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2.1 to Develop Institutional Conditions for Effective Detecting and Proving

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2.1 to Develop Institutional Conditions for Effective Detecting and Proving INCREASE OF EFFICIENCY IN COMBATING Organized Crime THROUGH RELEVANT APPLICATION OF PREVENTIVE AND REPRESSIVE ACTIONS, AND SEIZURE OF ASSETS OBTAINED THROUGH CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES MEASURES ACTIVITIES TASKS INDICATORS STAKEHOLDERS DEADLINES RESOURCES RISKS 2.1 To develop 2.1.1. Developing and 1. Reinforcement of capacities and 1. Improved working conditions Ministry of Justice, Continuously Human Lack of human institutional strengthening the enhancement of efficiency of the Special Special Prosecution resources/donati and material existing organizational Prosecution ons/budget resources conditions for 2. Improved motivation of the units for the fight employees effective detecting against Organized 2. Reinforcement of capacities and the 1. Improved working conditions Ministry of Justice Continuously Human Lack of human and proving of Crime based on gained enhancement of efficiency of the Special and all court levels resources/donati and material experiences, smuggling of Department of the County Court in Belgrade ons/budget resources drugs, people, possibilities and needs 2. Improved motivation of the employees vehicles, small weapons and other 3. Reinforcement of capacities and enhancement 1. Improved working conditions Ministry of Interior Continuously Human Lack of human goods, money of efficiency of the Service for Combating resources/donati and material Organized Crime within Criminal Police 2. Improved motivation of the ons/budget resources laundering, Directorate employees corruptive and 4. Reinforcement of capacities and enhancement 1. Improved working conditions Security Intelligence Continuously Human Lack of human criminal acts in the of efficiency of Security Intelligence Agency Agency resources/donati and material area of cyber 2. Improved motivation of the ons/budget resources technology and employees regular seizure of 5. Reinforcement of capacities and enhancement 1. Improved working conditions Ministry of Defense Continuously Human Lack of human assets gained of efficiency of Military Security Agency of the (Military Security resources/donati and material Ministry of Defense Agency) ons/budget resources through criminal 2. Improved motivation of the activities employees 6. Reinforcement of capacities and enhancement 1. Improved working conditions Ministry of Finance, Continuously Human Lack of human of efficiency of the Department for Prevention Department for resources/donati and material of Money Laundering 2. Improved motivation of the Prevention of ons/budget resources employees Money Laundering 7.Reinforcement of capacities and enhancement 1. Improved working conditions Ministry of Finance, Continuously Human Lack of human of efficiency of the tax police Taxing Department resources/donati and material 2. Improved motivation of the ons/budget resources employees 8. Reinforcement of capacities and enhancement 1. Improved working conditions Ministry of Finance, Continuously Human Lack of human of efficiency of the Sector for Control of Customs resources/donati and material Application of Customs Regulation Administration ons/budget resources 2. Improved motivation of the employees 1. Improved working conditions Ministry of Justice, Continuously Human Lack of human Department for resources/donati and material 9. Reinforcement of capacities and efficiency of the Special Prison Unit Execution of Prison ons/budget resources Sanctions 2.1 To develop 2.1.1. Developing and institutional strengthening the existing organizational conditions for units for the fight effective detecting against Organized and proving of Crime based on gained smuggling of experiences, drugs, people, possibilities and needs vehicles, small weapons and other goods, money laundering, corruptive and criminal acts in the area of cyber technology and regular seizure of assets gained through criminal activities Ministry of Justice, Continuously Human Lack of human Department for resources/donati and material MEASURES ACTIVITIES TASKS9. Reinforcement of capacities and INDICATORS STAKEHOLDERS DEADLINES RESOURCES RISKS Execution of Prison ons/budget resources efficiency of the Special Prison Unit 2. Improved motivation of the Sanctions employees 1. Number of conducted financial 1. Conducting financial investigations during Special Prosecution, 2.1.2. Consistent seizure investigations criminal investigations of OC Ministry of Interior Human Lack of human of assets acquired Continuously resources/donati and material through criminal 1. Value of seized assets 2. Seizure of assets obtained through criminal ons/budget resources activities continuously increases Courts activities 2.2.1 Develop efficiency 1. Apply optimal special investigative methods 1. Number of processed Lack of human in the application of in discovering and processing org. crim. groups org.crim.groups with use of Ministry of Justice, and material special investigative special investigative methods; Special Prosecution, resources methods in the fight Special Dpt of the against Organized 2. Monitoring the application of special 1. Best practice for application of County Court in investigative methods and recognizing the best special investigative methods Belgrade, Ministry Budget/donation Crime Continuously practices recognized of Interior, Security s Intelligence Agency, 1.. Improved efficiency of the use Ministry of Defense Lack of 3. Perfecting the use of special investigative of special investigative methods (Military Security funds/human methods in accordance with the best 2.2 Develop special Agency) resources practices investigative, operational tactical 2.2.2 Establishing the 1. Adopt the program and develop the action 1. Program of CIS developed and criminal criminal intelligence plan for the implementation of the Criminal action plan adopted Fourth quarter system within the Intelligence System 2009 intelligence and Budget, Ministry of Interior Ministry of Interior Lack of funds donations analytical (CIS) 2. Developing staff capacities and material 1. Improved quality and quantity Fourth quarter operational technical capacities of CIS of collected criminal intelligence 2012/continious methods in information ly combating 2.2.3 Advance the 1. Database formed Organized Crime existing analytical- 1. Forming the Special Prosecution data Special operational methods in base 2. Increased efficiency of Prosecution Lack of the fight against OC processing financial 2. Perfecting the use of analytics software 1. Number of conducted trainings Ministry of Interior, Human resources for automatization of analysis of collected Security Intelligence Continuously resources/donati information 2. Optimal use of software Agency, Ministry of ons/budget Defense (Military 1. Implementation of plans for Security Agency, 3. Enhancement of resources (material, technical enhancement of resources Lack of Ministry of Justice, or human) resources Ministry of Finance MEASURES ACTIVITIES TASKS INDICATORS STAKEHOLDERS DEADLINES RESOURCES RISKS 2.3.1 Accelerate the 1. Developed plan 2009 development of the no additional newly established Unit no risk 2. Report on the implementation 2010, funds needed for Financial 1. Develop capacities of the Unit for Financial of the plan continuously Investigations in line Investigations and establishment of regional 3. Financial Investigation Unit Ministry of Interior 2.3 To establish with the proposed plans lack of financial investigations units established with full human, budget, as well the material and new and develop material capacities 2013 donations, establishment of district human the existing human resources organizational Units for resources organisational Financial Investigations units for fight 2.3.2 Accelerate the 1. Develop capacities of the newly established 1. Developed plan Fourth quarter against organised development of Directorate for Managing Seized Assets 2010 crime capacities of the newly Ministry of Justice, 2. Report on the implementation Lack of human formed Directorate for Directorate for First quarter Human and material Managing Seized Assets of the plan Management of 2011 resources/budget resources 3. Developed human and material Seized Assets 2013 resources of the Directorate.
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