AUTHORITY REQUESTS for ACCESS to ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION – Legal Overview
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Gigabit-Broadband in the UK: Government Targets and Policy
BRIEFING PAPER Number CBP 8392, 30 April 2021 Gigabit-broadband in the By Georgina Hutton UK: Government targets and policy Contents: 1. Gigabit-capable broadband: what and why? 2. Gigabit-capable broadband in the UK 3. Government targets 4. Government policy: promoting a competitive market 5. Policy reforms to help build gigabit infrastructure Glossary www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary 2 Gigabit-broadband in the UK: Government targets and policy Contents Summary 3 1. Gigabit-capable broadband: what and why? 5 1.1 Background: superfast broadband 5 1.2 Do we need a digital infrastructure upgrade? 5 1.3 What is gigabit-capable broadband? 7 1.4 Is telecommunications a reserved power? 8 2. Gigabit-capable broadband in the UK 9 International comparisons 11 3. Government targets 12 3.1 May Government target (2018) 12 3.2 Johnson Government 12 4. Government policy: promoting a competitive market 16 4.1 Government policy approach 16 4.2 How much will a nationwide gigabit-capable network cost? 17 4.3 What can a competitive market deliver? 17 4.4 Where are commercial providers building networks? 18 5. Policy reforms to help build gigabit infrastructure 20 5.1 “Barrier Busting Task Force” 20 5.2 Fibre broadband to new builds 22 5.3 Tax relief 24 5.4 Ofcom’s work in promoting gigabit-broadband 25 5.5 Consumer take-up 27 5.6 Retiring the copper network 28 Glossary 31 ` Contributing Authors: Carl Baker, Section 2, Broadband coverage statistics Cover page image copyright: Blue Fiber by Michael Wyszomierski. -
3. Security-Intelligence Services in the Republic of Serbia Bogoljub Milosavljević and Predrag Petrović
3. Security-Intelligence Services in the Republic of Serbia Bogoljub Milosavljević and Predrag Petrović The Security-intelligence services (hence the intelligence services) are among the most important executive actors in any national security systems. In this chapter the term intelligence services denotes only specialised civilian and mili- tary organisations with security-intelligence functions, established within the state apparatus and operating under government control. Intelligence serv- ices should, first of all, provide state bodies with timely, relevant and precise 208 information. They should protect the constitutional order and national interests against penetration by foreign intelligence services and activities of organised criminal and terrorist groups. They are authorised to collect information from public sources, and can use secret methods, techniques and means.285 There are three organisations in Serbia with these responsibilities; the Secu- rity-Information Agency (SIA), the Military Security Agency (MSA) and the Mili- tary Intelligence Agency (MoI). The SIA is directly subordinated to the govern- ment and has the status of a special republic organisation, while both the MSA and MoI are organisational units (administrative bodies) within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) subordinated to the defence minister, and thus also to the gov- ernment. The functions of the intelligence services are specified by positive legal regulations286 and include the usual intelligence activities: 1. The collection and analysis of data relevant for national security, defence and protection of eco- 285 Reconciling the secrecy needs of intelligence services with the fundamental tenets of democ- racy is an important question. In order words, how can this secrecy be reconciled with transpar- ency of state institutions. -
Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency
LAW ON MILITARY SECURITY AGENCY AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY I GENERAL PROVISIONS Article 1 This Law shall regulate competences, activities, tasks, authority, oversight and control of the Military Security Agency (hereinafter referred to as the MSA) and the Military Intelligence Agency (hereinafter referred to as the MIA), co-operation, as well as other matters of importance for their operations. Article 2 The MSA and the MIA are the administrative bodies within the Ministry of Defence that perform security and intelligence activities of importance for defence and are part of a unified security and intelligence system of the Republic of Serbia. Article 3 The MSA and MIA shall be independent in conducting their activities within their scope of work. The MSA and MIA shall carry out mutual co-operation and exchange data. The method and contents of mutual co-operation and exchange of data stipulated in Paragraph 2 of this Article shall be regulated by the Minister of Defence. The MSA and the MIA shall co-operate and exchange data with competent institutions, organisations, services and bodies of the Republic of Serbia, as well as security services of other states and international organisations in compliance with the Constitution, the Law, other regulations and general acts, defined intelligence and security policy of the Republic of Serbia and ratified international agreements. In their work, the MSA and the MIA shall be neutral in terms of politics, ideology and interest. Article 4 The MSA and MIA shall have the status of a legal entity. The MSA and MIA shall have their insignia, symbols and other signs and marks. -
Democratic Security Sector Governance in Serbia
PRIF-Reports No. 94 Democratic Security Sector Governance in Serbia Filip Ejdus This report was prepared with the kind support of the Volkswagen-Stiftung. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) 2010 Correspondence to: PRIF Baseler Straße 27-31 60329 Frankfurt am Main Germany Telephone: +49(0)69 95 91 04-0 Fax: +49(0)69 55 84 81 E-Mail: [email protected] Internet: www.prif.org ISBN: 978-3-942532-04-4 Euro 10.- Summary On 5 October 2000, the citizens of Serbia toppled Slobodan Milošević in what came to be known as the “Bulldozer Revolution”. This watershed event symbolizes not only the end of a decade of authoritarian rule but also the beginning of a double transition: from authoritarian rule to democracy, on the one hand, and from a series of armed conflicts to peace, on the other. This transition has thoroughly transformed Serbian politics in general and Serbia’s security sector in particular. This October, Serbia’s democracy celebrated its tenth anniversary. The jubilee is an appropriate opportunity to reflect on the past decade. With this aim in mind, the report will seek to analyse the impact of democratization on security sector governance in Serbia over the period 2000-2010. In order to do so, in the first part of the report we have developed an analytical framework for studying democratic security sector governance, which is defined as the transparent organization and management of the security sector based on the accountability of decision-makers, respect for the rule of law and human rights, checks and balances, equal representation, active civic participation, public agreement and democratic oversight. -
Communications Bill (Volume II)
Communications Bill (Volume II) The Bill is divided into two volumes. Volume I contains Clauses 1 to 355. Volume II contains Clauses 356 to 403 and the Schedules. CONTENTS PART 1 FUNCTIONS OF OFCOM Transferred and assigned functions 1 Functions and general powers of OFCOM 2 Transfer of functions of pre-commencement regulators General duties in carrying out functions 3 General duties of OFCOM 4 Duties for the purpose of fulfilling Community obligations 5 Directions in respect of networks and spectrum functions 6 Duties to review regulatory burdens 7 Duty to carry out impact assessments 8Duty to publish and meet promptness standards 9 Secretary of State’s powers in relation to promptness standards Media literacy 10 Duty to promote media literacy OFCOM’s Content Board 11 Duty to establish and maintain Content Board 12 Functions of the Content Board Functions for the protection of consumers 13 Consumer research 14 Duty to publish and take account of research 15 Consumer consultation 16 Membership etc. of the Consumer Panel 17 Committees and other procedure of the Consumer Panel 18 Power to amend remit of Consumer Panel HL Bill 41 53/2 iv Communications Bill International matters 19 Representation on international and other bodies 20 Directions for international purposes in respect of broadcasting functions General information functions 21 Provision of information to the Secretary of State 22 Community requirement to provide information 23 Publication of information and advice for consumers etc. Employment in broadcasting 24 Training and equality of opportunity Charging 25 General power to charge for services Guarantees 26 Secretary of State guarantees for OFCOM borrowing Provisions supplemental to transfer of functions 27 Transfers of property etc. -
Centre for Law, Economics and Society Research Paper Series: 1/2019
Centre for Law, Economics and Society Research Paper Series: 1/2019 Are Economists Kings? Economic Evidence and Discretionary Assessments at the UK Utility Regulatory Agencies Despoina Mantzari Centre for Law, Economics and Society CLES Faculty of Laws, UCL Director: Professor Ioannis Lianos CLES Research Paper Series 1/2019 Are Economists Kings? Economic Evidence and Discretionary Assessments at the UK Utility Regulatory Agencies Despoina Mantzari June 2019 Centre for Law, Economics and Society (CLES) Faculty of Laws, UCL London, WC1H 0EG The CLES Research Paper Series can be found at www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-papers Pre-published version of: Despoina Mantzari, ‘Are Economists Kings? Economic Evidence and Discretionary Assessments at the UK Utility Regulatory Agencies’, Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, DOI: 10.1093/jaenfo/jnaa007 All rights reserved. No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form without permission of the author ISBN 978-1-910801-25-3 © Despoina Mantzari 2019 Centre for Law, Economics and Society Faculty of Laws, UCL London, WC1H 0EG United Kingdom ARE ECONOMISTS KINGS? ECONOMIC EVIDENCE AND DISCRETIONARY ASSESSMENTS AT THE UK UTILITY REGULATORY AGENCIES Despoina Mantzari* * Lecturer in Competition Law and Policy, University College London, Faculty of Laws. Email: [email protected]. I thank Ioannis Lianos, Diamond Ashiagbor, Stephen Littlechild, Andriani Kalintiri, Maria Ioannidou, the two anonymous reviewers, as well as participants at the IALS 2018 Lunchtime seminar series, the UCL Laws 2019 Lunchtime Research Seminars, the Annual Meeting of Law and Society 2018, the UK IVR conference 2017 (where an early draft of this paper received the ‘best early career paper prize’) as well as stakeholders of the Essential Services Access Network (ESAN) and policymakers at UK Office for Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) for helpful comments and discussions on earlier versions of this paper. -
Technology, Media and Telecommunications Review
Telecommunications Review Telecommunications the Technology, Media and and Media Technology, Technology, Media and Telecommunications Review Eleventh Edition Editor Matthew T Murchison Eleventh Edition lawreviews © 2020 Law Business Research Ltd Technology, Media and Telecommunications Review Eleventh Edition Reproduced with permission from Law Business Research Ltd This article was first published in December 2020 For further information please contact [email protected] Editor Matthew T Murchison lawreviews © 2020 Law Business Research Ltd PUBLISHER Tom Barnes SENIOR BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER Nick Barette BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER Joel Woods SENIOR ACCOUNT MANAGERS Pere Aspinall, Jack Bagnall ACCOUNT MANAGERS Olivia Budd, Katie Hodgetts, Reece Whelan PRODUCT MARKETING EXECUTIVE Rebecca Mogridge RESEARCH LEAD Kieran Hansen EDITORIAL COORDINATOR Gavin Jordan PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS DIRECTOR Adam Myers PRODUCTION EDITOR Anna Andreoli SUBEDITOR Martin Roach CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER Nick Brailey Published in the United Kingdom by Law Business Research Ltd, London Meridian House, 34–35 Farringdon Street, London, EC4A 4HL, UK © 2020 Law Business Research Ltd www.TheLawReviews.co.uk No photocopying: copyright licences do not apply. The information provided in this publication is general and may not apply in a specific situation, nor does it necessarily represent the views of authors’ firms or their clients. Legal advice should always be sought before taking any legal action based on the information provided. The publishers -
Communications Bill 311 Part 4 — Licensing of TV Reception
Communications Bill 311 Part 4 — Licensing of TV reception PART 4 LICENSING OF TV RECEPTION 353 Licence required for use of TV receiver (1) A television receiver must not be installed or used unless the installation and use of the receiver is authorised by a licence under this Part. 5 (2) A person who installs or uses a television receiver in contravention of subsection (1) is guilty of an offence. (3) A person with a television receiver in his possession or under his control who— (a) intends to install or use it in contravention of subsection (1), or 10 (b) knows, or has reasonable grounds for believing, that another person intends to install or use it in contravention of that subsection, is guilty of an offence. (4) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. 15 (5) Subsection (1) is not contravened by anything done in the course of the business of a dealer in television receivers solely for one or more of the following purposes— (a) installing a television receiver on delivery; (b) demonstrating, testing or repairing a television receiver. 20 (6) The Secretary of State may by regulations exempt from the requirement of a licence under subsection (1) the installation or use of television receivers— (a) of such descriptions, (b) by such persons, (c) in such circumstances, and 25 (d) for such purposes, as may be provided for in the regulations. (7) Regulations under subsection (6) may make any exemption for which such regulations provide subject to compliance with such conditions as may be specified in the regulations. -
Military Security Agency Military Security Agency
MILITARY SECURITY AGENCY Military Security Agency Military Security Agency (MSA) is the military security service responsible for security and counterintelligence protection of the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces. It was formed on 29 September 2003, based on the Act on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Security Services. In December of the same year it was presented to the public, and officially has started operating on 1 January 2004. By adopting the Act on the Essentials of the Republic of Serbia Security Services System, in 2007, it was defined that MSA is a part of unique security and intelligence system of the Republic of Serbia, as an administrative body within the Ministry of Defence. By the Act on the Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency, passed in 2009, competencies, activities, tasks, authorities, supervision and control of MSA were regulated. This Act defines the modern solutions for efficacious countering current security threats. In a transparent way, implementation of special authorities of MSA was regulated by it, with the goal of protection and timely suppression of threats directed towards the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces. Prior to the forming of the Military Security Agency, the military security service had been organized differently and had different names: - issues on security protection of army, for the first time in the recent history, were regulated by the Military Act of the Principality of Serbia, passed on 12 November 1839, in which, for the first time, penalties for treason, escape, rebellion, espionage, acts against the Constitution and “freedom of people“ were defined. -
Confirmation Decision Under Section 139A of the Communications Act
Confirmation decision under section 139A of the Communications Act 2003 relating to contravention of information requirements Confirmation Decision issued to British Telecommunications plc by the Office of Communications (“Ofcom”) Non-confidential version Redactions are indicated with [] Issue Date: 5 April 2017 Confirmation decision under section 139A of the Communications Act 2003 About this document This document sets out Ofcom’s confirmation that British Telecommunications plc (“BT”) has contravened requirements to provide information in response to statutory information requests made by Ofcom under sections 135 and 191 of the Communications Act 2003. These findings relate to BT’s responses to three separate requests by Ofcom for information concerning the provision by BT of Ethernet services. This document also sets out Ofcom’s decision that it is appropriate and proportionate in this case to impose a penalty on BT in respect of the contraventions it has identified. 1 Confirmation decision under section 139A of the Communications Act 2003 Contents Section Page 1 Introduction and Background 3 2 Confirmation of contravention of the BCMR s135 Notice 7 3 Confirmation of contravention of the Dispute s191 Notice 12 4 Confirmation of contravention of the Investigation s135 Notice 17 5 Penalty 21 Annex Page 1 Legal framework 27 2 Notification 31 3 List of additional annexes 34 Confirmation decision under section 139A of the Communications Act 2003 Section 1 1 Introduction and Background 1.1 This document confirms that we are satisfied that British Telecommunications plc (“BT”) has contravened requirements to provide information in response to statutory information requests made by Ofcom under sections 135 and 191 of the Communications Act 2003 (the “Act”). -
The Anatomy of Capturing Serbia's Security - Intelligence Sector
The Anatomy of Capturing Serbia's Security - Intelligence Sector Author: Predrag Petrović 2 The Anatomy of Capturing Serbia's Security-Intelligence Sector BELGRADE CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY Publisher: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy Đure Jakšića 6/5, Beograd Tel. +381 (0)11 328 72 26 E-mail: www.bezbednost.org Author: Predrag Petrović [email protected] Translation: Ivan Kovanović Design and layout: DTP Studio Belgrade, January 2020 The Policy Brief began as part of the “Who Oversees the Overseers: Western Balkan Security Services” project, which is supported by the European Fund for the Balkans (EFB). The content of this study is the exclusive responsibility of its author and it in no way reects the views of the EFB. 3 Abstract In its Enlargement Strategy for 2018, the European Union assessed that elements of state capture are present throughout the Western Balkans. Our research shows, howe- ver, that when it comes to Serbia this is a very restrained assessment as whole state institutions and sectors – the security services and institutions tasked with their con- trol and oversight – have been captured by the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Key positions in the security and intelligence sector are staffed by close associates of party officials or directly by party officials and its founding members. The Director of the BIA, Bratislav Gašić, and the head of the Security Services Coordination Bureau, Nebojša Stefanović, are founding members and high-ranking officials in the SNS. Key posts in the judiciary that are significant for the activities of the security services have been taken up by close associates of party officials or of the leader of the SNS and the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić. -
Modernise Or Decline Policies to Maintain the Universal Postal
Modernise or decline Policies to maintain the universal postal service in the United Kingdom. 16 December 2008 An independent review of the UK postal services sector Richard Hooper CBE | Dame Deirdre Hutton | Ian R Smith Cm 7529 £26.60 Modernise or decline Policies to maintain the universal postal service in the United Kingdom. 16 December 2008 An independent review of the UK postal services sector Richard Hooper CBE | Dame Deirdre Hutton | Ian R Smith Cm 7529 £26.60 0 Crown Copyright 2008 The text in this document (excluding the Royal Arms and other departmental or agency logos) may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium providing it is reproduced accurately and not used in a misleading context.The material must be acknowledged as Crown copyright and the title of the document specified. Where we have identified any third party copyright material you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. For any other use of this material please write to Office of Public Sector Information, Information Policy Team, Kew, Richmond, Surrey TW9 4DU or e-mail: [email protected] ISBN:9780101752923 Contents Acknowledgements 4 Headlines 6 Executive summary 8 Introduction 18 PART 1: SOME BASIC FACTS 22 A brief guide to the postal service 23 Not the Post Office 24 Who uses postal services? 24 Definition of the postal market 25 The letters process 27 The introduction of competition 28 PART 2: THE ISSUES 30 Post matters 31 What is the universal service? 32 What difference does it make? 32 Public opinion 32 Residential