DOCSLIB.ORG

Abyei: Sudan's Kashmir

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Abyei: Sudan's Kashmir www.enoughproject.org Abyei: Sudan’s Kashmir HISTORY OF ABYEI The key to a comprehensive peace in Sudan hinges Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)—The upon Abyei, the volatile and oil rich area astride agreement signed in January 2005 that ended the the boundary between North and South Sudan. twenty-year-long war between North and South Historically unique, Abyei developed a reputation Sudan; the CPA is slowly deteriorating as the Gov- as a bridge between North and South Sudan, but ernment of Sudan continues to fail to implement eventually as Southern nationalism grew during elements, such as its commitment on Abyei. the first North-South War, the identity of the Ngok Dinka of Abyei as Southerners surged. That war Government of National Unity—The government ended with an agreement in which Abyei won a made up of representatives from South Sudan and referendum which promised its population the the NCP, created by the CPA. choice to remain in Kordofan or be integrated into South Sudan. True to course, Khartoum failed to National Congress Party (NCP)—The ruling national implement this referendum. party of Sudan has failed to implement its commit- During the second North-South war, last- ing twenty years, the Ngok Dinka were SAUDI ARABIA EGYPT Lake R scattered and Abyei uninhabited. The U.S. SUDAN E Nasser D helped the Government of Sudan and Halaib S E Wadi Halfa A the SPLM broker the peace agreement Selima Oasis Lake Salala Nubia reached in 2005, but the two parties Muhammad Qol Laqiya Arba’in Port Sudan could not come to an agreement on Kerma Abu Hamed e Suakin Nukheila Dongola il Karima N RED SEA Abyei. Determined not to let the talks Merowe Tokar El’Atrun Haiya NORTHERN Karora Atbara unravel, the U.S. drafted the text of Gadamai war CHAD Ho NILE Ed Damer di a Shendi an Abyei agreement, called the “Abyei W ERITREA Abu’Uruq KKHARTOUMHARTO M KASSALA Protocol,” which both parties signed, but NORTHERN Omdurman Halfa al Kassala DARFUR NORTHERN KHARTOUM Gadida Miski KORDOFAN EL GEZIRA Sudanese President Bashir has rejected it. Wad Medani Sodiri Gedaref Umm Badr El Geneina Al Fasher El Obeid GEDAREF Sinnar WESTERN Kosti En Nahud Today, Abyei remains tense. The displaced DARFUR WHITE SENNAR Nyala NILE T'ana Abu Zabad Hayk' Renk Ed Damazin population has begun to return, but life SOUTHERN Al Fula SOUTHERN e l DARFUR KORDOFAN i BLUE Ed Da’ein N Famaka Tullus Muglad e t NILE is very basic and peace fragile. Kologi i Buram h Kadugli W Talodi Paloich Radom Abyei UPPER NILE UNITY Kafia Kingi NORTHERN BAHR Malakal EL GHAZAL Bentiu Kigille ETHIOPIA Aweil KEY PLAYERS Raga WARRAB CENTRAL Fathai Wau Akobo AFRICAN REPUBLIC WESTERN BAHR LAKES Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC)—The EL GHAZAL JONGLEI RumbekW Ukwaa h WESTERN i t EQUATORIA e Bor Towot commission—made up of five representa- N SUDAN i l Amadi e EASTERN EQUATORIA National capital Li Yubu tives of each party (Government of Sudan Maridi Kapoeta State (wilayah) capital Yambio Juba CENTRAL Torit Ch'ew Bahir Town EQUATORIA and SPLM) and five international experts— Nagishot Major airport Yei e L. Turkana International boundary il (L. Rudolf) N commissioned to reach an agreement on DEMOCRATIC t r State (wilayah) boundary e UGANDA b REPUBLIC OF l A ctori Proposed separation Vi a N i l Abyei that would be final and binding; THE CONGO e between North and South L. Albert KENYA despite this agreement, it was summarily L. Kyoga Source: Map adapted from United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section, Map No. 3707 Rev. 10. rejected by Sudan’s President Bashir. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. www.enoughproject.org ment on Abyei and other elements of the CPA. This non-resolution of Abyei and the lack of interest is part of a pattern of obstruction that is at the demonstrated by the key international partners— core of its strategy, closely linked to its obstruction especially the U.S.—means that the threat of Abyei of the UN-AU Darfur force. unraveling remains a dagger pointed at the hopes of peace in Sudan. The U.S. helped lead the nego- Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army tiations that produced the CPA, and in particular (SPLM/A)—The Southern rebel movement had sus- the Abyei portion of the agreement. The U.S. must pended its participation in the GNU, but announced lead multilateral diplomatic efforts to break the in December, 2007 that it would return, suggesting impasse over Abyei which threatens the CPA, and an agreement had been reached on all the CPA is- more widely a potential peace for Darfur. sues except those provisions related to Abyei. U.S. POLICY IMPERATIVES United States—The U.S. played a critical role in brokering the CPA, but has been largely missing • Defining a U.S. legacy—President Bush should in action in terms of facilitating and pushing for view proper implementation of the CPA as a leg- faithful implementation of the Abyei Protocol. acy issue, and Abyei is the provision that has the strongest U.S. connection ABYEI PROTOCOL It is a legacy issue for President Bush, and a The U.S. drafted the text of the Abyei Protocol in life or death issue for the people of Sudan. March 2004; both the SPLM and the Government of Sudan eventually signed. In brief, the Protocol provides for special administrative status, a mecha- • Building a diplomatic team—Ambassador Rich nism for local governance in 2011, a process to de- Williamson, the newly appointed Presidential En- termine Abyei’s boundaries, a share of oil revenues voy for Sudan, needs two full-time deputies, one to meet the needs of Abyei survivors and returnees, focusing on the CPA and the other on Darfur, as a security arrangement, and a referendum in 2011 well as a small team of diplomats based in the to determine Abyei’s final status: in the North or field. in the South. • Imposing a cost—The U.S. should work within the THE STAKES ARE HIGH UN Security Council to press for targeted sanc- tions on anyone obstructing implementation of The NCP’s failure to implement the Abyei protocols the CPA or the deployment of the UN-AU hybrid has dangerous repercussions for the South, Darfur force. The U.S. must also work with the European and all of Sudan. Its rejection of the ABC report, Union to coordinate pressures and provide intel- and the international community’s silence, has set ligence to the International Criminal Court. the precedent that one party to the CPA can abro- gate the CPA provisions without penalty. This could • Creating a field presence—The U.S. needs to have hold serious implications for the 2009 elections, a regular and visible presence in Abyei for both the referendum in 2011, and it raises the threat of political and programmatic reasons. violence and a return to full-scale war. Furthermore, the Darfur rebel groups severely question why • Preparing for national elections—The U.S. must they should enter into negotiations with the ruling use sticks and carrots to press for free and fair party, whose track record of abiding by negotiated elections in Abyei in 2009 and in the referendum settlements has been thoroughly negative. The scheduled for 2011..
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Humanitarian Situation Report No. 19 Q3 2020 Highlights
    Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report No. 19 Q3 2020 UNICEF and partners assess damage to communities in southern Khartoum. Sudan was significantly affected by heavy flooding this summer, destroying many homes and displacing families. @RESPECTMEDIA PlPl Reporting Period: July-September 2020 Highlights Situation in Numbers • Flash floods in several states and heavy rains in upriver countries caused the White and Blue Nile rivers to overflow, damaging households and in- 5.39 million frastructure. Almost 850,000 people have been directly affected and children in need of could be multiplied ten-fold as water and mosquito borne diseases devel- humanitarian assistance op as flood waters recede. 9.3 million • All educational institutions have remained closed since March due to people in need COVID-19 and term realignments and are now due to open again on the 22 November. 1 million • Peace talks between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Revolu- internally displaced children tionary Front concluded following an agreement in Juba signed on 3 Oc- tober. This has consolidated humanitarian access to the majority of the 1.8 million Jebel Mara region at the heart of Darfur. internally displaced people 379,355 South Sudanese child refugees 729,530 South Sudanese refugees (Sudan HNO 2020) UNICEF Appeal 2020 US $147.1 million Funding Status (in US$) Funds Fundi received, ng $60M gap, $70M Carry- forward, $17M *This table shows % progress towards key targets as well as % funding available for each sector. Funding available includes funds received in the current year and carry-over from the previous year. 1 Funding Overview and Partnerships UNICEF’s 2020 Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal for Sudan requires US$147.11 million to address the new and protracted needs of the afflicted population.
    [Show full text]
  • No More Hills Ahead?
    No More Hills Ahead? The Sudan’s Tortuous Ascent to Heights of Peace Emeric Rogier August 2005 NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CLINGENDAEL CIP-Data Koninklijke bibliotheek, The Hague Rogier, Emeric No More Hills Ahead? The Sudan’s Tortuous Ascent to Heights of Peace / E. Rogier – The Hague, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. Clingendael Security Paper No. 1 ISBN 90-5031-102-4 Language-editing by Rebecca Solheim Desk top publishing by Birgit Leiteritz Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme Clingendael 7 2597 VH The Hague Phonenumber +31(0)70 - 3245384 Telefax +31(0)70 - 3282002 P.O. Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.clingendael.nl The Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael is an independent institute for research, training and public information on international affairs. It publishes the results of its own research projects and the monthly ‘Internationale Spectator’ and offers a broad range of courses and conferences covering a wide variety of international issues. It also maintains a library and documentation centre. © Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyrightholders. Clingendael Institute, P.O. Box 93080, 2509 AB The Hague, The Netherlands. Contents Foreword i Glossary of Abbreviations iii Executive Summary v Map of Sudan viii Introduction 1 Chapter 1 The Sudan: A State of War 5 I.
    [Show full text]
  • “Kankasha” in Kassala: a Prospective Observational Cohort Study of the Clinical Characteristics, Epidemiology, Genetic Origi
    medRxiv preprint doi: https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.09.23.20199976; this version posted September 24, 2020. The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not certified by peer review) is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity. It is made available under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license . 1 1 Title [216/250 characters] 2 “Kankasha” in Kassala: a prospective observational cohort study of the clinical characteristics, 3 epidemiology, genetic origin, and chronic impact of the 2018 epidemic of Chikungunya virus 4 infection in Kassala, Sudan 5 Short title: [66/70characters] 6 Understanding the 2018 Chikungunya virus epidemic in Eastern Sudan 7 8 Authors: Hilary Bower1*, Mubarak el Karsany2,3*, Abd Alhadi Adam Hussein4, Mubarak Ibrahim 9 Idriss5, Ma’aaza Abasher AlZain6, Mohamed Elamin Ahmed Alfakiyousif2, Rehab Mohamed2, Iman 10 Mahmoud2, Omer Albadri,7 Suha Abdulaziz Alnour Mahmoud10, Orwa Ibrahim Abdalla10, Mawahib 11 Eldigail2, Nuha Elagib2, Ulrike Arnold1, Bernardo Gutierrez8, Oliver G. Pybus8, Daniel P. Carter9, Steven 12 T. Pullan9, Shevin T. Jacob11, Tajeldin Mohammedein Abdallah4,10#, Benedict Gannon1# , Tom E. 13 Fletcher11# 14 * Equal first authors, # Equal senior authors 15 16 Authors’ affiliations 17 1. UK Public Health Rapid Support Team, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine/Public Health 18 England, London, United Kingdom 19 2. National Public Health Laboratory, Federal Ministry of Health, Khartoum, Sudan 20 3. Karary University, Omdurman, Sudan 21 4. University of Kassala, Kassala, Sudan 22 5. Laboratory Division, Kassala State Ministry of Health, Kassala, Sudan 23 6. Communicable Disease Surveillance & Events Unit, Federal Ministry of Health, Khartoum, Sudan 24 7.
    [Show full text]
  • Sudan Food Security Outlook Report
    SUDAN Food Security Outlook February to September 2019 Deteriorating macroeconomic conditions to drive high levels of acute food insecurity in 2019 KEY MESSAGES • Food security has seasonally improved with increased cereal Current food security outcomes, February 2019 availability following the November to February harvest. However, the macroeconomic situation remains very poor and is expected to further deteriorate throughout the projection period, and this will drive continued extremely high food and non-food prices. The negative impacts of high food prices will be somewhat mitigated by the fact that livestock prices and wage labor are also increasing, though overall purchasing power will remain below average. A higher number of households than is typical will face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes through September. • Between June and September, the lean season in Sudan, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected in parts of Red Sea, Kassala, Al Gadarif, Blue Nile, West Kordofan, North Kordofan, South Kordofan, and Greater Darfur. Of highest concern are the IDPs in SPLM-N controlled areas of South Kordofan and SPLA-AW controlled areas of Jebel Marra, who have been inaccessible for both assessments and food assistance deliveries. IDPs in these areas are expected to be in Source: FEWS NET FEWS NET classification is IPC-compatible. IPC-compatible analysis follows Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during the August-September peak key IPC protocols but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of national of the lean season. food security partners. • The June to September 2019 rainy season is forecasted to be above average. This is anticipated to lead to flooding in mid-2019 and increase the prevalence of waterborne disease.
    [Show full text]
  • Promoting Peace and Resilience in Unity State, South Sudan
    BRIEF / FEBRUARY 2021 Promoting peace and resilience in Unity state, South Sudan The town of Bentiu, located in Rubkona County, is the comprising 11,529 households.1 Although people capital of the oil-rich Unity state and is predominately living in the PoC site are provided with protection and inhabited by the Nuer people. A series of waterways and humanitarian assistance, they still face challenges swamps cover large parts of the state and these provide including economic hardship, being targeted by armed pasture in the dry season for animals belonging to Nuer groups, violent crime, revenge killings inside the PoC and Dinka pastoralists, as well as other pastoralist site, and outbreaks of disease as a result of the crowded groups from neighbouring Sudan who migrate with conditions in which they live. In July 2020, UNMISS their animals into South Sudan during dry seasons in initiated consultations about its intention to re-designate search of grazing land and water. Unity state also sits the PoC sites in the country to IDP camps and hand over on some of the largest oil deposits in South Sudan and a responsibility of these camps to the government of South considerable amount of petroleum-related activity takes Sudan. People living in the Bentiu PoC site expressed place in and around Bentiu. The production of oil has concern at this plan – while conditions inside the contributed to fuelling conflicts in the state, resulting in camp are very poor, IDPs fear the threat of violence and displacement and environmental degradation. insecurity outside the PoCs if responsibility is transferred.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategic Peacebuilding- the Role of Civilians and Civil Society in Preventing Mass Atrocities in South Sudan
    SPECIAL REPORT Strategic Peacebuilding The Role of Civilians and Civil Society in Preventing Mass Atrocities in South Sudan The Cases of the SPLM Leadership Crisis (2013), the Military Standoff at General Malong’s House (2017), and the Wau Crisis (2016–17) NYATHON H. MAI JULY 2020 WEEKLY REVIEW June 7, 2020 The Boiling Frustrations in South Sudan Abraham A. Awolich outh Sudan’s 2018 peace agreement that ended the deadly 6-year civil war is in jeopardy, both because the parties to it are back to brinkmanship over a number S of mildly contentious issues in the agreement and because the implementation process has skipped over fundamental st eps in a rush to form a unity government. It seems that the parties, the mediators and guarantors of the agreement wereof the mind that a quick formation of the Revitalized Government of National Unity (RTGoNU) would start to build trust between the leaders and to procure a public buy-in. Unfortunately, a unity government that is devoid of capacity and political will is unable to address the fundamentals of peace, namely, security, basic services, and justice and accountability. The result is that the citizens at all levels of society are disappointed in RTGoNU, with many taking the law, order, security, and survival into their own hands due to the ubiquitous absence of government in their everyday lives. The country is now at more risk of becoming undone at its seams than any other time since the liberation war ended in 2005. The current st ate of affairs in the country has been long in the making.
    [Show full text]
  • The Economics of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur
    The Economics of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur John Prendergast, Omer Ismail, and Akshaya Kumar August 2013 WWW.ENOUGHPROJECT.ORG WWW.SATSENTINEL.ORG The Economics of Ethnic Cleansing in Darfur John Prendergast, Omer Ismail, and Akshaya Kumar August 2013 COVER PHOTO Displaced Beni Hussein cattle shepherds take shelter on the outskirts of El Sereif village, North Darfur. Fighting over gold mines in North Darfur’s Jebel Amer area between the Janjaweed Abbala forces and Beni Hussein tribe started early this January and resulted in mass displacement of thousands. AP PHOTO/UNAMID, ALBERT GONZALEZ FARRAN Overview Darfur is burning again, with devastating results for its people. A kaleidoscope of Janjaweed forces are once again torching villages, terrorizing civilians, and systematically clearing prime land and resource-rich areas of their inhabitants. The latest ethnic-cleans- ing campaign has already displaced more than 300,000 Darfuris this year and forced more than 75,000 to seek refuge in neighboring Chad, the largest population displace- ment in recent years.1 An economic agenda is emerging as a major driver for the escalating violence. At the height of the mass atrocities committed from 2003 to 2005, the Sudanese regime’s strategy appeared to be driven primarily by the counterinsurgency objectives and secondarily by the acquisition of salaries and war booty. Undeniably, even at that time, the government could have only secured the loyalty of its proxy Janjaweed militias by allowing them to keep the fertile lands from which they evicted the original inhabitants. Today’s violence is even more visibly fueled by monetary motivations, which include land grabbing; consolidating control of recently discovered gold mines; manipulating reconciliation conferences for increased “blood money”; expanding protection rackets and smuggling networks; demanding ransoms; undertaking bank robberies; and resum- ing the large-scale looting that marked earlier periods of the conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • North Darfur II
    Darfur Humanitarian Profile Annexes: I. North Darfur II. South Darfur III. West Darfur Darfur Humanitarian Profile Annex I: North Darfur North Darfur Main Humanitarian Agencies Table 1.1: UN Agencies Table 1.2: International NGOs Table 1.3: National NGOs Intl. Natl. Vehicl Intl. Natl. Vehic Intl. Natl. Vehic Agency Sector staff staff* es** Agency Sector staff staff* les** Agency Sector staff staff les FAO 10 1 2 2 ACF 9 4 12 3 Al-Massar 0 1 0 Operations, Logistics, Camp IOM*** Management x x x GAA 1, 10 1 3 2 KSCS x x x OCHA 14 1 2 3 GOAL 2, 5, 8, 9 6 117 10 SECS x x x 2, 3, 7, UNDP*** 15 x x x ICRC 12, 13 6 20 4 SRC 1, 2 0 10 3 2, 4, 5, 6, UNFPA*** 5, 7 x x x IRC 9, 10, 11 1 5 4 SUDO 5, 7 0 2 0 Protection, Technical expertise for UNHCR*** site planning x x x MSF - B 5 5 10 0 Wadi Hawa 1 1 x 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, Oxfam - UNICEF 9 11, 12 4 5 4 GB 2, 3, 4 5 30 10 Total 1 14 3 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, UNJLC*** 17 x x x SC-UK 11, 12 5 27 8 Technical Spanish UNMAS*** advice x x x Red Cross 3, 4 1 0 1 UNSECOORD 16 1 1 1 DED*** x x x WFP 1, 9, 11 1 12 5 NRC*** x x x WHO 4, 5, 6 2 7 2 Total 34 224 42 Total 10 29 17 x = information unavailable at this time Sectors: 1) Food 2) Shelter/NFIs 3) Clean water 4) Sanitation 5) Primary Health Facilities *Programme and project staff only.
    [Show full text]
  • Secretary-General's Report on South Sudan (September 2020)
    United Nations S/2020/890 Security Council Distr.: General 8 September 2020 Original: English Situation in South Sudan Report of the Secretary-General I. Introduction 1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2514 (2020), by which the Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) until 15 March 2021 and requested me to report to the Council on the implementation of the Mission’s mandate every 90 days. It covers political and security developments between 1 June and 31 August 2020, the humanitarian and human rights situation and progress made in the implementation of the Mission’s mandate. II. Political and economic developments 2. On 17 June, the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, and the First Vice- President, Riek Machar, reached a decision on responsibility-sharing ratios for gubernatorial and State positions, ending a three-month impasse on the allocations of States. Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, Warrap and Unity were allocated to the incumbent Transitional Government of National Unity; Upper Nile, Western Bahr el-Ghazal and Western Equatoria were allocated to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO); and Jonglei was allocated to the South Sudan Opposition Alliance. The Other Political Parties coalition was not allocated a State, as envisioned in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, in which the coalition had been guaranteed 8 per cent of the positions. 3. On 29 June, the President appointed governors of 8 of the 10 States and chief administrators of the administrative areas of Abyei, Ruweng and Pibor.
    [Show full text]
  • Downloaded from Brill.Com09/24/2021 04:59:59AM Via Free Access “They Are Now Community Police” 411
    international journal on minority and group rights 22 (2015) 410-434 brill.com/ijgr “They Are Now Community Police”: Negotiating the Boundaries and Nature of the Government in South Sudan through the Identity of Militarised Cattle-keepers Naomi Pendle PhD Candidate, London School of Economics, London, UK [email protected] Abstract Armed, cattle-herding men in Africa are often assumed to be at a relational and spatial distance from the ‘legitimate’ armed forces of the government. The vision constructed of the South Sudanese government in 2005 by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement removed legitimacy from non-government armed groups including localised, armed, defence forces that protected communities and cattle. Yet, militarised cattle-herding men of South Sudan have had various relationships with the governing Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army over the last thirty years, blurring the government – non government boundary. With tens of thousands killed since December 2013 in South Sudan, questions are being asked about options for justice especially for governing elites. A contextual understanding of the armed forces and their relationship to gov- ernment over time is needed to understand the genesis and apparent legitimacy of this violence. Keywords South Sudan – policing – vigilantism – transitional justice – war crimes – security © NAOMI PENDLE, 2015 | doi 10.1163/15718115-02203006 This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial 4.0 (CC-BY-NC 4.0) License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 04:59:59AM via free access “they Are Now Community Police” 411 1 Introduction1 On 15 December 2013, violence erupted in Juba, South Sudan among Nuer sol- diers of the Presidential Guard.
    [Show full text]
  • Soil and Oil
    COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE COALITION FOR I NTERNATIONAL JUSTICE SOIL AND OIL: DIRTY BUSINESS IN SUDAN February 2006 Coalition for International Justice 529 14th Street, N.W. Suite 1187 Washington, D.C., 20045 www.cij.org February 2006 i COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE COALITION FOR I NTERNATIONAL JUSTICE SOIL AND OIL: DIRTY BUSINESS IN SUDAN February 2006 Coalition for International Justice 529 14th Street, N.W. Suite 1187 Washington, D.C., 20045 www.cij.org February 2006 ii COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE © 2006 by the Coalition for International Justice. All rights reserved. February 2006 iii COALITION FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS CIJ wishes to thank the individuals, Sudanese and not, who graciously contributed assistance and wisdom to the authors of this research. In particular, the authors would like to express special thanks to Evan Raymer and David Baines. February 2006 iv 25E 30E 35E SAUDI ARABIA ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT LIBYA Red Lake To To Nasser Hurghada Aswan Sea Wadi Halfa N u b i a n S aS D e s e r t ha ah raar a D De se es re tr t 20N N O R T H E R N R E D S E A 20N Kerma Port Sudan Dongola Nile Tokar Merowe Haiya El‘Atrun CHAD Atbara KaroraKarora RIVER ar Ed Damer ow i H NILE A d tb a a W Nile ra KHARTOUM KASSALA ERITREA NORTHERN Omdurman Kassala To Dese 15N KHARTOUM DARFUR NORTHERN 15N W W W GEZIRA h h KORDOFAN h i Wad Medani t e N i To le Gedaref Abéche Geneina GEDAREF Al Fasher Sinnar El Obeid Kosti Blu WESTERN Rabak e N i En Nahud le WHITE DARFUR SINNAR WESTERN NILE To Nyala Dese KORDOFAN SOUTHERN Ed Damazin Ed Da‘ein Al Fula KORDOFAN BLUE SOUTHERN Muglad Kadugli DARFUR NILE B a Paloich h 10N r e 10N l 'Arab UPPER NILE Abyei UNIT Y Malakal NORTHERN ETHIOPIA To B.A.G.
    [Show full text]
  • ETC Situation Report No 72.Pdf
    Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) ETC Situation Report #72 Reporting period 14/04/15 to 27/04/15 ETC RoSS Sitreps are distributed every two weeks. The next report will be issued on or around 11/05/15. Highlights In Bentiu (Unity State), a mission is ongoing in order to provide on-site ICT support and resolve internet connectivity issues experienced during the past weeks. The ETC will also continue to provide ICT Helpdesk services to all humanitarians acting in this area. In Old Fangak (Jonglei State), a front line ETC service deployment assessment mission is planned for the coming week. The ETC is concentrating its efforts on providing emergency response data connectivity, security telecommunication services and renewable power to priority locations identified by the Inter-Cluster Working Group Technician, Bagi Palangako, at work at the ETC Office in Juba (ICWG) in response to the ongoing complex Photo: WFP/George Fominyem crisis. Achievements The ETC continues to support 24x repeater sites for the provision of security telecommunications services. On-site as well as remote ICT support services are being provided to 9x data connectivity sites across the country. In Bor (Jonglei State), a mission was carried out in order to conduce radio programming and provide security telecommunications support to the humanitarians acting in this area. In Ganyiel (Unity State), connectivity issues were reported last week. This week, a successful mission was carried out to replace the faulty equipment. Reliable connectivity is now restored for the humanitarians responding in this area. In Yida (Unity State), a successful mission was completed to determine and resolve the connectivity issues experienced at this location.
    [Show full text]