Why Rebels Reject Peace
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Why Rebels Reject Peace The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Huff, Connor Dezzani. 2019. Why Rebels Reject Peace. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42013084 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA Why Rebels Reject Peace A dissertation presented by Connor Maurilio Dezzani Huff to The Department of Government in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Political Science Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts June 2019 ©2019 — Connor Maurilio Dezzani Huff All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisor: Jeffry Frieden Connor Maurilio Dezzani Huff Why Rebels Reject Peace Abstract The successful resolution of violent intrastate conflict often depends upon rebels being willing to accept compromise peace settlements. However, some rebels refuse to do so, in- stead forming splinter organizations who perpetuate and escalate the violence in an effort to undermine the peace. Why? This dissertation presents a new individual-level theory of rebel decision-making. I argue that rebels’ personal experiences shape their anger toward, and trust in, the adversary they are combating. Rebels with higher levels of anger derive greater utility from defeating the government adversary outright, while rebels with lower levels of trust are less likely to think the government will abide by the terms of a proposed settlement. Increasing the value rebels place on defeating the government and decreasing expectations the government will abide by the deal, make individual rebels more likely to continue fighting throughout the reject compromise peace settlements. Rebels’ personal ex- periences aggregate over time, which create a distribution of rebels who vary in the likelihood they will compromise. I apply the experience-based theory to the case of one of the longest running conflicts in modern history: the fight for a united and independent Ireland. I study two distinct choices faced by rebels after the decision to participate at conflict onset: the decision to continue fighting as the conflict unfolded, and the decision of whether to accept a compromise peace settlement. Following the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921—which established an Irish Free State and partitioned Ireland into what is now the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland—fellow rebel combatants were forced to decide whether to accept the treaty or instead continue fighting against British government forces. Disagreements in this decision iii would plunge Ireland into a bloody civil war, pitting the “Pro-Treaty” versus “Anti-Treaty” factions of the once united Irish Republican Army against one another. The dissertation uses new individual-level data gathered from the military pension appli- cations of over 1,500 rebel combatants to study how rebels’ life experiences—such as being socialized into the rebel organizations, imprisoned, and persuaded by their commanding of- ficers when offers of peace were on the table—affected the likelihood they continued fighting throughout the duration of the Irish War of Independence and accepted or rejected the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty. This is the first dataset ever compiled that includes individual-level information tracing the membership of a rebel organization through the entirety of a violent conflict. The dissertation thus demonstrates how the relative extremism of the membership of a rebel organization endogenously changes throughout the entirety of a violent conflict as result of government and rebel group actions. iv | Contents Abstract iii Acknowledgments vii 1 Introduction 1 1.1 The Benefits of an Individual-Level Approach: Endogenizing Individual Rebel Extremism . .4 1.2 Theory in Brief . .6 1.3 Empirics in Brief . 10 1.4 Contribution of the Dissertation . 14 1.5 The Structure of the Dissertation . 16 2 A Theory for Why Rebels Reject Peace 18 2.1 Why Individual Rebels Reject Compromise Peace Settlements . 18 2.2 How Rebel Experiences Shapes Who Rejects Peace Settlements . 20 2.3 A Distribution of Rebels Varying in Their Willingness to Compromise . 29 2.4 How Persuasion Shapes Who Rejects Peace Settlements . 37 2.5 How Economic Incentives Shape Who Rejects Peace Settlements . 40 2.6 Conclusion . 43 3 How Individual Rebel Experiences Shape Rebel Group Composition 44 3.1 Historical Background on the Conflict in Ireland . 47 3.2 How Imprisonment Affected Who Kept Fighting: The Role of Anger and Trust 50 3.3 Individual-Level Data on Rebel Combatants in 1916-1923 Ireland . 55 3.4 Main Result: Imprisoned Rebels Fight Until Truce at Higher Rates . 65 3.5 Alternative Mechanism: Payment to Formerly Imprisoned Rebels . 66 3.6 Considering External Validity: Sample Composition, the Strength of Treat- ment, and the Control Group . 69 3.7 Conclusion . 71 4 Rebel Experiences and the Decision to Reject Peace 73 4.1 How Experiences Shape Rebels’ Priors About the Government . 77 4.2 How Persuasion Shapes Who Rejects Peace Settlements . 82 4.3 Data . 87 4.4 Results . 92 4.5 Addressing Additional Empirical Challenges and the Robustness of Results . 98 v 4.6 Conclusion . 99 5 Conclusion: Implications and Extensions of the Dissertation 102 5.1 Introduction . 102 5.2 External Validity . 103 5.3 Area of Future Work: How Individual Experiences Shape Group Behavior . 109 5.4 Conclusion . 110 A Appendix 113 A.1 Additional Information About the Military Pensions Collection . 113 A.2 Estimating Effects Among 1934 Pension Wave . 115 A.3 Estimating Effects with Dependent Variable Approved for Service . 117 A.4 Signing the Bias on False Negatives in Measuring Imprisonment Status . 119 Bibliography 120 vi | Acknowledgments This dissertation would not exist if not for the unwavering support of my family, friends, and advisors. My dissertation committee was incredible. Jeff Frieden trained me how to think. His clarity and patience are unrivaled, and if my future work falls short theoretically, it certainly won’t be due to a lack of effort on Jeff’s end. Dustin Tingley was the first faculty member I worked with at Harvard, and he taught me how to start, and finish, papers. His ability to think clearly about both theory and methods is incredibly rare, and was invaluable throughout the development of this dissertation. Josh Kertzer began at Harvard my third year, and was a jolt of creativity, energy, and inspiration within the international relations community. My research benefited tremendously from Josh’s ability to see the deep links between disparate bodies of research, and I am grateful for the mentorship Josh provided on countless issues, large and small. Dara Kay Cohen is the faculty member every graduate student dreams of having on their committee. Simultaneously incisive, brilliant, inspiring, and encouraging, my research and dissertation improved significantly thanks to her. I benefited tremendously from fruitful discussions of my project with colleagues at Har- vard and other institutions. I thank Laia Balcells, Muhammet Bas, Matthew Blackwell, Melani Cammett, Thomas Cavanna, Dara Kay Cohen, Jesse Driscoll, Songying Fang, James Fearon, Jeffry Frieden, Michael Gill, Andrew Hall, Soeren Henn, Dana Higgins, Tyler Jost, Casey Kearney, Joshua Kertzer, Dean Knox, Dominika Kruszewska, Shiro Kuriwaki, David Lake, Boram Lee, Ashley Leeds, Jack Levy, Christopher Lucas, Aseem Mahajan, Rose Mc- Dermott, Keren Yarhi-Milo, Cliff Morgan, Neil Narang, Richard Nielsen, Kenneth Scheve, Robert Schub, Jacob Shapiro, Beth Simmons, Austin Strange, Anton Strezhnev, Kai Thaler, vii Dustin Tingley, Michael Tomz, Michelle Torres, Barbara Walter, Jeremy Weinstein, Ariel White, Steven Wilkinson, and Thomas Zeitzoff for taking the time to meet with me and provide detailed feedback on my project. The project is signficantly improved thanks to you. I thank audience participants at Brown University, the Columbia-Harvard-Princeton- NYU-Yale Politics and History Conference, EITM Summer Institute at Duke University, Harvard International Relations Workshop, Harvard Experiments Working Group, Harvard- MIT-Tufts-Yale Political Violence Conference, NYU Abu Dhabi, Princeton University, Rice University, Rutgers University, UCSD, the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Graduate Student Associate Program, and Yale University, for helpful comments and sug- gestions. Constantine Boussalis, Thomas Chadefaux, and William Phelan graciously hosted me at Trinity College, Dublin. Rachel Nevins and Féilim O’Connor treated me like family when I was in Ireland. I owe you both a pint. Cécile Gordon, Michael Keane, and the staff at the Military Archives in Dublin provided invaluable guidance on the complexities of the military pension applications. I am grateful to Lorcan Collins, Diarmaid Ferriter, Liz Gillis, Mary Hatfield, Marnie Hay, Leah Hunnewell, and Mícheál Ó Doibhilín for helpful conversations and suggestions for navigating both the fascinating history and archival resources available for early 20th century Ireland. The most rewarding part of the job is trying to figure out how to answer hard questions with your closest friends, and I couldn’t have asked for a better crew. Andy Hall, Chris Lucas, Rob Schub, and Ariel White were fantastic co-authors, and even better friends.