTV is focused on ‘LE ecology’ – a business model that centres around the distribution platform. This is an attempt to differentiate LeTV from the rest of the online players (Mo Zhang, 2014; L. Xiao, 2015). This business strategy attracted attention from everyone from audience members and reporters to scholars, and has positioned LeTV right in the spotlight. When LeTV stood out from the rest of the players in the field, it was getting free promotion out of social discourse, facilitating a greater chance of surviving and defeating its rivals. LeTV was developing at an incredible pace: in 2016 it was expected to embark on a joint venture with Netflix (although the plan was later scrapped); prior to this, it was busy creating an interaction between multi-screens (Mo Zhang, 2014). After unexpected success in

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manufacturing smart TVs, LeTV even manufactured mobile phones for a short period (Bing,

2016).

A great deal of research on iQIYI shows that it is similar to other streaming platforms, focusing on content and marketing strategies. The development mode of iQIYI is similar to that of Netflix, in terms of premium video content production and copyright acquisition, in an attempt to attract subscribers (X. Yang, 2016). The question of what Chinese streaming services can learn from international platforms such as YouTube, and Netflix has become a pressing one in China (Ransohoff, 2010). To date, there has been a great deal of academic literature on China’s online video industry, mostly focusing on content and the development mode (iUsertracker, 2016c; Quan Ma, 2016; X. Yang, 2016), although some research has examined the changes brought to the media sphere. However, there is limited literature on the implications for cultural soft power, and the influence of international platforms such as Netflix.

Moreover, a growing body of research is focusing on regulation of China’s online media (Ciara

Linnane, 2016; Mou et al., 2016; Peng, 2016). Considering that it is difficult for foreign platforms to enter the Chinese market, this study will focus on the domestic development of the BAT and their affiliated streaming services to investigate the possibilities for international cultural dissemination and the changes brought to China’s online media sphere.

2.3 THE RISE OF NETFLIX AND ITS IMPACT ON NEW PRODUCTION

CULTURE

2.3.1 The development of Netflix

From distributor to content provider, Netflix has shown the world its capacity to transform what is known to what is unknown. Netflix was a traditional VOD distribution company, but it later seized the opportunity to digitalise content, making itself an online distribution platform.

Now its peculiar algorithmic culture has brought a revolutionary change to the ways in which

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media products are being produced. At every point where new technology has been considered a crisis, Netflix has treated it as an opportunity. Yet, even though the success of Netflix has intrigued researchers as well as the general public around the world, it attracted little attention at the beginning.

Before Netflix had more subscribers than the popular channel HBO, people were sceptical about its future. They were in fact sceptical about Netflix’s original premium content strategy, questioning the sustainability, and also doubtful about the content quality. People used to trust HBO more than Netflix; they were reluctant to believe that an online platform was capable of producing premium content equivalent to that on HBO. Before 2013, it is easy to find articles supporting HBO instead of Netflix. However, after Netflix had beaten HBO, becoming the most popular VOD service in the United States, people started to view Netflix from a different perspective. Silver (2013) suggests that ‘the key question is: if the only place highly engaged audiences can see a popular Netflix TV series or a Marvel or Lucas Film or

Pixar movie in the first post-theatrical window is on the Netflix platform, will they pay a small monthly subscription? The history of pay TV indicates that they probably will.’ It seems that

Silver is right.

In 2015, Netflix had more than 44 million subscribers in more than 40 countries (G. Li,

2015), and its global ambition was to reach 200 million subscribers (T. Barr, 2015). By 2016,

Netflix had covered more than 130 countries, accounting for over 50 per cent of prime-time internet traffic, along with YouTube, in the US market (Anne, 2016) and had 80 million subscribers in 190 countries (Roxborough, 2016). With subscribers all over the world, Netflix’s global ambition is more than obvious: to become the game changer. Although Netflix has been trying to march into China’s online territory for years, it ended up with a joint venture with iQIYI in 2017, and was later disbanded due to governmental censorship on content (Brzeski,

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2019). Nevertheless, Netflix succeeded in establishing itself in other parts of the world, such as Australia in 2015, with 200,000 authorized subscribers in 2014 (Elkins, 2016).

There has been limited discussion about the possibility of Netflix being TVIV – another nascent, revolutionary and advanced form of TV – since the idea was raised by Jenner in 2014.

This is a question worth contemplating. Despite all previous researches that has been conducted in terms of its recommendation system and algorithm, few researchers explored the future of

Netflix. So will it bring forth a new era of media (Jenner, 2014), and to what extent will it contribute to the development of cultural exchange internationally?

There is a great deal of literature regarding Netflix’s recommendation system and algorithm. Among this research, the definition of algorithm provided by Gillespie (2014, p.167) is well recognized: ‘algorithms not only help us find information, they provide a means to know what there is to know and how to know it’. It is a computational method to process big data, a way to better understand our online behaviour. We wanted to relieve ourselves of what to do with such a vast amount of information, and we have to believe in this system – but can an algorithm be wrong? In order to improve the accuracy of its recommendation system, Netflix tried to find a better solution via the Netflix Prize. The research into the recommendation system and algorithm of Netflix is often intertwined, with over 13700 research results on

Google Scholar. Due to the massive amount of research on the algorithm, the Netflix Prize was well examined, with 7350 results. The Netflix Prize was established to encourage system development that could ‘beat the accuracy of its recommendation system – Cinematch’

(Bennett and Lanning, 2007). It attracted participants from all over the world; instead of trying to understand the science of prediction, their focus was mainly on how to improve the accuracy

(Bell, Koren, and Volinsky, 2010). Technology precedes culture: even though there is little

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literature on the influence of the recommendation system on culture, most of the research is still focused on the algorithm.

Previous research examined how Netflix built its recommendation system, from original personalised guesses generated from each customer’s movie preferences (Pariser,

2011), to what they should do with all this information (data), and how this affects the recommendation system embedded into the streaming service (Vanderbilt, 2013), to the online recommendation system based on ratings, reviews and the algorithm (Župič & Giudici, 2016).

These researches are exploring the reasons behind Netflix’s success. A great deal of relevant research has therefore been conducted to investigate the innovative and creative business model of Netflix (McCord, 2014): how does Netflix apply the algorithm to screen productions to reverse the method of storytelling and what is the relationship with premium content strategies

(Cunningham et al., 2016)?

2.3.2 The global strategy of Netflix and its impact on local production

Everything mentioned above enables Netflix to prevail globally, but this is only part of the story. The global strategy of Netflix threatens the contemporary media landscape worldwide

(Adhikari et al., 2012; Given, Curtis, & McCutcheon, 2012; Goldsmith, 2015; Hoelck & Ballon,

2016), which breaks the balance between local and global, traditional and digital in a sense that

Netflix blitzed the existing territory and enabled it to morph into a brand-new space. This is not some cliché about how new media are going to take over traditional media, nor how new technology is going to replace the old (Rowe, Noble, Bennett, & Kelly, 2016; Turner, 2016), although similar discourses never cease to recur. Happening right now are media transformations across various boundaries that incorporate technology, content, functionality, culture and so forth. Due to the massive scale of the media sphere, and the limited time and resources of this research project, the study focuses on media transformations in online sectors only. The significance of Netflix partly resides in its challenge to resolve a conundrum that has

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been bothering the media industry for quite some time, with one exception: Hollywood. It is never easy to achieve media globalisation, but Netflix is obviously striving to reach global dominance, shaping itself as the online version of Hollywood.

Porter (1989) situates competition as the essence of strategy formulation. Olson (1999, p. 52) uses Porter to account for the competitive advantages of particular industries at particular times, stating that ‘these four sides to the diamond – factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries, and firm strategy, structure, and rivalry – combine in unique ways in different national contexts, conferring home-base advantages to particular nations in particular industries at particular times’. Paolo (2012) uses Porter to illustrate the industry network of Netflix, and contends that the relating and supporting American entertainment industry provides Netflix with industry know-how that renders competitive advantages.

Without its competitive advantage, it is hard to say whether productions like House of Cards would successfully be produced and distributed even with the world-leading recommendation system. Thus, ‘A firm’s resources are the fundamental determinant of competitive advantage.

Accordingly, resource constraints will limit a firm’s performance’ (Wernerfelt, 1984).

Netflix may become the online version of Hollywood – the secret lies in the algorithm:

‘Netflix has meticulously analyzed and tagged every movie and TV show imaginable, they possess a stockpile of data about Hollywood entertainment that is absolutely unprecedented’

(Madrigal, 2014, p. 2), but it is apparent that Hollywood is supporting its success, rendering a global dominance possible – but will it endure? The answer is positive in terms of Hollywood dominance (Hoskins, McFadyen, and Finn, 1997), but less so for Netflix. Netflix and

Hollywood are two forces that is dominating the screen market globally. Hollywood builds its dominance from content production, whereas Netflix is largely relying on the digital distribution. Hollywood provides audiences with ‘alternative realities’, where real life is being sheltered temporarily, thus providing the audience with an illusion of alternative reality and a

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satiation of viewing. Hollywood will dominate the in the future according to the theory of transparency: ‘Transparency is the capability of certain texts to seem familiar regardless of their origin, to seem a part of one’s own culture even though they have been crafted elsewhere’ (Olson, 1999, p. 16). Transparency is risky when it comes to homogenisation: normally, productions like martial arts and action films are more likely to have a higher level of transparency for their lack of ‘nutrition’.

What Netflix is aiming at – which makes it different from Hollywood – is to increase cultural diversity in its media productions, in contrast to homogenisation, Netflix is trying to preserve cultural specificity to maintain and reach for a large audience. It is still too early to predict the outcome of such revolutionary endeavours; scholars are more concerned about the impact on the local media sphere – questions are being raised about whether it will compete, facilitate or inhibit local productions (Barr, 2011; Cunningham et al., 2016; Goldsmith, 2015;

G. Li, 2015; Lobato and Meese; Silver and Cunningham, 2013; Turner, 2016). Despite the fact that Netflix has conquered more than 100 countries, the challenges facing its future are significant, especially with regard to increased cultural diversity, building a biennial local production culture and, most importantly, working out how to play to the world’s biggest audience, which entails relocation of production sites and recalibration of local elements in light of changing markets (Curtin, 2007).

In conclusion, a great deal of literature focuses on Netflix, mostly investigating its algorithm and recommendation system, the Netflix Prize, the reason for it achieving such a level of success, and (a few) on its unique way of media production and its impact on local media. Limited literature exists, however, on the future development of Netflix, its impact on the global media sphere, the influence of Netflix and streaming services on China’s media sphere, and the impacts on cultural production and cultural dissemination. With China having

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the biggest online industry in the world, it is timely and imperative to investigate this new screen ecology.

2.4 CHINA’S CULTURAL SOFT POWER AND ITS ‘GOING OUT’ AMBITIONS

2.4.1 Soft power and national strategy

In 1990, Foreign Policy delivered an analysis of ‘soft power’. Joseph S. Nye Jr., author of the original article, reconfigured some of the notions that have since been associated with soft power. The concept, he asserts, is the power of ‘attraction’, as opposed to the power of

‘coercion’ or ‘inducement’. Soft power is not exclusively cultural power, yet exporting cultural goods that hold attraction for other countries could potentially communicate values and influence societies as a by-product. In Nye’s (2004) words, ‘soft power’ is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. This definition is simple to understand; however, in order to gain further understanding of China’s soft power, one needs to look at its ‘four make-ups’ (Chitty, 2015). The first make up is identification, where cultures consist of deep traditional values that constitute the identity of a nation or a race. The second is reconciliation: when positioned in post-conflict situations, reconciliation is a kind of making- up. The third is ‘cosmetification’, which is an accentuation of positive images. The fourth is falsification, which is also seen as propaganda. These four make-ups represent the quality of soft power in a receding order – the last one in fact having the effect of reducing soft power

(Chitty, 2015). When discussing China’s soft power policy, or soft power scheme, it is often related to ideology propaganda or political agenda in Western discourses. In this sense, China’s endeavour in increasing cultural soft power – building Confucius Institutes, setting up a CCTV satellite channel, exporting martial arts movies and TV serials – is an effort to improve the attraction of Chinese culture and even of the nation (Barr et al., 2015; Berry and Farquhar,

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2006; Callahan, 2015; Ding, 2015; Edney, 2015; Zhao and Keane, 2013; Zhu, 2013) is often seen as ‘wearing too much makeup’.

The main-melody strategy is one of the factors that may be attributable to this stereotyped impression. In the sense of building national identity and strengthening the governance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the main-melody strategy was put forward in 1989 and has been implemented since then. As one of the most important cultural strategies in China, main-melody cultural productions are still being produced. Even so, this government- level intervention has failed to fulfil its purpose during China’s encounter with global

Hollywood (Berry and Farquhar, 2006). The ‘invisible hand’ is all over China’s cultural sectors, as ‘the government [has] attempted to tighten its ideological control on the cultural front’ (Su,

2016, p. 21), and has now expanded to the online front. Most literature has concentrated on the general concept of soft power, and on how to enhance China’s soft power; however, a small body of literature discussed the formation of the BAT as a new digital power, and their collective contribution in improving cultural soft power.

2.4.2 ‘Going out’ strategy

In 1999, the going global strategy (zou chu qu zhan lue) provided China with great overseas resources and opportunities, which enabled the country to achieve a booming economy – something that has become even more obvious since the accession of China to the World Trade

Organization (WTO) in 2001. Joining the WTO also brought many challenges to cultural industries, however – especially during the encounter with Hollywood regarding the film industry (Zang et al., 2012). The scholarship on relationships between culture and soft power focuses on the rise of Chinese soft power; Chinese culture and soft power; China’s attempt to becoming a global leader; and nationality in cultural productions ( Chan, 2009; Keane, 2016a,

2016b; Keane and Zhao, 2015). This literature indicates that, as the second largest economy in the world, China has long been trying to enhance its global visibility through cultural or

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creative sectors, and its ‘going out’ ambitions are in fact ‘old news’. When facing the threat posed by foreign counterparts, China tends to resist this force by blocking market entry either directly or indirectly – putting up various obstacles, constantly employing different regulations, and so forth (Donald et al., 2014; Fuchs, 2016; Keane and Donald, 2014; Wei and , 2008).

‘The great expectation that China’s culture will “go out” confronts the reality that the world market is not responding with acclamation to the kinds of cultural goods that are being sent out’ (Keane, 2016b, p. 18); such an awkward reality accentuates the need to create spreadable

Chinese content, and its corresponding distribution platform. The challenge emerging today is that digital technology makes it possible for China to reach a global audience, directly and with relatively reduced hindrance; however, it also opens up the Chinese market to foreign cultural productions and international co-production opportunities, and this is where the real battlefield lies.

The Chinese government understands the power of media better than anyone else when it comes to political propaganda. Watching CCTV news is a daily routine for most Chinese people, and it was more conspicuous before the digital age, when non-linear programming was unavailable. This explains why scholarly works often relate Chinese television content to soft power in screen studies of China. Dai Hugo and Chen Siming point out that the Chinese government is eager to enhance its soft power and creativity by improving the quality of television products, which in turn will increase international cultural communication (De

Burgh et al., 2012). Fisk, Keane and other scholars also stress the importance of television content in the process of ideological propaganda (Fiske, 2002; Keane, 2015; Wei and Xia,

2008). The development of television content and the enhancement of China’s soft power are therefore in a positive correlation. If China were able to disseminate Chinese screen content internationally, it would be able to enhance the global influence of Chinese culture, which will contribute to the increase in cultural soft power.

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2.4.3 Cultural discount

Wildman (1991) introduced the ‘model of trade in video products’ to explain US domination of this market. The concept of ‘windowing’ is proposed to account for the releasing of a program ‘in different distribution channels at different times’, as an attempt to maximize profits

(Owen and Wildman, 1992, p. 26), and this is a strategy employed by most TV productions these days. Meanwhile, Wildeman also examined the huge gap in international TV program trade, where US programs are dominating the foreign markets, taking up ‘one-third of broadcast hours’, and foreign programs (mostly UK-produced) only accounted for one to two percent in US (Owen and Wildman, 1992, p. 50). The US domination in international TV trade markets is largely due to ‘the size and wealth of English-speaking portion’ within the markets

(Owen and Wildman, 1992, p. 63), which leads to the discussion of cultural discount. However, with the development of foreign trade markets and the rise of international streaming services such as Netflix, it is easy to identify the emerging foreign dominance and new sequence of cultural .

Fiske (2002) explores the cultural connotations of television programs. As a good example to help understand international cultural trade, it involves concepts like cultural discount, cultural exchange and cultural proximity, among which cultural discount was positioned at the forefront of international cultural trade. Hoskins (Hoskins and Mirus, 1988, p. 504) first mentioned the concept of cultural discount: ‘A particular program rooted in one culture, and thus attractive in that environment, will have a diminished appeal elsewhere as viewers find it difficult to identify with the style, values, beliefs, institutions and behavioral patterns of the material in question.’ Cultural discount is almost inevitable in cultural trade: the higher the cultural proximity, the lower the cultural discount will be. Elsewhere, Olson (1999) adopts the concept of ‘transparency’ to illustrate various degrees of cultural discount via cases of Hollywood,

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emphasising that the more transparent the cultural production is, the less cultural discount it will encounter. These are all important factors in terms of China’s ‘going global’ ambitions.

To some extent, China’s ambitions are not just to enhance cultural soft power, ‘but also to reverse the cultural trade deficit that China faces internationally by bolstering exports in its media, cultural and creative industries’ (Flew, 2016, p. 172). China suffered a deficit in cultural trade both regionally and internationally for quite some time, compared with countries like the

United States. The reasons behind the deficit were a ‘lack of international competence, the content of product unable to meet the demand of market, the lack of perfect financing system, and the shortage of support from the government’ (Wei and Xia, 2008, p. 65). These are all important reasons why China failed in cultural trade internationally (Wei and Xia, 2008). Most research on China’s cultural export productions analysed the impact factors of China’s cultural products. The conclusions drawn from this research are that the major factor impacting China’s cultural export production is language (Zang et al., 2012), which means that audiences for

China’s cultural export production are mainly those who can speak Chinese Mandarin (Keane and Donald, 2014). This research outcome positioned cultural proximity as the most important factor in China’s cultural export. As a consequence, Chinese cultural production has suffered from severe cultural discount.

From 2012, there have been a growing number of scholars who have begun to study

Chinese television content, its international creativity and China’s soft power in the context of cultural products. Keane (2016a) elucidated the evolution of Chinese television, and attempted to explore the possible forms of international cooperation. Meanwhile, a systematic study of

Chinese television has been conducted to explore the possibilities of reasoning in China’s long- term failure at international attempts. Keane (2015) notes that the Chinese TV industry has huge potential for exploring future possibilities in the international market, and also great potential for enhancing China’s soft power. Premier Li Keqiang first adopted the term

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‘Internet+’ as a description of the characteristic of China’s economy today during the 2015

Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) and National Committee of Chinese People’s

Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Soon this phrase was widely used in media coverage, the government’s Blueprint Report and business conversations. Currently, as the most popular and largely acknowledged national strategy, Internet+ has successfully penetrated the Chinese economy, particularly those internet oligopolies that share close ties with the government and that have achieved a great success under its wing – the famous BAT. Based on such observations, Keane (2016c, p. 5428) argues that ‘few media industry events were immune from this discourse, signalling a perception that small-screen-connected devices were the future of the content industry’. This literature emphasizes the significance of the BAT and cultural productions in terms of China’s global ambition.

To date, there has been a great deal of literature on the development of the television industry domestically, most of it investigating TV serials, galas and news; there is also some limited research, both domestically and internationally, on the innovation of China’s TV programs. Little research exists, though, on the advent of TV exports and the implications for

China’s soft power (Keane and Zhao, 2015). The government has strict regulations on TV exports. However, others have proposed that cutbacks in TV entertainment policy have promoted the development of the online industry. Many Chinese scholars now focus on current and future government regulations on China’s cultural products (Meng, 2016), but the research outside China is limited with regard to cultural production and its contribution to China’s soft power, on how to integrate and disseminate Chinese culture within and beyond China’s borders, and on how the online industry will help China to increase cultural soft power.

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2.5 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the development of Chinese media industries was explored, as well as international threats and national dilemmas. The theoretical framework of the media industry and media economics has identified challenges brought by digital media, as well as technology advancement, indicating a reconfiguration of the comprehension of media industries. Existing works on media economics have emphasised the evolution of ‘old business models’; however, investigations of the ongoing evolution in China and beyond are needed from an academic perspective. Additionally, investigations of the interplay of media industries, media economics and technology – specifically, the implications of regulation, revenue composition and globalisation – are required in the context of Chinese screen industry studies.

Examinations of the revolution of TV, including digital TV, IPTV, OTT TV and so forth have identified smart TV, OTT TV and online video services as the future of TV. These emergent forms of TV have generated heated discussions in the academic field. In particular, scholarly works on streaming services investigated the prevalence of Youku, iQIYI and LeTV, noting a change in the business strategy and ecosystem of online distribution platforms. It is imperative to investigate the coalition of BAT and affiliated streaming services to explore their implications for screen culture as well as international cultural dissemination.

The need to examine the interactions of the BAT and Chinese streaming services has been emphasised in previous analysis; however, international threats and dilemmas are reshaping the Chinese screen industries as well. Netflix is in many ways redefining the content industry via its algorithm and recommendation system; meanwhile, it is influencing the production culture. Revelations on production culture and cultural disseminations are research questions that require further discussion. Most Chinese domestic studies have examined innovation in TV program and changes in content; however, limited research exists on the

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advent of TV exports (especially those enabled by streaming services) as well as the implications for soft power. These research gaps require further investigation.

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Chapter 3: BAT – the rise of three kingdoms

Chapter 2 emphasised the importance of examining the interactions between the BAT and streaming services in China, as well as their implications for production culture. In order to investigate the transformations that have occurred in the Chinese screen industry, it is imperative to analyse the BAT and streaming platforms respectively, to provide a comprehensive background. This chapter provides a contextual review of the BAT, with literature from a variety of sources analysed, including but not limited to industry reports, financial reports, books, biographies, periodicals, news and so forth.

This chapter outlines the difference between the Chinese and Western digital markets, noting that, despite of China’s efforts to copy Western services, Chinese online platforms are taking the lead in mobile payment services. Such a tendency indicates that Chinese services are capable of optimising featured services that could triumph over their Western counterparts.

Bearing this in mind, this chapter investigates the rise of online oligopolies in China – the BAT

– via data aggregation, revenue structure and political implications. It also examines why the

BAT is marching unfettered into the online screen industry.

3.1 DIFFERENTIATING THE WESTERN AND CHINESE MARKETS

3.1.1 The service integration spree

The Chinese online media market differs from Western markets in several ways: differences exist not only in the online screen industry, but in the entire internet business. China has the largest number of mobile users in the world – around 695 million in 2017 (CNNIC, 2017) – so it is impractical for Chinese enterprises to ignore the specific nature of the user experience, as numerous rivals stare over their shoulders. A unique business environment has been established

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under such circumstances. Online enterprises in China are dedicated to optimising the user experience, both on PC and mobile services, but this is far from enough (Guan and Tang, 2013).

Another innovation is high investment in functionality: multiple services within one platform combine to attract higher online traffic (the key measurement for online enterprises in terms of the number of users and their usage frequency). The end result is a better opportunity to generate profits. By combining new services into the platform, the ultimate goal of enterprises is to increase growth in user numbers while gaining more traffic.

The mobile-centric nature of China’s internet services is exceptional, and is a key distinction between Chinese companies and their Western counterparts: in China, affordances of mobile applications are often superior than those of PC services, and as a result mobile- centric habits have been cultivated among users. It is important to determine the causal relations between these two factors: affordances of mobility and mobile-centric habits.

Advanced platform affordances, along with fluent user experience, are co-evolving with people’s lifestyles. In this sense, Western-based platforms like Facebook, Google or Amazon offer a less diverse ecosystem on respective mobile applications, where the user experience is complementary to PC services. In addition to such user affordances, the development of online payment services adds to the mobile-centric environment. China is now considered by some international reports to be ‘a cashless society’ (Bloomberg News, 2017), one in which digital transactions are ubiquitous, from the supermarket to utilities payments. Such online payment services have accelerated the development of a unique mobile-centric environment: the large number of mobile users would in turn optimise user experience, which adds significance to the dependence on mobile-centric payment services – a very important advance in a society in which goods and services were previously hard to obtain. This virtuous circle continues to increase the mobile-centric nature of China’s internet services, expanding into the entire internet business.

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The mobile-centric environment has not been discussed widely in academic work to date, as many works are far behind the development of technology, which is updated on a daily basis. For people from other parts of the world, this new version of ‘digital China’ provides them with a future prospect of digital society, one that fundamentally changes their impressions of the nation. Thus , CEO of Baidu confidently claims in his book that internet services in China are not simply ahead of those in the rest of Asia; in a sense, they are even ahead of those in the United States in terms of online payment services (Y. Li, 2017).

As noted above, the emphasis on the mobile internet may be one of the identifiable distinctions so far between the two markets, even as there are many similar business models.

Meanwhile, the online enterprises in China – Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT) – are expanding by offering multiple services that cover almost all Chinese users’ online activities.

This phenomenon of providing multiple services within one platform – or, as some scholars describe it, ‘lock in strategies’ or ‘forming [an] enclosed business loop’ (Srnicek, 2016) – not only applies to Chinese internet companies, but also to global giants such as Google, Facebook and Amazon. This business strategy aims to maintain and increase numbers of users by providing multiple services in an attempt to meet everyone’s needs, which will ‘lock in’ users and improve the stickiness of the platform (Cunningham and Craig, 2019). Regardless of whether the approach used is business acquisition or platform convergence, the ultimate goal is to create an enclosed business loop that centralises the platform and radiates various possible fields to accumulate incremented capital.

Srnicek (2016) uses the term ‘platform capitalism’ to establish a framework and understanding of this platform economy. World-renowned digital platforms such as Facebook,

Google, Amazon and the BAT are thus ‘far more than internet companies or tech companies, since they can operate anywhere, wherever digital interaction takes place’ (Srnicek, 2016: 44).

While ‘platform studies’ has a legacy in computation and communications, Srnicek’s

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understanding of platforms emphasises the porous boundaries of traditional business models – that is, the characteristics of a business used to be distinct and relatively easy to distinguish.

Platform capitalism is becoming the product of our age. One of the essential qualities of digital platforms lies in their dependence on ‘network effects’, where platform and users co-evolve; this easily leads to monopolisation, which is accompanied by the acquisition of multiple services or the convergence of platforms. Srnicek believes that such platform convergence will have a tendency towards similarity, where platforms are alike and have similar functions targeting the same user groups. Srnicek (2016, p. 125) concludes that:

The cross-subsidisation of these ventures would come to an end, as would their

ability to compete with other major platforms. In any case, the capitalist

imperative to generate a profit means that these platforms will be forced either

to develop novel means of extracting a surplus from the general economic pie

or to fold their expansive cross-subsidising monopolies into much more

traditional business forms.

If the tendencies set out in this book continue, we can expect one particular

future. Platforms continue to expand across the economy, and competition

drives them to enclose themselves increasingly. Platforms dependent on

advertising revenues are compelled to transition more into direct payment

businesses.

As an emerging conceptual framework, platform capitalism has not yet been adopted widely in China, possibly because of its association with capitalism. Nonetheless, Chinese scholars often describe the ‘cross-subsidisation’ or affordance of multiple services within one digital platform as a ‘platform convergence’ strategy. The formation of this strategy is the result of

‘following market rules’, which was not invented in China by any means, but emerged from

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Western literature from around 1983. Jenkins and Deuze (2008) foresaw the online media age in 2001, where the idea of media convergence as a ‘process’ instead of an ‘end state’ implied that it was ongoing. In this sense, media convergence is a constant, taking place in multiple forms and on multiple levels, and can be regarded as the origin of platform convergence.

Information society theories have a longer legacy. In 1983, De Sola Pool proposed that the changing relationships within communication industries were driven by a force named

‘convergence’, the notion that ‘a service provided in the past by any one medium – be it broadcasting, the press, or telephony – can now be provided in several different physical ways’

(Pool, 1983). Although written over 30 years ago, this statement at least partly characterises what has been taking place in China’s online sector: the analogue medium, defined by spectrum scarcity, is being replaced by digital media ‘affordances’ and almost unlimited bandwidth –

‘physical ways’ are being superseded by ‘virtual ways’.

In the context of the brief history of Chinese communications since the 1950s, when information was sent along wired speakers in villages, the switch to ‘virtual ways’ represents a massive transformation. Private companies now offer services that previously were the province of governments. Chinese online platforms are now trying to achieve one-stop online portals, where all kinds of information and frequently used services are available, preferably through a single platform; convergence is thus a reality in China. Green and Jenkins argue that

‘this convergence is being shaped both by media conglomerates’ desires to exploit ‘synergies’ between different divisions and consumer demands for media content where, when and in what form they want it’ (Green and Jenkins, 2009). Prior literature, such as that by Jenkins and

Deuze (2008) and Haidee Wasson (2009) has explicitly discussed convergence – especially media convergence. Although the platform medium is not the same, the interplay of convergence remains consistent. The outcome of convergence in relation to China’s online

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sector is unclear in terms of how functionalities take root, but this disrupting force is blurring the boundaries between platforms, causing significant changes to Chinese online enterprises.

Chinese scholar Yu Guoming (2015b) also addresses platform convergence, believing that the evolution of platforms should be considered from a ‘higher dimension’. His claim aligns with the abstruse concept of ‘internet thinking’, reportedly devised by the chief executive officer (CEO) of Tencent. Baidu.com describes internet thinking as is a way of thinking about re-examining the market, users, products, enterprise value chains and even the entire business ecosystem in the context of the continuous development of (mobile) Internet +, big data, cloud computing and other technologies. Yu is striving to restructure the ‘dimension’ of the existing economic sector, and considers platform convergence strategy a critical instrument in this economic restructuring. He contends that currently used traditional business logic often fails to illustrate the hidden patterns behind the economic changes (Yu, 2015b). Intimidated by failure caused by unawareness of the tides, or defeated by nascent start-ups overnight (as is frequently the case with China’s internet businesses and globally, when businesses or new ventures/ideas can quickly become obsolete), internet enterprises in China are observing platform convergence with great passion, since the Tsinghua professor, Yu, is one of the most famous scholars in Chinese study of communication, not to mention the wide spread of his pioneering ideas through channels of state-led media, especially CCTV and Xinhua News

Agency.

Many online companies in China have gone on an integration spree, attempting to build a digitised service hub that also supports third-party applications (Yu, 2015a). This strategy is not unusual in the offline world, where ‘one-stop’ shopping is well known among the general public; however, it was less common in the digital realm until recently. Although platform convergence is now a trendy concept in China, it is not particularly different from the ‘network effects’ or ‘lock in’ strategy described in Western literature, where the aim is to create an

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‘enclosed business environment’ and increase user stickiness. In this sense, internet players in

China and the West are headed in similar directions, exploiting lookalike business models – although, to a large extent, China has begun to customise business models for its markets much faster than anywhere else. That being said, apart from the centrality of mobile, another distinction of the two markets lies in regulation: the , in addition to censorship, has cultivated an online space that is separated from the rest of the world, meaning outside information and online service are mostly blocked in China (C. Zhang, 2016), with the exception of VPNs, which provide temporary access only (Mou et al., 2016).

Online businesses in the West have been used to seeing their ‘copycat’ counterparts in

China, yet despite their huge success, distinct business styles and advanced technology, the tides are turning. Copycats, sometimes called shanzhai, have existed in China for a relatively long period of time, across numerous levels; the forms of copycat have gone from business models, to platforms, and in particular content. On the platform and business mode level, China has Youku – emulating YouTube; Renren – emulating Facebook; Weibo – emulating Twitter,

QQ – emulating MSN, and so on. On the content level, it is not surprising to encounter a history of copycat in the development of Chinese television, where Chinese TV content has copied the storylines of Western drama series and the scripts of variety shows. Later, this developed into program purchasing that signifies the end of copycat by acquiring the original copyright (Keane and Zhao, 2015). The copycat in China is making an endeavour to step out of Western shadows.

Such changes are readily identifiable, especially on the video platforms.

Internationally, YouTube is the most comprehensive platform – almost 40 per cent of content on YouTube is music related (Mclntyre, 2017), with the rest consisting mostly of UGC and amateur-professionalised content (content quality higher than UGC) (E. J. Zhao,

2016b). Unlike Netflix or other streaming platforms in Western markets that belong to subscription services, YouTube provides audiences with various . As the copycat of

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YouTube, Youku shows a more diversified style: it is a mixture of PGC, UGC, subscription, and amateur-professionalised content, all of which is available on a single platform. Even though Youku started as a copycat, the similarity has become less clear. Like other streaming platforms in China, Youku appears to be a combination of various online content. The blurring of boundaries has impacted both industry and user levels, so it is not a surprise to have dual simultaneous identities as a producer and an audience (Bruns, 2008; Cunningham and Silver,

2013). Blurring boundaries, as a different form of platform convergence, showcases the transformative and disruptive power in the Chinese online market, and provides a means for

Chinese platforms to differentiate themselves from Western models, in an effort to be more than copycats.

3.1.2 Catching up the game

As mentioned previously, internet services in China are, in a sense, ahead of those of the United

States in terms of digital payment platforms (Y. Li, 2017). By blurring the boundaries, online platforms in China began to extend their reach, both online and offline. The most notable advancement in daily life would be digital payment – the third-party payment platform. Owing to the development of Alipay, the second largest cash cow of Alibaba (it may become the first in the near future, currently occupied by Alibaba’s e-commerce platforms – and ), cash has become a less popular payment method in China (Ellisman, 2015). If one is lacking a smartphone or a third-party payment platform (even with Visa or MasterCard at hand), many things are likely to be inconvenient and inefficient. Once the saying was that without money, you could go nowhere; now, money has been replaced by digital money – numbers on third- party payment platforms. While China was digitalized in 2015, and online transactions were common, this did not apply to offline transactions using online platforms. For online transactions, purchasing and paying procedures are all processed online, so the online payment platform is more advantaged than the internet banking systems. However, offline to online

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payment is much more difficult: offline stores need to go through a digitisation process – in most cases, a complicated technical procedures (which has been made easy for offline stores these days, thanks to QR codes), for customers to use online payment platforms to pay for offline products. Despite this, the trend is clear. People who have lived outside China for a period of time would find this digitised lifestyle novel.

However, the advancements in payment innovation may seem less transformative. A well-established banking system and third-party payment platforms like PayPal and Apple Pay already provide a smooth user experience in terms of online and offline shopping, especially regarding the payment sector (Bailve, 2017). This pre-existed Alipay. Even so, the rise of

Alipay crushed the global dream of Apple Pay when Alibaba surpassed Apple as the most valuable company in stock price on the New York Stock Exchange on 13 July 2017 (He, 2017).

Alibaba became a national champion in China, where it is the most successful internet company with international ambitions.

Not every Chinese internet company can survive international competition; luckily, though, most Chinese internet services do not need to confront their international counterparts, as they live within the Great Firewall. One major reason why international companies like

Google fail to succeed in China is the strict government regulation that exists, like the Great

Firewall (O'Rourke, Harris, and Ogilvy, 2007). International counterparts excel in terms of their service and technology, but their fate is to a large extent doomed even after re-entering the Chinese market (if this is possible) when technical and governmental hindrances are put in place in order to protect local businesses, not to mention issues of intellectual property violation.

The Great Firewall has fostered a single business environment in which Chinese start- ups can grow; this is the prominent strategy used to keep international competitors locked out, leaving plenty of time and space for Chinese online companies to catch up. Technical hindrance alone is not sufficient to protect the local businesses: strict government regulation sometimes

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serves as a second insurance (Quelch and Jocz, 2010). Under the umbrella of the CCP, copycat versions of foreign platforms, such as QQ, WeChat and Weibo, received invisible support from the government, which buys them enough time to gather strength and achieve more. An enclosed business loop is thus forged with the protection of the party (Weekend, 2015). There is much at stake for the government in ICTs; they are a central part of the 13th Five Year Plan, as Yu Hong has noted. The rise of information technology, according to Ozawa (Ozawa,

Castello, and Phillips, 2001, p. 296), ‘will have a great impact on the heavily protected sectors … the more archaic, distorted, and inefficient an industry is, the greater the potential gains from the IT revolution, hence the faster the potential productivity growth. And East Asia has a huge backwater of hitherto regulated and protected industries which are now beginning to open up for global competition in trade and foreign direct investment.’ Ozawa has used the

‘flying geese’ model to describe the development of Asia-Pacific region, where the boom of economic development takes turns from Japan to China, and will possibly move over to India.

China is striving to hold the position, reluctant to hand over the throne of ‘world’s biggest manufacturing country’, as China struggles to maintain its leadership after a rapid growth in

ICT. The question is through which trajectory and how. Another approach is called

‘unbundling’ (Baldwin, 2017), which suggests that the technological advantages of the West have been transferred to developing countries through outsourcing; this is the problem that now ravages the US economy.

The Great Firewall is an implementation of regulated and protected internet industry, where industrial growth is eagerly anticipated. Platform convergence projects such ambitions by stirring up a form of transformative and innovative power across China’s online sector.

Initially, Chinese platforms are just substitute for foreign counterparts. Chinese users have to settle for less; however, the functionality of Chinese platforms now triumphs over that of foreign competitors, especially in terms of mobile payment. From the user’s perspective, even

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with other competitors (intruders) in play, they won’t be bothered with making choices, as social networking of a platform sometimes beats functionality (Brad Stone, 2017). Therefore, it is pointless to transfer to a different platform where the social connections are based entirely on another, and where one language dominates. This theory positioned social connection as a critical standpoint for understanding the platform dynamics, where the initial advantage renders the possibility of monopolisation that gives frontrunners a head start, making it rather difficult for latecomers to take a stand. The initial advantage, therefore, may serve as the third account of the rise of Chinese online giants and the failure of Western attempts in China.

Thanks to platform convergence, and technology advancement, China has finally found its footing in the global market, not as the king of copycat, but as a respectful counterpart.

China is indeed catching up the game, but are those companies powerful enough to compete with the world giants in the international arena? What are their international ambitions? In the

IT world, timing equals game-changing. The enclosed business ecology in China allowed companies to thrive; however, Baidu is not suitable for English searching, Paypal is easier but maybe less functional than Alipay, and WeChat is troubled in terms of making international progress (Weekend, 2015). No longer being a substitute is one thing; gaining international engagement is quite another. There seem to be awkward interactions between the two markets:

China Uber is not nearly as convenient as other versions in other regions; Netflix made compromises in content integrity, as one of the few winners that made their way into China – the endeavour is considered costly, risky and ambiguous. The fundamental difference in business environment and user habits has made online companies from both parties extremely difficult to survive on the other’s soil. Will BATs have a seat in the international market? If so, through which service and how? Will online content earn the chance to compete in international markets? Hopefully, an investigation of the BAT could answer these questions and more.

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3.2 THE THREE KINGDOMS: THE BAT

3.2.1 The BAT and online media

The role that the BAT are playing in the development of online media turns out to have been under-estimated. All three online giants have encountered various challenges, and even life-or- death moments, over the years. They have been rewarded in a way that is certainly beyond everyone’s imagination. Having fought through so many battles, their leadership is almost impossible to challenge, and their royal status is well earned and well deserved. That doesn’t mean, however, that the state involvement experienced at the preliminary stage would simply remain the same. When they grow into oligopolies, it is rather difficult to neglect what is been happening in the online space, particularly the competition being incinerated on online media platforms. Closing down social media accounts on WeChat (the private social platform in

China, which belongs to Tencent) (Pan, 2017) further proves the ambiguous relationship between online companies and the state. The secret ties between the BAT and the state can no longer be regarded as simply assumptions after this incident, which will complicate business strategies and online content production.

According to Yu Gong, the CEO of iQIYI, who delivered a speech at the iQIYI conference, the online platform affiliated with Baidu, UGC, was once reckoned as industrial waste. From a technical perspective, the maintenance of UGC on one platform cost large amounts of money and often gave the platform virtually nothing in return; however, UGC is now emerging as the newly discovered goldmine, with unlimited potential and more to excavate. This change evidenced the role the BAT are playing in content innovation – but why?

One of the BAT’s most notable contributions is the platform accessibility initiated by these enterprises, which increases the penetration of internet services among Chinese people and reaches even the most remote and under-developed regions of China (Institute, 2016).

Expressed in another way, advanced technology infrastructure such as 3G

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and 4G, or the accessibility of broadband, make it possible for less educated populations to access internet services at a lower cost. In a developing country such as China, the rise of the

BAT, along with advanced technology infrastructure, accelerates social equality and narrows the digital information gap (AliResearch, 2015) as well as improving local economies – for example, Alibaba’s endeavour to build a countryside e-commerce business has resolved information gap and transportation issues, which improved employability and ‘hard to buy, hard to sell’ situations in rural areas. In this sense, the BAT are powerful allies of the state.

China’s social infrastructure and economic system are more developed because of the

BAT, which fill the gaps in Chinese society that have radically challenged and transformed sociological patterns. The high penetration of online platforms and smart technology has disrupted the original hierarchy between cities and classes: coastal cities were more economically and socially advantaged than northern or western ones, and those in the elite, white-collar classes were much better informed than their lower-class counterparts.

Paradoxically, a disrupted hierarchy indicates a more civilised and developed society, where innovation and creation are acclaimed and recommended. Internet users are more intelligent than before, thanks to the penetration and accessibility mentioned previously; consequently, the quality of screen products is relatively high compared with the past. As a result, well- informed Chinese internet users have become more interested in culturally enriched content than in shallow productions. Once critical thinking is cultivated, it is difficult to ignore and pretend. Even though cultural innovation has always found its way back to a censorship mechanism, this unavoidable topic is the thorn in the Chinese people’s side (King, Pan, and

Roberts, 2013).

The internet brought critical thinking and the power to disrupt hierarchy, and it renders the video platform the space for content innovation; these changes are all indispensable for the resurrection of ‘in-between’ screen productions. ‘In-between’ screen productions refer to those

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where the quality is higher than or equal to UGC and equal or less than PGC. TV production in China can be categorised into four sectors: UGC, original, self-made and PGC. The in- between production refers to a combination of original, self-made and every other production that happens between UGC and PGC, including the amateur-professionalised content (see

Chapter 5 for detailed information). While original content has the potential to become self- made content (platform-commissioned productions), an amateur-professionalised process can take place from UGC to self-made, so it is not accurate to categorise this content in the current structure when it may be at different stages and forms in or between UGC and PGC.

Given the distinction of ‘in-between’ content and PGC, however, UGC is recognisable and distinguishable. This phenomenon differs from Western markets not only because of governmental regulative power, but because of the mixed business or platform environment.

In the speech on the iQIYI conference, Yu Gong, the CEO of iQIYI, suggested that it was the

‘platform that empowered [the] online content creator’, but the disrupted social hierarchy and the wakening power of online Chinese user might be the real facilitators. The empowerment of online content would probably take a long time if it were not for the rise of the BAT, given that the BAT are in possession of online video platforms. If the BAT have a way of transforming industrial waste like UGC into a gold mine, then their presence on an online media platform would possibly signify its transformative potential on the ‘in-between’ content and the future changes to come.

3.2.2 BAT and its vision for media empire

It seems odd that there is little Chinese academic literature that examines the BAT as a combined force rather than separate enterprises. A certain amount of literature was found regarding the social consequences, technical development and business strategies of these companies. A great deal of Baidu literature focused on the infringement issues caused by

Baidu, and the disputable ‘ranking by bidding mechanism’ (S. Yang, 2016); most of it

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investigates the social consequences instead of business strategies or their impact on the business environment. A great deal of literature on Alibaba examines this new form of e- commerce, however, and explores its impact on internet finance (Guo et al., 2006; Wu, Ma, and Shi, 2010); all of it draws attention to the company’s business strategies, but the influence on social consequences is seldom mentioned. The literature of Tencent is focused mostly on its social platforms, such as WeChat and QQ, where the platform is discussed as a means of social communication, information dissemination and platform distribution (Brad Stone,

2017). In the largest Chinese academic literature database, CNKI, that literature that includes all three BAT giants is often concerned with collaborations with media, movies, and other industries. Most of these articles are from magazines and news outlets rather than scholarly journals. Conversely, the omnipresence of biographies on these companies and their CEOs provides a dramatic contrast. Sitting on the ‘best-seller’ shelf across nearly every bookstore

(including online) in China, these books cover most of the mysteries that interest the mass audience, making themselves the most accessible form of material (much more than scholarly work) to Chinese readers, journalists and scholars. One interesting fact about biography is that it tends to avoid any harsh criticism; the same applies to books written by BAT institutions

(Alibaba and Tencent funded their official research institute; Baidu only has a marketing research institute so far), where conflict of interest is unavoidable. In this case, articles from magazines and news outlets are able to provide comprehensive histories of these companies and independent opinions, even though they may fall short in terms of argument.

There is a heated discussion regarding the combination of the BAT and the online video industry, mainly in news and magazines. A few books briefly mentioned this, but none of them went on to thoroughly investigate the reasons behind this strategic move. It is acknowledged that the BAT enterprises have invested heavily in the online video industry – Baidu owns iQIYI,

Alibaba has Youku and Tencent holds Tencent Video – but their reasons and motivations for

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expanding into the media sector remain theoretically unclear. Why would each of the BAT simultaneously choose the online video industry, and what does this seemingly unified and consistent action mean for the online world? The BAT have excelled in different fields, and their acquisition has moved across a wide range of areas, but the obsession with online video platforms and their interest in cloud services is something they have in common. In this context,

BAT could be taken as a combined force against other video platforms in the way they are reshaping the industry standard. To solve the mystery, it is imperative to conduct an analysis based on existing material, from the perspectives of data competition, gross income and political implications.

3.2.2.1 Data competition

Srnicek (2016) proposes that platforms are ‘an extractive apparatus for data’. Such illustration considers data and platform as indispensable instruments in the internet business. As a form of capitalism, data existed in the past, but the sheer amount of it today is unprecedented:

Massive new expanses of potential data were opened up, and new industries

arose to extract these data and to use them so as to optimise production

processes, give insight into consumer preferences, control workers, provide the

foundation for new products and services (e.g. Google Maps, self-driving cars,

Siri), and sell to advertisers. All of this had historical precedents in earlier

periods of capitalism, but what was novel with the shift in technology was the

sheer amount of data that could now be used. (Srnicek, 2016, p. 40)

When Western scholars theorised the importance of big data, business leaders in China echoed their views. has repeatedly emphasized the importance of data competition, stating that the future of the internet lies in data. When everyone else is confused about the corporate strategy of Alibaba, Ma has claimed on more than one occasion that Alibaba is not an e-

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commerce company, not an entertainment company, not an e-finance company, but a big data company. When Baidu and Tencent joined the competition, they willingly acknowledged the strategic significance of big data, but none of them claims officially to be a big data company.

Robin Li, the CEO of Baidu, believes that big data is the indispensable energy powering artificial intelligence, it is essential for optimizing machine learning and Baidu is converted to an AI company, instead of an online search company (Y. Li, 2007). Li believes big data is the fuel of the next industrial revolution, and that those who acquire enough of it will have a shot at a technology breakthrough. Tencent has been the frontrunner in market share for a long time; although its position is constantly threatened by Alibaba, its products have a mythical status in

China, with each one of them climbing right to the top. WeChat has been the most frequently used application on mobile devices for several years, and Tencent holds unimaginable amounts of data from one single platform. When three giants deploy seemingly unreasonable strategies in the online field, data competition probably accounts for such moves. The open secret is that data will be the game-changing factor in any future competition.

Video services are the second (next to search services) frequently used online activities in China, getting involved in online video industry grants companies with easy access to these active data. By acquiring online video platforms, the BAT are expanding their territory in data collection. For example, as a , Baidu collects the searching behaviour of online users; in the meantime, iQIYI (owned by Baidu) is able to collect and analyse viewing preferences. By combining the two datasets, Baidu will be able to identify the specific age group accessing certain online video content, users’ inclination to pay for subscription services, and so forth. In turn, their search results in the search engine and on the video platform will be optimised. If this synergy seems less convincing, then an example form Tencent might strengthen this relativity. Tencent provides a variety of online services, most of which cover social and entertainment activities. Because of the ‘identifiable ID’ (the mobile phone number

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used for registration of each user of the service), Tencent is able to tag along each ID and track its usage behaviours. Some unexpected conclusions can be drawn combined with datasets from video services – for example, in the group of luxury buyers, WeChat data could point out their location and their preferable brands, while data from Tencent Video could signify their predilection for particular video content, news headlines and so on (Su, 2017). These examples showcase the strategic position of video data for online giants, and the capability of the BAT in possession of such data, which implies the significance of video data in data competition.

For data competition, one critical step is to gain the most ground possible. Acquiring a vast variety of data – preferably across various fields – would enable enterprises to get a hold of big data and make better use of it. As the second most frequently used online activity

(CNNIC, 2017), building online video services is like establishing the path to a hidden treasure, with great effort and unlimited potential. If making use of big data is like sailing on the sea, then the ‘identifiable ID’ is like the only dim light on a dark night: it is one of the most important clues to utilise unlimited data. As another crucial step, Tencent excelled at gaining

‘identifiable ID’, as social accounts often require privacy and registration. The same applies to

Alibaba, where registration is essential for Alipay and internet shopping. Baidu fell short in this respect, as online searching is a relatively public activity, and registration is not necessary.

On the contrary, Gmail and other services make Google more convenient after logging on to a

Google account when using its services, including online searching. Although it is not a mandatory request, frequent users would still choose to have a better user experience by logging on to their Google account. Consequently, Google has a strong hold on ‘identifiable

ID’, whereas Baidu struggled to set up the ‘real-name registration’ policy. In fact, the ‘real- name registration’ policy was implemented by the National Internet Information Office of

China on 1 June 2017 (H. Jiang, 2017), as an act to strengthen governmental management against internet identity theft, to create a safe and green space for information flows by

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standardising internet platforms including Weibo and Baidu microblogging ().

Baidu has been on the government blacklist since several incidents triggered by false medical advertising, which resulted from its own business model – ranking by bidding mechanism

(Y. Zhou, 2012). The ‘real-name registration’ policy was aimed at regulating the internet space, especially in order to alleviate the long-lasting social turmoil between the public and the medical system, when several social unrest incidents have occurred due to the ambivalent and strained relationship.

Data are not merely essential to the big technology companies, but central to the digital economy. As Srnicek (2016, p. 6) points out, ‘with a long decline in manufacturing profitability, capitalism has turned to data as one way to maintain economic growth and vitality in the face of a sluggish production sector’. This claim situates data on centre stage in the 21st century, as a means to generate profit for the high-tech industries. Data competition is therefore the inevitable war of this age. It is established through platforms, and Srnicek provides a new way of comprehending such channels: the term ‘platform capitalism’ entails capitalism within the framework of platform, where the platform ‘does not own the means of production but rather has ownership over information’. Owners of the platforms, such as the BAT, will be able to collect data; clearly, the more ownership one platform contains, the more users will be drawn to it, and more data will be made available to the tech giants, so the more platform ownership the BAT acquire, the more data will be available to be utilized by them. This projects the

‘network effects’ Srnicek mentions in the book, where ‘the more numerous the users who use a platform, the more valuable that platform becomes for everyone else’ (Srnicek, 2016, p. 45).

Hence expansion into the media industry not only prepares the BAT for data competition, but also brings a synergy between platforms that draws on more users and adds more value. By venturing into online entertainment platforms – especially online video platforms – the BAT

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are deploying their battlefield for data competition, but the question is how they manage to gain enough income to lash out on large investments in these top-scaled data competitions?

3.2.2.2 Revenue income

The online video platform is becoming the indispensable infrastructure for the BAT, both in strategic terms (increase users and stickiness) and at the financial level (generating considerable income from advertising). Strategically, expanding their businesses to online video platforms is a small but necessary move towards the ultimate ecosystem – especially when the existing business model is only left with limited room to grow. Baidu is the largest online search engine company in China, Tencent is building up the kingdom of social and entertainment, and Alibaba is dominating in online shopping and online financial businesses

(such as Ant Financial), all of which have developed a well-functioned business loop. In the past, clients of BAT have been ranked at million level, but now they have climbed the ladder.

It is considered business suicide to adopt old business models, and it is imperative to discover new momentum. For the big companies, this is the match point: they can either choose to approach the finish line, or find a new game and initiate a new competition. Marching into the online video industry turns out to be an acknowledged ‘next move’. Regardless of the contribution made to the financial sector, online video industry is believed to be an attractive option for current and future investors. Such business strategy was considered applicable to maintain current clients and stabilise growth rates, for strategists believe that the screen and cultural industries will lead the future tides (Shi, Ren, et al., 2014), and it will become essential for China’s future business ecology. The online video industry – in this case, the online platforms – is therefore expected to become a fortress for the BAT kingdom in the next decade.

From a financial perspective, digital entertainment content does contribute to revenue income; the question is the extent to which this is so. According to the published 2017 financial year report for the first quarter of 2017 (to 31March 2017), the unaudited gross income of

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Tencent was $71.82 billion dollars (Tencent, 2017), Alibaba reached $64.29 billion dollars

(Alibaba, 2017) and Baidu gained $24.54 billion dollars in total (G. Li, 2017). Apparently,

Tencent is leading the pack, Alibaba is catching up, but Baidu is falling behind. Ironically, the famous BAT are actually ranked in reverse; it would be more appropriate to address them as

TAB, with their revenue income sequenced in a descending order. The financial report of

Tencent reveals its financial structure, and the same applies to Alibaba. Baidu, however, does not make public its financial structure or the explicit number across its various businesses.

Robin Li decided to withhold the financial report of Baidu (G. Li, 2017), but to disclose the figures regarding Baidu’s expenditure, to manifest a business framework and future agenda.

The revenue composition and expenditure structure of the BAT have shed some light on the way these huge enterprises operate. It is concluded from its financial report that Tencent generates income from three main sections: internet games; advertising; and other affiliated services (primarily the third-party payment application WeChat Pay and Tencent Cloud).

However, Tencent’s revenue composition is much more complex. As the largest social media and entertainment provider in China, Tencent’s services sometimes interact with one another.

In the 2017 Tencent financial report, Tencent revealed its five main services of revenue: social media and messaging services (e.g. QQ and WeChat); internet games (e.g. King of Glory); digital content (Tencent Video, QQ music, Tencent Yuewen Group); internet advertising (on

Tencent Video, Tencent News and WeChat); and others (WeChat Pay and Tencent Cloud)

(Tencent, 2017). Tencent makes a profit by advertising on its social and entertainment platforms, offering subscription or VIP services and selling virtual tools in internet games.

Tencent products are so popular that WeChat is the most indispensable application on any mobile device – Tencent CEO Pony Ma is concerned about over-use of it. Another application is enduring a similar but rather disputable fate: King of Glory was described by

Xinhua News Agency as ‘King of Poison’ (Yan, 2017) when it caused severe game addiction

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problems among Chinese juveniles across the nation. Following this incident, Tencent is enforcing ‘game time restriction rules’ on children aged under 12 to offset the negative social influence prompted by this crisis. This unexpected criticism from the most respected news outlets in China is an indication of the increasingly constrained relationship between the tech giants and the state.

From the figure provided below, it is shown that internet games generate the highest profit for Tencent, followed by social applications. Advertising income is earned across various platforms, and the most notable contribution came from Tencent Video. In Tencent’s 2017 financial report, Tencent Video was mentioned several times. Being involved in two sectors,

Tencent Video contributed greatly in terms of revenue from social apps and media advertisement, which take up 22 per cent and 4 per cent in revenue composition respectively.

Revenue generated from social apps refers to income based on digital content services, including digital music, video content and internet novels, in addition to virtual tools sales.

Judging from the context, it is safe to say that Tencent values the prospect and potential of

Tencent Video. The financial report emphasised the significance of online video platforms for

Tencent financially. While the prospect of the profitability of Tencent Video may be unpredictable, future plans are underway.

Internet games 13% Social apps 8% 41% Online advertisement 4% Media advertisement 12% Social media advertisement 22% Others

Figure 1: Tencent revenue composition Source: created by author based on 2017 Tencent financial report

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Others include: income generated by WeChat Pay and Tencent Cloud.

If the revenue composition of Tencent is complicated and even confusing, Alibaba’s financial report is straightforward and explicit. In terms of Alibaba, e-commerce is the pivoting business, generating the most income; the second group were all included in ‘others’; and the third category goes to the digital and entertainment industry, which refers to the video platform

Youku. Alibaba is establishing itself as the infrastructure of the future internet (AliResearch,

2015): if Tencent is monopolizing online social activity, then Alibaba is claiming hegemony in credit-based online activity. E-commerce sits at the centre of the Alibaba network, linked with logistics – an intelligent logistics network at the service of Alibaba’s e-commerce platform (Taobao and T-mall), but in the meantime capable of extending the network centring itself. Alipay is another practice that initially was based on Alibaba’s e-commerce platform, and that grew into the most widely used online payment application in China. Later, other practices emerged, such as Ant Financial, an online financial network that is under construction with Alibaba occupying centre stage.

Alibaba is making every move strategically. Jack Ma never embarks on a new territory randomly, and he is building a massive network to enable interactions between Alibaba’s different divisions and services (Fang and Liu, 2015). In a way, Alibaba is trying to manufacture the butterfly effect, only in this case it is trying to build its own empire where users will be able to conduct almost all online activities without leaving the Alibaba network.

The digital and entertainment sector constitutes the third largest revenue stream of Alibaba, which proves that it is essential for the Alibaba network, both financially and strategically. In the digital and entertainment sector, Alibaba acquired the mobile browser and news platform

– UC Web and UC Browser, and online video platform Youku. In addition, Alibaba Pictures was established as an attempt to enter the movie production industry. From movie production to the online video platform (Youku), accompanied by news outlets (UC Web) and advertising

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space (UC Browser), Alibaba has established a completed streamline and network of content industry that covers production, distribution, advertising and news coverage. In a sense,

Alibaba is framing four connected yet independent networks – e-commerce, online payment

(internet financial), intelligent logistics and online entertainment – all of which are strong enough to operate as independent businesses. In combination, Alibaba is stronger in various aspects: network synergy renders advantages over a single industry, with the combination of e-commerce and entertainment industry even spawning nascent business opportunities, such as the ‘watch and buy’ service – online purchasing that happens with video watching. Alibaba is making an effort at linking the networks to elevate the user experience of content consumption, while increasing profits from the entertainment industry.

E-commerce 19% International e-commerce 8% Ali cloud 4% 64% Digital and entertainment 5% Others

Figure 2: Alibaba revenue composition Source: created by author based on 2017 Alibaba financial report

Others include: Cainiao logistics, Alipay, Gaode map, and Ant financial, etc.

The Chinese version of Google, Baidu, falls short in many areas. Having endured a public crisis for its notorious ‘ranking by bidding mechanism’ (Cheng, 2013), Baidu is now investing most of its energy in AI (Han, 2015) and digital content via its very own streaming service, iQIYI. Unlike Google, which has diverse interests in multiple areas and makes substantial profits, Baidu has been undergoing a financial crisis for some time, especially since the death of Wei Zexi, who lost his life because of Baidu’s false medical advertising and

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ranking by a bidding mechanism (Yang, 2016). According to Wikipedia, Wei Zexi was a 21- year-old Chinese college student from who died after receiving experimental treatment for synovial sarcoma at the Second Hospital of the Beijing Armed Police Corps, which he learned of from a promoted result on the Chinese search engine Baidu. Wei’s death lead to an investigation by the Cyberspace Administration of China, prompting Chinese regulators to impose new restrictions on Baidu advertisements. This incident spread across the Chinese internet. Subsequently, Baidu faced intense criticism for its entire online search services.

One noticeable fact is that the ranking by bidding mechanism was an original profit model created by Baidu (Cheng, 2013), which also contributed greatly to Baidu’s gross income in the past. After a social protest against this mechanism, Baidu had to adjust its profiting model and rebuild its brand image. This incident successfully caught the government’s attention. The

Cyberspace Administration of China conducted an investigation, called on strict regulations to be imposed on Baidu advertisements. Some discussions about iQIYI and Baidu are claiming that the popularity of iQIYI at the preliminary stage was due to support from ranking by the bidding mechanism of Baidu, where Baidu would implement a preference setting for iQIYI- related video content and searches (Sohu.com, 2012). Although such claims are just assumptions, these two cases signify how severely the ‘ranking by bidding’ mechanism was judged by the public, and how damaged the brand image of Baidu has become. While the

Tencent’s and Alibaba’s 2017 financial reports were accessible on the internet, Baidu decided to withhold detailed information on its revenue income, instead disclosing expenditure with the aim of increasing the confidence of its current and future investors. As Robin Li has mentioned on various occasions, Baidu is betting its future on AI (X. Han, 2015 ), which takes up to 38 per cent of expenditure. iQIYI takes up 35 per cent in investment, but the profitability of this number one online platform and its joint venture with Netflix ensured promising prospects for Baidu. The broadband cost is from the maintenance of Baidu’s search engine

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service, which takes up to 18 per cent. Meanwhile, how will Baidu manage to make a profit while the current ranking by bidding mechanism is still being debated? For Baidu, the online video platform accounted for a considerable percentage, so expanding the company’s business in the online entertainment sector is a financial necessity.

9% 18% Broadband cost

Digital content

38% Research

35% Equity awards

Figure 3: Baidu expenditure Source: created by author based on 2017 Baidu expenditure report

After investigating the financial report and expenditure structure of BAT, it is clear that the expansion into the digital and entertainment industry is not just an impulsive act or a strategic business tactic, but has been driven by increasing market value and the need to make a profit. One may be surprised at the contribution generated by digital and entertainment industry to big enterprises; even so, the value of online video industry is still understated. The

BAT are in need of an online entertainment industry – strategically for data competition, financially for revenue income and politically for their emerging significance.

3.2.2.3 Political implication

At the Davos World Economic Forum in 2015, the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang emphasised the pivotal role of communications (from telecommunications to digital media) in relation to the national economic restructuring plan. This announcement confirmed the significance of the digital economy at a national level. In his book Networking China, Yu Hong (Y. Hong, 2017, p. 1) argues that ‘internet related business is seen as a boon to the nation, and networking and

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computing technologies are expected to retool traditional industry and commerce’. The emergence of tech giants such as the BAT highlights these overwhelming social, economic and cultural changes. This disrupting force has fundamentally transformed traditional industry and commerce and successfully garnered international attention. When digital media enterprises such as Facebook, Google, Amazon and Netflix became internationally mainstream, the power of the digital economy became a global social instrument. As one way to discern such a phenomenon, digital capitalism varies between realms. Hong (2017) refers to China as the state-led model of digital capitalism to differentiate it from the United States:

At the intersection of China’s rise as a global power and its internal quest for

transformation, digital economic development in China is one of the most

significant stories of the twenty-first century. Ultimately, this book is about

China’s state-led model of digital capitalism, which contends, collaborates, and

overlaps with the US-dominated system of global digital capitalism.

With China becoming a major global power, the Chinese government is exerting wishful thinking on the rise of its cultural soft power. Even as the second largest economic entity in the world, the rise of Chinese soft power is mostly noticed in Chinese diasporas (Keane, 2016a). The cultural soft power is mentioned more and more frequently in government reports, indicating an awareness of its importance; however, increasing soft power is never easy – especially for developing countries.

Some interesting points can be found in Daya Thussu’s (2013) work about the rise of India: he believes that in developing countries – whether China or India – the soft power side will only get noticed when hard power is significant enough; moreover, power is shifting away from the Western world, starting from the economic sector. In relation to the recent publicity of the ‘One Belt, One

Road’ policy, the huge amount of news coverage and scholarly activity suggests that this policy,

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as a political strategy to boost regional economies, is also an attempt to increase cultural soft power by strengthening economic ties (Yonghui Han and Zou, 2014).

When the BAT have a strong presence in the digital economy, the involvement in the media and entertainment industry essentially responds to a national policy of increasing cultural soft power. The strong presence signifies the huge economic power within the BAT. Combined with their advanced technological power, the BAT exhibit great potential in the online media industry.

Yet the government has mixed feelings about the rise of the BAT: on one hand it hopes to achieve a cultural breakthrough with the facilitation of BAT; on the other, the revolution in the online sector is posing regulation problems for the government. As a result, the BAT’s ‘in-between’ stance is one of the manifestations of contested state capitalism (Hong, 2017). The BAT oscillate between business strategies and state regulations, and their actions are contingent on government policies, just as the government struggles to regulate and support the domestic development and global expansion of these online behemoths. It is apparent that the BAT’s moves will have political implications regarding increasing cultural soft power, but the degree and means remain unclear.

3.3 CONCLUSION

Flew (2007) concludes that there are three aspects to the study of media industries and institutions: media economics, media industries and media production. It is imperative to ‘draw upon analytical tools provided by media economics to develop critical accounts of media industries’, then ‘the media industries perspective draws attention to the critical position of media production’ (Flew,

2007, p. 5). The interplay of these three elements constitutes a profound and comprehensive account for understanding media industries.

This chapter has provided a brief overview of the markets for Chinese and Western online media, and the rise of the BAT was evidenced while identifying the differences between the two markets. The ‘in-between’ relationship of the BAT and government is manifested

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through the newly established concept of ‘in-between’ productions in the content industry, which may be regarded as part of the distinctiveness of the Chinese online market. The account of BAT involvement in the media industry was elaborated through three perspectives: data competition, revenue income and political implications. Data competition could be divided within the range of the media industry, whereas the revenue income and political implications could be considered as sectors of media economics. The investigation of media production will be conducted in later chapters. These three perspectives in the account of the BAT’s involvement in the online media industry are generally one-sided from the BAT’s perspective, while missing the online media industry perspective.

Viewed from the perspective of online media platforms, the smooth transition of ownership is hard evidence that the online media industry is in need of these tech giants. Since being able to profit won’t be a problem in the future, online platforms will need enough financial support to sustain their astronomical expense in content acquisition and production, where normal companies would not be able to afford these – nor would they dare to step up. Consequently, the BAT emerged and grew in order to solve the awkward dilemma facing online platforms and for online services to reap rewards in the future, as well as for online tycoons to seize control of media platforms to fulfil their lofty ambitions. The combination of BAT+ entertainment platforms appears to be inevitable and mutually beneficial. Moreover, the decision to get involved in the online screen industry is consistent with the trend in similar platforms globally.

So what are the lofty ambitions of the BAT, what is their plan for globalisation, and what are the implications for the online screen industry? These questions will be answered in the following chapters.

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Chapter 4: Research approach and methodology

This chapter outlines the reasoning of the selected research approach, and looks at the operation of the research design applied during the data collection and data analysis stages of the research.

The case study method was adopted as the main research approach to investigate the synergies of the BAT and affiliated streaming services, and their collective impact on production culture.

In order to address the research questions, this study also used semi-structured interviews as part of the primary research method.

This chapter has four sections, dealing with the reasons for using case studies as the main research approach; contributions to media industries studies; data-collection methods; and research design. In the first section, theoretical analysis is provided to account for the selection of case studies as the main research method. This section illustrates why multiple case studies are required and which research questions are being addressed, and outlines the aims and contributions of this research through case studies.

In the second section, this chapter examines the contributions to media industries studies via case study research. The adoption of case studies and interviews as a method was designed to render an industry perspective – to build the academic analysis on industry discourses and media practices in addition to a theoretical framework. Such industry-based research is strongly advocated by media industry scholars such as Lotz and Cunningham in their analysis of the most appropriate approach to critical media industries studies.

In the third section, data-collection procedures are elaborated. The primary data collection used two key methods: case study methodology (including document analysis) and semi-structured interviews. Sources of case study documentation include online materials,

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organisational documenting and institutional resources. Data generated from semi-structured interviews are first-hand data collected from a variety of interviewees.

The final section of this chapter unveils the implementation of the case study approach throughout this study. The selection of interviewees and case studies, as well as the reasoning behind such arrangements, are provided. This section also illustrates how the research methods

(including case study and semi-structured interviews) managed to address these research questions:

• Will the BAT help China develop innovative screen media industry systems similar to

those of (Western countries) like the United States and elsewhere in the world?

• How does Netflix influence the online media in China?

• How will BAT become the new digital power

• What are the implications for cultural globalisation?

4.1 CASE STUDIES AS THE MAIN RESEARCH APPROACH

According to Sharan Merriam (2002, p.8) the qualitative case study is ‘an intensive, holistic description and analysis of a bounded phenomenon such as a program, an institution, a person, a process, or a social unit’. The changing media sphere in China and digital interactions between the entities involve a technological process enacted on the basis of social movement or democratic improvement, which in turn constitutes some solid reasoning for choosing the case study as a research method for this project: the keywords of this study are intensive description and analysis of a bounded media system.

The case study ‘allows the researcher to explore individuals or organisations, simply through complex interventions, relationships, communities, or programs and supports the deconstruction and the subsequent reconstruction of various phenomena’ (Yin, 2009, p. 17).

By looking at the histories and contemporary interactions of the BAT and their affiliated

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services, the first part of the study aims to deliver an overview of the streaming history that renders an explanation of the ‘subsequent reconstruction of various phenomena’ (Yin, 2009), which could explicitly illustrate the first sub-question: How does the Chinese screen ecology

– which importantly includes the regulatory system – differ from that of major Western markets and what implications does this have for BAT and streaming services?

From Stake’s (1995) perspective, a case is ‘a specific, a complex, functioning thing’, and ‘an integrated system’, which ‘has a boundary and working parts’ (Yazan, 2015). By investigating the BAT and online streaming services as an integrated system, it provides a systematic overview of the history that forms a comprehensive background for the study. It is acknowledged that the development of China’s online sector (as in the development of online media) is quite complicated: the history and development of one single platform could be written as a book. Thus, in order to examine the development history without missing the most important milestones, adopting a case study methodology is the optimal choice, which allows the researcher to expand the range of the project and illustrate research questions within the limited time and resources available.

4.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AND CONTRIBUTION TO MEDIA

INDUSTRIES STUDIES

Contemporary interactions manifest different characteristics on different platforms. For example, self-made productions (equivalent to Netflix Originals) are popular on iQIYI, LeTV,

Sohu and Tencent, but Youku once adopted a new strategy by developing its ‘platform-initiated channel’ (exclusive space for amateur-professionalised content also existed on other platforms).

In order to investigate platform characteristics, transformations of production culture and the influence of the BAT, the most efficient research method would be multiple-case studies. Only such cross-case analysis would be able to answer the second sub-question: How does Netflix

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influence online media in China? How will BAT become the rising star of new digital power?

Case studies of self-made productions in various genres – online drama, online variety shows and amateur-professionalised content – could shed light on differences and similarities between

Chinese and Western platforms, generating insight into the not-so-drastically different systems

(Keane, 2016). The latter part of thesis will examine questions like the prevalence of self-made productions, transformations of Chinese screen ecology and prospects of content creators.

Case studies are the primary research method used for this project. Through case studies of media practices, this study aims to analyse the Chinese screen industries on the basis of industry discourses and a production of culture approach (Caldwell, 2008). Well-recognised media industry scholars such as Lotz (2009) and Cunningham (1998) emphasise the importance of industry-based research in a critical media industries approach. In response to this advocate, this study is determined to enrich and inform understandings of Chinese media industries via industry-based case studies. Therefore, the case study is the primary research method used. In summary, this study is being conducted via qualitative research, aimed at contributing to the field of media industries studies – especially the debate of digital media and screen ecology – to ascertain how the new technology will influence our screen culture.

4.3 DATA-COLLECTION METHODS AND PROCEDURES

As Yin (2009, p. 28) states, ‘a case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion’. These features of case study research make it possible to implement an in-depth investigation on major video-on-demand services in China where research data derives from multiple sources.

As such data cannot be analysed through a quantitative research approach or by comparing certain variables when it is highly likely that these variables are not comparable, it is

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appropriate to examine the phenomenon taking place in China’s online media sphere by conducting case study research.

4.3.1 Selection of case studies

Considering the scope of this research project, it is necessary to conduct multiple-case studies where it is impossible to interpret the attribute of the vast majority of online streaming services and the new media sphere in China based on a single case study. Multiple-case studies enrich the research and enable a comprehensive analysis (Yin, 2009). The main research aim of this study is to discover the new production culture in China, and to examine its impact on local productions. To examine video-on-demand services in China and analyse the digital power potential based on the development of these services, this study selected five major streaming platforms in China for case studies: iQIYI, Youku, Tencent, LeTV and SoHu TV. The aim was to investigate the changes to and challenges for the online media sphere. Apart from these case studies, which are based on digital platforms, the thesis also presents four case studies featuring online media productions: two platform-commissioned productions (known as self-made productions), one traditional production, and one case study illustrating content creators. These cases, featuring online productions, constitute a thorough discussion of the formation of the new production culture and its impact on local creativity.

4.3.2 The use of case study documentation

The documentation includes information gathered online, hard copies of organisational documents and exclusive periodicals or documentation owned by institutions. Online information is easy to access and retrieve; however, hard copies may not be permitted even if the researcher were allowed to gain access to those files, in which case negotiation and note- taking may apply. Time therefore needed to allocated to searching institutional documentation prior to the commencement of fieldwork. When searching for institutional documentation,

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information needs to be able to provide insight into research questions that would later be of assistance for interviews. Ideally, institutional documentation should be sought before interviews; however, due to the complexity of fieldwork involving interviews, where a researcher often needs to adapt to interviewees’ availability, time constraints and schedule (Yin,

2009), preparation for interviews frequently had to be completed through online searching, with institutional documentation becoming a complementary source.

With regard to the sources of documentation, Chinese industry year books, trade papers, scholarly journal articles and books, business books, news, magazines, and industry report from big data research companies have been included in both the English and Chinese languages.

The quality of documentation varies between the two languages: sources in the often have a great deal of the latest data and updates, whereas this information is not so up-to-date in English sources; however, English scholarly work was found to be of higher quality than Chinese works. A documentation review in both languages and from different forms of sources enabled the researcher to map the landscape from a relatively less biased perspective. Documentation was extremely helpful for the contextual review of Chinese online oligopolies in Chapter 3 and the comparative study of major streaming services in Chapter 5.

4.3.3 The use of case study Interview

When conducting digital media research, it is imperative to include interviews as one of the most important sources of data collection. Streaming services are changing rapidly, so it is never enough to simply look into data or written material. Instead, it is important to obtain data from interviews, to further unveil the landscape. In order to make sure that each interview was fully developed and aligned with the scope of this project, interviews were carefully planned ahead of schedule, and interview questions were outlined and listed next to research questions.

Interviews undertaken for this study did not include any written survey or fully designed questions with closed answers; rather, they were conducted using mostly open questions. Most

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relevant questions were identified according to the initial case study report, with open-answer questions fully prepared in advance. These preparations were designed to mitigate the chances of deviation from the original setting, to guarantee a smooth interview.

4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to illustrate the constantly shifting media environment in China comprehensively, it is imperative to conduct case studies from a different scope and perspective. Therefore, a comparative analysis based on these case studies was required. Comparative study enables comparable factors to be measured within the same attribute, rendering an explicit analysis under a certain frame. In order to better understand the major streaming platforms in China, this study implemented a comparative study of the major players, focusing on content, production and development mode, aiming at identifying competitive advantages and analysing the sustainability of each platform. Case study was the primary research method, with other research methods such as comparative study providing secondary or complementary resources.

A case study protocol was developed prior to the case study research. A well-developed protocol comprises four levels: overview of the case study; data-collection procedures; data- collection questions; and a guide for the case study report (Yin, 2009). An overview of the case study includes background information of the development of online companies in China – particularly streaming services. Issues facing these companies were also identified, such as their limitations in realising media globalisation. Yin (2009) argues that there are six data- gathering tools: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation and physical artefacts; in Stake’s (1995) and Merriam’s (2002) perspective, case study researchers often adopt observation, interview and document review. This project implemented the three most widely adopted tools during case study investigation. Data

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collection of these case studies derived mainly from secondary sources such as trade papers, industry reports, journal articles, books and newspapers; the latest information and perspective were provided through interviews gained from fieldwork; observation functioned as a supplementary method when interviews proved to be insufficient or unavailable.

4.4.1 Selection of cases

In this thesis, case studies were selected from two levels: platform and production. This framework was adopted in order to determine the interrelations between the BAT, streaming services and online production. Case studies of online streaming platforms were designed to explore their business strategies, revenue composition and content inventory, in order to identify the impact of the BAT. After a comprehensive analysis of the BAT, and a thorough investigation of five major streaming platforms, it became possible to examine the changes in production culture through case studies of various content forms, including traditional production, online drama, online variety shows and amateur-professionalised content. Online productions were selected from different Chinese streaming services (Youku and iQIYI), and were intended to convey the different features and strategies of each platform. Additionally, the selection of these cases was aimed at investigating the new production culture, changes in distribution and monetisation, and the implications for China’s media sphere. Combined, these case studies were designed to illustrate the bottom-up media movement, implications for cultural innovation and social development, potential for increasing China’s cultural soft power and the rise of new digital power.

Case studies of media productions have been divided into three categories (tiers). The first category is drama production, which includes online platform-commissioned productions

(self-made productions) such as Unexpectedness (wan wan mei xiang dao, produced by Youku).

As a pioneer in self-made productions, this program is transformative and revolutionary in casting, adaptation, scripting, length, product placement advertising, and so forth. It was a pilot

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project supported by Youku, but is one of the first to have achieved unprecedented success.

Interviewees in this case included producers, directors, online media practitioners and traditional media staff.

The second category is program production of variety shows, include self-made variety shows produced by iQIYI – including The Rap of China (zhong guo xin shuo chang) – and traditional productions – including National Treasure (guo jia bao zang). The case study in the first category examined the origin of self-made productions, however, the case studies in this section focus on the maturation of self-made productions and their impact on screen culture.

The Rap of China is representative in many ways: it was one of the most popular online variety shows in 2017; the only variety shows that featured a form of underground culture – rap; the only program that implemented platform-involved vertical integration, which accounted for unprecedented innovations in content monetisation; and the only program that attracted social discourses on a national and even international scale. The Rap of China is a phenomenal show that achieved enormous economic and social influence. Youth culture is developing into

China’s mainstream culture via online productions; however, traditional TV stations such as

CCTV are seeking new ways to counteract such influences. National Treasure is in stark contrast to online popular culture, transforming museum knowledge into TV stories.

Comparative case studies of online and traditional variety shows will illustrate the changing media sphere in China, and the implications for media productions.

The third category features internet influencers (wang hong) and content creators. In this section, a single case study on Miss Papi is provided to investigate the amateur- professionalised process and potential of the UGC sector. Miss Papi is a typical case for the amateur-professionalisation process, becoming the leading wang hong in China. Miss Papi is widely accepted by Chinese online audiences as she comments on the daily news and topical events in a humorous yet critical manner. Miss Papi appeared with a ‘girl next door’ image

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with little makeup, and her video is recorded indoors in a homey environment. Videos of Miss

Papi look like the earliest form of live streaming, but they are not entirely the same. Content creators such as Miss Papi are developing rapidly in China, curating a phenomenon known as the wang hong economy. Consequently, streaming platforms in China unanimously joined the competition of developing platform-initiated channels (zi pin dao) to facilitate content professionalisation. A variety of shows like that featuring Miss Papi, can be found on platform- initiated channels; although these shows are not exclusive to any platforms, they represent the ongoing process (mining the content) that is happening nationwide in China. Miss Papi is one of the most prominent players in this field, so this case study sheds some light on entrepreneurship, precarious labour and the tendencies of the screen ecology in China. This chapter is dedicated to addressing the following research questions: What is the sustainability of content creators? How will platforms benefit from these schemes? Will they facilitate the growth of grassroots culture? And what are the implications for new production culture?

In summary, four cases have been selected to investigate media production and changes in screen culture. These cases were chosen carefully to map out the typical three-tier revolution that is taking place in China. Well-conducted case studies are able to explore the study’s research questions; however, while the selection of self-made productions is based partly on available interviews and resources, genres of self-made productions and content of platform- initiated channels will be analysed more extensively to form a broader perspective.

4.4.2 Implementation of semi-structured interviews

One notable fact is that, although cases on streaming platforms are definitive, cases on content productions are, to some extent, contingent on the availability of interviewees. This is why a number of interviews were required in this research. In some cases, interviews were the primary source of data for further analysis. According to the framework mentioned previously, interviewees should include a variety of participants with different backgrounds, which move

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across enterprise, platform and production to echo selected case studies. Specifically, this study included 18 interviewees, who are categorised into four groups: staff from BAT (five in total) and streaming platforms (three); traditional practitioners (three); traditional producers (three) and online practitioners (four). Interviewees are listed in Table 1.

As provided above, eleven out of eighteen interviewees chose anonymity, with only film directors and online practitioners willing to reveal their identities. Traditional practitioners included staff from provincial as well as national TV stations; internet practitioners were currently working, or had previously worked, at BAT; staff from streaming platforms included high-level personnel; and non-anonymous online practitioners were creators of successful productions. In order to address the research questions with a comprehensive analysis, it was imperative to interview media practitioners with various backgrounds.

Table 1: Interviewees

1. Internet practitioner A 2. Internet practitioner Fei Yan 3. Alibaba staff Haoyang Gao 4. Internet practitioner B 5. Internet practitioner C 6. Youku staff F 7. Youku staff G 8. iQIYI producer I 9. Traditional practitioners D 10. Traditional practitioners E 11. Traditional variety shows director J 12. Producer H 13. Independent film producer Jessica 14. Film director Shuai Xie 15. Showrunner Shuya Yang 16. Vice president of Papitube Nifang Huo 17. Self-media practitioner Bo Liu

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18. Vlogger K

Meanwhile, featured interviews from Chapters 6 to 8 were intended to inform case studies on online drama, variety shows and amateur-professionalised content. Although this study has made an effort to relate to changes in the media landscape through multi-faceted case studies and interviews, it is impossible to cover the entire landscape with the limited time and resources available. This study was only able to cover certain productions and certain platforms, and this is one of the limitations of this research.

However, in order to address research questions thoroughly, interviews have been assigned to each chapter. For instance, in Chapter 6, in addition to case study analysis featuring online drama, interviews with traditional practitioner, Youku Staff, producer and independent film director discuss the differences between traditional and online production. Likewise, case studies and interviews gathered from various backgrounds work as a method that is applied throughout the analysis. As semi-structured interviews, questions include but not limited to:

What do you think of the competition between Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent? What are their competitive advantages? What do you think of the relationship between the BAT and the government? What do you think of the platform facilitation? What are the differences between traditional and online production? What are the changes in production culture that you observe?

Interviews were conducted on the basis of the structure of Chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8. The case study in Chapter 5 required interviews to be used as secondary sources, in order to collect ideas and perspectives from internet practitioners, media practitioners, and so forth. Interviews in Chapter 6 included online media practitioners and traditional practitioners, to highlight changes in media production and distribution. A case study of self-made productions was conducted to explore the advent of platform-commissioned productions, and to discuss the impact on and changes taking place to local productions, as well as to explore the future possibilities of media production.

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Chapter 7 provides an analysis of censorship and regulative power. Interviews mainly focused on discussions about the evolution of online variety shows and the changing landscape of the online media sphere in China. Interviewees included producers of traditional TV programming, as well as online producers and practitioners, to elaborate various regulatory forces influencing traditional and online productions, and to unfold the success of online variety shows. These discussions not only address the current situation of cultural dissemination in China, but also try to explore the changes occurring in the digital technology context. In Chapter 8, amateur professionalised content is investigated through interviews with internet influencers (Wong Hong), general media practitioners and users of live streaming platforms. These interviews were dedicated to investigating the potential of the UGC sector, the systematic facilitation of content creation and innovation, and the impact on local production and cultural dissemination. In this chapter, interviews featuring internet influencers have been used as the primary source to support case studies, whereas data collected from other interviews are considered complementary sources.

Interviews were conducted in China, from September to December in 2017, across

Beijing, Hangzhou and Shenzhen. During the fieldwork in China, the researcher also went to academic and industry conferences, such as Tenyun Summit (December 1, 2017) held by

Tencent and The Palace, Ali Cloud Conference (December 1, 2017) held by Alibaba, and an academic conference (November 12, 2017) held at Shenzhen University. Through these events, researcher was able to make contact with potential interviewees in the IT industry and media industry, established academics and governmental personnel. Although some contacts were not able to participate, they would often recommend other participants through their personal connections. In addition to the contacts made through events, other contacts were made through the personal connections of the researcher. Invitations to participate were sent out to a number of groups through WeChat and QQ (instant messaging software), to initiate the snowball effect.

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About 30 interviewees were approached during the process, and 18 of them were willing to participate. Interviews were conducted through face-to-face and online communication. Each interviewee was being interviewed for thirty minutes to one hour, the interviews were occasionally recorded (with consent) and transcribed, and in many cases the interviews were conducted with notetaking instead of recording when consent for such conduct is absent..

4.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter explained the reason for selecting case studies as the main research approach, contributions to the media industry studies, data-collection methods and the research design.

In order to investigate the synergies between the BAT, streaming platform and online production, case study and semi-structured interviews were the optimal choice for data collection and data analysis. This research adopted documenting and interviews as the primary case study research methods. The case selection process and conduct of interviews were elaborated in the description of the research design.

Overall, this research requires and contains multiple case studies on streaming platforms and online productions. Among these, interviews are conducted with a variety of interviewees, including (but not limited to) traditional and online media practitioners, producers, platform executives, content creators and internet practitioners. Additionally, this study also adopted observation as a secondary research method, during the industry conference held by Alibaba and Tencent.

Most importantly, QUT’s Research Ethics Committee provided ethics approval, and interviews were conducted under the guidelines of research ethics.

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Chapter 5: Comparative study of China’s streaming

services

This chapter investigates the history and development of streaming services in China, through a comparative study of major players (including development strategies, revenue composition and content inventory), and digital disruption initiated by BAT. The first section of this chapter is designed to distinguish the conceptual framework of screen content between China and

Western markets. To some extent, the differences in conceptual framework manifest the differences between the two markets. This distinction serves as background information for further analysis. The comparative study of major streaming platforms aims at investigating the necessity and prevalence of self-made productions (platform-commissioned productions such as Netflix Originals), in order to identify the dilemma facing streaming services in current competition. Drawing from fieldwork data, an analysis of digital disruption brought by the

BAT elaborates on the growing power of these online giants and the synergies between the

BAT and streaming services. The collective influence on production culture of BAT and streaming platforms will be addressed in the following chapters.

5.1 BACKGROUND ON STREAMING SERVICES IN CHINA

According to the internet development report provided by China Internet Network Information

Centre (CNNIC) in January 2017, the number of mobile users in China has reached 695 million, and the number of internet users is 731 million. This means that over 95 per cent of users access the internet through mobile devices (CNNIC, 2017), indicating an incremental ‘mobile tendency’ in the context of modern China. Moreover, streaming services accounted for 32.8 per cent of all internet services, becoming the most important and profitable online entertainment,

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with frequency and overall time of use ranking first, and quantity of users ranking second, next to searching services. The popularity of streaming services and the skyrocketing number of mobile users are key factors in nurturing online platforms. These two factors suggest that increasing numbers of Chinese users are using mobile devices to access streaming services, and this unique phenomenon is closely related to the development of Chinese society and improved living conditions of modern Chinese people. The Chinese urban lifestyle is rather fast-paced, so time spent on vehicles or public transportation is considered a huge waste (taking into account general traffic conditions in urban cities). Over 80.7 per cent of people would therefore choose to watch streaming videos via mobile phones to make use of fragmented time.

The rise of online platforms is not only driven by the large number of mobile users and their interest in screen content, but also facilitated by the financial and technical support provided by the BAT. To better comprehend the role of the BAT in the rise of online platforms, it is crucial to look more closely at the evolution of the online media companies. The BAT launched full-scale acquisition and confrontation of online media platforms around 2013, ending with iQIYI belonging to Baidu, Youku belonging to Alibaba and Tencent Video belonging to Tencent. What is the motivation behind such acquisitions, and what does this suggest in terms of the development of online platforms?

The intervention of these platforms into sectors once monopolised by traditional media is the story of our time. To better comprehend the role of the BAT, which it continues to play in the entertainment sectors, it is essential to take a closer look at the composition of China’s online media space. In 2015, China’s online video platform space was dominated by five major players, accounting for 79.1 per cent of market share: Youku (21.3%), Tencent Video (20.2%), iQIYI (19%), LeTV (11.9%) and SOHU (6.7%) (iUsertracker, 2015a). The sixth player is

Mango TV; although currently independent of its parent company, Hunan satellite TV station,

Mango TV is still screening Hunan TV programs on the platform as catch-up TV – an extension

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of traditional media and a form of connected viewing (Holt and Sanson, 2013). Mango TV is not qualified as an online streaming service, and is therefore beyond the scope of this research.

From the content perspective, Youku used to focus on UGC and amateur professionalisation productions (Cunningham et al., 2016), but is now deploying considerable investment into platform commissioned productions (self-made productions) as a counter strategy to compete against iQIYI (Yi, 2017). Tencent Video’s emphasis is on becoming a super-platform that provides audiences with the most comprehensive content, including exclusive copyright content from industry-leading companies like HBO, Time Warner and

Paramount (Limited, 2015), in addition to a heavy investment in self-made productions. iQIYI is currently the industry leader in terms of market share and the scale of subscribers (Shijia,

2018). It is famous for its PGC and high-premium, self-made content, including self-made drama and platform-commissioned variety shows, and was able to hit US$2.9 billion in revenue in 2017. LeTV was intended to deploy a unique ecosystem with its prominent self-made content, but eventually found itself out of the first tier due to financial crisis at the corporate level (L. Jia, 2017). Sohu Video is the least competitive player compared with the previously mentioned major players, due to insufficient financial support and market share. However, in

2018, Sohu Video intended increasing its investment in self-made productions, according to

Chaoyang Zhang, CEO of Sohu Video (Xiang, 2018).

Major players in China, such as iQIYI and Youku, are suffering from financial deficits because of large amounts of IP copyright acquisition; this is also the case for Netflix in terms of copyright licensing to different territories (Anne, 2016). Nevertheless, few of them seem to be worried about this situation. Compared with excessive expenses in copyright acquisition and content productions, they are more concerned about how to attract more subscribers

(Chatham, 2016). They all believe in the enormous profitability of this market in the near future;

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the problem is not so much about cost or expense, but how to remain in the business regardless of the hardships. For those major players, whoever survives in the end will triumph.

5.1.1 UGC, original, self-made and PGC

The vast array of content on Chinese online platform falls under various definitions.

Misunderstandings of such concepts are highly likely, due to cultural differences and inaccurate translations. Professionally generated content (PGC) and user-generated content

(UGC) should be simple to understand and easy to distinguish – they are like a dichotomy.

Discourses regarding these concepts rarely encounter any misinterpretations in different cultural environments. The tricky part is the increasingly blurred boundary between audience and producer in the internet age, where the trendy concept ‘produsage’ (Bruns, 2008) explains the interactive role of these transferrable identities. What makes defining all the other middle range concepts so difficult is that the internet renders everything with the possibility of transforming into something else, in a manner so instant that definition can hardly keep up with it. In this chapter, the concept of ‘in-between’ content is adopted to elaborate productions ranging from UGC to PGC.

Discourses adopted by China and Western markets are completely different regarding the ‘middle-range concepts’ – that is, definitions of productions between UGC and PGC. In the sequence of content quality, productions in Western market can be divided into four sectors:

UGC; the amateur-professionalisation sector; originals; and PGC. Accordingly, productions are able to be divided into four categories in China: UGC; Originals; Self-made; and PGC (see

Table 2).

The confusing definitions mostly lie in the concept of original and self-made productions. In China, the term ‘original production’ (yuan chuang) covers a wide catalogue, ranging from general users to small-scale online shows and microfilms. Often original productions are of higher quality than UGC, and the tiers in this sector start with general users,

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ranging to internet influencers and professionalised amateurs. The development of this sector aligns with the Western concept of the amateur-professionalisation process that is now popular on YouTube.

Table 2: Difference in concepts between Chinese and Western markets

Term Definition Feature Example China UGC User-generated Low budget, Paike content, non- low quality (mostly unedited professionals content)

Originals Content Inconsistent Platform-initiated produced by budget, channel (a semi- inconsistent dedicated professionals quality catalogue for platform amateur- professionalised content) Self-made Content High budget, high Unexpectedness commissioned by quality (may be of (wan wan mei platforms higher or lower xiang dao) quality than PGC)

PGC Content made by High budget, high In the Name of the professionals quality (sometimes People lower than self- (ren min de ming made productions) yi)

Western UGC User-generated Low budget, low User content on content, non- quality YouTube professionals

Amateur- Content Inconsistent Personal channel professionalised produced by budget, quality on YouTube, semi- higher than UGC e.g. Pew die Pie professionals

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Originals Content High budget, high House of Cards, commissioned by quality (similar to Midnight Dinner platforms PGC) PGC Content made by High budget, high Prison Break professionals quality (similar to Originals) Source: Table created by author. Amateur-professionalisation can be described as a process that spots and transforms potential UGC into PGC content, which is often seen across major platforms in China. The difference is that in China, once influencers (wang hong) are granted the resources and capital to realize their professionalisation process, and if it is being invested or commissioned by a platform, it is labelled as a self-made production. Another distinguishable fact is that major platforms in China are all curators for amateur-professionalised content, as they provide a sub- category on the platform called ‘platform-initiated channel’, dedicate space and resources for content professionalisation. This channel aims at finding talented amateurs, cultivating customer loyalty and generating revenues at a low cost.

‘Self-made’ (zi zhi) was brought up in 2011 by Business Week when discussing the development strategy of iQIYI (Zhao and Keane, 2013). Self-made production refers to those that are commissioned by online platforms directly. In Chinese discourses, these productions are equal to Netflix originals in concept, but inferior to Netflix productions in quality. Thus self-made content refers to platform-commissioned productions, with inconsistent quality, whereas the Western concept of originals often represents high-premium content that is equal, sometimes even superior to traditional productions. In that sense, the concepts of PGC and

Originals are similar in the western market, that they are both referring to the professional content.

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5.2 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MAJOR PLAYERS

5.2.1 Development strategies

LeTV first started its platform in 2004 and gradually developed into a major player based on its unique LE ecosystem. Tudou was launched in 2005 and Youku in 2006. The online distribution platform continued to proliferate: Sohu Video entered the field in 2009, followed by iQIYI in 2010, Tencent Video in 2011 and Mango TV in 2014. From the timeline and trajectory of major players, the most evident observation is the significance of background, as those who are supported by internet oligopolies or successful satellite TV stations are conferred with considerable competitive advantage and future potential (iUsertracker, 2016a). Video service providers are lashing out immense amounts on content acquisition, threatening the profitability of these services. Consequently, on-demand video services need to seek financial support and be innovative. After spending a great deal of time and money fighting over exclusive distribution and IP copyright acquisition, major players discovered that in order to survive this fierce level of competition, having enough content was not enough. Content is infinite, and audiences can always opt for another service if they are looking for particular content, so the competitive advantage resides in development strategies and attempts to increase customer loyalty. iQIYI is one of the most prominent pioneers in terms of ‘self-made productions’. All major platforms are currently fighting in the self-made arena, initiating their plans for ‘self-made production’, turning the online sphere into a ‘self-made’ battlefield.

Nevertheless, the significance of major players does not rest upon ‘self-made production’, as all of them are aiming at a broader landscape (iUsertracker, 2015a).

5.2.1.1 iQIYI

The brand positioning of iQIYI emphasizes ‘high premium quality’. It brands itself as ‘a luxurious way of life’, pitching to subscribers by promoting a new screen service, a modern lifestyle where ‘luxury’ refers to user experience – high-definition viewing and premium

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content quality. As an entertainment distribution platform that focused mainly on building a reputation for its self-made productions before 2013, after merging with PPS and being acquired by Baidu in 2013, iQIYI’s landscape began to expand (Bischoff, 2014). Acquisition by Baidu granted iQIYI full access to search data, collected by the biggest search engine company in China. With the advantage of big data, iQIYI developed other services to elevate the user experience. The first move was to add voice search as its feature service in 2014 (Woo,

2017); this technique is owned and provided only by iQIYI so far.

Like other platforms, iQIYI provides users with direct portals to all video programs available on the internet. Based on the big data provided by Baidu, iQIYI has built a ‘video search brain’ system that interprets searching behaviour and video data (iQIYI, 2018); the data can assist content production and marketing strategies, and, by knowing the purchasing habits of users, provide recommendations. This may sound like a copycat of Netflix’s recommendation system, but it is in fact a ‘watch and buy’ service, with iQIYI being the electronic business provider. Although the service is not promoted widely, it has the potential to become a unique ecology, considering iQIYI’s ability to provide high-premium content production. IQIYI is focusing its next step on forming a video business chain, in which everything appearing in the video will be available to purchase with one click (Z. Zhang, 2015).

While this has huge business potential, in the meantime it can be comprehended as an attempt to break the traditional profit model, whereby online streaming services rely mainly on advertising and subscription fees.

PGC+ Self-made Video search brain, Powered by

Accurate High-premium quality recommendation Figure 4: Introduction to iQIYI Source: Figure created by author, 10.12.2016

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5.2.1.2 Tencent Video

As the last major player to enter into the online video industry, Tencent Video is not a frontrunner – yet. Nevertheless, with 800 million monthly active users from WeChat and QQ, not to mention its penetration rate of over 90 per cent of internet users (Harwit, 2017), it is hard to believe it won’t succeed. Tencent Video is initially famous for video news programs, most of which are linked directly to services in WeChat and QQ; consequently, users can watch video news on Tencent Video. With support from the parent company and the Tencent ecology

(QQ, WeChat, Tencent news, etc.), this internet giant is now aiming to become the biggest high-premium content provider and self-made content provider in China. Judging from its scale in overseas collaborative partnerships with HBO, Time Warner and Paramount (Limited,

2015), it is establishing a super media platform that will lead it to the top of the pyramid. As technical support, Tencent iCloud is embedded in the viewing process (iUsertracker, 2015a); expressed in another way, the video platform does not provide users with iCloud service directly, but employs this technology to improve users’ viewing experience. Tencent Video is the only platform where the American show Game of Thrones is available (Li, Bien, and Lee,

2017), rendering personalized promotion service on its social platforms, having the ability to connect its video platform to social media directly and by doing so forming interactions between different screens and various parties. The ultimate goal of Tencent Video is to become the biggest content provider across all categories – news, sports and entertainment – to set up an integral chain of cultural consumption (Keane and Chen, 2017).

PGC+ Self-made Social Attribute, Powered by

Most comprehensive content Interaction with WeChat, QQ Figure 5: Introduction to Tencent Video Source: Figure created by author, 10.12.2016

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5.2.1.3 LeTV

In a sense, LeTV is the ‘influencer’ of China’s online video industry, for its well-acknowledged

‘Le ecology’ (Y. Qian, 2016). The configuration includes platform–content–terminals– applications, expanding over Le Super TV, Le Phone, Le Top box and Le car, Le sports, Le iCloud, Le movie company and so forth (Mo Zhang, 2014). Content functions as a pillar industry in Le ecosystem, which explains the huge amount of content available on LeTV, ranging from TV series to music. LeTV was, for a period, the biggest self-made content provider in China. Among all the Chinese major players, Le was the only platform who has reached a big success in fields of hardware (Bing, 2016). Unlike most online streaming services, where the target audience is located in , Le is the only enterprise to have expanded its landscape to other countries, including the United States. It is was about to expand its global reach. The increasing popularity of Le Super TV encouraged Le to explore other services and possibilities linked with the hardware: feature services like Le Buy, children’s desktop and VR game are all incorporated in Super TV (L. Xiao, 2015). Aiming to become a trendy lifestyle, LeTV dedicated itself to being more than just an entertainment content provider, discovering its potential in tourism, education, medicine and so on, as a multi- service aggregator.

PGC+ Self-made Hardware going global

LE ecology Full coverage of media

Consumption Figure 6: MIntroductionulti-service provider to LeTV Source: Figure created by author, 10.12.2016

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5.2.1.4 Youku

As the dominant player and pioneer in the online video sphere in China, Youku Tudou represents a combination of PGC, UGC and self-made content. The company is the combination of two market forces: Youku and Tudou. The latter, formed by Gary Wang and

Dutchman Marc van der Chijs in 2005 used to be a direct competitor of Youku in the online video space (Keane and Su, 2018). After acquisition of its majority shareholding by the in 2012, Youku Tudou was able to integrate enormous online resources to a single platform (Anwar, 2017) and set up the biggest video search engine, Souku, while having

China’s largest e-commerce company as its parent company. As copycats of YouTube, both

Youku and Tudou used to focus on user-generated content; however, in order to survive the fierce and intricate competition of streaming services in China, they have had to innovate into something more than just a Chinese YouTube. The distinct difference between Youku Tudou and other platforms today is that it is the biggest amateur-professionalisation curator in China and is now fostering numerous internet influencers (wang hong).

Self-made+UGC UGC Curator Powered by

Amateur-professionalisation E-Commerce

Figure 7: Introduction to Youku Source: Figure created by author, 10.12.2016

5.2.1.5 Souhu

Souhu was the first PGC video platform in China, and the first to improve self-made productions to a professional level (Q. Zhang, 2017). It used to be a pioneer in many aspects, including promoting the ‘network linkage’ (tai wang lian dong) concept (D. Fan, 2012), where the importance of joint forces between new media and traditional platform was promoted. The

Japanese comics channel on Souhu is an industry-leading channel and Souhu has made great efforts to facilitate amateur-professionalised content. Dapeng Studio, a studio named after the

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protagonist and producer of Diors Man (Diao Si Nan Shi) – Dapeng, is established for amateur- professionalised content. The studio is supported and initiated by Souhu Video, which now accounts for more than half of all self-made productions on the platform. The famous host, musician, actor and producer Dapeng, majored in architecture prior to launching his career as a host of The Dapeng Show (Dapeng de ba de) in 2007. After gaining popularity from this online talk show, Dapeng expanded his career as a host on traditional platforms; meanwhile, he worked with Souhu on the self-made production Diors Man (Diao Si Nan Shi). Debuting in

2012, Diors Man (Diao Si Nan Shi) achieved unexpected popularity; later, in 2014, Souhu established Dapeng Studio to produce a range of comedy shows (E.J. Zhao, 2016b), mainly featuring Dapeng and the team. Industry data suggest that Souhu intends to expand the scheme to American TV drama acquisition, while developing knowledge-based PGC in the areas of cooking, tourism and so forth (Q. Zhang, 2017). The dilemma facing Souhu is that it is in many aspects falling behind because of a lack of creativity and inconsistent profitability, signalling a need to develop new business models.

Japanese comic Knowledge-based PGC

Da Peng economy Content oriented

Figure 8: Introduction on Sohu Video Source: Figure created by author, 10.12.2016

5.2.1.6 Comparative analysis

Of the five major players, three have joined the e-commerce model: iQIYI, LeTV and Youku.

Tencent Video has the potential to turn cultural productions into e-commerce services, but currently there is little evidence suggesting such an inclination. As for Sohu Video, it is still a content-oriented platform, meaning it has not adopted a business model other than developing self-made productions. All services have their own market niche, with each carrying the well-

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known attribute of their parent company, and even their e-commerce strategies differ from one another. iQIYI stands for high-premium quality: the video search brain is filled with various searching behaviours collected from Baidu, thus providing audiences with more accurate recommendations. LeTV is part of Le ecology: with hardware entering the global market, Le is committed to covering media consumption with its unique configuration of Le ecosystem.

On the path to becoming a multi-service provider, Le Super TV made it possible to make online purchases via a TV screen – an innovation for e-commerce. Youku is a platform with PGC and

UGC; as well as its role as an amateur-professionalisation curator, its adoption of the Alibaba e-commerce service shows great potential. As the most comprehensive video platform in

China, Tencent Video harnessed its social attribute to fully develop social community, sharing features and various forms of cultural consumption. Apart from having the industry-leading channel of American TV and Japanese comics, the characteristic of Sohu Video lies in its efforts to make knowledge-based PGC (such as cooking shows, and cultural shows, etc.), which is the ‘next move’ considering similar transitions happening on LeTV.

Table 3: Overview of China’s online video industry

Items iQIYI LeTV Youku Tencent Video Sohu Video

Potential of E- ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖

Commerce

OTT TV ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔ ✖

Main Strategy High- Le ecology Amateur- Comprehensive Japanese

(Development premium Professionalisation content, social comics, Da Peng

Mode) quality Curator attribute economy

Source: Table created by author.

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5.2.2 Profitability

General revenue from video distribution platforms incorporates advertising income, subscription fees (the video value-added services), copyright distribution and other sources of income (including online video games, e-commerce, OTT TV and so forth). Advertising income, subscription fees and copyright distribution account for a large percentage of gross income of China’s streaming services, since it is generated directly from the streaming services.

Thus the three services combined are considered to represent the primary income, whereas other sources of income are generated from proliferated business models. For instance, built- in e-commerce platforms, OTT TV (terminals) and platform-owned movie companies are considered to be a source of secondary income (iUsertracker, 2015b). From Figure 9, it is evident that secondary income increased over the years, from 15.7 per cent in 2011 to 28.2 per cent in 2016, whereas primary income dropped from 84.3 per cent in 2011 to 71.8 per cent in

2016. This phenomenon signifies a diversified tendency in revenue income, suggested various methods of monetisation.

REVENUE COMPOSITION OF CHINA 'S ONLINE VIDEO INDUSTRY 120.00%

100.00% 15.70% 12.10% 14.20% 24.10% 3.40% 4.30% 5.10% 27.20% 28.20% 30.50% 30.90% 80.00% 11% 13.10% 8.60% 5.60% 9.30% 12.80% 15.90% 60.00% 2.20% 16.30% 17% 2.30% 2.10% 2.30% 40.00% 72.50% 72.10% 67.80% 61.00% 57.80% 53.60% 51.10% 20.00% 49.80%

0.00% 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015e 2016e 2017e 2018e Advertising Copyright Distribution Video value-added services Others

Others include income generated by online video games, e-commerce, and OTT TV etc.

Source: iResearch

Figure 9: Revenue Composition of China’s Online Video Industry Source: Created by author.

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Monetisation of content is the primary goal of all streaming services; the difference lies in the extent and its meaning. Of all the efforts to make a profit as video distribution platforms, the unavoidable fact remains that the deficit of revenue income and the high cost of copyright acquisition both appear to be widening, according to annual report of video-on-demand services in China (Quan Ma, 2016). In an attempt to offset deficit and achieve financial balance, platforms are seeking various methods of content monetisation. In order to diminish copyright costs, iQIYI, Tencent Video and Sohu Video established a Video Content Corporation (VCC) to share copyright with each other, despite the potential risk in relation to copyright infringement. VCC was established as an attempt to counteract the consolidation of the leading streaming platform of Youku and Tudou, which posed a great threat to other existing online distribution platforms. The VCC agreement includes provisions allowing the three platforms to purchase certain copyright at a shared price, without affecting any other business models; however, this organisation was later dismissed due to copyright infringement.

5.2.2.1 Primary income: Subscription fees, advertising and copyright distribution

Discrepancies in subscription fees between China’s streaming services are indistinct. Users are permitted to use the website and view most of content with advertisements ranging from 60 to

91 seconds. Subscribers, however, have the privilege of skipping ads, viewing VIP content and enjoying binge-watching. This business model differs from that used by Netflix and streaming services in other countries, where in most cases only subscribers are granted access to content and the website.

Subscription income was increasing over the years, indicating a growth in the willingness of audiences to pay for streaming services. Conversely, revenue income of copyright distribution has reduced rapidly since 2014, from 9.3 per cent to 2.2 per cent.

Compared with subscription income, online advertising is more profitable, contributing

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57.8 per cent of gross income in 2015. In the same year, the scale of advertisement on online video platforms reached over 23.3 billion yuan, and in August 2016, the growth rate of online advertising on video platforms exceeded 77.8 per cent, generating 15.18 billion yuan quarterly

(iUsertracker, 2016c). Given the composition of gross revenue, China’s major players launched feature schemes regarding their advertisement services. With data access from Baidu search engine and Baidu Map app, iQIYI was able to accurately target its audience based on the data set provided above; this advertising distribution method is intended to serve advertisers as well as consumers. Tencent Video embedded its advertising service within a feature service in

WeChat – shake, shake is a feature service that enables mobile phones to interact directly with

TV. By enabling this feature service in WeChat, and actually shaking individual phones,

WeChat is able to identify and then match with the QR code appearing on TV, where program information or interactive attempts will be made available (this service went viral during the

2016 Spring Festival Gala, where a large number of audiences adopted this service to interact with the symbols appearing on the TV screen, hoping to win gifts from CCTV). Such innovation made advertising less boring and more interesting. Other platforms also promoted sophisticated advertising services, which often included advanced technology and data analysis.

As the third source of primary income, copyright distribution used to hold great potential when it comes to content redistribution and self-made productions. Normally, copyright was first acquired by one platform and then resold to other parties; however, it is more profitable to make popular self-made productions when taking high-cost copyright acquisition into account. Consequently, in order to increase profitability, the major players are now deploying more resources to facilitate the development of self-made productions.

However, with the expansion of secondary income, contribution made by copyright distribution has declined compared with the past.

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5.2.2.2 Secondary income

Secondary income is generated from self-made productions, e-commerce and hardware terminals like OTT TV, and has been growing slowly since 2012. All the major Chinese players are involved in self-made productions, although the scale varies; the discovery of this new landscape attracted plenty of attention from competitors. Youku, iQIYI and LeTV tapped into the field of e-commerce, intending to provide a ‘watch and buy’ service. Youku has the greatest potential in this area, considering the industry-leading role of its parent company, Alibaba, and is launching a brand experience store. iQIYI developed an instant ad-displacement feature – a new form of product promotion – and LeTV attempted to bring a refreshing shopping experience to enable consumers/viewers to enjoy e-shopping on the biggest screen at home! There is no evidence yet of the profitability of e-commerce services; however, providers believe that this new form of content monetisation will see exponential growth in the foreseeable future.

Platforms involved in terminal manufacturing are Tencent Video, iQIYI and LeTV.

LeTV initially started to produce Super TV in 2012 (H. Zhang, 2013); in 2014, iQIYI and

Tencent Video joined the competition. OTT TV should be established on a vast content and solid user base, as premises for success; popular applications like iQIYI app are also a good example. Le Super TV was once the most successful player in the terminal manufacturing field, whether Super Phone or Super TV. Le was making huge efforts to lower the prices of hardware, and balancing this expenditure with primary income. The sustainability of such business model is questionable, and it turned out to be a risky move (Lei Chen, 2017). In conclusion, all major players in China are progressively exploring new business models except for Sohu Video, which is concentrating mainly on content. In addition, the percentage of secondary income varies between platforms – especially in the case of LeTV, which has generated a considerable income from terminal manufacturing, and thus differentiated itself from other platforms.

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5.2.3 Content

The study’s thorough investigation of content catalogue on platforms shows that certain content genres align with the viewing preferences of audiences. Domestic movies are the most frequently viewed genre on online video platforms, followed by domestic TV drama and then overseas movies, domestic variety shows, overseas TV series and so forth. Given the fact that copyright acquisition on domestic content could easily lead to homogenisation, all platforms are deploying more capital to acquire overseas content. Another noticeable tendency is their expanded focus on self-made productions. Content on Youku is more about UGC and PGC content originated from UGC – known as the amateur-professionalisation process. In the meantime, Youku also provides audience with adequate PGC content. Tencent Video is focusing on overseas content and self-made variety shows. iQIYI has spent 500 million yuan on PGC content; meanwhile, it is lashing out 7 billion yuan to maintain its industry-leading role in self-made productions (Yi, 2017). LeTV is paying more attention to self-made productions as well; however, it is beginning to focus on the diversity of its content.

Sohu Video is competing in the self-made area and continuing its pursuit of overseas content and knowledge-based PGC. In general, the major players have various market niches to correspond with their content strategies, which differentiate them from one another. According to data retrieved from these websites, Youku covers the most genres, Tencent Video owns the largest number in PGC, iQIYI holds the highest quality and LeTV produces the most self-made productions. These characteristics constitute competitive advantages for the various platforms; however, the figures below disclose their disadvantages as well. A comparative analysis by genre will be provided to better illustrate the strengths and weaknesses from the perspective of content.

5.2.3.1 TV drama

In terms of TV drama, domestic TV series have the greatest number of viewers – far more than the next highest, American TV shows; this tendency that is consistent across all major platforms. However, the third largest number of viewers is spread across different columns on

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different platforms (see Figure 10), which means that, apart from the first two most popular genres, content has begun to diversify, targeting various audiences.

MOST VIEWED GENRES ON ONLINE PLATFORMS Overseas Variety Other Sports Domestic Movies Shows 5% 0% 5% 11% Comics Domestic Traditional 6% TV Drama UGC 10% 6%

Music Overseas Movies 7% 9%

Domestic Online Self- made Variety Shows 7% Domestic Variety Shows Entertainment News 9% 8% Domestic Online Self- Overseas TV Drama made Drama 9% 8%

Figure 10: Most viewed genres on online platforms Figure created by author Source: iResearch

Another interesting fact is that, except for US and British shows, the rest of the columns belong to the Asian region. Tencent Video has 2968 domestic TV series, iQIYI is not far behind with a number of 2394, Sohu Video takes third place, Youku has half the number of iQIYI and

LeTV has less than half of Youku. In the column of American TV drama, Youku has the largest number of 1001, closely followed by Tencent Video, Sohu Video has a not too small number whereas LeTV and iQIYI only has the number of 93 and 65, showing a huge gap in content diversity. Overall, these numbers echo platform-development strategies.

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TV DRAMA

0 165 Singapore 1 0 16 7 213 Tailand 6 0 10 49 415 52 90 89 24 375 Hongkong 7 0 15 55 573 Japan 10 0 1 97 914 Korea 97 279 34 10 160 UK 0 379 15 175 1001 USA 65 896 93 35 43 Self-made 45 2 76 1689 1200 Mainland China 2394 2968 552 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 Mainland Self-made USA UK Korea Japan Hongkong Taiwan Tailand Singapore China SOHU 1689 35 175 10 97 55 24 49 7 0 Youku 1200 43 1001 160 914 573 375 415 213 165 iQIYI 2394 45 65 0 97 10 7 52 6 1 Tencent Video 2968 2 896 379 279 0 0 90 0 0 LETV 552 76 93 15 34 1 15 89 10 16

Figure 11: Catalogue of TV drama on major players in China Figure created by author 09.20.2016

Sources from: iQIYI: http://www.iQIYI.com/ Sep 20, 2016 Youku: http://www.youku.com/ Sep 20, 2016 LeTV: http://www.le.com/ Sep 20, 2016 Tencent Video: http://v.qq.com/ Sep 20, 2016 Sohu Video: http://tv.Sohu Video.com/ Sep 20, 2016

5.2.3.2 Variety shows

Youku has the largest inventory for variety shows, and the highest number in all columns except for the exceptional number held by Tencent Video in domestic variety shows. Besides

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domestic variety shows, Korean shows are the second most popular genre, followed by Hong

Kong and Taiwanese shows; the least popular genre is American variety shows.

VARIETY SHOWS

0 14 Australia 3 0 0

32 619 Hongkong and Taiwan 34 87 21

91 909 Korea and Japan 112 195 3

31 200 USA and UK 7 17 11

2 239 Self-made 76 68 105

1546 1200 Mainland China 2079 3710 587

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 Hongkong and Mainland China Self-made USA and UK Korea and Japan Australia Taiwan SOHU 1546 2 31 91 32 0 Youku 1200 239 200 909 619 14 iQIYI 2079 76 7 112 34 3 Tencent Video 3710 68 17 195 87 0 LETV 587 105 11 3 21 0

Figure 12: Catalogue of variety shows on major players in China Figure created by author 09.20.2016 Sources from: iQIYI: http://www.iQIYI.com/ Sep 20, 2016 Youku: http://www.youku.com/ Sep 20, 2016 LeTV: http://www.le.com/ Sep 20, 2016 Tencent Video: http://v.qq.com/ Sep 20, 2016 Sohu Video: http://tv.Sohu Video.com/ Sep 20, 2016

The reason why popular variety shows based in the Asian-region are more likely to reach a larger audience than American shows is cultural proximity. Variety shows are embedded in the indigenous culture, making it harder to comprehend without cultural

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background and similar social experience. The scale for imported cultural productions in the genre of variety shows is the smallest compared with TV drama and movies.

5.2.3.3 Movies

The movie sector manifests Hollywood dominance, with the quantity of domestic films almost the same as American films – sometimes even higher.

MOVIES

15 576 Taiwan 13 151 56 61 1200 Hongkong 245 1337 368 38 0 Japan 160 93 18 79 1103 Korea 532 459 377 50 1200 France 124 0 98 77 1200 UK 137 786 111 737 1200 USA 4446 2261 392 1 54 Self-made 3 3 2 1594 1200 Mainland China 3265 1914 395 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000

Mainland Self-made USA UK France Korea Japan Hongkong Taiwan China SOHU 1594 1 737 77 50 79 38 61 15 Youku 1200 54 1200 1200 1200 1103 0 1200 576 iQIYI 3265 3 4446 137 124 532 160 245 13 Tencent Video 1914 3 2261 786 0 459 93 1337 151 LETV 395 2 392 111 98 377 18 368 56

Figure 13: Catalogue of movies on major players in China Figure created by author 09.20.2016 Sources from: iQIYI: http://www.iQIYI.com/ Sep 20, 2016 Youku: http://www.youku.com/ Sep 20, 2016 LeTV: http://www.le.com/ Sep 20, 2016 Tencent Video: http://v.qq.com/ Sep 20, 2016

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Sohu Video: http://tv.Sohu Video.com/ Sep 20, 2016

In this sector, resources are relatively broadened, with French movies in the mix. In contrast to distinct gap in TV drama – where the number in domestic production greatly surpasses imported productions – there is no obvious difference in the number of domestic films and overseas films (including those from the United States, United Kingdom, and Korea). These figures suggest that the most popular imported genre is movies, the second is TV drama, and variety shows come at the end. Expressed in another way, most of the content on major platforms is from Asian region, where cultural discount is mitigated due to cultural affinity. However, in light of its market dominance of movies and TV drama, American production is the most successful cultural force infiltrating Chinese and global culture.

5.2.3.4 ‘Self-made’ production

Self-made content is available on all four major platforms, and Youku seems to have the highest number of self-made variety shows and movies. However, from the perspective of impact and quality (as in popularity and production investment), productions from the other three platforms are much more distinct in the self-made area. As a newcomer in self-made production, Tencent started its journey with variety shows, which are relatively easy to produce compared with TV drama, especially in terms of online productions. Although Tencent Video is currently ranking last in all genres of self-made productions, in terms of both number and quality, the quality of existing shows is much higher than for normal online productions. Sohu

Video has a similar number compared with iQIYI; however, the popularity of these shows is inconsistent. LeTV has a larger number in TV drama and variety shows compared with iQIYI; however, the quality of shows is relatively lower than for iQIYI, since iQIYI’s self-made productions are successfully delivered to traditional platforms and are generally the most popular . In terms of the quantity of self-made productions, variety shows received the most enthusiasm, followed by TV dramas, with movie productions the least favourite. This

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phenomenon is in line with production efficacy, quality requirements and cost, making variety shows the easiest genre to produce due to high levels of efficiency, low quality requirements and low cost. Self-made productions are increasingly attracting online traffic, and questions are being raised about whether the rise in self-made production will facilitate major players reducing overseas content acquisition. The issue of whether this trend will weaken Western cultural dominance and strengthen Chinese cultural dissemination is worth further investigation.

5.2.4 Comparative analysis

As Netflix aims for a global audience, streaming services in China are also targeting a broader landscape. From the audience perspective, the differences between streaming services in China are still blurred, with audiences largely unable to distinguish one from another. In this case, customer loyalty has become a critical issue. The first part of this chapter investigated various concepts in the Chinese and Western systems, identifying the differences between original content and self-made content. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to comparing current major streaming players in terms of development strategies, profitability and content, in an effort to differentiate each platform.

For audiences, the biggest difference lies in content, and sometimes service; more often than not, however, content is more critical than services (Cunningham and Silver, 2013;

E.J. Zhao, 2016a). It is common to find audiences jumping between different platforms to find their favourite content, which means their loyalty lies with the content instead of the platform.

When particular content is available on more than one platform, displaying service and additional services (OTT TV, e-commerce, etc.) come into play. The displaying service normally includes high-definition, continuity and shorter advertising, which is related to profitability in terms of advertising income, and additional service ties to development strategies. According to the aforementioned analysis, it is obvious that development strategies

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are in accordance with profitability, additional services and diversified revenue composition.

Platform strategies contribute to customer loyalty by revealing potential in various areas and making it easier to distinguish one platform from one another. Development strategies and profitability work in dynamic interactions, with new strategies being formed to serve the purpose of making a profit, as high profitability enables a platform to discover new businesses and reach new territories.

Self-made content has enjoyed great success in recent years, and its full potential is yet to be reached. While all major platforms have launched their self-made schemes, the inconsistent quality is a thorny issue. From the information collected above, iQIYI is mostly famous for self-made TV dramas, Tencent is catching up rapidly in variety shows and LeTV used to have the greatest number in both categories. Sohu Video chose not to join the trend, and established Da Peng studio, which would allow the platform to share revenue and risks together with this independent company. Self-made productions are gaining more and more popularity, and the content is getting shorter, with audiences able to watch a nine-minute variety show or 15-minute TV drama during their daily commute or during any other fragmented time.

The high numbers of mobile users in China have heralded the arrival of the mobile entertainment era – viewers now enjoy entertainment whenever and wherever (Ma, 2017). The attributes of the China’s entertainment era do not simply rely on mobility, length and openness of content, however, but also lie in the fact that everyone has the freedom and potential to become an entertainer. The fact that all major platforms are curating their ‘platform-initiated channel’ (a dedicated channel for higher quality of UGC, similar to amateur-professionalised content) shows that audiences have the means to fulfil their dreams of being producers, actors and even directors. The unlimited possibilities of outsiders becoming insiders are among the greatest changes happening to the media sphere in China today. This is a bottom-up movement

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of grassroots culture, a disrupting force against the traditional system and a transformative process of content professionalisation and production. How this disruptive force comes to power and how the BAT will facilitate the changes in China’s media sphere are questions requiring further investigations.

5.3 DISRUPTORS AND DISRUPTION

Chapter 3 and previous sections of this chapter examined the history of the BAT and the development of streaming platforms respectively. These business analyses are pointing to the conclusion that the combination of the BAT and streaming services is inevitable and mutually beneficial. As an inevitable and disruptive force, the BAT are influencing the media landscape at various levels. Due to the expansion of the BAT, five major online streaming services have been downsized to become three main competitors, thanks to the fierce competition. During the seemingly peaceful years of 2016 and 2017, the arms race of online companies caused some deadly injuries to one of the talented competitors – LeTV. The glorious ‘Le-ecology’, which is often addressed by CEO of LeTV as ‘Le-eco’, is not that aloof or grand compared with the dreams of the BAT. Of all the advanced ideas and unprecedented success that LeTV has achieved during its peak time, the CEO of LeTV, Yueting Jia, often described his company as a ‘disruptor’. However, due to the financial crisis caused by excessive expansion, ‘Le-eco’ finally collapsed and the famous disruptor ended up with a damaged business loop because of its ambition to disrupt (L. Jia, 2017). As mentioned in the previous chapter, LeTV has made an undeniable contribution to the online media industry: Le Super Television received a great success and Le mobile phone was once quite popular, not to mention the revolutionary effort made in connecting multiple screens – all of which demonstrates a superior user experience for

LeTV users. LeTV was once on the winning side among disruptors, although the achievements of those years are fuzzy and fleeting; this term, however, has been adopted by many internet

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companies since then, as they try to concurrently embrace and curate the disruption. Disruptors refer to those who exhibited an overturning power against the existing order; for internet practitioners like Yueting Jia, the previous CEO of LeTV, disruptors stand for innovation, creation and the ability to build nascent business models (Y. Jia, 2017), such as the composition of manufacturer and content provider. Such a transformation is risky and ambiguous, with unexpected risks and costs. As the first martyr to die from trying, LeTV provided a lesson and a warning for all internet disruptors.

Considering the revolutionary changes in the internet and screen industry, the BAT and their affiliated streaming platforms can be regarded as disruptors; together, they have initiated a large scale of disruption in the online field – the empowerment of platforms with new affordances, the disruption of revenue structure and, more importantly, the cultivation of a creative force that radiates through the whole society. In the previous chapters, the BAT and streaming platforms were investigated independently; however, a pattern was identified demonstrating that the significance of streaming platforms to the BAT is like the significance of self-made productions to streaming platforms. The reasons for the BAT marching into the online screen industry are multiple, from profitability at the economic level to development strategies at the corporate level. The fusion of self-made productions has projected similar considerations from the perspective of platforms.

At the economic level, self-made productions play a strong part in revenue composition: they are more profitable than using copyright content (X. Zhu, 2009) because they are exempted from the cost of obtaining copyright permission. This is crucial for streaming platforms, which struggle to make ends meet; self-made productions allow platforms to spend money for their own sake, rather than making money for others (such as the enormous investment made in copyright acquisition in the past) (Yi, 2017). At the corporate level, developing self-made productions is a smart move to maintain current users and draw

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newcomers. As is apparent in the competition among the most promising streaming platforms

– iQIYI, Youku and Tencent – exclusive self-made content has become a common platform strategy to strengthen user stickiness (Craig, Cai, and Lv, 2016). This sounds familiar, as the

BAT consider streaming platforms key to their business ecology, to enhance user stickiness; they also believe in the profitable future of streaming platforms, which in turn all comes down to self-made productions (Montgomery and Priest, 2016). Such a phenomenon – the combination of the BAT and the screen industry, or the cooperation of platforms and self-made productions – is like the relationship between disruptors and disruption: one is the initiative of the other. Whether it is a BAT or streaming service, and regardless of the business disruption they have stirred up due to such a combination, there are political implications on a national level. According to Keane and Su (Michael; Keane & Su, 2018), the intervention of the BAT in the cultural sector should be considered within a political context:

The BAT and their platforms have made the move into culture, not because it

is innately profitable – in fact it is highly risky business – but because it enables

them to build more collaborations with other rising creative enterprises,

including foreigners, and in doing service their users with differentiated

content. In addition, they can shine in the reflected glory of Chinese cultural

soft power as more and more foreign investment is attracted to the sector.

In 2017, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released its 13th Five Year Plan, in which the government repositioned the digital creative industries as one of five emerging pillar industries in China. Twenty-one major projects were promulgated, including the Internet + project, Big

Data project, AI project, Digital, Cultural, Creative Technology and Equipment Innovation project, and Digital Content Innovation project (Ding, 2017), all of which suggest that developing the BAT and the digital-related industry is part of the national policy. In an age

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when the ‘Chinese dream’ (Ferdinand, 2016) represents nationhood and prosperity, to regain the glory of the great China of the past (Wang, 2017) – and where soft cultural power is gradually being transformed into cultural confidence (wen hua zi xin) (Du, 2017) – the government is trying to achieve a nationwide awakening of traditional culture and cultural innovation.

Building Chinese cultural power (wen hua qiang guo) and soft cultural power (wen hua ruan shi li) has been part of the Chinese government’s policy for some time. In 2011, at the

Sixth Plenary Session of the Seventeenth Central Committee, soft cultural power was proposed in the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Deepening the

Reform of Cultural System and Promoting the Great Development and Prosperity of Socialist

Culture; in 2012, President Xi Jinping proposed the ‘Chinese dream’, stating that ‘realising the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream of the Chinese people since modern times’ (Ferdinand, 2016); and in 2014, President Xi stressed the significance of constructing cultural power (wen hua qiang guo zhan lue). Coincidently, during the same period Premier Li Keqiang proposed the ‘Entrepreneurial and Innovation’ policy (shuang chuang zheng ce), whereby public entrepreneurship and innovation (da zhong chuang ye, wan zhong chuang xin) are highly recommended (Wei et al., 2017). The sequence of these political events underscores the growing importance of developing Chinese culture, creativity and a sense of identity, which have become the means for developing the courage and motives to realise the Chinese dream – that is, Chinese people should be reminded of who they are before they start dreaming of who they might become (Wang, 2011). Instead of wondering what could be done to mitigate Western influence, the Chinese government has repositioned the centre stage to cultural heritage, for a revitalisation of traditional Chinese culture. Clinging to traditional culture is in fact a diversion – a new focus away from the alluring foreign culture; however, such a strategy does not lead to openness, but rather to a tighter grip and greater

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internet censorship. In the eyes of Western scholars, China is now more than ever becoming a gigantic black box (Griffiths, 2017).

5.3.1 BAT and the disruptive force

The international success of Alibaba and Tencent provides a great example of playing to one’s strengths, given that they grew into tech giants in the Chinese market by fully utilising and abiding by Chinese characteristic. So far, the most successful and widely disseminated disruption brought by the BAT is the mobile payment revolution. As a world-leading nation in this movement, this technology was born due to the under-developed mobile banking system in China. Unlike Western countries, where the credit system is fully functional and operational, the credit system in China has become a hindrance for online shopping (Fan, Ju, and Xiao,

2016). This phenomenon was one Chinese characteristic. Because of the lack of an improved banking system, the presence of online payments provided a shortcut for a more convenient and instant payment experience. Therefore, the success of mobile payment system in China is attributable to the uptake of online shopping and the imperfect banking system, which makes these circumstances difficult to replicate in other parts of the world. Similar strategies can also be identified in the coalition of the BAT and streaming platforms, where each company is keen to develop and maximise its business advantages.

To some extent, the disruptive power of the BAT is contained by the fierce competition.

In order to investigate the country’s online markets more thoroughly, fieldwork was conducted in China from September to December 2017. Internet practitioners who are currently employed by the BAT, or who used to be BAT employees, were interviewed to generate industry perspectives that vary from those found in scholarly works. In addition to theoretical frameworks, these interviews present an up-to-date perspective on what is occurring in this field today. Based on relevant academic studies, it can be surmised that government facilitation is crucial to the development of online behemoths such as the BAT. However, from an industry

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perspective, a pertinent policy – such as the ‘Great Firewall of China’, where legislative and technology hindrance are enforced by the Chinese government to regulate the domestic internet

– may shield Chinese companies from their Western competitors (Foster and Azmeh, 2016), although this does not exempt domestic players from free market competition (Elkins, 2016).

The fieldwork findings emphasise the heated competition in this field: it is not easy to maintain a position as one of China’s top three internet oligopolies. In the eyes of Alibaba staff member Haoyang Gao, Baidu could no longer compete with Alibaba and Tencent:

I think that Baidu has lost its position in the first tier. As China’s number one

searching services, Baidu has done a lot of unspeakable things to our users, you

can find a lot of negative news reports and comments online, and they are not

pretty! Tencent is doing great in social and gaming, Ali is leading e-commerce

and cloud computing, and joined the competition of AI technology as well. The

business blueprint of BAT is expanding, but personally speaking, I think that

apart from social interactions, Ali is doing a good job in all the other areas.

(Internet practitioner Haoyang Gao, 2017)

Whether Alibaba is making achievements in other areas requires further discussion, but

Baidu’s disputable reputation is a common understanding in this line of work.

Another internet practitioner corroborated the idea that the real competition existed between Alibaba and Tencent:

The overall level of competition is reflected in the corporate culture, and social

value-oriented aspects. Baidu first proposed [the] AI concept, Ali is in the retail

area, Tencent is in the social field; each has its own advantages. There is also

competition in the common field. Narrowing down to the actual products, the

largest competition in my view is between Alipay and WeChat, smaller ones

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are between Ali Cloud and Tencent cloud. Ali’s advantage is that the payment

system combined with the e-commerce ecosystem and credit mechanism was

established at an earlier stage; the combination of online and offline shopping

is being tested constantly. Ali Cloud is also the earliest cloud computing

manufacturer in China, so the domestic market share is very high. (Internet

practitioner A, 2017)

It is well known that the three BAT companies excel in different areas: Baidu in online searching and AI technology; Alibaba in e-commerce and cloud computing; and Tencent in social media and gaming. Like any oligopolies, these ranks are earned, not bestowed. For the

BAT, acute market instinct often means keeping up with the tides – even though sometimes it is not the not online giants that dictate the trends, but rather the market itself. One interviewee,

Fei Yan, believed that:

The competition in the internet industry has gradually transformed from the

original major areas of search, social, and e-commerce into:

a: (product/content/service) To C consumer (kill time) competition

b: (ABC) To B Enterprise affordance competition.

The originally developed fields are growing into monopolisation, and this

situation has evolved into genetic theories, meaning that the advantages of

BAT are embedded in the lineage respectively; TO C and TO B model will

bring more and more borderless competition. Take Baidu, for example – the

advantage of Baidu reflected in the retained data collected from search service

and the consistent investment into the technology innovation. For example, for

high technology-oriented products, Baidu use[d] only six months to develop

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and deliver a news recommendation application – FEED, which instantly

became the biggest competitor against Today’s Headlines, the number one

news app in China. (Internet practitioner Fei Yan, 2017).

‘To B’ and ‘To C’ are figures of speech in the internet industry: ‘To B’ refers to products directly involved with companies, such as the advertisers of e-commerce platform Tmall or clients of BAT cloud computing services. The enterprise competition between the three BAT entities lies in their ability to empower other companies – for example, how effective will the advertisement be, what data will be generated and available from the advertisement, how powerful is the cloud computing service, how secure will the service be? ‘To C’ refers to direct interactions with consumers – that is, consumer competition – which always involves user experience and platform stickiness. Macroscopically, enterprise and consumer competition not only faces the BAT, but goes beyond the realms of enterprise and onto the industry level.

For tech companies, the competition between enterprise and consumer or the arms race of the three BAT are both fundamentally based on technology. AI, virtual reality (VR) and alternative reality technology were mentioned several times during all the interviews. For example, Alibaba has adopted numerous technologies to enable an online ‘smart dressing mirror’. With consumer-provided figures of the body mass index and AI-supported facial recognition technology, the smart dressing mirror creates a virtual image of the customer, with a potential accuracy of nearly 85 per cent (Ren, 2016). This technology enables customers to

‘try on’ over 1000 garments within three minutes, the undiscovered styles and countless possibilities no doubt unleashing the desire to purchase. Other technology innovations include

AI searching, AI recommendation and AI customer service. Baidu uses AI for voice recognition, natural language processing, image recognition, Knowledge Map and other services. Internet practitioners who have worked in the field for some time confirmed the enthusiastic response among industry practitioners to technology innovation:

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Alibaba has made lots of investments in AI technology, and they are not merely

fancy high-tech for showing off. These are the technologies that could touch

down base with the products of Alibaba, they could help improve the user

experience and simplify the using process. (Internet practitioner A, 2017)

Another internet practitioner Fei Yan believes that:

For Baidu, AI technology will be widely adopted in the use of Knowledge Map,

Knowledge Map is a newly established AI searching technology that will

definitely improve the user experience of online searching in the future.

(Internet practitioner Fei Yan, 2017)

For these internet giants, technologies are the foundation of products and services and the links to business ecology, which ultimately constitute the characteristics of each company and contribute to profitability. Meanwhile, oligopolistic monopolisation and the implementation of new technology have, to a degree, stimulated technology innovation on a national scale. In this sense, the BAT are not only aggregating capital power, but social influence and value recognition. The most prominent example of this is the expansion of online payment systems to social infrastructure and governmental levels. In some cities, such as the headquarters of

Alibaba, Hangzhou, Alipay (Alibaba’s online payment system) can be used on public transport, for governmental logistic services and more. Internet practitioners believe that these collaborations are, according to one interviewee, ‘mutually beneficial for government and corporate alike and will tighten the relationship while stimulating economic growth’ (Internet

Practitioner Haoyang Gao, 2017).

One practitioner contended, however, that ‘although I am not familiar with the relations between Alibaba and the state, Alibaba emphasises its social values, and not so much in governmental relations’ (Internet Practitioner A, 2017). Other interviewees expressed similar

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conservative attitudes, with one indicating that ‘I am not sure of the relationship between my company and the government, but I do know that we are pouring lots of money and resources to develop the AI technology, and this no doubt echoes governmental policies’ (Internet

Practitioner Fei Yan, 2017). While the ‘in-between’ stance of BAT and the state remains unclear, most industry practitioners stressed their willingness to comply with the government, such as complying with governmental policies or cooperating with governmental projects.

5.3.2 The second war

On one account, the BAT are enhancing their core business values through the incremented support from AI technology. On another, these values are not confined to searching, e- commerce and social apps, apart from which streaming services have been added to the list, considered to be attributable to the extension of usage time. The degrees to which affiliated services hold the central position in the BAT varies. However, in general they are the services that take up more usage time, improve platform stickiness and make more profit. Under such considerations, iQIYI is well recognised as the most important service for Baidu, for its remarkable achievements in the ‘kill time’ competition (see below). One of the internet practitioners revealed that:

The nature of online searching is the distribution of information. And

Information flow is Baidu’s current top priority, Baidu is focusing on providing

this service, and it has achieved success so far. Baidu will make a profit from

this service before AI takes over, and in the AI sector, driverless technology is

the main focus. In the meantime, it is important to prepare against the threats

brought by Tencent and Today’s Headlines, especially in terms of the size of

information flow. iQIYI is also a valuable asset, maybe one of the most

valuable weapons for Baidu, it is suffering from the huge financial deficit at

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the moment, but I guess maybe iQIYI still wants to become a listed company,

to be independent. I think that, the key of the internet lies in data traffic, or in

other words, information flow, the war of mobile internet traffic entrance has

nearly come to an end, leaving only few famous companies standing still after

the shakeout. The next step is to seize the usage time. In the past two years,

mobile internet companies have been fighting over for content, so the value of

content is more than obvious, and iQIYI is ultimately a content platform.

(Internet practitioner B, 2017)

Another pointed out that:

The revenue income of Baidu is largely dependent on advertising, but they aim

to diversify the revenue structure to content-oriented products like IQIYI and

FEED, and technology oriented products such as AI-based services and

products. (Internet practitioner C, 2017)

For Baidu, the profitability is ranked in the sequence of advertising, content and AI ecology; the significance of iQIYI to Baidu is more obvious than the same combinations of other competitors. iQIYI is vital for Baidu, whereas for Tencent and Alibaba, the streaming platforms are merely important business strategies rather than profit makers. Alibaba staff member

Haoyang Gao said:

Youku is playing a significant part in the ‘Alibaba entertainment corporation’,

it is helping Alibaba to cover more business territories. But I think the boom of

Youku is because of the Great Fire Wall. Well, in my opinion, Youku is the

copycat of YouTube, if YouTube could get into China, we won’t have Youku

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at all. Nevertheless, uploading videos onto Youku is a good thing for keeping

the digital stories of oneself. (Alibaba staff Haoyang Gao, 2017)

With the approaching bell of entrance war, the genetic theory of the tech giants was formed, as conglomerates were tagged and flagged in respected areas. Following suit is the ‘kill time’ competition, which brings the war to another stage of monopolisation, beyond the single one- on-one fight. The coalition of the BAT and streaming platforms is the shape of current and future competition. As disruptors, they are setting off a better version of the preceding content war, initiating a long-lasting and sophisticated combat with integrated forces. As parent companies, the BAT are subsidising their subordinates, from the financial level to technical support. This war is one of integrated platforms: it is about resources and orchestrated varieties.

For instances, Baidu is resourceful in data diversion – here is a comment from an anonymous internet practitioner:

Baidu will definitely provide iQIYI with data diversion. For example, they put

iQIYI on the top whenever users search for video content, Baidu will also

provide financial support for iQIYI – it is quite obvious; besides, what else

could be more valuable than iQIYI? But I’m not sure if Baidu provides any

technical support for iQIYI. You could have a look at how Baidu provides data

diversion for their own platforms. iQIYI is more than capable of handling most

of the problems except for the lack of funding. Maybe now they need to buy

data diversion from Baidu, I am not sure how this works.

Even with the platform facilitation conferred from its parent company, Baidu, iQIYI still faces great challenges:

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iQIYI is excellent in self-made programs, but for all the streaming platforms,

they are facing the same awkward situation, all of them burns money too fast.

I think programmatically, video platforms are about copyrights, that is why

they are burning money at this rate, and self-made programs should be the

solution and breakthrough of their business model. They might learn from

Netflix, given their recent cooperation with each other. (Internet practitioner B,

2017)

Other interviewees expressed similar understandings regarding the relationship of Baidu and iQIYI. It seems that iQIYI is not just a valuable asset, but the representative of Baidu. The bond shared by them is unique and different from that of any other competitors. For Alibaba,

Youku is more like an additional channel for advertising and publicity. For Tencent, Tencent

Video is ranked behind WeChat, Tencent games, and other profitable services. Baidu is counting on iQIYI while others are treating their streaming platforms as a pawn in the game.

Given the recent update of top three players, iQIYI turned out to be the most resourceful talent, as it sealed the deal with Netflix regardless of other competitors at play (Shijia, 2018).

5.4 CONCLUSION

Based on previous analysis, this chapter addressed why BAT and streaming platforms are joining forces, why streaming platforms are in need of the tech giants and why self-made production matters. When it comes to media and culture, no institution could steer completely clear of political . There is no exception under any circumstances, but the advent of online content is creating a headache, particularly for the government. Previously, it was rare to witness public interactions between the BAT and the government; however, the situation has changed.

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With an increasingly tight relationship between tech giants and the government, multiple initiatives have been established to accelerate the development of Chinese society.

One seemingly insignificant example is the installation of Alipay on the public transport system in Hangzhou, making Alipay the first virtual payment method to be activated on public infrastructure, replacing transport cards. More than ever, the involvement of internet technology has penetrated every part of Chinese people’s lives, which in turn shows the necessity for governmental surveillance and intervention. On the bright side, the BAT are eager to participate in government-related projects, as they believe this is a ‘mutually beneficial endeavour’ (Internet practitioner A and C, 2017); however, the conundrum concerns the extent to which government should be involved in business cooperation. A close relationship between the BAT and the government could circumvent closer supervision (especially in terms of content censorship). On the contrary, negative regulation may also lead to serious consequences, such as the social turmoil caused by inadequate censorship, or excessive monopolisation due to insufficient market control. Either way, the second war of the BAT is looks set for huge waves to come. With high-tech being the new driver of society and even the catalyst for culture, the impact of such forces remains to be revealed.

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Chapter 6: Content monetisation and cultural innovation

Chapter 5 identified the close relationship between the BAT and their affiliated streaming services. Combined, they are transforming the Chinese screen industry, but to what extent and on what aspects? This chapter identifies the new screen ecology in the context of self-made productions. By categorising the online sector, this chapter examines the narrowed difference and heated competition between traditional and online productions. The initial success of the self-made drama Unexpectedness (wan wan mei xiang dao) is investigated to unveil the boom in self-made productions and the reasons for their success. The case study of Youku self-made drama reveals the narrow difference and heated competition between traditional and online productions, highlighting the confrontation between youth culture (mainly grassroots culture or online culture) and high culture (Chinese traditional culture, such as Confucius, historical masterpieces and so forth). The final section of the chapter illustrates the development that has occurred in content monetisation and cultural innovation, to identify how and why self-made productions are more flexible in terms of content monetisation, and the competitive advantages of self-made productions over traditional productions. This chapter also discusses cultural exports of Chinese online productions, and China’s ‘going out’ endeavours.

6.1 NEW PRODUCTION CULTURE AND NEW SCREEN ECOLOGY IN CHINA

Aggregated platform affordances along with the ever-lasting fever for self-made screen productions characterise the identifiable new screen ecology in China. Apart from the disrupting force exerted upon the screens (online screen and traditional TV screen), and the increasing number of self-made productions, underscored is the profound impact on cultural renaissance and cultural innovation. It is imperative to cross-examine multiple screens – for

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instance, traditional screen versus online screen, or Chinese self-made productions versus

Netflix originals – in order to comprehend the social turmoil generated by this combination of tech companies and streaming platforms, as well as the integration of technology and culture.

Entertainment – especially digital entertainment – is and will continue to be an indispensable part of people’s daily activities, moving beyond a constant and becoming a cultural instrument.

IQIYI’s CEO Gong Yu stated that entertainment will play a critical role in the future. At the

Global Mobile Internet Conference (GMIC), Gong Yu indicated that ‘the future leisure expenses will be largely consumed by entertainment, and there will be several tendencies: for starters, entertainment will be elevated, and will also take up the free time due to technology advancement; second, screen productions are currently the mainstream form of entertainment, their future is unlimited with the facilitation of technology; third, streaming platforms will be the primary entertainment platform; and last but not least, content will be more abundant, and platforms will be more centralized (GMIC, 2017).

The entrance war is now over, and the BAT are well-established in their respective areas. They now face a second war, which signals the unsettling competition of platform affordance in content acquisition and production. The development of online streaming platforms has not been easy, particularly taking the long-existing financial deficit into account.

However, the combination of the BAT and streaming platforms has unleashed greater potential.

With entertainment being the king of ‘kill time activity’ (Internet practitioner Fei Yan, 2017), and video streaming being the most popular option of all (GMIC, 2017), a new production culture has formed in China, one in which the boundaries between online and traditional screens have become indistinct, and redundancy of video productions has become an understatement of this age. It is difficult to even try to describe China’s online screen content, due to its diversified types and formalities, although in Chinese online media studies, attempts have been made to discern the online screen content by platforms. For instance, the narrative

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of PUGC and UPGC is adopted to distinguish platforms with mixed screen content (iResearch,

2017); PUGC refers to those with a principal focus of PGC content and a minor attention on

UGC content; and UPGC points to those with a primary target for UGC content and a sideline for PGC content. Unlike the Western online streaming industry, where a platform is often dedicated to just one category of content – for example, Netflix for high-premium content and

YouTube for UGC content, especially vlogging (Cunningham and Craig, 2016) – the Chinese streaming platforms are a mish-mash of everything, with a wide variety of content on a single platform.

6.1.1 In between content – a mixture of everything

It has therefore proved to be a difficult endeavour to map out the online screen field. In

Chapter 5, a comparative definition of screen content in China and Western markets was provided on the spectrum from UGC to PGC. However, it is insufficient to represent the entire landscape of the Chinese screen field. Apart from UGC, originals, self-made productions and

PGC, there are also short videos, live streaming, platform-initiated channels such as iPartners

(CNIT, 2017), amateur-professionalised content and everything in between. ‘Short video’ (see

Chapter 7) is a prevalent term in China, referring to videos with a timespan from 15 seconds to less than five minutes (iResearch, 2017), such videos can be displayed on dedicated short video platforms, or social, news platforms and also on streaming platforms. Short video is classified by the length of the video rather than the content, and it covers everything from UGC content to amateur-professionalised content, such as original video, vlogging or live streaming. iPartners is a scheme launched by IQIYI, which is aimed at recruiting potentially successful amateur-professionalised content and rebranding it as self-made productions if it is promising enough (Luo, 2016).

There are no intervals between the spectrum from UGC to PGC. Aside from the two poles, the content in between is in an unstable state, where one type has the potential to escalate

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into another. This transferrable trait is what makes the Chinese online screen a prosperous and comprehensive space in which to thrive. Due to the transferable characteristic, the online content intrinsically possesses an ability or a state that stays in-between the definitions. Thus, the term ‘in-between’ content will be adopted in an attempt to represent the transferable characteristics and content between UGC and PGC, as well as including them, in order to better illustrate the Chinese online sphere.

The description of in-between content fits into an escalating order, whereby the transfer happens from a lower level to a higher class, in a sequence of UGC to amateur-professionalised

Content to platform-initiated channel content to self-made productions to PGC. This process cannot be reversed, however. There is one exception: with the ambiguous boundary between

PGC and self-made productions, traditional PGC content may not only be distributed on streaming platforms, but also be advertised and circulated like self-made productions. Such an inclination towards self-made productions does not suggest a recess, but rather a promotion strategy intended to reach a broader audience. The in-between content refers to online screen content specifically, and a simple version of this complicated landscape would entail considering it as a mixture of everything.

6.1.2 Categorising the online sector

Despite of the efforts made in discerning the online sector, it is still confusing to fully understand or investigate the in-between content. Instead, another narrative would be explicit and much more appealing, where the online sector is categorised by genre instead of the nature of production. As analysed in Chapter 5, online drama is the most popular genre, followed by online variety shows; online movies are the least popular genre. The quantity of these shows increases as the requirement of quality decreases. In addition to these genres, another prosperous section is the content made by creative content creators, such as the funny videos made by internet influencers Papi or the informal video made by KOL (Key Opinion Leaders),

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derived from Weibo or other social media platforms (Chiu, Lin, and Silverman, 2012), all of which nurtures the innovative power of the Chinese online sector, which could be defined as the innovative online sector or, as in Chinese academic terms, addressed as the self-media (zi mei ti) (Men, 2017). That being said, online screen content in China is divided into four genres: online drama, online variety shows, online movies and the innovative sector, or the self-media sector. Self-made productions are representative of high-quality content, and other productions are online content with inconsistent qualities. This chapter is dedicated to analysing online drama, Chapter 7 will focus on online variety shows and online movies, and Chapter 8 will examine the innovative online sector.

During the fieldwork, it was fascinating to witness new installations and high- technology displays. Beyond all the excitement of technology and a brief fantasy about grand dreams or the sci-fi futures, however, some surprises stand out. In the biggest conference in

China – the Ali Cloud conference, a gathering attracted more than 40 thousand participants: innovation and breakthrough were everywhere. Most of the exhibits showcased AI technology

– a future with a smaller workforce, less human interaction and fewer jobs. Most of the sessions talked about crazy and seemingly not so distant ideas, smart transport, smart livings and the way to ‘smart everything’. Being surrounded by these advanced technologies, Alibaba has delivered a superior experience of travelling ahead of our time. However, this surreal experience also posed deeper questions: if technology is so universal, if everyone is freed of their daily workload, then what should people do? Conveniently, Alibaba has almost everything covered, as Youku has fully committed itself to large scale self-made productions.

This platform, once famous for its UGC content, and later acknowledged by Chinese academics as the UPGC platform (a streaming platform that gives priority to UGC content, and on which

PGC content is secondary) (Sohu, 2017b), is now becoming a main competitor in the self-made area. Regardless of the pragmatic inquiries at the exhibition, what Alibaba is proclaiming

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loudly is the capability of innovation that moves across the parameters of technology and dives into the realms of culture. This unexpected move changes the previous formation of major streaming platforms, which means all the players are targeting the same audience – they are competing on the same ground, and their uniqueness is fading away. Such a situation can only lead to fiercer competition (Ma, 2017), and inevitably leaves the problems of how to maintain loyalty and user stickiness.

The previous chapter demonstrated the discrepancies between the different genres, projecting the strengths and weaknesses, and more importantly the distinctions between the various players. So far, the coalition with the BAT has largely narrowed the difference and heated up the competition (D. Zhang, 2017). This reality is reflected through the growing quantity and improved quality of self-made productions, and facilitated by the national policy of ‘Entrepreneurial and Innovation’ (shuang chuang zheng ce). As the driving force of national innovation, the government is providing the context for a noble motive, a political significance, and the BAT are offering technical and financial support – a form of business cooperation. At present, when the platform strategy is incomplete and the technology breakthroughs are underway, the streaming platforms in China are stuck in a stage where content is their most valuable asset and form of capital. It will take time for the BAT to entirely merge their high- tech with streaming platforms for a unified and superior user experience, where the uniqueness of each player will be strengthened. However, until then, competition due to homogeneity will be aggravated in the content sector (Shang, 2017).

6.2 NARROWED DIFFERENCE AND HEATED COMPETITION

The superiority of traditional TV has lasted for a long time, while online content has had to make an effort to be considered equal. For media practitioners, with either a traditional or an online background, online drama was considered to be light, amusing, innovative and fun,

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without any debate or disagreement. Although it is easy to admit that self-made drama is developing, it is difficult to view it as a serious counterpart of traditional TV drama, especially from the viewpoint of traditional practitioners, taking the general quality of online drama into account (An, 2017). When discussing the fundamental reasons for the prevalence of self-made dramas, media practitioners from both sides tend to present similar but also quite different answers. Traditional media practitioners collectively attributed the rise of self-made dramas to the development of communication technologies, whereas online media practitioners attributed their success to innovative content and their creative work. When combined, the various responses combined unveil the full picture regarding the success of self-made productions, where traditional media practitioners put their focus on technology affordances – in other words, the mechanisms – but online media practitioners differ from a practical point of view.

Such bifurcation represents a diversified way of thinking, and even explains the differences between traditional content and self-made productions: the former always operate in the framework, by the book, whereas the latter enjoy more freedom and carry fewer obligations.

What both parties did agree upon regarding the prosperous nature of self-made productions was the less sophisticated censorship, and the impeccable timing.

It is notable that traditional media practitioners still believe in the mechanism of traditional media, according to their views on online media. They tend to believe that the success of online content is a fortunate encounter, a supplement to traditional content, and will not become mainstream media at any time soon. One traditional media practitioner provided some thoughts on the success of self-made productions:

I think we can analyse this from two aspects, from the external to the internal.

First, in terms of macroeconomic and external factors, the improvement of

economic productivity has promoted the development of information and

communication technologies. These hardware foundations have provided very

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powerful groundwork for the development of online media and programs. The

way of accessing information has changed, it is now more convenient and faster.

Second, is the internal factor, that is, political factors. In the past, the

advertising law in China targeted only at traditional media. Even until today,

they have more power over traditional sector rather than the online field. These

internal policies and political factors actually provided some convenient

environment for the establishment and development of online media. Two

factors combined with the diversity of online content itself, including a wide

range of content from general interests to special preferences, have met the

appetite of mass audiences in a short period of time. Therefore, online

programs can achieve great success in our time. (Traditional practitioner D,

2017)

Another traditional media practitioner, who had worked in a famous TV station for more than five years, expressed similar views:

Due to the limited cost of self-made programming and relatively poor

production standards, although self-made programs may attract a few

audiences because of their variety, many viewers would still enjoy high quality

programs.

The reason of success in terms of self-made productions is largely and foremost

attributable to the rapid economic development in China, as well as the

popularity of the internet network, and the rapid development of mobile

internet; these material conditions determine the superstructure. After gaining

sufficient material supply, people began to search for spiritual enjoyment. So

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now there is a relaxed entertainment-inclined environment, and this is very

important.

In addition, since traditional media need to undergo a strict censorship, there

are many taboos and forbidden things in terms of content, which gives the self-

made shows a lot of room to grow. These self-made programs and dramas can

walk alongside the river without getting damp; such things can satisfy a

considerable number of audiences and their curiosity. (Traditional

practitioner B, 2017)

Online practitioners, however, noticed the unprecedented changes in viewing experience, and suggested that it is content and experience that distinguish online productions from traditional programs:

I think that the success of self-made shows lies in content and script. Self-made

productions are just so different from the traditional TV, where episodes are

long and boring. Besides, I recall that the SAPPRFT hasn’t released the

provision on TV advertising, so watching TV shows on TV is often interrupted

with lots of advertising, which is annoying. But self-made content is the

opposite, you can watch the show without any interruption, and that felt great!

(Youku staff F, 2017)

Taking multiple external and environmental factors into account, staff from Youku explained the discrepancy in censorship between online and traditional content. Despite this difference, youth culture and the content made especially for young generations were considered to be the primary impetus and fundamental factors that had contributed to the success of online self- made content. In general, the key words point to the creative work:

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However, success can never be simply achieved. At that time, censorship on

self-made content is relatively less strict, the TV network was sluggish, and

younger generation wants more interesting and new stuff, and so on. These

factors constitute the soil for self-made shows. Besides all these factors, the

success of these shows also comes from the innovation of media practitioners.

Self-made shows are more sophisticated than ever, audience had access to more

high-quality content, users are more willing to pay for online content and

platforms are making a profit out of it. As such, a beneficial cycle has been

established. Also, large amount of capital promoted the development of this

field. These years, investment sectors are keeping an eye on the development

of online content, many producers are able to find enough funding, this is also

a good thing for content. User experience of streaming platforms rises as

content keeps reaching for new standards. Then success only becomes a matter

of time. (Youku staff F, 2017)

In the eyes of online practitioners, the success of online content and streaming platforms is well deserved and virtually inevitable. However, different voices from traditional media practitioners value the contribution of the internet itself. From their perspective, this is a triumph of internet technology, a success of society, a victory of the time, rather than a celebratory moment for self-made productions.

I personally think that the success of online programs is not so much but the

success of online media, as technology and online platforms provided these

programs with multiple channels to disseminate, and online programs can only

broadcast and display on these platforms if they want to gain more audiences.

(Traditional media practitioners A, 2017)

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Most of those who were silent want to make their own voices. Internet is a

relatively open platform for public opinions, where users were given the

opportunity to voice their voices. Netizens can participate in self-made

programs through bullet screen and other ways, to enhance their sense of

presence. (Traditional media practitioners B, 2017)

Multiple resources have confirmed the success and future ambitions of self-made productions

(Feng, 2017; Sohu, 2017b). The difference between self-made and traditional TV drama has narrowed a great deal – even more than traditional practitioners would dare to imagine or realise. It is understandable that for traditional media practitioners, it is difficult to remain impartial – especially in terms of online media when it develops at an annoyingly rapid speed.

If discussing the rise of self-made productions from an objective perspective, however, it is significant enough to be treated as the serious counterpart of traditional TV productions, especially when seven of IQIYI self-made productions and a few others commissioned by other streaming platforms made their way onto the global streaming platform Netflix in 2017

(Variety, 2017) – a victory far beyond what traditional productions have achieved. This milestone rewrites the history of cultural exports and even raises the possibility of reversing the cultural deficit. Despite the narrowing differences between traditional and self-made content, self-made productions have embarked on their journey by targeting the younger generations. This strategy is still valid, with a slightly broader audience, as the keen followers of post-1980s and 1990s programming gradually approach middle age.

6.2.1 Youth culture and the initial success of self-made drama: A profile of Unexpectedness

Prior to 2015, when self-made drama was not widely accepted (. Sun, 2016), and streaming platforms tapped into this area tentatively, self-made drama series were nothing more than funny videos – a product not taken seriously enough by audience and platform executives alike.

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The overwhelming, unprecedented and unexpected success arrived later, due to foreward thinkers. The first and biggest success of self-made drama series belonged to Unexpectedness

(wan wan mei xiang dao), a drama series that constituted several independent episodes. Similar to the Western framework of Black Mirror or The Number Nine, every episode of this series has an independent storyline, situated in history, and features a funny story that projects an aspect of modern life. This show is very different from what Chinese audiences were used to.

The low budget for the series is reflected in the low quality, and the plot seems untraditional and challenging – not to mention the exaggerated style of advertising placement. It is as if this series was made for the bullet screen. As the first self-made drama series to have achieved such a success, it created an irregular, cheap and whimsical impression, quite opposite to the impact of a traditional TV series. After this success, other streaming platforms joined the trend of producing unconventional self-made drama series (Chen and Yanhong, 2017) in an attempt to jump on the trend.

There are plenty of Chinese media studies of the initial success of self-made productions and its meaning in terms of grassroots culture (R. Sun, 2016; L. Yang, 2014).

Many Chinese academics believe that Unexpectedness, as the first successful self-made drama series, broadened the horizons of Chinese audiences. The metaphorical term that originated from an overseas student who first adopted this description on YouTube – ‘zhou zhi huo’ (I live to watch the episode every week, my life depends on it) (W. Wang, 2014; J. Wu, 2014) – is a vivid example of the popularity and influence enjoyed by this series among the younger generations. In addition to feedback valuation, where appropriate consideration was given after the distribution of each episode and adapted into the new releases, headlines of the week or topic of the day were featured (Yan Liu, 2014). The acknowledged success of Unexpectedness can be attributed to the assimilation of a weekly screening system borrowed from US and

Korean dramas. The show faced dire financial straits during the first season, and the content

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was in many ways far-fetched; nevertheless, it resonated with the younger generations better than any other high-quality traditional productions available at that time. The academic analysis regarding the reasons for the show’s success generally concurs. Opportunity beckoned when paying for copyright content became a costly choice for online platforms, and unforeseen effort was made in innovation as well as in dedication to the younger generations. However, the process of making the initial series remains ambiguous. What were the inspirations and the biggest challenges? How did youth culture prevail over traditional culture? The following investigation of Unexpectedness is dedicated to addressing these questions.

Even the media practitioner from Youku shared similar considerations regarding the success of Unexpectedness: that in addition to the timeframe of less than 10 minutes per episode, the fresh content and interesting plot were a distinct contrast to the traditional TV viewing experience:

Personally speaking, I think that the success of Unexpectedness and the self-

made drama lies in content. I can still remember quite clearly that back in the

time, the SAPPRFT had not implemented strict advertising laws on traditional

television, so you had to bear with the commercial intervals constantly, which

was absolutely annoying – that was the worst viewing experience ever. But

online drama provided a continued viewing experience, with no interruptions

at all. As an audience [member], I think this is just awesome! (Youku staff F,

2017)

Besides, the crew of Unexpectedness consisted of non-professional self-media content creators, who specialised in funny videos. Such a combination was only a tiny bit unusual for Youku, but very strange for other streaming platforms. What was the logic behind these arrangements?

Why it was commissioned by Youku instead of other potential competitors? It is therefore

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essential to examine the nature of Youku and the position it occupied at that time, in order to comprehend such phenomena.

Despite the incongruent discussion of the first advocator of self-made productions,

Youku was endorsed by most media practitioners as the first online platform to propose the idea of online drama, online movies and the concept of self-made content. These terms are familiar nowadays, but were advanced and forward-thinking concepts back then. As a UGC platform, Youku possesses unlimited resources and enormous potential, which provide the platform with insight into the online screen industry. As a precedent, Youku commissioned several self-made series, such as Hip Hop Quatet (xi ha si chong zou), Unexpectedness and Old

Boys (lao nan hai), and the slogan of the platform was ‘Produce Content and Dreams’. In the early stages, making self-made content was a huge challenge, even though it was commissioned by the platform, but the low budget indicated that these shows were only trials, which were less likely to find a sponsor or funding. The only keys to success were faith and dreams – this is what they had and also what was left:

At the beginning, content creators are relatively poor. Unlike now, when there

is plenty of money in the online entertainment industry. What I’m trying to say

is that, at that time, content production was accomplished by a group of people

with great passion and dreams. For filmmakers and directors, they have to

believe in their faith and their dreams, and just because of this faith, they were

able to fight through the longest night and witness the rising of Youku self-

made content. (Youku staff G, Self-made Department 2017)

Because of the efforts made by these pioneers and the huge success that followed, the director of Youku’s self-made production department decided to bring in the Master Micro Film project. Through Youku’s cooperation with film festivals, several famous film directors’ works

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were chosen to be distributed on the platform. The concept of the microfilm was first proposed by Youku – it is acknowledged that the first real micro-movie was A Bread-induced Bloodshed, which is produced by Youku. In an attempt to enhance everyone’s awareness of microfilm, and also to improve the quality of Youku’s self-made content, the master micro-film series was born under such circumstances. In addition to the Master Micro Film project, Youku started an initiative called Young Director’s Plan, a scheme aimed at developing the content production capabilities of young directors and increasing the quantity of high-quality content to be distributed on the platform, which sounds familiar and is in fact similar to the platform scheme used nowadays to uncover UGC content. Back then, though, high-quality, self-made content was still rare, and most of it was mixed UGC content:

After all these years, I think that Youku has led all the online streaming

platforms onto the self-made path, and it has also made all the younger

generations, especially young directors, realize that the online streaming

platform could be the place to fulfil their dreams. Although it seems unrealistic

and pale to talk about dreams in our age, back then dreaming was the ultimate

motive to push us forward. (Youku staff F, 2017)

The facilitating schemes of Youku earned the company reputation of being a platform focused on dreams and compassion. This impression was later conveyed in multiple interviews when interviewees were being asked about Youku. Media practitioners – especially content creators

– often adopted the term ‘dream’ to describe Youku as a streaming platform. This compares with other streaming platforms, where they were being described from different angles – some from the viewpoint of market value, some from the content quality. The consistent feedback from Youku underlies a mutually resonating identity between the platform and media practitioners, making a dream platform for those who had dreams. Such a phenomenon

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suggests that Youku’s early moves had a huge influence on content creators, and this continues to the present time. Thus the chain reaction began. As a platform that speaks to its users and creators, Youku has a real regard for the youth culture. Platform strategies affect users as well as content creators, as younger generations become increasingly attracted to the platform. The arrangements of the production crew of Unexpectedness turned out to be a calibrated combination. As active content creators on Youku, those in the crew were well experienced and well supported by the show’s fans. This was a show made by and for the young generation:

When Unexpectedness just came out, it created a form that we have never seen

– it was new. The producers of this show are not media practitioners, they did

not receive standard training like every other media producer. Why could they

make a success? Well, we think it is about paying attention to the young culture

and new things that the young generations like. People say that this show is

similar to a Japanese show called Rihe, but no matter what, both of these shows

are trying to express the cultural consumption and inner appeal of college

students. Fast-paced content seems to cater to and also suitable for the fast-

running society. You are young, you have so many exciting things going on

with your life, and you don’t have enough time to watch TV? Do not worry,

we will give you a show that you have enough time to watch. (Youku staff G,

Self-made Department, 2017)

6.2.2 Youth culture and high culture

The success of Unexpectedness transmitted a signal to the Chinese online sector: that youth culture and the younger generations are critical factors when it comes to competing with the traditional media. After the first season of Unexpectedness in 2014, Youku made more investments into the following two seasons, and in 2016 the online movie Surprise was

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launched as the final chapter of this online drama series. The trajectory of the first self-made content showcased the rising of online content and the prevalence of youth culture (Chen and

Yanhong, 2017). Due to the achievements of self-made content in 2014, an online catch phrase derived from this online contents had gone viral on the internet, across multiple platforms from news apps to social media, where it was widely adopted in news reports, daily conversations and drama series (W. Shi, 2015). According to the traditional practitioner, the internet is important for people to be given the space and choice to ‘voice their voices’ (Traditional media practitioner B, 2017), which is evidenced by the proliferation of online catchphrases.

The advent of self-made content was inevitable. For one thing, as the mainstream media platform, the traditional media were holding all the cards, from media production to distribution. From their monopolizing position, it seemed logical to demand astronomical amounts in copyright licensing. In contrast, the online media were barely surviving due to the nearly unbearable costs of copyright fees. The move to self-made content was simply an act of survival. Moreover, the absolute voice of traditional media was causing aesthetic fatigue for

Chinese audiences, as evidenced by the cultural deficit caused by the copyright purchasing of

Korean and Japan content productions (Xinru, Jiang, and Wenjing, 2010). The self-made content was born under these circumstances, as a seemingly insignificant force against the authoritative voice, a scream for innovation and a long-suppressed desire to express. This is what youth culture and self-made content truly stand for.

The previous misunderstanding of youth culture has implicated the online self-made content, however, as if it were immature, casual and lacked constraint (Lidan, 2015). It is true that youth culture once developed into grassroots culture, and was overly casual and inappropriate due to a lack of restraint and control. As increasingly strict censorship is being implemented upon the online sector (Ye, 2015), online content is now rather different

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compared with its previous incarnations; still, the gap persists as the confrontation between youth culture and high culture escalates.

Over the years, self-made content experienced modification, preserving only youth culture and innovation at its core. The investment is now at the same level as traditional content, and the quality is equal to or higher than that of traditional TV. The content is neither shallow nor vulgar, and the mainstream distribution channels are shifting towards online platforms. The advancement of self-made content compared with the past is identifiable in three aspects: investment, commercialisation and distribution (Youku staff F, 2017). Self-made content is now capable of multi-channel investment and multi-level commercialisation, where innovative advertising formats were created for the online environment to maximise the value for both content and advertisers (Qingtao, 2016). In addition, multi-layer distribution was adopted in order to provide value-added services and means to monetise content further. Self-made content is innovating constantly: it is always new, interesting and different; it caters to the younger generations; and it serves as the epitome of youth culture.

As youth culture increasingly parallels the mainstream culture, the traditional media are obligated to restore their authoritative voice. The proposition of the Chinese dream and

‘rejuvenating Chinese culture’ contrasts with the youth culture (Z. Yu, 2015), a claim that aims high and comes from the high ranks – a cultural form that is divine and noble, heavy and serious.

If youth culture is popular, created by the people, then the Chinese culture proposed by

President Xi Jinping is a high-born culture that is the opposite of youth culture. Youth culture is included in pop culture – it is like a popcorn culture that is fleeting, changing and unadorned.

However, high culture is composed of traditional culture, such as Confucian culture, so it is insightful, historical, theorised and profound, and sometimes has a political agenda. The

Chinese high culture refers to ‘a wisdom that reign over science and technology on a deeper level’ (Jing Wang, 1996).

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The promotion of high culture is to some extent a political strategy to balance the cultural influence of the internet and traditional media, and more importantly an imperative to balance the political order and reorient public opinions. Such a contradiction intensifies as the youth culture continues to disturb the mainstream culture, through which several transformations have occurred. The popularity of self-made content has successfully caught the attention of SAPPRFT, which in turn has responded with increasingly strict censorship regulations (Liyong Xu, 2017) that ultimately have lifted the quality standards of self-made productions. In addition, an over-supply of self-made content has unconsciously contributed to aesthetic fatigue, where the audience is longing for premium cultural productions. The unexpected popularity of the state-sponsored anti-corruption TV series In the Name of the

People further evidenced the desire for high-quality productions, even though it was considered by the BBC to be ‘a publicity film of political gains regarding the anti-corruption movement’

(Hui Wang, 2017). As the first anti-corruption production in ten years, this TV series received a full-scale welcome across a variety of generations and nationalities, indicating a high-profile return of mainstream culture. Interestingly, as the centre of youth culture, the online platform contributed more than six billion hits to the anti-corruption TV series (Hui Wang, 2017), suggesting a large-scale migration to online platform and an irreversible tendency of viewing habits from TV to online.

As the counterpart of high culture, with the ingredients of youth culture, self-made productions have made considerable progress, becoming increasingly similar to – and even sometimes indistinguishable from – traditional productions. The growing similarity is manifested primarily through self-made drama series, however, and is less distinct with regard to self-made variety shows, where the confrontation of youth culture and high culture is even more strongly intensified by the comparison of The Rap of China and National Treasure (see

Chapter 7 for detailed discussion). After years of evolution, the quality of self-made drama is

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as high or higher than that of traditional drama, with additional functions – including the innovative advertising implantation, graft advertising (yi hua jie mu shi guang gao). By using the same crew, the same scenes and the same costumes, graft advertising is a way to secretly advertise a product in a humorous yet reasonable manner (Youku staff G, Self-made

Department, 2017) without jeopardising the viewing experience. In short, graft advertising advertises the product through an additional plot, but without leaving the original realms of the program. This is just one innovation: self-made productions continue to diversify ways of investment, distribution and commercialisation.

However, the inclination of self-made drama towards traditional TV series received mixed reactions. Film director Shuai Xie, the deputy director of Train Wreck (Can Zhou), which was nominated at the Cannes International Film Festival, the UEFA Film Festival and was a finalist for the Best Director Award and the Most Popular Film Award at the Beijing

Undergraduate Film Festival, shared his thoughts on the development of online drama. As a promising director who swore would never enter the online movie industry, he believes that even though online drama is making headway in the screen industry, there are too many shallow productions. The online industry is complicated, and assimilation towards traditional drama, in terms of investment, genre and quality, is perceived as a strategic move, simply because it is easier to go through censorship. Interestingly, sometimes shallow online productions were created in a certain way so they would go through the censorship process in a timely manner, ‘for the short cycle would make it faster to make a profit’ (Film director Shuai

Xie, 2017).

The quality of online drama is inconsistent, and the number of high-profile productions does not eliminate or entirely elevate the quality of online content. Self-made productions should cling to traditional content as the affection for high-quality content never ceases.

According to one of the traditional practitioners, ‘the quality of self-made productions is poor

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because of the insufficient investment: some audiences may watch online shows for the shallow materials, but most of them love high-quality content’ (Traditional media practitioners B, 2017).

In the eyes of traditional media practitioners, online content is and has always been in need of further improvement. Likewise, traditional content could use some online presence – for instance, utilising multi-platform distribution, generating derivative videos and products, and so forth. The tension between youth culture and high culture is underlined through these different reactions. The attempt to take advantage of each other, however, could be considered a contested balance in the cultural sector.

6.3 CONTENT MONETISATION

Self-made productions have innovated in terms of investment, distribution and commercialisation, according to online practitioners (Youku staff F, 2017). The numerous positions designed for today’s producers are in fact created to attract investment. As an anonymous producer stated:

Becoming a traditional film producer takes time, it is not something you could

achieve overnight; however, due to the proliferation of online content and

media companies, you could see that a lot of young producers are assigned to

attract investment, and improve business communication. They are more like

PR than the real producers, at least from what I reckon. If you want to know

real producers, you should go to Hollywood, you could find real producers

there who knows art, script, the film industry, and who also knows how to

control cost and attract investment, they are the real organisers and managers

of the project. The screen industry in China is developing very fast, and because

of this, the practitioners tend to be eager for quick success and instant benefit.

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Therefore, the quality of our productions is less satisfied compared with foreign

productions. (Producer H, 2017)

The trajectory of the screen industry in China is following a similar path to Hollywood, despite the huge differences in production quality. This observation is shared by another independent film producer:

Having worked in the traditional movie industry for six years, I noticed a

tendency of industrialisation. This industry has changed from the director-

oriented system to producer-oriented mechanism. (Independent film producer

Jessica, 2017)

Jessica has noticed something that is not just a tendency that exists in traditional media, but a universal fact across the entire media industry. The great number of emerging producers from online platforms evidenced such transformations. With increasing amount of capital invested in the online productions, the concept of capitalism is more than ever deeply embedded in the online sector.

The embodiment of monetisation also comprises distribution and commercialisation.

Online distribution is more diversified by implementing subscription services, or other value- added services, as ways to monetise content (Qisi, 2015). Audiences are able to choose pay- per-view services with or without any subscriptions, and VIP members (subscribers) are awarded with no advertising, high resolution and elevated sound support (Lin, Qiu, Li, and

Guan, 2016). Commercialisation emphasises the feasibility of all commercialised solutions, including the development of derivative products, the usage and excavate of intellectual property value, the innovation of advertising (such as the graft advertising) (Agency, 2016), and so forth. Content as a data generator, attention concentrator and profit aggregator is taken as the capital in the current competition. Various attempts to capitalise content are ultimately

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the manifestation of content monetisation. Platform affordances contribute to content capitalisation; with flexibility marking the nature of online platforms, content production and monetisation are more diversified and market-oriented compared with traditional productions.

These innovations and transformations are due to online platforms, and dedicated to online productions, as the witnesses of content monetisation. One of the online practitioners shared similar considerations:

No one thought about content commercialisation back in the day – all we were

thinking about was to produce the show on time; it was impossible to

commercialise the content. But now, all we think about is how to utilise the

content for its commercial interest. The innovation in advertising is born for

the self-made productions, such as creative ad replacement, graft advertising

and so on. But of course, the online distribution platform determines a

diversified possibility of commercialisation, as censorship is after all less strict

than traditional platforms. (Producer H, 2017)

To some extent, content monetisation is one of the fundamental differences between traditional and online productions. ‘Data-driven, flexible and diversified’ (Independent film producer

Jessica, 2017), the perceived distinction between online and traditional production, as the composition of content monetisation, is disrupting the long-standing order in the media industry:

The development of the internet had broken the distribution hierarchy in the

media industry, where TV stations and movie theatres are the first and primary

distribution channels of media productions. However, the advent of internet

gradually brought along a cooperation model, which is more market-oriented,

open-minded and flexible. These terms attracted more and more content

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producers, they were more inclined to cooperate with online platforms rather

than traditional ones. Thus the rigid order of monopolisation was finally broken.

(Independent film producer Jessica, 2017)

As it turns out, self-made productions – which have been greatly empowered by content monetisation – are drawing enormous attention from famous TV producers and even world- renowned film directors. , the famous director of American Dreams in China and

Perhaps Love, and Wang Kar Wei, the director of internationally recognised award-winning film In the Mood for Love, have publicly claimed their enthusiasm for the self-made productions (Vanguard, 2017), which signals a promising development in the future. Media practitioners in China reckon these gestures are a high commendation of the field, and some of them tend to believe that the basic reason for this phenomenon is that ‘online drama makes good money in a timely way’ (Film director Shuai Xie, 2017):

You know the famous movie director Peter Chen claims to be entering the

online drama market. Because online drama is taking big IP, they are hiring

high-standard production team to produce good drama. It is not a coincidence

or change of mind – director Wang Kar Wei wanted to make online drama as

well. I think the fundamental reason is that online drama makes money – it

makes good money in a timely way! You may not understand this: online

drama makes ends meet even before it is displayed on the platform, and this is

how the industry works now. For example, when the meals are ready, you can

smell them before you’ve seen them, and this makes the meals even more

delicious, right? Online movies and dramas are just like this. (Film director

Shuai Xie, 2017)

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For film directors who are well aware of the system and distribution channels, profitability is indeed one of the considerations. After all, it is a matter of survival. In a public speech, director

Peter Chan stated:

We film directors are now confronted with dire situations, no matter it is in

China or America. Commercial movies and animations are leading the market,

leaving other types of movies tiny room to survive … sometimes, a film with

three years hard work is often left with pure luck for two weeks, or even one

day. (Chan, 2017)

Content monetisation is enticing for directors and content creators who have suffered due to certain restrictions and limitations of the existing media system. The ‘sabotaged’ order is rendering equal opportunities for directors and audiences; the internet and the development of content monetisation have ended the age where ‘few people often decide what audiences should watch on a national scale’ (Chan, 2017). Digital distribution has brought equilibrium to the content sector, and a diversified environment and numerous ways of commercialisation have exposed more diversified content to a wider audience. Content monetisation is facilitating the future development of self-made productions, and is unveiling a prosperous future.

6.3.1 Cultural exports as a signal of ‘going out’?

Content monetisation is creating a discrepancy between online and traditional content. When iQIYI successfully exported seven self-made productions to Netflix (Variety, 2017), the debate about Chinese culture ‘going out’ reappeared. Prior to this incident, Western media scholars had a thorough discussion regarding their concerns about the ‘going out’ policy as a diplomatic strategy. Chu believes that the difficulty of understanding the Chinese context persists, and that

Chinese media productions are still below the expectations of Western audiences (Y. Chu,

2014). Keane (2016a, 2016b) points out that the ‘going out’ policy is a failure, but it is

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connecting with Chinese audience overseas. These are precious insights about the ‘going out’ ambition, but have things changed (Keane and Zhang, 2017)? Critics in China echo these concerns, as the seven successful ‘going out’ self-made productions are different from the previous exports: ‘Netflix chose these shows for their high-quality, similar genre to American

TV shows and low requirement of Chinese contexts’ (Feng, 2017). Chinese cultural elements are a scarcity in these shows. The awkward yet ironic situation now is that Chinese shows have changed: by meeting Western expectations, they are hardly recognisable as Chinese shows.

Another reality is that Chinese streaming platforms appear to have no ambition to expand their services overseas at this stage. A producer from iQIYI stated that, ‘from my own perspective, I think we have no plans of expanding our services to other countries at the moment, our focus stays within mainland China’ (iQIYI Producer I, 2017). Ironically, even though the Western audience believes that Chinese shows are connecting with the overseas

Chinese demographic, the Chinese platform and its parent company, which are linked closely with the government, expressed no intentions to provide their services to the overseas Chinese audience when the main channel for watching Chinese content is largely a foreign platform:

YouTube. Therefore, connecting to the overseas Chinese diaspora was not the priority agenda, but more of a boous in the process of cultural ‘going out’. The Chinese diaspora is in a sense being isolated from the Chinese online media environment, as it takes time, energy and technical skills to locate content – especially self-made content – and the user experience remains consistently time-consuming. Although the situation has changed, with Netflix acquiring a few self-made productions to distribute globally, it is still difficult for diasporas to be part of the media discourse or the media context when some of the self-made productions remain hard to obtain. Both the youth culture and the fleeting internet culture seem to be – and truly are – far away.

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The promising partnership with Netflix does not guarantee a successful ‘going out’ endeavour (EW-Entertainment, 2017). The deal struck by IQIYI and Netflix was deemed a golden opportunity to export Chinese media productions; however, the dilemma facing IQIYI and all the other production companies around the world is how to bring in the appropriate amount of local content without ruining the viewing experience of audiences with various cultural backgrounds. This is a question that faces all the production companies, and even more so with the globalisation of streaming platforms such as Netflix, making the difficulties faced by the Chinese ‘going out’ policy a world-recognised global conundrum.

6.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to illustrate the new screen ecology in China. By categorising the

Chinese online screen field, Chinese streaming services are recognised as a mixture of everything, with various content available on a single platform. ‘In-between content’ is a newly established term to capture the dynamics in the Chinese online field. However, in this study the analysis framework is established under the structure of genres, instead of content features, due to its transferrable nature. The development of online productions, as well as their growing significance, has been examined through the discussion between traditional and online media practitioners. Even though traditional practitioners are reluctant to embrace the proliferation of online productions, they in awe of the success and popularity of the online programs. The prevalence of online production is partly attributable to less censorship, but more importantly is due to the emphasis on youth culture.

Youth culture has emerged from being a seemingly insignificance force, against the authoritative voice (mainstream culture), to become a form that parallels or even threatens the traditional culture. The confrontation between youth culture and high culture stresses the sociological influences exerted by the new screen ecology. The history and origins of youth

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culture were explored through a case study of the series Unexpectedness. The desire to ‘voice their voices’, and the dedication to catering to young audiences – such as producing a show made by and for the younger generations – may account for the prevalence of youth culture in online shows. The tensions between these two cultural forms are intensified, as youth culture and the online platform continue to impact viewing habits.

The narrowed difference and heated competition between traditional and online productions is empowered by platform affordance and content monetisation. Self-made productions or platform-commissioned programs have cultivated a series of changes globally, most prominently the disruptive order formulated in the media industry, where distribution, production and monetisation are integrated into a single platform. Innovations in platform affordance also contribute to cultural exports, albeit on a limited scale.

Changes in the new production culture, such as platform integration and the confrontation between youth culture and high culture, are discussed in more detail in the next chapter, where this phenomenon becomes more evident in the sector of online variety shows and online movies.

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Chapter 7: From ‘edge ball’ to new industry standards:

Changes in online variety shows

Chapters 3, 5 and 6 investigated the corporate power of the BAT and their motivation for joining the online media industry; the development of major streaming platforms and their business strategies; and content creation of online drama in relation to the prevalence of youth culture. These chapters systematically explored the interrelations of the media ecosystem between market, distribution and content production. This chapter continues the discussion about content production from the perspective of online variety shows. The contrast of youth culture and high culture will be continued, and the platformisation of online variety shows will be illustrated. However, in order to unveil the evolution of Chinese online variety shows, it is imperative to briefly outline the history of TV genre and format studies, in order to strengthen understanding of the transformations of various genres and TV forms within the online context.

Research questions to be examined include how Chinese online shows differ from traditional ones; how the online media environment and online platforms impact content production; and what this entails. A brief literature review is provided below to frame the theoretical background for further discussions.

7.1 TV GENRE AND FORMAT STUDIES

Online streaming services and platform-commissioned programs are to some extent less inventive compared with technological advancement in distribution and monetisation. Despite the change of distribution channels, online versus broadcasting, and on-demand videos versus , the continuity of television genre categories has remained the same over the years, across various platforms. By situating online variety shows in the context of TV genre

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studies, a broader context will be unveiled to facilitate the understanding of the history, evolution and influence of TV programming. Silverblatt (2015) provides an argument in terms of genre studies by adopting the case study of quiz shows:

Tracing the evolution of a genre over time provides insight into shifts in culture.

To illustrate, quiz shows originated on the radio during the 1930s as elitist

programming and were designed to enlighten their listeners and heighten the

public’s appreciation of intellectual pursuits and achievement … However, by

the 1940s, as quiz shows began catering to a broader audience, the contests

became less intellectually challenging.

It is not only quiz shows that can be informative, however. Rose (1985) points out that at the dawn of this century, reality shows witnessed ‘an explosion in new approaches to programming and formats’. Following the thread of reality TV development, Rose (1985, p. 4) delivers some insights into TV genre studies and argues that:

The eagerness with which US programmers looked abroad during the last few

years may be a new trend, but in many ways it stems from the same spirit (and

anxiety) that has always let networks to search for some novel aspect of

formula production to exploit or, in most cases, rework and recycle. Especially

since the 1980s, genre TV programming has rarely operated according to

precise formal categories or strict style and content conventions.

Similarly, Chandler (1997, p. 3) proposes that, ‘traditionally, genres (particularly literary genres) tended to be regarded as fixed forms, but contemporary theory emphasizes that both their forms and functions are dynamic’. He stresses the changing process or even dismantling of genre through the work of Nicholas Abercrombie and David Buckingham, stating that ‘the

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boundaries between genres are shifting and becoming more permeable’ (Abercrombie, 1996) and that ‘genre is not simply “given” by the culture: rather, it is in a constant process of negotiation and change’ (Buckingham, 1993). Regardless of exaggerated claims of

‘dismantling of genre’, previous studies have discussed the fluidity of genre to a broad extent.

Jason Mittell (2001, p. 19) notes the ‘fluidity of genre definitions over time’ (see also Rose,

1985). Elsewhere, Rick Altman (1984) argues that genre mixing is a way to improve marketability of Hollywood films during the golden age (see also Gottgetreu, 1999). In more recent studies, Silverblatt (2015, p. 203) adopts the term ‘hybrids’ to describe the ambiguous boundaries of certain TV genres – for instance, ‘the reality genre is the fusion of documentary and soap opera’.

Previous genre studies have investigated the dynamic development – that is the dismantling, mixing and hybridity – of genres, and the implications for culture, texts and markets (Fiske, 2002; Hartley, 2003), during which ‘reality TV’ has appeared repetitively as a milestone that has witnessed genre merging and redirected television studies (Murray and

Ouellette, 2004). According to Silverblatt (2015), ‘The reason that this genre first appeared on the air is that reality shows are relatively inexpensive to produce.’ In addition to being a

‘market-driven system’, the potential of reality TV as a hybrid genre was initially doubted by executives and many others, and they tend to be dismissive of the genre. After the success of

Survivor, American Idol and Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, however, many networks like

CBS (Columbia Broadcasting System) and 20th Century Television began to deploy long- term plans for reality shows. The popularity of reality TV has to some extent ‘changed the economics of the television industry’, but critics often regard this genre of TV programming as ‘being voyeuristic, cheap, sensational television’ (Hill, 2005, p. 452). Hill argues that:

The mixed metaphors of drug addiction and war indicate how the reality genre

is often framed in relation to media effects and cultural, social and moral

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values … Such criticism of reality TV fails to take into account the variety of

formats within the reality genre. (Hill, 2005, p. 452)

The reality TV genre includes ‘a range of formats with distinctive characteristics’, such as infotainment formats, surveillance reality formats, fly-on-the-wall docu-soap formats, lifestyle formats, reality game formats, life experiment formats, reality talent formats, celebrity reality formats and reality clip show formats (Hill, 2005). John Corner (2004) identifies the incorporating elements of reality genres: ‘there is a hectic innovation around the combination of the “real” with the self-declared and openly performative “artificial”’ (Corner, 2004, p. 290;

Holmes and Jermyn, 2004, p. 292). Corner argues that the combination of new elements in reality programming is seeking directions as they ‘relate back in their practices and their

“look”, to the pre-1990 models of observational documentary programming’ (Corner, 2004, p.

295). Biressi and Nunn (2005, p. 5) argue that:

Audiences often gauge the authenticity or truthfulness of reality TV on a scale

of emotional realism and personal revelation. The reality TV subject is

enjoined to share their pain, their surprise or their joy in a realm of mediated

sociality and the most successful contestants of series such as are

often those who have allegedly remained ‘true’ to themselves and who have

been frank with their audience.

In the ‘post-documentary culture’ (Biressi and Nunn, 2005), reality TV’s pursuit of ‘real’ TV or ‘authenticity’ is in need of documentary programming in varying degrees – it is, after all,

‘The work of being watched’ (Andrejevic, 2004, p. 130). Andrejevic argues that ‘what becomes important … is not so much the content but the rules for interaction’; while he recognises reality

TV as a ‘customizable transnational format’, he emphasises the revolution in program interaction rather than mixed genre or content, where programs can be localised as required.

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To some extent, the framework of program interaction could be interpreted as a TV format, where content or genre can be reproduced or localised within the given structure. Moran and

Malbon (2006, p. 20) state that

existing TV programme formats are capable of producing new elements that

expand the range of possible applications or adaptations. The spin-off

programme is both new and original, but its seeds and potential is seen to lie in

the pre-existing programme format. Hence, from one point of view, the

emphasis falls on the idea of a core or a structuring centre.

7.1.1 TV format trade

John McMurria (2009, p. 181) examined the dynamics between reality TV and economic power, arguing that:

Reality TV developments in Asia, Africa and Latin America reveal regional

cultural contexts that exist in dynamic tension with this economic power as

formatted reproductions have negotiated local culture, evaded copyright

regimes, found uneven success, and disturbed authoritarian national politics

and elite tastes.

These discussions illustrate the significance of transcultural context and social implications in terms of the reality TV format trade. As of 2006, the United States – the world’s leading cultural power – accounted for more than 60 per cent of global TV programming rights, with the United

Kingdom second with 21 per cent. In comparison, the TV program imports in the United States are much less significant, but still contribute greatly to the cultural relations among diasporas

(McMurria, 2009).

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The proliferation of reality TV around 1990 is attributable to the prosperity of the TV format trade business: ‘From its humble origins in the 1950s, the TV format industry has become a global trade worth billions of euros per year’ (Chalaby, 2011, p. 293). Chalaby argues that TV formats travel internationally through local adaptations, and the industry transformation was initiated by ‘four “super-formats” (Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?,

Survivor, Big Brother and Idol)’ (Chalaby, 2012, p. 37). When the prevalence of reality TV began to extend internationally, the ‘four super-formats’ encountered the largest raid of copycat programming. Nationally, Fox became the ‘leading copycat of reality shows’, produced copycat programs from CBS, ABC and so on (Silverblatt, 2015); however, copycat issues are far more severe internationally. The case study of ‘one of the most successful global television format franchises’ – Idol – shows it was distributed globally, with ‘over 40 global versions – in the absence of specific format rights’. Singh and Kretschmer (2012, p. 11) argue that formats are not legally under copyright protection; however, they ‘are bought and sold for large sums of money’. The ‘format bible’ –the list of production details – is considered ‘a globally distributed container for locally produced content’ (Moran and Malbon, 2006; Oren and Shahaf,

2013).

As Moran and Malbon (2006) propose, the continuity of both authorised and unauthorised copying of TV programs remains up to the present. By recognising TV program distribution, at least to some degree, as a format franchising business, Moran and Malbon (2006) investigated the legal perspectives of such matters, proposing that formats were not legally protected as they seemed to be. Nevertheless, the global franchising of TV program formats has intensified over the years. Chalaby (2015) recognises the ‘global TV format commodity chain’ as the key engine that contributes to the world TV industry. As this chain model facilitate the internationalisation of media firms and companies, the industry keeps reshaping and transforming interactively with the international trading system. Moran (2009a) investigated

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the global franchising and local customising of TV program formats, exploring various levels of format adaptations based on Heylen’s framework (Heylen and Maxwell, 1994), which involves linguistic codes, intertextual codes and cultural codes. With regard to television, the first level involves form and style as the ‘poetics of television’; the second level of adaptation contains ‘the orchestration of intertextual elements’; and the third level involves ‘a local adaptation [that] may herald the introduction of a new television genre to a particular national television culture and industry’ (Moran, 2009a, p. 115).

Likewise, Ferguson and Appadurai (Straubhaar, 1998) propose that the conformity rendered by US-dominant cultural imperialism, or cultural homogenisation and even globalisation, is to some extent overstated. Jian Qian (1969, p. 10) argues that the bottom-up local resistance of cultural globalisation is inevitable, as audiences will always seek ‘local diversity in all cultural, linguistic, political, demographic, and geographic aspects’. Elsewhere,

Kraidy (2005, p. 95) adopts the term ‘hybridity’ or ‘cultural fluidity’ under the context of globalisation to describe ‘the growing cultural homogenisation arising from cultural imperialism’ (Flew, 2018). Despite various discussions of cultural homogenisation and cultural imperialism, cultural diversity, or hybridity, is the driving force of globalisation. In turn, globalisation of TV formats or screen culture necessitates a certain degree of localisation that essentially contributes to the reconfiguration of national culture, albeit to the extreme of neither global nor local:

The TV format industry’s maturation as a mainstay of an international system

of cultural exchange seems to point not to a strengthening of the global and the

local at the expense of the national but to a reconfiguration of the national that

may be to the detriment of those other two levels. (Moran, 2009a)

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Elsewhere, Oren and Shahaf (2013) note the paradoxical relationship between globalisation and localisation through their analysis of global television formats. In Regionalizing Reality,

Kim explores the significance of regional impetus in ‘shaping the flows of global media formats’ (Keane, Flew, and Yecies, 2018). Although the Korean Wave has been examined especially in terms of its film productions, television productions have attracted far less discussion. Hye-Kyung Lee explores the Korean Wave studies, and renders a conclusive discovery: that external studies have focused on cultural consumption and globalisation, whereas internal studies examined production and export capacity as well as the implications within the Korean society, among which one of the interesting findings is the critical perspective regarding the Korean Wave and its limited promotion in cultural diversity (Kim,

2013). Nevertheless, for the regional television format trade, cultural proximity is an enticing leverage. It is often discovered to be a mutually beneficial endeavour, not only for the mitigation of the readaptation of original formats, but also for the in-depth interactions with audiences. Kim notes that the ‘Korean Wave stimulated the evolution of Korean reality formats in the East Asian market’, for its ‘intimacy through the collective recognition of intraregional connectedness in cultural values and ideas’. Such viewing experience is attributable partly to cultural proximity, which gives regional formats a competitive advantage. In a circumvention of governmental policy, a collective strategy (such as formats acquisition) has been adopted between China and Korea to maintain the inflow of Korean culture. These collaborations have promoted Korean media as the format provider, contributed to the growth of Chinese media productions and facilitated cultural hybridisation (Keane et al., 2018).

The continuity of TV genre and TV formats – especially in genre hybridity and cultural hybridisation – persisted in the online media sphere. The trajectory of online variety shows parallels that of reality TV to some extent, especially in terms of transformations of and implications for genre and culture. Online shows increased the cultural consumption of screen

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productions across various regions, which essentially intensified cultural diversity in the progress of globalisation. Online programs in the first decade of the second millennium manifested various traits and predilections that coincided with the Western commercial television system. For countries like China, media systems have long been state owned instead of private owned; Flew (2018, p. 39) notes that ‘there are clearly parts of the world where there is, and always has been, a significant degree of monitoring and filtering of internet content:

China, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia’. Even so, the dualism (state vs corporate) of the Chinese media system incorporates different levels of regulation and censorship. In terms of state media, content is heavily regulated to represent the national images; however, with regard to the online sector, regulations are lessened to some extent to enable the divisiveness of social discourses.

In general, the further away media are from the government, physically or ideologically, the freer their activities will be (Keane, 2001).

7.2 ‘EDGE BALL’ STRATEGY

In the Chinese online media industry, one interesting fact is that the number of self-made variety shows has consistently been larger than the amount of self-made TV drama. Chapter 5 investigated the number of self-made productions on five major platforms and identified the gap between TV genres, where the number of self-made TV dramas as of September 9, 2016 was 201 in total, and the number of self-made variety shows reached 490 (see Figures 10 and

11 in Chapter 5). This phenomenon is attributable to the lower cost of self-made variety shows.

Due to these numerous attempts, self-made content enjoyed great success in 2014: the self- made drama Unexpectedness (wan wan mei xiang dao) went viral on the internet, and self- made variety show U Can U Bibi (qi pa shuo) was also a huge hit. The reason why self-made content erupted in 2014 was partly due to the SAPPRFT regulation of traditional TV stations

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(known as the 2013 regulations on TV entertainment), 2 which resulted in a shortage of programs; however, it was also due to a platform strategy of pursuing profitability, as copyright fees became increasingly unaffordable over the years. The large number of self-made variety shows unavoidably lowered the average quality of these productions, and prejudice against self-made variety shows persists – especially among traditional media practitioners and the older generations, as online variety programs were, and still are, often considered shallow and shoddy content (Zhaohuan Zheng, 2017).

Nevertheless, impressions of the quality of self-made drama have improved greatly due to the increasing number of high-quality shows produced over the past few years, including the popular Youku self-made drama Insomnia (bai ye zhui xiong), which was acquired by Netflix and intended to be distributed across more than 190 countries (L. Liu, 2018). The development of self-made variety shows is less positive, however. The first self-made variety show to have made a difference was U Can U Bibi, an online program that achieved wide coverage among the younger generations (Luming Chen, 2017). Screened in 2014, U Can U Bibi received the highest advertising sponsorship of US$10 million; in 2015, this number skyrocketed to over

$20 million (WeMeMedia, 2017). Evidenced by economic influence, this online production was an unprecedented phenomenon during 2014–15, when self-made variety shows began to explode across the internet. More hit shows like U Can U Bibi have emerged over the years, as they keep setting the bar higher for initial investment and advertising sponsorship. U Can U

Bibi is the representative of self-made variety shows, the epitome of youth culture: it is known for its openness, novelty and entertainment (L. Fyuan, 2017). Having witnessed the success of

2 In 2013, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television released the ‘Notice on Job the Programming and Filing of Integrated Channel Programs of Satellite TV in 2014’ to further strengthen the supervision of Satellite TV stations. The requirements are that: the number of overseas copyright acquisition programs is limited to one per year, per station; the music programs can only broadcast between 19:30 and 22:30, and up to three TV galas are allowed during the holiday season; Chinese animation and children’s programs are regulated to 30 minutes a day, and this also applies to Chinese documentaries.

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U Can U Bibi, many online variety shows and even provincial TV stations made an effort to replicate such success. One noticeable tendency was the collective behaviour of playing the

‘edge ball,’3 which refers to specific program production when untraditional, unconventional, unhealthy and negative content is involved to attract an audience.

Playing the ‘edge ball’ used to be a widely adopted strategy to attract audiences; it refers to program content that draws ‘eyeballs’ with little concern for regulatory provisions. If self- made drama is famous for testing the limits of regulation from time to time, then online variety shows are constantly challenging the ‘edge’ at all times. In June 2017, SAPPRFT issued the

‘General Rules for Auditing Online Audio-visual Programs’, when dozens of online variety shows were forcefully removed from the market due to their inappropriate content and ‘edge ball’ strategy (Ting and Hui, 2018). In addition, more than 107 online drama were requested to stay off the market. This is by far the most severe regulation to have been imposed on the online sector. The emergence and prevalence of online content since 2014 triggered regulation conundrums in the screen industry; however, the TV-level censorship arrived much earlier than anticipated, in 2017. Changes in policy indicated the increasing scale and evolvement of the online market, where adaptive measures are now needed to survive the fierce competition.

Under such circumstances, an ‘edge ball’ strategy is no longer a viable choice for producers or showrunners. Although popular shows were the first to abandon this strategy, less favourable productions continued to use it as a last resort. For the general online audiences, online variety shows maybe less on ‘edge’ these days, but they are still known for their openness (Y. Yu,

2016). As for the target audiences – the younger generations, they are increasingly counting on the revolutionary ‘edgy’ content.

3 The term ‘edge ball’ (ca bianqiu) is used widely in media and journalism to refer to creative compliance. The meaning comes from the game of ping-pong. Where the ball hits the edge of the table, it is a winner.

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7.2.1 Forming industry new standards

As the ‘edge ball’ strategy gradually fades into history due to tightened censorship since 2017, the industry is forming new standards. Investment and quality are increasingly equal to or higher than traditional TV variety shows, but in many ways online productions speak to the grassroots culture. Compared with self-made drama, the contrast between high culture and youth culture is more evident in online variety programs. Such confrontation can be identified through the most disputable and popular self-made variety show, The Rap of China (zhong guo you xi ha), and the refreshing high-culture show on CCTV that initiated a fever of traditional

Chinese culture and cultural heritage, National Treasure (guo jia bao zang) (Cong, 2017).

Unlike previous successful shows such as U Can U Bibi, in which content was fresh and slightly untraditional, The Rap of China was unconventional, featuring niche culture – hip hop.

It achieved more than three billion hits in total for its first season – the most viewed program so far (Wan, 2017). Being outside the mainstream culture, a variety program based on hip hop culture was seen as a bold move (Zhang and Wang, 2017). The success of The Rap of China was unexpected; however, it is no surprise that discourses upon the hip hop culture were later engaged in on a national scale (Shao and Meng, 2017). Even though self-made variety shows are reshaping industry standards, niche content is still considered to be largely beyond the mainstream. Such a confrontational stance explained why a successful hip hop show would draw attention from the whole society. As niche culture, hip hop is provoking confrontational attitudes: it is favoured mostly by young people, and less by other online users (Y. Jiang, 2017).

The edge ball strategy is rarely seen these days; however, the manifestation of youth culture – such as hip hop culture – still right on the edge in social discourse.

Some media critics believe that the Chinese government is not in favour of the hip hop show, and that it will eventually be regulated by SAPPRFT. Things turned out to be rather eventful when the winner of The Rap of China – PG One – was enmeshed in a scandal. The

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tabloid news later developed into a much serious matter. Under the spotlight, PG One was found declaring negative values on his own Weibo account and also in his lyrics. Consequently,

SAPPRFT decided to ban PG One completely, due to his negative influence on the younger generations (W. Zhou, 2018). Eventually, just as media critics had foretold, the show was implicated in this incident and the fate of The Rap of China became unpredictable. Many media critics believe that PG One’s comments provided an excellent excuse for government censorship of The Rap of China, enabling SAPPRFT to act upon the rules. Just like The Rap of

China, online variety shows are constantly discovered to be at the centre of disputable discourses. For online variety shows, openness of content is a tricky balance to maintain: media practitioners need to be creative within the framework, as one traditional practitioner pointed out:

For self-made variety shows, the issue to be considered is how to set the limit.

Because state is now implementing increasingly strict regulations on online

public opinions, if this kind of government supervision continues or upgrades,

then ‘playing edge ball’ will no longer be a good idea. However, there are still

many opportunities lying around, online companies can use big data to analyse

audience preferences based on the available digital information, in order to

distinguish preferences, make a show based on these algorithm, and send

program notifications using the recommendation system.

In the meantime, I have to admit that self-made variety shows have nurtured a

great number of mass audience, and advertisers certainly are in favor of these

programs. If the content is good enough, and they have various ways in

monetisation, then the prospect of profitability will be very good. (Traditional

media practitioner E, 2017)

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The development of online variety shows has certainly evoked a sense of curiosity among traditional practitioners. Because the online screen industry is new and innovative, but risky, traditional practitioners have taken a conservative attitude towards job opportunities. When asked about where they would prefer to work, the experienced traditional practitioner indicated a huge interest in online productions: ‘Frankly speaking, I would prefer to stay in the traditional industry, but I am very interested in online productions, especially in the way they work’

(Traditional media practitioner E, 2017). Another young director, who is still at an early stage of his career, expressed a more ambiguous attitude:

From the perspective of production, I would certainly choose online variety

shows over traditional ones. Because I think online shows has less guidelines

and frameworks to worry about, we would be given a larger space to fulfil our

creative ideas or bold envisions. But on the other hand, traditional variety

shows are often faced with a larger range of audience, whereas online shows

mainly focus on the young people. So, in general, I would say they have their

own advantages, but honestly, I don’t know, it is hard to say. (Traditional

variety shows director J, 2017)

While traditional practitioners worry about the openness or the uncertainties of online variety shows, online practitioners believe that they are being misunderstood, as always. The Chinese literature on recent online variety shows almost unanimously maintains that the popularity and quality of these shows are in many cases better than for traditional programs (Liu and Zhang,

2017). From the perspective of a few scholars, the online variety shows are becoming a substitute for traditional shows (J. Jiang, 2016) – or, to put it more accurately, online streaming platforms are growing into a preferable choice against traditional systems. For example, the famous TV reality show Dad, Where Are We Going? (ba ba qu na) decided to distribute its

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fifth season exclusively online, not only for more lenient censorship, but also for a flexible and interactive viewing experience (Sohu, 2017a). Online shows are more capable of content monetisation, audience interaction and content innovation – advantages that traditional programs are less adept at seizing these days. And then there is the adoption of the bullet screen: as some online users put it, sometimes the bullet screen is even more interesting than the show itself (X. Jia, 2017). As a way to create a group viewing experience, the bullet screen amplifies interactive emotions (X. Li, 2017) and is considered to be a generator of memes.

Despite the presumed discrepancy between traditional and online variety shows conceived by traditional practitioners, the content and format of these shows are not really very different (except for a few programs that choose not to focus on the mainstream culture). Online variety shows are, by and large, TV genre programs equipped with digital distribution systems.

They are produced by traditional producers with similar frameworks and narratives (Cutler,

2015; Landau, 2016). In relation to TV formats, Albert and Malbon (2006, p. 11) state that ‘the most significant dynamic seems to be one of adaption, transfer and recycling of narrative and other kinds of content’. Digital distribution networks such as Netflix and many other streaming platforms are increasingly confronted with ‘international licensing of TV formats’ and TV programs in general (Humphreys, 2007; Zhu, Keane, and Bai, 2008). Prior to and during 2018, many of the Chinese hit shows were in fact localised TV format programs (Q. Jiang and Leung,

2012), Tencent-produced talk show Roast (tu cao da hui) is formatted from the American show

Comedy Central Roast; iQIYI’s The Rap of China (zhong guo you xi ha) is pirated from the

Korean program Show Me the Money; and Youku’s Who’s the Murderer? (ming xing da zhen tan) is also formatted from the Korean show Crime Scene. Formatted programs require high investment, professional production and so forth, which leads to similarities between online and traditional programs, leaving ‘localisation’ as the manifested variable (Moran, 2009b).

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Apart from technological affordances, the similarities between online and traditional variety shows are increasing in terms of quality, content production, format and even censorship. Censorship used to be one of the competitive advantages of online variety shows; however, this advantage is fading away as the regulation becomes more and more compelling, which inevitably increases the similarity between online and traditional shows. For online variety shows, censorship is also relevant: they have to be innovative and creative without crossing the line, to maintain a competitive advantages against their traditional competitors. As someone who works in the film industry, and has access to both online and traditional systems,

Director Shuai Xie shared his thoughts:

Do you know why online productions want to be similar to the traditional ones

or even clinging to traditional TV formats? On one hand, many online variety

shows are derivatives of traditional variety shows, on the other, it is easier to

go through censorship. Censorship of online content is not strict, but still, they

want the process to be over as soon as possible. Another phenomenon is that,

lots of practitioners would like to produce low quality and shallow shows,

because shows like these are easier to get a pass, which makes it faster to make

a profit. Censorship of online content is relatively loose, but have you seen

anything related to homosexual, sociopath, or suicide? I don’t think so. You

see, relatively loose is a relative concept. (Film Director Shuai Xie, 2017)

Shuya Yang, a showrunner of The Rap of China who has worked in production companies for several years and is very experienced, believes that the prejudice against the online variety shows is something should be clarified:

Personally speaking, I think that many people may have some

misunderstandings for the self-made variety shows. It is understandable,

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because when we started to do online variety shows at the very beginning,

especially when our studio was initially established, we were making small-

scaled programs. So, it is normal that people would believe, that online variety

shows are nothing serious, they are small programs, not even comparable to

traditional TV programs. But the truth is, when we started our second show,

the production cost was basically the same with top Class-A Satellite TV

programs, and we were already making high-quality shows, even though few

people have realized that. We certainly do not think that online variety shows

are all about those who focus on bold content or playing ‘edge ball’ strategies.

(Showrunner Shuya Yang, 2017)

The bifurcation between traditional and online media practitioners in terms of self-made variety shows is not rare – indeed, it is similar to their attitudes against the self-made drama: doubtful yet curious. But why? How are online variety shows different from traditional programs, and what are the differences regarding their target audience? Is it possible to innovate traditional variety shows to compete with their online competitors? In order to respond to these questions, this chapter examines The Rap of China as a case study, to reveal the challenges and successes of online programs. The counter-measure against youth culture – the production of National

Treasure – is taken as a second case study, to examine the tension between youth culture and high culture.

7.3 THE MAKING OF THE HIT SHOW: A PROFILE OF THE RAP OF CHINA

The Rap of China is a music reality show produced by iQIYI. It cost over US$4 million, and was the most expensive self-made variety show and a pillar project for IQIYI in 2017 (Tang,

2017). Like other talent shows, where three to four celebrity producers are invited, The Rap of

China included four judges, three of them well known – Wilber Pan, Chang chen-yue and MC

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HotDog; however, the last judge, and also the youngest – Kris Wu – became the most popular judge on the show. Although Kris Wu seems less persuasive as a judge, when comparing his music achievements with those of others, he is in fact one of the most famous pop stars in

China. Such a judging arrangement underlies the ambition of The Rap of China, making a professional music talent show is not enough: it needs to be dramatic, confrontational, disputable and entertaining as well (Z. Sun, 2018).

Clearly, The Rap of China has caused certain tensions in Chinese society. One noticeable development was the strict regulations enacted upon the hip hop groups and songs in early 2018, when Triple H (hong hua hui), a Chinese Northwestern hip hop group, was banned from the market along with more than 200 hip hop songs that, according to the government, do not align with core socialist values (Team, 2018). Additionally, tattoo culture, secondary culture and so forth were being regulated concurrently. Such political enactment signifies a severe monitoring of the hip hop sector. Under such circumstances, the second season of The Rap of China was destined to embark on a different path.

Screened on 14 July 2018 this season was finally online. Even though the show was produced by same producers, with the same format, it was given an entirely different , only with the same English translations. The Chinese name of the show changed from zhong guo you xi ha, to zhong guo xin shuo chang, emphasising the dissemination of positive values and attitudes. To some extent, such evolution can be considered a compromise to meet governmental regulations.

However, the second season of The Rap of China took cultural diversity to the next level. One significant change was the globalisation of contestants. Unlike the first season, where auditions were confined to within mainland China, with few overseas Chinese contestants, the second season expanded the territory globally, to Australia and North America.

While cultural diversity was manifested through contestants from various regions, the Chinese

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culture was being exported through the modality of Chinese rap. Moreover, the combination of judges emphasised another form of cultural diversity. Originally, the judges included two

Taiwanese, one Taiwanese American and one Canadian Chinese, but the second season invited another female musician from Hong Kong. Such combination of judges and contestants suggested an inclusiveness of cultural diversity on a global scale. If the first season brought hip hop culture out from the underground to the mainstream, the second season harboured greater ambitions: this time, the aim was the dissemination of Chinese culture and the global fever of

Chinese rap.

The success of The Rap of China therefore comprises three components: including dramatic conflict, community engagement and content monetisation. On level of dramatic conflict, the confrontation set up throughout the entire show guaranteed entertainment and ongoing heated discussion about the program. The second level, community engagement, worked on the fan communities and program publicity, by using KOL and other self-media publicity strategies, such as Weibo, WeChat groups and live streaming; the multi-platform cooperation showcased one of the most successful and advanced publicity operations in the online field. The third level, content monetisation, evolved with the multi-platform distribution.

With the combination of three levels, The Rap of China became one of the most popular variety shows in 2017, among The Coming One (ming ri zhi zi), Dad, Where are We Going? (ba ba qu na), Who is the Murderer? (ming xing da zhen tan) and a few others. Some scholars believe that the success of this show was due to the competition system, well-crafted editing and the platform effect (Z. Sun, 2018; Zhang and Wang, 2017). Based on the interview from the showrunner of The Rap of China, Shuya Yang, the next section provides a detailed examination of the success of the hit show.

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7.3.1 Dramatic conflict

According to Flew (2018, p. 244), hybridity refers to media texts, that ‘are sufficiently “open” to be interpreted in various ways by differently culturally situated audiences’, which enables

‘a music genre such as rap to be adopted and reinscribed across multiple local cultural contexts, while retaining a shared set of global norms and conventions’. From underground music to centre stage, it is the first-time in China has come under the spotlight. For those who previously had not been familiar with, or had not liked, hip-hop music, this show provided an opportunity to get to know the niche culture. The reason few variety shows would bet on niche culture is partly because it is favored by just a small fraction of the audience. Making a show based on a limited number of targeted audience members is a bold move – or rather, a risky bet. Putting hip hop music at centre stage is the most evident dramatic conflict of this show: it comes with huge risks and tensions, but also contains unleashed power and potential.

The idea is intriguing for audiences, although less so for advertisers. The awkward situation is that few advertisers would have believed in the success of this show, or even if they did, they often wanted to play the safe card. With so much at stake, then, was the success of The Rap of

China an accidental phenomenon or a calculated result?

Based on the interview with the showrunner, it is safe to say that the show’s producers had large ambitions. For some producers, profitability is an important factor: they have to bear it in mind to avoid financial deficit. Others, though, are willing to take their chances regardless of the consequences – they are desperate to make a difference. The showrunner Shuya Yang claims that a thorough investigation of the existing formats was carried out, and that choosing hip- hop culture was not a random choice, but rather a thoughtful decision:

At first, we wanted to do a talent show, of course we wouldn’t have guessed

that we will be doing something so vertical like the show you are watching

today. But from our experience of making variety shows, and also from our

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acute professional instinct from trending hot topic, we noticed that there are all

kinds of talent shows on the Chinese market. Although there are some

successful models, but in general, these shows weren’t able to make a

breakthrough or innovate. Therefore, we believe that in order to make a success,

we need to find something unique, substantial, and classified. We finally

locked on hip hop, because we noticed that, the hip hop culture can be found

everywhere, no matter it is in clothes or music, or other elements, hip hop is

very popular among Chinese younger generations. (Showrunner Shuya Yang,

2017)

‘Stay real’ is the motto of hip hop culture (Zhan, 2017), which is different from traditional

Chinese culture. In Chinese culture, ‘the golden mean’ is embedded in the Chinese way of thinking, which means that moderation in all things is the best way to live one’s life. In contrast,

‘stay real’ encourages people to express their true feelings, be true to themselves and be brave, which essentially contradicts traditional Chinese culture. Originating from American street culture, hip hop inherited the spirit of rebellion; one famous rapper believes that ‘the nature of hip hop is opposition to struggle, division, inequality, and hypocrisy’; although this spirit is largely absent from Chinese rappers and The Rap of China (W. Zhou, 2018), one thing remains

– ‘speak your mind’. Despite the inconsistent comments on the show, the rappers were confident enough to be themselves – they were direct, fearless and careless. However, in traditional Chinese culture, modesty is considered to be the priceless virtue, and those who are inconsiderate or overly straightforward are seen as rude and impolite. The inherent conflict between two cultures was enlarged on the stage of The Rap of China, and the dramatic twists and turns on the show made it one of the most topical variety programs of 2017.

One example illustrates the distinctions and conflict between the two cultures. When a participant failed at the audition or didn’t make it to the next level, hip hop players faced the

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result directly. They confronted the celebrity judges, directors and even producers in front of the cameras – something that would never happen in other Chinese talent shows, where participants often leave amidst tears and moving speeches. As some scholars have discussed, this show illustrates the personalities of the players, delivering a sense of authenticity that is rarely seen on Chinese variety shows (L. Sun, 2017; Wan, 2017; Zhan, 2017). However, it is not just the players who have attitudes, it is the show itself. When media critics indicated that

The Rap of China was copying a Korean hip hop show named Show Me the Money, the celebrity producer admitted that this was true in a straightforward way, without any embellishments. Copycat Korean shows are rarely news for Chinese audiences, and format borrowing does not always guarantee the success of the program. Even though the producer acknowledges the fact of copying a Korean show, this does not weaken the authenticity of the program due to highly localised content. Audiences are awed at this blunt confession, meanwhile, they are more intrigued by the claim.

It is predictable that a show unfamiliar to audiences and advertisers will face various challenges; however, even under the pressure of advertisers, the production team refused to make any compromises, and thanks to their seamless efforts, the show was both dramatic and confrontational:

Because we have chosen the hip hop theme, frankly speaking, we were under

great pressure. At the very beginning, one of our client told my boss that, they

could tolerate the hip-hop culture of this show, but the name of the show must

be changed to Our Idol, or something related to Idol; they wanted something

familiar, and they would sponsor the show only after these terms were met.

However, after a thoughtful consideration, we decided to do a vertical project,

and differentiate the show right from the name. So, we stuck to our original

name, and produced the show without any sponsorship, which is quite a bold

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move! Our clients started joining in after the first episode, and the sponsorship

of the show was edited later on the screen during the post production! You

won’t be able to see any advertisements on set, because we do not have any.

(Showrunner Shuya Yang, 2017)

7.3.2 Community engagement

For The Rap of China, publicity and community engagement were interactive and concurrent.

When the first episode of the show was destined to be screened without sponsorship, iQIYI decided to step in and facilitate with publicity. By integrating various resources for recommendation and advertising on the iQIYI platform, The Rap of China was able to extend media exposure to iQIYI users. Although supported and distributed on iQIYI, program publicity on one single platform is far from enough. Given that it features a niche culture, it is crucial that the show is able to reach its target audience within a short period of time, otherwise it will not be successful.

When the financial situation is tough, managing community engagement and achieving publicity through such experiences is a smart move. By getting in touch with fans of celebrity judges, spreading free tickets to fans, gathering active fan members in WeChat groups, sending the latest publicity materials to WeChat groups and so forth, The Rap of China is seeking to circumvent the ordinary path. Normal shows launch their publicity schemes with proper capital support; however, this show did so by utilising ‘fan group power’:

We received great support from iQIYI. I’ll talk about these in detail when we

discuss content monetisation. For community engagement, we managed our

fans through the WeChat group, we would divide fans into specific groups. At

the preliminary stage, we would contact fans of the celebrity judges who joined

our show, and then we would invite fans to do the social media publicity and

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public opinion monitoring with us. Their presence at iQIYI, and their fan-made

videos sometimes helped us to advertise more efficiently. We also did a lot of

offline interactive events for fans, such as giving away free tickets to invite

them to come and watch our show live. We would also go to BB website (also

a video distribution platform) to talk about some fan channels in and outside

the website community. Apart from these, we would bring active fans to our

WeChat groups, where we would interact with them and release last-minute

event information and other publicity agendas. We have more than ten WeChat

groups, and each of the groups contains more than 500 members, so roughly

we have 5000 fans engaging with us directly, and they help us with publicity

work on social media platforms. In this case, we would update the publicity

material in a very timely and frequent way in the groups. We believe that

WeChat groups are more private and intimate than Weibo, so we set up these

groups to give our fans a sense of belonging, instead of simply interacting with

them on public social media platforms. (Showrunner Shuya Yang, 2017)

Having 5000 active fan leaders – or, in Western terms, media intermediaries – who come from different fan groups and fan communities suggests that the exact number of fans helping the production team with their publicity work is infinite and hard to imagine. In the internet age, the younger generations are no longer interested in traditional advertising; on the contrary, initiating discussions of certain programs or products proves to be more appealing. Under such circumstances, the community engagement strategy plays a crucial role in the success of The

Rap of China, which sheds some light on plausible explanations for why the show remains topical throughout the entire season. As the show remains in the top ten daily searches on

Weibo (the Chinese version of Twitter), it is raising curiosity among those who are not the target audience and even those who dislike it. The fan groups are intermittently initiating the

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‘snowball’ effect, and the media environment is increasingly surrounded by discussion of The

Rap of China. Eventually, a sufficient body of peer pressure formed (Kandel and Lazear, 1992): if everyone talked about the show, then those who were not talking about it, or who did not know about or watch the show, felt isolated and excluded. The sense of belonging is important for the younger generations, especially when they grew up immersed in the online environment. Social online behaviour, such as making friends online through online games, is all part of searching for a sense of belonging (Domahidi, Festl, and Quandt, 2014).

7.3.3 The manifestation of content monetisation

From dramatic conflict to community engagement, The Rap of China is distinguishable from other variety shows in various ways. The show was destined to confront emergent challenges and situations; however, due to the special nature of hip hop culture and the tie-ins regarding youth culture, content monetisation is ought to be unique as well. The prevalence of self-made production is taken as a remedy for financial deficit by claiming the control in production, distribution and copyright that the streaming platforms and their parent companies like BAT are coherently seeking for capital gains. The optimal prospect of content monetisation is a multi-level mobilisation of resources from the corporate level to platform distribution, where resources are being shared and exchanged for increased revenue income and mutual benefits.

Even though attempts were made in terms of multi-level content monetisation, the most successful example of all is The Rap of China.

Derivative programming is one of the most common publicity strategies in the screen industry: there are movie or drama derivative documentaries, celebrity-featured derivative programs and so on. However, The Rap of China implemented a full-scale publicity strategy, which ranges from derivative programs to live streaming. It is not usual to produce derivative programs in almost every sub-channel of the platform – even the showrunner admitted that this is their first endeavour on a full-scale publicity scheme.

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We received lots of support from various departments of iQIYI. Although we

landed at the variety shows channel, other channels like entertainment, music,

documentary are all helping us in promoting the show by doing all kinds of

derivative programs. The entertainment channel produced behind-the-scenes

programs, like ‘Hip-Hop Headline’, and the documentary channel often

provides documentary stories of our casting crew and the growing up

experience of our participants, to be promoted on the documentary channel. In

addition, concert footage of our participants will be screened on the music

channel. As you can see, the show is very popular now, and hip hop culture is

very hot! So iQIYI is deploying a long-lasting and extensive plan for the hip

hop culture, and that’s why we started a secondary channel under the music

channel – the hip hop channel. Besides, the fashion channel also helped us with

publicity. This is the first time that we have tried to initiate and connect all the

platform channels. But some channels joined us at a later stage, not in the very

beginning, so we did not really get the chance to conduct in-depth cooperation

with these channels. But we did try to improve this situation. We introduced

the fashion outfit of our celebrity judge Kris Wu back stage, then we made a

fashion show based on this, and promoted it on the entertainment channel.

(Showrunner Shuya Yang, 2017)

Conversely, such full-level platform facilitation for a connected viewing experience (Holt and

Sanson, 2013) contributed to the development, expansion and profitability of the show – and iQIYI as well:

In return, we helped the iQIYI VIP department, we joined the Qixiu live

streaming and gaming channels, we made VIP exclusive content for iQIYI to

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attract new VIP members, and this turned out to be very effective. Moreover,

we did a live streaming of our participants on Qixiu, and we received an

amazing response. During the program’s broadcasting period, the live

streaming our participants did on Qixiu Live was worth tens of millions of

markets promotion in advertising. However, we keep losing active users as the

show becomes less topical; we want to change this situation in the second

season. We want to maintain the heat of the show, and that’s why we want to

do a regular hip hop show on the live streaming channel in our next season,

hoping that we could increase the audience stickiness of the show. Our profit

comes from centre stage (Z. Hou, 2018). As one could have expected, in the

internet age a cultural exploration program is not exactly the most interesting

TV genre, likely to appeal to the younger generation; however, National

Treasure set out to change this.

As a national program that designed to balance youth culture, National Treasure is targeting the younger generations, but is not limited to this demographic. For TV programs, the first impression is critical: it determines the viewer’s inclination to change channels or stay on the channel. For a cultural exploration show on CCTV, with a fairly boring stereotype, the only thing that can hold an audience is the first shot on the screen

– the host’s opening gambit. There are two playful things about the opening of the

National Treasure that set the tone for the show: one is the selection of the host, Zhang

Guoli, a versatile and talented actor who is famous and respected across all age groups; the other is the opening line and hosting style. is in his early sixties; he established some classic figures on the screen, including the role he was playing as an emperor in Qing Dynasty. He has a unique charisma that combines humour with discreet, and casual with well-behaved; in some ways, he represents the show itself –

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knowledgeable yet lively. His hosting style is casual – for example, the opening line of the show is, ‘We are a very young program advertisers, and also we sell our IP for derivative products, to enable IP value-added business, and this turns out to be very profitable in the long run. In addition, we do live broadcast voting, because it is a paid voting, so there are some revenue as well. (Showrunner Shuya Yang, 2017)

By creating an immersive media environment for the show, whether in social discourses on social platforms such as Weibo, WeChat and media coverage or the full-scale publicity scheme on iQIYI, The Rap of China is forming a publicity and viewing system that is very different comparing to Netflix recommendations. But even with a revolutionary distribution system, it is less useful without the main ingredients – creative and attractive content (Cutler, 2015). It is unclear whether such success is replicable. Although it is possible to imitate community engagement and content monetisation, tightened censorship will make it difficult to duplicate further dramatic conflict, which is critical for aggregating attention and raising social discourse.

Nevertheless, online variety shows are becoming increasingly similar to traditional TV in content, although less so in distribution and monetisation. As internet and affiliated services further improve interactive features, streaming platforms are becoming new combinations of viewing and social platforms. The discrepancy between the online and traditional media systems keeps intensifying on a global scale.

7.4 VARIETY SHOWS AS THE CULTURAL INDEX

Compared with self-made drama, variety shows are increasingly being built within a contemporary cultural context and embedded in current social discourses. Self-made drama is free from the present era, where content could range from ancient times to future explorations: it is a space for creation, imagination and even diversion. Previous studies have shown that drama sometimes functions as an escape from reality (Chang, 2016), whereas variety shows

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are often based on the present time zone, society and culture. These innate differences distinguish drama from variety shows: drama is timeless, a work of art that can be relived after decades, even without relevant cultural context; variety shows (especially knowledge-based programs) represent the cultural index of a certain era and culture, which can be less entertaining without the blends of cultural context and social discourses (Rollins, 2015). The distinction is more evident on a global scale: transnational screen productions are subject to cultural context, cultural proximity, and so forth. Drama series involve less cultural context than variety shows – for instance, Chinese audiences may find it easy to understand American drama made in the 1980s, but would be clueless if they watched American variety shows created in the 1990s. The fact that variety shows are based on a cultural context emphasises their attribute as a cultural index.

7.4.1 Online variety shows vs traditional variety shows

The previously discussed studies have underlined that the discrepancy between online and traditional variety shows largely resides in their target audience. No matter whether bullet screen or mobile screen (designed for fragmented time), online variety shows are working their ways towards catering for the younger generations, which leaves their traditional counterparts in an awkward dilemma (Y. Jiang, 2017). On one hand, traditional variety shows are trying to make some changes to catch up with the online era, to attract young generations; on the other hand, it is important to maintain the connection with the target audience – the middle-aged and elderly generations. The age gap between audiences has inevitably induced different strategies, where online shows are made for the younger generations with trendy features, but the traditional shows are made for elderly generations with insightful resonance. Traditional practitioners coherently believe that online variety shows are aimed at and suitable for youngsters, but traditional shows are targeted at a broader audience.

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In addition to the differences in audience targeting, traditional practitioners adopt similar narratives when describing the development of variety shows, where the metaphor

‘frame’ is used to project the degree of censorship control: traditional shows are faced with a firm frame, but online shows encounter loosened standards:

I think that the most fundamental difference is positioning, the different

narrative system. Traditional variety shows are more framed, they are orthodox,

serious, with a systematic theoretical system and a complete production

process and rules. In other words, every step is justified. Besides, these

programs are generally premiered on TV; therefore, we are faced with a strict

censorship system, so it is extremely difficult to innovate or make a

breakthrough.

But online variety shows are displayed on the internet, with a relatively

loosened censorship system; the narrative is relatively free, the positioning is

more accurate and the degree of ‘vertical integration’ is very high (by ‘vertical

integration’, I mean their consistent effort made in audience feedback, content

monetisation and program distribution). If we take traditional shows as dinner,

then self-made variety shows are more like dessert – they are good-looking and

may be trying to deliver some meanings, but in comparison, online shows in

general fall short in media guidance and public opinion. (Traditional

Practitioner E, 2017)

Another show director, who is young and new to the traditional industry, shared similar ideas:

Online variety shows are the newly emerged programs, compared with the

traditional variety shows. They are closely related to the latest internet culture,

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with a loosened framework, and that’s why online shows are capable of doing

lots of programs that are banned for the traditional variety shows. For example,

in one of the self-made variety shows of iQIYI – My Song (ou di ge shen a) –

the hostess delivered the show opening by advertising for the sponsors: since

the show is sponsored by Xiang Milk Tea, the hostess said: ‘Thirsty? Hungry?

Try Xiang Milk Tea, morning tea energize your day, afternoon tea is good for

your cool-bility!’ Lines like this will never be permitted on broadcast channels.

Now here comes the interesting part, because this show received great feedback,

then Jiangsu Satellite Channel started a similar show called See Your Voice.

Although they are very similar to each other, this show didn’t receive much

enthusiasm from audiences due to various restrictions, compared with its

online version. That being said, traditional shows have perks as well: the

targeted audience is more diversified. Unlike online shows, which mostly

centre around the youngsters, traditional variety shows are generally family

friendly – we are reaching a larger audience, so to speak. (Show Director J,

2017)

Such differences are largely attributable to the various levels of restrictions exerted upon variety shows by the SAPPRFT, as mentioned in the interviews. However, different mechanisms of platforms also define the distinction between online and traditional variety shows in distribution. Traditional practitioners are well aware of the threat posed by their online counterparts, and they have made great efforts to draw back the attention of the younger generations. From the viewpoint of traditional practitioners, program distribution between online and traditional platforms is in many ways similar, taking into account the various innovations made on traditional platforms. The common understanding is that the distribution and publicity strategy on online platforms are more innovative than on traditional platforms in

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terms of ‘vertical integration’. This term is an industry-invented narrative to illustrate online business models, where content advertises, monetises and influences in a vertical order. The hit show The Rap of China is an exemplar of ‘vertical integration’, where niche culture develops into mainstream culture via a process of targeted circulation. the proposed content is more likely to resonate with the targeted audience; the circulation within the targeted sphere could essentially initiate the snowball effect on a broader audience.

Despite the advantages of online platforms in ‘vertical integration’, the traditional shows are making a series of attempts and improvements. By adopting social media platform into their publicity strategy, and using short video platforms and live streaming to enhance interaction, the traditional variety shows are in many ways similar to their online counterparts.

This transfer process started from the fundamental elements:

We have made some changes over the years. We now pay more attention to

data analysis, viewing preference analysis and targeted audience analysis, we

are making an effort in producing the right content for the right audience.

In addition, we are inclined to make the show more entertaining, the programs

now transformed from the bitter, heart breaking stories to a relaxed and light

style, this phenomenon is manifested through subtitles, sound effects and other

packaging elements for variety shows.

Also, we upgrade the equipment, we began to use aerial photography, go pro,

SLR cameras, and so on for shooting, in order to intensify the camera language

for special perspectives. And we are increasing the proportion of documentary

shooting. (Traditional Practitioner E, 2017)

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After the internal upgrade, traditional shows embarked on their adventure with new media attempts:

When we put the program on air, we will scroll QR codes of our official

WeChat and Weibo account on the screen, and sometimes there will be a small

Q&A sections where you need to scan the QR code and follow our WeChat

official account to interact with us and get the answer.

Normally, we would broadcast our show simultaneously on multiple platforms;

sometimes we would invite celebrities in the show to join us in the live

streaming. We would also cooperate with online platforms, to distribute short

videos of our show, such as Today’s Headlines and Tencent.com. Like online

shows, we would also make short videos to distribute on the WeChat official

account and the internet. (Traditional Practitioner E, 2017)

The integration of traditional and online platforms is smooth and effective, especially in terms of promotion and publicity; however, such a transition is less likely in relation to content. The publicity or promotion of traditional variety shows could be rather similar to that of online shows, with the exception of innate features of online platforms. The traditional show director suggested that, ‘except for the unique affordance of online platforms, I don’t see any difference between online and traditional shows in publicity’ (Show director J, 2017). Traditional and online shows vary in terms of target audience, platform affordance (publicity) and content; the age gap in the target audience indicated different styles of content, then platform affordance aggravated the gap in age and credibility. As of today, credibility is the most distinguishable external distinction between online and traditional variety shows, despite the differences mentioned above. It is evident that traditional practitioners believe that cross-screen distribution will proliferate in the future; they consistently referred to the significance of

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credibility and the responsibility of traditional platforms, maintaining that traditional platforms would play a significant role in the future. In the meantime, though, they indicated that censorship of the online sector would increase, and expressed their concern about the online future:

For a country, I believe it is very important to have an authoritative voice, and

this might turn out to be the responsibility of traditional media in the future …

loosened censorship fostered the development of online shows, but things will

change, censorship supervision will be strengthened, but I cannot pin down the

exact time. (Traditional practitioner E, 2017)

7.4.2 Restoring the authoritative voice: The case of National Treasure

With the prevalence of online variety shows, such as the unexpected success of The Rap of

China, and the awkward dilemma facing traditional practitioners when they try to appeal to younger and pre-existing target audiences, traditional variety shows face a dire situation.

Compared with online variety shows, traditional variety shows fall short in dramatic conflict

(due to censorship control, it is difficult to replicate anything resembling the conflict aroused by topical content such as hip hop culture), community engagement (the interaction and management of fan groups) and content monetisation (the platform affordance of ‘vertical integration’). These three factors align with the distinctions in content, target audience and platform affordance. Expressed in another way, online variety shows have taken up the industry-leading positions since 2017, when the number of online variety shows reached 197

(according to SAPPRFT data) and traditional shows were down to 149 (China.com, 2017). In addition, the compound annual growth rate of revenue income from online variety shows is estimated to increase by 42 per cent, whereas the advertising income of traditional shows has dropped by 3.7 per cent (Entgroup, 2018). According to advertising and marketing manager of

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Mango TV, advertising is growing into the primary revenue income stream of online variety shows: ‘In 2015, the percentage of online variety show revenue income of Mango Internet TV is less than 10 per cent, however, it reached over 50 percent by the end of 2017’ (Du, 2017).

Based on trade journals and online articles, online variety shows are claiming and will continue to hold the higher ground in number, scale and profitability. As a cultural index indicator, this phenomenon signifies the imbalance between two cultures: the excessive amount of youth culture and the lack of high culture.

Restoring the authoritative voice is not a charade or a slogan: it is an imperative to balance the youth culture, to provide a healthy and positive environment for the screen industry and to restore the cultural renaissance. After the youth culture feast in the summer of 2017,

CCTV presented another surprise; in December, National Treasure was quietly debuted on

CCTV-1 and CCTV-3. This cultural exploration program normally features China’s cultural heritage: it was constructed around the qualities of value and originality. The most common discourse is between celebrity judges and participants (who bring the treasure to the show); the format is similar to America’s Got Talent, only in this case it is ‘China’s Got Treasure’. This

TV genre used to be one of the most popular on Chinese television (Q. Shen, 2017). Although there many similar cultural exploration programs existed in the past, National Treasure is distinct from its predecessors in almost every way. Unlike other shows, where the protagonists of the shows are real people, this newly produced program sets the national treasure – the

Chinese cultural heritage – at. How young are we?’ The audience responds: ‘Five thousand years.’ The studio audience, which is composed of college students born in the 1990s and 2000s, shouts out the answer, which comes up on the screen – it is a loud reminder to the younger generations of China’s 5000-year history, along with all the legends and heritage. National

Treasure is trying to reclaim the younger generations, to rebuild their interest in traditional

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culture and restore the mainstream culture to echo the national policy of strengthening cultural renaissance (X. Chen, 2018).

In the National Treasure, the protagonist is and always has been the national treasure.

These national treasures were invited from nine mainland museums, along with famous experts.

Appearances of museum experts bring in authoritative voices and professional insights. The structure of the show is centred around each treasure; the show invites one celebrity to act as the protector of each heritage, and to initiate a stage play divided into two parts: the first part focuses on the legendary heritage and is adapted on the basis of historical facts; similarly, the second part extends the story up to recent times. The show is dedicated to bringing life to the national treasure. It is an innovative attempt to construct a conversation with China’s cultural heritage, to deliver a modern expression of traditional culture and to resonate with the sentiments of the audience (Hu, 2018). Such innovation combines documentary TV with variety shows; rather than being informed about the historical facts of the heritage, re-enacting events makes them more entertaining and memorable; it is like watching TV drama based on true events (Cong, 2017). It is not just plot that is interesting on National Treasure, it is the actors in the play as well. Unlike most variety shows, where there is a fixed number of celebrities, National Treasure invited 27 celebrities to participate in the show, and none of them is fixed except for the host, Zhang Guoli. This variety show turns museum knowledge into vivid TV drama with independent episodes. Luckily, the show’s efforts paid off: National

Treasure received phenomenal feedback from the younger generations, and it successfully reignited China’s passion for cultural heritage and traditional culture. This time, national policy staged a shining return.

7.4.3 Youth culture against high culture?

The prevalence of National Treasure and the tendency of ‘cultural digitisation’ are concurrent, as an implementation of the national policy ‘Revitalizing Chinese Culture’. Meanwhile, the

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spectrum of youth culture and high culture are extending in opposite directions. Traditional programs have changed, even though the traditional platform lacks high-tech affordances, such as a bullet screen, insert advertising, instant purchases online, recommendations and so on, platforms like CCTV are still in possession of unique and intangible resources. If youth culture is proliferating using online attributes, then high culture should be magnifying the influence by working to enhance its own advantages. Variety shows featuring traditional culture and cultural heritage seem to be the game-changing factor. In recent years, there has been an increasing number of knowledge-based variety shows; meanwhile, the quantity of self-made variety shows is also increasing. The tension between youth culture and high culture is tightening through the competition of wining over younger generations.

The confrontation between youth culture and high culture is mirrored through the competition between online and traditional platforms. Whether drama or variety shows, and regardless of their distribution platforms, TV genres are still the dominant program formats.

From the perspective of traditional practitioners, it is TV genres that are obligated to protect the integrity of public opinions; it is they that will lead a healthy entertainment environment, and they should be the model for online shows. Recent TV shows have demonstrated that traditional platforms are endeavouring to cater to youth culture and the younger generations.

Moreover, distribution of traditional shows on online platforms, operating official social media accounts and so on could be considered an effort to narrow the discrepancy between traditional and online platforms. Targeting niche audiences is no longer a specialty of online platforms: traditional counterparts are also taking measures to address their targeted audiences. In the eyes of regulators, the advent of online platforms – especially self-made productions – created a loophole in the regulation sector that needs to be fulfilled sooner rather than later. During this process, traditional television will continue to produce shows that cater to the younger generations while featuring high culture, and online programs will continue to produce shows

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for the younger generations while featuring youth culture. The result is a continuous confrontational state between youth culture and high culture.

7.5 CONCLUSION

The competitive media system in China has resulted in creation and innovation from both parties, both traditional and online. It has been identified that the quality and format of online shows are rather similar to those of traditional shows; meanwhile, traditional programs are more entertaining and humorous, in certain ways similar to online programs. However, that being said, the crucial step for traditional producers should be to find the right theme and appropriate combination that are beyond the capability (in financial and impact terms) of online shows, instead of attempting to increase online and interactive features. Judging by appearance and viewing experience, traditional programs and online programs are searching for common ground: the golden standard is high quality without seriousness, humour that is not shallow, knowledge without stereotypes. In terms of content, though, the confrontation between youth culture and high culture unfortunately persists.

The state-owned media bear obligations to restore the authoritative voice in the industry, abide by reputation, uphold the existing media system and exercise censorship. The development of traditional platforms is contingent on national policies – they are responsible for the state as well as for audiences. Traditional platforms are suitable and also capable of making high culture programs, to counteract the impact of online programs. In contrast, online platforms are privately owned companies, and the development of online platforms depends on profitability (or capital). Online platforms are responsible for audiences – especially their subscribers – and appealing to the younger generations is their priority.

Online platforms will further accentuate the importance of youth culture as the main strategy to attract the younger generations. An independent circulation has been formed, and

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increased numbers of subscribers lead to increased numbers of youth culture productions. That said, competition between traditional and online platforms further emphasises the contrast between high culture and youth culture. Programs featuring high culture and youth culture were initially adopted as a strategy; however, they are now turning into a major competitive advantage.

This chapter illustrated the development of online variety shows by investigating the

‘edge-ball’ strategy and the hit show The Rap of China, with industry insights and the inner logic of online variety shows provided. Confrontation between youth culture and high culture was examined further by the case study of National Treasure, where the contrast between two cultures was explained through platform comparisons.

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Chapter 8: The short-video industry and the

development of content creators

In Chapters 6 and 7, investigations regarding the implications of the BAT plus streaming platforms in the PGC sector were conducted. The prevalence of online drama was discussed in detail, and the innovations made in online variety shows were illustrated by the case study of

The Rap of China. These innovations are partially attributable to the development of advanced technology, and to some extent commercial strategies, but additionally they are attributable to the uptake of youth culture. For quite some time, the mainland screen culture has been under the influence of the Korean Wave, Japanese pop culture, Taiwanese shows and Hong Kong productions. The prolonged history of a cultural trade deficit is testimony to the lack of cultural innovations in China. In this chapter, the expansion of streaming platforms into the UGC sector will be examined. By mapping out the trajectory of the expansion of the BAT and affiliated streaming platforms in PGC and UGC production, this thesis will develop an overview of the transformation of China’s digital media industry, the differences or similarities against the US system and the implications for cultural innovation.

Before diving into the focus of streaming platforms and their enthusiastic participation in the UGC section, the primary endeavour should be categorising the short video industry. As mentioned in previous chapters, the Chinese landscape of streaming platforms is ‘a mixture of everything’ (see Chapter 6). Even though the proliferation of short video platforms and live streaming applications is ushering in a dedicated space for UGC, major players such as iQIYI,

Youku and Tencent Video still emphasise the inclusion of UGC on their services. As Chinese platforms oscillate between PGC and UGC, similar endeavours can be identified across

Western platforms as well, when they vacillate between the two spaces of cultural production,

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such as YouTube Premium, and Snapchat Discovery. However, despite the similarities in the earlier phase of platform development, the proliferation of short video and streaming platforms has indicated an accelerated evolving pace of the Chinese landscape compared with that of the West.

According to industry reports, ‘short video’ refers to video content that is distributed on new media platforms, with a timespan of five minutes or less; it is a communicative channel following narrative, images and traditional video content, with low production costs, easily spreadable features and blurring boundaries between users and producers (Kong, 2018). The short video industry has received a huge boost in recent years; concurrently, the live streaming industry has endured a number of ups and downs contingent on government policies

(considering state regulation or the crackdown on live streaming content and live streamers).

According to an industry report, the growth rate of short video usage reached 311.3 per cent in

2017, with 88 per cent of internet users accessing short videos for online social activities,

79 per cent for news, 76 per cent for music and 41 per cent for e-commerce (TrustData, 2018).

For instance, Meipai, Kwai App (Kuai Shou) and Tik Tok (Douyin) are the prevalent short video platforms for social entertainment, dedicated to ‘recording and sharing everyday lives’.

Other news-related short video platforms include Miaopai, which is in a partnership with Sina

Weibo. Tik Tok (Douyin), Huoshan and Xigua are short video platforms for news and social media, affiliated with the most popular news app, Today’s Headlines. Additionally, top-tier professional content such as Rage Comic (Bao zou man hua), Ergeng and Yitiao are distributed across a variety of channels, from exclusive mobile applications to short video platforms such as Miaopai, and streaming platforms such as Tencent Video. Brought together by one theme or brand, such professional content is superior in content monetisation. For example, Yitiao as a short video brand advocates life aesthetics; its well-produced professional content is contributing to its embedded e-commerce platform. It is first and foremost a short video content

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provider, but also an online household vendor. To conclude, the short video industry is a multi- purpose initiative that enables wide coverage across the internet for services that incorporate pan-entertainment content.

In the social media entertainment industry, one distinguishable contribution is made through content creators. For Cunningham and Craig (2019, p. 29), the hierarchy of Chinese content creators is outlined as key opinion leaders (KOL), influencers (with a highlight on commercial value), wang hong (with a pejorative sense) and general content creators:

In China’s ‘parallel universe’ SME industry, the term ‘KOL’ (‘Key Opinion

Leaders’) is dominant; however, the rise of influencer marketing has led to the

use of ‘influencers’ as industrial markers of their commercial value. Reflecting

the highly-gendered space of fashion, beauty and lifestyle vloggers, the

Chinese sometimes pejoratively refer to creators as ‘wang hong’ (pretty girls)

and implies a lack of talent. We refer again to Kim Kardashian’s 60 Minutes

quote. There must be some talent involved as some of these wang hong are

generating nearly US$50 million USD per year.

Following the hierarchy provided by Cunningham and Craig, this chapter will provide an analysis in an effort to cover various tiers. The interviewees in this chapter include top-tier influencers, among them the leading Chinese wang hong, Miss Papi; the middle-tier general content creators who used to work in the studio signed by iQIYI channel (see below); and the entry-level live streamers hoping to become the next successful wang hong. These interviews will assist our analysis of production, distribution and monetisation in each tier, to unveil this evolving landscape and the hidden power of UGC and professionalising process, and to illustrate how the platform strategy used to develop UGC content impacts cultural dissemination and cultural innovation. What do Miss Papi’s efforts to build a sustainable

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creator brand reveal about precarious entrepreneurialism, management and labour in China’s short video industry? How does a platform facilitate or sustain the proliferation of content creators, how is it possible to differentiate the Chinese from the US system, and what are the implications for the cultivation of new production culture?

8.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AMATEUR-PROFESSIONALISED PROCESS

The Chinese media industry has adopted a system, which differs from its Western counterparts, to describe screen content with various qualities. In Chapter 5, the concept of self-made productions was brought up to distinguish it from UGC content; this term refers to screen content commissioned by platforms, such as Netflix Originals. Chapters 6 and 7 identified large-scale innovation of TV productions, whether self-made online drama or variety shows, or an improved version of traditional TV programs – all of them are categorised as PGC productions. Apart from the professional sector, however, UGC has rapidly gained popularity in recent years. Before the prevalence of self-made productions in China, UGC was to a large extent regarded as a liability from the perspective of streaming platforms. Unlike high-quality content, where revenue is expected and even guaranteed, UGC content struggled to make ends meet. Zhao claims in an article published around 2013 (Zhao and Keane, 2013, p. 735) that,

‘as UGC is fraught with copyright issues and of inferior quality, it only adds to bandwidth cost without generating revenue’. Although the value of UGC was disregarded by scholars and industry practitioners at the time, it is now considered to have great commercial potential. The cultural consumption of professionalised UGC is taking various forms, from platform-initiated channels (zi pin dao) to specialised short video platform and live streaming applications, where numerous internet influencers are cultivated. From a broad industry perspective, professionalised UGC content is now regarded as a goldmine (Luo, 2016). A perception has been generated by the successful development of self-made productions that the role of internet

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influencers or talented content creators is in fact an industry mechanism to filter valuable content for reproduction purposes.

For Cunningham and Craig (2019), such a process on Western online platforms is defined as the ‘amateur-professionalised process’, even though the content generated from successful YouTubers is not necessarily systematically included in the platform-based innovation program. The distinction between Chinese and Western online platforms underlies the difference between media systems. The Western online platforms provide specialised services, with streaming platforms such as Netflix, Hulu or Stan dedicated to streaming PGC content, whereas YouTube is the base for UGC content. On the contrary, Chinese major streaming platforms (such as iQIYI, Youku, Tencent Video, Mango TV, etc.) provide combined services; furthermore, industry pioneers see them as omni-entertainment platforms

(Mao, 2017). The establishment of platform-initiated channels (zi pin dao) in Chinese streaming services is believed to have been aimed at setting up a kind of ‘farm’ system

(Cunningham and Silver, 2014), with stories, talent and business opportunities discovered and excavated, ready to be utilised on various platforms. Although the amateur-professionalised process also takes place in other specialised short video or live streaming platforms (H. Yu,

2017), a systematic framework was constructed and operated by Chinese streaming services in pursuit of content platformisation and vertical integration.

Platform affordances and the burgeoning internet celebrity economy stimulated the development of bottom-up grassroots culture. For online giants such as the BAT, internet influencers, or wang hong, provide a link to merchandising and content monetisation of their subordinate services, making the business ecosystem more profitable and accessible. The e- commerce platform of Alibaba, Taobao, often corroborates with wang hong to conduct product-featured livestreaming or short video content, as a formulation of buyer’s guidance, which can also be displayed on other livestreaming or short video platforms. The iQIYI-owned

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livestreaming section, Qixiu livestreaming, contributes to program advertising and online purchasing at iQIYI mall (a built-in e-commerce platform supported by iQIYI). The growing prevalence of an internet celebrity economy projects the scale of the amateur-professionalised process. The platform-sponsored channel, or the so called open-access platform (a scheme where streaming platforms choose to share datasets, advertising income and other resources with content creators), has been established for content creators as a corporate strategy for a market-verified selection process (Y. Fang, 2017); this is a way to identify amateur- professionalised content with commercialising potential. However, the increased number of content creators and internet influencers has also raised various questions. What is the motive behind these content creators and internet influencers? How should the content be monetised?

What support did they truly receive at the platform level? What are the future prospects? This chapter seeks to address these questions by examining the latest academic and industry discourses in China. The case study in this chapter features the leading Chinese internet influencer, Miss Papi, in order to analyse the success and prospects of Chinese internet influencers, and to discuss and share insights into the entrepreneurship of content creators.

8.1.1 The rise of platform-initiated channels (zi pin dao)

Platform-initiated channels are a sub-class of platform category. Emulating YouTube, the platform-initiated channels refer to one dedicated channel, where original content is signed by the platform. Unlike general short video content, where the platform recommendation appears to be a scarcity, platform-initiated channels receive a variety of premium resources and supports. Similar to platform commissioned (self-made) productions, where intermediaries are removed from the equation, mitigating acquisition costs, the platform initiated-channels aim to develop their own multi-channel networks (MCN) for talent scouting and content monetisation, to support their self-made productions where available. These channels are accessible on iQIYI, Youku and Tencent Video, creating an enthusiasm for content professionalisation.

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Content creators now have access to these open access platforms, where desirable platform support, resources and funding are offered to those deemed worthy of them. However, homogeneous competition is forged among the amateur-professionalised content, which inevitably renders a fiercer elimination environment. Taking these developments into account, along with the proliferation of self-made productions, the BAT are plotting to develop and omni-entertainment framework with the assistance of content excavation and monetisation, to establish a systematic process of professionalising amateur content. For instance, Alibaba is launching Alibaba Cultural Entertainment Group, where Alibaba Pictures Group, Youku,

Alibaba Sports, Alibaba Gaming, Alibaba Literature and Alibaba Digital Department are all included (Jiao, 2017). Similarly, the vice president of Tencent, Cheng Wu, brought up the concept of pan-entertainment to describe the connected entertainment industries centring on intellectual property (IP) (Y. Liu, 2017). By connecting the dots in various sectors, Alibaba and Tencent are determined to establish a business ecosystem for the production and professionalisation of cultural content. Although these two online giants adopted different terms to name their grand strategies, this homogeneous competition is centred around one critical element: IP.

The definition of IP is not conclusive in Chinese academic and industry discourses, however, the definition provided by the vice president of Tencent, Cheng Wu, seems to be a well-acknowledged one. In Cheng’s words, IP is ‘a market tested symbol that resonates with human emotions’ (S. Wu, 2017); alternatively, acknowledged cultural brands such as Star Wars,

Marvel and Snow White are world-class IP, where games, merchandise and derivatives are made available as the by-products of these successful series. The screen industry in China is under-developed compared with the American model, where the prevalence of self-made productions requires a great amount of popular IP that exceeds industry output. The creation of platform-initiated channels (zi pin dao) occurred under such circumstances; they are

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effectively IP incubators (X. Hou, 2017). One reason that internet-born IP is favoured by platform-commissioned and even traditional-made productions is its previously tested market popularity. These screen adaptations based on bestsellers – for example, a book or internet literature – is like having an insurance policy before making an investment: it is a system that increases the profitability of platforms, and also guarantees the popularity of cultural productions. Zi pin dao is facilitating the discovery of good IP, and industry practitioners believe that mining the content of thousands of originally amateur creators is a way to find a little piece of gold among all the dross.

Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent are initiating various schemes to facilitate the development of content creators, emulating YouTube’s farm system. Alibaba’s streaming platform Youku launched the platform-sponsored channel (zi pin dao) Da Yu Hao in March 2017, as the content-creation platform affiliated with Alibaba Cultural Entertainment Group, which is also part of a bigger innovation scheme on the corporate level: the Feng Chi Plan. Such advocacy in content innovation and creative talent curation was seen as an implementation that echoed the National Innovation Policies (Share, 2017). It is evident that Alibaba is dedicated to integrating content entrepreneurship with Ali technology: connecting with the Ali Cloud, and distributed and advertised through Youku and Ali’s internet browser are some of the ways content creators are empowered by these schemes – a systematic facilitation. iQIYI announced its platform-initiated channel, iPartners (ai qi yi hao), in 2016, and initiated the Polaris Plan

(bei ji xing ji hua) later in 2017 to assist and locate talented content creators (E. Liu, 2017).

Similarly, Tencent launched the platform-initiated channel Qi E Hao in 2016, and the Ten

Billion Plan to empower content creators (Chuange Jing, 2017). These attempts to build platform-initiated channels and initiate seemingly lucrative plans are platform strategy to recruit talented content creators. Regardless of these ambitious schemes, it is dubious whether this system is capable of delivering successful and high-quality IP.

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On one hand, the data show an increasing number of internet influencers in the online economy. Take live streamers as an example: the penetration rate of live streaming users is over 54.3 per cent of all internet users (J. Shi Zhou, 2018). Additionally, the revenue income of Tencent’s online literature platform (an open-access platform for online readers) is astronomical – for instance, Yue Wen Group made 4.95 billion yuan a year in profits, with an increase of 60.2 per cent over the previous year (Yimin Han, 2018). These data showcase the potential of internet influencers for the economy, and the viability of screen adaptations. In the process of professionalising content, internet influencers facilitate content monetisation, whereas online readers contribute to content dissemination and distribution. The ecosystem centring on IP moves from literature, gaming, screen productions and animation to e-games, forging an enclosed business loop that can potentially maximise the value of IP and the possibilities of content monetisation. In addition, incubating actors and actresses is also part of the IP excavation (Song and Huang, 2017). The process of talent scouting happens from the inclusion of the platform-sponsored channel (zi pin dao) to the production of self-made content, with the systematic development of creative content and talent is often reckoned to be one of the most effective means to further lower production costs. In the screen industry, the BAT – along with their affiliated streaming services – are creating a self-sustaining network, where content, protagonist, production and distribution are all nurtured and implemented on the platform, for the platform and by the platform. This independent ecosystem is described by

Chinese scholars as ‘the creator economy’ (B. Huang, 2017).

8.1.2 The creator economy

Western scholars like Cunningham and David have explored the creator economy through the theoretical framework of social media entertainment (SME):

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The infrastructure of SME is comprised of diverse and competing platforms

featuring online video players with social networking affordances, including

YouTube, Facebook, Vine, Instagram, Snapchat, , and Vessel. These

platforms have generated iterating business models that entrepreneurial content

creators have harnessed to engage in content innovation that represents a

radical break from the professional norms of cinema, broadcast television and

even most cable television. (Cunningham and Craig, 2019)

In China, the creator economy is a scholarly term in Chinese discourse equivalent to the SME industry. Chinese researcher Bin Huang from the State Council Development Research Centre, emphasises the significance of the creator effect, which showcases the awareness of this creative force at the government level (Huang and Xiang, 2017). Huang adopted the term

‘creator economy’ to illustrate the emergent industrial system of content curation and IP facilitation. As a newly developed concept, the creator economy depicts an intangible ecosystem in a logical manner, like a needle to a thread. By establishing the ecosystem of professionalising amateur content via a platform-sponsored channel (zi pin dao), online literature platform and screen productions, and so on, online giants were able to create IP, develop professionalised UGC content and nurture stories, which all leads to the final goal: to monetise and create sustainable/growing businesses and create content as the ultimate necessity

(Lu and Peng, 2017). From a user’s perspective, the creator economy serves as an innovative force: it is a phenomenon that attracts more witnesses and more users. In the meantime, it is challenging and alluring to be part of the creator economy, when boundaries between user and creator keep blurring over time.

BAT and its streaming platforms are setting up a systematic ‘farm system’, preferably superior to YouTube, to facilitate the mining of content; this is an action to utilise all possible content and realise the maximisation of monetisation. Online literature platforms like Tencent’s

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Yue Wen Group are on the front line for written IP (scripted content), whereas platform- initiated channels are a goldmine for screen IP, and live streaming or short video vloggers are potential candidates for screen cast selection. There is sufficient evidence (such as from the

Yue Wen Group) that written IP has been making huge profits, but it is unclear whether content creators and vloggers share the same profitability. Take the Yue Wen Group as an example: acquired by Tencent in 2015, the Yue Wen Group was originally known as Shengda Literature, the biggest online literature platform in China (K. Wang, 2015). Such a transition indicated a strategic change, where Shengda Literature was turned into a division of the Tencent pan- entertainment ecosystem instead of an independent company. Previous information gained from a variety of sources, such as industry reports, academic studies and news, suggests a promising future envisioned by pioneers. Still, it is important to remain vigilant and objective about this massive amount of information, and to be wary of projected or alternate reality.

Demonstrated above is a structure of the IP ecosystem, where content innovation starts from initial ideas into scripted content and is then taken up into production. Yet, despite its partial success in different sections, such as online literature or online games, there is scant evidence that this enclosed IP cultivation business system is fully functional – at least not yet.

Becoming familiar with these grand plans makes it even more clear how far things are falling behind. In order to enclose the gap between vision and reality, the remainder of this chapter examines the responses of interviewees from different levels of the industry. A profile of the leading Chinese internet influencer, Miss Papi, is provided in the next section, to examine brand building and explore revelations of precarious entrepreneurialism. Based on the trajectory of Miss Papi, the second interview was with a former practitioner who worked at a studio signed by platform-initiated channel iQIYI channel, in order to further investigate precarious labour. The third interview was obtained from entry-level live streamers, with a

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limited fan base, to showcase emulators of Miss Papi, and to acknowledge the distinctiveness of her success.

8.2 THE ORBIT OF THE MOST FAMOUS CONTENT CREATORS IN CHINA:

A PROFILE OF MISS PAPI

Miss Papi, the best-known and most successful internet influencer in China, was the first to make a name in the field. In Chinese academic studies on internet influencers, Miss Papi is often the most popular choice for case studies, with Wang exploring the internet influencer phenomenon (Huishan Wang, 2017), Huang examining content monetisation (X. Huang,

2017), Xie discussing the reason for success (Xie, 2017) and so forth. The name of Miss Papi signifies more than Miss Papi herself or the team: it is a symbol of the self-media sector – a recognition of the field. Even though Miss Papi is highly acknowledged as a wang hong, however, she prefers to be considered and addressed as a content creator rather than by the rather derogatory term wang hong (Hua, Leong, and Yu, 2017). Miss Papi’s real name is Yilei

Jiang; she graduated from Central Academy of Drama and received professional training in directing and drama production. Unlike those content creators who started out with limited professional knowledge, and had to go through an amateur-professionalised process, Miss Papi is a professional player with a non-traditional career launch.

Miss Papi gained fame over a very short period. In October 2015, she began to publish short videos online, and by March 2016 (H. Xiao, 2016), she had successfully attracted investments of 12 million yuan and reached a market value of 120 million yuan (Z. Wu, 2016).

In March 2017, Miss Papi established Papitube, which was later acquired by an Agency

Company for 120 million yuan. Later in 2017, she was granted the position of ‘China Internet

Promotion Ambassador’ (Blue, 2017), and in December 2017 she was acting in a major popular comedy film, Demon Bell (yao ling ling), with box office takings of over 300 million yuan

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(S. Xiao, 2018). In just two years, Miss Papi was able to transform from being an internet influencer into a professional actress, and the founder of the MCN company Papitube. This is by far the most successful trajectory of any internet influencer or content creator in China.

8.2.1 As content creator, as wang hong

Initially, Miss Papi was no different from any other platform user: she would upload her funny videos to the Douban platform – a social media platform classified by interest groups – simply for fun. Later, she moved to larger platforms with more users, such as Weibo and WeChat (the

Chinese version of Twitter and Facebook), where her fan base kept increasing rapidly. She was responsible for the multi-platform distribution of her own short videos until the establishment of her own company. Although Miss Papi turned her hobby into a career, the motivations of internet influencers, general content creators and users are not always the same. For the general live streaming users, being a vlogger is simply intended to ‘relax from high-pressure work, sharing my talent of playing instrument, and make some money’ (Vlogger K, 2017). Self-media practitioner Bo Liu indicated that ‘the greatest motivation is making money, everyone runs fast towards the direction where it makes money, and they run even faster if there is no profit to make!’ (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017). In the self-media field, users with various backgrounds are embedded with various agendas: some are testing the water, some are driven by profit and only a few are making real contributions to this innovative sector.

It is undoubtedly difficult to create viral content, and not everyone can achieve this objective. As the roommate of Miss Papi back at the Central Academy of Drama, the vice president of Papitube Nifang Huo, expressed:

I’m really happy for her. I think she has found the best job for herself, where

she could make use of her talent to the greatest length. But in the meantime,

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fame comes with greater responsibilities, and Miss Papi is weary by that. (Vice

President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017)

The success of Miss Papi is no mere coincidence or good luck: it is the result of hard work and the implementation of professional knowledge. Miss Papi’s funny videos are a concentrated talk show accomplished by herself, with a weird fake voice, almost zero makeup, exaggerated face expressions and a homey environment (Bu, 2018). This ‘girl next door’ image was designed to better resonate with audiences – to create affinity with her fan communities.

However, in order to achieve such a success, the designed character is far from enough. Miss

Papi’s work is known for her penetrating comments on social phenomenon, education and dating, with videos such as The Difference Between Northern and Southern Part of China, How to Start a Relationship, Treat Your Moms Like Kids and so forth, where topic selection is one of the hardest parts:

We are putting a lot of work in content and topics, the requirements and

standards are very high. First of all, the topic we choose needs to be something

that we want to express. Secondly, we also hope that this topic can resonate

with our audience. That being said, we try to select the topic that fits well with

the majority of our audiences, not too niche. Third, we want the video to be

very interesting and funny, and we do our best to create these experiences.

(Vice President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017)

As the icon and symbol of internet influencers and content creators, Miss Papi is still one of the lucky ones. With high standards and an ambition to make every video viral content, the timeframe of the production of Miss Papi’s video is inconsistent. In contrast, general self-media practitioners indicated that their production work was conducted on a daily and weekly basis.

For Miss Papi, her work is driven by desire and inspiration:

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There is no time limit in making the Miss Papi’s video, sometimes one video

may only take a few hours from planning to finishing, and sometimes, this

process could take six months’ time. If we have an idea, but we haven’t figured

out how to express it in the best way, we will simply put it on hold. (Vice

President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017)

For general practitioners, it is a time-limited task that has to be finished and delivered in time, regardless of the quality:

We are a small team. Weekly production and daily production content takes

different time span to finish the job. In terms of the weekly production content,

from topic selection, script writing, shooting to post production, we would

roughly finish it in five days. But daily content requires a lot of work, we have

to complete all of these work in one day, it is rather demanding, and relatively

poor in content quality. However, streaming platforms are in favour of daily

shows, so that they could produce new content frequently to appeal to their

audiences. As such, we have to produce daily shows in order to cater to their

preferences. (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017)

Even with a flexible time schedule, Miss Papi updates her videos less frequently compared with previous years. The fan group suggests that Miss Papi is now too famous and too busy to make video content, as she has so many new ways of making money, such as advertising, acting, live appearances and so forth. A dearth of creative talent may also account for such a phenomenon. A similar trajectory of content creators can also be identified in the work of

Cunningham and Craig, where content creators often endure the stages of age out, flameout and burnout (Cunningham and Craig, 2019). These well-established trajectory issues are the conundrum facing most content creators and internet influencers globally (Ping, 2017). Will

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the inspiration of content creation persist? Will they lose fan communities if they change their accustomed style? How should they comprehend fame, and how is it possible to build a hobby into a career? Miss Papi is exploring multiple opportunities as a way out:

Miss Papi is no longer just a short video creator. She is also the owner of the

Papitube company, so she is a boss now. She started starring in movies and

participating the variety shows, so the frequency of video updates will certainly

decline. The pressure of producing hit video has always been high, no matter

it is now or at the beginning. Sometimes these things just happen, you can’t

control it or manufacture it. (Vice President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017)

8.2.2 The means of survival: Content monetisation

The boom in platform-initiated channels is incubating its own internet influencers and content creators – direct counterparts of Miss Papi. Confronted with this fierce competition, the optimal strategy is to establish a similar curation system, like Papitube, to systematically facilitate fan communities with new faces, new images and new storylines, instead of updating videos based on previous models. Miss Papi is still updating videos constantly, but less frequently; while she explores her opportunities in the screen industry, she tries not to be overly distant with her fan communities. Intermittent appearances in self-media productions not only enable Miss Papi to maintain her popularity, but also assist the ascendency of other internet influencers and content creators who work at Papitube:

Miss Papi brought three advantages to Papitube: one is content guidance,

another is contribution of data traffic and the last is brand value. The future of

Papitube would like to be a ‘KOL [key opinion leaders] gathering place’, ‘KOL

incubator’, and ‘star accelerator’. After more than a year of adjusting, the team

has greatly improved the internet sensitivity, judgement on emerging internet

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influencers and content sensitivity, which will also become our core

competitive advantages. (Vice President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017)

Papitube is a diversified solution to maintaining a fan base, interacting with fan communities and expanding fan influence. The vice president of Papitube believes that the emergence of numerous MCN companies or agencies is actually generating healthy competition:

It is true that platforms are incubating their own platform-initiated channel, but

that is just a tip of the iceberg. Many MCN agencies are emerging, they are all

incubating internet influencers. Although the competition is going to be fiercer,

the flourishing of various content is undoubtedly a good thing from the industry

perspective. Papitube is Miss Papi’s short video MVN agency, it is a company

where we would incubate internet influencers, and operate in a media matrix

formation that will ultimately maximise the value of our existing traffic. In

addition to starring in the film, Miss Papi also made appearances in variety

shows. Overall, the general direction of Miss Papi is to enter the greater

entertainment industry. (Vice President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017)

Top content creators and MCN agencies like Papitube are aiming to incubate internet influencers and content creators; the majority of self-media practitioners are more concerned with attracting more hits (or data traffic). As for general users, such as live streaming vloggers, they are baffled about how to increase the number of followers. With support from Miss Papi and the development strategy of the company, Papitube has accomplished great things:

In the short video MCN list of Weibo released in October 2017, Papitube

ranked first. On the Weibo short video influence Top 50 list, Papitube has five

internet influencers or content creators on the list, Miss Papi ranked first, the

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other four were: Bigger Institute (bi ge yan jiu suo), Zhang Mao to practice

Mouth guns (zhang mao yao lian zui pi zi), Kat and Sid, and ACui. These are

the creators that have more than 1 million Weibo fans, they can guarantee their

video frequency and quality, some of them are capable of monetising content

constantly, and some even become the frontrunners in the vertical business

model. (Vice President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017)

Papitube has four rules when incubating content creators, which are also its development strategies:

The first rule is the continuation of Miss Papi's methodology. Keep making

original content, and keep making special ones. The second one is to tailor content

in the production line. We create account based on each influencer’s unique styles

and advantages, in order to emphasise personality and avoid homogenisation. The

third one is to maintain quality operation and vertical integration of head account,

adopting specific screening and elimination mechanisms. And the most important

rule is to enhance influence, enhance user stickiness, and enhance the curation of

KOLs. (Vice President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017)

There are three primary ways to monetise the content of self-media: advertising, e-commerce and subscriptions. The revenue structure varies among different content creators and internet influencers. For top-tier internet influencers, or wang hong, their revenue stream is diversified and more flexible. For example, the primary income of Miss Papi and Papitube generally comes from advertising endorsements, with a fraction of income generated from e-commerce.

Diversified ways of monetising content have increased the availability of profitability:

Apart from advertising endorsement and e-commerce, we also receive a small

amount of income from platform revenue sharing scheme (shared

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programmatic advertising revenue). As you know, different platforms have

their own unique incentive policies in terms of revenue sharing with content

creators. We believe we have great potentials in content monetisation, as we

kept setting new bars of advertising income. (Vice President of Papitube

Nifang Huo, 2017)

The revenue income of second-tier general content creators is largely dependent on platform revenue sharing. Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, who used to work in a self-media content production team registered as platform-initiated channels across the BAT, including iPartners

(ai qi yi hao), Da Yu Hao and Qi E Hao, stated that, ‘frankly speaking, 90 per cent of our revenue income is generated from platform revenue-sharing schemes (programmatic advertising), and only 10 per cent comes from other revenue streams’ (Self-media practitioner

Bo Liu, 2017). Similar to live streaming vloggers, self-media practitioners are making great efforts to increase the scale of their fan base. It is always great to have dreams: ‘I receive a salary from my agency company, but I’m sure I will have a team in the future to help me do the live streaming, and I hope I could have more fans, because then I can fully utilize my talent’

(Vlogger K, 2017). The great numbers of third-tier creators make it even more difficult to survive to the upper class, however: reality is cold and cruel, and not easy to change. Bo Liu, who works in a team with a fan base of over 30 thousand online users, which is registered on numerous platforms, said: ‘Many people would say that if I have more fans, then I can monetise my content in so many ways, but I hate to break it to you, increasing fan numbers is really, truly, and painstakingly, difficult!’ (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017).

As a small reflection of the self-media field, Miss Papi, Bo Liu and the live streaming vlogger constructed a micro-landscape of this sector. Similar to Bärtl’s (2018) findings, there are ‘stark contrasts between video genres in terms of channels, uploads and views … a vast majority of on average 85% of all views goes to a small minority of 3% of all channels’. China's

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self-media content entrepreneurial data and trends report provided by Penguin Intelligence (the think tank of Tencent) indicates that only 5 per cent of content creators and internet influencers are making a profit (Penguin Intelligence, 2016). When a great number of content creators are fighting to become registered accounts on platform-supported channels, looking to a prosperous future, those who are registered are desperately seeking new ways to monetise the content and diversify revenue streams. Those practitioners who have been in this field for quite some time, and who have witnessed and endured the challenges of content monetisation, have come to realise that the future might be worrisome.

8.3 THE CONUNDRUM AND DILEMMA FACING SELF-MEDIA

PRACTITIONERS

As self-media practitioners keep flooding in, the profitability of individual practitioners has been weakened to some extent. In the history of Western social media entertainment, similar precedents have occurred, turning the field from an overreliance on programmatic advertising on YouTube alone to a diversified revenue stream based on merchandise, live appearances, scripted televisual options and book publishing, but mostly branded content integrations using multiple platforms (Cunningham and Craig, 2019). Things are paralleled in China, with

YouTube a few years ahead of time. General content creators in China are still based in phase one: programmatic advertising. However, it would be easier to receive a steady income from the revenue-sharing scheme, if it were verified as a registered account. Becoming a registered account is easy from the perspective of experienced self-media practitioners: the procedure is simply ‘get signed, upload video, and receive platform revenue sharing’ (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017); however, it is more of a new beginning than a destination. Despite the available registered account on iQIYI, Tencent and Youku, there are hundreds and thousands of newcomers who are tapping into the self-media field. For those nascent players,

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the most frequently mentioned question was: How do you become a registered account on a certain platform? With sufficient ancillary support from the platform, and a consistent effort in uploading content, becoming a registered account is easier than many had anticipated:

You need to make sure that you are uploading the content steadily, and meanwhile,

note that you need to keep the quality of these uploads roughly on the same level,

then before you know it, your program will get signed up, and there you are, a

registered account, it is not a big deal. (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017)

The common strategy for self-media practitioners is to distribute their content simultaneously across various platforms. Being a registered account doesn’t prevent the creators from displaying their work elsewhere – it is not an exclusive contract, but rather one with flexible terms. For example, Youku reached out to Miss Papi at an early stage, so Miss Papi would initially upload her work to Youku; however, nowadays her work is accessible everywhere.

For content creators, multi-platform distribution renders more hits and a higher explosion rate, which empowers their ability to further monetise content. With regard to platforms, they have put forward all kinds of beneficial policies to support content creators, all of which have resulted in homogenised competition, with similar tactics, incentive policies and content:

Our content is distributed on iQIYI, Youku, Tencent Video and Today’s

Headlines, these are our primary platforms, but we have dozens of other

distribution channels, and I won’t lay it out, because there are too many.

Anyway, lots of channels will display our content, but it doesn’t matter – we

cannot make much profit out of it, we mainly profit from revenue sharing of

major channels as I mentioned earlier. (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017)

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Even though content creators are faced with fierce competition compared with live streaming vloggers, these can only be regarded as minor problems. Live streaming is a form of interactive, live and sharing activity; it is a social platform for the younger generation, but it also creates a free space for uncivilised conversations. The most difficult part about live streaming, according to general users, is to face their worst fears, to face doubt when they are at the age of doubting themselves: ‘You have to pretend like nothing is wrong, even if someone does not recognise your value, or even try to discredit you on live, but because it is you facing the camera, not the others, so you have to watch your behaviour’ (Vlogger K, 2017). Live streaming is a booming industry, but its disadvantages and negative influences are greater than its positive endeavours.

8.3.1 Platform facilitation

The prevalence of self-media sector is largely attributable to the prosperity of platforms and the associated platform strategies. According to Zhao, these changes are initiated by creative destruction, which has ‘forced change in industry boundaries and entry barriers, a breakdown of formerly protected market positions, and reform of regulatory frameworks’ (Zhao and

Keane, 2013). The years 2016 and 2017, when self-media creators were exposed under the spotlight, and when Miss Papi completed her ascendency of popularity, are viewed as the golden phase of self-made productions. At this time, the confrontational stance between major streaming players was officially identified, with the BAT-affiliated iQIYI, Youku and Tencent monopolising the online entertainment industry. Platform strategy and facilitation provide opportunities and motivations for content creators and internet influencers alike; however, the importance of platform facilitation is less significant, and even in a sense restricted, from the perspective of self-media practitioners.

Regardless of the grand platform schemes or plans for the self-created sector, the practical support at the platform level is manifested through three aspects: promotional spot, revenue sharing

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(based on data traffic) and data sharing (according to the industry report). Providing promotional support and implementing revenue sharing are common in platform facilitation:

In terms of platform cooperation, we normally receive some promotional spots

from the platforms, and sometimes they would share their revenues with us

based on data traffic. We upload our content to Weibo, all major streaming

platforms, and live streaming platforms such as Meipai, and so forth.

Promotional spot is the most commonly seen support we would receive from

all the platforms. (Vice President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017)

Platform support proved to be less supportive, however, as there was an absence of data sharing from the interviews conducted during the fieldwork:

The support we received from major streaming platforms such as iQIYI, Youku,

and Tencent, is nothing more than some promotional spot on the website or on

mobile applications, and also, revenue sharing from data traffic. (Self-media

practitioner Bo Liu, 2017)

As for entry-level creators, they have yet to receive substantial support from the platform:

I think the live streaming platforms are developing really fast, they have

sponsored lots of TV programs, such as ‘I am going to the Spring Gala’ etc., I

have not received any support from the platform, maybe I am not famous

enough? But I do have support from the agency company. (Vlogger K, 2017)

What was gained from practitioners seems rather different from industry publicity. The fancy publicity towards content creators is more like a motive or a wishful thinking, rather than practical solutions. According to former iQIYI channel practitioner Bo Liu, ‘the platform

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facilitation in China is way below the support YouTube provided for its creators – honestly, the support that Chinese content creators received from our major streaming platforms is very limited’ (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017). Practitioners like Bo Liu have encountered the bottleneck of the self-media sector: the show is in a sense popular, with a certain amount of fan base, but they find it difficult to make any breakthroughs. Fan numbers stay at the current level, with no signs of increasing or declining; the platform failed to provide any other support than revenue sharing, and the show has to continue. Content creators and influencers are faced with a doomed fate: they are participating in a game of survival (X. Chen, 2017). The conundrum is how to stay innovative and be adaptive to cope with the foreseen dilemma.

8.3.2 YouTubers and their Chinese counterparts

In China, practitioners use a sarcastic expression to describe their situations: ‘dance with chains’.

Content regulation – the perpetual bane of the Chinese media sector – is overseeing the self-sector as well. Miss Papi, the most famous internet influencer and content creator in China, received notice from the government in April 2016 to ‘rectify inappropriate content’. As a chain reaction incident following the regulation regarding ‘sex involved live streaming’ phenomenon, the government is signalling that there is a red line to warn content creators and internet influencers

(F. Liu, 2016). Even though some would argue the accusations are false, as Miss Papi is far from being a sex streamer, creators and practitioners are now, more than ever, dedicated to ‘contributing to a healthier online environment’ (Vice President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017):

We have lots of attention, and so we bear more responsibilities. We now have

more juveniles among our audiences, and we will apply strict standards in

terms of content selection. There are actually many topics available, and we

will now pay more attention to the topics that include positive energy. (Vice

President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017)

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Bo Liu believed that platform-initiated channels share a rather different perspective:

When I started producing self-media content, I did not encounter any kind of

regulation at first. We were using lots of violence, sex scenes and, frankly

speaking, we were playing the edge ball strategy pretty relentlessly, but then

no one dares to involve any of these due to content regulation. I think if we

keep the content away from sex and violence, then we should be fine. (Self-

media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017)

The entry level live streamer interviewed was in favour of heavy regulation of the live streaming sector, considering several previous crackdowns: ‘I think content regulation is the right move. We should purify the live steaming market, keep it away from sex streaming and all that. I am in favour of it!’ (Vlogger K, 2017)

In general, content regulation in the self-media sector is less strict compared with PGC sectors. The notice sent to Miss Papi engendered some controversial discussions (Y. Zhang,

2016), but the message delivered was crystal clear: no edge balls and do not cross the line.

Content regulation is always one of the distinctions between Chinese and Western online markets; however, in the field of self-media, there is another noticeable difference: platform affordances. Self-media practitioners believe ‘Youtubers are in a much better place than us, they receive really useful and helpful support from YouTube’ (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu,

2017). As mentioned in previous chapters, major Chinese streaming services are different, yet they emulate the YouTube ‘farm system’ (Cunningham and Silver, 2014); while industry reports and academic works refer to all-inclusive Chinese platforms as part of the omni- entertainment ecosystem, they were in fact regarded as ‘internet television’ in the eyes of self- media practitioners. Bo Liu believes that the fundamental difference between YouTube and

Chinese streaming services is that ‘YouTube has the soil for professionalised UGC content, it

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is a place where these contents could actually grow, but Chinese streaming services are more like a distributor than an incubator’ (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017).

It is well-acknowledged that Youku was the copycat of YouTube, their resemblance went beyond name and website layout to platform strategies and content. Back in 2006, when

Youku was established as the Chinese version of YouTube, a great deal of user-generated content and video uploads were expected. Youku was referencing the development of YouTube by encouraging video uploads to build up a video encyclopaedia, and the ten-minute size limitation of YouTube videos was changed to unlimited time and space, in order to attract more users and generate more uploads (Z. Li, Gu, and Xie, 2011). However, due to limited types and numbers of video uploads, the user preference and the burgeoning of streaming services around

2013, efforts to construct a video encyclopaedia turned out in vain. Youku was caught up in the copyright acquisition campaign, where the platform was shifting towards a new strategy that enabled Youku to no longer be ‘the copycat of YouTube’. Chinese streaming services were undergoing fierce competition around 2013 to 2014, when the war of copyright acquisition essentially led to the advent of self-made productions. The omni-entertainment platform strategy that exists today was not a thoughtful plan, but rather an adaptive reflex:

The major players acquired a large amount of high-quality content during

2013-2014, they were in the war of copyright acquisition. However, by the end

of 2014, they turn back to develop professionalised UGC content, I do not think

they had an impeccable plan, quite the opposite, I believe, they are doing this

to claim more users and resources. (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017)

Chinese streaming services differ from their Western counterparts. According to previous analysis, this is manifested through two different business models: Chinese services are ‘a mixture of everything’, while Western players are ‘the provider of specialized content’. Chinese academic

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media studies and industry reports indicate that this ‘all-inclusive’ strategy is the pathway to

‘verticalized platformisation’, where cultural production, distribution and monetisation are unified and connected in the omni-entertainment ecosystem. However, Western debates regard verticalised platformisation as a clear and present danger, as the strategy empowers major players in various ways, and has raised certain concerns among self-media practitioners:

In the United States, if people want to watch movies or TV drama, they would

go to websites like Netflix, but in China, no matter what content we are looking

for, we have to go to the major players – Youku, iQIYI, and Tencent Video.

But the thing is, when a single website is in possession of PGC and

professionalised UGC, with a limited promotional spot, of course they would

save the spot for their best players – costly PGC or highly invested self-made

productions. So where can you find the professionalised UGC content? It is

like a trap for us. (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017)

When YouTubers take over the frontline, or at least most of the promotional spots, on

YouTube, Chinese self-media content creators are often discovered at the bottom of the web page. It takes time and patience to scroll down the page and wait for it to load, not to mention the immersive distractions from the top-ranked PGC and self-made productions. From the perspective of Chinese self-media practitioners, they receive insufficient support from the platforms, but the platforms wield the power to ‘let them live or die’:

The fate of professionalised UGC is in the hands of streaming platforms. If

platforms are willing to direct their data traffic to us, then we live, if they are

not up for it, then we die. Right now, we are in a dead end. We do not have

much traffic or attention; therefore, we do not get paid very well, and because

of our low salary, it is difficult to make high-quality or innovative content, and

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then the loop continues. On the contrary, YouTubers not only get enough

promotional spot, but also production support from YouTube. I’m not really

sure exactly what support do we receive from our platforms. (Self-media

practitioner Bo Liu, 2017)

8.3.3 The prospect of worldwide YouTubers

Content creators worry collectively about their own futures, for the prospects for the

YouTubers are less promising than they appear to be. For successful creators, one plausible solution is to change careers – such as video producers becoming authors, or vlog stars becoming TV or movie stars. Yet the fate of their fellow content creators who work behind the scenes or cameras is more precarious when they are forced to quit – willingly or not.

Practitioner from platform-initiated channels Bo Liu and the other content creator who used to work at the famous self-media brand – Bao Zou Big News Events (the No. 1 Youku-registered account with more than 5.6 million subscribers, and 180 million fans across all social accounts, affiliated with Rage Comics) expressed their concerns about the self-media sector when they coincidently made the congruent decision to seek other career opportunities:

I do not want to stay in the self-media sector anymore, because now censorship

is upgraded, monetisation takes longer, and the business model is rather

immature. You would not have imagined that only 5 per cent of self-media are

actually profitable, so what about the other 95 per cent How do they survive?

How long could they last? I could not see my future in it. (Previous practitioner

of Bao Zou Big News Events)

I have left the iPartners, this field has downsized quite a lot compared with two

years ago. In the self-media sector, everyone survives in a different way. The

self-media team I used to work for have changed their content for survival.

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Now they are producing short derivative videos for self-made drama, which is

useful and valuable for platform publicity. But the thing is, no one knows how

far they can go. A while back, entertainment content made money, now drama-

related content has taken over, I think it is contingent on platform strategies

and agendas. (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017)

Such transformations among content creators are prevalent worldwide. It has been identified that the profitability of the entire short video industry is approaching its ceiling (iRESEARCH,

2017b). The dilemma confronting worldwide creators, YouTubers and MCN agencies lies in how to improve their sustainability. A change of character or content often has risky implications, whereas maintaining previous models would essentially result in aesthetic fatigue. As a well-acknowledged industry conundrum, few have succeeded in similar attempts.

Miss Papi is one of the exceptions, but her company, Papitube, and its incubated internet influencers might not be so lucky after all:

The challenges facing MCN agencies like Papitube are a serious matter that we

should consider. Finding ways to empower our internet influencers is a task

that challenges us every single day. The logic is the same with incubating

accounts, and tailoring is essential. We must be clear about personalities and

characteristics of the creators, then pave the way for them selectively, instead

of simply doing what is popular. We aim for a long-term strategy, not short-

term popularity. (Vice President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017)

The media discourses in China are shaping UGC or self-media into a goldmine (Lu Xu Zhang,

2018). Such claims seem to be convincing, considering the unanimous platform strategy of the self-media sector; however, the industry insights gained from practitioners suggest otherwise.

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‘Challenge’ is merely an understatement of the fierce competition encountered by content creators. Few self-media practitioners implied that they had ‘seen through the bubbles’:

I left the self-media sector during the second half of 2017, because the scale of

this business is smaller than you think. I know that lots of companies are

exaggerating their market value, like self-media is a big deal, but truthfully, it

is not true. I think it is just their play or trick to get some venture capital to take

over. Personally speaking, I think the development of the most popular short

video platform (I don’t want to be specific), will be bumpy in 2018. I am just

not optimistic about the future. (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017)

The possibility of being a ‘goldmine’ is excuse enough to attract the attention of major players, it is not money or profitability that are in short supply, but rather talent. With the BAT in the background, lashing out money is merely a minor concern:

Although I am not optimistic about the future, I am not entirely sure that it is

going to be obsolete. I guess no one is sure of the future, not me, not you and

not the platform decision makers. Platform practitioners are not sure of the gold

mine, they believe they are onto something, and they have enough money to

explore. Then they decided to take the spot, and see if they can make anything

out of the alleged ‘goldmine’. Still, I am sceptical about this adventure, if we

fast-forward one year, who would still remember Miss Papi? Reality is cruel!

(Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017)

The emergence and increasing popularity of specialised short video platforms like Meipai and

Douyin has demonstrated the changing environment in the self-media sector (H. Li, 2018; Ziyi

Zheng, 2017). These instant-streaming short video platforms are generating more creative and

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funny content that forges a new frontier against the major players. The incubator and types of content may have changed from time to time, but the amateur-professionalised process has not.

The brightest prospects for the self-media sector are in the transformations and reconfigurations of creative content. Miss Papi and her team are expecting a promising future:

The efficiency of incubating internet influencers and various accounts will

hopefully be improved, and I hope that Papitube will be a central place for

famous accounts and KOL. (Vice President of Papitube Nifang Huo, 2017)

The first eruption of self-media content began around 2016, when self-made productions were gaining popularity. Bo Liu believes that in five years’ time, ‘we might be looking at the second eruption of self-media content’:

It is difficult to predict what this filed will look like in five years, but I believe in one

rule: no matter whether it is internet born content or wherever born content, as long

as it is funny, interesting or useful, it will make be successful. If we open the door to

more content creators, and give them more space, I think we might be looking at the

second eruption of self-media content. (Self-media practitioner Bo Liu, 2017)

8.4 CONCLUSION

The confrontation between capital and state power is further enhanced in the self-media sector.

Unlike PGC content, where censorship or government regulative power retains the upper hand,

UGC (including professionalized UGC) is largely regulated and facilitated by the power of capital. Such a two-sided force not only empowers the top-tier content creators, but also aggravates the fierce competition at the lower levels. The excavation scheme for IP, or the

‘gold mine’, could be considered a capital driven endeavour. Stimulation policies and the grand scheme initiated by the BAT showcased their ambition in configuring the omni-entertainment

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world; however, the incomplete incubating system crippled the middle-tier creators (a revenue- sharing strategy is regarded as ‘not enough’ or insufficient) while continuing to draw newcomers. Top-tier content was therefore gained at a great cost to numerous creators, through fierce competition with only 5 per cent making a profit. The general observation of this chapter would be the conundrum of sustainability of content creators and the limitation of content monetisation. The BAT are partly providing financial support to improve the professionalisation process of UGC, contributing to cultural innovation; however, from an industry perspective, it is also responsible for the fierce competition. Nevertheless, the BAT are not concerned about the heated competition; on the contrary, the increasing number of participants will only enhance their chances of ‘digging the gold’.

Platform facilitation has contributed to the prevalence of grassroots culture and the new production culture. The involvement of tech companies and platforms on the production level reconfigured the power distribution of traditional media industries. The new production culture identifies the significance of audiences: instead of one-way production, where programs are commissioned by television stations or third parties, the involvement of platforms brings feedback and evaluation to the production line. Platform strategies of ‘mining the content’ have essentially aggravated the progress of power distribution. It is a market-tested content-selection process with audience participation. This systematic excavation of UGC content and the professionalising process parallels strategies used by Western platforms such as YouTube; however, the Chinese market differs from the US market in this respect, as it lags a few years behind.

The internet industry is in many ways reshaping the media industry. It is common to witness industry reconfigurations at various levels; however, one noticeable tendency is the changing media sphere caused by digital technologies and facilitated through platform affordances.

Platform comparisons in Chapters 7 and 8 difference between the media landscapes of China and

Western countries. What are the prospects of these comparative studies? How should we

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comprehend the new production culture? Chapter 9 concludes this study by using a structural framework to inform theoretical understandings as well as industry revelations.

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Chapter 9: The changing media sphere in China

9.1 OVERVIEW OF THESIS

As digital champions, Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent (BAT) are transforming digital and non- digital related businesses in China. This thesis set out to investigate transformations of Chinese screen media industry, and to examine the possibilities for developing similar industry systems in countries like the United States and elsewhere in the world. Questions like how Chinese screen ecology differs from that of major Western markets, implications for the BAT and streaming services, the influence of Netflix and globalisation prospects were addressed throughout the study. In order to unveil the influence of the BAT on the screen industry, it is imperative to gather the strands of the various aspects for a comprehensive analysis. Thus an analysis of the changing online media sphere in China moves across the institutional level of

BAT enterprises and streaming platforms; the production levels of different TV genres – drama and variety shows, as well as online exclusive amateur-professionalised content – and the political facets of digital power and cultural globalisation. This is a comprehensive study that traverses three main streams regarding the changes that have occurred in modern Chinese screen studies.

The overarching argument of this study is that as the BAT rise to new heights of digital power, they are increasingly empowering and being empowered by streaming services, which transform production culture in content distribution, monetisation and production, and reconfigure the power distribution of media industries in the content-professionalisation process. This study contributes to critical media studies by encompassing the ‘middle-range theory’ proposed by Cunningham (Cunningham, Jacka, and Sinclair, 1998) and ‘critical industrial practices’ emphasised by Caldwell (2008). Distinct from media industries research,

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with mixed methods of cultural studies approach and political economy approach, advocated by Williams and Hall, this critical media industry study bears considerations of ‘production of culture’ approach, in response to ‘the need for empirical research into the media industries with an eye towards the struggle over ideological hegemony in the production of popular culture, in particular’ (Havens, Lotz, and Tinic, 2009, p. 240). By providing close readings of industry discourses, interviews and so forth, this industry-based research accounts for interrelations of political-economic structures and industrial practices.

When drawing from established scholars of media economics, it is integral to examine the media industries from an economic perspective, with Albarran (2002) delimiting media industries that ‘differ from other businesses’. Picard (2011) also emphasises attributes of media industries as ‘economic entities’, in addition to noting the interrelationship between industry, economics and technology, and pointing out that media content and services provided are the same, regardless of the mediums. Doyle (2013) further discusses reliance on technology, and accounts for digital convergence and the growth of the internet. Previous scholars have identified changes of technology and the implications on media industries; however, few studies have examined the extent and degree to which these changes are reshaping the media industries in the context of current technology advancement. Elsewhere, Lots and Havens

(2012) propose a ‘cultural interventionist approach’, taking into account the implications of media regulations. Napoli (2009) shares his perspective on economic influences, stating that

‘revenue composition of media industries is a relatively new territory in current research field’, which requires further investigations. Furthermore, Curtin (2009) accounts for changes and reconfigurations in media globalisation. These scholars identify media regulation, revenue composition and media globalisation in the era of online media as gaps in current media industries research. In order to illustrate these research gaps, a literature review of the BAT

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and Chapter 5 have comprehensively examined the micro politics of the media industries in

China – changes in institutional levels – as one of the contributions of this research.

In the second part of the literature review, the theory of platform capitalism was adopted.

Chinese scholar Guoming Yu proposed a platform convergence strategy, along with Srnicek’s

(2016) concept of platform capitalism – a capitalist perspective. This section has illustrated the business logic of the BAT, recognising these online giants – including Google, Facebook and

Amazon – as internet infrastructure manufacturers or digital service providers: the business expansion into the online media industry is a crucial step for an ‘enclosed business loop’, but such a business strategy is also motivated by data aggregation, revenue income and political nuances, which have were examined throughout this section. Additionally, the BAT and their increasing influence have raised concerns regarding capital and state power; the ambiguous relationship between market and state has been described by Yu Hong as ‘a contested balance’

(Y. Hong, 2017). Chapter 5 differentiated similar but different concept of online content, from self-made to original content. Meanwhile, the characteristics of each platform have been investigated through development strategies, profitability and content. As a disruptive force, the BAT are promoting a much fiercer form of competition in the digital entertainment industry.

Synergies between BAT enterprises and streaming platforms are transforming the internet as well as the screen industries. Most notably, reconfigured content-production process has challenged the power distributions of traditional media systems, where users are becoming the predominant decision makers rather than passively receiving content.

In Chapters 6 to 8, discussions centred around industrial practices and changes in production culture. Close readings of empirical data – mostly interviews and industry discourses – as well as examinations of industrial practices echoed the appeal of the critical media industries approach, emphasised by Lotz, Havens and Tinic (Havens et al., 2009). This is another contribution of this research. These chapters illustrated the varieties of content

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production, from PGC to UGC, including self-made drama (equivalent to Netflix originals), self-made variety shows (platform-commissioned cultural productions) and videos by content creators (similar to YouTube channel by YouTubers). Analysis of the BAT enterprises and streaming platforms has rendered a structural background of a changing online media sphere in China; however, a more detailed examination was required in order to identify how and to what extent content production is modified or revolutionised in this process, as well as the implications for cultural dissemination and revelations for cultural as well as digital power.

Three main case studies were presented. Chapter 6 selected an online drama produced in 2013

– Unexpectedness – to discover the origins and initial success of self-made productions.

Chapter 7 adopted an online variety show – The Rap of China – to unveil the evolution of online productions in 2017. Chapter 8 reviewed the development of UGC from the perspective of content creators. Such an arrangement is intended to provide an historical point of view, with cases are selected from various periods of time (from the past to more recently), situated at different stages of platform development (from the premature to well-established phases).

Chapter 6 mapped out the landscape between Chinese and Western platforms. Chinese streaming platforms are filled with mixed content, from UGC to PGC and everything in between. In comparison, Western platforms contain content of unitary quality – for example,

Netflix is for PGC production and YouTube is for UGC narrative. By differentiating the landscape of China from the Western market, the Chinese online sector was carefully categorised and illustrated to enable a better understanding. The BAT as technology enterprises are facilitating the prevalence of self-made productions.

Initially, self-made productions were trial productions in search of new possibilities and diversified revenue streams. Nowadays, the inclusion of the BAT partnering with streaming platforms brings out a systematic process of content monetisation through vertical integration.

In Chapter 6, the differences between online drama and traditional drama were discussed via

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the case study of Unexpectedness. In Chapter 7, transformations of self-made productions were investigated further through online variety shows. Contextual analysis of TV genre studies and

TV formats was provided to create a theoretical framework for variety shows. The thorough background of reality TV informed the evolution, as did the development of the Korean Wave, and its influence on Chinese variety shows. The edge ball strategy was examined in relation to censorship regulation, as it became a new variable for competition.

The combination of the BAT and streaming platforms has led to innovative business strategies, enriched content monetisation and stimulated the prevalence of youth culture. Their shared interest in UGC sector, however, inevitably intensifies pre-existing competition. It is possible to elaborate on the influence of the BAT on the screen industry through selected case studies of self-made productions, but such an analysis is more difficult in relation to the UGC field. For instance, Netflix Originals will not be screened on Hulu or other streaming platforms unless they are under a certain agreement. In this sense, each case selected from the vast range of self-made productions is indicative of particular platform characteristics and strategies. The case study of Unexpectedness in Chapter 6 explains why self-made productions originated from

Youku instead of other platforms; the case study of The Rap of China in Chapter 7 showcased the publicity capacity and profitability of iQIYI through program operations and omni-platform vertical integration. In the UGC sector, instead of being dedicating to a single platform, content is distributed across various channels in order to attract more attention and greater revenue.

Chapter 8 therefore investigated the UGC sector collectively through content creators, from the perspective of top-tier creator Miss Papi, to general content creators from iQIYI channel, to entry-level live broadcasters, in an effort to map out the general landscape of the UGC field.

The biggest strength, originality and contribution of this research are that it has provided a broad spectrum of media content, including drama, variety shows and short videos, in an attempt to develop an extensive coverage of the digital media landscape in the context of

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changes to production culture. Concurrently, this thesis has conducted case studies of Chinese digital platforms, noting that aside from US, China is the only industry in the world that has developed the ecosystems of connected services/platforms. The findings of cultural programs are similar to scholars like those of Keane (2016b), that Chinese programs circulate within the domestic market, and the robust of domestic production is far from international reach. Based on these findings, the notion of soft power is diversified. As China realizes that cultural soft power is much more difficult to reach comparing to hard power (such as military power), it is becoming increasingly substituted by digital power.

One of the key findings of this empirical research is that while the success of platform- commissioned screen productions such as Netflix Originals is to a large degree attributable to the algorithmic culture, for Chinese self-made productions, technology served as a minor contribution compared with user-directed strategy. The initial attempt at self-made production,

Unexpectedness, was a show made for the younger generations who ‘don’t have enough time to watch’ (Youku Staff C, 2017). The prevalence of youth culture and its confrontation with high culture distinguish Chinese platforms from their Western counterparts.

Another key finding is that, as a peculiar case, The Rap of China generated a huge and unexpected success through vertical integration, such as a community engagement publicity strategy and content monetisation system. The case study of The Rap of China emphasised the contrast between youth culture and high culture, where online shows draw from underground culture (such as The Rap of China), and traditional TV shows extract from traditional Chinese culture and museum knowledge (such as National Treasure). These confrontations essentially raise the tensions between capital and state power.

The last empirical finding was generated from case studies featuring short video content, where precarious labour, and the conundrum faced by, and prospects of, content creators were unveiled. Based on interviews with content creators, they are collectively calling upon platform

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facilitation similar to those of YouTube, meaning that other than an increase of finicial support, platform resources, community establishment and production facilitations should be provided.

Comparative analysis of the Chinese and Western landscapes discovered that, although

YouTube currently represents an advanced system, Chinese platforms evolve and transform at an accelerated pace.

9.2 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE CHINESE AND WESTERN MEDIA

SYSTEMS

9.2.1 Characteristics of the Chinese screen industry

The most distinct difference between Chinese and Western media systems is the prevalence of propaganda (ideological dissemination) and regulatory concerns. As the literature review in Chapter

2 indicates, both Chinese and Western scholarship account for Chinese media in the context of regulation and publicity (Birch, 2014; Brady, 2015; Clode, 2003; J. Hong et al., 2009; Yong Zhong,

2001). The ‘Channel Before Content’ strategy (Keane, 2015) witnessed an era of political priority, especially prior to the digital age, where non-linear programming was unavailable. During the time of linear programming, media entities were in charge of power distribution, with each medium – whether radio, television or newspapers – was in possession of a certain amount of media power. In this sense, the ‘Channel Before Content’ strategy was a process of power aggregation: media coverage was achieved through a great number of channels; broadcasting the same content across a variety of channels signified the capability of information control or the regulation of media flows.

The online screen, however, is a process of reverse-engineering and an implementation of power distribution. Keane (in Keane and Donald, 2014) contends that online media have disrupted the hierarchy of media distribution, transforming into and forging new empires.

The emergence of the online screen was identified with political significance. The involvement of the BAT in the streaming industry complicated business strategies and

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disrupted development progress. Based on the theoretical framework of platform capitalism, attempts to achieve platform convergence or service integration were regarded ‘as an optimal form for extracting data and using them to gain an edge over competitors’ (Srnicek, 2016).

According to Srnicek (2016), network effects – a combination of Google and YouTube,

Amazon and Amazon Prime, the BAT and streaming platforms – are a means to establish market monopolisation. This may account for the BAT and streaming services joining forces.

One notable distinction of internet services between the Chinese and Western markets is the mobile-centric environment, where affordances of Chinese mobile applications are superior to PC services. This phenomenon is attributable to the rapid lifestyle and fragmented time and space of Chinese online users. In comparison, Western mobile applications are merely complementary to PC services. China’s mobile-centric environment has contributed directly to the prevalence of mobile payment services and emergent forms of cultural production. The analysis in Chapter 6 showcased the production of online drama and the tendency of short video content. Initial productions of online drama emphasised independent storylines and shorter time spans, targeted at users of mobile services – the younger generations. To some extent, expansion of the BAT and the development of mobile services are facilitating the formation of a new production culture – a stage embedded with transformative power.

9.2.2 New production culture

The general research aim of this thesis was to investigate the influence of the BAT in facilitating the Chinese screen media industry systems (or in curating new production cultures), to differentiate between the Chinese and Western systems. On a global scale, media systems (both in China and the West) are challenged and transformed by the emergence of online media, constituting a new screen ecology. According to Cunningham (2015, p. 278), this new screen ecology refers to a media ecosystem that is ‘being shaped by a set of increasingly global online screen entertainment platforms, most prominently Google/YouTube, Apple, Amazon and Netflix’. The advent of online

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screen entertainment platforms has transformed the ways in which media productions are being produced, consumed and distributed. Most notably, streaming platforms such as Netflix have cultivated an algorithmic culture that has optimised the viewing experience and production process.

While Netflix attempted to establish an online Hollywood through high-quality productions,

YouTube encouraged the development of UGC via systematic facilitation of YouTubers. The formality of Western screen media systems conforms with the characterisation of PGC and UGC; however, streaming services in China are hybrids of YouTube and Netflix, and much more.

Chinese streaming services are constantly in a process of emulating their Western counterparts. Despite this, YouTube and Netflix are still far more advanced than Youku and iQIYI in aspects such as user experience, recommendation system, technology affordances and so forth. The prevalence of self-made (or platform commissioned) productions on Chinese platforms was to some extent influenced by Netflix. Although Chinese platforms failed to emulate the advanced ‘algorithmic culture’, or recommendation system, they chose to bet on a

‘user-centric’ strategy: ‘if audience do not have enough time to watch a show, we will make a show they have enough time to watch’ (see Chapter 6). The ultimate weapon of Netflix – all the high-tech involved in media production and distribution, was translated into ‘audience perspective’ (or ‘user-centric’ strategy) by Chinese platforms. This process of audience empowerment is one of the manifestations of the new production culture. The case study in

Chapter 7 discussed audience empowerment through community engagement, with program publicity implemented via online interactions taking place on other online social platforms such as Weibo, WeChat and short video platforms.

Another noticeable tendency of the new production culture is the ability to employ content monetisation. Chinese platforms manifest a higher level of vertical integration capacity compared with Western platforms, which is attributable to service integration, or a platform convergence strategy. Features and attributes embedded within platforms create portals to other affiliated

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services, such as online shopping or online social groups, as ways to monetise content to the maximum. For content creators in the UGC sector, however, Chinese platforms fell short in many aspects compared with YouTube, particularly in terms of platform facilitation. Analysis in

Chapter 8 identifies Chinese streaming services as ‘a form of online TV’ rather than an incubator of content creators, based on the context of UGC development. As hybrids of YouTube and Netflix, new features are proliferating on Chinese streaming platforms to make up for their disadvantaged aspects. Streaming services in China may be inferior to their Western counterparts (in terms of certain areas), but they are undoubtedly evolving at an accelerated rate.

Despite the similarities of streaming platforms between two markets, Chinese and

Western media systems differ in their regulatory concerns. Chapters 6 and 7 identify the confrontation of youth culture and high culture, unveiling the increasingly developed media system shaped by regulatory power. As youth culture (online culture) parallels or even threatens mainstream culture, it is imperative to restore the authoritative voice via high culture.

The BAT have contributed to the prevalence of youth culture, while state owned television stations have remained dedicated in the productions of high culture. Apart from content censorship, productions featuring high culture are considered as a counteracting force against the youth culture – a measure to balance the media landscape. As a result, high-culture productions have abandoned their previously aloof style, catering to the viewing preferences of younger generations; online productions have put more attention into improving quality, and investment keeps increasing. Media systems in China are trying to find a middle ground, where youth culture and high culture are able to facilitate each other in both cultural production and cultural dissemination. The present confrontation between the two cultural forms, however, represents the tensions between capital and state power.

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9.3 THE BAT: A NEW DIGITAL POWER?

The formation of a new production culture empowers audience as well as platforms. Service integration increases platform accessibility, but also enables back-channelling for data acquisition and data analysis. The rising power of the BAT accentuates the risks of market monopolisation, and also exacerbates tensions between capital and state power. To some extent, Baidu, Alibaba and

Tencent (BAT) represent China’s digital economy. As world-renowned internet companies, the

BAT are creating national and international turmoil, constituting a threat to state power and international order. The business strategies of the three BAT are different yet similar: apart from their increasing international market value and constant competition in adjacent areas, the three entities are also fighting over users and data (the fundamental driver of profitability and technology innovation), which ultimately leads to capital incrementation. It is common for the BAT to conduct large-scale acquisitions and mergers that empower their services and platforms in various ways; however, the synergy and tension between capital and state power are more intricate than ever.

This situation is not only the case in China: as digital companies turn into national giants, the tension between capital and state power is a dynamic interaction that occurs globally. The recent incident that occurred between Facebook and the US Congress only serves as a reminder that the power of digital giants is endowed by general users, just as Congress is empowered by US citizens.

When digital media become a significant part of people’s lives and a large number of ‘netizens’4 have been born across various platforms, few rights are acknowledged for general users. In a sense, the confrontation between capital and state power is inevitable: sooner or later, they are destined to clash. By investigating the balance between these forces, this thesis hopes to draw attention to the

4 The term netizen is a portmanteau of the words ‘internet’ and ‘citizen’, as in ‘citizen of the ’. It describes a person who is actively involved in online communities or the internet in general. – Wikipedia.

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contested and strategic stance of online oligopolies to raise awareness and generate further discussion of the use and regulation of online services.

The BAT contributed to the coverage of internet services, and also raised the bar in terms of platform accessibility. Technology affordances of the BAT have accelerated social equality, narrowed the digital information gap (AliResearch, 2015) and improved local economies

(e.g. Alibaba’s endeavour to build a countryside e-commerce business has resolved information gap and transportation issues, which has improved employability and ‘hard to buy, hard to sell’ situations in rural areas). As the BAT grow into world-recognisable enterprises, they are constituting a new digital power, and are in most cases powerful allies of the state. However, the

BAT are also causing problems for the Chinese government: while they contribute to the evolution of the online environment, they are also creating various new regulatory issues, such as game addiction, the edge ball phenomenon and so on.

Drawing from Hong’s (2017) work, the BAT’s ‘in-between’ stance is one of the manifestations of contested state capitalism. The BAT oscillate between business strategies and state regulations, and their actions are contingent on government policies, just as the government struggles to regulate and support the domestic development and global expansion of these online behemoths. The interplay of the BAT and the state has accounted for the circumvention of a closer degree of supervision, which has complicated business strategies and content production. The BAT as a new digital power contribute but also threaten state power. The interrelation of capital and state power is a phenomenon that exists both in China and beyond.

9.4 GLOBALISATION OR GLOCALISATION

China’s global ambition is more than evident, not only in terms of increasing cultural power, but also with regard to offsetting the cultural deficit. Yet the question is whether the new production culture, which is increasingly being shaped by the BAT, will facilitate the globalisation or

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glocalisation of cultural productions in China? Prior to further analysis, it is imperative to become familiar with some basic facts. The strategic stance regarding globalisation differs between BAT enterprises and their affiliated streaming platforms. Most prominently, the BAT have been preparing for and deploying global expansion for some time, whereas streaming platforms have yet to schedule internationalisation on their agenda. Streaming platforms have concerns about providing services globally, considering copyright issues and technical affordances. However, joint ventures with global platforms such as Netflix have proved to be a mutually beneficial endeavour.

Netflix is finally involved in the Chinese market after years of lobbying, while for iQIYI (the

Chinese streaming platform in a partnership with Netflix) and other streaming platforms, screening content on Netflix is so far its most successful global adventure.

At the end of August 2018, there were 42 Chinese drama and 42 Chinese movies screening on Netflix, ranging from self-made productions to traditional TV shows and Hong Kong productions. On the platform level, the accessibility of Chinese content on a global streaming platform rendered opportunities to a broader audience, regardless of intended viewers (mainly

Chinese viewers or diasporas). On the content level, the growing number of exported cultural productions indicates the facilitation of the BAT in terms of glocalisation. BAT enterprises provided capital and pertinent support, enabled self-made productions to proliferate within Chinese markets, and contributed to benign competition in domestic markets. Unlike previous stages, where

Chinese viewers are largely influenced by Korean or American productions, Chinese audiences today are shifting their preferences back to domestic content.

Based on the development of Chinese screen media, globalisation can be divided into three stages: in stage 1, local viewers prefer global content; in stage 2, local viewers prefer local content; and in the final stage, global viewers prefer local content. This process of globalisation via glocalisation will ultimately be universally applicable. The BAT coalesced with streaming platforms to facilitate the glocalisation media sphere for their globalisation ambitions.

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Although Chinese productions are preferred by domestic audiences, it is still an ordeal to reach global viewers despite increased accessibility through Netflix. Previous analysis discussed the language barriers and cultural discount of Chinese productions. Compared with screen drama, variety shows contain more cultural elements, so are more likely to encounter cultural discount, and vice versa. One interesting comparison is the number of online variety shows on Netflix and

Chinese streaming services. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the number of variety shows on Chinese streaming platforms was 490 in 2016, and iQIYI contributed 76 productions. The number of

Netflix Originals in the variety sector, however, was no more than 10 programs by March 2018.

These data suggested that cultural discount, language barriers and so forth are still the most prominent hindrances to globalisation. Confronted with an international conundrum, the globalisation of Chinese productions is a dream that is still to be realised.

9.5 CONCLUSION: REIMAGING THE NEW PRODUCTION CULTURE AND ITS

RELATIONS WITH CULTURAL DISSEMINATION

Streaming services in China have propelled the development of online productions, facilitated the confrontation between youth culture and high culture, and raised concerns regarding synergies between capital and state power. More importantly, new production culture on a global scale is a content-professionalising process that has reconfigured the power distributions of media industries, from top down to bottom up – such as the curation of amateur-professionalised content. While streaming services in China challenges state-owned media systems, the international success of

Netflix threatens worldwide media systems as well – most prominently the Hollywood system.

What has been identified in this thesis, is a systematic process of professionalising content.

From self-made drama to self-made variety shows, these productions keep setting the bar higher in quality and investment, to compete with high-quality and high-cost traditional productions. To some extent, this trajectory is similar to the professionalisation of UGC productions through the

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process of ‘mining content’ or ‘digging for gold’ (see Chapter 8), when self-made productions are generated from adaptations of online literature. Platform-commissioned productions keep professionalising as they cultivate and contribute to the new production culture.

This study was able to explore the changing media system in China, and to examine the implications of the mega technology enterprises – the BAT – for the new production culture.

Although the influence of Netflix in the context of Chinese media has been discussed on several occasions, it is insufficient to unveil the changes in the global media system, due to restrictions in time and resources. Moreover, as a qualitative study, data are gained and analysed on the basis of interviews, so an inadequate number of interviews will have certain effects on the research findings.

This thesis has made an endeavour to deliver an overview of this rapidly changing field; however, a more comprehensive analysis of certain aspects is missing in this study, due to limited time and interview contacts. For instance, from Chapters 6 to 8, there are sparse case studies in each chapter, though these cases are representative of the relevant field; the data are less convincing without sufficient case studies for further referencing. Additionally, live streaming and the short video industry are mentioned briefly in this thesis, but these fields require more detailed examination in future studies. Instead of drawing from secondary sources to conduct more case studies, this thesis chose to utilise first-hand data from limited cases to deliver insights and analysis that would otherwise be difficult to generate from secondary sources. Despite this project having certain disadvantages, it has provided a structural analysis of the BAT and the screen industry; however, a much more comprehensive study is imperative as media systems continue to be shaped by platformisation, creating threats and opportunities for media globalisation and internet governance.

For Chinese media studies, it is timely to investigate live streaming culture and the short video industry, in order to further investigate changes to new production culture and the prevalence of grassroots culture. Additionally, co-productions between China and Netflix (if such arrangements exist in the future), their strategies to guard against cultural discount and the potential

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for cultural globalisation, media globalisation and censorship of the content of cultural exports are research topics worthy of further investigations.

On a global scale, platform-commissioned Netflix Originals disrupted the power distribution of the media industries to a broader extent, as evidenced by catering for viewer preferences via the algorithmic culture and disruption of distribution from transnational to global, and from traditional channels to online platforms. Netflix Originals refer to platform- commissioned productions that generate astronomical production costs and contribute to generating newly recruited subscribers. Netflix is a streaming platform, as well as a global screen investment and co-production agency. Regardless of the dispute regarding Netflix’s global expansion, it is growing into a global distribution system with unlimited co-production potential.

Netflix’s affordance of global distribution not only enforces American cultural dominance, but also generates globalisation opportunities for other cultures. As Netflix reaches for a more diversified audience, cultural diversity is, more than ever, embedded in its screen productions. If the pioneer of streaming services is becoming the strongest opponent of the most successful system of globalisation – most notably Hollywood – then disruption of the global media system has only just begun. How does Netflix reconfigure cultural globalisation? How is it possible to test, theorise and refine the conceptual framework of media globalisation (Lobato, 2019)? What are the prospects and debates in regards of platformisation, and what are the challenges for global media studies?

These research questions also require further investigation.

Additionally, drawing on future research questions that centre around , one notable tendency is the growing attention being given to datafication. Online platforms are gathering enormous amounts of digital data, and the question of how these data are acquired, processed and utilized, and the impacts of this for media practice and data privacy, are important areas for future research.

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Appendix A: Participant Information for QUT Research Project

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT RESEARCH PROJECT – Interview –

Digital Entertainment Media, Multiplatform Distribution, and China’s Quest for Cultural Soft Power

QUT Ethics Approval Number 1700000399

RESEARCH TEAM Principal Researcher: Chunmeizi Su PhD student Associate Researchers: Professor Terry Flew Principal Supervisor Distinguished Professor Stuart Cunningham Associate Supervisor Dr Mark Ryan Associate Supervisor Creative Industries Faculty Queensland University of Technology (QUT)

DESCRIPTION This project is being undertaken as part of a PhD study for Chunmeizi Su.

The purpose of this project is to understand the intersection of China’s internet and screen industries around new digital content platform. While there have been studies of Chinese media and the Chinese internet, this project is distinctive in bringing such work together.

You are invited to participate in this project because your professional role is related to this topic, and this means you have something to contribute to this knowledge, or you’ve been studying it for some time as a scholarly interest. PARTICIPATION Your participation will involve an audio recorded interview at a time and location that is mutually convenient, that will take approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour of your time.

General questions will include: • What’s your take on nascent online video forms, such as short videos, live streaming and so on? • To what extent and in what aspects has the online media industry advanced comparing to the traditional broadcasting media? • How do you think of the new business models emerging from the Chinese online media industries, and what does it mean for online media industry?

Professional role specific questions may include: • How are online and digital media platforms changing in China today? • What are the challenges from you own perspective?

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• How long have you been practicing in your field? • Has your business and/or creative strategy shifted and why? • Where do you see yourself in five years, and how would you describe the future internet and screen industry?

Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you do agree to participate you can withdraw from the project without comment or penalty. You can withdraw anytime during the interview. If you withdraw with 4 weeks after your interview, on request any identifiable information already obtained from you will be destroyed. Your decision to participate or not participate will in no way impact upon your current or future relationship with QUT or associated external organisation. EXPECTED BENEFITS It is expected that this project will not benefit you directly. To recognize your contribution should you choose to participate, the research team is offering a small gift from QUT. RISKS There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your participation in this project. PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY You can choose if you would like to be acknowledged by name, as an expert in your field, or if you would like your comments to be anonymous.

As the project involves an audio recording: • You will have the opportunity to verify your comments and responses prior to final inclusion. • The audio recording will be destroyed 5 years after completion of the study. • The audio recording will not be used for any other purpose. • Only the named researchers will have access to the audio recording.

Please note that non-identifiable data from this project may be used as comparative data in future projects or stored on an open access database for secondary analysis. CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE We would like to ask you to sign a written consent form (enclosed) to confirm your agreement to participate. QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT If you have any questions or require further information, please contact one of the listed researchers:

Chunmeizi Su [email protected] Terry Flew [email protected] +61 7 3138 8188 CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE PROJECT QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects. However, if you do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the project you may contact the QUT Research Ethics Advisory Team on +61 7 3138 5123 or email [email protected]. The QUT Research Ethics Advisory Team is not connected with the research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial manner. THANK YOU FOR HELPING WITH THIS RESEARCH PROJECT. PLEASE KEEP THIS SHEET FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

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Appendix B: Consnet Form for The Interviewees

CONSENT FORM FOR QUT RESEARCH PROJECT – Interview –

Digital Entertainment Media, Multiplatform Distribution, and China’s Quest for Cultural Soft Power

QUT Ethics Approval Number 1700000399

RESEARCH TEAM Chunmeizi Su [email protected] Terry Flew [email protected] +61 7 3138 8188 STATEMENT OF CONSENT By signing below, you are indicating that you:

• Have read and understood the information document regarding this project.

• Have had any questions answered to your satisfaction.

• Understand that if you have any additional questions you can contact the research team.

• Understand that you are free to withdraw without comment or penalty.

• Understand that if you have concerns about the ethical conduct of the project you can contact the Research Ethics Advisory Team on +61 7 3138 5123 or email [email protected].

• Understand that the project will include an audio recording.

• Understand that non-identifiable data from this project may be used as comparative data in future projects.

• Agree to participate in the project.

Please tick the relevant box below: I agree for my comments made at the interview to be acknowledged by name. I do not agree for my comments made at the interview to be acknowledged by name.

Name

Signature

Date

PLEASE RETURN THE SIGNED CONSENT FORM TO THE RESEARCHER.

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