Project Responder: National Technology Plan For

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Project Responder ainlTcnlg lnfrEegnyRsos oCtsrpi Terrorism Catastrophic to Response Emergency for Plan Technology National National Technology Plan for Emergency Response to Catastrophic Terrorism

April 2004

Prepared by Hicks and Associates, Inc.

for

The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and the United States Department of Homeland Security pi 2004 April Project Responder National Technology Plan for Emergency Response to Catastrophic Terrorism

Edited by Thomas M. Garwin, Neal A. Pollard, and Robert V. Tuohy

April 2004

Prepared by Hicks and Associates, Inc. for

The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and the United States Department of Homeland Security

Supported under Award Number MIPT106-113-2000-002, Project Responder from the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) and the Office of Domestic Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security.

Points of view in this document are those of the editors and/or authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of MIPT or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. ii

PROJECT RESPONDER Executive Summary

Executive Summary

Purpose and Vision – Project Responder • Response and Recovery The National Memorial Institute for the • Emergency Management Preparation and Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) in Oklahoma Planning City focuses on “preventing and deterring terrorism or mitigating its effects.” Since April 2001, • Medical Response MIPT has supported Hicks & Associates, Inc. in developing a National Technology Plan for • Public Health Readiness for Biological Agent Emergency Response to Catastrophic Terrorism, Events pursuant to a guiding vision: • Logistics Support Emergency responders should have the capability to prevent or mitigate terrorist use of chemical, biolog- • Crisis Evaluation and Management ical, radiological, nuclear, or high explosive/incen- • All-Source Situational Understanding diary (CBRNE) devices and emerging threats. • Criminal Investigation and Attribution In addition to the specifics of CBRNE devices and emerging threats, responders need to be pre- • Mitigation and Restoration for Plant and pared to deal with the catastrophic scale of effects Animal Resources that these threats may produce; thus a need for technologies to rapidly coordinate and integrate response capabilities from multiple local, Strategy for Responder Capability regional, state, and federal organizations and dis- Improvement ciplines is implicit in this vision. Developing a technology plan to fill gaps in responder capability is important but it will not The plan focuses on technology investment to be enough by itself to actually increase emergency improve capabilities within twelve National responder capability across the nation. In many Terrorism Response Objectives (NTROs) that areas, responder capabilities are limited more by cover the anticipated scope of emergency respon- resources and gaps in organizational capability ders’ requirements for dealing with chemical, than by technology. biological, nuclear, radiological, and explosive/ incendiary attacks on the homeland:1 Organizations responsible for improving responder readiness for catastrophic events need to • Personal Protection and Equipment develop a strategy for implementing the technol- • Detection, Identification, and Assessment ogy plan and assuring the successful transition of new technology into the hands of emergency • Unified Incident Command, Decision responders. Those organizations should consider Support and Interoperable Communications the lessons learned by other agencies who have

1 The National Terrorism Response Objectives resulted from a series of eight workshops and dozens of field interviews with over 125 emergency responders, a number of related groups established to focus on terrorism response, and 135 experts in key technology fields from across government, industry, and academia.

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PROJECT RESPONDER managed similar activities, together with the technology development should improve respon- unique characteristics of responder organizations. ders’ capabilities to deal with all types of catastrophes, whether man-made, natural, or accidental. The following ten imperatives capture the main elements of an implementation strategy that Response Technology Objectives – A empowers responders and meshes the need for a National Agenda for Research and research and development program led by the federal Development government with the decentralized nature of responder procurement decision-making: Each NTRO chapter in this plan presents technology roadmaps made up of new initiatives to • Establish and exploit appropriate responder close gaps in responder capabilities. The building collaborative environments. blocks for the roadmaps are Response Technology Objectives (RTOs). The RTOs recommend pro- • Focus federal, industrial, and non-profit grams for the federal government to adopt (in investment on the most pressing needs articu- addition to current efforts), and most are linked lated by responders. to the prioritized needs of emergency responders. The 48 RTOs described herein include descrip- • Insist on affordable end-products. tions of the objective and its goals, the payoffs • Leverage existing federal, state, and local gov- that will result from the RTO, challenges that ernment investment and infrastructure. will be encountered while pursuing the RTO, and milestones and metrics by which developers • Where possible, include terrorism response can structure a program and gauge its progress. capability into upgrades of normal duty cloth- Taken as a whole, the 48 RTOs may be consid- ing and equipment. ered a research and development agenda for improving emergency response capabilities. • Achieve continual improvement through spiral development and evolutionary deployment. Each RTO also includes rough budget estimates and a programmatic timeline. The different • Emphasize open architecture, interoperability, budgets represented in the 48 RTOs sum to a and proactive involvement in establishing total of nearly $3.5 billion, over six years. appropriate standards and testing. However, these totals are neither definitive nor comprehensive. The cost and schedule estimates • Identify existing commercial and government assume the continuation of currently pro- advanced technologies for integration into grammed efforts in related areas and assume innovative solutions to meet responder needs. effective leveraging of those programs. • Quicken the maturation and deployment of Furthermore, the estimates are based on top- advanced technology products, innovative down expert judgment rather than a detailed concepts and eventual capabilities through bottom-up plan. More precise estimates would modeling and simulation, demonstrations and require knowledge of the actual budgetary and effective commercialization. institutional environment in which the work is to be carried forward. Finally, these estimates con- • Focus investment in strategic research areas to centrate on needed technology research and provide future opportunities. development: they do not include costs for establishing standards, third party testing and Furthermore, although the vision and resultant evaluation, acquisition, training, maintenance, plan are for response to catastrophic terrorism, and the myriad other actual costs that will be technology development to increase responder encountered in increasing the capabilities of state capability should aim, when possible, for and local responders. What these estimates do increases in “all-hazards” capability. That is, provide is a minimum threshold investment in

PROJECT RESPONDER Executive Summary

research and development that the nation must decontamination, administer prophylaxis, take pursue, if it is to have the option of increasing antibiotic, “suit up” or don mask. response capabilities consistent with the goals, needs, priorities, and technology objectives • Stand-off Radiation Detection and Identification – described herein. Develop affordable, robust radiation detectors for stand-off discrimination and identification The RTOs, grouped by National Terrorism of nuclear weapons and dirty bombs. Sensors Response Objective, are: must be capable of networked operation and detecting unshielded nuclear weapons in vehi- Personal Protection and Equipment (PPE) cles moving at highway speeds. • Body Protection – Devise new concepts for • Integrated Remote Detection of CB Agents – improved body protection and create the basis Develop and demonstrate compact, low-cost, for prototypes. The ultimate goal is to pro- reliable sensor technologies and/or systems for vide the basis for a one-suit-meets-all-goals wide area, remote detection of airborne clouds system. and plumes of biological and chemical agents. • Respiratory Protection - Oxygen Available – Such systems should be able to reliably detect Discover and demonstrate new materials and and accurately characterize threat aerosol filter and mask designs to achieve longer dura- clouds at ranges of up to 1 kilometer. tion, lighter weight, with effectiveness against all toxins, low breathing resistance, and a cost • Portable Stand-off Container Inspection – of less than $300 per unit. Develop and demonstrate compact, non- contact, non-intrusive sensor technologies • Respiratory Protection - Oxygen Deficient – and/or systems for detection of biological and Discover new air storage concepts and chemical agents in sealed containers. Such improved materials for self-contained breath- systems should be able to reliably detect and ing apparatus. Increase in-service time from potentially characterize threat agents in con- less than one hour to four hours. tainers at distances of 1-2 meters.

• Decontamination – Discover and demonstrate • Integrated Networked Sensors for CBRNE new ways to neutralize toxins on responders Detection – Develop two or more large-scale clothing and gear. Explore more environmen- urban networked sensor testbeds to support tally friendly chemical wash systems that are the full spectrum of DIDA functions. Employ quick and thorough. Find means of determin- arrays of static, mobile, and remote sensors for ing the completeness of decontamination. intercepting nuclear and radiological weapons, detecting and characterizing aerosolized CB • Escape Respiratory Protection – Develop an agents, and mapping the attack and ensuing improved version of escape hood: more com- effects. Integrate sensor networks with infor- pact, lighter, with a shelf-life of five years, and mation networks for flow of raw data, indica- effective against all hazards. tions, and warning.

Detection, Identification, and Assessment • Combined Effects Modeling for Urban Canyons – (DIDA) Integrate CBRNE effects models and simula- • Wearable Integrated CBR Sensors – Develop tions for complex urban canyons. The models miniature, integrated CBR detectors and should provide inputs and outputs to help in collection devices for use on responders, medical and population monitoring data, as and eventually the general population. well as provide inputs to models associated Provide rapid (timely) alert to the wearer of with injury and casualty assessment. danger and type of attack, e.g., proceed to

PROJECT RESPONDER • Research for On-Scene Assessment of Low-Dose • Multimedia Supported Telepresence – Adapt cur- Exposure to Chemical Agents – Research and rent Web-based technologies to the responder develop the feasibility of sensor systems that environment in order to obtain multimedia can reliably determine at the scene of an information (i.e., enhanced teleconferencing) attack whether an individual has symptoms on a timely basis. caused by low-dose exposure to a chemical warfare agent. Response and Recovery (R&R) • Contaminated Victim Knowledge Base – • Real-Time Structural Stress Measurement – Develop a tool for emergency responders to Develop a portable, real-time stress measure- use in determining how to respond to a mass ment sensor for continuous onsite assessment chemical, biological or radiation contamina- of structural safety. After a blast associated tion event. Using data provided by available with terrorist event, responders may need to sensors and information stored before the enter structures or rubble without knowing event the, tool will provide responders with whether collapse is imminent. During rescue the best course of action to begin the deconta- and response, the safety of the structure or mination of large numbers of victims. rubble may change. • Protective Coatings for Critical Equipment – • Stand-off Automatic Choke Point Screener – Develop materials and appliqués that will Develop sensor systems that can find and resist contamination or facilitate rapid decont- intercept terrorists at choke points (building amination without degrading sensitive equip- entrances, airports, etc.) prior to their ment such as electronics, such that critical intended attack, or after an attack as they equipment can be rapidly returned to service attempt to escape. within the contaminated zones in less than one hour. Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications (UIC) • Ground Penetrating Radar for Specialized • Point Location and Identification – Develop a Search and Rescue – Develop and demonstrate system for the location of responder personnel an affordable ground penetrating radar system in three dimensions in the incident area (i.e., to assist search and rescue operations, in order in buildings and rubble piles). to rapidly locate, assess, and rescue, injured and/or contaminated victims. • Seamless Connectivity and Information Assurance – Develop a “Responder C3 System” • Irradiation and Gaseous Decontamination for that can seamlessly and dynamically intercon- Mass Fatalities – Adapt irradiation and gaseous nect multiple interagency users, who have decontamination technologies and methods multiple functions, multiple information and (e.g., food irradiation and concepts used on communications systems. The systems must postal facilities after October 2001 anthrax operate the first time and every time and attacks, etc.), for mobile use in a mass fatality remain operational through the incident. incident.

• Incident Command Information Management Emergency Management Preparation and and Dissemination – Provide incident com- Planning (EMPP) mand decision support, situation and resource • Risk Awareness and Assessment Decision Support status management, communications system Technology Demonstration – Integrate existing management and mission/task tracking. This technology to develop a system that will pro- capability should include information visuali- vide automated decision aides for those zation and fusion tools as well as modeling charged with assessing the vulnerability and and simulation capability.

PROJECT RESPONDER Executive Summary

protective course of action for potential targets of operation and new enabling technology can within their jurisdictions. be explored to support disasters and mass casualty incidents. Conduct research on how • Electronic Transcript Smart Card – quickly doctors can screen patients via Demonstrate, for standardization and accept- telemedicine. ance, a digital smart card/chip “electronic transcript” system that securely verifies ID, • Novel Decontamination – Conduct research to levels of training/certification, and currency, develop new ways to effectively decontaminate for the multitude of responders that converge large number of victims in the event of a on the scene of a catastrophic event. chemical or biological attack, especially in cold weather. It should significantly increase the • Alternate/Mobile Hospital Contingency throughput of people being contaminated and Management – Develop standards based on will probably save lives. case studies, benchmarking, and best practices in use for managing hospital/medical Public Health Readiness for Biological Agent contingencies. Events (PHRBAE) • Course-of-Action Development System – A • Health Surveillance for Early Detection of Computer-based decision support and infor- Biological Agent Events – Develop a compre- mation management tool that can assist the hensive surveillance system that ensures initial emergency planner/response community in recognition of an emergent illness at the earli- achieving higher levels of sophistication in est point in the progress of a biological agent information assessment, integration and event. This system would be based in metro- manipulation. politan areas and the states but would allow fully transparent data aggregation up to the Medical Response (MR) national level. • Mass Prophylaxis Knowledge Base and • Rapid High-Throughput Clinical Assessment Decision Aid – Develop a tool for emergency and Testing – Develop a system that can screen responders to use in determining the “at-risk” patients through minimally invasive tech- population in a mass chemical, biological or niques to improve the speed, throughput, radiation contamination event and developing comprehensiveness, and convenience of field a mass prophylaxis course of action. clinical assessment and testing for biological agent exposure and disease status. • Mass Prophylaxis Delivery System – Develop a tool that allows responders to significantly • Models for Re-dissemination and Contagion of increase the throughput of individuals who Bio-agents – Develop improved models for the are receiving prophylactic treatment. re-dissemination and contagion of biological agents. The models must be integrated with • Casualty Management System – Develop a tool surveillance information to help get a starting for emergency responders to use to manage point for the model. potentially tens of thousands of victims from a mass casualty event. The systems should be Logistics Support (LS) able to positively track each patient either through tagging (i.e., bar code) or through • Integrated Logistics Information System (ILIS) – biometrics. The system should provide the Develop an evolutionary Integrated Logistics medical/syndromic and treatment records as Information System capable of connecting well as the physical location of the patient. all echelons of command (including regional and national) and all types of suppliers and • Telemedicine Test Bed – Establish a telemedi- other logistics nodes. The functions of this cine testbed where research on new concepts information system include planning and

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PROJECT RESPONDER providing the appropriate initial logistics • Overhead Imaging for Wide-Area Surveillance response to support emergency response to and Assessment – Exploit existing imaging disasters, tracking inventories and items in technology involving earth orbit satellite and transit (across jurisdictions), projecting needs unmanned surveillance aircraft to remotely for consumables and other support items survey agricultural terrain for the presence of including transportation, providing informa- crop plant disease, down livestock, and tion and decision support for transportation wildlife remains. optimization, and providing information relevant to the rapid assessment of safe bases of • Trace-Back Capabilities Using Information operation. Systems and Tags – Design and implement a systems approach to using miniaturized chip • Many-to-Many DNA Matching of Body Parts – technology for tracking plant, animals and Develop the capability to recover, track, and food products back to points-of-origin with identify using DNA comparisons of bodily data updating at critical control points. remains from mass casualty events. • Threat Analysis Critical Control Points Program Crisis Evaluation and Management (CE) for the Food Chain – Use systems analysis to identify the key points in the food chain at • Non-Lethal Safe Seizure of Perpetrators – which detection is to be attempted and the Develop non-lethal technologies to instantly detection techniques and technologies (includ- immobilize perpetrators with weapons or ing visual inspection) that would be most cost hostages, such that explosive devices or other effective. weapons are not setoff. • Modeling of Plant and Animal Outbreaks, All-Source Situational Understanding (ASU) Surveillance, and Response – Develop modeling • All-Source Information Fusion and Analysis tools for use by cognizant agencies and inci- System – Develop a prototype tool and doctri- dent commanders that can aid in optimizing nal template for an information and analysis plant and animal surveillance and response cell to support Incident Command. The strategies. objective is to collect, fuse, analyze and pres- • Improved Irradiation Methods – Find quick, ent information from all sources, including effective and inexpensive prophylactic and sensitive intelligence information. post-exposure treatment countermeasures for contaminations and infestations in food and Mitigation and Restoration for Plant and feed through different forms of irradiation. Animal Resources (MRPA) • Plant and Animal Responder’s Decision Aid – • Enhanced Fumigation Technology – Codify the Allow plant and animal responders to apply state of the art in using fumigation to decon- codified knowledge and to reach back to spe- taminate food processing and storage facilities cialists so that they will act to most efficiently and transportation carriers and find cheaper assess and identify damage, limit onward con- and more efficient ways to perform this tamination, and embark on the correct mitiga- function. tion strategy where plants and animals are the targets or initial indicators of terrorism. • Digesters and Plasma Burners – Evaluate the state of the art of portable systems for carcass • Field Screening and Assessment Tests – Develop disposal and develop a program for ascertain- a cost-effective set of rapid screening and iden- ing the relative strengths and weaknesses of tification tests for plant and animal disease the individual systems and their operational and the presence of CBR agents in plant and animals.

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PROJECT RESPONDER Executive Summary

capacities, limitations, and costs of procure- Discovery and development of revolutionary ment and operation in representative field set- approaches to rapid, non-intrusive stand-off tings. The purpose is to understand our detection and identification of chemical and bio- domestic capability to destroy animal carcasses logical agents in packages and containers, with contaminated with threatening diseases. effective ranges of a few feet in unconstrained geometry. Strategic research and development in • Prototype Prefabricated Animal Crematorium this area will also benefit numerous functional Facility – A prefabricated system that could be capabilities, described in other NTROs, that erected and made operational in a matter of require indication or assessment of the presence several days should be developed to prevent of chemical or biological agents. contagion from animal carcasses. Ultra Wideband (UWB) Communications – The Long View – Strategic Research for Achieving communications penetration through Emergency Response walls, in high rise buildings and underground or in tunnels. Research in this field will support Within many of the NTROs, responders identi- functional capabilities in Unified Incident fied desired capabilities that technologists assessed Command Decision Support and Interoperable to be not achievable within the current state of Communications, as well as functional capabili- basic science and technology. The project iden- ties in other NTROs that require communica- tified five strategic research areas that hold the tions or telemetry, especially through mass such potential to provide the understanding and tech- as collapsed rubble or in areas where commercial niques that may permit breakthroughs in capabil- wireless communications cannot function today. ities. At the basic level envisioned for these research areas, specific research projects are at Biomarkers of Agent Induced Disease and Systemic most loosely connected to specific responder Injury in Humans, Plant and Animals – This needs; rather the goal is to increase the pool of research area is central to Public Health Readiness knowledge that may be drawn upon by develop- for Biological Agent Events and Medical ment activities in the future. Response, and also to Mitigation and Restoration The five Strategic Research Areas are: for Plant and Animal Resources. However, its benefits are also generally important to the Nanotechnology – Building structures at the Detection, Identification, and Assessment molecular level to meet desired goals in the per- NTRO, and specifically to functional elements in formance of materials for personal protection and several NTROs that require the identification equipment. Potential improvements in Personal and assessment of biological and chemical agents. Protection and Equipment motivated the defini- The central thrust is better understanding of tion of this SRA. However, its benefits will also changes in living systems under assault by chemi- contribute to capability increases in Detection, cal and biological attack, to permit more rapid Identification, and Assessment; Unified Incident assessment, agent identification, and treatment Command Decision Support and Interoperable selection. Communications; and Response and Recovery. This National Technology Plan is intended to be Surface Science – Central to capability increases in a draft of a living document. Federal technology personal protective materials is strategic research planners should not simply fund and implement and development in the chemistry and physics of the plan as written because: surfaces, especially modified surfaces. Surface Science is also relevant to decontamination and • it needs to be interrelated to other capability to many advanced detector technologies. areas for efficient application of resources; Observables and Sensing for Stand-off Inspection of • it needs to be iterated as new information Containers with Chemical or Biological Agents – becomes available; and

PROJECT RESPONDER • the appropriate mechanisms for involving and objectives of this and subsequent documents commercial vendors in developing technolo- should be considered just that—goals—not gies and deploying the resulting products to threshold or exit criteria for capability develop- disparate responders have not been worked ment. As capabilities are built and fielded, this out. plan will change. As new threats emerge, needs will change, requiring further changes to the Thus these technology plans, and the needs plan. Thus, this plan should be considered the that underlie them, will not be the final word on first contribution in an iterative process to the responders’ needs and capabilities. Capabilities continual improvement of responders’ capabilities and needs continually change, and the plan via an evolutionary development and deployment must evolve in response to new R&D results as process that will work in the dispersed responder well as to operational innovations. The goals marketplace.

PROJECT RESPONDER Preface

The National Memorial Institute for the • Medical Response (MR) Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) in Oklahoma City focuses on “preventing and deterring terror- • Public Health Readiness for Biological Agent ism or mitigating its effects.” Since April 2001, Events (PHRBAE) MIPT has funded Project Responder, an effort by Hicks & Associates, Inc. and the Terrorism • Logistics Support (LS) Research Center, Inc., aimed ultimately at • Crisis Evaluation and Management (CE) improving local, state and federal emergency responders’ capabilities for mitigating the effects • All-Source Situational Understanding (ASU) of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive/incendiary (CBRNE) terrorism. Project • Criminal Investigation and Attribution (CI) Responder will achieve this aim by producing two tools: a National Technology Plan for • Mitigation and Restoration for Plant and Emergency Response to Catastrophic Terrorism, Animal Resources (MRPA) and a Web-based Responder Knowledge Base of The National Terrorism Response Objectives are current and emerging systems and technologies the result of a series of eight workshops and for response to terrorism. dozens of field interviews with over 125 emer- This document builds upon the foundation laid gency responders and a number of related groups by the first Project Responder Interim Report established to focus on terrorism response. The Emergency Responders’ Needs, Goals, and Priorities objectives cover the anticipated scope of emer- (March 2003)2, which presented priorities for gency responders’ requirements for dealing with technology-enabled improvements in response chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, and capability, described in twelve National Terrorism explosive/incendiary attacks on the homeland. Response Objectives (NTROs): The technology plans for each of the NTROs were developed from a common philosophy that • Personal Protection and Equipment (PPE) meshes the decentralized nature of responder procurement decision-making with the need for a • Detection, Identification, and Assessment research and development program led by the (DIDA) federal government. • Unified Incident Command, Decision Support and Interoperable Communications This draft National Technology Plan is intended (UIC) to be a living document. Federal technology planners could not simply fund and implement • Response and Recovery (R&R) the plan as written because: • Emergency Management Preparation and • it needs to be interrelated to other capability Planning (EMPP) areas for efficient application of resources;

2 Neal A. Pollard, Robert V. Tuohy, and Thomas M. Garwin, Emergency Responders’ Needs, Goals, and Priorities, (March 2003, Updated) an Interim Report of Project Responder, prepared by Hicks and Associates, Inc., for The Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department of Justice, at the request of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

PROJECT RESPONDER Preface

• it needs to be iterated as new information prototype technologies that would be useful to becomes available; and emergency responders.

• the appropriate mechanisms for involving Need for Iteration – The experience of federal gov- commercial vendors in developing technolo- ernment and industry best-practice technology gies and deploying the resulting products to planning efforts strongly suggests that technology disparate responders have not been worked planning needs to be an iterated, participative out. process. Detailed budgets can only realistically be developed through a dialog with a selected exe- These three reasons are elaborated in the follow- cuting agency, and the amount of money to be ing paragraphs. allocated to a particular project in a particular period can only be decided in the context of the Need for Interrelationship with Other Program overall resources that are made available. The Areas – The plan’s focus on the needs of emer- planning process itself develops additional infor- gency responders, while crucial, is not complete. mation and understanding over time as research It was very important to discipline the process by and technology programs proceed. addressing the needs of this crucial user community that is on the front line of our national effort Technology Transfer and Commercialization – against terrorism, and that traditionally has not Concepts for technology transfer and commer- been intensively supported by new technology cialization are central to any federal strategy for development. However, even with a flexible defi- developing and deploying new capabilities to nition of “emergency responder” (for example, to state and local responders. Many issues inherent include public health specialists and various types in successful diffusion of new technology to of medical personnel, in some cases of biological responders are not technological, but rather range attack), important areas of technology develop- from issues of training, logistics and budgets to ment for deterring and preventing terrorism and basic issues of federalism. Nevertheless, technol- mitigating its effects are not within the current ogy transfer, primarily through commercializa- scope of this plan. Thus, much of port, border, tion, will be important to bring mature technolo- and aviation security, as well as the development gies into responder-oriented applications or of vaccines and medical treatments, is not demonstrations, to guarantee to vendors a mar- addressed in the current planning effort. ketplace sufficient to induce full production of technologies, and to field technologies on a wide Moreover, there are important overlaps and syn- enough scale to meet responders’ needs. ergies between some technologies identified as Commercialization strategies – whether through important for emergency response and those in regional purchasing arrangements, public/private these other areas. Thus the Project Responder partnerships, direct federal acquisition, tied grant draft National Technology Plan needs to be syn- programs or other approaches – will be crucial chronized with technology planning efforts in for bringing down costs of new capabilities suffi- these other areas, as well as with other agencies, ciently for medium- and smaller-size jurisdictions for maximum efficiency and effectiveness in an to procure them. overall investment strategy. The Department of Defense already has a number of technologies Another important set of judgments that will that address responders’ needs. For example, the affect how technology will be deployed, and thus Combatting Terrorism and Force Protection tech- how it should be developed, relates to the distri- nologies and demonstrations of Defense bution of capabilities at different levels of Department’s Joint Warfighting Science and response. Federal officials and their state and Technology Plan are relevant to some of the criti- local counterparts will have to determine the cal needs of emergency responders, and the most effective distribution and organization Technical Support Working Group has produced of capabilities across the country and at various

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PROJECT RESPONDER Preface

levels (i.e., local, state, federal or regional). For national standards, federal government and inde- example, some specialized capabilities would be pendent testing, and focused (and typically com- most effective and efficient deployed and oper- petitive) commercialization activities involving ated as a regional resource, while other capabili- vendors of responder equipment. ties must be available at the local city or county level. Even within local forces, some capabilities Finally, to be maximally effective, new technolo- will be given to every responder, while others will gies and new operational procedures must be be reserved to special units. developed together, in an iterative process. For this reason, many of the technology plans Judgments of what capabilities belong at which described below include processes like the levels cannot be made a priori. Rather they are Defense Department’s Advanced Concept the result of a set of balancing considerations Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), which that are in many ways dependent on technology. combine technology developers and operational Typically, specialized capabilities are unique to users to integrate relatively mature technologies specialized organizations because of high cost into innovative operational capabilities. and difficult training requirements. In some Moreover, the rese arch and development process instances technology can reduce cost and training itself will provide new opportunities and prove requirements or improve safety to the point that others to be less promising than initially thought. a hitherto specialized capability can be widely distributed. Experiments (technical and opera- These technology plans, and the needs that tional, aimed at learning) and demonstrations underlie them, will not be the final word on (aimed at determining feasibility) involving inno- responders’ needs and capabilities. Capabilities vative concepts, products, advanced technology, and needs continually change, and the plan must systems, and “systems of systems” will be useful evolve in response to new R&D results as well as in arriving at appropriate, affordable operational to operational innovations. The goals and objec- applications of new technology, and will stimu- tives of this and subsequent documents should be late both vendor supply and responder demand considered just that – goals, not threshold or exit for these solutions. criteria for capability development. As capabilities are built and fielded, this plan will change. A process to improve responder capabilities must As new threats emerge, needs will change, requir- recognize the realities of the decentralized nature ing further changes to the plan. of responder procurement and the limited resources available. Compared to corporate prod- For all these reasons, this plan should be consid- uct development or federal government acquisi- ered the first contribution in an iterative process tion, there are many more significant players in to the continual improvement of responders’ the process. The process must encompass a myr- capabilities via an evolutionary development and iad of state and local agencies; strategic leverage deployment process that will work in the dis- in the process can be provided by Federal money, persed responder marketplace.

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PROJECT RESPONDER Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... III PREFACE...... xi I. INTRODUCTION...... 1 A. VISION ...... 1 B. STRATEGY ...... 1 C. STRATEGIC RESEARCH AREAS ...... 5 D. PLANNING PROCESS ...... 9 II. PERSONAL PROTECTION AND EQUIPMENT ...... 15 III. DETECTION, IDENTIFICATION, AND ASSESSMENT ...... 31 IV. UNIFIED INCIDENT COMMAND DECISION SUPPORT AND INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS ...... 63 V. R ESPONSE AND RECOVERY ...... 81 VI. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PREPARATION AND PLANNING ...... 99 VII. MEDICAL RESPONSE...... 119 VIII. PUBLIC HEALTH READINESS FOR BIOLOGICAL AGENT EVENTS ...... 141 IX. LOGISTICS SUPPORT...... 163 X. CRISIS EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT ...... 177 XI. ALL-SOURCE SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING...... 189 XII. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND ATTRIBUTION ...... 207 XIII. MITIGATION AND RESTORATION FOR PLANT AND ANIMAL RESOURCES ...... 215

APPENDICES A. SPIRAL DEVELOPMENT AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF AFFORDABLE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS ...... 243 B. ACRONYMS ...... 249 C. HOME AGENCIES OF PROJECT PARTICIPANTS AND INTERVIEWEES...... 259 D. ABOUT THE AUTHORS AND EDITORS ...... 263 E. INDEX ...... 269

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PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter I Introduction

Each National Terrorism Response Objective technology development should aim, when possi- (NTRO) chapter below presents technology ble, for increases in “all-hazards” capability. That roadmaps made up of new initiatives to close is, technology development should improve gaps in responder capabilities. The building responders’ capabilities to deal with all types of blocks for the roadmaps are Response Technology catastrophes, whether man-made, natural, or Objectives (RTOs), located at the end of each accidental. chapter. The RTOs recommend programs for the federal government to adopt (in addition to cur- B. Strategy rent efforts), and most are linked to the prioritized needs of emergency responders. The RTOs Developing a technology plan to fill gaps in include descriptions of the objective and its goals, responder capability is important but it will not the payoffs that will result from the RTO, chal- be enough by itself to actually increase emergency lenges that will be encountered while pursuing responder capability across the nation. This will the RTO, and milestones and metrics by which be a new undertaking on the part of the federal developers can structure a program and gauge its government. Organizations responsible for progress. Each RTO also includes rough budget improving responder readiness for catastrophic estimates. The following discussion describes the events need to develop a strategy for implement- foundation and process used to link needs to ing the technology plan and assuring the success- technology, and derive these building-block ful transition of new technology into the hands RTOs. of emergency responders. Those organizations should consider the lessons learned by other A. Vision agencies who have managed similar activities. Some of those lessons are including in the follow- The vision guiding the strategy to improve the ing ten imperatives we believe should be included capabilities of our emergency responders is: in such a strategy:

Emergency responders should have the capability to • Establish and exploit appropriate responder col- prevent or mitigate terrorist use of chemical, biolog- laborative environments – Project Responder ical, radiological, nuclear, or high explosive/incen- has established a network of responders, from diary (CBRNE) devices and emerging threats. all the emergency response disciplines in order In addition to the specifics of CBRNE devices to understand their needs as they themselves and emerging threats, responders need to be pre- articulate them. The best way to assure that pared to deal with the catastrophic scale of effects the products that result from the technology that these threats may produce; thus a need for plans are useable by the constituents who need technologies to rapidly coordinate and integrate them is to continue to listen to them through- response capabilities from multiple local, out the process. A broad-based representation regional, state, and federal organizations and dis- of users (responders et al.) should be involved ciplines is implicit in this vision. in the development process. The Integrated Project Team approach used in the DoD and Furthermore, although this vision and resultant other agencies may be a useful model, but plans envision response to catastrophic terrorism, making it work in the fragmented responder

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter I

universe will require significant adjustments ability to respond to terrorism is to increase and probably the regular use of distance- responders’ ability to respond to all events— collaboration technologies. the so-called all hazards approach. While some capabilities will remain the province of • Focus federal, industrial, and non-profit invest- specialized units, the first response will almost ment on the most pressing needs articulated by always be by non-specialized, front-line per- responders – This plan offers a prioritized list sonnel with day-to-day equipment. The only of needs. This prioritization should continue way first responders will be equipped to deal to be explored with responders and those who with the situation is if the materiel is widely are responsible for preparing the nation for dispersed throughout the force. This terrorism to ensure that resources are applied approach also may achieve affordability to the highest priorities and payoffs. through economies of scale. Influencing non-federal investment is crucial because of the decentralized nature of the • Achieve continual improvement through spiral responder community and the reliance on development and evolutionary deployment – For commercial vendors; these influence mecha- reasons of affordability and interoperability, nisms need more attention and focus. new responder capability will often need to be implemented through evolutionary upgrades • Insist on affordable end-products – The Director of existing systems. Spiral development also of the Homeland Security Advanced Research offers the opportunity to maximize improve- Projects Agency recently said that affordability ments by taking advantage of experience with must be a performance specification for home- the earlier deployed version of equipment. land security systems. State and local govern- Costs are lower, too, compared to multiple ments are and will always be resource limited. new system developments. Responders buy their gear from commercial firms who must compete on price as well as • Emphasize open architecture, interoperability, technical performance. Affordability must be and proactive involvement in establishing appro- addressed at every step of the development priate standards and testing – Open architec- process. tures are critical to being able to make evolutionary improvements in capability. This • Leverage existing federal, state, and local govern- approach also lowers cost and increases per- ment investment and infrastructure – formance by lowering barriers to entry into Governments have substantial preexisting the market and creating more effective compe- investments in response capabilities—there is a tition. Open architectures also help to define large capital stock in use and responders are and enforce interoperability. Multiple juris- familiar with established operational patterns. dictions and levels of government must be able Systems developed for use by local responders to work together to respond to catastrophic must take advantage of and integrate well with terrorism. Current gaps in interoperability current equipment and infrastructure. among their various systems have stymied that Systems that require the wholesale replace- ability. Interoperability must be a absolute ment of existing equipment and infrastructure requirement for new systems. Standards and will be doomed to stay on the shelf because testing to those standards will be an important response agencies simply can’t afford them. enabler of interoperability.

• Where possible, include terrorism response capa- • Identify existing commercial and government bility into upgrades of normal duty clothing and advanced technologies for integration into inno- equipment – Responders can not afford and do vative solutions to meet responder needs – A sig- not want specialized terrorism response equip- nificant amount of technology that has the ment. It is clear from our research that, where potential of dramatically increasing responder possible, the best way to increase our country’s capability appears to be available in the

PROJECT RESPONDER Introduction

commercial world (primarily in the informa- the beginning and throughout the develop- tion technology industry) and in the federal ment cycle. Commercial vendors should be government (especially in the Department of involved at the earliest possible opportunity. Defense). It has not yet been focused on responder needs. Leveraging this investment • Focus investment in strategic research areas to will enable early improvements in responder provide future opportunities – Although there capability sooner and probably save money. appears to be a great deal of technology that Early investments should be made to adapt can help responders available in the near-term, this technology for use by the responder com- the solutions to some of the response commu- munity and to facilitate its adoption. nity’s most vexing problem are not on the horizon and the chance to develop leap-ahead • Quicken the maturation and deployment of capability must not be ignored. Therefore, advanced technology products, innovative con- any prudent R&D portfolio must include cepts and eventual capabilities through modeling investment in fundamental research to solve and simulation, demonstrations and effective those problems. We have recommended sev- commercialization – Modeling and simulation eral areas where investment in basic and (M&S) has proven to be a very useful tool in applied research is needed to provide the determining how systems will work together answers to needs across many responder capa- before they are built. Both the systems that bility areas. are being considered, as well as the environment they will be operating in can be modeled In addition to these imperatives, a strategy to in most cases. This allows the testing of how implement a successful responder R&D program systems will work before committing to build- should consider a few other elements beginning ing expensive prototypes. M&S is also scala- with how the R&D portfolio is managed. A dia- ble so that new response concepts (the combi- log between opportunity and risk lies at the heart nation of new operational concepts with new of any technology investment decision; where to technical capability) can be tested at the tacti- invest along the risk continuum is a tough ques- cal unit level as well as the incident command, tion. One must make “trade-offs” between the regional and even national levels. In combina- level of desired capability and the likely cost of tion with exercises and demonstrations, M&S and time to get to the eventual product. For all can prevent or mitigate false starts, help assure except the least risky, near-term investments, all that the systems will work in the intended R&D activities have learning at their core. Along environments, and help develop new concepts the way discoveries will be made, unexpected of operation that can increase the capability of obstacles may impede progress, and new knowl- new systems even before they are deployed. edge may provide unexpectedly easy paths to M&S will not obviate testing the actual sys- improved capability. Although investment to tems. It can, however inform the trade-off reduce uncertainty is an important element of process throughout the development process, any well-planned R&D effort, it is impossible saving money in the long run. and imprudent to reduce overall risk to zero.

Unlike the military, responders buy their Therefore, at least some of all but the lowest-risk equipment in the commercial marketplace projects should be expected to fail. Some num- and each local jurisdiction, for the most part, ber parallel efforts (e.g., different research paths to buys separately resulting in a highly frag- the same goal) should be pursued, even to the mented market. Any technology developed extent that projects might seem to be duplicative. by the federal government must eventually Individual failures should be expected and should make its way to the responders via commercial not be cause for indictment of the overall pro- vendors. Commercialization of government gram. Sponsoring agencies must understand the developed technology must be addressed from need for flexibility as R&D goes forward.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter I

In theory at least, planners should weigh the system-oriented Integration Readiness Levels prospective value of any technology investment, (IRLs) can be used to manage risk in complex discount this value by the assessed probability of development and integration programs. The success (technical risk), subtract any non-mone- readiness levels used by the DoD and others are tary costs and risks, and then divide by the pro- described in Appendix A. jected R&D investment. This notional benefit/cost ratio would allow a comparison of In addition to the risks of technology develop- “bang for the buck” across different proposed ment, successful implementation of an R&D technology investments, providing an indication program has other risks as well. Technology of how efficient the R&D program will be. development has its own equivalent of “the operation was successful but the patient died.” Often In practice, of course, such arithmetical exercises an apparently successful technology development frequently fail to give a definitive indication fails to find users because the specification was because it is too hard to assess the projected bene- based on an inadequate understanding of user fits in numerical terms, and because it is hard to needs and operational context. Requirements for account for important second-order benefits of interoperability, user-friendliness, and cost are R&D. Moreover, the calculus needs to take into obvious examples of areas that need to be worked account the interaction among various projects. out in advance. In other words, the technology For example, the value of a four-hour protective transfer process has important risks that must be suit would be limited if the mask that goes with assessed and managed in addition to the risks of it only protects for thirty minutes. While the technical development per se. NTRO chapters were prepared with this opportunity/risk calculus in mind, and the suggested There are proven ways to manage and reduce investments were checked with a crude version of these technology transfer risks. The Defense this calculus, expert judgment was viewed as Department has been successful in its Advanced superior to arithmetic in arriving at a coherent Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD), overall plan. Thus the technology effort must be which integrate mature (and often commercially viewed as an investment portfolio, in which available) technologies and products in a novel opportunities and risks are balanced and spread operational concept to demonstrate the value of across multiple projects. new capabilities or new technology-supported operational approaches. By involving users from One key to managing technical risk is to ensure the outset and producing a small “leave-behind” that the level of integrated development does not capability, the ACTD process focuses attention get ahead of the maturity of the component and on real user needs and enforces attention to the system technologies being integrated. real operational environment. This sort of mech- Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs), developed anism is proposed in a number of the Responder originally by NASA and endorsed by the Defense Technology Objectives in the NTRO chapters. Department, provide a systematic approach to this management process and should be consid- Finally, creating a technology plan for improving ered for adoption by the Department of capabilities to prevent and mitigate catastrophic Homeland Security for its R&D activities. For terrorism is to some extent addressing the second- example, no developmental technology should be ary needs of responders. In many areas, respon- slated for inclusion in a developmental system ders view their capability shortfalls as not being until it has had the equivalent of a successful primarily solved by technology; resources and “technology demonstration” (TD) that demon- problems of integration across different govern- strates the maturity of the technology and readi- mental organizations are a more immediate con- ness to move to the next level of development.3 cern. These vital responder concerns should be A combination of component-oriented TRLs and addressed by the United States Department of

3 The Defense Department equivalent is the Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD).

PROJECT RESPONDER Introduction

Homeland Security and other responsible govern- important for dealing with catastrophic terrorism ment organizations. Although the plan does not in the future. The areas identified here combine speak directly to policy and financing issues it is the promise of basic research with a more focused nonetheless understood that they will play an emphasis on responder needs. important role in increasing the nation’s capability to respond to terrorism. Nanotechnology Potential improvements in Personal Protection C. Strategic Research Areas (SRAs) and Equipment motivated the definition of this SRA. However, its benefits, together with those Research in basic science and advanced technol- of Surface Science (discussed immediately below), ogy offers the potential for leaps in capability. will also contribute to capability increases in Investment planning tends to short-change these Detection, Identification, and Assessment longer-term efforts because the pay-off is less cer- (DIDA.1 On-Scene Detection); Unified Incident tain than low-risk development projects using Command Decision Support and Interoperable nearer-term technology. This is especially the Communications (UIC.1 Point Location and case in an area as urgent as improving responder Identification); and Response and Recovery capabilities for catastrophic terrorism. An appro- (R&R.2 Rapid Decontamination of High-Value priate overall investment strategy should provide and Critical Response Equipment, R&R.6 opportunities for investment in basic and early Specialized Search & Rescue, and R&R.8 Residual applied research relevant to the key problems and Hazards Assessment and Mitigation). in promising approaches that are off the beaten track. Objectives: Five such areas are described below. They are Building structures at the molecular level to meet strategic in three ways. First, they address tech- desired goals in the performance of materials for nology development at the strategic level – that personal protection and equipment. is, a long-term, risky commitment to developing solutions that are yet to be discovered, where suc- Thrusts: cess is only likely to be achieved beyond the time- • Creating fibers and cage structures, line of near-term or existing technology solutions. In this sense, it also requires “strategic” funding, • Characterizing them, beyond the normal programmatic timeline of two • Studying their performance vis-a-vis several of to five years. the goals in PPE. Second, they are strategic in impact: the resulting Applications: increase in capability from successful research will be more than incremental. Rather, successful • Fabrics with improved and controllable per- strategic research will revolutionize responders’ meability for uniforms. systems, giving responders a discontinuous improvement in capability. • Fabrics with chemically reactive substituents for self-decontamination properties. Third, they are strategic in breadth. Although a Strategic Research Area may be central to a spe- • Porous materials perhaps based on nanotubes cific functional capability, successful research in or bucky-balls and capable of storing large these areas will benefit responders across many quantities of air at modest pressures. domains of capability and even across NTROs. Surface Science: Many other areas of research—especially basic Also central to capability increases in personal research—could also have been identified as protective materials is strategic research and

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter I

development in the chemistry and physics of sur- Thrusts: faces, especially modified surfaces. • Candidate phenomenology and signatures.

Objectives: • Theoretical detection and identification limits. Learn how to create and chemically modify surfaces to enhance material performance for per- • Sensing concepts. sonal protection goals. • Practical limitations and potential countermeasures. Thrusts: • Create materials with very high surface areas. Research should focus on those problems for which no potential solution is being considered, • Modify those surfaces chemically to provide or for which a near-term solution does not seem reactivity with toxins, either stoichiometric or possible. For example, the DoD is experimenting catalytic. with contact sensing of chemical agents, with some good results; this research objective should • Synthesize molecular cage or tube structures look for phenomenology and concepts that do and evaluate their ability to absorb large vol- not require physical contact with the package. umes of air. Such concepts may be extensions of current work to non-contact approaches as well as entirely new Applications: concepts and observables. Both active and pas- • Self-decontaminating materials. sive sensing strategies should be studied: directed energy beams, optical, acoustic resonance, back- • Improved filter elements useful against all scatter, and telltale residue detection should be toxins. considered.

• Storage of large volumes of air in SCBA Chemical agents in fluid state may have reso- breathing tanks at moderate pressures. nances that can be excited at short range by energy pulses or acoustic waves. Biological pow- Observables and Sensing for Stand-off ders will pose the most serous and difficult threat Inspection of Containers with Chemical or since they may be shipped in very small quanti- Biological Agents ties and may be in solid form. Based on current The requirements of Detection, Identification, understanding, it is likely that some threats in the and Assessment merit a national-level strategic most difficult scenarios will not yield to a solu- investment in research and development in this tion. The research program should identify the area. Strategic research and development in this solution space for techniques developed, develop area will also benefit numerous functional capa- detection models, and define limits of perform- bilities, described in other NTROs, that require ance. This will permit sensor developers to pro- indication or assessment of the presence of chem- ceed in applications to provide useful devices for ical or biological agents. the responders.

Objectives: Applications: • Discovery and development of revolutionary • Chemical and biological agents hidden in approaches to rapid, non-intrusive stand-off properly sealed containers and vessels pose a detection and identification of chemical and serious threat from terrorists. Such threats are biological agents in packages and containers, impossible to detect with current technology; with effective ranges of a few feet in uncon- thus responders plan for detect-to-treat rather strained geometry. than detect-to-stop for CB attacks. Unlike

PROJECT RESPONDER Introduction

airport luggage screeners that force bags Applications: through a sensor system, responders may con- • Point Location and Identification. front a nearly limitless variety of packages in unconstrained geometries. They may not have • Communications in areas that cannot be the time or access to more than one view or accommodated by wireless. perspective, and the scenario may not be conducive to physical contact with containers. • Covert communications. The discovery of new sensor phenomenology • Short-range, high-bandwidth wireless suited to this problem and the development of communications. field sensors would provide a major tool in defeating CB attack before it occurs. Biomarkers of Agent Induced Disease and Depending on the resultant sensor concepts, a Systemic Injury in Humans, Plant and Animals wide variety of sensor types may be possible: handheld, suitcase, networked, automatic. This research area is central to Public Health Readiness for Biological Agent Events and • Direct applications for the responder of this Medical Response, and also to Mitigation and development would include on-scene analysis Restoration for Plant and Animal Resources. of suspicious packages, choke point screening However, its benefits are also generally important of luggage and mail, screening of shipping and to the Detection, Identification, and Assessment trucking containers, and warehouse and stor- NTRO, and specifically to functional elements in age facility screening. several NTROs that require the identification and assessment of biological and chemical agents. Ultra Wideband (UWB) Communications As a complex homeostatic system, the human Research in this field will support functional body reacts in complex ways to insult. Focusing capabilities in Unified Incident Command on the disease and trauma processes, and the Decision Support and Interoperable body’s responses to them, this Strategic Research Communications, as well as functional capabili- Area will identify useable markers of exposure, ties in other NTROs that require communica- disease and systemic injury. These markers can tions or telemetry, especially through mass such be used for screening individuals and making as collapsed rubble or in areas where commercial treatment decisions. Some of these markers of wireless communications cannot function today. chemical or biological exposure or infection may be detectable without invasive sample collection. Objectives: Achieve communications penetration through Accurate assessment of chemical poisoning and walls, in high rise buildings and underground. physical injury or burns has benefits for triage in various contexts. In the case of physical injury Thrusts: and burns, one would hope to detect early stages • Improve characterization of radio frequency of major organ failure that might not be obvious propagation through buildings and rubble. otherwise. • Develop understanding of theoretical limits of In the case of attack by an infectious agent which UWB performance. replicates in the body, the body provides its own culture medium and amplifying systems for • Characterize and bridge gaps between current detection and identification of agent. The sooner and theoretical performance in prototype a biological attack can be detected and character- systems. ized and the victims identified, the better the

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter I

chances that a disease outbreak can be contained and between the infected and non-infected and that exposed individuals will survive. In states, and between severe and less severe many instances the threat agent will not be injuries and illnesses. detected in the environment and the earliest possibility for detecting and characterizing the agent • Understanding the value of alternative rapid will be through testing specimens from exposed clinical testing systems for accurately reading individuals. The hypothesis is that early stages of and assessing these indicators. the disease process and the body’s initial response • Expand basic knowledge of plant and animal to a pathogen produce measurable signatures that genomic structures and functional genomics. would be useful for early identification of exposed individuals and at least preliminary char- • Characterize and assess biomarkers of plant acterization of the agent. Such testing will also and animal disease. be useful to distinguish contagious individuals from those who are not dangerous to others. • Develop the substantive information underlying databases that can be provided to “first Aside from its value in preparedness for a terrorist detectors” and emergency responders to dis- attack, this research has the potential to revolu- criminate between normal conditions of plant tionize the practice of internal medicine. crops and other plants vs. the presence of con- Moreover, the required machinery and consum- taminants or pathogens of concern in national ables are only likely to be effectively available in agricultural defense. sufficient quantities (and with sufficient reliability) if they are in routine use in medical practice. Thrusts: Therefore this strategic research area should be • Understanding biomarkers of exposure and conducted or at least overseen by an organization disease progression in human and animal with broad medical responsibilities such as the breath, saliva, mucous, sweat, blood, excreta, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious and retinal scans. Disease. • Calibrating the wide range of “normal” values The benefits from research on plant and animal to be expected in humans, animals, and biomarkers are as significant in agriculture and plants. animal husbandry. These fields are important to human health as well, because animals and plants • Physiological markers and signatures of can be vectors for human disease. The payoff in disease. these fields would appear earlier because of the lower threshold for regulatory approvals for tests • Plant and animal genomic and proteomic vari- and assessments applied to animals. ability and systems.

• Drawing conclusions from field observable Objectives: physiological symptoms. • Developing knowledge of signatures of exposure, injury, poisoning, and disease process, • Assessing the potential of methods of rapidly and the body’s response; understanding the and reliably “reading” biomarkers. availability of these signatures for sensing and for testing of specimens; and understanding Applications: how these signatures change during the course • Screening for injury or illness. of chemical exposure or disease induced by biological agents. • Identification of disease agent.

• Assessing the usefulness of these indicators as • Distinguishing contagious from non- discriminators between different threat agents contagious individuals.

PROJECT RESPONDER Introduction

• Triage for agriculture, animal husbandry. twelve National Terrorism Response Objectives (NTROs) identified by this nation’s emergency • Understanding of wild animal disease vectors. responders as documented in the Project Responder March 2003 report. The twelve D. Planning Process NTROs provide a structure whereby the breadth of emergency responder capabilities, required to Project Responder has identified key areas where successfully respond to a catastrophic terrorism additional investment in technology development event, can be divided into manageable pieces for and commercialization could provide high pay- the technology planning process. offs in response capability in both the near and longer terms. It has done this by involving These plans assume that, whereas emergency responders and technologists in a disciplined responders will have the responsibility to deploy process that takes current and emerging technolo- and use equipment and technologies in response gies and advanced products into account. Within to terrorist acts, the federal government will have these key areas, it has been able to suggest mecha- primary responsibility for investing in research nisms by which these payoffs can be achieved. and development of technologies for terrorism response not currently available and not under For example, one of the key capabilities of inter- development commercially. est to responders is for squad, departmental, and incident commanders to be able know the posi- The technology plans result from a six-step tion, and, if possible, health status and cumula- process designed to develop a “capabilities-based” tive agent exposure status of all responders at an national technology plan for terrorism response. incident scene. Inexpensive radio-frequency tech- Although the steps in the process are depicted as nologies are available to perform at least the loca- sequential, in practice they overlap and were con- tion function in open environments, but technol- ducted iteratively. The steps in the process are ogists are not sure how or even whether these depicted below. capabilities could be provided within buildings, underground, or in the rubble that could result Each NTRO chapter contains five elements: a from a building collapse. The technology plan definition of the needed capability, a set of oper- for unified incident command thus includes two ational environments for evaluating capability thrusts in this area: first, 1. Establish Scope of Effort and Framework for RDT&E Plan evaluation of operational and (Vision and National Terrorism Response Objectives) system concepts that integrate current technologies and 2. Identify Capabilities Needed by Responders: demonstration to facilitate (1) Operational (2) Functional (Supporting) commercialization of a near- term solution; and, second, 3. Identify Capability Gaps and Possible Technology Solutions strategic research into the propagation of Ultra 4. Establish Technology Goals to Focus RDT&E on Closing Gaps Wideband Radio Frequency (Reponse Technology Objectives) signals underground, in buildings, and in rubble, to 5. Identify Opportunities for Supporting Demonstrations precede the system design of a more capable, longer-term, 6. Track Progress with RDT&E Roadmap solution. PROGRESS: National Terrorism The following chapters con- Response Capability Increase tain technology plans for the Six-Step National Terrorism Response Technology Planning Process

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter I

needs and shortfalls, a number of functional capa- responders and technologists at the local, state, bilities that together define the operational need and federal levels, reviewed by senior experts on in more detail, a discussion of current capabilities the Senior Advisory Group, and further tested in and shortfalls for each of the functional capabili- depth and refined in eight workshops. These ties, and the technology plan itself, made up of a interviews and workshops reflect the expert summary technology roadmap and a set of insight and advice of over 125 emergency respon- Response Technology Objectives, structured to ders across all disciplines, and over 135 technolo- guide technology investments in order to produce gists and planning experts from government, a relatively efficient and orderly improvement in laboratories, universities, and industry. capabilities available to responders. Within each NTRO, functional capabilities Operational Environments appear in order of priority (i.e., importance as a needed response capability). In interviews and Operational environments represent the variety of workshops, the responders were asked to priori- contexts in which the functional capabilities are tize among the marginal or unavailable capabili- assessed. The operational environments defined ties: “which ones are most important to have in this process have been deliberately kept broad soonest?” However, one must keep in mind that and simple. There is infinite variation in the a response objective (e.g., a NTRO) will not be operational environments emergency responders met without some level of capability present from may face. However, it was clear from the work- all of the functional elements. Moreover, the shops that emergency responders automatically functional capabilities are defined at a sufficiently calibrate in their minds the type and magnitude high level of generality that some needs in a high- of events about which they need to be concerned. priority functional capability may actually be less Asking responders to work through detailed sce- urgent than some of the most important needs in narios to arrive at requirements did not appear to a lower-ranked functional capability. improve the process and seemed in some instances to constrain thought by focusing too Current Capabilities and Shortfalls tightly on the details of the particular scenario presented. The responders were comfortable with The analytical bridge between a statement of the level of detail and variation the current struc- needs and a technology plan is an understanding ture provides. While this level of detail has been of the gaps between capabilities available today chosen to appropriately represent responder per- and the prioritized goals of responders. To sup- spectives, it is possible that a higher level of dis- port this analysis, the operational environments crimination will prove necessary in some specific and supporting functional capability elements are cases as detailed technology planning proceeds. arrayed on a matrix, with operational environments along the horizontal axis and functional Functional Capabilities capability elements on the vertical axis. At each intersection in the matrices, three nested boxes The functional capabilities represent the tasks or appear, with each box colored either green, yel- functions that must be accomplished in order to low, or red. The colors within each nested box achieve mission success within the overall defini- indicate the availability of capabilities and tech- tion of the NTRO. If responders cannot cur- nologies, as illustrated in the sample chart on the rently accomplish these functional elements as next page. they have defined them, then the elements include unmet needs—gaps that must be bridged The color of the outermost box indicates the if responders are to be prepared for terrorism. availability of the functional capability to the responder. That is, for this box, the Project asked The functional elements in this document have participants “does this functional capability exist been vetted in dozens of field interviews with today for the operational environment?” The

PROJECT RESPONDER Introduction

1. Do emergency responders 2. Are technologies available 3. What are the technology The NTRO chapters have the functional capability in the near-term to provide risks of developing this in this operational this functional capability? functional capability? also summarize “Gap environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH Fillers.” The discussion YES / MARGINAL / NO in these sections gener- Personal Protection and Equipment ally describes technol- Operational Environment ogy and non-technology 1 High Explosive/ measures that could be Functional Capabilities Chemical2 Biological Radiological Nuclear Incendiary 1. Body Protection From All 3 taken to close the gaps Hazards between what respon- 2. Long-Term Respiratory Protection – Oxygen Available ders need and what they have. Where specific 3. Long-Term Respiratory Protection – Oxygen Deficient technology development 4. Escape Respiratory Protection programs are recom-

5. Responder Decontamination mended, the Gap Fillers are more fully described Green Ð Available Yellow Ð Uneven or Red Ð Capability marginal capability absent at the end of the chap- Sample NTRO with Color-Coding Legend4 ter, in the Response Technology Objectives. However, the Gap Filler results of that assessment are expressed in the discussion also includes some options for technol- matrices by assigning a color to the outermost ogy transfer that can improve capability without box: green if the functional capability exists a development program, as well as non-material today; yellow if the capability is marginal or solutions (e.g., changes or increases in funding for unevenly available among responders; and red if training, doctrine, organization, etc.). the functional capability does not yet exist. Based on this information, the project asked the If the availability of a functional capability ele- technologists and responders “what is the near- ment was judged to be limited or non-existent, term availability of the technologies needed to participants were asked to consider why this is so fill the gaps in capability?” The answer to this (e.g., is it a cost issue for all or some jurisdictions, question provides the color for the second or is the technology just not there?). The nested box in each matrix cell. The box is responses to that question are noted in the dis- green if technology is available in the near-term cussion of the Current Capabilities for each func- (i.e., less than five years). The box is yellow if tional capability element. technology is marginally available in the near- term. The box is red if technology does not seem For functional capabilities where the responders to be in the R&D pipeline. indicated marginal or no availability, Project Responder brought together technologists and Technologists were asked to assess the overall responders in workshops to recommend technol- technological risk of the R&D effort required to ogy programs to close those gaps. To lay the surmount the gaps identified. This level of risk is foundation for these recommended programs, the represented by the color of the third, innermost NTRO chapters summarize existing technology nested box in each matrix cell. For this issue, programs and areas of development that have technologists were asked “what is the technologi- application to the functional element, and char- cal risk for developing technology to close these acterize what technology limitations and barriers gaps?” The box is colored green if the risk was are in the way of achieving the needed capability. considered low, yellow if the risk was considered

4 Note that if an outer box is green, the subsequent issues are irrelevant and thus not addressed. Thus, areas where capability is available would be represented by a single green box. Furthermore, if a box is gray, responders believed that the functional capability was not applicable to that specific operational environment.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter I

moderate and red if the risk was considered high. achieve the ultimate desired level of capability. Because of the level of aggregation at which these For some capabilities, it will be important to pur- judgments were made, they must be treated as an sue both near-term and longer-term development overall characterization of the technical difficulty efforts, with some attention to transition between of achieving all of the responders’ goals, rather the two, to maximize important responder capa- than the level of technical risk associated either bilities in all time periods. with each goal. Technology Roadmaps – Goals to Close One purpose for providing these data points in a Capability Gaps simplified color-coding schema is so that readers interested in the forest more than the trees can Each of the NTRO chapters presents technology easily orient themselves to the overall pattern of roadmaps that describe the development path to gaps in capability and the likely role of current greater capability. The building blocks for the and additional technology investments in bridg- roadmaps are Response Technology Objectives ing these gaps. Thus, towards the beginning of (RTOs). The RTOs represent recommended pro- each NTRO chapter below, the entire NTRO grams for the federal government to adopt, in and its constituent functional capabilities are rep- addition to current efforts. For some needed resented in a single matrix with the color-coded functional capabilities, it is natural to define a boxes. This matrix helps the reader identify at a coherent technology effort to remedy all the tech- glance three important facts: those areas where nologically-determined capability shortfalls in a improved capabilities are needed, the degree of single program. In these cases, there will be a focus and likely success of existing technology one-to-one mapping between the RTOs and programs in providing the full set of capabilities functional capabilities. In other instances, key wanted by responders, and the significance of the technologies may enable more than one func- technological obstacles that stand in the way of tional capability, or a functional capability may delivering those capabilities. require a heterogeneous set of technologies to fill the identified shortfalls. Areas with red in the outer boxes (that is, with severe shortfalls in capability available to emer- As presented in the NTRO matrices, the assessed gency responders) but with a green middle box level of technological risk in meeting key capabil- are areas where existing technology programs will ity objectives plays a key role in determining provide solutions, or in some instances where the what sort of technology effort is proposed. High needed solutions are primarily not technological technological risk generally implies a need for in nature. (The needed solutions may be organi- applied or even basic research to develop infor- zational or budgetary.) mation about the feasibility of novel technical approaches. A high degree of parallelism in If the middle box is red or yellow but the inner- development would also be desirable. An inter- most box is green, that means that current pro- mediate level of risk suggests that the basic tech- grams are not adequately focused on responder nical knowledge is available but that the imple- needs but that low-risk technology solutions are mentation of this knowledge pushes the current available. In this case the appropriate recommen- state of the art, requiring a significant engineer- dation is for a technology integration (low-risk ing development effort. development) program or even simply a program for encouraging the commercial integration of Low technological risk implies that the short- commercial-off-the-shelf technology (COTS) fall can be remedied through straightforward through a testing and certification program. On combinations of known technologies that are the other hand, matrix cells that are all red repre- already available in the military or commercial sent a needed functional capability element that spheres, whether they are already combined in poses significant technological challenges to commercial-off-the-shelf products or not. Low

PROJECT RESPONDER Introduction

technological risk should not be taken to indicate RTOs may need to be adjusted to the organiza- that little effort or ingenuity is required; the com- tion that ends up responsible for their execution. bination of significant unmet needs and low assessed technological risk often suggests the pres- The RTOs describe technology objectives and ence of thorny technology integration issues (for milestones, and provide rough estimates of cost example between multiple existing and novel sys- and schedule. The cost and schedule estimates tems) or significant organizational roadblocks to assume the continuation of currently pro- technology adoption; effort required in these grammed efforts in related areas and assume instances may in fact exceed that needed to effective leveraging of those programs. The esti- develop some previously unavailable widget that mates are based on top-down expert judgment on its own solves a capability problem. rather than a detailed bottom-up plan. More precise estimates would require knowledge of the In some functional capability areas, improved actual budgetary and institutional environment capability is urgently needed yet the ultimate in which the work is to be carried forward. technological solutions require extensive research Thus, the next step would be to choose a respon- and development. This situation generally sible federal agency and an execution strategy for prompted technologists to recommend a multi- each RTO, and determine the appropriate degree pronged approach in which a relatively low-risk of risk and parallel development for each pro- development program can be aimed at a set of gram, as well as the institutional context in which meaningful intermediate capability goals while various research and development tasks would be higher-risk and longer-term activities are begun performed. Even with this context firmly estab- that are oriented toward the ultimate levels of lished, several planning iterations will be required capability desired. to achieve stable and accurate cost and schedule estimates. There is considerable art in defining technology objectives to close capability gaps. One wants Because of the current rapid rate of evolution in objectives and interim milestones that are con- the federal government’s mechanisms for concrete enough to enable easy assessment of ducting homeland security R&D, the Response progress, but that are broad and flexible enough Technology Objectives do not identify specific so that technology development programs can agencies for program execution. However, the take advantage of learning during the R&D discussion in each chapter identifies some agen- process. R&D programs with similar content cies that are participating in key areas of technol- need to be managed together, so that cross-fertil- ogy development: in such cases, it is important ization is easy and so that budgets can adapt as that current programs and expertise be leveraged some paths become more or less promising than in whatever new arrangements are developed in originally thought. Thus the structure of the the Department of Homeland Security.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter I

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter II Personal Protection and Equipment (PPE) Chapter Chair: Dr. John Lyons Chapter Coordinator: Michelle Royal Definition discussing Personal Protection and Equipment have stayed “close to their home turf.” Personal Protection and Equipment (PPE) is the Nonetheless, responders believe that large events capability to protect responders, via gear from the would affect the amount of protective gear effects of chemical, biological, and radiological needed, more than the nature of the gear needed. agents as well as blast and incendiary effects. Chemical and biological incidents are in Operational Environments between a strictly local problem and a national- level catastrophe – partly because of relatively The capabilities required of emergency respon- common HAZMAT incidents; partly because of ders and the needed protections will vary by the the special teams being formed at the national type of incident. Chemical, biological, nuclear, level, as well as recent anthrax incidents. radiological, and explosive/incendiary events place different requirements on protective It should be noted that the responders want to equipment. Within these distinct operational minimize the number of sets of protective gear environments, there is a near infinite number of required. Therefore they want any proposed set variations in terms of size, severity, specific agent, of new gear to be effective, not only for the major geographic area, and so on. However, responders terrorist disasters, but also for everyday events. believe that they need to be prepared for the full (This means that the new gear must have all the range of effects, and that these variations would different new features thoroughly integrated in mean little in terms of the protection they would the design.) This is not just a matter of limiting need. Thus the discussion here deals largely with inventory or even saving time in turning out for the four major types of threat agent that respon- an incident, although these are also very impor- ders needed to be protected from: chemical, bio- tant. Many responders will arrive on an inci- logical, radiological, and the heat and kinetic dent scene, often equipped only with everyday insult from explosive/incendiary events. The garments, before the incident has been fully assessments in the tables are at this level. (The characterized; in addition, there is a danger that effects of nuclear explosions were resolved into terrorists will employ secondary devices at an combinations of explosive, incendiary, and radio- incident scene that could add additional hazards logical effects.) to an ongoing incident. For these reasons, moving in the direction of an all-hazard protection In discussing Personal Protection and Equipment, capability will sometimes be a matter of life and responders have typically focused primarily on death, not just convenience. scenarios that can be handled locally; there has not been much discussion of nuclear holocausts, for example. Disasters involving large parts of Needed Functional Capabilities and Priorities states or regions, as would be the case for aerial dispersion of chem/bio agents, have not been Protecting emergency responders is a top priority; discussed much, although such scenarios loom keeping them in the best physical and mental large at the national level. The responders in condition is essential to maintain the vital

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter II

services they must provide. This NTRO is technology challenges will be in body and respira- focused on gear such as clothing and masks for tory protection, where (especially in respiratory the individual. protection) little research is going on and the trade-offs between weight and duration will be Responders and technologists considered a set of difficult. five functional capabilities to handle the operational context described above. These capabilities Personal Protection and Equipment are presented below in Operational Environments High order of priority: Explosive/ Functional Capabilities Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Incendiary • Body Protection from 1. Body Protection from All All Hazards Hazards 2. Long-term Respiratory • Long-Term Respira- Protection – Oxygen Available 2 tory Protection – O 3. Long-term Respiratory Available Protection – Oxygen Deficient 4. Responder Decontamination • Long-Term Respira- 2 tory Protection – O 5. Escape Respiratory Protection Deficient 1 1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this • Responder 2 operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO 3 2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional Decontamination capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO 3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability? • Escape Respiratory LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH Protection Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’

Responders’ top priority is protecting the body, PPE.1 – Body Protection from All Hazards. primarily through protecting the skin (i.e., rang- The ability to have full-body protection for respon- ing from firefighter turnout suits to the full ders from all hazards: not only CBRE, protection of HAZMAT uniforms) and then, but also toxic industrial chemicals and other protecting the lungs (i.e., masks of various kinds). hazardous materials. The discussion did not deal with preventing falls This element includes not only terrorists’ use of and other physical injuries. CBRE but also industrial chemicals and other Finally, the responders are concerned about the hazardous materials. The rationale is that respon- thoroughness of decontamination. This became ders need to minimize the number of different part of the separate functional capability on suits, masks, and the like they must carry. This decontamination in this NTRO, and also part of makes a one-suit-fits-all-needs solution very attractive. In this way the same protective system the sensor plan presented in Chapter III (DIDA). works for everyday hazards as well as terrorist Overall State of Technology for disasters. As mentioned above, given the likeli- Personal Protection hood that responders will arrive at an incident before it is fully characterized, and the possibility The matrix to the right shows a mix of moderate of secondary devices with additional threat agents to high technological challenges in raising the aimed at responders, the all-hazards suit will be a level of capabilities for emergency response. The lifesaver as well as a convenience. chart shows relatively few green assessments, mainly for decontamination for radiological Goals: and high-explosive/incendiary, where responders The responders set the following goals for this feel they have acceptable procedures. The key element. These goals were used to assess the

PROJECT RESPONDER Personal Protection and Equipment

current capabilities and provide the target capa- • Variable visibility of suits. Most of the time bilities for the plan. responders want to be visible but SWAT teams may want to have low visibility. • Lightweight: <15 lbs for the full ensemble (gloves, boots, suit, helmet) but not including • Provide protection against thermal, ballistic, add-ons such as microclimate cooling or com- CBRE. These are the basic needs. munications gear – current bunker gear for firefighters is heavy when dry, and worse when • Durable against tearing, puncture, and impact. wet. • Designed to fit. One-size-fits-all is not good • Rapid donning and doffing. Velcro has enough. improved this a lot but donning essentially air- • Hearing protection. tight gear against hostile atmospheres generally requires a second person to assist. • Laser vision protection. Law enforcement officers, often first on the scene, are concerned • Comfortable; microclimate conditioning – the about encountering terrorists using laser airtight, watertight suits need climate control weapons. and ventilation for any extended period. It is likely that semi-permeable fabrics will require Current Capabilities: this too. There are no ensembles that meet all of these • Capable of being used with existing gear. If goals. HAZMAT and bomb squad gear come the new items are to be used with existing items, closest. Bunker gear for firefighters is heavy, old and new must be compatible. For law becomes waterlogged, and is not designed for enforcement, the new suit must have a pocket chem/bio or radiological hazards. It does a good for ballistic vests, etc. job against thermal, impact and puncture threats. The military have suits designed primarily for • Improved dexterity, especially for gloves. chemical attack (though it turns out they are effective against biological attack as well). The • Waterproof. Army has bomb fragmentation shields that are • Able to self-decontaminate – this suggests put under their uniforms, but they are heavy and reactive chemicals in the material that will cannot be worn routinely. The Army’s battle neutralize the hostile agents. dress overgarment and the Joint Services Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) • Exceeds current standards. Capable of meet- are both based on a charcoal interlayer to absorb ing anticipated future standards as they are the toxic agents. The JSLIST suit is a newer produced and adopted. design, lighter and is claimed to be more comfortable. • Built-in extraction handle. This will enable one responder to pull another out of a tight Law enforcement officers have ballistic protection spot without taking off protective gear. and little else. Emergency medical personnel currently do not make much use of special gear. • Non-conductive electrically. Radioactive sources may emit various kinds • A base suit that works for all missions with of injurious radiation. Some are either non- appropriate add-ons for different situations. defensible with lightweight materials (gamma, This is a great challenge with a great cost pay- neutron, and x-rays,) or they are charged off as well as simplifying logistics. particles with limited ability to penetrate the

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter II

skin or clothing (alphas, betas). The alphas and through (i.e., sweat) but nothing larger. This betas can attach to larger dust particles and find concept is in late applied research wherein addi- their way into the lungs or through breaks in the tional polymers are being evaluated. Whereas the skin into the blood stream. Ingestion sometimes current Land Warrior program in the Army is is possible. However the usual chemical suits based on the JSLIST technology, the semi- provide excellent protection and the particles are permeable membrane technology is planned to easily washed off.5 While exposure to known, come to fruition by 2010. The Future Force low levels of gamma, x-ray, or neutron radiation Warrior effort (fielded by 2015-2020 with the can be limited by time to relatively safe levels, first units deployed by 2010) is planned to rely high levels require very dense metals such as lead on semi-permeable fabric composites with active, for effective shielding. Specialized suits and, self-decontaminating properties. preferably, robots should be used for clean up and for insertion of high-level radiation sources into a The DoD is supporting a significant university shielded container. research effort to see what new benefits may be achieved through the use of nanomaterials and All of the goals are desirable but most important nanotechnology (see additional discussion of among them are: lightweight protection, durable these technologies in Chapter I (Introduction) as against tearing, puncture, and impact, good fit to (Strategic Research Areas)). the wearer, improved glove dexterity, waterproof, and compatible with other gear used by the serv- Technology Limitations and Barriers: ice. The concept of a single base suit for all with The challenge is not so much in designing a sys- add-ons for particular scenarios has great appeal tem to meet one or another goal but rather to but is regarded as very difficult technically to meet all the priority goals in one system. achieve. Cost savings from having one suit rather Reducing weight will be a challenge. Power than many different suits would be substantial. sources for cooling the suit will be a limiting fac- There has, as yet, been no movement toward this tor as it is in nearly all military applications for goal. A possible exception is in the military as the individual war-fighter. A particular challenge exemplified by the Army’s work on semi-perme- is providing seals at zippers and other closures. able fabrics. They are designed for chem/bio use; they may or may not be suitable for firefighting. There are many schemes with good performance against one or several hazards but they are not State of the Art: lightweight, easy to use, comfortable, or they fall There is a new research alliance at the Institute short of other needs and goals described above. for Soldier Nanotechnology (ISN) at MIT that is Resistance to chem/bio agents might be achieved conducting a basic and early applied research pro- by reactive agents in the material and by reduced gram covering some of the goals of this func- or near-zero permeability. The effectiveness of tional capability. Other efforts are underway at reactive agents needs to be tested carefully to the Army’s Natick laboratories. The focus of the determine how much toxin specific fabric coat- Army’s FFW program is similar to other goals of ings can handle; to see if there is a possibility, or this functional capability. even a necessity, of a catalytic effect rather than a stoichiometric one; what the shelf life of the coat- At the Army’s Natick laboratories, the focus ing will be, and how responders can know if the is shifting from layered suits with a charcoal active agent(s) are still active. These properties interlayer to a lighter suit with controlled or will not necessarily be useful in firefighting – and semi-permeable fabric. There is just enough may be degraded by heat and water encountered permeability to allow water molecules to pass in typical firefighting situations.

5 See “Medical Management of Radiobiological Casualties Handbook” Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, Bethesda, MD (April 2003).

PROJECT RESPONDER Personal Protection and Equipment

What is needed is a combination of the latest in National nanotechnology research programs materials science and system engineering and should be integrated into an overall plan so that ergonomics. The one-suit-meets-all goal is the results flow smoothly into the overall program most intriguing idea. Reaching agreement outlined below. Integration of all the pieces must among the various groups of responders will be be planned. The acquisition strategy should be difficult and will require patience and skill in to involve all relevant research entities from the consensus building. This skill will be required outset by forming integrated advisory bodies both in defining performance requirements and made up of suppliers, R&D activities, the ulti- in developing the necessary purchase standards mate fielding entity, and the users. Similarly, when the technical barriers have been overcome. R&D alliances should be formed among the performers. This way the work can be kept on track All scenarios are rated yellow for adequacy of and optimized easily. current technical programs. They have small budgets, the market is relatively small, and the The overall program might look like this: test and certification capability is not adequate. • A basic and exploratory effort on self- Gap Fillers: decontamination, cooling systems and power sources, and sealing zippers and closures. The degree of risk for delivering these capabilities depends upon how ambitious the future R&D • An applied research program on fabrics to program objectives will be. For the one-suit- combine resistance for all scenarios using the meets-all goals, the risks are very high. This is a various schemes now either commercial or in stretch goal that may very well not be met in the advanced development as starting points (i.e., early years but the fallout along the way should semi-permeable fabrics, products of nanotech- meet many of the goals. The chem/bio risks are nology research programs, and cooling systems moderate given the military’s high priorities. on the military drawing boards). Radiological risks are low for alpha and beta particles but high for gammas, x-rays, and neutrons. • Development work to build prototypes first of Ordinary protective garments will not address the individual technologies for separate goals and latter three forms of radiation hazards. The risks then of integrated systems; evaluate in the lab- for R&D on the high explosives and incendiary oratory and in the field. scenario are rated high because this is where the normal hazards of fire fighting, HAZMAT, and • Cost reduction via developmental engineering EMS fall along with the WMD high explosives work to adapt military technology for emer- and incendiaries. Most of the current federal gency responder products. R&D is aimed at chem/bio hazards. PPE.2 – Long-Term Respiratory Protection The priority goals for protective garments are: Where Oxygen is Available (i.e., Air reduced weight for the thermal barriers, resistance Purification). The ability to have long-term respi- to tearing, puncture and impact, comfort, ability ratory protection in an oxygen-available environ- to breathe, suppleness, self-decontamination, ment (air purification). cooling systems and power sources, and provision Goals: for integrated communications. The basic suit should contain as many of these as possible. • Duration: >12 hours. However it is reasonable to mount separate • Weight: <10 ounces. research programs on some of these goals and then integrate the various pieces into a final • Very low breathing resistance (400 liters/min. product. peak inhalation rate) and with positive pressure.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter II

• Comfortable especially for the prolonged use State of the Art: anticipated in these goals. There are programs under way addressing some • Vision – Full peripheral field of view (>120 of the goals but not in an integrated fashion. degrees) to include both lateral and vertical. Technology Limitations and Barriers: No fogging. The most difficult challenge is to reduce weight • Integrated communications capability to substantially while increasing the capacity of the include back to incident command center sorbents. (The current capability is that it and to other responders. requires 11 oz. of sorbent to achieve six hours of protection.) Improved sorbents will help, but • Residual life indicators for expendable this is likely going to be a trade-off in design. components. Improved communication through the mask is • Affordable: <$300 each. very important and will be a challenge both technically and to the weight limitation. • Interchangeable components with other manufacturers’ models. The risks for most of the goals are not high; an exception is the weight-capacity trade-off. • Capable of handling all hazards. Solving this trade-off satisfactorily will require a breakthrough in materials and in design. • Exceeds current standards and meets anticipated new standards as they are adopted. Gap Fillers: • Resistance to heat and cold and flash The following kinds of R&D are needed: mate- protection. rials research; design of the mask assembly; design and performance of the filter elements. • Serviceable at the home base as opposed to having to return to the manufacturer. • The materials work includes the sorbents themselves and should include new sorbents; • Useful for health care providers as well. e.g., nanoparticles based on carbon nanotubes with additional molecules inside – caged struc- • Low physical profile; non-snagging. tures – with a very high capacity. Current Current Capabilities: R&D results should be integrated with these projects. The responders would like to have a single system with interchangeable components such as filters, • Additional material work should be devoted to face pieces, etc. The components should be lens materials, antifogging technologies, lighter interchangeable with systems from all manufac- weight mask materials and improved sealants. turers. This is not the case today but some of the goals are met by currently available systems. This • Construction and evaluation of performance functional capability is rated today as overall mar- should include various combinations of filter ginal and much work will be necessary to meet elements with the goal of increasing capacity the all-in-one goal. There are different filters for per unit weight and thereby lengthening different threats raising the possibility of the user time in service; also layering in various selecting the wrong one, an action that could be combinations to achieve performance against fatal. Breathing resistance is too high, making the broadest possible spectrum of toxins. the user work too hard to breathe and shortening Reduced resistance to breathing is a must, and the length of time the user can wear the gear. will be achieved from both new filter materials Communications are difficult, if not impossible, and designs; possibly some form of the power- lenses fog easily and the equipment is too heavy. assisted air purifier respirators might supply an The manufacturer must service most current answer. systems.

PROJECT RESPONDER Personal Protection and Equipment

PPE.3 – Long-Term Respiratory Protection in Current Capability: an Oxygen-Deficient Environment. The ability Current systems include principally self- to have long-term respiratory protection in an oxy- contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Today’s gen-deprived environment with unknown hazards. SCBAs are typically rated up to one-hour service at 4500 psi in the tank. They cost between Goals: $5,000 and $6,000 (cf the goals of four hours • Long-term: >4 hours under stress. and $3000). The responders discussed rebreathers – systems that remove carbon dioxide • Heads-up display capability. and generate fresh oxygen. These were pioneered by the Navy submarine rescue programs and are • Weight except mask: <10 lbs. (Current is used for deep-sea diving even today. They were 20 lbs without the mask.) used by fire departments (based on potassium • Integrated communications to command cen- superoxide, a hazardous material) before the ter and other responders. newer, lighter weight SCBAs were introduced. Given that many years have passed and much • Comfortable, ergonomically designed. new chemistry has appeared, it would be worth an R&D investment to see what new concepts • Fragmentation/shrapnel/crush protection. may be possible. Tethered systems are not being addressed because of the entanglement problem. • Status indicator for consumable parts. There is a new system available that claims utility as a rebreather for up to four hours. The maker • Ability to withstand thermal loads, both hot also claims it has the potential to be adapted as a and cold. one-hour SCBA. It weighs somewhat more than the current SCBAs. • Serviceable at the responders’ home bases. The SCBAs of today are heavy and have a name- • Durable. plate lifetime of up to one hour. In practice, the • Affordable: <$3000 each. (Currently wearer can only stay in the hazardous atmosphere $5000-6000.) about twenty minutes because of the need for ingress and egress time plus a good safety margin. • Integrated environmental monitoring This is enough time for a rescue but little work- (addressed in Chapter III (DIDA), under ing time otherwise. “sensors”). State of the Art: • Full peripheral field of view, 120 degrees both There is not much cutting-edge activity in this lateral and vertical. No fogging. area. There is some new work on rebreathers in the Navy. The current posture was given by • Integrated personal alert device to indicate the Boston FD; namely, they abandoned distress emergency. rebreathers in 1978 when the improved SCBAs • Interchangeable components (especially the became available. face piece) with other breathing apparatus. Technology Limitations and Barriers: • Meets appropriate and anticipated emerging Reducing weight to reach the above goals while future standards. increasing duration of service is another difficult trade-off, similar to that for filter masks. The • Low physical profile; no snagging. current fiberglass-wound aluminum tank was

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter II

developed by NASA thirty years ago. In the PPE.4 – Responder Decontamination. The future there may be materials developments that ability to decontaminate response personnel, permit higher air pressures. Alternative means of including law enforcement and medical person- storing the gas (air) can possibly be had by novel nel, and their personal equipment on scene and sorbents within the tank to obviate the need for in all weather conditions. high pressures. Goals: Other challenges for the masks are similar to • Environmentally benign. those for filter masks. • Benign to equipment. The technological risks of achieving these goals are significant. Achieving much higher pressures • On-scene real-time detection of any residual in the air tank will be difficult and would require hazards – decontamination assurance. substantial advances in strength of materials. On the other hand, developing a solid sorbent system • Dry decontamination. to hold large quantities of sorbed air would require both very different sorbents for air, and a • Speed – fast as a baggage conveyor. system to release the sorbed gas. These are new • Ability of the garments and personal equip- departures and have inherent development risks. ment to self-decontaminate. Gap Fillers: Current Capability: The R&D for the mask itself will be similar to that for filter masks (PPE.2 (Long-Term Most methods in use today begin with drenching water showers. If chemicals or biological agents Respiratory Protection – O2 Available)). There is a need for electronic communication from within are suspected then the most common reagent is the mask. The communication piece is a func- chlorine as solutions of sodium hypochlorite tion described in Chapter IV, as an element of (common laundry bleach) in concentrated or dilute forms. These solutions are relatively slow – the Unified Incident Command Decision fifteen minutes exposure is recommended to Support and Interoperable Communications destroy some biologicals; e.g., anthrax spores. (UIC) NTRO, but the integration of micro- The concentrated form (5% – 6% for laundry phones, headphones, or speakers and controls bleach) is hazardous to the skin and eyes and and displays into protective equipment will need should be used with caution. to be done as the suits and masks are developed. The same is true for power supplies for systems A Canadian company has developed a foamed in the mask or garments, which are a part of product that is said to be effective in bomb Chapter IX (Logistics Support). suppression as well as in decontamination applications. The air supply requires substantial exploratory and applied research to address the weight and The Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Insti- duration goals. The assumption is that we cannot tute has issued a report that states that decontam- simply increase the pressures in the existing or inating particulates containing alpha or beta par- similar tank systems to reach greater than 4 hours ticles (the only long-lived radiation hazards) is lifetime in service use and a weight for the stor- not difficult and the present techniques should be age system of under 10 lbs. What is needed is a adequate – the particles are readily washed away. low-pressure tank filled with a new air sorbent (Decontamination of wounds is somewhat more that will hold the requisite air weight in a modest complicated.) In addition radiacs or geiger coun- volume at a modest pressure. This requirement is ters are effective sensors for residual radiation similar to that faced by the hydrogen-fueled car hazards. engineers, only much less hazardous.

PROJECT RESPONDER Personal Protection and Equipment

Responders lack reliable sensors to determine Gap Fillers: whether chem/bio decontamination has been The several decontamination efforts currently effective. They therefore are reluctant to reuse underway should be coordinated and new fund- decontaminated garments. They prefer to discard ing for research coupled to these efforts. Current them. There is a serious psychological barrier to funding sources should continue their sponsor- reuse. (Responders are less wary of decontami- ship. The self-decontaminating fabric concept is nated solid surfaces; e.g., tools and the like. See a good one; it is currently being looked into by Chapter V (Response and Recovery).) the military. DoD is also looking at nano-fabrics engineered to detect as well as neutralize haz- State of the Art: ardous chemicals and biologics. Reliable sensors There are two approaches at present: improved will be required to assure that the agents in the decontamination chemicals for use in showers fabric have done their job. (See Chapter III etc., and self-decontaminating fabrics wherein (DIDA).) reactive entities are built into the fabric. This is a relatively untested concept (see discussion under Beyond maintaining or enhancing current R&D PPE.1 (Body Protection From All Hazards)) now programs, the principal needs here are coordina- in research funded by DoD. Chlorine-containing tion and integration followed by field testing. Of washes are hard on the environment and on the concern is the completeness of the destruction of fibers. Substitute chemicals are being studied. the toxins; this in turn means introduction of The Army’s Edgewood Arsenal has several proj- analytical techniques and sensors effective at ects under way including enzymatic decontami- detecting very low levels of toxins. Testing will nation, ultraviolet light decontamination for bio- involve trials with individuals in full field uni- logics, and high-pressure steam or even form exposed to a surrogate chemical, followed supercritical steam. There is no R&D on the by a standard decontamination wash and then psychological problem of reusing contaminated evaluation. equipment such as garments. Sensors responsive at low concentrations on surfaces are required but PPE.5 – Escape Respiratory Protection. not yet available. (See Chapter III (DIDA) for Protection for escape from contaminated areas but sensor development.) not used for entry and rescue operations.

Technology Limitations and Barriers: Goals: There are two primary challenges: chem/bio sen- • Duration – 15 minutes. sors effective at low levels of surface contamina- • Easily deployed with safe packaging. tion, and the psychological resistance to reuse of decontaminated garments. (See discussion above.) • Easily portable – on belt or in vehicle. The technological risk of developing these capa- • Compact size: 4" by 3" by 1/2"; bilities is moderate to low. There are a number weight: 8 ounces. of possibilities for destroying chemical or biological residues, and one can be optimistic that • Extended shelf life – minimum five years. improvements over straight chlorine systems • Lens – full peripheral vision (lateral and verti- will be fielded. On the other hand, developing cal) 120 degrees; no fogging. the low-level sensors capable of relieving the psychological barriers to reuse will be much • Nondegradable, environmentally stable; more difficult. Given the concern over contami- ruggedized. nation from terrorist acts, the sensors are likely to be developed. Successful research into the • Disposable. psychology of emergency responders is more problematic.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter II

• Carrying case (designed to wear on the belt). beyond, perhaps, voice enhancers (no power required) will not be possible. Because of the • All hazards. weight and size restrictions it is probable that the filter elements will be lighter and smaller than • Status indicator. those in PPE.2 (Long-Term Respiratory Protection • Resistant to thermal loads (hot and cold) and – O2 Available). Thus the elements must be at flash protection. least as effective as those required for PPE.2 (Long-Term Respiratory Protection – O2 Available) • Affordable (<$100). filter masks, even though the time of use will be much less. • Integrated communications. Gap Fillers: Current Capability: Research and development for escape masks has The utility of the escape mask is to enhance the goals that are so similar to those for ordinary likelihood of escape from hazardous areas, not to filter masks that the research program for the perform tasks. Capability is marginal for rescue former ought to derive from the program for masks. They are not universally used, many in the latter. Thus lighter mask materials, more effi- current fire service stocks are years past the expi- cient sorbents, better designs for the filter, voice ration dates. Available products are not conven- enhancement and so on should arise in the PPE.2 ient to wear, need to be more compact, and are (Long-Term Respiratory Protection – O2 Available) deficient in the same ways as air filtration masks program and simply be adapted for PPE.5 (see PPE.2 (Long-Term Respiratory Protection – O2 (Escape Respiratory Protection). Available)). They are being distributed in some venues – the Pentagon recently distributed some Personal Protection and Equipment 20,000 commercial products within the building. Response Technology Objectives The Department of Defense Technical Support (PPErto) Working Group (TSWG) has recently had several hoods evaluated using a draft NIOSH standard. The roadmap shows the recommended programs Large numbers of these have been purchased with their proposed funding as a function of recently by the Departments of State and elapsed time. Even with the overlaps in timing Defense. The Interagency Board for Equipment the chart tends to look linear. Yet R&D is sel- Standardization and Interoperability (IAB) urges dom linear; rather, it is usually carried out with more priority and funding for these masks. The many starts and stops, recursive loops and so on. IAB’s requirements are similar to the goals listed Furthermore, the expenditures appear to be steady across each bar when, in fact, there will be above. Given that the fire service is more likely ramp-ups and ramp-downs within each bar. to require SCBAs in such environments, the users Separate RTOs are recommended for each of will tend to be law enforcement and the EMS the five functional capabilities; however, as plus civilians in certain venues. noted below, extensive coordination among the first three will be necessary. For the first three, State of the Art: the programs begin with exploration of new con- Some R&D is being done in industry; little in cepts going beyond what is currently in use or in the military. The effort is probably sub-critical to active R&D already. This exploration is basic achieving the goals described above. research; it should produce new concepts to meet the goals. There follows a period of applied Technology Limitations and Barriers: research, beginning while the basic work is still Meeting the weight, size and duration goals will going on. This research is to shape the basic require a difficult trade-off. The result should fit concepts into working constructs that will on the responder’s belt. Adding communications solve one or more goals. This work will lead to

PROJECT RESPONDER Personal Protection and Equipment

development of ideas into prototype working integrated into the suit mask combination of the models suitable for test, evaluation and demon- future. stration (T&E). Since cost is a significant barrier already for emergency responders and since new For PPErto.3 (Respiratory Protection – O2 technology often comes at a higher cost than that Deficient), weight and duration of use are which it replaces, engineering work for both cost the key goals. Materials research on the mask reduction and easier producibility is a separate polymers and on the tank should provide some bar. improvement. Finding means of absorbing large quantities of air in a bed of sorbents especially Finally, there must be integration across most of created for air absorption should allow storage the functional capabilities. To express this prop- of much more air at only moderate pressures. erly would require another dimension. In partic- The results must be integrated with PPErto.1 ular the results of PPErto.1 (Body Protection – (Body Protection – Basic and Applied Research). Basic and Applied Research), PPErto.2 (Respiratory Protection – O2 Available) and PPErto.3 For PPErto.4 (Decontamination), there are two (Respiratory Protection – O2 Deficient) must be technical routes to be pursued. One is to find compatible with one another. The most effective decontaminating solutions that are less harmful means of assuring this integration is to have it to equipment, suits and the like and to the envi- going on continually from the outset. Some sort ronment. The other is to discover and make into of coordinating committee should be set up with products, self-decontaminating fabrics such that representatives from the R&D performers, the toxins are rendered harmless on contact and less manufacturers, and the ultimate users. external decontamination is necessary. The latter approach is included in PPErto.1 (Body Protection For PPErto.1 (Body Protection – Basic and – Basic and Applied Research). Applied Research), the current academic work and basic research in nanotechnology should produce For PPErto.5 (Escape Respiratory Protection) the new materials technology for fabrics that will only technical work that should be needed is to have a degree of “smartness.” This work will adapt the results of PPErto.2 (Respiratory protec- combine with explorations of other concepts to tion – O2 Available). The escape mask is essen- achieve the one-suit-fits-all goal. Applied tially a downgrade of the new filter masks. The research will develop the new designs needed biggest challenge here is the size and weight limits. One expects that the higher effectiveness of to incorporate the new concepts and will the new filter agents as well as the lighter weight provide the basis for constructing prototypes mask materials – both coming from PPErto.2 for development work. Integration is for both (Respiratory Protection – O2 Available) – will backward compatibility with existing suits and enable meeting the weight and size goals. masks and for compatibility with new masks in PPErto.2 (Respiratory Protection – O2 Available) PPErto.1 – Body Protection – Basic and and PPErto.3 (Respiratory Protection – O2 Applied Research Deficient). Objectives: For PPErto.2 (Respiratory Protection – O2 Devise new concepts for improved body protec- Available), the work will focus on lighter weight tion and create the basis for prototypes. The and more effective removal of toxins for longer ultimate goal is to provide the basis for a one- time periods. This means materials research for suit-meets-all-goals system. Research findings lighter mask polymers and research on new sor- from the DoD’s large investment in this area will bents with higher capacities and effective over a be fed into this activity, as will be results from broader range of toxins. There will be studies of Strategic Research Areas described in Chapter I. various designs for the filter packs, as well as for The costs below are in addition to existing pro- the mask/filter combination. The mask must be grams and fundings.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter II

Payoffs: designs suitable for development work. Principal The results will provide the basis for prototypes outcomes will be: scientific and engineering to be used for development and commercializa- reports describing the new concepts and designs tion of an advanced system of body protection along with appropriate patent disclosures. The that meets all threats with a minimum of special- applied work will produce the basis for proto- ized add-ons. There will be more protection at types used in the development phase. an overall reduced cost to the responders. This work will explore new fabrics and assem- Challenges: blages of fabric types with the goals of preventing Obtaining improved performance for all threats toxins from entering, providing strength and at reduced weight will involve trade-offs between toughness, reducing weight, increasing comfort sets of mutually opposing requirements. Meeting and dexterity. Some ideas include controlled the one-suit-meets-all goals requirement may be a permeability, microclimate control, fibers from stretch that cannot be completely met. nanotechnology, and reactive substituents to neutralize the toxins. Milestones/Metrics: PPErto.1 – Budget in Millions FY2005: Basic and exploratory Thrust 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals research to define the fundamental Body Protection $2 $9 $10 $18 $10 $15 $64 Research concepts to be used. Review the best of ongoing work in the federal labs and universities to lay the base for further new con- PPErto.2 – Respiratory Protection – Oxygen cepts. Launch a coordination committee. Available

FY2006: Continue the basic and exploratory Objectives: work and begin applied research on the com- Discover and demonstrate new materials and fil- bined goals of the one-suit-fits-all-needs concept. ter and mask designs to achieve longer duration Emphasize microclimate cooling, ballistic and (>12 hrs), lighter weight (<10 oz.), effective bomb fragment protection, and new fabric con- against all toxins, low breathing resistance (at a structs. peak breathing volume of 400 liters/min), and meets the cost target of less than $300 per unit. FY2007: Complete the basic research. Begin The mask should be serviceable at the responders’ integration of findings from all programs and home station rather than at the factory. begin work on prototypes. Payoffs: FY2008: Continue applied research and begin Present filter masks suffer from the need to advanced development of the prototypes. Work change filter packs for different toxins and from on manufacturability and cost challenges. high breathing resistance. The new filter mask FY2009-2011: Continue development work will provide much longer time in use, be lighter, through FY2011. Final product is a field- and have less breathing resistance, be effective demonstrated technology for a one-suit-fits-all- against all toxins, as well as meet the cost goal. needs protective suit. The responder will be able to wear the mask longer and be much more comfortable in it. The proposed program in this plan is to complement the DoD efforts, not duplicate Challenges: it. It should begin with basic and exploratory Improving effectiveness and lengthen service life, work apart from nanotechnology for three years. while at the same time reducing mask weight, Beginning a year and a half into the basic pro- will involve some difficult trade-offs. To meet gram (see PPE Roadmap) applied research will the weight objectives will require new sorbents in convert the new concepts into materials and the filters that take up much larger quantities of

PROJECT RESPONDER Personal Protection and Equipment

toxins than heretofore. This means new materi- Improve seals and face pieces, communications, als, perhaps from developments in nanotechnol- and indicators of remaining useful life. ogy. This will make use of results from Strategic Research Areas in Chapter I (Introduction). Payoffs: The much longer in-service time (up to Milestones/Metrics: twelve hours) will mean that responders can FY2005: Basic and exploratory research, search- accomplish much more in the hot zone, and ing for a universal filter element effective against trapped or isolated personnel can await rescue all hazards. Study and evaluate candidates from more safely. Effectiveness will be aided by the nanotechnology research across the nation. reduced weight (10 oz.) and improved materials, FY2006: Continue basic work including work seals, and comfort. The mask will be effective on new lens systems with better antifogging against all hazards and have a shelf- or on-the- properties, communications systems within the belt life of five years. The result should be mask and begin applied work on most promising designed so as to be compatible with the new suit candidates. developed in PPErto.1 (Body Protection – Basic and Applied Research). FY2007: Continue exploratory research and start formulation of one or two prototypes. Conduct Challenges: integration work of proposed prototypes with Technology for absorbing large volumes of air at results of the other functional capabilities’ relatively low pressures does not exist. New sor- research. bent materials based on nanotechnology are being discovered now. Decreasing weight while FY2008: Complete exploratory work on second- improving performance represents a difficult ary characteristics. Continue applied work on trade-off. prototypes. Make sure the prototypes can be manufactured at reasonable cost. Milestones/Metrics: FY2009: Continue construction and FY2005: Basic research on new sorbents for air laboratory testing of prototypes. Begin field to increase life without increasing tank pressure. demonstrations. Look at cage structures, nanotubes and buckey- balls, compare with research findings in hydrogen FY2010: Continue work on manufacturability fuel storage. and cost. Carry on field demonstrations, recycle to lab and back to field. FY2006: Continue basic research. PPErto.2 – Budget in Millions Investigate new rebreather concepts. Thrust 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals Begin applied work to build new tank Respiratory Pro- $3 $4.5 $7.5 $10.5 $6 $9 $40.5 storage. tection Materials and Designs – O2 Available FY2007: Complete basic work and recommend one or two concepts for appli- PPErto.3 – Respiratory Protection – Oxygen cation research. Begin development work on new Deficient concepts. Integrate as many of the goals as possi- Objectives: ble and integrate with results of the other RTOs in this NTRO. Begin manufacturing and cost Discover new air storage concepts and improved control studies. materials for self-contained breathing apparatus. Increase in-service time from less than one hour FY2008: Begin test and evaluation studies on to four hours. Meet weight and cost goals, evolving prototypes. Continue building proto- design ergonomically for function and comfort. types and evaluating in the laboratory and field.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter II

FY2009: Complete all work. Results are one FY2007: Develop prototypes and evaluate in or two fully demonstrated and field evaluated the laboratory. Begin test and evaluation in breathing apparatus suitable for use when field demonstrations. oxygen is deficient. FY2008: Complete field demonstrations. Carry PPErto.3 – Budget in Millions out manufacturing and cost studies. Thrust 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals Respiratory Pro- $1.5 $3 $4.5 $15 $16 $40 FY2009: Complete manufacturing and cost tection Materials and Designs – O2 studies. Deficient PPErto.4 – Budget in Millions PPErto.4 – Decontamination Thrust 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals Decontamination $2 $3 $4 $7 $6 $22 Objectives: Technologies Discover and demonstrate new ways to neutralize PPErto.5 – Escape Respiratory Protection toxins on responders clothing and gear. Explore more environmentally friendly chemical wash sys- Objectives: tems that are quick – <1 minute exposure – and Develop an improved version of escape hood: thorough. Find means of determining the com- more compact, lighter, with a shelf-life of five pleteness of decontamination. Devise reactive years, and effective against all hazards and at a chemical substituents on clothing to neutralize all unit cost of about $100. toxins. Payoffs: Payoffs: The hood will fit on the responder’s belt and Current methods do not have the confidence of will be especially useful for law enforcement offi- responders; they are loath to reuse decontami- cers first on-scene. nated clothing. The cost savings from reuse will be considerable. Challenges: To be at once smaller, lighter, and more effective Challenges: presents a severe difficulty and must entail a new Developing techniques for determining the com- much more effective filter element and lighter pleteness of decontamination will be difficult. mask materials. Removing the present psychological block to reusing the decontaminated clothing will require Milestones/Metrics: study into the phenomenon and education com- (Since the technology will be the same as for the bined with reliable new technology. new filter masks (PPErto.2 (Respiratory Protection – O2 Available), the same basic and applied Milestones/Metrics: research will be needed. Using the results of FY2005: Applied research on new systems pro- PPErto.2, only development work and adapting posed elsewhere. Consider new chemical con- the results will be required. The development cepts and compare and contrast with the current work will begin after the fourth year of PPErto.2 chlorine-based approaches. Review results of and run for three years.) work on self-decontaminating fabrics work being FY2005: None done in the DoD as well as elsewhere. FY2006: None FY2006: Continue studying proposals from earlier work. Select one or two systems for proto- FY2007: None type development.

PROJECT RESPONDER Personal Protection and Equipment

FY2008: Adapt technology from PPErto.2 FY2010: Complete development work with field (Respiratory Protection – O2 Available) to experiments. escape masks. Build prototypes. Begin development work on prototypes. PPErto.5 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals FY2009: Continue development work. Escape Respira- $0 $0 $0 $0 $2 $4 $6 Conduct demonstrations. tory Protection

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 • Prototype Suite • Integrate Respiratory PPErto.1 – Body Protection – Protection Applied Research & Development • Test & Evaluate

• Longer Duration (12 hrs) • Lighter Weight (10 oz.) PPErto.2 – Respiratory Protection – • Affordable ($300) Oxygen Available

• Longer Duration (4 hrs) • Lighter Weight (10 lbs) PPErto.3 – Respiratory Protection – • Affordable ($3000) Oxygen Deficient • Environmentally Benign • All Weather PPErto.4 – Responder Decontamination

• Effective Against All Hazards PPErto.5 – Escape Respiratory Protection • Affordable ($100) Personal Protection and Equipment Technology Roadmap

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter II

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA) Chapter Chair: Dr. Jasper Lupo Chapter Coordinator: Michelle Royal Definition sophisticated compound attacks that could come in the future. Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA) is the capability to quickly detect, locate, charac- In DIDA, responders considered all stages and terize and assess a potential or ongoing terrorist levels of the threat spectrum, but with primary attack. DIDA consists of sensor and related emphasis on response: information technologies and capabilities that can provide responders with knowledge to deal as • Prevention – pre-release, pre-event defensive effectively as possible with terrorist events involv- measures to prevent, reduce vulnerability, and ing weapons of mass destruction. minimize consequences prior to terrorist use of the weapon. The prevention stage may span Operational Environments minutes to years. Upon warning of an impending event, responders will attempt to In considering DIDA, responders focused on pre- detect, locate, identify, assess potential dam- and post-attack capabilities against five categories age, isolate, and disarm a weapon of mass of terrorist attack: chemical, biological, radiologi- destruction. This NTRO deals with the cal, nuclear, and explosive/incendiary. In practice, detection through assessment portions of the they divided these five into two groups. The first operation. Note that many of the sensors used group, consisting of the chemical, biological, and to accomplish this are also useful in the long radiological (CBR) attacks, requires some means periods of vigilance leading up to the tip-off of dispersal in air, food, water, or other media or emergence of an impending threat. and causes injury or death through inhalation, ingestion, or bodily contact. By contrast, • Response – capabilities needed following release nuclear, explosive, and incendiary devices (NE) or detonation, during the period in which have their primary effects through blast, pressure, people are in danger. Response may last from and fire. Responders are also concerned that minutes to days, depending on the severity of more than one type of device might be used in an the attack and the nature of the weapon. attack. Here DIDA may provide the initial detection that an attack has occurred. It would also be DIDA can be hindered by terrorist use of decoys, used to rapidly provide on-site information deceptive techniques, secondary devices, and about the weapon, the victims, and the extent countermeasures that shield, hide, saturate sen- of damage. This information is needed so that sors, hinder discrimination, or disguise the responders may also protect themselves if pos- weapon. These countermeasures are obviously sible as they proceed to help the victims and relevant prior to release or detonation. However, avert further damage. The response phase also the use of post-release countermeasures must be includes the prevention of further damage considered in order to avoid surprise from more from secondary devices by detecting their presence and facilitating their deactivation.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

• Consequence management – post-event sensor including bacteria, viruses, spores, and bio-toxins, and information capabilities that facilitate both those occurring in nature and those that recovery, aid cleanup, and improve treatment might be altered or engineered in the laboratory. of victims. At some point in time, response Bio-toxins are not living organisms and behave will become consequence management, restora- more like chemical agents. Some bioagents are tion and recovery. This may happen over contagious, complicating containment and track- hours to days, weeks, or much longer if the ing of the attack. Some are intended to disable event is severe. In recovery, DIDA provides and others to kill. The lethal doses vary dramati- critical information needed to prevent further cally by agent type and the age and health of the infection or exposure to residual agents, aid in victim. As with chemical agents, bioagents are cleanup, define quarantine and keepout zones, nearly impossible to detect until they are used. assess structural integrity, and determine hab- They are even more easily concealed than chemi- itability of buildings. cal weapons because extremely small containers may contain enough agent to affect tens of thou- Responders and technologists discussed differ- sands of people – biological agents can be 100 to ences among the five attack modes and what they 1000 times more lethal than chemical agents. mean to DIDA; their findings are summarized DIDA of released bioagents is also relatively below. mature in the laboratory and in controlled environments. However, rapid, affordable detection Chemical Agents – Chemical weapons can be bro- and identification in the field is more difficult ken up into three classes: toxic industrial chemi- than in the case of chemicals due to the fact that cals such as phosgene, injurious chemical warfare lethal agents may be virtually indistinguishable blister agents such as mustard gas, and lethal from harmless counterparts. chemical warfare agents such as nerve gas. Dispersal is a key parameter in the use of chemi- There is generally more time to deal with the cal weapons. Detection and identification of dis- effects of a BW attack than with chemical and persed chemical agents has received a lot of atten- bomb threats. The exposed population may not tion for both industrial and anti-terrorist begin to exhibit symptoms for seventy two hours purposes. Sensor technology tends to be rela- or more. This typical delay produces a danger tively mature, although there is an issue with false and also an opportunity. The danger, especially alarm rates if there are similar, confusing chemi- in the case of contagious agents, is that the delay cals (interferents) in the environment. Volatility will impede the identification of carriers of infec- and persistence of various chemical agents can tion who have dispersed from the attack site also dramatically affect detection strategy. before the existence of an attack has been recog- Inexpensive, rapid field sensors that can handle a nized. The opportunity is that detection of an spectrum of agents are in development. Stand- attack can provide an opportunity for contain- off and remote detection of chemical agents in ment and treatment efforts that may prevent containers is very difficult, but progress has been onset of the disease or reduce its effects.6 made with sensing schemes that involve contact or very close proximity with the reservoir. The Radiological Agents – A so-called dirty bomb is DoD R&D activities are making good progress made of radioactive materials dispersed by con- in the detection of chemical aerosol plumes. ventional explosives. A small quantity can con- taminate a large area and affect a large number of Biological Agents – the Poor Man’s Nuke. people. These agents are not well suited to pro- Biological weapons and agents are quite diverse: ducing large numbers of fatalities but they can DIDA must handle a wide range of threat agents, cause panic, long-term illness, and deny use of

6 Many bacterial diseases can be treated effectively with antibiotics if the exposure and nature of the agent is recognized in time. Even where no effective specific treatment is available (as in the case of most viruses today), non-specific medical care and preventing secondary infections can contribute importantly to survival.

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

key facilities or neighborhoods. Depending on identification/attribution would use very special- the isotopes used, danger may persist from hours ized capabilities possessed by the Department of to centuries. Unlike CB agents, radiological sub- Energy and its National Laboratories. stances can be detected before release because radioactive materials emit gamma rays and neu- Explosive and Incendiary Devices – Bombs like the trons that can be detected at useful stand-off Oklahoma City and Khobar Towers devices are ranges (tens of meters for unshielded devices). large, vehicle-transported weapons. Stand-off Sensor technology is relatively mature and com- detection of the explosives in bombs and incendi- pact. Portable radiation detectors in pager and aries is difficult, but progress has been made and cell-phone-sized packages are commercially avail- responders consider this a manageable DIDA able and used by some responders. However, no problem. Detection usually relies on stand-off handheld, compact device is now available that and proximity sniffing for nitrogen compounds. can identify isotopes in the field. Field ID is pos- Suicide bomb vests may be detectable through sible in fixed, vehicle, and man-portable hardware clothing with imaging or acoustic systems that do that tends to be too expensive for widespread use. not detect the explosive material itself, but rather Although DIDA at modest ranges is possible, a visual shape or indication of unusual density shielding can dramatically reduce the effectiveness that may help intercept the carrier. of sensors and their range. On the other hand, shielding is heavy and makes concealment more Needed Functional Capabilities and difficult than with chemical and biological Priorities agents. Cleanup is conceptually easy because the agents radiate, thus facilitating delimitation of Responders and technologists considered a set of contaminated areas and equipment. Functional Capabilities to handle the operational context described above. The capabilities are pre- Nuclear Weapons – Because of the enormous sented below in order of priority, the first being power of nuclear weapons, and the devastating the highest. They are grouped into four cate- nature of their effects, time is the critical factor in gories reflecting break-points between the degree the prevention phase of an event. Prior to deto- of priority as judged by responders. These rank- nation, it is possible to tell the difference between ings were provided in workshops and interviews. legal radioactive materials, a dirty bomb, and a nuclear bomb. Unshielded weapons can be • On-Scene Detection detected at tens of meters. Nuclear weapons are • Remote and Stand-off Detection large and heavy when compared to CBR agents; • Classification and Mitigation they are much harder to carry and conceal. If • Non-Intrusive Stand-off Inspection extra shielding is used to conceal the weapon, the • Detector Arrays and Networks added weight makes it even more difficult to transport these weapons, and the shielding itself • CBRNE Effects Modeling and Simulation may be subject to detection. Although an indi- • Collection and Dissemination of Weather and vidual can carry a technologically advanced Environmental Conditions low-yield weapon, vehicles are the more desirable • Pre-Triage/Differentiation Among Levels of means of moving them around. If nuclear Exposure detonation is achieved, simple detection is no longer an issue. Assessment for nuclear weapons • Rapid Assessment of Structural combines all the capabilities for radiological Integrity/Other Risks plus explosives and incendiary devices, and • Remote Detection of Deception

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

Overall State of Technology for characterization of suspicious objects; detection Detection, Identification, and in the presence of decoys and countermeasures; Assessment detection of secondary devices; and the post- The matrix on the next page shows a mix of attack location of the source of an agent release moderate to high technological challenges in rais- or a device that may be continuing to release the ing the level of capabilities for emergency agent. Wearable, man-portable, and vehicle- response. The section that follows lays out a mounted devices are needed. number of Response Technology Objectives that Distinction was made between systems that are will address key areas for high-payoff technology expensive or that require highly trained users and development. inexpensive and easy-to- Detection, Identification and Assessment use systems. The former Operational Environments are likely to be used by a High few specialized response Explosive/ Functional Capabilities Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Incendiary units that are unlikely to be first on the scene and 1. On-Scene Detection that therefore are 2. Remote and Stand-off unlikely to contribute to Detection initial detection; the lat- 3. Classification and Mitigation ter could be proliferated throughout public safety 4. Non-Intrusive, Stand-off Inspection forces and thus might provide a real possibility 5. Detector Arrays and Networks of affording initial

6. CBRNE Effects Modeling and detection. Even among Simulation capabilities that can be 7. Collection and Dissemination of widely proliferated, there Weather and Environmental Conditions is an important distinc- 8. Pre-Triage/Differentiation tion between wearable Among Levels of Exposure sensors that are carried 9. Rapid Assessment of Structural Integrity/Other Risks at all times by police officers and firefighters, 10. Remote Detection of Deception/Intent and bread-box sized or 1 1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this larger units that would 2 operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO normally remain in a 3 2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO vehicle. 3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability? LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH Great emphasis was Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’ given to wearable sensors. The workshop also Detection, Identification and noted that it would be burdensome or unaccept- Assessment able to require emergency responders to carry DIDA.1 – On-Scene Detection. The ability to multiple sensors to span the sensing needs for full detect danger to self (responder) and others. This spectrum CBRNE on-scene detection, even if capability, ranked as the highest priority by each were the size of a cell phone. It was sug- responders, focuses especially on initial detection gested that an integrated device is needed. before an attack, or, after agent release but This is the subject of a suggested development before the onset of symptoms. It includes: program.

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

Goals: • There is no capability available to local • Accurate, rapid, reliable, affordable. responders for pre-release nuclear detection, although federal responders may have the • Minimum logistics tail (power requirements capability. and consumables). • Biological sensor capability is very limited or • Wearable, man-portable, and vehicle-mounted unavailable; known devices. commercially available equipment is costly and somewhat delicate, making it suitable • Ability to detect presence of decoys, counter- only for personnel with specialized skills and measures and secondary devices. training. • Ability to locate source, vessel or vector. State of the Art: • Communication link to command center – Technologists noted that much has and is being potentially allowing alerting and subclinical done to support the goals for on-scene detection. information to be integrated without operator They noted that nearly all existing systems are the intervention. result of past and current military R&D. See the chart below for a detailed survey of CB detection • Adaptable for use on robotic platforms for programs from the April 2003 Integrated penetration into hot zones too dangerous for Chemical and Biological Defense Research, immediate entry by unprotected responders. Technology Group Programs Shared Technology Platform Detection and Identification Genetic Detection • HANAA B PCR for genetic detection of • Auto Genetic ID B bacterial and viral agents Current Capabilities: • APDS B • PCR DTB B Responders are aware of the • Field Sample Extractor B wide variety of sensors on the Detector on a Chip • Argonne MAGIChip B Microchip platform for • Advanced Multi-function Biochip B detection market and pointed out in • Gene Chip Biosensor B the workshop that they do • Activity Based Detection and Diagnostics B Mass Spectrometry • BSPS-ESI/MS B Mass spectroscopy not have or use them because • SESI IR MS B methodologies for sample • Bio-ToF MS B handling/analysis they are too expensive and • Advance Ion Trap MS B difficult to use. • Real-Time Bio MS B Handheld Systems • CADB C Systems optimized for • µChemLab/CW C handheld use • µChemLab/BW B • Emergency responders • µChemLab/CB CB • Personal Alarm Monitor-BW B rely almost completely on • Personal Alarm Monitor-CW C • UCPHHA B information from calls • SMALLCAD C received at the • Handheld Low-level CAD C • Maritime TICD C dispatch center, with no Other • Immunobead Force Differentiation Assay B N/A – Each platform is unique • Amplifying Fluorescent Polymer CB initial on-scene • Pyrolysis-GC/Ion Mobility Spectrometry B • Optical Particle Classifier B information. • CB ID in Water CB • Integrated CB Point CB • DCASTS C • Patrol officers have no Reagent/Assay Development sensors at all. • Biocontaminant Detect/ID Strategies B Goal of programs is shared, • Nucleic Acid-based Assays B but the nucleic acid-based • Reagent Development (antibodies and program differs from the • Chemical detectors exist alternatives) B antibody programs • Immunoassays B but are too large (useful • Protein Signatures B for specialized units only). Supporting Technologies • Ambient Background Characterization B Immature technologies not yet • Aerosol Sampler Development B fully defined; will eventually • Threat Agent Characterization B contribute to the bio point • Radiological dosimeter detection technologies listed pagers are not widely above deployed. Ongoing CB Detection Programs as of 2003

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

Development and Acquisition Plan: Chem-Bio to emitters of this sort of radiation, as well to be Point Detection (p.11). This plan outlines the prepared against all hazards and to ensure full major efforts by the DoD, DoE, and TSWG. decontamination of radiation sources.7

Chemical – A number of chemical detection A major gap was noted: responders need an inte- devices and technologies are emerging and should grated wearable CBRNE sensor suite that is easy become available for commercial transition; to use, nearly automatic, and requires little or no JCAD, Gas Chromatography Surface Acoustic training to use properly. It was noted that almost Wave (GCSAW), IMS, traffic light sensor, SMO all sensor work is concentrated into specific sensor (metal oxides), enzyme based devices, tissue based stove pipes such as chemical or biological. Each sensors, activity based sensors, cell based sensors, community has its own expertise and technical Raman spectroscopy, dual GC, aerosol gel (C&B), issues that consume resources and challenge the Smart Card, miniature Flame Ionization Detector limits of detection science. Thus there has (FID), Flame Photometric Detector (FPD), been little motivation or funding available to LPOSS, Polychromator chip, Iontrack, mass spec- pursue integrated devices. See the chart on page trometry; and combinations such as SAW/IMS. 35 (Ongoing CB Detection Programs as of 2003).

Biological – Immunoassay (manual, automated), Technology Limitations and Barriers: genetic assay (manual, automated polymerase The most prominent limitations are the false neg- chain reaction (PCR)), particle detection/classification, multiple optical approaches, capillary atives and positives associated with the detectors electrophoresis, pyrolysis/ion mobility spectrome- for all threats. Most reliable CB detectors require try, cell-based sensors, mass spectrometry, laser contact with the agent, and in fact, collect and induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS), auto- intensify the agent to get enough to be mated sample collection and preparation, host detectable. This is complicated by the fact that expression of genetic markers, synthetic ligands, the environment has substances that may be con- and bio-detectors on a chip, such as Canary – a fused with threats or add to the noise of the sen- Lincoln Laboratory development which may sor. There is a need to characterize, and then soon be ready for application. rapidly and accurately adjust to fluctuations in the background produced by these ambient Radiation – As mentioned earlier, there are substances. Certain biodetection technologies are commercially available handheld gamma ray agent specific; there is the possibility that new detectors. However, there is no discrimination agents may be rapidly engineered that do not capability, and the devices do not detect neu- exist in any library or detection inventory. On trons. A handheld, combined gamma ray and the other hand, more general detection strategies neutron detector with built-in discrimination may fail to provide a clear picture of the agent capability is needed to reduce false alarms associ- and what to do about it. It is likely that a layered ated with normally occurring medical and indus- approach will be needed, and that the handheld trial sources. Work toward this end is underway devices will only be able to provide capability at Department of Energy (DoE) laboratories. against a limited set of known agents. While alpha and beta radiation may be less of a threat to produce mass casualties (particles must Handheld and wearable chemical and nuclear be inhaled or ingested or enter the skin through detectors exist in separate packages. Algorithms wounds to be dangerous, and thus efficient for the discrimination of radioactive isotopes dispersal and control of particle size would be using sodium iodide detectors also exist but necessary), responders need detectors sensitive handheld devices do not currently offer

7 Fortunately, most alpha and beta emitters also emit detectable levels of gamma radiation; otherwise they would be hard to detect at a distance through the air unless present in very large quantities. Detectors and procedures are available that, at least in skilled hands, allow the rapid characterization of all radiological hazards and assessment of the degree of decontamination. Packaging these capabilities for use by personnel with less- specialized training is still something of a challenge.

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

discrimination capability. Bioagent detection pulse could damage sensitive electronic compo- technology for wearable sensors is not as mature. nents outside the blast zone. PCR technology cannot be packaged to fit in a handheld device. Immunoassay systems might Finally, with regards to wearable sensors, the abil- provide capability for a small number of bioa- ity to package a full CBRNE detection and dis- gents, although sensitivity would be limited to crimination suite in something the size of a per- high-level attacks. Emerging biochips offer the sonal digital assistant (PDA) will require best hope for combined sensitivity, speed, cost significant R&D. Currently, the weights and and multi-agent handling. Technologists assert sizes of individual handheld devices (with their that biochips are now ready for commercial appli- known limitations) for each threat are all some- cation. Hence, the goals of DIDA.1 pose a what larger than a single PDA. major engineering and packaging challenge to combine all in one wearable unit, but no funda- Gap Fillers: mental science issues. An integrated handheld, PDA sized, CBRNE sensor would fill the major gap noted during Current biological detectors are slow and take responder discussions. Combination of existing anywhere from twelve minutes to one hour to and emerging sensors in one handheld device will produce reliable results in the field; other limita- be a significant challenge. Ease of use and train- tions include poor portability, the need for costly ing will be a necessity since this device would reagents that must be replenished whether used probably be issued at the scene to responders who or not, sample collection and preparation, and have had little or no prior opportunity to use it. cost of reagents and processing fluids. It was If possible, the detectors should rely on tech- noted that genetic engineering of agents poses a niques that do not use expensive or perishable limitation on our ability to recognize new bioa- consumables and reagents. The device will need gents; it is currently easier to quickly design a to be rugged, environmentally hardened, and eas- new agent than to figure out how to detect it in ily decontaminated. Even if such a device can be the environment, and commercialize the reagents made, an important issue will be the concept of and processing needed for on-scene detection. operations for its use. For example, will the There is also growing but limited knowledge of wearer get an immediate alarm or will data be virulence factors that may be useful for character- collected for use by leadership? Some experts ization and assessment of organisms. express concern about public panic or hysteria, The vast majority of responders do not have on- but this may be less of an issue for devices scene radiation detection and discrimination designed for use by responders rather than an capability; although the underlying technology is untrained populace. See the associated technol- considered mature by many technologists. ogy objective, DIDArto.1, (Wearable Integrated Radiation pagers and dosimeters do exist but they CBR Sensors), and the DIDA roadmap for details. cannot generally distinguish between isotopes in the body from medical procedures and terrorist DIDA.2 – Remote and Stand-off Detection. threats. On-scene radiation discrimination for The ability to identify and assess the severity of an the responder simply does not exist. attack, and define keep-out areas from outside the hot zone, remotely examine clouds for agents and It was noted that little is being done to combine other harmful particles, and assess the levels of radi- sensor types into multi-sensor packages. Ease of ation in an area. Stand-off ranges of up to one training and ease of use were cited as deficiencies kilometer are desired. This may be accomplished with current sensors; there is a need for devices through the use of true remote sensors and/or that require little, easy or no training. Electro- point sensors on mobile robotic ground and air magnetic interference was cited as a factor that vehicles; currently even trained dogs and other could degrade sensor processor performance. In animals are used to carry sensors. Sensors that the case of a nuclear attack, the electromagnetic actually enter the hot zone are in fact point or

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

embedded sensors and rely on close-in detection responders to detect explosives. Several breeds methods or exposure to the agent; the sensing are used, depending on the task and prefer- mechanisms for these are covered in other capa- ence of the user. Sense of smell varies from bilities. See DIDA.1 (On-Scene Detection), 100 to 1000 times better than human beings. DIDA.5 (Detector Arrays & Networks), and Hound dogs and beagles are the most sensi- DIDA.7 (Collection and Dissemination of Weather tive, whereas collies and German shepherds are and Environmental Conditions) for discussion of smarter. Attention span is an issue; smarter such detector technologies. dogs tend to get bored more quickly. Dogs can be trained to detect a wide variety of sub- Goals: stances. One drawback with dogs is that they • Responders want aerosol plume, cloud assess- require care and feeding whereas robots can be ment and identification from stand-off ranges stored until needed. of up to one kilometer. State of the Art: • Detection of harmful CB agents and radiation Remote and stand-off detection of chemical levels with low false alarm rates. clouds has been in the military inventory since 1990 and was deployed in the 1991 Gulf War. • Compact, easily operated, automatic systems However, these military units are not designed are needed for use by responders who deploy for civilian use. Civilian needs for wide area to a scene in a vehicle. surveillance could best be met by a network of permanent sensors that measure spectral trans- Current Capabilities: mission over modest path lengths. • No remote chemical detection is used by responders even though the military has had There are a number of existing programs with items in the field for over ten years; the applicable technology for chemical sensors. National Guard Civil Support Team has a Fourier Transform Infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) vehicle mounted threat sensor. There are no is deployed in military fielded instruments; it is convenient man-portable sensors. expensive, detects nerve agents and toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) but is not very useful • Radiological remote sensors such as gamma against mustard gas. FTIR is passive and can see ray imaging systems for nuclear plants and up to 5 km in ideal conditions. Active laser tech- associated accidents exist. However, they work nology is in military R&D; it holds promise to at ranges of a few meters and are slow, even make maps of cloud density but issues of eye against very high levels of radiation encoun- safety as well as effectiveness need to be tered in spills of nuclear waste or meltdown addressed. There are various concepts for using situations. coated fiber optics either in passive or active • Biological plumes: no current operational stand-off sensors or in robots that penetrate the capability for remote sensing exists for civilian cloud. Hyperspectral imaging in various spectral use. Military devices are developmental. regions can detect absorption lines of certain Some concepts rely on penetration of the chemical agents and is being considered for plume with robots to collect samples for Chem/Bio and other aerosol detection jobs as later analysis. Chem/bio plume tracking is well as civilian environmental monitoring. There currently a priority in military R&D. is significant industrial interest in this technology. In certain bands, its sensitivity is limited to day- • Explosives sniffing robots are useful but too light only; shadows in urban canyons may reduce expensive for wide proliferation, although they effectiveness. do provide a means for getting sensors into areas that may be too dangerous for the For sensing biological agents, ultraviolet (UV) responder. Dogs are often used by civilian sensing is currently limited by the availability of

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

powerful, UV laser diodes at wavelengths of in CB detection. Sensitivity is poor and limited interest. This technology may provide useful dis- to dense clouds containing 1800 agent-bearing crimination out to a few hundred meters. Laser particles per liter of air. This equates to very diode technology is under development at dense clouds and does not allow accurate map- DARPA. Currently there are no credible ping of the lethal boundaries of the plume. approaches for mid- and near-infrared (IR) detec- Detection of biological clouds from a distance is tion. DoD is investigating medium wave a topic of military R&D. infrared (3-5 microns) LIDAR systems capable of remote bioagent cloud detection at up to a kilo- True remote radiological and nuclear sensors meter. Commercial systems exist (e.g., for remote exist, but are too large, heavy, and expensive for sensing of gas pipeline leaks), but further research nearly all emergency responders. Range is a few is needed to assess their potential for stand-off meters, dependent on shielding and whether or detection of bioagent clouds. not the object is moving. This limit is fundamental and based on background radiation and For sensing radiation and high explosives/incen- detector sensitivity. It is very unlikely that any diary weapons, Sandia National Laboratory’s amount of funding will improve the range of Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program has been these sensors. Physics does not support detection deployed in the Former Soviet Union, to prevent of radioactive isotopes at ranges greater than a the smuggling of nuclear devices and material few tens of meters, or a hundred meters in ideal through key choke points. DTRA has installed a conditions. Thus detection of the cloud from a variety of radiation and bomb detection testbeds dirty bomb or the fallout from a nuclear weapon at four military bases in the U.S. as part of the would depend primarily on detection of the Unconventional Nuclear Weapons Defense obscuration using optical, lasers, and or thermal Program. The sensors used on these bases are too imaging. It would not be possible to identify the large and expensive for easy use by responders. cloud as radioactive without prior information or There are very large systems that can image penetrating sensors. through container walls to give the responder a picture of the contents, including people. One Gap Fillers: system uses x-ray scanning in a large van and the A gap was identified highlighting the need other uses gamma rays. These systems are very for smaller, proliferable, network oriented costly and best used at loading areas and weigh- radiation sensors with built-in discrimination ing stations. Millimeter wave imaging has been capability. See DIDArto.2 (Stand-off Radiation developed for short-range imaging through non- ID), and the DIDA roadmap. metallic walls. Researchers at Los Alamos National Laboratory have demonstrated the feasi- Suitcase size detection suites would provide bility of using naturally occurring muons in cos- detection ranges of a few hundred meters, mic rays for detecting high-atomic weight materi- depending on the agent. Responders noted the als (fissionable material or shielding) for vehicle need for a relatively compact, affordable solution inspection, but dwell times on the order of one to on-scene cloud mapping that would combine minute are needed. both chemical and biological detection in one easy to deploy and use package. Technologists Technology Limitations and Barriers: suggested that easing up on tough military, The availability of high-energy UV laser diodes combat-driven specifications such as rapid alert currently limits the range of biological plume time, extended ranges, and detect-on-the-move detection. The optical transmission of UV is capability could enable such a development for inherently limited to a few hundred meters in the urban use this decade. Static installation of bi- atmosphere, depending on wavelength. static designs could improve sensitivity and allow Wavelength agile and higher power lasers are continuous sampling; e.g., transmitter on one needed in general for improved stand-off ranges building and receiver on another. See DIDArto.3

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

(Integrated Remote Detection of CB Agents) response to a hazardous incident by military and and the DIDA roadmap. civil responders. ADASHI™ can be used at the site by the Incident Commander (IC) or at oper- DIDA.3 – Classification and Mitigation. The ation centers. The tool supports individual and ability to integrate sensor data with symptoms and collective training at a responder’s home. pathology and provide mitigation guidelines for ADASHI™ is designed to function on laptops dealing with contamination and injury. Focus is and desktop computers. on the local information tools available to the responder and the ability to correlate observations A number of chemical risk assessment tools and with a particular event. Responders need a sim- related environmental tools are in development. ple tool that walks them through a decision tree These decision aids will allow the user to assess and leads to recommended action. It is related to the transport of toxic chemicals. They are DIDA.8 (Pre-Triage/Differentiation Among Levels designed primarily for use by engineers. of Exposure), which focuses more on the sensing of subtle physiological phenomena associated Lightweight Epidemiology and Advanced with pre-triage conditions that cannot be dis- Detection, Emergency Response System cerned by a busy responder who must deal with (LEADERS) is a medical surveillance tool provid- the obvious cases. ing real-time analysis of medical data to identify the presence of a covert or naturally occurring bio-event. Clinical data is collected using specific Goals: medical applications and laboratory identification • Comprehensive: All hazards should be tools. covered. Sandia National Laboratory developed probabilis- • Immediately available – the responder should tic risk assessment (PRA) as a tool for evaluating not have to wait for input. the risks associated with high-consequence systems such as nuclear weapons and nuclear power • User-friendly, expert system. generation plants. This tool is used for risk • Small, compact PDA size. assessments for critical infrastructures such as dams, water utilities, chemical plants, and power Current Capability: plants and might be adapted for responder use (especially for planning before an incident). • Responders indicated that they have a wide choice of emerging tools that they could The Chemical Biological Response Aide purchase. (CoBRA) software contains pre-loaded accredited operating procedures and on-scene checklists • Components exist for each threat of some designed to address chemical identification, evi- combinations, but a full threat spectrum needs dence collection, decontamination and general to be integrated into a system that is immedi- response to terrorist use of a weapon of mass ately available to responders. destruction.

State of the Art: The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency There are many programs that are addressing cer- (DARPA) has developed a set of tools, including tain threats. A modest effort is needed to inte- The Global Response Incident Planner (GRIP) grate them. and the Field Inventory Survey Tool (FIST). The program has also created the Playbook The Automated Decision Aid System for Manager. DARPA also developed a program to Hazardous Incidents (ADASHI™) is an Army- address the weaknesses in current crisis manage- sponsored, portable, computer-based integrated ment systems—the Enhanced Consequence decision-aid support system for improving the Management Planning and Support System

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

(ENCOMPASS). This product is an integrated DIDA.4 – Non-Intrusive, Stand-off Inspection. suite of software tools that uses Web-based and The ability to detect pre-release CBRNE materials standalone software to collect and distribute in packages, vehicles, and on people, without dynamic data to and from multiple sources in requiring packages or vehicles to be opened. For use near real-time. ENCOMPASS has two primary at portals for special events, limited areas, con- subsystems: the Incident Command Manage- tainers and at traffic stops. More broadly, the ment System (ICMS) and the DARPA Syn- inspection of packages includes mail in the postal dromic Surveillance System (D-S3). ICMS cen- system, shipping containers, crates, luggage, cargo ters on the functions of the Incident Commander in ships and trains, aircraft, and trucks, so there at various levels, including the emergency respon- will be overlaps between responder needs and der, scene commander, operations center, and/or those of various federal agencies and the postal state/national emergency center. The D-S3 is a service. Stand-off may be from one meter to a biosurveillance capability that tracks patients’ few meters. Although this kind of inspection is signs and symptoms to alert epidemiologists of generally accomplished using controlled geome- any new trends, such as the possible release of a try, a relaxation of this constraint would be biological agent. useful and permit wider use of the equipment. The detection of shielding for nuclear devices Technology Limitations and Barriers: is needed for dealing with radiological counter- There are neither technology barriers to meeting measures. the performance goals nor to meeting cost and size goals. A host of products and programs exist, Goals: and there are even federally funded efforts in • Useful ranges from one meter to several place to help sort through them. This is prima- meters. rily an information and software integration task. The biggest challenges involve a friendly user • Accurate, portable, rapid, reliable, affordable. interface for the responder and orderly treatment • Minimum logistics tail (power requirements of all the databases and information needed to and consumables). link knowledge to action. • Man-portable, and vehicle-mounted devices Gap Fillers: (less pressing). Responders would like to see the integration of military and civilian programs and processes. • Ability to detect presence of decoys, counter- Technologists, although appreciative of the need, measures and secondary devices. felt that the maturity level of this capability and • Rapid detection on the order of a few minutes ongoing programs is too high to warrant creation at most depending on range and agent being of a gap filler technology effort within DIDA. detected. However, it is recommended that the government consolidate its own programs, take steps to main- • Nuclear/Radiological: Detect unshielded tain a current catalog of available tools, and devices and shielding for further inspection. ensure that responders have adequate information on the value of these tools either through an offi- Current Capability: cial or semi-official standards/testing process or • Special event teams have portal magnetome- through a voluntary responder evaluation process ters, imagers, and explosive residue sniffers. similar to that found on some commercial internet sites. This functional capability overlaps with • Responders have no stand-off inspection capa- the requirements for R&Rrto.1. bility for biological agents and would like an integrated CB capability.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

• Radiation pagers exist but are not generally Gap Fillers: deployed. See DIDA.1 (On-Scene Detection). Technologists and responders identified the need for a program for close-in, non-contact, nonde- • Crowd surveillance/traffic stop systems structive stand-off inspection of containers that (unconstrained geomentry) not available. might contain CB agents. Technologists think State of the Art: that this is a very difficult capability to achieve and that the barriers are formidable. See Remote detection and identification of radioac- DIDArto.4 (Portable Stand-off Container tive materials is a solved problem for ranges Inspection), the DIDA roadmap, and the list of that do not exceed physical limits. Shielding issues discussed below. can reduce those ranges but with great weight penalty to the terrorist. At present, non-intrusive • Acoustic programs should be extended to non- detection of chemicals in vessels requires physical contact scenarios. contact with the vessel: this includes current applications of ultrasonic technology to detect • Radiation detectors should be made more liquid in containers. Noncontact detection of practical: reduced size and cost are needed. chemical agents in vessels is a focus of military See DIDA.1 (On-Scene Detection) and R&D. There are no known techniques that can DIDA.2 (Remote and Stand-off Detection). provide reliable detection of biological agents in vessels. • Acoustic detection technology should be explored for detection and identification of The Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) solids in containers. has supported a variety of programs in stand-off explosives detection. They have created a DIDA.5 – Detector Arrays and Networks. Defense Technology Objective to detect 100 Sensor arrays that can be networked to provide pounds of explosives at ten feet. This program alerts, identification, localization of CBRNE goes to FY2005. UV and X-ray fluorescence pro- threats; linked to command data centers; to provide grams may also offer solutions to detect, on sur- environmental monitoring in urban centers, build- faces, secondary or tell-tale substances associated ing interiors and sensitive areas. Although ranked with threat agents. Other technologies in exis- fifth in part because they do not fit into existing responder concepts of operations, probably one tence with application to stand-off detection of the most important developments will be sensor explosives include acoustic (including dielectric arrays that can be networked to provide alerts, and thermal), prompt gamma ray neutron activa- identification, and localization of CBRNE tion analysis (which does not require contact with threats. There is a growing need for compact, container), and laser trace explosives detection. low-cost, minimal care, automatic detectors to enable the fielding of widely distributed, hetero- Technology Limitations and Barriers: geneous sensor arrays and networks. These sen- • Currently there is no non-contact method for sor webs should be tied to command data centers inspection of CB containers in unconstrained through wireless and/or wired communications scenarios; there are very few concepts that links. Data derived from the arrays will localize have a credible theoretical basis for solving the source and project danger areas using physical problem. models and 3-D GIS. They will provide environmental monitoring in urban centers, building • Responders consider the affordability of lim- interiors, and mobile nodes with the capability ited available products to be a significant for automatic alarms. Distributed data collection barrier. will enable event tracking and characterization. Sensors should adhere to standard outputs and • There are no responder tools for detecting input commands through commercial interfaces dangerous solids within well-sealed containers.

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

such as Universal Serial Bus (USB) to ensure State of the Art: interoperability and rapid insertion into the Technologists have identified many relevant pro- network. grams, although at this time none will meet the needs of civilian responders without significant Goals: scaling and expansion to the full threat spectrum. • To the fullest extent possible, sensor networks should be populated by compact, low-cost, Biowatch is a new federal program that involves minimal care, automatic detectors. the DHS and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). It will modify and use the EPA environ- • The network software should be capable of mental sampler network to monitor urban envi- effectively assessing events with heterogeneous ronments for aerosol bio-attack. At least 25 cities arrays of sensors. will be involved. • Communications should be able to withstand For the Unconventional Nuclear Weapons the peak loads associated with a crisis. Defense (UNWD) program, DTRA has installed experimental, operational nuclear protection net- • Computing assets should be distributed works at four DoD bases. Though limited in and/or embedded, and linked to combined scale, they have identified the essential ingredi- effects, microclimate, and weather/modeling ents needed for defense against both nuclear tools for automatic, seamless assessments as weapons and dirty bombs. The network at events unfold. Camp Lejeune, NC has also shown how civilian • Automatic alarms should be backed up by and military responders can be unified to combat online modeling and confidence measures. this threat. • Standardized, common lexicon and data for- The DHS successor to the Bio-Defense Initiative, mats to afford universal access. the Bio Threat Consequence Management (BTCM) effort, will fund R&D in a variety of • The network should provide a space-time map sensor and network integration issues; BTCM of the event, to include parameters such as results will be useful to the ultimate goals of severity, duration, and population exposure. DIDA.5. Current Capability: NASA has created a Smart Healthcare • There are really no operational responder net- Management System, a network of sensors and works for homeland defense. Some experi- computers which monitors both environment mental networks have been implemented for and personnel status. military force protection by the U.S. Army at CECOM. Although there is much to learn NSOF (Network Sensors for the Objective Force) from these efforts, they must be adapted to is an Army CECOM R&D effort to support civilian emergency responders’ operations. deployments of Unattended Ground Sensors Furthermore, they need to be expanded to the (UGS) networks. The purpose of this project is full CBRNE threat spectrum and scaled up to to develop, provide, and demonstrate communi- deal with large urban settings. cations networks that can successfully interconnect with UGS networks within a sensor field • Few commercial buildings have any type and also connect the UGS network field back to of CBRNE sensors and associated network higher-level data fusion and Command and infrastructure. Control (C2) elements.

• Most COTS and GOTS sensors require some Smart SensorWeb, a DoD program, pioneered adaptation to make them suitable for flexible the concepts of complex integrated networks for insertion into networks. the individual combatant. This lower echelon

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

perspective makes it a useful case study for the • Military efforts concentrate on defense within responder. the confines of military bases or dynamic combat and do not normally address the needs Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is of large population centers. But some of the involved in two programs of interest: the Wide- results may be scalable to urban scenarios. Area Tracking System (WATS) for detecting and Furthermore, funding constraints have limited tracking a ground-delivered nuclear device; and efforts to single threat or small experimental the Joint Biological Remote Early Warning efforts that do not cover the full threat System (JBREWS) for alerting U.S. field troops spectrum. of an attack with biological agents. Both systems consist of a network of sensors and communica- • Modeling software for embedded networking tions links with information continuously evalu- is not seamless. Combined effects modeling is ated by unique data-fusion algorithms. The not available, and the outputs from single sensors can be permanently deployed at chosen models are usually fed by hand to another locations or mounted in vans for deployment on model. Microclimate predictions are needed demand to protect specific areas for specific situa- but are not mature; this problem must be tions or events. studied in the context of large sensor arrays.

The Joint Warning and Reporting Network • Current networks and associated software tend (JWARN) consists of software and hardware to be rigid, hardware specific, and difficult components that link NBC detectors to tactical (expensive) to upgrade to new sensor hard- communications for NBC warning, reporting, ware. Networks are susceptible to cyberterror- and battlefield management. This network is ism, but also fail on their own. being designed for dynamic combat operations. • Communications become overloaded easily. Finally, the Joint Service Installation Pilot Project (JSIPP), is a DoD program managed by the Gap Fillers: Defense Threat Reduction Agency; it is designed A major integrated approach to CBRNE net- to upgrade nine military installations to be model works was recommended by the technologists’ sites for biological and chemical safety. JSIPP workshop. Some of the design considerations for will be linked with existing responder networks an integrated regional network are listed below. and ESSENCE – The Electronic Surveillance Although some of the pieces of an integrated net- System for the Early Notification of Community- work are mature, the scale of this capability war- based Epidemics. Ultimately, up to 200 bases rants a major initiative. See DIDArto.5 may be outfitted with similar equipment under (Integrated Networked Sensors for CBRN Detection) the more comprehensive Project Guardian man- and the DIDA roadmap for additional detail. aged by the military Joint Project Office for CB This technology objective stimulated a great deal Defense. of discussion about a wide-range of issues, the most important of which are discussed below: Technology Limitations and Barriers: • Standard sensor, communications, and data The construction of large sensor networks is an formats are needed. engineering problem. No particular barrier exists that must be overcome in order to meet the goals • Self-configuring networks with flexible archi- of this element. tecture should be adopted from the military. Although there are many laudable efforts under- • The network should be designed to deal with way to evolve toward a unified CBRNE sensor a wide-range of existing and future sensors to network, these efforts do not provide a complete include integration with other sensors – intru- package suitable for homeland defense. sion detection, traffic management, public surveillance, and security systems.

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

• Data fusion and information management • User friendly. over the network. • Reduction in the complexity of response to • The network must use simulation and physical combined effects. models (buildings, structures) and have a reachback to CDC, medical surveillance, and • Includes: incendiary, radiation, blast, shock other databases. and other effects.

• All methods of bandwidth management and • High quality descriptions in an urban communications stability should be explored. environment. For example, a low-band width, cell phone- based architecture may be a useful layer if it Current Capabilities: can maintain effective service during peak • Military models exist to an extent, but are not demand periods associated with a crisis. available to or fully adapted for civilian Smart detectors and sensors will reduce band- responders. width. Surge capacity and scalability will be important design considerations. • Many mature models exist for blast and shock but are only invoked when a crisis occurs and • Resistance to countermeasures is going to the military comes in to provide post-attack become increasingly important as terrorists analysis. become better equipped and more technically astute. State of the Art: • Data management and archiving will need to Individual models exist for all agents and all be flexible and easily adjusted to deal with likely methods of agent dispersion. Some com- changing policies, laws, and operational needs. bined effects models exist for subsets of the CBRNE spectrum. There is, however, no fully • Perhaps one of the most powerful capabilities integrated, combined effects model for all the of the network will be Global Positioning sys- agents/threats. tem (GPS)/GIS tracking of dynamic network elements and possibly victims after the event. DTRA’s Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) is an example of existing DIDA.6 – CBRNE Effects Modeling and plume models that predict hazards from CBRN Simulation. The ability to rapidly produce vali- weapons and facilities. It predicts exposure infor- dated dispersal and effects models for urban terrain mation for military and/or civilian populations and building interiors. Modeling and simulation attacked with CBRN weapons. HPAC also pro- can provide an effective extension of individual vides exposure information for populations in the sensors and spatial-temporal analysis of sensor vicinity of accidents involving nuclear power webs data for event discovery or false alarm miti- plants, chemical and biological production facili- gation. Models may greatly reduce the complex- ties, and CBRN storage facilities/transportation ity of response to combined effects resulting from containers. DTRA also developed the explosions and associated dispersal of agents. Consequence Assessment Tool Set (CATS) that Models must include incendiary, radiation, chem- can help field personnel assess the effects of ter- ical corrosion, blast, shock, and other effects. rorist and natural catastrophes. Finally, the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center Goals: (NARAC) at Los Alamos National Laboratory • High confidence description of hazard disper- has a plume modeling for all hazards. A laptop sal and effects. version exists for use by responders.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

Similarly, the SPAWARSYSCOM sponsored • Much effort is focused on aerosol models, Vapor, Liquid and Solid Tracking (VLSTRACK) however some models are needed for indoor, simulates the release and downwind hazard from fire/incendiary, structural analysis, and water a chemical or biological warfare (CBW) attack. distribution (DoD and DoE are working on these issues). DoD has also developed a sophisticated array of blast effects models and associated 3-D structural • The aerodynamic flow around buildings and models that can be used to assess damage to in urban canyons may pose a significant chal- buildings and structures. These models have lenge to current physical models and scientific been used to estimate the details of well-known understanding of the problem. terrorist bombings (e.g., Khobar Towers, Oklahoma City, the USS COLE) and have The speed of processing and sensor array density resulted in greatly revised and/or more accurate will determine accuracy and relevancy for respon- estimates of bomb size. der use. Modeling of aerosol dispersion in complex urban environments is a matter of current For interior dispersion modeling, there are com- research. Without dense weather sensing and mercial air flow models that can predict air flow large sensor arrays, the outputs of the individual inside buildings. Another example comes from and combined models may be of little use to the the Environmental Protection Agency’s Office of responder on the scene (although responders at Research and Development, which is attempting higher echelons may find coarse information use- to develop accurate models for use in urban set- ful in planning). Accurate pictures of cloud dis- tings (e.g., “urban canyons”; emphasis is on dispersal may not be possible until the weather and persion of TIC and CB aerosols). sensor infrastructure can support it.

Technology Limitations and Barriers: Gap Fillers: The technologists determined that there is a need A host of important considerations were identi- to combine the existing and emerging models for fied by responders and technologies. See the separate CBRNE effects into a system of DIDArto.6 (Combined Effects Modeling for Urban models that can seamlessly provide the best Canyons) and the DIDA roadmap for additional model for the particular scenario at hand. They details. also noted that there are competing models for the individual threat domains. • Validation is an essential ingredient. The workshop recommended that greater emphasis • Models are stove-piped into specialty fields and adequate funding be devoted to validation due to the limited budgets, difficulty of the exercises; this includes more simulant releases science, and missions of developers. or live testing in controlled environments. Integrated, seamless modeling and simulation Validation in situ is a credible option. DoD of the full range of CBRNE requires the and DHS need to closely coordinate valida- patching together of several massive computer tion efforts. codes. • Models must incorporate 3-D inputs and out- • Fixed and dynamic sensor networks and puts for cities. robotic sensors are needed to provide information necessary to get reliable results on limited • Microclimate modeling is needed down to space and time scales (e.g., microclimate data) meters and five minutes. Compute time that can support responders. Results will be should be an important design consideration. highly dependent on the size and latency of If a model needs more time than the phenom- sensors. enon it is predicting then it will be generally less useful to the responder.

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

• Responders would like the outputs to be in Current Capabilities: terms that are familiar to responders, rather • Weather and pollutant sensor networks exist than scientists and engineers. but are not fine-grained enough for urban settings. • Responders are very interested in ease of training and certification, and would like to have • They are not integrated with agent characteris- virtual training capabilities built in. tics and predictive effects modeling.

• Models of operational effects and virtual pro- • Deployable networks for forest fires exist but totyping can be included, which show the are not widely proliferated and not oriented to impact of increased capability on overall CBRNE. response. State of the Art: • Technologists suggested that sensor array density may be an effective way to offset model Technologists noted that there were already large complexity (e.g., climate sensors vs. climate investments in weather effects modeling; it was model, or building stress sensors vs. model determined that the technology is relatively complexity). Sensors could track micro- mature. The DoD alone invests about $160M weather or directly measure agent dispersion. per year in environmental monitoring, models, (See DIDA.7 (Collection and Dissemination of climate, and microclimate R&D. Weather and Environmental Conditions) and Weather simulations are becoming increasingly DIDA.5 (Detector Arrays and Networks).) accurate and DoD uses weather predictions as a key part of its combat planning for both long- DIDA.7 – Collection and Dissemination of and short-term decisions. Large computers are Weather and Environmental Conditions. being networked and employed to provide local Responders need automatic collection and dissemi- weather on demand around the nation. nation of real-time weather information so that they can understand and assess the extent of contamina- DTRA has developed a prototype of its aerosol tion by airborne agents and bombs. The collection dispersion model for urban scenarios, called and ubiquitous availability of accurate weather Urban HPAC, which uses meteorological inputs. information is essential to the understanding and NOAA has efforts to provide microclimate assessment of outdoor release of agents. The data sensing and modeling including urban weather information and associated predictive microclimes. models should include terrain and building effects. Weather data and models should be Technology Limitations and Barriers: embedded in all response systems. This is an engineering problem. The cities must determine what weather monitoring Goals: infrastructure will best suit their needs and pro- • Allows responders to establish and shift vide the level of weather knowledge and timeli- perimeter(s). ness within their budget. They will need to weigh this against their needs to detect and • Linked to predictive modeling (sunlight, tem- understand terrorist attacks that depend on perature, humidity, wind effects on particular weather effects. Some of the effects of weather agents). may be offset by operational plans that minimize the uncertainties associated with understanding • Includes interior and exterior micro climates – weather. terrain and building effects. Generally, except for microclimate scale predic- • Embedded in all response systems. tions in urban scenarios, this technology is quite

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

mature. Predicting scales below 1 km will require • Handheld sensors for noninvasive assessment finer sensor grids and computer simulations that of patient shock (thermal imaging may allow handle the associated increase in data. It is rapid screening of shock and other injury). unlikely that the National Weather Service or other civilian needs will rapidly move in this • Smart cards with responder health history. direction. • Linked to sensor readings.

Gap Fillers: • Non-contact methods are preferred. Since the weather is essential to predicting the dispersal and effects of the agents, the technolo- • Integration with UIC.1 (Point Location and gists determined that the microclimate gap in this Identification) for responder location history DIDA should be incorporated in DIDArto.6 and perhaps physiological status. (Combined Effects Modeling for Urban Canyons), and that the sensors for fine scale meteorological Current Capabilities: data would best be covered in DIDArto.5 • Some laptop data is available, providing infor- (Integrated Networked Sensors for CBRNE mation on symptomology and course of illness Detection). Further, the need for integrated following exposure, but it is not widely effects modeling was felt to be a compelling deployed and does not integrate sensor infor- umbrella that would support a healthy invest- mation or personal history. ment in microclimate modeling. See the DIDA roadmap for details. • Some fire/EMS vehicles carry medical care protocols, but they are in hard copy and DIDA.8 – Pre-Triage/Differentiation Among cumbersome. Levels of Exposure. The ability to integrate sensor • There are no sensors or instruments coupled information, personal history (pre-exposure and directly to computers to provide automatic location during event), and physiological symptoms assessment. Responders must have consider- to provide on-scene assessment of low-dose exposure able skill in interpreting data. and assists responders in predicting near-term health status and treatment modalities for victims and State of the Art: involved responders. While at the complex scene of an ongoing or recent event, responders need to There are pieces of this that are quite mature. guide the removal, expedient decontamination, For example, diagnosing burn severity in the field and preliminary treatment for most critically is a well developed discipline. However, under- injured/exposed. They must determine the dis- standing non-lethal exposure to CB threats and position of the injured and the apparently combined effects is still a matter of research. It unharmed. This capability will integrate on- will take years to develop field deployable scene sensor readings and any available informa- protocols and sensing tools that can permit a tion on victims’ history to determine near-term responder to rapidly distinguish triage cases from health status. For example, smart cards carried others, and act with confidence on the assess- by the responders would be useful in assessing ment. This element is complicated by legal their condition. Handheld devices may detect and privacy issues, which may pose fundamental whether a victim is in shock or is exhibiting barriers to the technical solutions. For example, symptoms associated with low-dose exposure to it may be years before the general populace is chemical weapons or other toxins and agents. comfortable with a smart card that contains personal medical history.

Goals: The DoD is developing technologies for military • Remote bio-systems analysis (e.g., responder medical use that have application to responders’ outside hot zone assessing victim inside). missions: these technologies are being geared for

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

early detection and assessment of pathogens in Achieving these was considered very high risk. the patient’s body. For example, the DARPA Thus a research program is recommended; see Advanced Diagnostics Program is developing technology objective DIDArto.7 (On-scene technology to detect the presence of infection Assessment of Low-Dose Exposure to Chemical by any pathogen in the body or in prepared Agents – Research) and the DIDA roadmap. samples—in real-time and in the absence of rec- ognizable signs and symptoms, when pathogen DIDA.9 – Rapid Assessment of Structural numbers are still low. The Army Telemedicine Integrity/Other Risks (e.g., gas lines). The abil- Program has been investing for years in on-scene ity to rapidly assess and integrate structural infor- technology for assessment and treatment of mation and measurements to allow responders to injuries in combat scenarios. This work has assess the structural integrity of buildings in the established centers, software, sensors and tools wake of explosions, fires and or impact. A signifi- that can help field medics rapidly treat certain cant cause of casualties in terrorist events is col- injuries in the field. The effort has focused on lapse of damaged structures and buildings. WMD as a major objective. Furthermore, Responders need to know if it is safe to enter and Digital Area Thermography is being studied as a conduct search and rescue. Responders need to means to assess the effects of blister agents, and conduct post blast/fire/impact assessment of gene chips are being developed for rapid analysis structures and to assess corrosion damage follow- of saliva, blood, and sweat. ing chemical release. Ideally, tools are needed to make emergency responders act like fast build- Technology Limitations and Barriers: ing/structural engineers. This capability will benefit from knowledge of details of specific • The physiological observables have not been buildings in advance. defined. Are they unambiguous? Can sensors detect them? Goals: • There is a major psychological issue that must • Assists responders in making go/no-go deci- be addressed – does shock negate the feasibil- sions about entering structures. ity of such diagnostics? • Allows responders to act as structural • Affordability. engineers.

Gap Fillers: • Rapid, compact. The technologists and responders identified a set • User-friendly. of important features that this capability would need in order to be useful: • Reliable.

• Demonstrable physiologic changes – basic Current Capabilities: research program. • Motion detectors exist for use in determining • Non-invasive. structural stability.

• Capable of detecting early stages. • Not everyone has specialized USAR (urban search and rescue) or TSR (technical search • Ability to recommend treatment commensu- and rescue team) equipment and training. rate with level of exposure. • Data on individual buildings is not available • Must be able to handle many cases rapidly. or not rapidly accessible.

• Physiological sensors.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

State of the Art: extended modeling and sensor ideas in recent A number of programs exist that provide solu- years as deep, hard targets have become a target tions for various elements of detecting, assessing, of interest. or modeling structural integrity or hazards; how- 3-D laser imaging has become a preferred tool for ever, no common suite of tools integrates them both commercial and military in the measure- into a single capability. ment and modeling of buildings and vehicles. It Structural sensors are employed widely in the can be used to create 3-D wire frame models of structures. Comparisons are easy using change civilian sector to measure and monitor stress in detection software, thus enabling rapid and accu- buildings. Structural vibrometry has become a rate structural change assessment. major development in the aftermath of the World Trade Center collapse. The National Institute for Technology Limitations and Barriers: Standards and Technology Fire Research Lab is developing vibrational technologies, used to assess This is a very difficult problem but many aspects structural integrity under the stress associated of it have been studied persistently throughout with intense heat and fire. Another example of several decades. Rapid assessment of existing, assessment technology is the Multi-Zonal standing, instrumented structures and buildings Blowdown Model (MBLM), which calculates the is mature, but understanding severely compro- propagation of vapor from a source within a mised structures and collapsed structures requires building, described using the Building Model more advanced technology. Providing these tech- Generator (BMG), with damage described by nologies will require several years of R&D to combine real-time sensing with modeling, to give Munitions Effectiveness Vulnerability Assessment responders a capability by which they can confi- (MEVA), and includes the capability for model- dently decide whether a structure is safe to enter. ing the release of gas from a vent or aperture in Operational necessity may of course override the the building. recommendations of the technology. Sensors and Radar technology is being developed to assist models exist, but combining them into an on- structural integrity assessment. Los Alamos scene capability will require a sequence of field National Laboratory has developed microimpulse experiments and model validation cycles to make radar that could be used at close range to assess a useable package. stress and incremental movement of structures • There is a lack of high resolution models and after a blast has occurred. This technology holds sensors and modeling in 3-D for tall and deep promise for penetrating a few feet of dry rubble, structures and ruins. and walls of standing structures. Also, ground penetrating radar is being looked at by industry • Real-time imagery through rubble and walls is for oil exploration, and by the military for mine a major challenge; viable techniques should detection and underground structure assessment. look for alternatives to such sensors until they can be made workable. Other approaches exist for using modeling technology to assess structural integrity and the Gap Fillers: effects of various stresses. For example, Idaho Technologists noted the existence of many capa- National Engineering Laboratory has created ble models and simulations that are continually a large test facility for testing structures in undergoing improvement. They also noted that earthquakes; it is a shake table for large struc- there are excellent sensing techniques that provide tures. Also, as mentioned earlier, DTRA has static and dynamic stress readings for buildings invested for 50 years in blast modeling and blast and structures. They suggested an integration mitigation technology. There are numerous tools of such sensors and software in a field portable available through this work. The Bomb Damage or vehicle mounted package for use by respon- Assessment (BDA) Programs within DoD have ders. See technology objective DIDArto.8

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

(Real-Time Structural Stress Measurement) and the privacy test, which may pose insurmountable bar- DIDA roadmap. riers if the general populace places privacy above security. Variability of human response may also DIDA.10 – Remote Detection of doom this element if it is found that there are no Deception/Intent. The ability to conduct non- reliable indicators, in any combination, that can invasive, non-contact, detection of human deception provide reliable screening. Drugs and condition- and hostile intent at security checkpoints. ing may also defeat the concept. Until unam- Responders may encounter terrorists prior to or biguous physiological indicators can be proven to during an event. They need noninvasive, non- connote hostile intent, this capability will be contact, tools for screening at security check- unachievable. points where they may use sensors and natural procedures to elicit measurable response associ- Gap Fillers: ated with deception and hostile intent. Technologists and responders could not see this Goals: as a credible capability in the near future, but they felt it would be important if the goals could • Rapid decisions to avoid congestion at be achieved. An initiative is suggested to develop choke points. an experimental data collection and field research • Low false alert rate. capability by 2010. Because this was deemed to be a very high risk effort, it was determined that • Reasonable probability (80%) of detecting current DoD efforts should be monitored until terrorist. 2007; assuming adequate progress, this effort would proceed at that time. See technology • Independent of culture and language. objective DIDArto.9 (Stand-off Automatic Choke Point Screener) and the DIDA roadmap. • Based on unambiguous physiological observables. Detection, Identification, and • Capability of learning and in situ validation. Assessment Response Technology Objectives (DIDArto) Current Capability: DIDArto.1 – Wearable Integrated CBR Sensors • There is no sensor augmented capability. Objectives: • Responders use intuition and simple interro- Develop miniature, seamlessly integrated CBR gation. (Israelis use observation rooms.) detectors and collection devices for use on responders, and eventually the general popula- State of the Art: tion. Provide rapid (timely) alert to the wearer of This capability is in its infancy. DoD is conduct- danger and type of attack, e.g., proceed to decon- ing research on close range detection of decep- tamination, administer prophylaxis, take antibi- tion, but the work is in the phenomenological otic, “suit up” or don mask. Provide wireless phase. readout of exposure information, date, time, and location for use in epidemiological analysis, Technology Limitations and Barriers: command response, and treatment. The device Lie detectors require physical contact. may be the size of a cell phone and carried in a Physiological monitoring of certain human convenient place that does not hinder free move- responses (e.g., face temperature profile or eye ment, or the sensors may be embedded in head- movement) can be done at useful ranges but gear and/or clothing and uniforms. The device tying the observations to an understanding of a must have onboard storage and some processing person’s intent or mental state is a matter of for recording, analyzing, and retaining history of research. Such a capability will need to pass the individual’s exposure. Also should be capable of

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

being connected to or integrated with the loca- and 10 ppb for blister agents with a detection tion/communication devices developed under time of one minute. Radiation detectors should UICrto.1 (Point Location and Identification). be improved to incorporate discrimination capability to distinguish common medical isotopes Payoffs: from those used in nuclear weapons. Wearable sensors will save lives and help respon- FY2005: Transition work from DoD and DoE ders and leadership understand the extent and to begin design and development of wearable severity of population exposure. This will greatly integrated CBR sensors. Metrics include: total reduce casualties and enable accurate response weight of integrated sensor less than 1 pound, with minimum panic and confusion. battery life of 24 hours, maximum biochip detection cycle of 15 minutes. Demonstrate aerosol Challenges: sampler with minimum volume collection rate of The detection technologies for CBR are in differ- 12 liters per minute. ing levels of maturity and no programs exist that integrate the three modes. Miniature biological FY2006: Verify performance in laboratory and sensors suitable for wearing are in their infancy. controlled field trials. Show CB modes able to The most likely robust solutions involve the use withstand full environmental range. Demon- of micro arrays of bio-receptors on electronic strate 72 hour operating life of biochip. Neutron readout chips. They are years away from practi- and gamma ray detectors should be capable of cal field application. Challenges include collec- identifying unshielded nuclear weapon within 10 tion and sampling, receptor design, field life, cost feet of sensor. of receptors and associated solutions/reagents, FY2007: Demonstrate integrated devices in and environmental hardening of the receptors. responder exercises. Measure false alarm rates of Developmental chip-sized chemistry labs are now less than 1 per month for each mode in varied being tested at DoE laboratories. Their false urban terrain and conditions. Show effective sen- alarm rates and accuracy in complex, “dirty” envi- sor decontamination process or low-cost to per- ronments are still in need of R&D. Radiological mit disposal of after event. detectors for wearable sensors are relatively mature, although the device must detect gamma FY2008: Transition to limited industrial produc- rays and neutrons, and be able to distinguish tion and deployment with unit cost of $7500 or likely threats from industrial and medical sources. less in quantities of 1000. Verify transition plan Integration of the three detection modes (CBR) for full rate production price of less than $3500 will be a power, size and weight challenge. in quantities of 10,000. Reliable alerting, discrimination, and identification are a challenge in this size package. DIDArto.1 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals Integrated Wearable CBR $0 $15 $30 $20 $10 $75 Milestones/Metrics: Sensors FY2004: Develop and demonstrate DIDArto.2 – Stand-off Radiation ID biochip technology scalable to unambiguous detection of four agents with consumable costs of Objectives: $5/day, overall sensitivity (including collector) of Develop affordable, robust radiation detectors 100-10000 (10000 threshold, 100 objective for for stand-off discrimination and identification long-term) organisms for an exposure time of of nuclear weapons and dirty bombs. Processing 10 minutes. The limit of detection for biotoxins and sensor must be capable of nearly unattended should be 10-100 nanograms. For handheld operation 24/7, and must distinguish between chemical detectors, performance goals are a few relatively harmless, legitimate sources and parts per billion (ppb) sensitivity for nerve agents terrorist devices. Sensors must be capable of

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

networked operation and detecting unshielded plan for full rate production price of less than nuclear weapons in vehicles moving at highway $15,000 in quantities of 10,000. speeds. Deployable nationwide. DIDArto.2 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals Payoffs: Stand-Off Radiation ID $0 $18 $32 $29 $11 $90 Provides immediate alert to responders and security forces to intercept suspicious con- DIDArto.3 – Integrated Remote Detection of tainers, vehicles, or objects. CB Agents Challenges: Objectives: Current radiation detectors are costly, large, and Develop and demonstrate compact, low-cost, reli- not designed for production quantities suitable able sensor technologies and/or systems for wide for network deployment on a national scale. area, remote detection of airborne clouds and Primary challenges are: discrimination of threats plumes of biological and chemical agents. Such from legitimate domestic sources and the ability systems should be able to reliably detect and to detect both gamma rays and neutrons in a accurately characterize threat aerosol clouds at compact package. ranges of up to 1 kilometer. Their field of view should afford area coverage either through wide Milestones/Metrics: beam scanning or through point-to-point grids FY2005: Transition work from DoD and DoE that characterize the transmission path. Use of to begin design and development of combined cloud penetrating sensors or substances is neutron/gamma ray detector for networked included in this program as an option to provide nationwide security applications. Design criteria: detailed information about the cloud. These sys- range of 10-50 meters; discrimination capability tems should provide real-time data about plume for threat vs. non-threat; physical size <0.3 sq and aerosol paths for use by responders and to mile area, environmental hardening against feed computer models so that the event progress weather and temperature extremes; output for can be mapped and predicted. network and wireless data transmission; inputs for remote control; and built-in diagnostics. Currently fielded systems are complex, heavy, and large. They are not suitable for deployment out- FY2006: Verify performance in laboratory and doors, exposure to the elements, and continuous controlled field trials. Show ability to discrimi- operation. These limitations need to be nate with 90% probability of correct classification addressed. at maximum range. Demonstrate ability to detect standard nuclear weapons targets (provided A key activity for this program will be to transi- by DoE) at range. Design incorporates resistance tion and reconfigure military technology and to simple countermeasure. concepts to civilian development. Many of the military requirements may not apply to home- FY2007: Demonstrate prototype devices in land defense, and reducing requirements may responder exercises. Install prototypes at choke lower risk and costs and accelerate maturation. points in experimental CBRNE testbed. For example, the military avoids the use of bista- Demonstrate vehicle performance. Show detec- tic spectral transmission measurements because it tion and discrimination at range against moving cannot predict or control the sensor deployment vehicle carrying unshielded standard target. geometry ahead of time. This constraint does Vehicle speed <70 mph. not normally apply to homeland defense. Furthermore, DoD is considering the use of pen- FY2008: Transition to limited industrial produc- etrating microrobots and unmanned micro air tion and deployment with unit cost of $25,000 vehicles to enter a suspicious cloud and collect or less in quantities of 1000. Verify transition samples or conduct analysis. It is recommended

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

that this concept be included in the trade studies simulation. Study bistatic detection paths for for the RTO. deployment in urban canyons.

Payoffs: FY2005: Transition work from DoD and DoE to begin design and development of remote inte- Allows the emergency responder the ability to grated CB sensors for deployment in urban set- detect an attack from a distance, monitor its tings. Adapt technologies to specifically solve progress, issue alerts that may prevent contamina- homeland defense problem. tion of personnel, secure a contaminated area, administer to victims, apply appropriate triage FY2006: Continue development working to and gather information about the event for evi- metrics: range of greater than 500 meters, dis- dence collection and analysis. This system is crimination of aerosolized biological warfare envisioned as part of a layered defense system agents from naturally occurring biological debris, that either runs continuously or is activated when combined false alarm rate of less than one per other systems or intelligence have given an alert month. to a possible release. The result is the ability to identify a species but not a strain and to enable a FY2007: Verify performance in laboratory course of treatment. and controlled field trials. Show ability to withstand full environmental range. Demonstrate Challenges: 60 degree wide area coverage from single sensor. Currently there are no programs that provide Show plume detection sensitivity for cloud den- combined CB remote detection. The sensors sity of 100 micrograms per cubic meter with need to be reliable, work in real-time, require no 85% probability of detection. wet chemistry or other exotic consumables and FY2008: Demonstrate integrated devices in be low-cost. They must be able to detect parti- responder exercises. Vary sensor deployment cles the range of 2-10 microns, and detect based on predictions obtained through modeling aerosolized multiple chemical agents reliably. and simulation. Experiment with concept of Chemical detection must deal with both toxic operations. Measure false alarm rates of less than industrial chemicals and chemical warfare agents one per month for each mode in varied urban such as sarin. There is a need for static and terrain and conditions. mobile sensors that be rapidly deployed to a field location. Low cost upkeep and operational cost FY2009: Transition to limited industrial produc- are essential for those systems that operate con- tion and deployment with unit cost of $25,000 tinuously. Some risk reduction may be possible or less in quantities of 1000. Verify transition by using fixed bistatic detection grids (transmitter plan for full rate production price of less than at one location and receiver up to 500 meters $15,000 in quantities of 10,000. away; monitors transmission DIDArto.3 – Budget in Millions spectra along path). Computer Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals processing throughput will be Integrated Sensor Suite $0 $25$40 $29 $10 $0 $104 an issue for imaging sensors.

Milestones/Metrics: DIDArto.4 – Portable Stand-off Container Inspection FY2004: Demonstrate stand-off bioaerosol detection and discrimination range (threshold) of Objectives: one kilometer, sensitivity (threshold) of 3,000 Develop and demonstrate compact, non-contact, agent-containing particles per liter of air non-intrusive sensor technologies and/or systems (ACPLA), and real-time detection. Analyze opti- for detection of biological and chemical agents in mal deployment strategies using modeling and sealed containers. Such systems should be able to

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

reliably detect and potentially characterize threat composition. It is possible that the agent may be agents in containers at distances of 1-2 meters. carried in what appears to be a commercial prod- Although emphasis is on the analysis of the vessel uct container or other ordinary object such as a contents, a helpful sensing strategy may include fire extinguisher. The actual agent container may detection of unique or suspicious chemical or be carried or concealed within another vessel in biological manufacturing residues that may exist an attempt to defeat screening. Many detection on the outside of the container. Current develop- schemes rely on analysis of fluid characteristics mental sensors require physical contact with the but biological agents are likely to be carried in vessel to function. It is desirable that the sensing powder form. mechanisms rely on techniques that are not harmful to humans in and around the vessel. Milestones/Metrics: Further, the sensors should be tolerant of viewing FY2004: DoD/DoE to continue development of geometry if possible. For example, short-range non-stand-off detection technology for chemical acousto-optical techniques may prove effective. agents. Prove ability to reliably detect selected Sensors that require the use of ionizing radiation chemical warfare agents from ordinary harmless or high directed energy beams (laser or micro- chemicals. Determine limits of discrimination wave) may provide utility for scenarios where capability. Validate useful performance metrics: humans are not near the vessel being scanned. ability to detect four or more specific chemical agents reliably and distinguish them from ten dif- Payoffs: ferent harmless fluids with a false declaration rate This capability gives the emergency responder the of less than 10%. Show results against a variety ability to detect and possibly characterize the of common fluid vessels such as soft drink bot- contents of a chemical or biological agent con- tles, fire extinguishers, and household chemical tainer without contacting the vessel. Stand-off containers. Extend experiments to consider easily container inspection would permit convenient implemented countermeasures that terrorists ranges of 1-2 meters stand-off detection in choke would consider using to avoid detection. points such as transportation terminals and allow rapid scanning of a collection of objects that may FY2005: Extend chemical vessel inspection tech- be found in and around the scene of a potential nology to non-contact methods. Show ranges of terrorist attack. This also gives responders the 10 to 50 centimeter with detection of one or information needed to direct attention and focus more selected threat chemicals. Assess practical to specific containers; this could be particularly and theoretical limits and define metrics. useful in hunting for terrorist weapons in ware- Develop geometry insensitive inspection tech- houses and storage areas. niques for chemical vessels. Define potential techniques for bio-agent vessel inspection: consider bistatic (two point sensing) measurement Challenges: procedures and associated geometrical constraints The most significant barrier is the paucity of for noncontact inspection at busy choke points; signatures. Chemical and biological agents are examine potential for monostatic (single point relatively easy to conceal since they emit no sensing) active techniques that can probe the ves- radiation, and potent quantities can be carried sel to detect the agent; develop stand-off surface in small vessels. They do not emit any character- inspection techniques that identify tell-tale istic observable radiation of any sort. Properly residues of substances associated with production prepared and sealed vessels should not have any or handling of bio-agents. unique chemical or biological residues on the surface, although it may be possible to look for FY2006: Demonstrate non-contact chemical unusual amounts of common residues as an inspection performance equal to contact alarm to warrant more extensive examination. methods. Develop compact, portable device, Containers may vary in size, shape, and preferably handheld, for stand-off inspection of

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

chemical vessels. Extend range to two meters or of 1000. Verify transition plan for full rate more. Conduct lab experiments of biological production price of less than $4,000 in quantities vessel inspection technology for promising tech- of 10,000. niques. Begin development of DIDArto.4 – Budget in Millions screener that relies on residue Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals detection on the surface of CB Combined Stand-Off CB $0 $20 $30 $30$20 $30 $130 vessels.

FY2007: Demonstrate biodetection: one kilo- DIDArto.5 – Integrated Networked Sensors for gram of 2-4 selected agents stored in dry form in CBRNE Detection sealed containers at a range of 10-50 cm. Conduct demonstration against 5-10 commonly Objectives: occurring commercial or industrial dry containers The ability to defend cities against large scale safe enough to contain biological agents without attacks will ultimately depend on integrated net- leakage; e.g., powdered herbicide or insecticide works of sensors. containers (other methods are more reliable for detecting unsafe transport). Conduct operational • Develop two or more large-scale urban net- tests of chemical stand-off inspection devices in worked sensor testbeds to support the full rigorous, controlled trials and relatively uncon- spectrum of DIDA functions; testbeds should strained urban responder exercises. Demonstrate be chosen to cover different urban settings, CB residue screener detection range of two e.g., a complex seaport environment and a meters against 3-5 likely residues; identify likely large inland urban complex. Employ arrays of screener confusers and legitimate vessels that static, mobile, and remote sensors for inter- would have identical residues. cepting nuclear and radiological weapons, detecting and characterizing aerosolized CB FY2008: Transition chemical stand-off detector agents, and mapping the attack and ensuing to limited industrial production and deployment effects. Integrate sensor networks with infor- with unit cost of $4,000 or less in quantities of mation networks for flow of raw data, indica- 1000. Verify transition plan for full rate produc- tions, and warning. Employ a variety of tion price of less than $2,000 in quantities of networked software agents to provide image 10,000. Deploy CB residue screener in industrial and data processing, embedded model based production with same costs. detection, false alarm reduction, and event mapping and prediction. FY2009: Demonstrate non-contact bio-agent inspection performance equal to contact meth- • Support the activities associated with a spec- ods. Develop compact, portable device, prefer- trum of emergency responders, e.g., fire, ably handheld, for stand-off inspection of police, rescue, emergency medical teams and suspicious containers. Extend range to two municipal departments. The capabilities meters or more. Begin design of combined include the necessary infrastructure to support CB stand-off inspection device. communication, sensing, surveillance, instru- FY2010: Develop and test CB non-contact mentation and data collection for a wide-range inspection device. Show performance of each of experiments, demonstrations and exercises. mode equal to the performance of individual The underlying architecture should be scalable detectors. and support standard interfaces and connections to facilitate plug and play experiments FY2011: Transition CB stand-off detector to with systems and sub-systems and insertion of limited industrial production and deployment advanced components and technologies. with unit cost of $8,000 or less in quantities

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

Payoffs: number and type of each sensor. Estimate acqui- The program will establish a national capability sition and operational costs for two alternative for municipalities and metropolitan areas to par- sensor network designs. ticipate in experiments, demonstrations, and eval- FY2005: Complete detailed design of networks. uation activities. It will provide an in situ, real- Support Red Team activities for initiating inci- time environment for advanced systems and new dents and evaluating real-time response of sys- technology evaluation. The instrumentation and tems and responder organizations. Begin installa- information displays will enable observation of tion in selected urban centers. Conduct trade operations spanning multi-threat attacks. It will study of climate sensor density versus modeling allow regional coordinators, incident command- accuracy; adjust climate sensor mix accordingly. ers, and emergency responders to train, and Demonstrate initial functional capability to experiment with new concepts of operation. regional coordinators, commanders and emer- The testbed and associated infrastructure will gency responders. Integrate CBRNE sensors and empower the civilian community to conduct detectors with other commonly used intrusion exercises analogous to those conducted on the and security systems to include seismic, acoustic, Western Test Range by the military community. motion detection, video surveillance, and smart These exercises have proven to be invaluable to tags. Consider active and passive geolocation and military units which subsequently are deployed to tracking of vehicles, especially in higher risk areas a wide-range of countries. such as shipping centers and ports. Consider implications of tracking victims in response and Challenges: recovery phases. Employ wireless and wired data transfer as needed. Consider dedicated response A major challenge is to design the sensor network networks that do not become overloaded in a to overcome the failings of the available CBNRE crisis. off-the-shelf sensors. A technical challenge is the testbed architecture which must be scalable and FY2006: Begin series of spiral development capable of accommodating a wide-range of equip- experiments in a networked testbed environment. ment and systems. A managerial challenge is that Develop test plan that provides realistic results a broad set of capabilities is needed, and must be without the need for agent release. Support realized through the creation of large industrial/ experiments, equipment T&E and training of academic teams allied with DoE and DoD labo- other metropolitan communities who deploy to ratories. The sensor network will need to inte- the testbed. Demonstrate network false alarm grate multiple legacy systems as well as state-of- rate of less than one per month with probability the-art equipment and information systems and of detection of 99% or higher for radiological data analysis. and nuclear threats. Response time for nuclear weapons attack must be less than five minutes. Milestones/Metrics: FY2004: Initiate competitive program with mul- FY2007: Demonstrate network false alarm rate tiple awards for urban sensor networks. of less than one per month with probability of Contractors conduct a detailed assessment of detection of 85% or higher for CB attacks. Show alternatives using modeling and simulation, and network capability to reduce false alarms by a fac- other analytical tools. Determine cost drivers and tor of five over single sensor approach. Continue CONOPS for sensor networks. Qualified teams the development and implementation of the test- will consist of sensor and network firms with bed and demonstrate metropolitan scale experi- expertise and products that cover the full ment capability. Support training of CBRNE threat spectrum. Determine area cover- coordinators, commanders and emergency age, population coverage, response time, tolerable responders. Support planning of large-scale exer- false alarm rates, and other key parameters vs. cises and technology evaluation and transfer.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

FY2008: Continue support of planning, training may not become feasible until dense meteorologi- and exercises for other metropolitan areas and cal sensor arrays are deployed. Validation testing municipalities throughout the country. Develop and evaluation and testing is a major challenge transfer package to regional defense. Disseminate and technological solutions are being sought to and provide indoctrination seminars to states and mitigate legal, medical, and environmental con- regions. strictions while still providing confidence that DIDArto.5 – Budget in Millions models are providing useful informa- Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals tion. Most models do not speak to Civilian Regional Networks $100$150 $200 $150 $50 $650 each other; uniformity and standardization of inputs and outputs, common validation metrics, and automatic results transfer DIDArto.6 – Combined Effects Modeling for and data sharing are needed. Urban Canyons Milestones/Metrics: Objectives: FY2004: Assume development lead for modeling Integrate CBRNE effects models and simulations of combined CBRNE effects. Adapt existing and for complex urban canyons. The models must developmental single phenomena models. Start include unified, seamless software integration of microclimate study to determine sensor spacing the most mature and well validated models for and kinds needed to provide microclimate model CB aerosol dispersion in urban environments, inputs for accurate predictions to 50m or less. munitions effects, structural damage, thermal Consider use of existing urban sensors both for damage, blast and overpressure, coupled with microclimate and exploitation in physical effects microclimate prediction and fine grain climate models. Adapt DoD munitions effects models to sensor grid. In addition, they should provide large urban structures. inputs and outputs to help in medical and population monitoring data, as well as provide inputs FY2005: Establish software environment for to models associated with injury and casualty integrated effects modeling and simulation data assessment (DIDA.8 (Pre-Triage/Differentiation handling and results passing. Combine distrib- Among Levels of Exposure)). uted computing concepts with high performance mainframe capabilities. Pass results over high- Payoffs: speed networks so that predictive capability is not Additional capabilities provided to responders vulnerable to single point failure. Conduct tests include: tracking and prediction of plumes asso- of microclimate modeling accuracy and a trade ciated with CBR aerosol dispersion in urban set- study of sensor density and cost versus model tings; integrated modeling of explosive and uncertainty; adjust accordingly. Combine CB incendiary effects combined with NRE threats; plume models with blast, shock, and radiation coupling of transport with damage and expected models. casualties; and recommendations for courses of FY2006: Verify microclimate performance and action and prediction of population exposure. determine accuracy limitations based as a function of types of conditions. Integrate microcli- Challenges: mate into CBRNE effects models. Employ mul- There are reasonably validated, existing and/or tiple models for each agent in order to capitalize emerging models for large-scale climate effects for on strengths of each and for comparisons. most threats except biological. Current effects Develop urban in situ validation strategy to modeling efforts are just beginning to deal with include dispersion of simulants, real and simu- combinations of effects, and the microclimate lated climate sensor inputs, and inputs from effects encountered in cities still remains an area existing building sensors (e.g., stress sensors or of significant difficulty. Microclimate models urban earthquake monitors). Deploy in the two

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

urban validation testbeds being used for net- feasible. The large variety of TIC and CW agents worked sensors. Incorporate sensor characteris- that might be employed, possibly in a combined tics. Create high fidelity digital models of central attack, would greatly complicate this problem. core and critical locales of two major urban cen- Furthermore, not all people will respond the ters: include 3-D models of all major structures same way and exhibit the same symptoms; some down to 30 cm or less. Define plume dispersal may not exhibit any observable symptoms at all, test range in urban center. but nevertheless need treatment.

FY2007: Demonstrate modeling capability in a Milestones/Metrics: series of single and multiple event simulations. FY2004: Continue research on methods for Show plume tracking to 10 meter accuracy in inferring human injury from exposure to low- 5 knot wind with low turbulence; 100 meter dose chemical agents using animal testing, bio- accuracy in 15 knot wind and moderate turbu- chemical analysis, and tissue-based experiments. lence. Demonstrate end-to-end seamless model- Continue work in analysis of reliable data from ing and simulation online. industrial accidents. DIDArto.6 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 Totals FY2005: Extend current work in Combined Effects M&S $10 $25 $20 $7 $62 model-based injury related to moderate- dose exposure. Leverage and expand work in long-term exposure to industrial toxins. DIDArto.7 – On-Scene Assessment of Low-Dose Infer from chemical similarity, potential damage Exposure to Chemical Agents – Research associated with new toxins, or toxins for which little useful data exists. Examine physiological Objectives: symptoms that may occur during low-dose Research the feasibility of sensor systems that can exposure. reliably determine at the scene of an attack whether an individual has symptoms caused by FY2006: Develop models of average human low-dose exposure to a chemical warfare agent. response to low-dose exposure. Consider use of a In the event of a chemical attack, not all victims variety of sensors to observe the physiological will receive a dose necessary to kill or disable. characteristics of such exposure. Expand work in Some may be injured and others may experience temporary and permanent respiratory damage symptoms associated with low-dose exposure. associated with exposure to low-dose TIC. Extend DoD efforts with CW agents that dam- Payoffs: age the skin. Currently there is no unambiguous means for FY2007: Catalog the combined external symp- associating physiological observables with low- toms that may conclusively indicate the exposure dose chemical exposure. This research would to certain classes of chemical agents. complement the ongoing limited research efforts in DoD and extend the analysis to toxic indus- FY2008: Design sensor concepts that can trial chemicals. It would also determine the feasi- observe such symptoms in real-time. bility of on-scene detection of low-dose exposure and appropriate procedures for handling and FY2009: Incorporate sensor concept designs into treating these victims, if any. human response models.

Challenges: DIDArto7 – Budget in Millions Associating field observable Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals physiological symptoms with Field Observable Indications $0 $10 $10 $10$10 $20 $60 low-dose exposure may not be and Sensors

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

DIDArto.8 – Real-Time Structural Stress them with these urban structural models. Measurement Capitalize on rapid 3-D modeling work to provide means to create structural models of build- Objectives: ings, facilities, and large segments of cities. Develop a portable, real-time stress measurement Examine sensor suite designs that can provide sensor for continuous onsite assessment of struc- critical data on the scene to feed models. tural safety. After a blast associated with a terror- FY2005: Integrate models with sensor inputs in ist event, responders may need to enter structures portable device that can monitor structures while or rubble without knowing whether collapse is rescue and cleanup operations are ongoing. imminent. During rescue and response, the Verify performance in laboratory and scale model safety of the structure or rubble may change. experiments. Migrate testing to full scale facili- Payoffs: ties at DoE or DoD. Create scale models if needed. Build and test a portable sensor suite. This capability will save rescuers lives in cases where the structure will not support a rescue FY2006: Demonstrate confidence levels of attempt. Conversely, lives may be saved because 70 percent on predictive capability of model plus a rescue is safely conducted by avoiding unsafe sensor. Enter limited production and fielding: routes, or because an operation is found to be weight of 30 pounds; stand-off 10 meters or viable in spite of outward appearances. more; automatic operations; alarm relay to Responders can continuously assess the structural responders. Conduct operability evaluation in stress of buildings and rubble. If stress exceeds responder exercises. Deploy and test sensor suit limits associated with materials and design, or in the field if opportunities occur, here or abroad. changes in stress exceed safe margins, responders are alerted and can exit to avoid injury. DIDArto.8 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2004 2005 2006 Totals On-Scene Indications and $20 $40 $20 $80 Challenges: Sensors Structural integrity models work best with detailed information. Such information may not be available for the damaged building; further, DIDArto.9 – Stand-off Automatic Choke Point detailed information of rubble cannot be Screener obtained rapidly or accurately. The correlation of real-time, continuous measurement of stress, Objectives: movement, tremors, vibrations, and other observ- Develop sensor systems that can find and inter- ables must be relied upon to provide estimates of cept terrorists at choke points (building the stability. Use of embedded models with real- entrances, airports, etc.) prior to their intended time data feeds is a major challenge. Key issues attack, or after an attack as they attempt to are: determination of characteristic or tell-tale escape. This capability could allow reliable signatures; packaging of multi-mode sensor into screening of suspicious or dangerous people via portable system; size; weight; determination of observation of physiological characteristics. sensor location for best results; ease of deployment and use; simplicity of results and recom- Payoffs: mended responder actions. This capability could prevent attacks and facilitate the capture of perpetrators, saving lives and Milestones/Metrics: money. Terrorists and collaborating individuals FY2004: Use DoD and DoE structural models can be intercepted before they gain access to their and simulations to urban structures such bridges, targets. For example, a would-be highjacker subways, tunnels, skyscrapers, and arenas. would be stopped at the ticket counter even Incorporate blast and shock models and integrate though papers and baggage have checked out.

PROJECT RESPONDER Detection, Identification, and Assessment (DIDA)

Challenges: FY2008: Consider the following observables The primary challenge is to identify a set of sig- either singly or in combinations as candidates for natures and observables that provide unambigu- recognition of intent: voice, gait and head move- ous indication that a person intends to or is ment analysis, eye movement; odor; temperature; already executing a terrorist attack. Humans vary posture changes. Develop concepts that rely on widely in their response to threats, danger, and creating a baseline for each individual. fear. Physiological observables taken individually FY2009: Develop operational test scenarios that may not suffice to drive down the false alarms. can be legally implemented in key choke points to collect sensor data. Candidate sensors may Milestones/Metrics: include passive and active imaging to include FY2007: Extend ongoing federal research to con- long-wave infrared and eye-safe laser radar, stand- ceptual system designs and operational concepts off chemical sensing, and motion sensing, in sev- that minimize false alarms and disruption to eral spectral regions. choke point operations. Sensor should provide unambiguous measurement of key physiological FY2010: Establish test program for competing indications associated with terrorist mental state. designs. Use live testing in urban choke points: Non-contact approaches are preferable. e.g., airport passenger check-in, ticket booths, Processing of individuals should take no more building entry, and arena entry. Select most than one minute. Although identification of promising approaches based on: accuracy; false people is not a goal, the processing could benefit alarm rate; throughput or speed of measurement; from identification or prior knowledge of the and cost. Proceed to refined designs in later individual via national database or local records years. from prior accesses. DIDArto.9 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2007 20082009 2010 Totals Stand-Off Automated $5 $5 $8 $0 $18 Choke Point Screener

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 • PDA/Cell Phone Sized • Integrated CBR Suite DIDArto.1 – Wearable Integrated CBR Sensors • Multi Agent ID

• Stand-off 10-20 meters • Network Operations DIDArto.2 – Stand-off Radiation ID • Gamma/Neutron

• Stand-off 1 km • Man-portable, Compact DIDArto.3 – Integrated Remote • Affordable Detection of CB Agents

• Stand-off 1-2 meters • Monostatic DIDArto.4 – Portable Stand-off Container Inspection • Briefcase Size

• Full Urban CBRNE DIDArto.5 – Integrated Networked Sensors • FAR <1/month for CBRN Detection • Low Opns Cost/sq km

• Microclimate to <50m • In Situ Validation DIDArto.6 – Combined Effects • Event Mapping to 10m Modeling for Urban Canyons

• TIC and CW Agents DIDArto.7 – On-Scene Assessment of Low-Dose Exposure to • 20% False Alarm Rate Chemical Agents – Research • Event Mapping to 10m

• Man-portable • Deploy in 5 Minutes DIDArto.8 – Real-Time • Automatic Alarm Structural Stress Measurement

• Fast, Natural DIDArto.9 – Stand-off Automatic • False Alarm Rate <10% Chokepoint Screener • Range of 10-100 ft

Detection, Identification, and Assessment Technology Roadmap

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter III

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter IV Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications (UIC) Chapter Chair: Dr. Guy Beakley Chapter Coordinator: Dr. Maria Powell

Definition however, that cannot be solved with existing technology or non-technology solutions and will Unified Incident Command (UIC) is the capability require research and development. to seamlessly acquire, store, distribute and protect information needed by the incident commander to successfully manage the response to a terrorism Needed Functional Capabilities and Priorities event. “Response,” in this case, involves a variety of actions and decisions across police, fire, emer- The needed functional capabilities prioritized in gency medical and other departments to include the Emergency Responders’ workshops include local, state and federal support personnel. the following items, prioritized in order of importance to the responders. Operational Environments • Point Location and Identification. This capability differs from others in that the functional capabilities do not differ depending on • Seamless Connectivity and Integration. whether the incident is chemical, biological, • Information Assurance. explosive, or nuclear. Rather, functional elements are evaluated against their performance and con- • Incident Command Information Management tribution to the capability across the spectrum of and Dissemination. information management environments which • Multimedia Supported Telepresence. include: Information Acquisition, Information Assessment and Course of Action Development, The responders gave Point Location and Decision-Making, and Direction. This means Identification (UIC.1), and Seamless Connectivity that increases in capability can result from sys- and Integration (UIC.2) nearly the same priority tems integration, engineering, application of but with a slight edge to Point Location. The commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies responders believe that the most important piece and other solutions not directly reliant on new of information to an incident commander is technology development. For example, organiza- where his/her personnel and equipment in the tional changes, equipment/interface standards, incident area are. This is a long-sought after but and practice/training may be more relevant than only partially satisfied need. Seamless connectivity technology in solving some of the problems. In addresses the com-munications interoperability addition, some capability gaps can be eliminated issue that vexes most responders when several by simply procuring devices in large quantities to departments (i.e., police, emergency medical, and be distributed in smaller amounts to various fire in multiple municipalities) have to work jurisdictions. There are some key priority needs, together in a large event. Information Assurance

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter IV

Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable (UIC.3) and Incident Communications Command Information Operational Environments Information Management and Assessment Information and COA Decision- Dissemination (UIC.4) were Functional Capabilities Acquisition Development Making Direction rated as moderately high but not as high a priority as the 1. Point Location and Identification first two. Although still con- 2. Seamless Connectivity and sidered a needed capability, Integration

Multimedia Supported 3. Information Assurance Telepresence (UIC.5) was rated the lowest priority among 4. Incident Command Information Management and Dissemination these functional capabilities. 5. Multi-Media Supported The sense of the responders is Telepresence that there would be real value 1 1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this in having video teleconferenc- 2 operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO ing capability in the field and 3 2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO between responder elements; 3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability? it’s just not as urgent as the LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH other needs. Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’

The discussion of the individual functional capa- regardless of user position or movement, all the bilities addresses the functional needs across the time. Safety is a primary concern of the incident operational elements, as well as technological and commanders. The commander needs to know non-technological solutions. It should be kept in the location and well-being of each responder for mind that an extensible framework needs to be rescue and situational awareness reasons. Point put together so that these individual elements can geo-location and identification are necessary come together and work as a unified incident regardless of user position or movement. command. This means, for example, that a solu- Location information is also useful for giving a tion for point location and identification must picture of where the resources are and monitoring work with a solution for interoperable communi- status in cases where the response has a positional cations in the unified incident command for large objective. For safety it is also useful to measure and small jurisdictions. physiological status of the individual, but cost is a practical concern. A low-cost version of a physio- Overall State of Technology for logical monitoring system similar to that used by Unified Incident Command Decision NASA might be appropriate. Support and Interoperable Communications Goals: The matrix to the right shows a mix of moderate A key goal is to identify and locate an individual to high technological challenges in raising the within 3 meters in any direction and under any level of capabilities for emergency response. conditions including weather and interior, within However, as the matrix indicates, point location buildings and in tunnels over 400 feet below and identification is the only functional capabil- ground. The responders also indicated that loca- ity that calls for technology development with a tion of high heat and combustion and other haz- moderate degree of risk. All other technology ards (including the chem/bio/radiation hazards as areas can achieve results with low technology addressed in the DIDA NTRO) would be development risk. extremely valuable and should be transmitted by audible alert to the responder in danger and also UIC.1 – Point Location and Identification. to a field command location. The positional This is the ability to know and visualize the information, physiological status, (and environ- location and identity of individual responders mental warning, if provided) must be transmitted

PROJECT RESPONDER Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications (UIC)

wirelessly inside/outside structures and through ment to operate 50 feet down in a subway that rubble to an off-site command post, and to other has not been previously wired. Responders stated appropriate parties including within teams of that there is some capability available to locate responders. To aid in the visualization of posi- personnel in the operational area in two dimen- tion in the environment, the command display sions only. Current systems indicate in what should provide building and other environmental direction an individual may be and roughly how overlays. The command should also be able to far away that individual is, but not, for instance, provide this information wirelessly back to the what floor he/she is on. Current systems are responder teams. All this should be accom- being used mostly by some of the larger fire plished with minimum delay and flawless opera- departments, have limited range and are not inte- tion of such a system needs to be assured. The grated into command situational awareness sys- identification and location equipment should tems. A range of at least 1,000 feet is required. come up on the first try and stay up during the entire mission without a “crash” or other service State of the Art: interruption. Commercial-off-the-shelf equipment exists for a Size, weight and power requirements for the number of applications other than those for remote devices should be kept to a minimum. responders. These include child location in parks Power should be provided by small replaceable (wristband device placed on the child, receivers at batteries and should be assisted by an intelligent various locations in the park and location sta- power/operational management system to ensure tions, where queries can be made), vehicle loca- that the device would continue to provide essen- tion systems, Radio Frequency Identification tial rescue location service for the duration of a (RF ID) tags for inventory control and various mission, perhaps up to one month. The entire experimental systems. R&D is being conducted responder package should be smaller than a ciga- on RF ID tags by Naval Air Systems Command rette pack and should weigh very little more than and the Army’s Land Warrior program, digital RF the battery. It should preferably be integrated tags by DARPA/Army CECOM and others, into individual protection gear. Ultra Wide-band (UWB) by Lawrence Livermore and U.S. Army, and Blue Force Tracking (mostly Such technology, once available, would revolu- classified). Army NVESD is presently developing tionize personnel accountability procedures a prototype UWB position location and tracking within responder organizations. All personnel at system specifically designed for interior fire and a response scene, including volunteers, should be rescue operations. equipped with these devices. Thus it would be important that such capabilities either be stan- The capability to determine the location of a dardized across jurisdictions and disciplines, or wireless 9-1-1 caller is becoming available in that the equipment has a standard interface to some parts of the country. The FCC’s wireless uniforms and personal protective equipment, so E9-1-1 rules seek to improve the reliability of that the devices could be issued to all responders wireless 9-1-1 services and to provide emergency entering the perimeter. services personnel with location information that will enable them to locate and provide assistance Current Capabilities: to wireless 9-1-1 callers much more quickly. Currently there is no affordable system for point Even though this capability does not meet all of location of responders satisfying the above the responder needs it will be very cost effective requirements. The requirement, “under any con- and may be the most satisfactory solution for dition” needs to be specified so not to obviate users with limited resources. The FCC has man- more affordable solutions. An interim goal dated that wireless carriers provide the geographic might be to operate from five stories down in a location of cellular 9-1-1 callers as part of its building or a somewhat more difficult require- E9-1-1 Phase II rules. Phase I of the FCC

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter IV

mandate, required that, effective 4/1/1998, wire- new technology, but further R&D needs to be less carriers provide the callback number and the done to meet the responders’ needs. location of the cell site or base station receiving a 9-1-1 call. Phase II of the FCC mandate addi- The U.S. Army CECOM has a number of sci- tionally required that wireless carriers provide the ence and technology programs on position, navi- geographic location (i.e., latitude and longitude) gation and tracking that directly relate to these of the caller as part of Phase II E9-1-1 implemen- needs. One is on advanced position and tracking tation, beginning October 1, 2001. The full for the Objective Force and is in its initial year of deployment (i.e., 95% penetration) of this capa- a four year investigation. Another program uses bility is required to be completed by December triangulation technology to pinpoint location 31, 2005. The requirements do not satisfy those within 25 ft. Other programs examine net- of the responders in that the location is estimated worked assisted GPS, Ultra Wideband (UWB) to within a 50 meter – 150 meter radius for for ranging, and dead-reckoning models. The handset-based location technologies, and a 150 – Navy uses Infolinks units, which may be too 300 meter radius for network-based location costly for many municipalities. None of these technologies. Also, depending upon the type of programs meet all of the responders’ requirements location technology chosen by a wireless carrier, a including low-cost. caller’s location may not be able to be determined if the call originates from deep within a building Technology Limitations and Barriers: or subway. Point location through 400 feet of ground or concrete is not practical from a size weight, Steve Wozniak, the co-founder of Apple power and cost perspective. Practical ground Computer, recently announced the development penetration limits are about 20 feet through r of a simple and inexpensive low-data rate wireless einforced concrete. Going down 400 feet in a network that uses radio signals and global posi- tunnel would best be done with a tunnel com- tioning satellite data to keep track of a cluster of munications system. It may be best to set an inexpensive ($25 production cost) tags within a intermediate requirement of penetrating five sto- one- or two-mile radius of each base station. ries down in a building or a somewhat more dif- WozNet will include a home-base station that has ficult requirement of penetrating 50 feet down in the ability to track the location of dozens or even a subway that has not been previously wired. hundreds of small wireless devices that can be Concepts of operations that involve deploying attached to people, pets or property. While the wired links to RF repeaters may help bridge specific technical solution (reliance on GPS) cho- these gaps. sen for WozNet is unlikely to translate directly into the solution for responders (unless high- For the near-term the technology risks are moder- power GPS pseudolites can be developed to pene- ate to high in propagation through buildings, trate buildings and rubble), the low-cost of the earth, or rubble, but will likely improve as tech- tags and system suggests that other system con- nologies such as UWB and component miniatur- cepts could be developed inexpensively as well. ization continue to attain success in performance, size, weight, power, and cost. Barriers to reach- Ultra Wideband is a promising new technology ing the goals include detection of RF propagation that sends out short pulses that occupy a wide- through buildings, walls and rubble. range of frequency. Because receivers using this technique can discriminate signals in a great deal of noise, transmitters require very little power Gap Fillers: and the system can operate under the noise floor The chosen approach is to begin with demonstra- used by higher-powered devices such as GPS and tions of existing technologies combined with cell phones. A number of companies such as research on alternative approaches to surmount- Time Domain Corp. and MultiSpectral ing the identified technical barriers and limita- Solutions, Inc. have considerable capability in the tions. This initial phase would be followed by

PROJECT RESPONDER Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications (UIC)

integrated systems development and demonstra- problems. 500 people do not need to talk with tion and transition to industrial production of each other at one time. The system may have to the resulting devices. handle that many entities at one time, but even if it were technically possible to allow all pairs to UIC.2 – Seamless Connectivity and communicate simultaneously, this would not fit Integration. This is the ability to provide com- with the needs for incident command to main- munications systems that are able to seamlessly tain a common operational picture flowing up and dynamically interconnect multiple intera- and a coherent set of orders flowing down. There gency users (with multiple functions), as well as is also the need for responders to spend most of other information and communications technol- their time doing rather than communicating. ogy systems. The normal procedure is to establish a hierarchi- Goals: cal communications plan that simplifies the con- Within several minutes after the Pentagon attack nections that need to be made. The system of September 11th, emergency workers from ten should handle 50 agencies with links to state and jurisdictions were on the scene, trying to commu- national systems. The agencies should have their nicate with different technologies, on different own network plan with ten or fewer simultaneous radio frequencies, using different spectrum bands. callers. The system should not require techni- Incident command communications systems cians to be on-site and use common terminology must be able to seamlessly and dynamically inter- and nomenclature. It should also have the ability connect multiple interagency users, who have to operate within and between challenging envi- multiple functions, and multiple information and ronments and terrain, e.g., high rise buildings, communications technology systems. The com- underground, in canyons, and on-the-move. A munications system should integrate wired and number of levels of security will be required to wireless systems and enable communications restrict information that would be harmful in the within and between tactical, operational, and wrong hands. However, it is envisioned that the strategic levels. This includes the ability to sup- security system will be much simpler than that of port separate communications channels among the military. See UIC.3 (Information Assurance). responders, strike teams and task forces. Peer to peer communications in IP networks offers additional capability and should be A principal problem is that the existing equip- included. ment that responders have is not necessarily interoperable among fire fighters, police, and Current Capabilities: emergency medical personnel, even within the Communications systems vary across different same jurisdiction. This problem has been largely jurisdictions and departments. Digital communi- addressed by most jurisdictions, but equipment cations systems are only just now being deployed from different jurisdictions is most likely not across the nation, and for the most part, without interoperable, e.g., the county equipment may concern for interoperability. The standard system not communicate with the city equipment, or in most localities is an 800 MHz trunk system. adjacent county equipment or the state equip- However, this has limited range, especially in ment or various Federal departmental equipment. urban environments, and not all localities have Interoperability between in-place equipment is a changed to this system or have the required big problem. repeater system to facilitate its use. The system also takes substantial time to initially upgrade Communications capability should include video and make available for use. and data communications in addition to voice. The equipment should be scalable and integrate This is an area where the responders believe that up to 500 agencies/systems. A call plan with the needed capability, as they have described establishment of networks takes care of a lot of above, is not available because of a combination

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter IV

of affordability and lack of standards. There is digital systems. 2.5G and 3G systems will have also a significant deficit in the ability to commu- data rates of approximately 115 kb/s and 384 nicate within large buildings, deep in subway kb/s, respectively. Cellular systems are problem- tunnels and in underground structures and atic in times of emergency because of the general canyons. Current systems mostly offer only voice overloading of the spectrum and potential loss of communications, with little or no capability for support structure. However, once effective prior- text, graphics, images, or video. ity use provisions are put in place, low-cost, and 9-1-1 capability makes cellular attractive for State of the Art: resource-limited organizations. Many state and local projects have been insti- Emergency responder command and control tuted for increasing communications interoperability – including, for example, those by the vehicles are available that offer satellite, software Massachusetts State Police, Kentucky responders programmable radios, cellular telephone and and a number of Florida projects, which have wireless LAN capability. One problem is the cost been undertaken to relieve the problems in their (approximately $250,000, although this cost jurisdictions. would come down if they were mass-produced).

Interconnect appliances exist to interconnect vari- The Defense Department’s Joint Tactical Radio ous existing radios. They vary in capability from System (JTRS) is a mobile radio system where interconnecting six different radios to intercon- hardware and software products conform to a sin- necting twelve radios over eight networks. gle Software Communications Architecture (SCA). The government is procuring a family Standardization efforts have also taken place. of affordable tactical radios to meet military Notable among them is Project 25, by the communications requirements in a competitive Association of Public Safety Communications environment by capitalizing on commercial tech- Officials, standardized as ANSI 102. Project 25 nologies and processes. The radios are expected is an open-standard, digital land mobile radio sys- to cost $2,000 – $5,000 in quantities for one tem that is backward compatible to traditional channel and one mode. The SCA makes it possi- analog radios. In the digital mode it achieves ble to procure radio applications such as wave- double the spectrum efficiency and includes forms and hardware independently. JTRS will be packet data services.8 The problem is the juris- used in the military environment to provide com- dictions have existing radios and support tower mand, control, and communications with forces infrastructure and do not have the money to via voice, video, and data media forms during all upgrade them. phases of military operations to include base support in non-military roles. Commercial availabil- Wireless network standards include IEEE 802.11 ity is expected in 2006. for high bandwidth, packet switched communications but limited mobility due to short-range; Power line networks may be considered as a solu- IEEE 802.16 for high bandwidth, packet tion to the failure of wireless communications to switched, metropolitan area coverage; 3G cellular work in many high rise buildings and under for medium bandwidth, circuit switched, and ground. The power line capability should be continuous coverage via cellular design; and the included in some radios and the radios should new IEEE 802.20, which is under development work even if the power is disrupted. for a continuous coverage cellular system similar to 3G in many respects, but utilizing packet Technology Limitations and Barriers: switched access. 2.5G and 3G cellular systems There are barriers and limitations to solving have the advantage that they use the same towers, this problem. One is interoperability of all the base stations and radios of the current (2G) different radios that departments have purchased

8 See Desourdis et al, “Emerging Public Safety Wireless Communication Systems,” Artech House, 2001 for further information.

PROJECT RESPONDER Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications (UIC)

over the years. Scale and affordability will be hoped-for results of the SAFECOMM program issues here. The requirement for a network man- and establishes a process to continually improve ager or technician is also a problem. Two-way the communications capability of emergency broadband communications among vehicles and responders. responders on the move in urban environments is a difficult problem. Interconnection of UIC.3 – Information Assurance. This is the existing equipment is a solvable problem but ability to guarantee the availability, confidential- upgrades may have to be made in order to ity, security, and integrity of information and meet the requirements. Although the near-term information systems, including redundant availability of these technologies is marginal, the systems. technological risk of developing them is low. Goals: Gap Fillers: The unified incident command must have the Because the primary barriers to responders having capability to operate first-time every-time and these capabilities have to do with standards, remain in operation for the duration of the mis- interoperability (including legacy systems), and sion. Redundant systems may be required to availability of resources, the chosen technology maintain fail-proof availability. The incident approach is to demonstrate a “Responder C3 command must provide for security, confidential- System” that is developed over time using a spiral ity, and integrity of information. The responders development process. The development should see system availability and system integrity as one start with the evaluation and adaptation of cur- issue and hence they have been combined under rent off-the-shelf technology and be able to lever- this requirement. The system must have the abil- age emerging technology as it is developed. This ity to authenticate users including the device, is essentially an engineering effort that establishes operator, and data. It must include multi-level standards and an architecture then iteratively security and provide seamless security within and incorporates advances in the state of commercial among enclaves and users. The security should, and military technology. The state of the art is of course, not degrade the data. There should be moving much too fast on its own to justify a visual indication of security status at all levels. adding additional funding into development of The incident command should have monitoring the technology itself except in the context of spe- and alert of attempted and actual security cific extensions of technology for our purposes. breaches. The latency should be on the order of a tenth or a second or less. Some of this is already being proposed in the DHS’ SAFECOMM program. SAFECOMM is Current Capabilities: a DHS effort to address the wireless communica- Most of the technology needed for information tion interoperability problem for emergency assurance probably already exists, and does not responders at the local, state, and federal levels. require extensive research and development It will build on the efforts done to date by the efforts in addition to efforts already underway. Public Safety Wireless Network Program. The The information assurance issues pertaining to a DHS intends to revitalize and enhance the unified incident command for emergency respon- SAFECOMM program however; little informa- ders have less to do with technology push than tion is available about the new program. The with prioritization of costs, integration of tech- SAFECOMM program should result in a nologies in an incident command system, proce- national standard architecture for emergency dures and non-materiel solutions. Existing tech- response communications and move toward niques from different fields can be applied to demonstrating the goals and capability set forth incident command. above. Our recommended program leverages the

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter IV

State of the Art: Real-time video surveillance systems focus on There are numerous commercial-off-the-shelf physical security (i.e., force protection against technology options already available or maturing bombs, terrorists, chemical, biological, etc.). that aid in the authentication of users. Physical These systems have built-in algorithms to identify security is already fairly advanced through bio- threats before a security breach has occurred (i.e., metrics, digital fingerprinting, facial recognition snipers, trucks getting too close, employees technologies, and iris recognition. While the standing in front of a locked door for more technology exists, most of these applications have than 10 minutes). As soon as a threat has been not made it to the first responder community. identified an alert is sent to central console for For example, there is no authentication on radios processing. in most communities, a potential application Data Correlation Engines currently focus on would be to use fingerprint authentication on Automated Information Systems (AIS) and the cruiser radios. Currently, user authentication areas where people and computers interact. A usually comes via an identifier in standard radios, variety of sensors have been built that provide but these are subject to compromise if the radios security to particular areas, e.g., firewalls, intru- are lost or stolen. Biometrics is the most favored sion detection systems, and access control servers. physical security means, and it is envisioned that Of course, all these sensors generate numerous biometrics will be in fairly widespread use in the alerts that could easily tie-up an entire Network security field for authentication and will be rela- Operating Center (NOC) just reviewing them. tively inexpensive (estimate of $25 per unit). A Data Correlation Engines attempt to reduce all significant challenge will be to define policies that these alerts from many different sensors and say how the information is shared (by whom, make smart decisions to select only those critical how and when) among the many agencies and alerts that require human intervention. entities that may be called upon to collaborate in Currently, there are several studies being con- situations of great urgency. ducted with regards to the “Insider Threat” to Authentication of networks can be achieved DoD Systems. Some of these studies are propos- through Terminal Access Control and ing the creation of data correlation systems that Authorization systems (TACAS), Secure ID, actually combined physical security systems Common Access Cards (CAC) and Public Key (video surveillance) with AIS data correlation. Infrastructure (PKI). These are all commercially available systems. PKI has become so large that Technology Limitations and Barriers: there can be scaling issues with the large number Multi-level security system technology tends to of repository or servers holding certificates, which be very hard to do and not very conducive to can increase latency (10 seconds or so). interoperability. Currently, there are “guards” that fit between two different security classifica- Currently, there are a number of intrusion detection levels on a network. The Operating Systems tion systems (IDS) that are commercially avail- Multi-Level Security (OSMLS) is one computer able that serve as visual identification of security that can process both classified and unclassified status, i.e., Internet Security Systems (ISS) and information. It has been recently developed by Enteyosys “Dragon.” Ever since the Linux oper- DARPA but is not commercially available and is ating system came out, the Open Source costly. Classified information moving between Community Research “SNORT” is the fastest agencies and especially between Federal and local growing IDS system because it is free to compa- entities has always been a concern and difficult to nies. However, SNORT can be labor intensive. implement for both technical and security rea- Organizations should also consider commercial sons (many local responders do not possess clear- intrusion systems such as those provided by ances). It is more appropriate from the emer- major communications equipment companies gency responder perspective to have multi-agency such as Cisco Systems Incß. security or privacy protection where information

PROJECT RESPONDER Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications (UIC)

is segregated between agencies that have a need to near-term. The responders believe little to no know about particular information. For example, capability exists for this element and the technol- there may be some criminal information that the ogists believe that the technology development police do not want EMS or the Fire Department risk is low to moderate. to know. Also, there is a requirement that 9-1-1 information be kept private. However, the uni- Gap Fillers: fied incident command needs this information. Again, because the primary barriers to responders having these capabilities have to do with stan- Another important aspect when combining dif- dards, interoperability, and availability of ferent classifications of information is to make resources, the chosen technology approach is to sure that it goes to the right database that can merge the requirements for information assurance store information securely with different levels of into the overall Responder C3 System recom- privacy. Law Enforcement Online (LEO) might mended in the previous section. Information be a good Web-based source/model to maintain assurance technologies are similar to the commu- secure and local access to pertinent information. nication and information technologies discussed A very high-level of redundancy for all compo- in the previous section in that the state- of-the- nents/pathways/data elements is very expensive art is moving forward quite adequately on its and difficult to implement but it can be achieved. own. For our purposes we need to be in a posi- NASA and the military services have imple- tion to rapidly adopt currently available technol- mented systems with very high redundancy, but ogy and promising new technology as it becomes they are very few players in this field. Some available. Our recommendation is that the need amount of redundancy is realistic, but most for information assurance be addressed together responder units do not currently have this cap- with seamless communications. Therefore, we ability. Most communications channels have two offer a single Response Technology Objective for backup routes. Some redundancy is built into both areas. cell phones. Nextel phones can become walkie talkies. Most mobile responder units currently UIC.4 – Incident Command Information have at least two units – a cell phone and a radio. Management and Dissemination. This is the ability to provide decision support, situation and Less than 1/10 second latency is currently very resource status management, communication sys- difficult to achieve especially with encryption. tem management, and mission/task tracking in The current state of the art is about 400 millisec- order to allow responders to see, understand and onds, but the military have systems with latencies act. one half that. While responders feel that it is important to have the fastest communications Goals: available and intelligible conversations, there is an understanding of what is a reasonable expecta- The incident command must have tools and serv- tion. The marginal improvement in this capabil- ices to provide decision support, situation and ity is not enough to justify money to accelerate resource status management, communications the current progress of research of improving this system management and mission/task tracking. technology to less than 1/10 latency. Streaming video, information visualization, and fusion tools are needed as well as modeling and Information assurance is an area that the emer- simulation capability, and graphic representation gency response community can piggyback on of geo-location of responders with building/ progress by, and leverage innovation of others. equipment overlay. These tools and services sup- Despite this fact, however, horrendous integra- port all hazardous incidents and should be pow- tion problems and a number of unknown ered from any number of sources including unknowns regarding technologies makes this par- AC/DC, solar and batteries. Commanders need ticular technology marginally available in the access to all sorts of databases including weather

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter IV

reports. The decision support suite should have 9-1-1 calls came in indicating that the structure an automated mode where it gives problem alerts was showing signs of collapse in time to warn without being prompted. The system should many of the personnel in the buildings. There operate wirelessly and transmit off-site. And was no capability to recognize this or “hotwire” finally the software should have a cost goal of the information to the incident commander and $3,000 to $10,000, which could potentially limit responders. the capability. This cost limit is related to the size of the community – a larger community can State of the Art: afford a more sophisticated system. Many information management tools are available and emerging to perform incident command The capability should include the acquisition, and control. In fact the tools exist in many processing, verification, and targeted distribution forms and provide varying degrees of decision of intelligence in operational support of incident support, situation and resource management, command. Real-time access to open source communications systems management and misinformation, e.g., mass media; public safety sion/task tracking. It is true no single integrated answering point, e.g., 9-1-1 call data; command system or network exists for performing this board data; and security information is required. function, but programs to set standards and to Intelligence sources providing imminent establish what systems are interoperable would go threat/danger should provide immediate notifica- far toward satisfying responders’ needs. In the tion up and down and by push and pull. Tools military, a suite of standards is used to define the should be provided for intelligence analysis parameters to which component modules must including data mining, threat/vulnerability analy- conform and this is generally satisfactory toward sis, interagency assessment, aggregation, and pre- meeting the goals of information management. dictive analysis. The intelligence support should For example, the Defense Collaborative Tool provide the ability to fuse all intelligence disci- Suite sets standards that are used for keeping plines including human intelligence, signals intel- track of collaboration, chat function, audio, video ligence, electronic intelligence, etc. into one loca- teleconferencing (VTC), mapping, “white board- tion. Intelligence sources should have priority ing,” document sharing, application sharing, etc. communications links to the command staff. Provision should be made for automated report The capability to mine data during an incident is generation and information sharing. by no means insignificant. Sizable investments have been made by the military on decision sup- Current Capabilities: port systems with data mining capabilities and This is in an area where the responders believe these should be leveraged for emergency response that technology probably exists, but no one has operations. U.S. Army CECOM has programs taken the time or provided the money to inte- such as DaVinci for distributed analysis and visu- grate technology into a system of systems alization and Area Secure Operations Command designed for emergency management unified and Control (ASOCC) that should be investi- incident command. They believe there is mar- gated for appropriateness for responders’ require- ginal capability to gather the information neces- ments. DaVinci is a windows-based application sary, but little capability to manage the informa- that has a map view, a resources view and a tion. The responders believe that very little in timeline view of the emergency event with the way of automated decision support tools is modeling and simulation and monitoring capa- available to this community, and what may be bility. ASOCC is a package of commercial available is too expensive. There is also little data and government off-the-shelf software that mining capability available to the responders. provides information exchange, visualization, One of the responders from New York gave this collaboration, decision support, and orders and example: a review of emergency telephone data- reporting functionality. These systems should bases indicate that at the World Trade Center, be considered for appropriateness in providing

PROJECT RESPONDER Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications (UIC)

effective information management and to the process will be a constant eye toward dissemination. reducing cost. The cost of the system needs to be such that local emergency management organiza- TSWG’s CoBRA, the chem-bio response aid, is a tions can afford it. cost effective application and is available on a ruggedized laptop. However, it lacks resource UIC.5 – Multimedia Supported Telepresence. monitoring and tracking capability. There are a This is the ability to provide a multimedia telep- number of other sophisticated systems for laptops resence between incident commanders response such as PEAC (Palmtop Emergency Access for personnel, technical specialists, and off-site Chemicals) and CAMEO, which have capability facilities. to model plumes. At least 50 different software packages exist that provide expert agents, emer- Goals: gency service information management, engineer- The unified incident command should provide ing analysis and decision support. A concerted multimedia telepresence capabilities among and effort is needed to fully integrate some of these between incident commanders, response person- technologies into fully functional systems in the nel, technical specialists, and off-site facilities context of responder operations. Efforts should including the capability to stream video. This be expended to objectively evaluate systems that includes the ability to provide an overhead view, show promise and to determine the best of breed to see beyond the current location utilizing such for the responders’ requirements. The important capabilities as manned aircraft, UAVs (unmanned point is to integrate the best of breed into system aerial vehicles), UGVs (ground) and national of systems and decide the standards, to prevent assets such as satellites. Real-time virtual reach- proliferation of incompatible systems. back (private national network) is to be provided. The incident command should provide distrib- Many of these capabilities and some others are uted collaborative decision support capability. It being encompassed by the Defense Department’s should provide for 5-7 critical feeds and handle Homeland Security/Homeland Defense 2 up to 100 sites for up to three separate telecon- Command and Control ACTD (HLS/HD C ferences. It should have the ability to link with ACTD). Its purpose is to provide a homeland outside entities that are not necessarily on the security decision support center for knowledge established network such as CNN by whatever capture and knowledge management using high- media including phone, video, and web. The powered computing and visualization capabilities multimedia should be scalable and support hand- for emergency response. held capabilities in the field. It should be easily Technology Limitations and Barriers: usable and provide good image quality, even if the responder is moving. The system should have Although responders believe little to no capability the ability to incorporate the appropriate security exists for this element, technologists believe that schema. the technology development risk is low, with technology readily available in the near-term. This is an area where inexpensive COTS equipment should be employed and adapted where Gap Fillers: necessary. Being able to collaborate and see from The program we are recommending leverages the afar is a very powerful tool, but the cost of an HLS/HD C2 ACTD to provide ever increasing implementation can be considerable. Capabilities capability in a spiral development process. It uses of the military and intelligence community the technologies integrated into the ACTD as the should be examined to see what fits its require- basis and then evaluates emerging technologies ments. In addition, the command should look to for inclusion in an Incident Command the Internet for practical solutions that can be Informational Management Tool Set. The key implemented at low-cost.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter IV

Current Capabilities: video to fit in half the bandwidth previously Video teleconferencing technology is available required. TSWG is having work done on a and deployed in some areas. For a large number Teleconferencing Bridge to develop a secure com- of areas it is simply too expensive for many users. munication system that allows military and other No responder department represented in the government organizations to communicate with workshops had anything close to the above capa- multiple parties simultaneously in a secure, but bility desired by the responders. Such extensive not classified environment. The secure bridge capability, to include collaborative decision sup- sends encrypted communications to up to 30 port and connectivity with handheld devices in connected devices. The design will support com- the field is not even on the horizon as far as the munications between both fixed and mobile responders can now see. units. Video technology changes rapidly since it is State of the Art: developed for many commercial applications. Information portals or gateways are commonly Micro cameras exist today that previously did not constructed providing access to the Internet for exist. Games, the Internet, and computers have specialized services. A dynamic system can be pushed the technology to low-cost solutions for designed, leveraging Internet methodologies, for the home. There are commercial services that ad hoc networks that support multimedia serv- offer city maps, 3-D images, building plans, and ices. The architecture can be configured such the like. One example is I3 Systems (3-D that systems are separable, but interconnected to imagery, outside the building, modeling, web- maintain privacy. By implementing inexpensive site). The idea is to link to these various services computers and hand held devices each unit for data mining. Efforts are being made to (node) can be low-cost and offer considerable obtain interior plans for buildings (not through power to access information needed by the 3-D imagery but by other requested standards). responders. Police have gone into many public buildings and completely mapped the area. Obtaining blue- The National Guard now has the technology to prints of older buildings is generally not a prob- link up to 100 locations. It is in the process of lem, although the accuracy and timeliness of the upgrading its teleconferencing system to one drawings are many times a concern. based on the Internet protocol. The Defense Collaborative Tool Suite (DCTS) sets standards It is desirable to have a common operational pic- that are used for collaboration, chat function, ture and be able to click on the area of interest. audio, video teleconferencing (VTC), mapping, The Army has a program to obtain and distribute “white boarding,” sharing documents, sharing a Single Integrated Ground Picture (SIGP). applications, and optionally streaming media. The Joint Interoperability Test Command tests Technology Limitations and Barriers: DCTS equipment for certification. DCTS The only technical barrier noted was the ability exceeds the requirement for 5-7 critical feeds to provide such a robust system at a cost that now, but the cost of $150,000 per suite may be local agencies can afford. too expensive for most users. It would be prudent to see if a cost reduced system could meet Gap Fillers: most responders’ needs. The chosen approach has two phases. The first is A large amount of research and development to adapt current Web-based technologies to the work is being conducted in the multimedia area. Responder environment. The second is to inte- A new compression technology has been stan- grate this system into the emerging Responder C3 dardized jointly by the International System and refine these systems through a series Telecommunication Union and International of exercises into a standardized package for Standards Organization that permits quality responder use.

PROJECT RESPONDER Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications (UIC)

Unified Incident Command Decision conditions, and in tunnels over 400 feet below Support and Interoperable ground. Point location through 400 feet of Communications Response Technology ground or concrete is not practical from a size Objectives (UICrto) weight, power and cost perspective. Practical UICrto.1 – Point Location and Identification ground penetration limits are about 20 feet through reinforced concrete. Going down 400 Objectives: feet in a tunnel would best be done with a tunnel Conduct demonstrations of existing point loca- communications system. We need to further tion and identification technologies combined refine the requirement to see if there is an inter- with research on alternative approaches to sur- mediate requirement of penetrating five stories mount the identified technical barriers and limi- down in a building or a somewhat more difficult tations. The demonstrations should be followed requirement of penetrating 50 feet down in a by integrated systems development of point subway that has not been previously wired. location hardware and transition to industrial Reliable alerting, discrimination, and identifica- production. tion are challenges in a small package that accom- panies the responders. The combination of a The system should locate within three meters in point location and identification device and well- any direction, identify, and determine the well- being monitor makes the wearable device neces- being of each responder under any conditions sarily larger. Key enabling technologies include including weather and interior to buildings and 3-D visualization, UWB technology, state-of-art underground. battery supplies, miniaturization of electrical components including antennas, and product The point location and identification transmitters ruggedization. should be miniaturized and seamlessly integrated for use on the responders’ person or clothing. Milestones/Metrics: They should provide rapid (timely) alert to the FY2004: The Department of Homeland Security wearer of danger to well-being and type of attack (DHS)/The Technical Support Working Group and wireless readout of exposure information, (TSWG) initiated a new Broad Area Announce- date, time, and location history for use in epi- ment on Integrated Spatial Recognition that can demiological analysis, command response, and yield results for this requirement. However, pro- treatment. The device should be smaller than a grams are needed that specifically address the cigarette pack and carried in a convenient place responders’ requirements. The programs can be that does not hinder free movement, or the sen- segmented into what is available now (principally sors may be embedded in headgear and/or cloth- above ground), R&D on point location in building and uniforms. The device must have ings, and research below ground. Homeland onboard storage and some processing for record- Security should sponsor a new program demon- ing, analyzing, and retaining history of the indi- strating current point location, identification, and vidual’s exposure. tracking technology above ground, in a basement Payoffs: underground and under rubble. The Army Night Vision UWB prototype is scheduled for 4QFY04 Wearable sensors will save lives and help respon- and could form a baseline for the current state of ders and leadership understand the extent and the art of UWB in interior search and rescue severity of population exposure. This will greatly operations. The cost would be about $2 million reduce casualties and enable accurate response and require one year. with minimum panic and confusion. FY2005: Over the next two years, a second Challenges: program should be established for R&D for The commanders want a fool-proof system point location within buildings. UWB is a for locating a person in any event, under any promising technology for this application. The

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter IV

R&D program would cost about $10 million should integrate wired and wireless systems and over two years with a prototype at the end of the enable communications within and between program. Metrics include: total weight of inte- tactical, operational, and strategic levels. This grated sensor, less than one pound and battery includes the ability to support separate communi- life of one week, minimum. cations channels among responders, strike teams and task forces. FY2006: The third program is research in what can be done in propagation through the ground, The program will also address information assur- through concrete, and under rubble. This could ance needs of first responders. Those needs be a million-dollar-a-year program and could last include the capability to operate first time every as long as there are promising new results. The time and remain in operation for the duration of performance should be verified in laboratory and the mission. The system must have the ability to controlled field trials. authenticate users including the device, operator, and data. It must include multi-level security FY2007: Battery life of resulting systems should and provide seamless security within and among be extended to one month. Demonstrate inte- enclaves and users. The security should, of grated devices in responder exercises. course, not degrade the data. There should be a FY2008: Implement the point location and visual indication of security status at all levels. identification system and demonstrate it. The incident command should have monitoring and alert of attempted and actual security FY2009: Transition to limited industrial produc- breaches. tion and deployment with unit cost of $50 or less in quantities of 1000. Verify the transition plan The program will leverage the efforts and results for a full rate production price of less than $30 in of the SAFECOMM program with regard to quantities of 10,000. wireless communications interoperability and will be the integrating activity for all UICrto.1 – Budget in Millions emergency response communica- Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals tions standards and systems. It Point Location and $2 $5 $6 $3 $3 $2 $21 Identification System will also leverage DoD efforts such as the Army Land Warrior, UICrto.2 – Seamless Connectivity and Future Force Warrior, and Future Combat Information Assurance Systems programs, which call for integrated net- Objectives: worked operations that involve the dismounted soldier. Demonstrate a “Responder C3 System” that is developed over time using a spiral development Payoffs: process. The development should start with the evaluation and adaptation, if necessary, of current Interoperable communications will save lives and off-the-shelf technology and be able to leverage help responders and leadership understand the emerging technology as it is developed. This is extent and severity of population exposure. This essentially an engineering effort that establishes will greatly reduce casualties and enable accurate standards in an overall open architecture and response with minimum panic and confusion. then iteratively incorporates advances in the state of commercial and military technology. Challenges: The primary barriers to responders having seam- The Responder C3 System must be able to seamless connectivity and integration have to do lessly and dynamically interconnect multiple with standards, interoperability, and availability interagency users, who have multiple functions, of resources. Responders have existing equip- and multiple information and communications ment and the equipment is not necessarily technology systems. The communications system interoperable among fire fighters, police, and

PROJECT RESPONDER Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications (UIC)

emergency medical personnel, even within the years’ demonstration. Continue Responder C3 same jurisdiction. Interoperability between in- Systems commercialization efforts. place equipment is a big problem. Developing a national architecture and standards will require FY2009: Complete integration of ICIM and cooperation at all government levels and across point location tools and transition the demon- dozens of non-government organization. This is stration system to architecture and standards a huge cultural issue. maintenance efforts. UICrto.2 – Budget in Millions Milestones/Metrics: Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 20082009 Totals Responder C3 $6 $10 $15 $20 $20 $10 $81 FY2004: Evaluate the progress of the SAFECOMM program and develop a program schedule to accommodate expected accom- UICrto.3 – Incident Command Information plishments. Evaluate military C3 capabilities for Management and Dissemination meeting responders’ needs. Objectives: FY2005: Establish an overall Responder C3 Provide incident command decision support, Systems architecture and standards set capable of situation and resource status management, integrating the networked sensors of DIDArto.5 communications system management and (Integrated Networked Sensors for CBRNE mission/task tracking. This capability should Detection) using COTS technologies wherever include information visualization and fusion possible. Begin evaluating “off-the-shelf” (both tools as well as modeling and simulation capabil- commercial and military) technologies that ity. It should include graphic representation of address the goals described above. Integrate geo-location of responders with building/equip- COTS technologies as appropriate into a demon- ment overlay. It should have access to all sorts stration system. of databases including weather reports. The decision support should have an automated FY2006: Begin integration of SAFECOMM mode where it gives problem alerts without results and ICIM tools (UICrto.3) as appropriate. being prompted. Demonstrate initial capability with available COTS and SAFECOMM developments. In addition, the capability should include the Evaluate the demonstration and begin integrating acquisition, processing, verification, and targeted the next block of improvements as indicated. distribution of intelligence in operational support of incident command; real-time access to open FY2007: Continue to integrate SAFECOMM, source information, e.g., mass media; public COTS and ICIM tools into the system. Develop safety answering point (9-1-1) call data; and and conduct large scale demonstration for seam- command board data. Finally the software less connectivity and information assurance capa- should have a cost goal of $3,000 to $10,000. bility across at least ten jurisdictions and 20 or The effort will be a true spiral development, more agencies. If possible, piggyback on sched- demonstrating and transitioning increasing uled emergency responder exercises. Continue to progress toward the target capability (as defined evolve the architecture and standards. Begin the by the goals), in increments. Responder C3 Systems commercialization effort to increase the likelihood of transitioning the A national DHS SONET (synchronous capability to responders. optical network technologies) digital backbone system is needed to provide the imagery, voice, FY2008: Integrate Point Location and data, and video information needed. It should Identification technology developed under be a part of a DHS telecommunications UICrto.1 (Point Location and Identification) and system. Leveraging the DoD’s Global Grid other improvements indicated by the previous as well as a number of existing commercial

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter IV

communications “rings” should provide adequate FY2008-2010: Continue progress toward target technology. capability and beyond by iterating and transitioning new versions of the ICIM toolset. Payoffs: UICrto.3 – Budget in Millions Incident command information manage- Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 20082009 Totals UIC Information Management $15 $15 $20 $7 $5 $5 $67 ment and dissemination will save lives and Dissemination and help responders and leadership understand the extent and severity of UICrto.4 – Multimedia Supported Telepresence population exposure. This will greatly reduce casualties and enable accurate response with min- There are many camera systems in place that may imum panic and confusion. be able to provide information about an incident. The problem is how to collect the video, process Challenges: it and distribute it. It would be helpful to the The capability to mine data during an incident is incident commander if he/she could plug into a by no means insignificant. Sizable investments video system already installed in a building. This have been made by the military on decision sup- is a systems access/integration problem as well as port systems with data mining capabilities and a dissemination problem. High resolution in the these should be leveraged for emergency response imagery is a desirable feature. The responders operations. Making the system of systems exten- need current images, not those of a week ago. sible going from very low-cost for simple systems There is also a great need for information that is to rather high cost in larger metropolitan areas is not readily available at an incident. This includes also a challenge. detailed maps, land-use data, and infrastructure such as airports, railroads, highways, bridges, and Milestones/Metrics: utilities. A program needs to be instituted using Internet technologies for obtaining this informa- FY2004: Evaluate the results of DoD’s HLS/HD 2 tion on a timely basis. This is analogous to the C ACTD. Perform a gap analysis between the radio communications gateway discussed in DoD system and the goals set forth above. Begin UICrto.2 (Seamless Connectivity and Information construction of a DHS SONET digital backbone Assurance), but this is an information portal or to support the ICIM testbed. gateway.

FY2005: Transfer the ACTD technology into an It is greatly desirable to have an overhead view of ICIM testbed. Finish construction of a DHS the incident. This can be done by tethering cam- SONET digital backbone system. Evaluate eras or even repurposing a camera system from a COTS technology to address gaps identified in UAV such as Predator into a manned system for the previous year and reduce the cost of the over- flying over incident areas. An additional problem all toolset. Begin developing the initial ICIM exists in transmitting a video from a scene to a tool set with DoD and COTS technology. responder in route, especially in an urban FY2006: Complete development of initial ICIM canyon. On-the-move receivers are needed that tool set. Demonstrate the capability in an emer- work in urban canyons. Metadata (data about gency response exercise. Transition the capability the image – where is it, what it is, etc.) is also to the Responder C3 System (see UICrto.2 needed and should be inserted into the video at (Seamless Connectivity and Information the source. These advanced multimedia features Assurance)). Continue to evaluate COTS and could be included in an advanced concepts tech- new technology to improve capability and reduce nology demonstration to collect the relevant cost. information about an incident, integrate it, and make it available to the responders. The cost FY2007: Demonstrate and transition increased of such a program should be about $2 million ICIM capability to the Responder C3 System. with duration of one year. The main risk is

PROJECT RESPONDER Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications (UIC)

feasibility (user friendly, functional, form factor, Making the system of systems extensible for and cost). A broader $5 million program should going from very low-cost simple systems to rather be undertaken subsequent to the demonstration higher cost, larger metropolitan systems is also a for setting standards over the next three years. challenge.

Objectives: Milestones/Metrics: The first objective is to adapt current Web-based FY2004: Develop and demonstrate Internet technologies to the responder environment in technologies for obtaining multimedia informa- order to obtain multimedia information on a tion on a timely basis. The system should do a timely basis. The second is to refine these sys- quick search in less than one second. It should tems through a series of exercises into a standard- have drill-down capabilities. A second project ized package for responder use. The program should be initiated to establish an ACTD to col- using Internet technologies will gather low hang- lect relevant information about an incident. ing fruit and should cost about $2 million for a first year program to integrate current Web FY2005: Productize the Internet software. technologies. Establish standards based on the multimedia ACTD. Establish an advanced concepts technology demonstration to collect the relevant information FY2006: Verify performance of the Internet soft- about an incident, integrate it and make it avail- ware in laboratory and controlled field trials. able to the responders. The cost of such a pro- Establish standards based on the multimedia gram should be about $2 million with duration ACTD. of one year. A broader $1 million per year pro- FY2007: Demonstrate the Internet software in gram should be undertaken subsequent to the responder exercises. Establish standards based on demonstration for setting standards over the next the multimedia ACTD. few years. FY2008: Transition to the Responder C3 System Payoffs: (see UICrto.2). Further establish standards based Multimedia systems will save lives and help on the multimedia ACTD. responders and leadership understand the extent and severity of population exposure through FY2009: Conclude the standards effort based on actual visualization of the incident. This the multimedia ACTD. will greatly reduce casualties and enable UICrto.4 – Budget in Millions accurate response with minimum panic Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 20082009 Totals and confusion. Multimedia Supported $4 $5 $3 $3 $3 $1 $19 Telepresence Challenges: The main risk is feature/function feasibility (user friendly, functional, form factor, and cost).

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter IV

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 • Location of Any Responder within 3m in Any Direction UICrto.1 – Point Location and Identification • Identification • Determination of Well-Being • Engineering Effort to Leverage COTS Technologies UICrto.2 – Seamlesss Connectivity and Info Assurance • Standards

• Decision Support • Situation and Resource UICrto.3 – Incident Command Information Status Management Management and Dissemination • Mission/Task Tracking • Embedded Building Video Systems • Overhead Views via UICrto.4 – Multi-media Supported Telepresence UAVs Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications Technology Roadmap

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter V Response and Recovery (R&R) Chapter Chair: Dr. Barbara Reagor Chapter Coordinator: James Hammill

Definition • Establishment of Perimeters.

Response & Recovery (R&R) is the capability for • Functioning in the Absence of Critical the rapid location and rescue of individuals Infrastructure and Restoration of Essential trapped or isolated by the effects of a terrorist Public Services. attack, and the rapid, effective and thorough decontamination of large numbers of victims, • Health and Crisis Response Education. buildings and equipment, to support emergency response operations to include urban search and • Specialized Search and Rescue Capabilities. rescue, decontamination and restoration of critical services. • Evacuation/In-Place Shelter Management. • Residual Hazards Assessment and Mitigation. Operational Environments Response and Recovery is focused on the five • Mass Fatality Management. operational environments represented by the threat: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, • Traffic Management. or high-explosive and incendiary effects of an event. These threats are explained in detail in the • Incident Action Planning. Chapter III (DIDA). The effects represented by • Public Relations and Media Management. these operational environments were kept deliberately broad to reflect the variations in capabilities and understanding among jurisdictions of differ- Overall State of Technology for ent sizes and resource levels (e.g., volunteer emer- Response and Recovery gency responders in small towns to career emer- The matrix on the next page shows that respon- gency responders in large metropolitan areas). ders have at least a marginal capability in most of the functional capabilities represented. Needed Functional Capabilities and Priorities Furthermore, in those areas where some technology development is still required, technologies Emergency responders identified and prioritized can be delivered, or at least demonstrated, in the twelve functional capabilities needed to respond near-term, without significant technology devel- in the operational context and mission statement opment risk. This means that capability increases described above. These capability elements are are possible in the near-term in this particular presented below, in order of descending priority. NTRO. It also means that barriers to capability • Mass Victim Decontamination. increases are more likely to be related to cost, training, policy, or planning concerns than to • Rapid Decontamination of High Value and technology per se. Critical Response Equipment.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter V

Response and Recovery Operational Environments decontaminated, could High be handled by Explosive/ Functional Capabilities Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Incendiary responders using only

1. Mass Victim Decontamination gloves and minimal protective clothing. 2. Rapid Decontamination of High Value and Critical Response Equipment • This functional capa-

3. Establishment of Perimeters bility ought to be directly supported by, 4. Functioning in the Absence of Critical Infrastructure and Restoration of and interactive, with Public Services other capabilities that 5. Health and Crisis Response Education provide real-time information on pres- 6. Specialized Search and Rescue Capabilities ence and type of con-

7. Evacuation/In-Place Shelter taminant. This will Management be dependent on 8. Residual Hazards Assessment capabilities reflected and Mitigation in Chapter III

9. Mass Fatality Management (DIDA).

10. Traffic Management • Decontamination “through-put” needs 11. Incident Action Planning to be scalable to accommodate victims 12. Public Relations and Media Management as quickly as they can be brought to the 1 1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this 2 operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO decontamination 3 2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO zone. 3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability? LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH Current Capabilities: Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’ • Responders believed there is now a mar- R&R.1 – Mass Victim Decontamination. The ginal capability to perform this function, ability to identify contaminated people, isolate them, limited mainly by cost and availability of move victims out of the “warm zone,” and remove equipment. contaminants at a gross (not definitive) level. This also includes an ability to determine the necessary • This functional capability is stronger now level of decontamination required before further for the nuclear and radiological operational transportation or treatment. environments than it is for chemical and biological environments, especially for those juris- Goals: dictions with nuclear power plants or other • The minimum level of decontamination significant presence of radioactive materials. this capability should insure is dependent This is due in part because of the focus and on the contaminating agent itself, but gener- attendant resources the federal government ally should be a level sufficient that the places on areas with nuclear power plants, victims no longer present a secondary con- weapons labs, etc.; a different focus than the tamination risk to themselves, their emergency federal government places on chemical storage responder/caretakers, or to the immediate facilities or plants that process toxic industrial environment. This means victims, once chemicals and materials.

PROJECT RESPONDER Response and Recovery (R&R)

• Responders believed that the high explosive/ victim decontamination: the drain on personnel incendiary operational environment was not and resources for training on new technologies relevant to this functional capability. Although and products transferred, for example, from the high-explosive or incendiary terrorist attacks Defense Department to the local response com- can have toxic effects, these effects would be munity will require ongoing funding to assure handled as in a chemical operational environ- proficiency and maintenance is sustained. ment. A large amount of dust and dirt per se is not considered contamination. Technology is marginally available in the near- term for chemical decontamination. Responders State of the Art: and technologists agreed that many chemicals can be cleaned with existing or near-term technolo- The U.S. Government has years of experience in gies for certain chemical agents (mainly military mass decontamination for radiological crises. chemicals). However, generally applicable tech- However, even with this experience, large amounts nologies are only marginally available in the of equipment are still required to collect effluent near-term, that would adequately perform in during radiological decontamination efforts. an environment where military-grade and/or For chemical decontamination, the standard toxic industrial chemicals/toxic industrial materi- approach is to use mass quantities of water for als (TICs/TIMs) were present in mixes. It was general classes of chemicals. However not all agreed that one can rapidly determine presence of chemicals can be effectively removed using water. general classes of agents, but the specialized The effectiveness of specific technologies and equipment tends to be built around chemical warfare agents, and is expensive. methods for chemical decontamination will be inherently dependent on detection and identifica- A technological limitation of decontamination tion of the agent. These capabilities can be technology is one that is also inherent in detec- found in Chapter III (DIDA). tion and identification technology: minimizing false positives in detectors, swipes, etc. Current There are a number of programs underway that detection equipment requires specialized labor- have application for this functional capability; intensive maintenance in order to keep error rates however, these programs are not necessarily being down. developed with emergency response applications in mind. Technologists believe there is an oppor- Finally, decontamination effectiveness will be lim- tunity to provide access to some technologies that ited by the ability to contain or neutralize con- have been or are under development in the fed- taminated effluent. EPA guidelines have not ade- eral government and military arenas. At a mini- quately addressed the release or disposal of mum, there is an opportunity for technology contaminated run-off. Emergency responders transfer to assist emergency responders in the will not have the luxury of waiting for a decision. short-term by engineering and demonstrating A “mass decontamination effort” will require these technologies for emergency responder immediate action and the decision will rest with applications. the incident commander. An interim solution at the scene may be to collect effluent in lots of Technology Limitations and Barriers: barrels or pumped into large tank trucks or blad- The primary limitation for fielding these tech- ders (if available) and hold for disposition. This nologies is one of cost, rather than technology. would require tracking of the containers. Costs will be especially prohibitive for decontamination equipment that is agent-specific (cost for Gap Fillers: decontamination equipment for standard toxic Technology advances in this area are considered industrial chemicals and materials is within to be of low technological risk and achievable in reach). Cost considerations also limit training the near term. Technology programs must first and sustainment of new capabilities for mass differentiate civilian needs from military, and

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter V

then consider existing military equipment and prevent secondary contamination on city sur- technology to transition to responder use (includ- faces or sewers; additionally, other chemical ing mobile detection mounted on vehicles). The additives could be used to neutralize (anti- DoD’s Office of Technology Transition bacterial, base for acids, etc.) harmful effects (Commercialization and Dual Use Science and to the environment. Technology divisions) should be engaged to see where technology exists and whether it can be • Distance learning technologies, to convey moved to the private sector for commercialization decontamination procedures and standards, and/or transferred to the emergency responder for delivery to “networked learning centers” community through technology transfer. (i.e., fire houses or National Guard facilities).

In tandem with investigating current programs, • Cross-cutting capabilities from other NTROs the U.S. Government (ideally, the Department (especially Unified Incident Command and of Homeland Security) needs to develop test Emergency Management Preparedness methods and standards (e.g., how clean is clean, Planning), such as incident command/mission environmental tolerances for effluent, etc.), to planning software (e.g., overlays) will help in compare against current decontamination tech- establishing decontamination site boundaries nologies in responders’ scenarios. Testing and (zones), associated weather conditions, etc. standards are critical to increasing responders’ R&R.2 – Rapid Decontamination of High capabilities in this area in the near-term, even Value and Critical Response Equipment. The with significant investments. Some of the testing ability to identify contaminated equipment, isolate and evaluation can be accelerated, to shrink the it or move it out of the warm zone, and remove timeline two to three years. contaminants to a verifiable level of “clean,” in Gap-fillers to address responders’ requirements order to rapidly return equipment to service in the include: midst of an emergency.

• A modeling and simulation exercise/feasibility Goals: analysis focusing on specific scenarios and • Rapid return of equipment to service agents, to evaluate existing decontamination (<1 hour). technologies. • Two levels of decontamination: for emergency • Development of a highly intuitive Graphical use and reuse, and definitive decontamination. User Interface (GUI) for equipment Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) or laptops in vehicles Current Capabilities: to augment the training for the emergency responder community. • Responders felt the current capabilities for this functional capability were identical to that • Establishment of a digital capability that will of mass victim decontamination: a marginal provide a picture (graphs) regarding action to capability exists today (irrelevant for high be taken upon arriving at a chemical/biologi- explosive/incendiary). cal incident (i.e., 1-800-CHEMBIO). This system would answer questions right away and • Currently, much equipment has to be prevent unnecessary efforts, delays or lost time destroyed because it cannot be decontam- (this gap filler is similar to those called out in inated. This is a significant cost to DIDA.3 (Classification and Mitigation)). jurisdictions. • Research for “Effluent Decontamination and State of the Art: Disposal.” A program for how to track this There are a number of technologies under devel- by-product is needed. Binding agents could opment. Resource management and tracking be added to help contain the effluent and technology is available and can be engineered to

PROJECT RESPONDER Response and Recovery (R&R)

accommodate this application. Materials science Technologies in these areas will inherently products under development by Nuclear/ depend on sensors to automatically track Biological/Chemical (NBC) survivability pro- equipment being committed to the contaminated grams are an example of this possibility. These zones. Some organizations manually bar code products include contamination-resistant materi- equipment going into a hazardous area, but that als and paint: a Soldier and Biological Chemical will not work effectively in a WMD event as it Command (SBCCOM) (now Edgewood will become time-prohibitive, and manual efforts Chemical and Biological Center (ECBC)) report, are error-prone. Comparison of Decontamination Technologies for Biological Agents on Selected Commercial Surface Contamination-resistant materials and materials Material (April 2001), evaluates available tech- science will be expensive, but the option to sacri- nologies (mostly research-scale) based upon their fice large quantities of high valued equipment is ability to reduce the spore contamination on pan- not efficient: equipment should be decontami- els of different materials representing office envi- nated and returned to service for use on the next ronments. The study also examines chemical call. agent resistant coatings (paint) which could be Cost is a significant challenge for the availability used on high-value equipment. These efforts of materials, polymers, etc. Technology transfer could be applied to emergency response equip- and commercialization strategies (e.g., market- ment, but the technology is currently too place incentives) are not mature. expensive.

Water is still a primary decontamination Gap Fillers: material, but is usually detrimental to electronics. This functional capability is reliant on resource Technology does exist to protect electronics, and management and decontamination technologies. could become part of a “standard” for new equip- The government needs to develop and evaluate ment going forward. However, the cost to retro- resource management concepts for identifying, fit the embedded base of equipment would be finding, indexing, and limiting use of contami- prohibitive. nated equipment during crisis, as well as managing the usability and safety of equipment that will Other technologies and products are under devel- be used and kept in the “hot/warm” zones. As opment by the Defense Department. In applying technology for resource management becomes these technologies, there will be issues related to available, associated procedures will need to be technology transfer and commercialization. developed to quickly identify critical equipment Some efforts are underway to identify strategies needed for specific events. Electronic communi- for technology transfer out of the military arena cations will be paramount under these conditions and into civilian hands, especially emergency (see Chapter IV (UIC)). responder, use. It is plausible that the response community will provide new markets for those Methods need to be developed and tested to products and technologies, which might help detect equipment degradation after decontam- drive costs downward into the affordability range ination technologies have been applied. for local jurisdictions. Decontamination will have some negative effect on the life expectancy of the equipment. Technology Limitations and Barriers: Prototypes can be built and studied in materials The technologies needed to raise the level of science labs, but large-scale production of protec- capability in this area are of moderate technologi- tive polymers for use today will be a manufactur- cal risk, and will require more research rather ing challenge. than technology transfer.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter V

Decontamination technologies can mitigate Current Capabilities: reliance on resource management and fill gaps in • This capability exists today in the high explo- this overall capability. Such gap-fillers include: sive/incendiary operational environment.

• Development of materials science programs • This capability is marginal for the chemical, for CBRNE survivability/contamination- radiological, and nuclear environment, and resistant emergency equipment; non-existent for the biological operational environment. • Research to create a “plastic casing” to encase and seal equipment without degrading • In general, this functional capability depends functionality; heavily on detection, identification, and assessment capabilities. (See Chapter III (DIDA).) • Water resistance appliqués/membranes for electronics to enable the use of water as a State of the Art: decontamination agent; Currently, situational awareness technologies such • Research concepts of providing a “multi-layer” as cameras in a police cruiser or at intersections system that could be removed and discarded can be employed to establish perimeters. By for rapid equipment reuse; assessing and leveraging the technologies in place from both public and private enterprises (sub- • Research and development in manufacturing ways, parking lots, automated teller machines, science/engineering and equipment design to etc.) self-generating perimeter concepts can allow rapid maintenance/replacement of become a reality. degraded parts; Modeling technologies also exist which can be • Research to provide dosimeter type compo- used to provide suggested responses such as nents/instrumentation to signal when equip- perimeter sizes. These technologies have existing ment is becoming unsafe. scenarios built-in, and will automatically monitor the aspects of an event, whether it be a “what-if” R&R.3 – Establishment of Perimeters. The simulated event for training purposes, or a real ability to identify, establish, manage, and control event. The tools use detailed computer algo- (including inter-zone movement and control of flow rithms and data processing architecture using between) hot, warm and cold zones and security specifically tailored expert assistance logic and perimeters. high-speed data manipulation techniques.

Goals: Technology Limitations and Barriers: • First units on scene, regardless of discipline This capability element is reliant mainly on tech- (e.g., law enforcement) can recognize hazard nologies from Chapter III (DIDA) for sensors and quickly (within minutes) determine and and Chapter IV (UIC) for communications. verify hot zone. There are significant challenges in having detection technology (to know if the situation is • Ability to establish (cordon) and communicate changing), and communications technology (to hot zone to arriving units. know where your people are, and to communi- • Security perimeter established and secured cate reliably with them). Real-time detection is within minutes by first arriving law needed to decide if the perimeter needs to change enforcement. due to weather changes, perimeter breaches or unknown parameters that may be uncovered dur- • All perimeters modified (expanded or con- ing the event. Plume modeling technology is tracted with varying levels of security) as nec- available but training and sensor placement is essary in real-time. required for it to be effective.

PROJECT RESPONDER Response and Recovery (R&R)

Gap Fillers: • Restoration of essential public services (i.e., • Development of vehicle instrumentation those needed for assuring the lives and well- with DIDA technologies that can be inte- being of the public in the vicinity) within grated with vehicle-mounted geographic infor- three days. mation system (GIS) capabilities to “model” a perimeter. Current Capabilities: • Capability is available across the spectrum for • Development of systems that integrate sensors responders to function in the absence of criti- into perimeter modeling tool-kits, with sen- cal infrastructure for twelve hours. sors and communications that are weight- neutral and integrated into standard equip- • Capability is marginal for responders to restore ment (e.g., police badges) and linked into GIS, essential public services within three days for C2, modeling systems, etc. all but nuclear operational environments. Capability does not exist to restore public • Development of technology suites, advanced services within three days of a nuclear attack. systems and concepts so that potential target sites can self-generate perimeters, by inputting State of the Art: data into arriving personnel GIS and model- A variety of programs exist within the Federal ing systems. Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), DoD, • Use of wireless and internet technology to and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) move pictures/information to responders and to provide solutions for functioning in the back to command posts while still in the absence of infrastructure and quickly and tem- assessment stage of the incident. porarily restoring critically needed public services. These programs include long-lived power sources, • Leverage current infrastructure capabilities like smart cables for power conversion, quickly the Department of Transportation’s (DoT’s) erectable communications towers, multi-fuel camera and monitoring equipment used in compatible generators, and alternate power metropolitan areas. sources. Many regulatory agencies provide for methods and procedures to assist with natural • Systems integration of all the above needs to disasters such as forest fires, earthquakes, and be developed. All of the “piece-parts” are floods. These methods and procedures are available. directly applicable to man-made terrorist events. R&R.4 – Functioning in the Absence of Critical Technology Limitations and Barriers: Infrastructure and Restoration of Essential Cost is a main barrier. Technologies will need to Public Services. The ability to carry out the criti- be purchased in “quantity” to be affordable to all. cal missions of the organization in the absence of Emerging power sources are still very expensive. facilities and utilities that are normally available, Capability is reliant on power sources, such as and then decontaminate, reconstruct, and reactivate solar, wind, gasoline, battery, etc. The small government and private services, mechanisms, and manufacturing base in this area does not push the processes that serve as or support essential public envelope on battery development as demand is services, including emergency services, food and low or limited to highly specialized equipment in water, electricity, sanitation, and other functions the DoD. As a consequence, R&D programs for that directly support immediate human needs. the desired technology is sparse or directed to very specific products or agencies/departments. Goals: • Operation for twelve hours in the absence of critical infrastructure.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter V

Gap Fillers: Emergency Broadcast System. The Department • Development of lightweight long-lived power of Transportation (DoT) has a broad range of sources (e.g., batteries) and recharge technolo- diverse technologies, known collectively as intelli- gies (e.g., photovoltaics). gent transportation systems (ITS), which might fulfill many of these needs. ITS is comprised of a • Development of alternative micro-power number of technologies, including information sources. processing, communications, control, and electronics. There are a number of other federal • Development of power management in elec- models to draw upon: for example, following tronics design (energy efficiency design). the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reex- • Development of multi-fuel engines. amined the role of emergency planning for pro- • Systems engineering to integrate national tection of the public in the vicinity of nuclear monitoring of critical infrastructure interde- power plants. The Commission issued regula- pendencies into jurisdictions’ response tions requiring that before a plant could be capabilities. licensed to operate, the NRC must have “reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures R&R.5 – Health and Crisis Response can and will be taken in the event of a radiologi- Education. The ability to develop and disseminate cal emergency.” The regulations set sixteen a public education program to help prepare the pub- emergency planning standards and define the lic psychologically and physically to deal with the responsibilities of licensee, and State and local effects of the attack, to make them aware of emer- organizations involved in emergency response. gency procedures and services in the event of the attack, and to make them understand the necessary Finally, there are a number of capabilities within requirements they must fulfill or be aware of (e.g., the private sector for training and awareness into first aid, personal decontamination, hazard avoid- which terrorism planning is being or can be ance, etc.) in the aftermath of an attack. incorporated. One such example is CorpNet, for business continuity planning education. Another Goals: example is the Partnership for Public Warning • A checklist in each citizen’s house, as well as (PPW), a partnership between the private sector, schools and businesses. academia, and government at the municipal, state and federal level. The PPW’s mission is to Current Capabilities: develop a consensus on process, standards and systems that will provide the right information This capability exists today for the nuclear envi- about dangers to life and property to the right ronment, but is marginal for the other opera- people, in the right place, and at the right times, tional environments. so those in harms way can take timely and appropriate action to save lives, reduce losses and speed State of the Art: recovery – whether from natural disasters, acci- There are several programs and public informa- dents or acts of terrorism. tion campaigns that successfully address cross- cultural/language barriers and could be used as Technology Limitations and Barriers: models. Examples include: the National • There are no “technology limitations” in deliv- Libraries of Medicine Breast Cancer campaign; ering information. However, there are “barri- the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) ers” to delivery: multi-lingual, multi-cultural, food safety program, and E9-1-1. Other public education levels (documentation should not information programs provide a model for incor- exceed a fifth grade level), and distribution porating education with technology: National methods to assure information reaches every Weather Service, Amber Alert System, reverse household. 9-1-1, Emergency Notification Systems and

PROJECT RESPONDER Response and Recovery (R&R)

• Technology is available for notification to the • In a terrorist event, the time it takes for a public-at-large (homes, offices), however there USAR team to respond (two to four hours) is is no demand or push by emergency manage- insufficient to allow for rescue operations. By ment at the national or state levels. A pro- the fourth hour, it is a recovery operation. gram of this type would incur large upfront costs. However, this will not happen without • USAR teams have capability to temporarily a good business case or mandate or both. stabilize collapsed structures and rubble piles.

Gap Fillers: • There is limited access to specialized search and rescue training for non-USAR personnel. • Enhancement of current technologies with notifications systems such as: Community State of the Art: Notifications System (CNS), Carrier Grade Notification System (CGNS), Emergency The FEMA USAR task forces currently carry Notification System (ENS), Remote search cameras, acoustical devices, and smart lev- Surveillance Support System (R3S). els (for structural engineering) as standard rescue equipment. However, FEMA Task Forces are not • Create a program based on three factors: available for response, per policy, unless disaster awareness, education (dealing with generic includes collapse of a reinforced concrete build- problems/situations and generic answers) and ing. All 28 FEMA teams will be upgraded to training. WMD capable, which will allow them to enter a hot zone for short periods of time. Extended • Work within existing projects and organiza- time will be dependent on new PPE and the tions (above) in the government, private sector availability of relief workers and the extent of and academia to establish a national awareness time required on scene. Various technology com- program. ponents are available for an emergency responder technology platform. However, the effectiveness R&R.6 – Specialized Search and Rescue cannot be determined until requirements are pro- Capabilities. The ability to rapidly locate, assess, vided. Engineering/integration, standards and and rescue, injured and/or contaminated victims in operational test and evaluation (OT&E) are a CBRNE environment with or without structural critical to overall effectiveness of the needed collapse. technology.

Goals: Technology Limitations and Barriers: • Safely locate, disentangle and remove victims • Ground penetrating radar (GPR) capability quickly and efficiently. exists for up to ten feet of earth. The ability to look through 30-50 feet of rubble is cur- Current Capabilities: rently a technological challenge (GPR has • FEMA’s Federal Urban Search and Rescue been researched extensively with limited suc- (USAR) Task Forces represent the highest level cess for land mine detection). of capability today, with listening devices, search cameras, and robots for detection and • Sensor suite for robotics is a question of extraction. Most jurisdictions do not have a requirements, packaging and cost, not engi- Federal Task Force. neering. Radar can be made to work with robotic arms, etc. Requirements need to be • In addition to this uneven national capability, generated to match the responder mission even Federal Task Forces today have a mar- (weight constraints, power, endurance, stan- ginal capability to do specialized search and dards, etc.). rescue in a contaminated environment, especially in a biological operational • Standardized caches of equipment will need to environment. be flexible, one-suit-fits-all.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter V

• Communications challenges are inherent in • Engineering for packaging all the various com- transmitting out from under rubble, in/out of ponents into a suite to make a ruggedized a building, etc. (This barrier is probably best capability, followed by operational testing and overcome by ultra wideband communications evaluation. technology, a recommended Strategic Research Area described in Chapter I.) • Research and development in acoustic detection, improved ground penetrating radar, • Personal protection technology (see Chapter II robotics for gas detection (carbon dioxide (PPE)) advances are needed to improve (CO2) detection for victim location), etc. endurance in a WMD environment. Power source materials are also a challenge for these R&R.7 – Evacuation/In-Place Shelter operations. Management. The ability to manage public access to relocation destinations, and planning and deploy- • Cost limitations for local jurisdictions apply ment/location and direction to in-place shelters for here, as well. those citizens for whom evacuation is not possible or necessary. • The challenges of packaging components at the device level (weight, range, etc.) depend Goals: on requirements. This is an area of low tech- • In-place shelters to handle 1000 persons. nology risk. The various components exist. Technology for packaging and manufacturing • Climate control. require research. With funding this can be achieved within three years. Basic work is Current Capabilities: already being reviewed by the Communi- • The capability exists today for the high cations Electronics Command (CECOM) in explosive/incendiary environment. The capa- support of DHS. bility is marginal for all other operational Gap Fillers: environments. • Upgrade of all USAR Teams to be WMD- • Evacuation plans have not been established for capable as soon as possible. most major cities in the U.S., besides those at risk from hurricanes. • Standards and test and evaluation (T&E) for ground penetrating radar for application in State of the Art: this functional capability. Technology is available to build emergency infra- • Development of ultra wideband communica- structure, provide ballistic protection, and place tions capability in an operational package that high energy particulate air (HEPA) filters to tem- sends telemetry further up the command porarily cover heating, ventilation and air condi- chain, beyond the on-scene rescue unit (see tioning (HVAC) systems. Evacuation and shel- Chapter IV (UIC)). tering is more of a policy, planning and management issue with complex managerial and • Standards and T&E for ultra wideband com- psychological impacts. The Red Cross has estab- munication technology (see Chapter IV lished shelter in place guidelines. From the DoD (UIC)). side, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has “Force Provider,” which • Development of requirements for applying the provides temporary shelter for mobile population various sensor suites, platforms, robotics, bat- in crisis, and the “Immune Buildings Program,” teries, etc. which already exist. which can provide technologies and solutions for in-place sheltering.

PROJECT RESPONDER Response and Recovery (R&R)

Technology Limitations and Barriers: State of the Art: • Management of the process is more of a chal- Most major jurisdictions have in-place programs lenge than technology development (i.e., quar- and plans to comply with regulations prescribing antine situations, public access and control, this functional capability, promulgated by, e.g., media relations, communication and educa- FEMA, EPA, DoT, etc. tion, integrating plans with technology suites for evacuation routes, integrating plume mod- Technology Limitations and Barriers: eling, and ability to communicate once the The ability to address and mitigate any “residual evacuation starts. hazard” is highly dependent on the community’s capabilities and availability of resources. It is There is little technological risk in developing probable that metropolitan areas will have local programs to meet these capabilities. control and response capabilities which will quickly move to apply EPA guidelines, address Gap Fillers: any particulate contamination and take steps to • “Force Provider”-type pre-positioned struc- alleviate the effects. tures should be stored at regional depots in the U.S. ready for deployment to house evacu- Gap Fillers: ated or to isolate and control contaminated Apply decontamination technologies that are population. available or will be developed, e.g., in R&R.1 • Use of business contingency planning organi- (Mass Victim Decontamination), R&R.2 (Rapid zations/media to include evacuation/shelter-in- Decontamination of High-Value and Critical place planning as part of their industries core Response Equipment), etc. requirements when developing company/ R&R.9 – Mass Fatality Management. The family contingency plans. ability to contain, decontaminate, remove, and • Initiation of a new National Evacuation track fatalities. Program similar to the FEMA Fallout Shelter Goals: Program. • Collection, preservation of the body (suitable R&R.8 – Residual Hazard Assessment and for open casket). Mitigation. The ability to identify, assess the presence and danger of, and mitigate lingering presence • Positive identification of the body. and effects of threat agents, secure still-dangerous areas, and manage waste and effluent from contam- • Maintenance of evidence. inated areas. • Preservation of personal effects.

Goals: • Notification of the next of kin. • No secondary contamination. Current Capabilities: Current Capabilities: • The capability exists today for hazardous This capability exists today across the spectrum materials (HAZMAT) units to perform this of operational environments. However, the capa- function, with the exception of a biological bility is dependent upon emergency management operational environment, for which no capa- preparation and planning functions. (See bility exists today. However, HAZMAT units Chapter VI (EMPP).) will not turn to this mission until they are finished dealing with live victims.

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter V

• Coroners do not have this capability for • If decontamination is not an option, bodies any operational environment except high might have to be cremated. However, suffi- explosive/incendiary. cient cremation capabilities do not exist in the U.S. for an incident involving mass fatality. State of the Art: • Food irradiation and gaseous decontamination There are procedures in place to address fatalities technologies are promising, but are also very caused by a terrorist attack using chemical, large and not easily mobile. nuclear and high explosive devices. The National Medical Response Plan created a Disaster • Irradiation technologies pose specific problems Mortuary Operational Response Team in radiation management, transportation of (DMORT) consisting of fifty personnel in train- bodies, metrics for cleansing bodies internally, ing to respond to a “mass fatality incident.” facilities vs. numbers of dead to be decontami- However, under the best circumstances the nated, etc. DMORT team can decontaminate up to fifty bodies in a twenty-four hour period. Biological Gap Fillers: and radiological (dirty bomb) decontamination • Adaption of gaseous decontamination and does not have sufficient documentation to deter- food irradiation technologies to this capability. mine how decontamination will be handled for external and internal cleansing of the remains. • Mobilization and miniaturization of irradia- These contaminants raise serious concerns and tion and gaseous decontamination technology. questions as to what the disposition of the remains will be once a decontamination process is R&R.10 – Traffic Management. The ability to complete. While the goal of the DMORT team manage traffic in evacuation and around incident is to preserve the body, preferably for open casket site, to include knowledge of traffic flows, alterna- viewing, there may be an unwillingness on behalf tive routes, relocation routes and destinations, and of the local mortuaries to receive decontaminated accidents/traffic blockages. remains without an agreed measurement that Goals: defines what “clean” is. • Real-time traffic re-routing. Current technology for “food irradiation” has been partially successful. This technology (e.g., • Knowledge of “flow” (i.e., number of cars, Sure-Beam) was applied in decontamination their destinations, etc.). efforts of post office facilities after the October 2001 anthrax attacks. The technology could be • Ability to handle evacuation of >100,000 applied to biological decontamination. vehicles.

Chemical/biological body bags heat-sealed, with Current Capabilities: gaseous decontamination, is a concept under A marginal capability exists today, across all oper- development. However, there are issues with ational environments. transporting contaminated remains to a decontamination site. State of the Art: Traffic management capabilities exist today and Technology Limitations and Barriers: are employed in most major cities. Nevertheless, • Political, religious and cultural considerations more sophisticated products could be developed drive the technology requirements. that would allow for dynamic rerouting while maintaining the integrity of the “final destina- • Biological decontamination of bodies must be tions” selected to house evacuees. The U.S. internal as well as external. Army has technologies and algorithms for

PROJECT RESPONDER Response and Recovery (R&R)

situational awareness, traffic routing and re-rout- Goals: ing, alternate routing and timing, knowledge of • Part of a unified incident command process. blockage. Simulation programs can be created from these technologies to provide “sensible evac- • Written, formal documentation (continually uation routes and policy/procedures” depending updated) by the start of the “second opera- on strategic decisions at the time of the particular tional period” (in responders’ terms). incident. Each urban area will differ on a day- by-day basis depending on road maintenance • Plan that covers all agencies/activities relevant (closures or bottlenecks), construction etc. It will to the incident, to include functional annexes be important to have a collaborative tool to prac- for each agency that participates in unified tice traffic management in a crisis mode and incident command. identify known shortcoming and areas for improvement. • Includes a safety plan and a medical plan and may include other event specific plans. Technology Limitations and Barriers: • Disseminated in all operational periods. • A major metropolitan area will never have enough personnel and assets to deal real-time • Integrates GIS, expert systems, sensors and with a mass evacuation traffic crisis. processing systems (tied into detection, etc.) and shared databases/information systems on • This functional capability is reliant on perime- readiness and availability of response assets, ter establishment and security technologies, integrated as a comprehensive web based sys- and interoperable communications. tem to determine which plans and capabilities are appropriate for the incident scenario. Gap Fillers: • Systems integration: GIS visualization tech- • Includes post-incident analysis and corrective nology, fed by rapidly reconfigurable sensor action program. suites, integrated with other existing products for traffic control, perimeter establishment Current Capabilities: and control, etc. There exists today a marginal capability for this function. Larger jurisdictions with a dedicated • Pre-planning with communities that will be Office of Emergency Management have a receiving the evacuees (see R&R.7 (Evacuation stronger capability in this functional area. In-Place Shelter Management).) State of the Art: • Use of message boards that can be towed into place or messages displayed on electronic sig- Today, incident planning technologies exist but nage if applicable. will require integration and standardization into such structures as the National Incident • A designated radio broadcast channel for Management System (NIMS), etc. It is critical to emergency information in each urban area. be able to provide on-the-fly managing of assets and people along with knowledge of terrain and operational area and have the flexibility of R&R.11 – Incident Action Planning. The re-tailoring and distributing scenarios and plans. ability to implement a process that starts with pre- The DoD has a great deal of experience in this event planning, and then assessment, identification area, with programs such as DARPA’s Command of goals and objectives, strategy for dealing with sit- Post of the Future, and the U.S. Navy Space and uation, assignment of tasks, and follow-up. Naval Warfare Systems Command’s (SPAWAR)

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter V

programs to integrate situational awareness sys- • Dissemination of accurate information. tems into command post systems. Many planning tools have come out of these efforts, which • One unified voice, in a qualified public infor- could be leveraged to the emergency responder mation officer that the represents the community. unified command structure.

Technology Limitations and Barriers: Current Capabilities: • This problem is process-intensive, and not This capability exists today. limited by technology barriers. State of the Art: • Planning is reliant on all-source situational Media firms and government agencies have long understanding and unified incident command. established crisis communications plans that (See Chapters IV (UIC) and XI (ASU).) include designations for media encampments, • Common standards are required for logistics for power, water, etc. However, media interoperability. coverage of disasters has increased public expectations for government response. • Training issues are inherent, including strain on personnel, readiness, cost and time needed Technology Limitations and Barriers: for training, etc. Technology must be highly There are no significant technology limitations intuitive and flexible (multimedia and flexible for providing this functional capability. in time). Difficulties arise only in policy or planning issues, such as education of responders and government Gap Fillers: officials in the methods and procedures necessary • Affordable and highly intuitive common suite for dealing with a terrorist event, and the control of tools (GIS, satellite phones, video telecon- of sensitive information during ongoing crises or ference (VTC) capability, interoperable com- law enforcement investigations. munications link, software, etc.) integrated into the NIMS, etc. Gap Fillers: Media plan for terrorist events, refined to take • Training technology to facilitate deployment into account lessons learned from recent history of this capability. (e.g., 9/11, Iraqi campaign, etc.). R&R.12 – Public Relations and Media Management. The ability to accommodate the Response and Recovery Response logistics requirements of the on-scene media encamp- Technology Objectives (R&Rrto) ment, to provide the media necessary information R&Rrto.1 – Contaminated Victim Knowledge critical to informing the public of the threat and Base associated emergency directions (e.g., evacuation, danger areas), and to manage the safety of the Objectives: media (their physical safety). Develop a tool for emergency responders to use in determining how to respond to a mass chemi- Goals: cal, biological or radiation contamination event. • Established process for using media resources Using data provided by available sensors and for enhancing public safety (site cameras, heli- information stored before the event, the tool will copters, satellite connectivity). provide responders with the best course of action to begin the decontamination of large numbers of • Use of media assets to help emergency victims. The tool will facilitate rapid identifica- operations. tion of the presence and type of contaminant, communicate results to a knowledge base, and • Control of airspace.

PROJECT RESPONDER Response and Recovery (R&R)

provide responder with recommended course of R&Rrto.2 – Protective Coatings for Critical action. The tool should include a highly intuitive Equipment Graphical User Interface (GUI) and be useable Objectives: on a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) or a laptop in a vehicle. It should have the capability to pro- Develop materials and appliqués that will resist vide graphics regarding action to be taken upon contamination or facilitate rapid decontamina- arriving at a chemical/biological incident. See tion without degrading sensitive equipment such also DIDA.3 (Classification and Mitigation) and as electronics, such that critical equipment can be DIDA.8 (Pre-Triage/Differentiation Among Levels rapidly returned to service within the contami- of Exposure) for application to other needs. nated zones in less than one hour.

Payoffs: Payoffs: This will help emergency responders effectively Enables rapid return to service of critical equip- identify, isolate and prepare to decontaminate ment that is too expensive or important to be victims. It will help to save lives and prevent discarded, without causing secondary or continu- spread of contamination. ing contamination to personnel or environment.

Challenges: Challenges: The development of such a tool is considered low Much of the equipment needed by emergency risk, however its utility will depend on the real- responders is electronic in nature and may not be time data about the incident and the nature of able to be cleaned using convention cleaning pro- the decontamination it uses. Availability of real- cedures (e.g., water) or returned to service within time data is dependent upon the development of one hour. Protective casings impair functionality new and improved sensors, which are addressed or usability of equipment. Materials science faces technological challenges. (See Chapter I for a in Chapter III (DIDA). discussion of materials science as a Strategic Milestones/Metrics: Research Area.) FY2004: Benchmark similar systems for develop- Milestones/Metrics: ing course of action recommendations. Develop FY2004: Identify and evaluate potential enabling architectural design for the tool, collect and inte- technologies. grate existing information. FY2005: Begin research or applied technology FY2005: Develop a prototype of the tool and effort on new materials and coatings as indicated begin emergency responder testing. Begin com- by evaluation process in the previous year. mercialization effort to aid in transition to Develop metrics for evaluating “clean.” responders. FY2006-2007: Develop and test alternative pro- FY2006-2008: Integrate and deploy systems tective coating concepts for several common, for emergency responders while continuing high-value pieces of responder equipment. to integrate new products and methodologies into the system. Complete commercialization FY2008: Develop prototype protection packages. effort. Test packages in operational environment. Begin R&Rrto.1 – Budget in Millions commercialization efforts to transition technology Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals to use. Develop Integrated Technology $5 $5 $5 $5 $5 $25 Suite (Toolkit) Pilot R&Rrto.2 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals Protective Coatings $15 $22 $25 $18 $10 $90

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter V

R&Rrto.3 – Ground Penetrating Radar for R&Rrto.4 – Irradiation and Gaseous Specialized Search and Rescue Decontamination for Mass Fatalities Objectives: Objective: Develop and demonstrate an affordable ground Adapt irradiation and gaseous decontamination penetrating radar system to assist search and res- technologies and methods (e.g., food irradiation cue operations, in order to rapidly locate, assess, and concepts used on postal facilities after and rescue, injured and/or contaminated victims October 2001 anthrax attacks, etc.), for mobile in a CBRNE environment with or without struc- use in a mass fatality incident. tural collapse, including location of live victims buried in tunnels or beneath reinforced Payoffs: concrete up to fifty feet. Safe handling, tracking, and delivery to family, of Payoffs: decontaminated remains, without degrading the decedent’s suitability for open casket funeral. Rapid response and greater chances of recovery of injured victims. Challenges: Challenges: Radiological containment safeguards; mobility of Penetrating reinforced concrete or dense rubble. large equipment for irradiation/gaseous deconta- Penetrating radar capability exists for up to mination and fatality processing; verification of ten feet. The ability to look through 30-50 feet biological decontamination, especially inside of rubble is currently a technological challenge. corpses. Milestones/Metrics: Milestones/Metrics: FY2004: Define requirements for applying FY2004: Develop requirement for applying irra- ground penetrating radar for urban search and diation and gaseous decontamination technolo- rescue operations in a CBRNE environment. gies to this functional capability, to include Identify existing programs in DoD and industry safety/surety (e.g., radiological surety) systems and and create a development consortium to acceler- concepts. ate the product development. FY2005: Identify and evaluate potential enabling FY2005/2006: Develop and engineer a search technologies and procedures. and rescue Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) prototype. Develop a commercialization plan FY2006: Engineer solution based on technolo- using consortium members. gies found. This will likely require making the technology small enough to serve the function’s FY2007: Begin field testing GPR prototype. logistical needs. Demonstrate capability in a large-scale urban search and rescue exercise. FY2007: Continue engineering development and begin testing equipment and concepts of opera- FY2008: Complete commercialization of GPR tions. Develop methods and procedures; training and transition to use by emergency responders. programs.

R&Rrto.3 – Budget in Millions FY2008: Demonstrate capability in a mass fatal- Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals ity exercise. Transition to use. Ground Penetrating $5 $10 $15 $20 $5 $55 Radar R&Rrto.4 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals Mass Fatality $3 $4 $16.5 $15.7 $15.7 $54.9 Decontamination

PROJECT RESPONDER Response and Recovery (R&R)

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 • Ability to Identify, Isolate and Prepare to Decontaminate Large R&Rrto.1 – Contaminated Victim Knowledge Base Numbers of Victims • Graphical User Interface • Materials and Appliques that Resist Contamination or R&Rrto.2 – Protective Coatings Facilitate for Critical Equipment Decontaminiation • Return to Service within One hour

• Rapidly Locate, Assess, and Rescue Injured and/or Contaminated R&Rrto.3 – Ground Penetrating Radar for Victims Specialized Search and Rescue • Location of Victims in Tunnels Up to 50 Feet

• Enables Safe Handling, Tracking and Delivery R&Rrto.4 – Irradiation and Gaseous of Decontaminated Decontamination for Mass Fatalities Remains Response and Recovery Technology Roadmap

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter V

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter VI Emergency Management Preparation and Planning (EMPP) Chapter Chair: Brett Kriger Chapter Coordinator: Dr. Maria Powell

Definition their various emergency support tasks. That workspace has some variations in its nomencla- Emergency Management Preparation and ture but is generically referred to as an Planning (EMPP) is the capability to perform Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The vulnerability analysis of high-risk facilities and EOC has a role in all phases of emergency locations, plan responses to various terrorist sce- management: narios, perform low-cost high impact training for terrorist incident response, and coordinate among • In the preparation phase, the EOC is func- local authorities before a terrorist attack. This tional and prepared for any contingency. It is capability objective focuses on preparation and used for orientations, training, and exercising. planning across all phases of comprehensive emergency/disaster management. • In the emergency response phase, the EOC along with supporting department operations Operational Environments centers, serves as the central point for agency or jurisdiction coordination and overall man- The operational environments for this NTRO agement of the emergency. are: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive/incendiary. The type of event • In the post emergency or recovery phase, the responders must address dictates the needs of EOC can be used to house supporting organi- incident commanders, and thus the demands on zations and direct the recovery operation. the EMPP support structure to manage the preparedness, support coordination, and resources It is important to note that EOCs do not directly needed by incident commanders. manage or “command” incidents. “Command” implies setting incident objectives, determining However, from the perspective of the emergency strategy and tactics, and assigning and supervis- manager, the type of event or threat scenario is ing tactical resources. This is the role of the on- not the critical factor in developing an effective scene incident commanders using the component and coordinated response and recovery system. elements of the Incident Command System In most jurisdictions, the emergency manage- (ICS). The EOC is part of the support structure ment and EOC function are required to take a for the ICS and its commander, but the EOC multi-hazard/risk perspective. Plans call for the does not command, it coordinates and supports. EOC to deal with the complexity of cascading In a complex incident involving multiple agencies events and constant variations in response and organizations there may be a more elaborate priorities. coordinating structure within the EOC that is usually referred to as Unified Incident Command Some objectives will describe needs for a work- or the Incident Management System. space that supports the functional staff during

PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter VI

Responders emphasized that emergency response The complexity of coordinating and prioritizing is initially dependent on local resources and capa- the resources of multiple agencies requires the bilities. The system at the local level must be multilateral sharing of authority to ensure the adequate to support the initial response and then most rapid and effective response possible. A sin- smoothly expand to encompass regional, state, gle manager cannot be directly responsible for all and/or national multi-agency coordination. This of the efforts needed to minimize this elapsed ability to expand rapidly and integrate resources time. A manager has to have plans, data, and to supplement the original local response communications to competently work with oth- involves: ers as necessary, and to support emergency responders and incident commanders in efficient • Establishing priorities for response. response.

• Allocating critical resources. In a major area-wide incident, there may be multiple incidents of various types within a single • Developing strategies for coordinating multi- jurisdiction. Some incidents may be single- agency and inter-agency response problems. discipline (e.g., fire service) incidents; others may • Sharing information. be multi-disciplinary incidents operating under a unified command. The jurisdiction’s EOC may • Facilitating communications. be activated to coordinate the overall response, while the Incident Command System is used by Needed Functional Capabilities and field responders. Incident commanders may Priorities coordinate their actions through department operations centers which are represented in the Responders emphasize that the coordination and EOC. There may also be direct coordination and support for all stages and levels of the threat spec- communications occurring between incident trum must be addressed. However, emergency commanders and the EOC. The complexities management is generally focused on preparedness and difficulties of sharing data and information strategies that provide for impact assessment, that is critical to an effective, safe, and timely resource prioritization, and consequence manage- coordinated response is at the core of this ment. These strategies originate with decision- NTRO. makers who function collaboratively in EOCs. The traditional capabilities of EOCs are based on The enabling technologies for these capabilities the readiness and effectiveness of emergency are already available, in many cases, or in stages response services to respond jointly to a signifi- of advanced development. Still the capabilities cant event that is beyond the capability of any are not generally in place at the local level. In one agency or organization. some cases the obstacle is not availability but the complexity of the software, maintaining compe- Response to a major terrorist event places greater tence to operate it, availability of data sets, and demands on the management system than other costs in time and dollars for procurement train- large-scale incidents. The initial response would ing, and sustainment. The needed functional be quickly supported by multiple agencies from capabilities are presented below in order of prior- all levels requiring a rapid assemblage of diverse ity, the first being the highest based on respon- capabilities, some from distant areas that have lit- ders’ input in workshops and field interviews tle operational familiarity with the others. This conducted during the earlier phases of this effort. would occur in the midst of confounding uncertainties, limited resources, conflicting priorities • Risk Awareness and Assessment and potentially tragic misdirection. Many responders, lacking clear guidance, would simply • Mission Rehearsal, Simulation, Embedded react to apparent immediate needs. Training and Distance Education

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• High-Value Target Identification and available, at least marginally, in the near-term for Monitoring application in all but a handful of specific areas, even for those areas where capability is marginal • Alternate/Mobile Hospital Contingencies (e.g., the highest priority Risk Awareness and Assessment) or non-existent (e.g., the third-highest • Course of Action Development priority High-Value Target Identification and • Establish Emergency Operations Center Monitoring (EMPP.3)). These technologies can be developed and integrated with little technolog- • Facilities/Infrastructure Hardening ical risk. This emphasizes the point that capabilities in this response objective can be increased The responders rated Risk Awareness and today, through systems integration or even com- Assessment (EMPP.1) as the highest priority mercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies, as within EMPP. Risk awareness is the most impor- well as from non-technology solutions such as tant requirement of planning response to a terror- changes in organization, doctrine, and training, ist attack. The next four were rated near each and through the development and adoption of other in priority: Mission Rehearsal, Simulation, standards. Embedded Training and Distance Education (EMPP.2); High-Value Target Emergency Management Preparation and Planning Identification and Monitoring Operational Environments (EMPP.3); Alternate/Mobile High Explosive/ Hospital Contingencies Functional Capabilities Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Incendiary (EMPP.4); and Course of 1. Risk Awareness and Assessment Action Development (EMPP.5). 2. Mission Rehearsal, Simulation, Imbedded Training and The next highest priority was Distance Education Establish Emergency Operations 3. High Value Target Identification Center (EMPP.6). The and Monitoring responders thought that, even 4. Alternate/Mobile Hospital Contingencies though this area can use improvement, they are already 5. Course of Action Development doing this function in most 6. Establish Emergency geographical areas. Finally, Operations Center

Facilities and Infrastructure 7. Facilities/Infrastructure Hardening (EMPP.7) was rated Hardening lowest priority because it is 1 1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this not a central function of 2 operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO 3 2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional emergency management. capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO 3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability? LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH Overall State of Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’ Technology for Emergency Management Preparation and Planning EMPP.1 – Risk Awareness and Assessment. The ability to provide analysis and assessments of threat, The matrix below shows a pattern of few vulnerability and criticality of events, venues, and technological challenges in meeting the needs systems (including key assets and infrastructure). of Emergency Management Preparation and Planning. The key challenges will be in the The first step in emergency management prepara- highest priority Risk Awareness and Assessment tion and planning is the understanding of the (EMPP.1), but these challenges should not risks and an assessment of how to address them. be technologically significant. Technology is The ability to support this process technically

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with automated decision aides and other infor- outputs are incomplete and require additional mation technology will increase the effectiveness analysis. There is common agreement that the of the analysis and therefore the plans that are technologies are potentially available but there is derived. confusion on whose job it is to operate the software, run the models, and conduct the analysis. Goals: Most of the software tools typically available to • Ability to collect and integrate data on multi- most responders offer only incomplete pieces of ple sites. the required analysis, and the various systems are not integrated into a comprehensive useable tool. • Ability to sort and prioritize. State of the Art: • Identification of potential cascading effects. There are a number of COTS products that com- • Data sets that employ nationally mandated bine agent dispersal and plume modeling (partic- standards. ularly chemical, nuclear, radiological, high explosive, or natural disasters), GIS systems, and • Management of data in secure format. database-linked decision support software: many of these products are based on experience with • Data sharing across jurisdictions, departments natural disasters. Most of the advanced programs (digital format). in this area are under active development by the • Integration of national information and past Departments of Defense (e.g., the National experience. Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)) or Current Capabilities: the Department of Homeland Security (especially FEMA). Many of these modeling or decision Most technologies needed by this functional support products are mature enough to have been capability are available today, irrespective of cost. implemented in various local, state, and federal The consensus is that initial cost is not necessar- emergency management organizations. ily the salient issue – lack of integration and usability are the main roadblocks. If integration and usability are taken as the main factor in Technology Limitations and Barriers: defining availability, then the capabilities are gen- There are no specific technological limitations to erally seen as unavailable. achieving these goals. There are some limitations in the area of storage and display capabilities in Responders have to quickly assess the situation individual response vehicles, and even greater surrounding an incident that put lives and prop- limitations in the speed of delivery via wireless erty at risk. Their knowledge, training, and expe- means in a networked or Web-enabled mode. rience provide the primary basis for the initial However, the technologies needed to overcome actions they take. In addition, responders under- those restrictions are beyond the scope of this stand that there are software tools that may help functional element. with the risk assessment of key facilities and infrastructure and models that predict impacts; Although there are no specific technological limi- however, there is currently little evidence of wide- tations or restrictions on data sharing, the issue of spread use. Much of the software is complex and interoperable equipment and software has been a time-consuming to operate competently and concern for many public safety officials because comprehensive data sets needed to make model there is not a focused, clearly delineated set of results useful are not always available. Internet standards for incident management. Improved interoperability and speed of data Even where the technologies (and supporting exchange could be gained with standardization in data sets) are employed, the decision support the Expanded eXtensible Markup

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Language/eXtensible Markup Language many cases, the delivery method varies but the (EXML/XML) Web programming language. same training and course materials may be accomplished either way. The concern about dis- Gap Fillers: tance learning systems is to ensure the supporting The next step should be to ensure that the soft- equipment requirements are compatible with ware already utilized is configured such that the what is available to responders in their operating needed features have output that is transportable environment (i.e., firehouse, squad room, etc.). to other EOC software programs. E-learning, Web-based learning, online learning, EMPP.2 – Mission Rehearsal, Simulation, and distance learning are widely used as inter- Embedded Training and Distance Education. changeable terms. However, these terms have The ability to conduct realistic, high-quality train- subtle, but distinguishable differences. Useful ing programs and exercises that comply with definitions for these distance learning systems are: national training standards (i.e., to meet continuing • E-learning – generally covers activities involv- education requirements). ing computers and interactive networks simul- Mission rehearsal and simulation is generally con- taneously. The computer is not necessarily the sidered to be a specialized method of delivering central element of the activity nor does it pro- training involving realistic practice to accomplish vide learning content. However, the computer a specific operation or task. There are many and the network are key factors in the learning commercial systems for accomplishing that activ- activity. ity and the military departments have developed • Web-based learning – generally covers learning very elaborate methods and systems. Some of the materials delivered in a Web browser, includ- most sophisticated are those employed for training when the materials are packaged on CD- ing in aircraft and space vehicles. ROM or other media. Embedded training is event- or threat-specific • Online learning – associated with content training that could be concurrent with, and thus readily accessible on a computer with content accompany, other all-hazards training. Examples accessed on the Web or the Internet, or include chemical terrorism response training that installed via media (i.e., CD-ROM) on the could be combined with “ordinary” HAZMAT computer’s hard disk. training. This would incorporate (i.e., embed) new requirements for specialized skills and • Distance learning – includes any interaction at knowledge into existing required initial and a distance between instructor and students, recurring training. Responders’ time is already at but provides for interaction between instructor a premium for training: most jurisdictions can and student. Simply posting or broadcasting barely afford the drain on readiness from time learning materials is not distance learning. away and overtime costs for personnel to keep Instructors must be involved in receiving feed- current with normal-duty training requirements, back and evaluating level of skill/knowledge notwithstanding additional training requirements mastery. for terrorism response. Embedded training programs and technologies can create efficiencies in Distance learning has traditionally referred to tel- meeting training requirements that save jurisdic- evised broadcasts and correspondence courses, tions time and money while increasing prepared- and still includes those delivery systems. ness for terrorism alongside all-hazards training. However, responders were more concerned with reducing the overall training load by ensuring The subject of distance education covers a very that the requirements for accomplishing levels of broad range of training methods that range from knowledge and certifications were carefully posted printed materials (e.g., correspondence crafted and met national standards (few are cur- schools) to completely Web-based programs. In rently established). The delivery method was not

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considered to be particularly important – only interactive, asynchronous, delivery strategies. that it be effective and efficient. These goals include:

Beyond HAZMAT response, there are currently • Selection of delivery methods and technologies no national minimum requirements that cover should follow a careful needs analysis that has terrorism training. The Occupational Safety and been validated by responders. Health Administration (OSHA) and the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) provide for some • Availability to as many of the potential standards. True national training and credential- extended response teams as possible to include ing standards would provide for smoother inter- state and local emergency responders, govern- operability for multi-agency, multi-level response ment officials, National Guard units, FEMA, operations. FBI and the Department of Defense. (Participants sharing training are more likely Goals: to appreciate each other’s roles and develop Training programs and distance education should relationships that will help coordinate efforts.) be: • Employment of scenario-based simulation • Embedded in current systems when possible. exercises that place response teams in real-life situations through realistic virtual interaction. • Embedded in current duties when possible (concurrent training). • Ability to replay and evaluate the actions taken and decisions made by trainees, so that they • Tailored to different scenarios and localities. can critique their overall performance and set goals for improvement. • Supportive of mission essential tasks. • Provisions for sustaining and refresher training • Re-configurable. are essential regardless of the technology • Interactive at various levels from responder to employed. command to higher authorities. • Simulations that test critical decision-making Training Programs should: skills during all types of CBRNE crisis scenarios, including the more probable scenarios of • Be mandatory (100% of personnel within a accidents and natural disasters. given timeframe; retraining at given intervals). Current Capabilities: • Include testing and assessment. The responders believe that the capabilities to • Include capture/sharing/implementation of do all the things above are available, especially in lessons learned. the military. However, standards development, minimum skills/knowledge determination, and • Assess particular skills or subsets within train- coordinated funding are required to tailor the ing modules, so that trainees do not have to technology to emergency responder operational repeat entire modules to learn a narrow subset requirements. of skills. Achieving the goals primarily involves changing Responders also indicated that training managers how responders train, not providing delivery and distance learning developers should pursue technologies. There is no national standard for additional goals as existing emergency response training processes, nor is there a central reposi- education and training gradually transitions from tory for training and exercise coordination. This traditional linear classroom instruction to more has created confusion among training methods,

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variance in results, and duplicative training Technology Limitations and Barriers: efforts. The adequacy of available bandwidth and installed user equipment was discussed as a State of the Art: technical constraint to widespread implementa- Technology to accomplish delivery of automated tion. In most of the country (outside the larger distance learning is advancing more rapidly than metropolitan areas), equipment is rarely state-of- the ability to employ it effectively. The Web has the-art and Internet connectivity (if available) is rapidly evolved from a text-only medium to a likely to be via dial-up modem. Many volunteer multimedia communication system with new and fire departments don’t have computers – legacy- varied opportunities for learning at anytime and capable or otherwise. in any place. The technological revolution enables the teaching-learning process to meet the Gap Fillers: needs of any responder. More and more training • Improve output of compression using software is being made available online but the acceptance only (i.e., without the need for high-tech sys- of that delivery mode has not been universal. tems or hardware). Given the ever-expanding range of possibilities presented by new technologies, training develop- • Smart card/chip that contains an “electronic ers must identify processes that work. transcript” securely verifying ID, levels and Educational needs should drive the technology currency of training/certification for outside rather than vice versa. Models developed to agency responders that are integrated with guide this process often fail to address the specific local ICS. needs of the adult learner. Standards and guidelines need to align with specific learner needs and • Grant-funded equipment upgrades to ensure program goals. adequate multimedia equipment and tools are available for local academies/jurisdictions. There are many commercial and military systems and tools available that permit response simula- • Use of open source user-friendly tool sets to tion and rehearsal. These are computer- facilitate customization of training packages by controlled training systems that simulate specific local or regional training managers/academies. real-time emergency environments. They effectively allow trainers and incident commanders to EMPP.3 – High-Value Target Identification evaluate and re-evaluate their management strate- and Monitoring. The ability to monitor high- gies based on dynamic scenarios, including the value targets by retaining their identification, uti- likely behavior of responders, victims, other peo- lizing appropriate monitoring techniques that comple on the scene, vehicles, fires, explosions, chem- municate status whenever needed, and addressing icals, weather and other environmental factors. threats as they become manifest and evolve with The simulator response training and evaluation respect to high-value targets. for virtually any type of emergency should allow There is no single approach to critical infrastruc- for review and repeat for different strategies, pro- ture protection for every community. Each must cedures, and events. The system also allows users address its security concerns to reflect unique to test and measure the aptitude of emergency aspects of consequences, threats, and vulnerabili- responders, allowing them to identify problems ties in terms of credible threat, tolerance for risk and correct them before making a fatal mistake in and ability to mitigate consequences. Leaders the field. System costs vary by simulation com- and planners must identify the vulnerabilities of plexity and range from tens of thousands of dol- numerous assets, and then categorize and rank lars to many millions. the risk profiles of the facilities and assets they

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identify as critical. The results of that localized them. Even if the expense for support hardware analysis are the only basis upon which an effec- and infrastructure is provided, the issues of train- tive and credible monitoring and response system ing, pattern awareness programming, and user could be implemented. interface for response will impede effective implementation. Goals: Most localities maintain a list of key assets or Responders described system requirements and likely targets that is updated yearly but these tar- needs that are very similar to those of physical gets have been identified based on traditional protective systems for very high-value targets such risks and threats, such as susceptibility to fire haz- as chemical and nuclear weapons storage areas, ards. The sites and facilities that are likely to be sensitive military sites, missile sites, and strategic attractive terrorist targets may require different command and control centers: examination. The current target lists are initiated • 24 × 7 × 365 real-time capability. and maintained by a building walk-through, and the results are rarely captured in a database or • Ability to fuse information from multiple sen- digital format. Current systems are not config- sors (community infrastructure protection ured to allow monitoring of targets in real-time would require integration of tens of thousands from a centralized command center. of sensors). State of the Art: • Integration at various echelons (multi-agency, multi-level, and transnational). There are no existing programs that are technologically enabled or specialized to auto-generate • Scalable and on-demand. this information or produce databases that will support visualization. Existing GIS and conse- • Inclusion of decision aids (such as expert sys- quence assessment programs will recognize data- tems for pattern recognition, etc.). bases that have been populated with this data but • Secure management of data. there are no existing technologies that will permit auto- or self-population. • Validation capability. There are extensive existing security systems and Current Capabilities: sensors which can be employed in conjunction with alarm/switcher/multiplexer interfaces to Technologies that support these requirements can computer displays to provide a degree of capabil- integrate, sort, and respond to sensors and pro- ity to support the stated goals. Sensor technolo- grammed patterns, but patterns and alarm-level gies include: parameters are subject to user interpretation and response determination. These technologies can • Perimeter monitoring of systems (i.e., traffic meet the needed goals, but are contingent on the cameras/closed circuit television (CCTV)). programming of software for monitoring systems to interpret patterns that users establish. The • Physical protection systems (security and technologies to install sensors and monitoring alarm technologies). systems are available and very capable. • Satellite imagery. The implementation of these technologies as a consistent capability is very limited within the • GIS/database technology. responder community. Responders and technolo- • Multi-function unattended ground sensors. gists discussed existing technologies that are available but determined that it would be complex • Seismic sensors for pattern recognition. and expensive for most jurisdictions to deploy

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Technology Limitations and Barriers: management, before the overwhelming needs There are generally no technology limitations or cause a system overload. For example, the barriers to achieving the stated goals. Monitoring urgent care centers should set up an information and sensor technology (except for biological sen- clearinghouse to continuously match casualty sors that are discussed elsewhere in this report) demand with bed supply. Each network would are very mature and are in widespread use to provide information links to its corresponding accomplish the described goals (i.e., nuclear networks. The hospitals would provide capacity power plants, nuclear weapons storage areas, information to the transport network; the highly classified military security areas). on-scene casualty stabilization and triage network However, the sensors only report status. The would provide casualty information (numbers, interpretation and decision making must be pro- types and locations) to the transport network; grammed into automated Supervisory Control and the transport network could generate its own and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, transport missions based on need and resource Programmed Logic Controllers (PLC), alarm availability. switcher/multiplexer systems, or left to the inter- Major incident or mass casualty response requires pretation of human operators. rapid communication of the status of emergency medical resources between field units, hospitals, Gap Fillers: dispatch centers and many other organizations The goals described above are procedural and involved in the response. Such information tra- operational but could be enhanced by use of ditionally includes information on the incident or available technologies. There are no gap fillers threat, emergency department capacities, bed needed for this functional capability beyond availability, specific treatment protocols, the sta- those initiatives described in other NTROs (see tus of pharmaceutical stocks, availability of especially Chapter III (DIDA) for sensor and response personnel, equipment and teams, and detection technologies). status of other medical resources (e.g., National Disaster Medical System). In addition to provid- EMPP.4 – Alternate/Mobile Hospital ing this information, this capability needs to pro- Contingencies. The ability to identify and provide vide for: alternate and surge medical locations during pre- event planning. • Quick establishment of screening/triage at des- This capability is needed during any large-scale or ignated primary and alternate medical facilities catastrophic event whether it is caused by a tech- or emergency centers. nological accident, natural disaster, or CBRNE • Hospital “lockdown” (control entry/exit attack. To achieve efficiency, the medical care to enforce quarantine or limit spread of system is carefully balanced between anticipated contaminants). need, and in-place capacity. A sudden surge in victims would quickly overwhelm the medical • Public education to help citizens function as capabilities of nearly any locality. The incident first-aid or stopgap healthcare providers. management system would need to designate appropriate alternate and surge medical locations. • Personnel and staffing planning across a Hospitals do not generally plan (nor do they have region. the sole responsibility to plan) for these surge requirements and they do not traditionally have a • Pre-event stocking of needed supplies and system for reporting bed-space or staff capacities pharmaceuticals. in real-time. • Identification of needs and inspection of alter- Goals: nate facilities. This capability should provide data necessary to a • Integration of planning with other organiza- common operational picture for medical needs tions and participants.

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Current Capabilities: HRSA funds the hospital preparedness coopera- Currently, distribution of information and gath- tive agreements, totaling $498 million. The ering of required data is accomplished through CDC’s guidance this year focuses on seven faxes, telephone calls, and radio transmissions, areas: preparedness planning and readiness which can take 45-90 minutes to complete, even assessment; surveillance and epidemiology; if the effort is pre-planned. This time consuming laboratory capacity for handling biologic agents; process hinders the ability of resource managers laboratory capacity for handling chemical agents; to meet the first two goals identified above. health alert network and information technology; However, other than for communications communicating health risks and health informa- and information distribution, technology is tion dissemination; and education and training. probably not the major obstacle to achieving The HRSA guidelines for cooperative agreements these capabilities. outline six priority areas: governance; regional Emergency response organizations and support- surge capacity to handle terrorism victims; emer- ing EOCs have guidance available to them gency medical services; hospital linkages to public regarding the spectrum of possible events to plan health departments; education and preparedness for; however, there is no guidance on how to plan training; and terrorism preparedness exercises. for the specific needs for emergency medical services. This area requires very specialized knowl- Several software systems have been developed and edge that is not traditionally found among emer- used by medical facilities to improve the ability to gency planners in an EOC or in responder track and report capabilities through emergency organizations. There are some plans for mass management centers. These systems have sub- immunizations that could be somewhat useful as stantial overlap with those that will help provide templates, but there is a need to train people on early warning of a biological attack through mon- how to plan for these contingencies. itoring of the demand for medical care. (See PHRBAE.1 (Surveillance and Information Few localities have identified alternative hospital Integration Systems) as well as MR.2 (Mass locations for additional bed space or treatment Casualty Medical Care Management).) specialties. Most hospitals have cooperative agreements to transfer certain types of patients to Technology Limitations and Barriers: alternate hospitals, but these transfers will over- This capability does not require additional tech- whelm hospitals very rapidly in the case of a nology development to meet the stated goals. major CBRNE event. There is very limited surge The technologies and software tools exist, but the capacity at most hospitals and few have the capa- requirement for hospitals and medical facilities to bility to lockdown to prevent walk-ins. accumulate and report the data through standard- State of the Art: ized protocols does not. The barriers are primarily procedural and operational. Attaining the objectives and goals for this area may be facilitated through assistance from the Gap Fillers: Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the Health Resources and Services Administration A key gap filler is the development of systems (HRSA). with existing technologies for integrating and distributing needed information on hospital and CDC-HRSA bioterrorism funding grant pro- alternate facility capacity and resource availability. grams are available to help state and local govern- The ability to track the information exists, but ments upgrade public health infrastructure and some hospitals see this information as commer- health care systems to better prepare for and cially sensitive, and others see this process as an respond to bioterrorism and other public health excessive administrative burden. Thus, the will- emergencies. CDC administers public health ingness and procedures to share this information preparedness awards, which total $870 million. should be addressed through national standards

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and benchmarks. Planners should pursue the structure that needs close coordination. A high following paths to partially implement this degree of organization and preparation is required capability: to support responders’ information needs effectively, and success relies on the ability to acquire • Conduct case studies and identify best prac- real time data which change dynamically, inte- tices from actual events or benchmarks from grate it with geographical data, and provide the effective advances in managing hospital managers and responders with a continuous view contingencies. of the status of the situation.

• Build on existing networks. For example, Tactical/operational decision makers (responders) Maryland has a secure statewide health sector need to have this vast array of data immediately emergency data communications system and available, generally in a graphical display form. Facilities Resource Emergency Database Additionally, there is the need for an organized (FRED) that is used both for facility resource management information system to support management and for alerting. strategic activities (i.e., pre-disaster planning, • Evaluate the CDC/Public Health Service training and event reconstruction that occur at report on emergency management tracking the EOC). systems in Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Oklahoma for feasible pilot programs. Goals: The various interrelationships of data required • Integrate with syndromic surveillance efforts. need to be integrated into several complete deci- Reporting of hospitals/pharmacies reporting sion support systems and management informa- use trends could be expanded to include tion systems to support tactical planning, beds/assets. Many of the same communica- response management and damage assessment. tions links are needed for both purposes. The various systems fall into two fundamental (PHRBAE.1 (Surveillance and Information components: database systems, and expert sys- Integration Systems) discusses other efforts as tems. The database system serves as a warehouse well.) for the data, and the expert system implements decision support. Linked modules include visual- EMPP.5 – Course of Action Development. The ization systems to translate raw data and model ability to develop Office of Emergency Management outputs, and GIS tools to represent geographi- (OEM) procedures, tactics and plans after identifi- cally referenced information. Visualization tools cation of potential terrorist threats within a locality. are essential for emergency managers to integrate and analyze the complex, massive datasets that Providing accurate and accessible information to will flow from WMD events that most respon- support contingency planning and response pres- ders and managers expect. ents a formidable challenge to the emergency planning community. The emergency manager’s It should be recognized that this functional capa- challenge has always been to acquire enough bility is very closely aligned with the description accurate information to make correct decisions, and goals of EMPP.1 (Risk Awareness and prioritize the application of resources, and then Assessment), as well as UIC.4 (Incident Command keep track of the results. Additional complexity Information Management and Dissemination) and derives from the requirement to coordinate LS.1 (Logistics Information System). An effective response operations in an overwhelming CBRNE decision support system should provide: event with response undertaken by a variety of agencies with blurred responsibilities. A complex • Capabilities benchmarked by experienced and web of government agencies, military organiza- fully resourced municipal emergency manage- tions, and state and local responding agencies ment agencies. operate within an uncertain organizational

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• Interagency and metropolitan area integration. personnel who need to collaborate in a multitask- ing, multistage effort. • Simulation/exercise evaluation of plans. Gap Fillers: • Modeling, simulation, and red-teaming capability. Products that could be deployed soon and that would close some gaps in this needed capability • Ability to identify and track training and per- include: formance needs. • A common standardized distributed database • Indicators for early warning assessment and web server that can be used by federal, processes and tools (e.g., play-books and target state and local emergency planning and folders). response agencies, to provide comprehensive updated data and models relative to antici- Current Capabilities: pated CBRNE threat scenarios. Technologies exist in this area, but they have yet • A decision support system that provides algo- to be effectively applied to this problem. Little in rithmic simulation and support for evaluating the way of templates and decision support soft- intervention and response actions, and high- ware has been utilized by responders. lights specific planning and operational issues A working system (even if all of the data sets are as a consequence. available necessary to support visualization) must be fully integrated, in order to couple attribute- EMPP.6 – Establish Emergency Operation based dataset queries with high performance visu- Center (EOC). The ability to establish an effective alizations. There are advanced file-based systems multi-agency, multi-discipline coordination and that provide a solution to this problem, but there information resource center, to support coordination is little implementation at the state or local levels. and direction of strategic resource management, (These should not be considered technology limi- communication, logistics, etc. following a WMD tations as much as availability, training, and event. usability impediments.) In a catastrophe, decision-makers would face a vast amount of disorder and the most pressing State of the Art: need would be for a unified concept of opera- The state of the art for EMPP.1 (Risk Awareness tions that would reduce the disarray among pri- and Assessment) described available software appli- mary responders. With central management cations that are useful for this functional capabil- overwhelmed in the first few hours, the EOC ity as well. There are several software systems would be the focus for supporting networks oper- that have been applied to achieving some of the ating somewhat independently without any sig- goals listed for this functional element. nificant degree of direct coordinated guidance.

Technology Limitations and Barriers: Goals: Despite the apparent merits, most visualization Responders emphasized the need to “build from systems generally lack data management support the bottom up.” This approach provides solid of the scope described by the goals listed above. prototypes and operational concepts that have They offer some built-in support for finding per- credible support among the responder commu- tinent datasets based upon the attributes of the nity that can develop into a synchronized datasets but generally provide a fairly low-level national emergency management system over file browsing or tabular reporting mechanism. time. Effective unified command at the local Additional complexity is added by diffuse emer- level is the first step in developing a national gency management and response organization capability to respond effectively to a major terrorist event.

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The objective of a unified concept of operations at theses facilities could be compared to the chal- from a central EOC is to mobilize, deploy and lenges of planning for continued operation of utilize all essential resources and capabilities into cities following a limited nuclear attack during an action plan that effectively prioritizes tasks the Cold War. At present, in the event of a cata- needed in response to a terrorist attack. strophic attack, EOC network and response man- Coordination, cooperation, and collaboration agers would find themselves operating in an envi- among the decision-makers requires establishing ronment with the following characteristics: an EOC capability that can meet the following goals: • Many jurisdictions would lack adequate planning, training, information systems, commu- • Interoperable communications (up/down/ nications, or response agency associations suf- horizontal). ficient for all possible scenarios. • Current situation and resource status and • Most initial responses would be ad hoc and location. depend on system capacities and responder training in place at the moment of the attack. • Ability to project future operations. • Confusion and misinformation would prolif- • Database and communications integration. erate regarding unknown agents and their effects, public reactions, other response activi- • Common command system and terminology. ties, and availability of needed resources. • Seamless integration between EOC and field • Competing priorities, competition for command units. resources and lack of coordination would be • Open architecture and ability to exchange/syn- endemic among responders, incident com- chronize datasets among different nodes in the manders, and EOC directors. decision-making or management network. • Strict command and control would be impos- • Rapid communication links to regional and sible as emergency responders followed their national EOCs, agencies and “trigger points” instincts in the initial moments following the (surveillance control stations, command posts, attack. In the first three to six hours, incident etc.). commanders and supporting systems would be hard-pressed to assimilate the scope of impacts • Geographical and functional redundancy in and resource needs to issue all of the necessary other non-proximate location. orders, even if communications were perfect.

• Surge capacity workspace and logistics State of the Art: support. There is a daunting array of operating centers of various sorts at the national level. Only FEMA Current Capabilities: has developed an effective system of Regional Each state has some facility designated as an Operations Centers (ROCs) designed to coordi- EOC but capabilities, space, and equipment vary nate federal response in support of state and local widely. Major metropolitan areas have a range of jurisdictions for emergencies and disasters. EOC facilities that mirror the range of capabilities at the state level. However, fiscal constraints Most very large municipalities, states, and DHS would make it virtually impossible for jurisdic- (FEMA) have operations centers that are capable tions to have all capabilities needed to respond to of functioning to achieve the stated goals. The a major event, forcing them to draw on capabili- FEMA Regional Operations Centers were ties from many different locations. The scope of designed and equipped specifically to implement mobilization, deployment and utilization needed the Federal Response Plan and manage the

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resource support needs of states following a vehicles and even greater limitations in the speed disaster. of delivery via wireless means in a networked or Web-enabled mode (especially in the network The Emergency Management XML Consortium overload conditions to be expected in an inci- is developing standards based on Extensible dent). Responders are also concerned with the Markup Language to help emergency managers difficulty in data integration and graphics/data and responders improve data and graphic com- compression, exacerbated by a lack of software pression to facilitate and better integrate diverse standards. Technologists have noted, however, software and hardware. The consortium is organ- that improved interoperability and speed of data ized under the Standardization Committee of the exchange could be gained with standardized cod- Organization for the Advancement of Structured ing for the commonly used EXML/XML Web Information Standards (OASIS) standards body. programming language, discussed above.

The consortium working on the Standardization Gap Fillers: Committee has more than 50 members that are Templates and training courses to establish EOCs supporting the development of the XML schema- could be very helpful. The federal government based standards. The range of improvements might consider establishing local/state/regional includes unified incident management, geo- EOCs, of which there are currently a few graphic information system data accessibility and examples. usage, notification methods and messaging, situational reporting, source tasking, and asset and Because of its complexity, a unified concept resource management. Technologists expect to of operations requires common response have a clearer and streamlined path to Internet coordination with the strong support by major interoperability using this EXML standard by stakeholders. One option to expand the coordi- end of 2003. nation of multiple agencies from multiple levels is to develop regional operations centers in major Technology Limitations and Barriers: cities that are well-staffed and more experienced There are no specific limitations to the imple- in the problems associated with a major event. mentation of existing technologies in the EOC They have planned, trained, and exercised with environment. Data transfer and communications surrounding counties, states. They are familiar are where most technological limitations reside, with the integration of federal and military assets. to include access to telecommunications, cell phone networks, and the Internet during a crisis. Emergency managers and unified command sys- Limitations in sharing data and communicating tems have made great strides in developing EOCs (i.e., equipment interoperability) also have been a and operating concepts to address these problems concern for many public safety officials for years.9 that are likely to occur in coordinating response Communications interoperability issues, such as to a major terrorist incident. Most build on the those identified after the September 11th, 2001, incident command system. However, the lack of terrorist attacks between New York City firefight- a unifying concept of operations that functions ers and law enforcement officers, also extend to from a capable EOC facility would lead to wasted the sharing of other digital exchange and integra- resources, lives lost and a delayed response. tion capabilities where there is not a focused, While there is acceptance that a tightly managed clearly delineated set of standards for incident response might initially be impossible, a manage- management. ment concept that provides for a well-connected EOC could allow considerable independent There are presently some limitations in storage action within centrally coordinated guidelines. and display capabilities in individual responder This could be accomplished through a coherent

9 Methods for assuring communications connectivity and achieving interoperability are addressed in the NTRO on Unified Incident Command Decision Support and Interoperable Communications

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“network of networks” that linked the EOCs of Current Capabilities: response organizations from many agencies and The capability to conduct risk assessments and levels. engineer hardening in all listed categories is available. DoD and FEMA have studied hardening EMPP.7 – Facilities/nfrastructure Hardening. methods and established protective standards for The ability to provide information on mitigation, decades. However, the guidance on what levels hardening techniques and response of hardening are required is limited and specific planning to facility managers regarding identified to locations that have unique requirements for high-value assets and facilities, apply hardening protection of equipment or personnel, and usu- codes (to include retrofit laws and standards) and ally specified in regulations (i.e., prisons, weapons test and evaluate the hardening effort. storage, communications centers, banks, etc.). More extensive tools are required, for determin- Goals: ing needs and standards for general application at The traditional threat modes that government the state and local levels. and military facilities consider for building and equipment protection include hardening meas- State of the Art: ures in the following groupings: The Department of Defense has many programs • Penetration shielding from man-portable that address the needs of the military to protect explosive (thrown explosive, missile, rocket and defend soldiers, equipment and personnel propelled grenade) attack. from attacks of all kinds, including those that might be perpetrated by terrorists. • Protection from terrorist/saboteur vehicle bombs. Technology Limitations and Barriers: The technologies are mature for assessment, • Radiation shielding. design, engineering and applying physical hard- • Protection from air bio/chemical ening to facilities to achieve desired levels of pro- contamination. tection. The only impediments are methods for credible risk assessment to determine needs for • Protection from intruders proceeding on foot. physical enhancement and justification of the subsequent cost for completing the upgrades. • Shielding from electromagnetic pulses (EMP). Standards for assessment, design, and engineering The range of hardening would generally include against chemical, biological and radiological security, robustness, resilience, and redundancy. threats are less mature because of the wide variety The goals for this functional element are: of the threats and because of limits on our knowledge of lethal doses in real world condi- • Procedures to identify and prioritize high risk tions. Improvements are easy to design but full target hazards (coordinated with EMPP.3 protection is very difficult to assure; arriving at (High-Value Target Identification and an appropriate intermediate point would be diffi- Monitoring) above) for hardening. cult. Hardening against nuclear blast, fire, and EMP effects is also fairly well understood but • Centralized repository of standardized codes impossible at close range. and strategies. Gap Fillers: • Ability to retain functionality of the structure being hardened, balancing functionality vs. FEMA provided extensive guidance to states and security (cost-benefit analysis). local governments for analyzing facility protection and attack resistance during the Cold War • Certification of tested and evaluated products. era from the late 1950’s through the mid 1990’s. FEMA provides standards for EOC survivability

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and hardening enhancement for existing struc- commitments to implement existing technolo- tures to serve as shelters, command centers, and gies. The discussion of EMPP Response alternate government sites. Each state had a Technology Objectives expands on these combi- Facilities Engineer staff position that was 100% nations, and highlights existing technologies that federally funded. This information and guid- can be improved or made more feasible for ance is still available from FEMA archives and implementation. many states retain the regulatory and guidance information. The Department of Defense and The diversity of responder organizations and local communicable disease laboratories have methods, and state authorities employing disparate systems techniques, standards and protocols for construc- of command, control and coordination presents a tion of facilities that are effectively resistant or significant obstacle to effective implementation of hardened to prevent penetration or release of bio- existing technologies and best practices. Data logical threats. The cost and operational viability warehousing and knowledge management systems of such facilities in the CBRNE terrorism context that have been effectively implemented within is highly questionable, however. While the ability some military organizations, federal agencies, or and technology exists to construct or harden a large cities are not compatible with systems that facility to the standard of a Level 4 Bio-Lab, the are generally in widespread use, thus hindering functionality of such facilities would be severely the ability for multi-agency, multi-level response limiting and it is doubtful that a cost/benefit in a complex environment. Commonality and analysis would support application except in rare similarities among crisis management systems instances. Jurisdictions that desire hardening locally, regionally, and nationally are needed to to the blast overpressures of the nuclear attack foster effective joint efforts. Preparedness for survivability standards that FEMA defined or effective response management is most effective that the CDC promulgates for design of a Level when it is simple, flexible, and standardized. 4 laboratory can acquire and use this information In the hours immediately following a major event to develop hardening standards and procedures to information management and decision support the extent of the resources available to support systems must provide for decentralized manage- the associated costs. ment that permits a fair degree of autonomy to the functional networks collaborating in the Emergency Management Preparation and response. The rapid linkage of these compatible Planning Response Technology systems is needed to ensure the devolution of Objectives (EMPPrto) information and management, and to establish a The Emergency Management Preparation and common operational picture. Because of the Planning capabilities described above are not gen- complexity of implementing such systems, erally dependent on new or emerging technolo- acceptance of hardware and software standards gies. Rather, capability increase will come prima- needs the enthusiastic support of major stake- rily from the identification and integration of holders from local, state, and key military/federal best-of-breed software and procedures, guided by agencies. Most entities recognize the problems standards developed specifically for emergency and have been working on finding solutions. management preparation and planning at the The most immediate need is to create a continu- local level. Continued improvements and ing process that builds on the insight of key enhancements in technologies are still important, stakeholders. This is consistent with the need to however. In most cases, meeting needs and goals “build from the bottom up” in a process that pro- is dependent on development of standards, appli- vides concrete pilots projects led by credible fed- cation of operational/procedural methods, acquir- eral-level agencies that could harmonize this uni- ing existing data sets, man-hours to enter data for fied, national concept for support. specific sites, and/or making fiscal and training

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EMPPrto.1 – Risk Awareness and Assessment initial and sustainment training to ensure usabil- Decision Support Technology Demonstration ity of relatively complex software.

Objectives: Milestones/Metrics: Determine selection criteria for software systems The RTO should be oriented around a demon- that are effective, and metrics for assurance that stration project following selection of software, critical data sets will be available to responders training of responders/EOC personnel, and and sustainable. Determine “best-of-breed” in establishing multi-agency/multi-level interoper- useable collaborative decision-support systems ability, including the following milestones: that promote effective emergency response planning. Create benchmarks for integrated systems FY2004: Pilot program to define requirements that will consolidate the stove-piped risk and for software integration originating at the local impact assessment models currently available. level (bottom-up approach). Demonstrate an integrated, effective set of shared FY2005: Select demonstration sites that are tools that monitor the urban environment and small to medium sized cities that have a real- provide enhanced near real-time situational and world pre-planned event. integrated data from disparate sources into a single coherent view to support disciplined decision- FY2006: Demonstrate integrated technologies in making. actual use with live data and information flow to evaluate capabilities implementation and Payoffs: improvement. The development of systems that can accomplish the stated objectives will allow the nation’s Technologies should demonstrate, in a carefully responders and emergency managers to initiate a constructed series of exercises, ability to meet response with confidence that their incident situ- responders’ confidence in the usability, interoper- ational awareness is valid. Follow-on responders ability, and capability of accomplishing the stated and off-scene managers will have a common view goals. of the tactical arena and collective basis for crisis action and strategy development for consequence The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, National management. This demonstration should result Institute of Justice, and the Office for Domestic in a capability that helps free the crisis manage- Preparedness already have extensive experience ment team from time-consuming and tedious with such assessment software. data assessment and filtering, permitting higher- EMPPrto.1 – Budget in Millions level situational assessment and rapid response to Thrust 2004 2005 2006 Totals Decision Support Technology $2.5 $4 $3.5 $10 changing events. Demonstration

Challenges: EMPPrto.2 – Electronic Transcript Smart Although the technologies are generally available, Card. The advent of the Internet and its steady the challenge is to design the linkable networks development from a text-only medium to an to overcome the traditional lack of compatibility expanding multimedia communication system of many off-the-shelf proprietary software pack- has offered new and diverse opportunities for ages, data sets, and digital maps. There is a tech- training at convenient times and places. The nical challenge in implementing the digital archi- expanding range of possibilities requires training tecture and supporting software which must managers to be proactive in the development and accommodate a wide range of existing equipment use of technology in the teaching-learning and systems. Those capabilities have been process. They must become involved in the demonstrated in exercises and tests, but the chal- development process to ensure that it is the edu- lenge remains to commit the time and effort for cational needs that are driving the development

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of technology, rather than vice versa. These that address these concerns have been demon- responsibilities can be supported by technologies strated in Boston, Massachusetts and Prince that allow training and response managers to ver- William County, Virginia. ify responders’ proficiency and currency in specific skill sets and training requirements. Milestones/Metrics: Milestones should focus on demonstration proj- Objectives: ects in three sites (large, medium, and small juris- Demonstrate, for standardization and acceptance, diction) following selection of software, evalua- a digital smart card/chip “electronic transcript” tion of hardware, training of ICS staff, and system that securely verifies identification, levels responders to employ the “smart card” technol- of training/certification, and currency, for the ogy in a multi-jurisdiction response exercise. multitude of responders that converge on the scene of a high-visibility CBRNE event. Technologies should demonstrate, in a carefully constructed series of exercises, ability to meet Payoffs: responders’ confidence in the usability, interoperability, and capability of accomplishing the stated Immediate verification of credentials is essential goals. to make effective use of volunteers and mutual aid that may arrive in a chaotic fashion. The FY2004: Research existing technology; define tracking of the individuals for safety and their requirements for information to be tracked; spec- qualifications is an overwhelming task for inci- ify/the minimum equipment specifications; select dent commanders. Use of such smart cards, with software to implement the smart card technology. chips programmed to turn on when the wearer crosses a designated perimeter, would give the on- FY2005: Select three jurisdictions for demon- scene commander a rapid, accurate, and verifiable stration sites that test the technology in the full picture of resource and skill availability, and range of response; demonstrate tracking technolo- ensure the qualifications of each responder at the gies in actual use with live data and information scene. This objective could ultimately be com- flow to evaluate capabilities implementation and bined in a synergistic way with the responder per- identify shortfalls. sonal locator technology that is the subject of UICrto.1, to enable safety monitoring and FY2006: Evaluate systems for effectiveness. accounting throughout the event. FY2007: Produce strategies, best practices, and technology benchmarks/minimum standards for Challenges: technology implementation. The GPS-enabled smart card technology to EMPPrto.2 – Budget in Millions achieve the objective is available but it is Thrust 2004 20052006 2007 Totals not in widespread use. The GPS feature Electronic Transcript Smart $2.25 $3 $1 $0.75 $7 may not in fact be necessary in an early ver- Card sion that would rely on the inherent short distance of the card/reader combination for EMPPrto.3 – Alternate/Mobile Hospital rough location. This is a low-risk demonstration Contingency Management project to benchmark systems that can ensure interface and display capabilities in the emer- Objectives: gency responder communities. The challenge is Develop standards based on case studies, bench- to gain acceptance of the use of technology that marking, and best practices in use for managing tracks movement and location of individuals. In hospital/medical contingencies. A formal study some implementation scenarios, responders saw of software systems (perhaps by CDC or Public personnel tracking as an invasion of privacy or Health Service) is needed, to determine the exist- violation of union rules. Procedures and policies ing capabilities, feasibility of expansion, and the

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inclination of hospitals to support the reporting Technologies should demonstrate, in two care- requirements. fully constructed exercises, ability to meet responders’ confidence in the usability, interoperability, Payoffs: and capability of accomplishing the stated goals. Quick implementation of critical resource EMPPrto.3 – Budget in Millions reporting of hospital and medical resources in Thrust 2004 2005 2006 Totals Alternate/Mobile Hospital $1.75 $0.75 $0.75 $3.25 common database formats for decision support Contingency Management by incident commanders, emergency responders, and emergency managers. EMPPrto.4 – Course-of-Action Development Challenges: System. Computer-based decision support and information management technologies can assist This is a very low risk enterprise that uses readily the emergency planning/response community in available existing technologies and COTS soft- achieving a higher level of sophistication in infor- ware to accomplish the desired goals. Bench- mation assessment, integration and manipulation. marking and best practices will be demonstrated An effective decision-support (or course of action in a relatively straightforward endeavor that stud- development system) should synthesize information ies the implementation in three to five munici- in a manner that facilitates and speeds up the palities using existing systems. decision-making process and allows for the devel- Milestones/Metrics: opment of databases that reflect the full spectrum of the various organizational modes, resources Review and evaluate software to use in a and capabilities. Policy and procedure integra- demonstration project to test capabilities for tion with constant sustainment training is needed coordinating medical resource availability and for this capability to find broad acceptance and prioritization. This demonstration project should implementation. follow selection of software, training of responders/EOC personnel, and participating hospitals Objectives: in two jurisdictions. Project completion includes Software integration to link existing GIS, model- the following milestones: ing, planning, flood and incident management FY2004: Pilot program to define requirements systems, National Crime Information Center for software integration, and demonstrate imple- information, Radiological Emergency mentation, originating at the local level with Preparedness systems, and specialty databases jurisdictions that have volunteer hospital partici- (e.g., California’s earthquake-related systems), pation (bottom-up approach). with existing decision support programs. The sponsorship of this effort should fall to the organ- FY2005: Demonstrate technology and evaluate izations already heavily committed to developing system usage, in two jurisdictions that have hos- systems that span the local, state, federal, and pital/medical facilities with existing computer- military multi-level response structures. Those based resource tracking capability, with integrated two national organizations are the Defense Threat technologies in actual use using live data and Reduction Agency (DTRA) and Department of information flow to evaluate capabilities imple- Homeland Security (FEMA). The CATS system mentation and identify shortfalls. that is sponsored by DTRA is particularly well- suited to build on for benchmarking and stan- FY2006: Analyze and define strategies/best prac- dards for integration and interoperability, and the tices for technology selection (benchmarking) and FEMA HAZUS-MH system is the most capable implementation. GIS-based natural hazards system.

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Payoffs: agency/multi-level interoperability. The project A course-of-action development system will help includes the following milestones: incident commanders and EOC officials make FY2004: Evaluate candidate software that is better decisions more efficiently and in better available and in effective use; define integration coordination. Developing interoperability stan- and data-exchange protocols that will be compat- dards will facilitate the DHS policy for EOC ible with system capabilities at local levels. regionalization and encourage others to make the commitments to cost, training, and strategic FY2005: Define minimum equipment criteria; planning necessary to commit resources and select equipment for use in testing; deploy soft- implement compatible EOCs. ware and equipment for exercise and train participants. Challenges: There are no significant technological challenges FY2006: Select four demonstration sites that are to pursuing these goals. Risk is minimal. representative of the full range of local response capabilities (one large, two medium, one small Milestones/Metrics: jurisdiction); demonstrate integrated technologies The salient effort is focused on a proof-of- in actual use with live data and information flow concept demonstration project that provides for to evaluate capabilities implementation and areas multi-agency, multi-level linking of compatible for improvement. Evaluate effectiveness of systems that are already in use. A unified systems. approach by organizations “owning” the software The technology demonstration will facilitate must define protocols for exchange of compatible responder and command-level confidence in the data sets and visualization outputs. The ultimate usability, interoperability, and capability of goals are to select the most capable and compati- accomplishing the stated goals. ble software, select viable demonstration sites for a tiered exercise, train responders/EOC personnel EMPPrto.4 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2004 2005 2006 Totals and other participants, and demonstrate multi- Course-of-Action $3.5 $8 $6.75 $18.25 Development System

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 • Local Bottom-Up Requirements for EMPPrto.1 – Risk Software Integration Awareness/Assessment • Pre-Planned Events Decision Support • Demo Integrated with Technology Demonstration Real Data and Bandwidth • Verifies Responder ID, Training, Certifications EMPPrto.2 – Electronic • GPS Enabled Transcript Smart Card • Interoperable

• COTS Software EMPPrto.3 – • Integrated and Alternate/Mobile Hospital Demonstrated in 5 Contingency Management Jurisdictions • Multi-Agency, Multi- Level Linking of EMPPrto.4 – Course-of- Compatible Decision Action Development System Support Systems Emergency Management Preparation and Planning Technology Roadmap

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PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter VII Medical Response (MR) Chapter Chair: Dr. Stephen Kornguth Chapter Coordinator: Michelle Royal Definition those appropriate in a chemical, nuclear or high explosive incident. In biological and radiological Medical Response is the capability to provide events, there is a longer time delay between rapid, effective, safe treatment of persons exposed release of the agent and manifestation of its con- to CBRNE threats. This is achieved by mobiliz- sequences among an affected population. The ing, deploying, and sustaining a safe field medical continued threat of exposed persons to others response in full coordination with hospitals and persists because of the infectious quality of bio- public health infrastructures. logical agent or prolonged half-life of the radio- This section is complemented by the Public logical agent. The effects of nuclear, chemical Health Readiness for Biological Agent Events and explosive materials on a target are apparent (PHRBAE) National Terrorism Response within seconds to minutes of the event. Objective (see Chapter VIII), which focuses on Radiological materials will manifest their adverse capabilities needed specifically for response to effects on a target within hours if the dosage is biological threats. high; it may take weeks to years to observe the full consequences of the threat materials at lower doses. Humans, animals, or plants will manifest Operational Environments clinical signs typically seventy-two hours to eight The type of event or threat scenario proved to be days after exposure to a biological threat agent. the most relevant way of defining the variety of Because of the delay between exposure and operational environments for medical response. appearance of clinical signs, the type of emer- Therefore, this NTRO’s Operational gency responder will differ and the management Environments are: chemical, biological, radiolog- of the high threat situation will require strategies ical, nuclear, and high explosive/incendiary. that differ from other CBRNE events. However, in most instances the effects of a nuclear explosion on survivors amount to combi- There are two distinct timelines for recognition nations of exposure to radiation, heat, fire, and of an event: immediate and delayed. If sensor blast (though probably on a larger scale). Thus, systems that detect threat agents are present at the nuclear operational environment calls for the time of release, immediate action may be combinations of capabilities needed for the radio- taken by authorities in proximity to the event. logical and explosive/incendiary operational envi- Such action includes securing the perimeter fol- ronments. For this reason, within some func- lowed by treatment of exposed persons with tional capability areas, the ‘nuclear’ operational appropriate antibiotics, antivirals, and anti-toxins. environment is considered not applicable because However, the more likely response to a biological all the needed capabilities are included within the event (and to low-level radiological and chemical radiological and explosive/incendiary operational events) will be along a delayed timeline, where environments. the dispersal of the threat agent will not be detected at the time of release. Responders The capabilities required for medical response to may not recognize the occurrence of an event a biological or radiological incident differ from until after the first appearance of clinical signs

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inconsistent with normal patterns of illness in the • Mass Casualty Medical Care Management community. This will occur typically three to eight days after release of the biological agent, or • Individual and Collective Protection of Health possibly longer in the case of a low-level radiolog- Care Personnel and Facilities ical incident. The emergency responder in this • Rapid Clinical, Environmental and Veterinary situation will be the health care provider in an Field Assessment. emergency medical service environment, an emergency room, a private physician, the pathol- • Medical Response to Public Affairs ogist, a pharmacist or a family member. • Modeling of Exposure/Casualties for Location Diagnosing and distinguishing an illness as a and Numbers result of either an emergent disease or bioterrorist activity will be frustrated by two issues: 1) many • Definitive Decontamination illnesses appear similar to common flu at early stages (enteric or respiratory signs), and 2) the • Medical Staff Surge, Re-Supply and Proper process of differential diagnosis requires the diag- Accreditation nostician first to rule out the most probable • Telemedicine in Support of Surge causes of illness before considering unlikely causes. The functional capabilities are presented in priority order based on responders’ input in work- There are three important timeframes related to a shops and field interviews conducted during the biological threat: pre-event, minutes to hours earlier phases of this effort. The functional capa- surrounding the release event, and four or more bilities were subsequently modified and validated hours post-event. Protective measures in the pre- in workshops involving both responders and event period and during the release phase include technologists. The first three (Mass Medical vaccination, storage and maintenance of vaccines, Prophylaxis (MR.1); Mass Casualty Medical Care antivirals and antibiotics, body-cover similar to Management (MR.2); and Individual and that used in surgical suites, face masks that cover Collective Protection of Health Care Facilities and the mouth, nose, ears and glasses. In the absence Personnel (MR.3)) were regarded by a strong con- of skin abrasions or puncture wounds, biological sensus as the highest priorities in this NTRO. threat agents (i.e., viruses, bacteria, fungi and toxins) will generally not penetrate intact skin (with It should be noted that this NTRO originally the exception of cutaneous anthrax). They may considered the functional capability Therapeutics be ingested, inhaled or injected. After the first and Treatments in Dangerous Environments. This four hours antibiotics, antivirals and vaccines will functional capability was originally considered be required. Those persons exposed to agents lowest priority of the NTRO. After further con- should be placed in isolation. Care providers and sideration, responders agreed there was no real emergency responders will require face masks and need to pursue this capability because they could gloves. Washing hands with detergent or diluted not foresee any scenario where treatment will be bleach is required and contaminated clothes given in the “hot zone.” Current strategy should be removed and contained at a safe desig- involves the removal of exposed persons from the nated site near the incident. hot zone to an adjacent clean area and subsequent removal of clothing and washing of Needed Functional Capabilities and exposed persons. Therefore, this functional capa- Priorities bility was eliminated from the list of needed The functional capabilities needed for this capabilities for this NTRO. NTRO, in priority order, are: The responders believe that marked improvement • Mass Medical Prophylaxis is needed in the rapid detection of agents in hot

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zones and of persons Medical Response exposed to threat Operational Environments agents. They also High Explosive/ believe that new Functional Capabilities Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Incendiary approaches are neces- 1. Mass Medical Prophylaxis sary for administration of prophylaxis to large 2. Mass Casualty Medical Care Management numbers of persons. A 3. Individual and Collective high priority was Protection of Health Care Facilities and Personnel placed on developing 4. Rapid, Clinical Environmental and Veterinary Field tools for looking down- Assessment range at an incident to identify health status of 5. Medical Response Public Affairs victims and detecting 6. Modeling of Exposure/ Casualties for Location and threats in the environ- Numbers ment. This is 7. Definitive Decontamination addressed in part in 8. Medical Staff Surge, Re-Supply Chapter III (DIDA) and Proper Accreditation and Chapter IV (UIC). 9. Telemedicine in Support of Surge A related high priority Requirements is availability of a 1 1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this voice-activated docu- 2 operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO mentation assessment 3 2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO tool to link emergency 3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability? responders to hospitals LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH and clinics via the Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’ Internet. MR.1 – Mass Medical Prophylaxis. The ability The discussion of the individual capabilities is to provide mass medical prophylaxis (including related to the needs identified. Several of the antibiotics, antivirals and vaccinations) to persons essential needs do not require novel technology exposed to biological agents, and to provide appro- development (e.g., capability to distribute vac- priate pharmaceuticals or protective materials to cines, antivirals and antibiotics) but rather require persons exposed to chemical, radiological or high an adaptive change in administrative policy and explosive incidents. culture. Other needs do require technological innovation (e.g., modeling dissemination of This functional capability assumes that knowledge aerosols based on meteorological data at low alti- of an incident is timely enough that prophylaxis is tude). While technological advances are required administered at or near the scene and therefore in this area, modification of public attitudes and can mitigate danger to potential victims and administrative structures will also be required if responders. In the case of biological or radiologi- success is to be realized. cal agents, the window for recognition of an event is about 24 to 96 hours post exposure; for chemi- Overall State of Technology for cal agents, the window is seconds to minutes. Medical Response Goals: The matrix below shows a pattern of moderate to This functional capability includes the following high technological challenges in meeting the goals: needs of medical responders. • Identification of at-risk population.

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• Protection of population from developing ill- functional capability establishes a need for new ness after a CBRNE event. rapid delivery techniques. Improved delivery techniques require development of strategies for • Identification of appropriate prophylaxis and distribution (including staffing, logistics, facili- contraindications. ties, etc.), expedient and efficient acquisition, and administration (to include tracking) of pharma- • Improved delivery methods. ceutical stockpiles. • Strategy development for distribution of mate- Improved methods have been established for rial (including staffing, logistics, facilities, security, responder protection and social control etc.). in the event of a CBRNE incident. However, • Expedient/efficient acquisition, distribution desk-top drills conducted across the nation con- and administration (to include tracking) of tinue to reveal shortcomings in the system. To prophylaxis. improve the capability of the nation to minimize adverse consequences from a CBRNE attack, an • Strategies for managing pharmaceutical additional goal of this capability is development stockpiles. of new methods to test the readiness of systems for mass prophylaxis. • Security, force protection and social control. The development (as opposed to management • Methods to model and test systems in order to and delivery) of novel prophylaxis to improve improve preparedness for mass prophylaxis protection against some agents is implied in this eventuality. function. However, this has been outside the scope of Project Responder. Therefore, this func- The key to this capability is to detect the pres- tional area is limited to the management and ence of threat agents at the earliest point after delivery of prophylaxis. dissemination, to identify the population at highest risk, and to devise a plan to administer pro- Current Capabilities: tective medication. The detection and identification of threat agents requires sensor technology as There is no technology in use for rapid identifica- described in Chapter III (DIDA). (See also tion of at-risk populations. Systems that use real- PHRBAE.1 (Surveillance and Information time information about an attack do not yet exist because that information has not been previously Integration Systems), PHRBAE.2 (Rapid High- been available. The federal government and Throughput Clinical Assessment and Testing) and some cities are now deploying the kind of sensor MR.4 (Rapid Clinical Environmental and systems that could provide that information, on Veterinary Field Assessment).) The identification an experimental basis, but more development is of the “at-risk” population includes identifying required. those in the immediate vicinity of the release of agent and others with particular susceptibility to With regard to identifying appropriate prophy- the threat agents (such as the immuno-deficient, laxis and contraindications, current studies on the aged, or those with chronic disease). This func- human genome are anticipated to provide infor- tional capability probably requires specialized mation regarding which individuals are most sus- demographic databases. ceptible to adverse responses to antibiotics and other chemicals. It is not possible now to deter- The goals point to a system that merges knowl- mine which individuals are most susceptible to edge about the ongoing incident, previous knowl- adverse clinical response to vaccination. edge about prophylaxis procedures and protocols and modeling and simulation to provide a knowl- Delivery methods have not changed their basic edge base that responders can use to manage a technology in years, but policies have become mass prophylaxis operation. In addition, this more conservative and less supportive of mass

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prophylaxis. Auto-injectors and reusable syringes is investigating the use of urban mass transit are still the fastest means for delivery. But under monitoring systems and other fixed arrays as a current administrative policies and procedures, it basis for understanding the urban environment. has been estimated that approximately 50,000 to Demographic databases with GIS registration are 100,000 persons could be vaccinated for small- being deployed, and data mining of 9-1-1 sys- pox per day in the U.S. according to the Center tems is spreading. Systems that provide event- for Disease Control. Compare this with the vac- driven treatment management and bar-coding cination of five to six million in two weeks in tied to medical records are also being developed. New York City in 1947. The change is a consequence of the large number of immuno-deficient Technology Limitations and Barriers: individuals today (e.g., organ transplants, AIDS) There are few major technical barriers to increas- and the litigious nature of society compared with ing our ability to administer antidotes to biologi- that in 1947. Difficulties in mass vaccination are cal, chemical and radiological agents. The largest further evidenced by the large number of health technical barrier is the ability to integrate dis- care workers (90%) who have refused vaccination parate databases. However, the primary limita- with the smallpox vaccine. This indicates that tion is the lack of an administrative infrastructure even knowledgeable workers do not perceive the able to deal with licensing of personnel who are risk/benefit ratio of vaccination to be beneficial at not physicians or are from another jurisdiction. this time. Immunization of the population in an The fact that almost all countermeasures to bio- urban area the size of New York or other metrop- logical, chemical or radiological threat involve olis could require as much as seventy days. By some level of morbidity raises the likelihood of contrast, other countries estimate that a popula- litigation. Rapid determination of at-risk population of five million persons can be immunized in tions is reliant on sensor systems. Therefore, the ten days. The problem is therefore more social and political than technological. primary technology barriers to providing this capability are similar to those described in Chemical, radiological, nuclear and HE threats Chapter III (DIDA). are not readily managed by prophylaxis. Ready availability of anti-nerve gas antidotes (acetyl- Gap Fillers: cholinesterase inhibitors) can mitigate the effects The primary gap filler would be the development of exposure; inappropriate use of the antidote of a knowledge base with decision aides, tem- however is associated with adverse clinical effects plates, and management support for responders and therefore contributes to the social and legal to use to manage a mass prophylaxis operation. issues mentioned above. The system would integrate existing and future databases to provide access to situational aware- State of the Art: ness. In addition, a program needs to be created Technology currently exists for more rapid deliv- that will address a more rapid delivery system ery of prophylaxis, and for tracking the adminis- with significantly higher throughput rates tration of pre-event and post-event treatment. Marked improvement is needed in rapid adminis- MR.2 – Mass Casualty Medical Care tration of prophylaxis for chemical and biological Management. The ability to provide automated threats as such threats emerge. New tools to support for handling large numbers of casualties monitor and track administration of treatments being cared for in many geographical locations and are also needed. with a wide variety of injuries within likely terrorist scenarios. It includes triage and hospital care. Elements of the technologies that will enable the goals are emerging today. Smart sensor networks The emergency responders placed a high priority are being developed by the Department of on developing an ability to look “downrange” at Defense. The Department of Homeland Security an incident to allow remote triage and to provide

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appropriate support tools for the on-scene • Expert systems to provide appropriate treat- responder, similar to those discussed in the previ- ment strategy to emergency medical services ous section. This capability would allow remote (EMS) and other responders. sensing of vital signs (e.g., blood pressure, pulse, blood oxygenation, dilated pupils and panic lev- A key goal is the development of technology to els). When coupled with a voice activated docu- monitor a patient’s progress through the system mentation headset to remotely link vocally docu- in order to keep track of patients’ locations and mented assessment with text/cathode ray tube treatment updates. As discussed in the previous (CRT) screen, staff at remote hospitals will be section, the management of large number of better able to evaluate crisis situations. All this casualties is one of the biggest problems facing would be part of an automated system to manage responders. The management system envisioned the treatment and keep track of the casualties. by this set of goals would certainly overlap with This capability should be interoperable across all the requirements described in MR.1 (Mass agencies likely to be involved, at least on a Medical Prophylaxis), with greater scope. The regional basis (if not national) and used on a goal which differs here is the ability to sense vital daily basis. physiological information without direct contact (i.e., non-invasive). Responders referred to this as Goals: the “triage tricorder.” Once acquired, physiological information could be remotely transmitted, in The goals for this functional area include: real time, to provide a common medical opera- • Ability to monitor a patient’s progress through tional picture made available to command, EOC, the system in order to keep track of where hospitals and other key personnel. The biosens- people are and treatment updates; linked into ing tool is similar to that described in Chapter III a common operational picture for deployment (DIDA). Decision support technology to by emergency responders. develop triage strategy can emerge from this approach. • Ability to attach to patients. Current Capabilities: • Capable of identifying triage priority, clinical At the present time, there are multiple existing status and personal information; and remotely systems being used to identify and track victims transmitting it in real time to a common oper- at an incident site. These systems are primarily ational picture available to command, EOC, manual (e.g., names are taken and entered by hospitals and other key personnel. hand) and the resulting data sets are not stan- • Medical operational picture containing real- dardized nor linked to other users. Common time information about the resource status operational picture systems exist in the military and patient care capabilities of the local system and those systems do integrate medical situa- to command post/EOC (see also EMPP.4 tional information. The military systems would (Alternate/Mobile Hospital Contingencies)). need to be adapted for civilian use. No capability currently exists in the field to remotely sense • Development of strategies and systems for dis- physiological characteristics. Some voice acti- tributing personnel resources in massive casu- vated/recognition medical documentation sys- alty systems. tems are being deployed in the clinical environment but not in the field. Current voice • Management of some critical patients simulta- recognition technology does not work well in neous with triage. noisy environments. Terrorist events will most likely be noisy and chaotic. • Biosensing.

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State of the Art: and medical management authority, EOC or The use of bar codes to track moving items or incident command; the information could be stockpiles of food is well established at Federal converted to text on a CRT screen. Express and major food stores. Many prototype • Automated casualty management system using systems are under development to provide infor- bar code technology or radio frequency tags. mation continuity between emergency medical The system would track patients and their services and hospitals. The State of Maryland has medical information and relay the information a prototype program for formatting triage sheets back to incident command. This could to electronic forms and reporting this informa- also be used for syndrome information and tion to incident command system for assigning analysis. beds. A commercially available software package from Cerner allows the rapid capture of clinical • Expansion of the physiological monitoring data at the time of patient entry into the system. program recommended in DIDA to include The DREAMS (Disaster Relief and Emergency this area’s bio-sensing needs. Medical Service) project in Texas also utilizes electronic data sets obtained at an incident site to • Systems built for everyday use, not just cata- provide a common operational picture to distant strophic incidents. medical care providers. The Virginia health care system provides emergency room facilities with • Standards developed and accepted by user medical data from an ambulance, via radio fre- communities on a regional and national basis. quency transmission. (The standards must then be integrated into everyday operations so the user commu- Technology Limitations and Barriers: nity is familiar with the procedure. An Internet-based system is one way of a For this capability to come to full fruition, every chieving some standards and to have a health care organization that can potentially robust communications.) become involved in an incident needs to have the system or be interoperable. This presents not • Ability to train on the system. The inclusion only a technical challenge to successfully integrate of simulation and virtual reality elements to both new and legacy systems, but a policy and train while operating the system will be administrative challenge to establish and imple- important (e.g., embedded training). (See ment national standards; not to mention cost EMPP.2 (Mission Rehearsal, Simulation, issues. Embedded Training and Distance Education).)

Current systems have yet to be tested in a truly MR.3 – Individual and Collective Protection- mass casualty situation where tens of thousands Health Care Facilities and Personnel. The of victims need to be managed. It remains to be ability to protect medical care personnel and facili- seen what technical difficulties emerge from that ties (to include field hospitals and triage areas) from scenario. The ability to develop voice recognition CBRNE hazards. systems that can operate effectively in very noisy environments has yet to be realized. In the event of a CBR incident, there will be a need for automatic lockdown mechanisms in Gap Fillers: health care facilities. This is required to diminish Some elements of programs that should be con- the risk of disease to patients at the hospital that sidered to fill gaps include: are in a pre-existing state of compromised health. The automatic lockdown may be expected to • Voice activated documentation software pack- reduce security needs and release responders to ages which will permit electronic (remote) undertake other critical missions. Field hospitals information transfer between an incident site would be established to further reduce the risk of

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disease dissemination to compromised patients. from the application of mostly off-the-shelf tech- (See MR.2 (Mass Casualty Medical Care nology (such as in the case of the security goal). Management) and EMPP.4 (Alternate/Mobile It would be most effective to have technical eval- Hospital Contingencies).) Although technology uations of hospital designs prior to construction is an issue, isolation of patients and establish- of new facilities so as to enable care of affected ment of field hospitals also involves many policy persons without contaminating large numbers of decisions (e.g., financial allocations, sources of people. The development of national standards field hospital, routing of critical care patients). similar to building codes would be necessary.

Goals: Current Capabilities: The following goals are an indication of what At the present time very few, if any, hospitals capability is needed in this area: have a security force capable of locking down the facility. Bio contagion in hospitals is a real prob- • Sensor-based, automatic, real-time, secure lem; nosocomial infections are commonplace in lockdown systems (i.e., double-door systems). most urban medical facilities. Very few hospitals have any capability to house patients with highly • Over pressure, filtered air. infectious disease. Even those that do have such • Capacity for isolation. capability can manage only between ten and forty patients. Many of those hospitals are located in • Adequate security for site and personnel in the remote areas and present a challenge in transport- case of a lockdown, supported by rules of ing patients from an incident site to the facility. engagement (not generally technology enabled Therefore, although the technical ability to treat except for where manpower can be replaced by patients with highly infectious disease or chemi- barriers with trusted access systems). cal exposure exits, the ability to manage a major attack with associated large numbers of victims • Proper respiratory protection that allows field remains unaddressed. The low probability of and hospital medical personnel to see and such an attack diminishes the likely allocation of communicate with the victims (covered in local resources. The high consequence of the Chapter II (PPE)). event, however, requires novel approaches and solutions. Facilities around the country exist for • One-size-fits-all respirators which are easy to management of patients with highly infectious use and not bulky. Ease of operation, storable disease or with chemical agent exposure. over long term, can be worn for a long time Examples include Ft. Detrick, the University of without taxing the responder (covered in Texas at Tyler, and the Johns Hopkins University. Chapter II (PPE)). All the technologies needed to create this capability exist in a commercial off the shelf mode. • Airlock and bubble to provide containment However, the expense of integrating the capabil- and safe operations (addressed in Chapter VIII ity in existing hospitals will be prohibitive. There (PHRBAE)). are also a limited number of field hospitals in the Army (e.g., Natick) and Air Force for treatment • Technical evaluation of hospital design which of individuals in conditions of isolation. provides ways for people to be assessed without contaminating large numbers of people State of the Art: (not primarily technology-enabled). Most of the relevant state-of-the-art technologies As indicated by the parenthetical comments, a reside in the military. For individual protection number of these goals are being addressed in of health care providers, military medical person- other NTROs. Still more are not strictly techno- nel use the same gear as soldiers. Some of the logically enabled, although some may benefit military hospitals and labs have been fitted with

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isolation units that are meant to deal with the Gap Fillers: treatment of any infectious diseases, including From technology standpoint, technologists and those that are bio-warfare threats. Natick Army responders agree that the technology is available Research & Development Center has developed to meet this needed capability. The deployment field-deployable hospitals (and other enclosures) of that technology is a funding and policy issue, built to protect health providers and patients and therefore no gap filling programs are offered. from chemical and biological threats. Some hos- However, the need remains, and the federal pitals have built-in protection fields in their triage government should study the situation with a and emergency room areas. However, there view toward determining whether federal funding seems to some difference of opinion as to the and policy initiatives are needed to create this effectiveness of the methods used. Lack of stan- capability. dards for emergency responders is a problem. MR.4 – Rapid Clinical, Environmental and Technology Limitations and Barriers: Veterinary Field Assessment. The ability to assess The major limitation and barrier in establishing environmental, human and animal data relating to protected facilities is not technical, but financial. the existence of biological, chemical or radiological The low probability of an attack, even with high threat. This assessment will assist responders in consequences, limits enthusiasm for major out- medical triage and diagnostics. lays of funds, especially by local governments. In addition, a large portion of the country’s health- There is an unmet need to have minimally inva- care facilities are private sector entities that must sive, rapid diagnostic tools that can be linked to be concerned about the financial “bottom line.” dynamic models of chemical, biological or radio- Thus, there are very limited resources to finance logical agent dispersal, and the clinical appear- the required changes. In cases where tens of ance of disease/morbidity/mortality. These tools thousands of victims will need treatment, alter- would support the treatment and management of nate facilities in schools and other government thousands of victims. owned buildings will probably be converted into temporary hospitals. The decontamination of Goals: these buildings after use and the public accept- • Rapid diagnostic tools to safely and accurately ance of assurances that re-occupancy of the build- detect and identify injuries or illnesses. ings will be a very low risk will raise new issues. As an example, reutilization of schools may be • Link remote responder to reach back to a problematic if public perception exists that the specialist for diagnostic support (telemedi- schools may be unsafe. The inability to use cine–video and data link/distance triage). postal facilities that were contaminated by • Linked in real-time to dynamic models, sur- anthrax after clean-up, and the utilization of veillance systems to acute care. schools that had reported high levels of asbestos, are two examples of the difficulties regarding • Broadened multimedia training to expand community acceptance of decontaminated struc- knowledge among all responders. tures. As stated above however, these are essentially policy and social issues, not technical. It These goals again speak to the need for a mini- would help to have a better understanding of the mally invasive field diagnostic tool that provides, risks at low levels of contamination, and assays among other things, the capability to reach back that detect those low levels. Chapter III (DIDA) to a specialist for diagnostic support. The linkage recommends work on sensors that would help in must be available in real time and allow the this area. emergency responder to access dynamic models

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of disease dissemination and surveillance system. type of mass spectrometer, has significant capabil- The end result of this activity is to facilitate the ities for identifying chemical or biological threats, more rapid and effective triage of patients based but it is not available in a lightweight mobile on information obtained across distances of form. Retinal scanning for diabetes is another miles. technology allowing for rapid screening of subjects for signs of illness. Current Capabilities: A variety of tools have been developed and tested Technology Limitations and Barriers: for measurement of blood oxygen, glucose and Among the difficulties with these rapid screening body temperature. Sandia and Los Alamos procedures is the wide range of “normal” values National Laboratories have developed infrared in the total population. It would be most useful systems for such applications (these are discussed to have a data set with internal calibrations for all in Chapter III (DIDA)). Thermal scans have persons. Alternatively, distribution curves of been utilized by Canada, Taiwan, China and “normals” in each population are required if rapid other Asian nations to detect individuals with ele- screening is to prove useful. More ways need to vated body temperature during the SARS out- be discovered to sense that the body (humans and break in March 2003, although it remains to be animals) is giving indications of sickness. Finally, seen how effective they really are in screening for the speed with which we need to analyze the sen- disease. All the methods identified must be sor feedback, in order to diagnose the individual, applicable for screening large numbers of subjects is technically challenging. rapidly. This capability is limited compared to goals needed in this functional capability. Gap Fillers: Fundamental research is required on ways to dis- State of the Art: cover and detect physiological clues to illness The national laboratories have developed pro- without invading the body (such as those men- grams for utilizing infrared spectral analysis to tioned above). (See also the Strategic Research determine changes in wellness of individuals. Areas in Chapter I.) The many new non-invasive Sandia Laboratory and the private sector have approaches to sensing physiological phenomena developed infrared devices to enable the measure- should be benchmarked and a study of possible ment of blood glucose and cholesterol. Infrared synergistic combinations be performed. A library scanning of individuals allows for rapid determi- of blood component signatures (such as infrared nation of body temperature and was used on a spectrum) should be developed in support of large scale in monitoring which airline passengers those methods that use blood as a diagnosis from Asia were possibly SARS carriers during the medium. spring of 2003. Blood oximetry allows for the determination of oxygenation of the blood; this is MR.5 – Medical Response to Public Affairs. an important parameter in triage of patients. The ability to manage large numbers of otherwise Miniaturization of nuclear magnetic resonance healthy people concerned for their well being as the (from the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns result of a CBRNE event, without taxing the med- Hopkins University) and gas chromatography ical resources of the community. This management devices can now permit rapid screening of closed is realized through the use of public communica- environments for signatures of chemical agents tion systems including the Internet, radio, televi- and precursors in exhaled air volumes. The sion, the press and telephone; and by coordina- miniature mass spectrometer device was devel- tion with state Departments of Health, the office oped from funding provided by the Defense of the governor in each affected state and the Advanced Research Projects Agency. The Matrix Centers for Disease Control. Assisted Laser Desorption Ionization (MALDI), a

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Goals: State of the Art: An overall goal is providing public awareness at a In addition to Advice Nurses and the initiatives sufficiently high level so that the well-informed of some of the telecommunications carriers, com- can initiate self-help processes, thereby increasing munities are deploying reverse 9-1-1 systems, the efficiency of medical response personnel. The where local emergency managers can get urgent specific goals identified by responders are: information to their constituents via telephone.

• Strategy for reassurance of unaffected or mini- Technology Limitations and Barriers: mally affected populations. This is another area where technology to enable • Remote or offsite screening system which this capability already exists. Technology to sup- can field calls or visits (e.g., reception centers, port this capability is already being pursued by telephone hotlines, website) from potential commercial telecommunications companies and patients who report their symptoms. HMOs. The barriers are primarily policy and funding. Among the policy issues to be • Reduction of impact on medical resources of addressed are mechanisms to increase the num- the affected area. bers of lay persons who can provide assistance in a medical emergency. Under what circumstance • Rapid screening for exposure to WMD agent may lay persons be utilized to provide services (dealt with in MR.4). while liability concerns are managed? HMOs have extensive experience in managing the access • Capability effectiveness before people arrive at to medical care providers, patients, relatives and the hospital. the worried well. An examination of which procedures are most effective in increasing patient Current Capabilities: care and reducing inefficiency may improve care At present, the strategy for reassuring the popula- delivery in a crisis situation. tion is through non-governmental media outlets. These sources are often inconsistent. Tremendous In the U.S. the mass communications commu- stress is placed on medical personnel and hospital nity could provide real assistance to the public facilities as a result. Many clinical care practices and care providers. In many cases, including the (including Health Maintenance Organizations World Trade Centers in September 2001, the (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations media served an important role. In other cases (PPOs) have established a filtering system media coverage has been less than helpful, or has between the patient and physician, sometimes even hindered crisis response. Absent any serious called an “Advice Nurse” where providers effec- planning media support would be uneven and tively triage their clients and give medical advice haphazard at best. The federal government may via the telephone. For the larger HMOs this is a want to examine the use of media to help manage very sophisticated high-transaction-rate process. a worried populace. Some of the large telecommunication companies are developing call center capabilities that can Gap Fillers: handle thousands of calls an hour. This combi- There are no gap filling technology objectives nation of technology and process would be help- recommended in this area. ful in creating this capability. A coordinated health care support center, able to handle large MR.6 – Modeling of Exposure/Casualties for volumes of telephone inquiries and walk-in cases, Location and Numbers. The ability to provide would be necessary in the event of a biological, automated support for understanding the likely chemical or radiological incident. range of exposure and casualties in particular situations, primarily the dispersal of threat agents.

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Chapter VIII (PHRBAE) discusses modeling of Although various federal agencies have modeled exposure specifically to biological agents. aerosol dispersal under varying conditions of wind, temperature, and surface morphologies, The need for modeling and simulation to sup- decision making tools based on such modern port responding to a terrorist incident is fre- analyses are not available to emergency respon- quently mentioned throughout this document. ders. For the most part, responders do not have Responders want to know what they are dealing any access to such modeling tools for estimating with, and where. This section is concerned with casualty level and threat dispersion during an modeling of radiation and chemical exposure. actual incident. The desire is for a system that can not only model the dispersal of threat agents, but what the Providing emergency responders with real time likely exposure to individuals in a given location access to models and the capability to use such is as the plume moves and disperses. models poses a potential security risk. Such information could be exploited by terrorist if Goals: the information got to them – the majority of The goals for this area are as follows: emergency responders are not cleared for receiving classified information. This may be a techni- • Pre-event modeling for policy and procedure cal limitation as well as a policy issue. development. State of the Art: • Prospective, near real time dynamic modeling The Department of Defense and NOAA have system for the entire U.S. in order to project developed very sophisticated modeling and simu- future outcomes from current emerging situa- lation technology to support prediction of chemi- tions (mid-event). cal and biological agent “plumes.” Most, how- • Models should be able to dynamically interact ever, do not work in real time and little has been with other models, databases and sensor done to integrate the models with real-time sen- inputs. sor and weather information. Most of the technologists involved in this process felt that all the • Any system output must be user friendly at elements of technology needed to accomplish this least at the responder command level. functional capability are in hand and the technical risk of developing the needed capability is Current Capabilities: low. Although models exist for the effects of agents on human, animal and plant populations, none of Technology Limitations and Barriers: these are real-time models; none interact with There are significant technology gaps facing the other challenge conditions (such as weather or emergency responder with respect to models of urban canyons) and decision making tools. For agent dispersal. These include determination of example, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric the dose of agent that an individual is likely to Administration (NOAA) models wind move- encounter if he/she is in a building (as compared ments at several hundred feet above ground level. to on the street). For example, what is the effect Wind modeling below this level and in of HVAC on agent dispersal and what are the urban/rural canyons has not been demonstrated. urban canyon effects? The lack of knowledge of The Department of Defense does possess real micro-weather effects on modeling of agent dis- time models for agent dispersal but these are pri- persal is a major limitation. marily for elevated altitudes. Oklahoma City has used weather radar data (Doppler) for plume The anthrax release in October 2001 revealed modeling. the differing dosage thresholds for different

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populations; in one case an elderly woman in should be understood as the removal of contami- Connecticut, who received a relatively low dose nants to a level that is not anticipated to cause of agent (presumably much less than 8,000 pfu) clinical signs of chemical, biological, radiological died from the disease. The minimal effective toxicity. The major aim of this effort is the dry dose in the well population may be several mag- decontamination of large numbers of persons nitudes higher than that required for serious ill- (hundreds of persons) exposed to threat agents ness in the immune compromised, the aged or while they are still in or adjacent to the hot zone. newborns. Goals: The current modeling technology requires inter- The goals identified by the responders for this pretation by specialists – in a crisis situation such area are: assistance will not be readily accessible. There is no clear understanding of the level of training • Capability to definitively decontaminate a required for an educated responder to make effec- thousand people at a time. (Facility, personnel tive use of real-time dynamic models. The use of and supplies need to be expanded to meet the modeling systems for agent dispersal and estima- needs.) tion of disease based on the demographic and meteorological data by the responder community • Tools to measure contamination in order to may challenge the degree of fault tolerance and ensure decontamination of victim. sensitivity of the system. A user community less aware of the limits of a model may initiate • Capability to do definitive decontamination of actions inconsistent with the goals of the design- complex wounds in the field. ers of such a model. • Dry decontamination/neutralization system. As stated earlier, the release of dispersal models • A database of available and appropriate decon- and associated information to emergency respon- tamination resources/processes. ders does have security implications as well. The cost associated with providing security checks on The decontamination must be achieved within a all emergency responders may prove to be an time frame that assures the population does not impediment to achieving this aim. manifest toxicity from the dispersed agents. Deployable (handheld) sensors need to be devel- Gap Fillers: oped to measure contamination in order to The most effective approach may be teaming of ensure decontamination of victim. The technol- emergency responders with NOAA and the pri- ogy for this is being addressed in Chapter III vate sector to develop meteorological maps that (DIDA). The ability to quickly expand facilities, can model aerosol dispersal. A limited number of trained personnel and supplies needs to be cre- emergency responders may be trained and ated. The capability must permit the definitive employed as critical regional experts in interpreta- decontamination of complex wounds in the field. tion of model systems. These individuals may be Dry decontamination/neutralization approaches vetted for security clearance and sustain a high should be explored (e.g., UV light for some level of readiness with appropriate compensation agents).10 The purpose of the dry decontamina- for this responsibility. tion is to allow decontamination in very cold weather. The associated problem is that the MR.7 – Definitive Decontamination. The abil- clothes must be decontaminated, the body hair ity to remove (or neutralize) all contaminants on decontaminated and that this be accomplished victims. Although definitive decontamination is prior to transport of affected individuals to a safe defined as the removal of all contaminants, this site. Responders need a database of available and

10 Deployable trailers with heated showers, hot air dryers, and clean clothes may serve as a non-technological alternative to dry decontamination.

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appropriate decontamination resources, processes Technology Limitations and Barriers: and tools to assess successful decontamination. The primary difficulty is that the nooks and This goal is being addressed in the Chapter V crannies of the human body are very difficult to (Response and Recovery). reach (e.g., arm pits, body creases, groin etc.), perhaps more so with a dry material. Current Capabilities: Several methods have demonstrated utility Contamination of respiratory airways by biologi- including the application of material with high cal and radiological agents fosters recurring agent static electrical charge; tissue paper; and the use dispersal during respiration. Perhaps the most of diatomaceous aluminum silicates. Electrostatic difficult challenge is developing rapid throughput precipitation of biological agents suspended in air of potentially exposed persons with sufficient is one method to remove agent from an environ- decontamination to permit further movement of ment. Such techniques do not remove agent the population. from surfaces with limited air flow (e.g., nooks and crannies). Currently, removal of clothing Gap Fillers: precedes decontamination procedures for affected The development of a dry decontamination persons. The emergency responders believe that material would be very helpful. This could be reluctance to disrobe in public will be a major gas not harmful to humans, or a device like a lint impediment. The need to cleanse areas of abun- brush with “sticky” surfaces for adhesion of agent dant hair (head, armpit and groin) compounds particles. Before this can be done there is a need the problem. Tools need to be developed to edu- to develop a scientific basis for evaluating effec- cate citizens and place their concerns of modesty tiveness of decontamination materials. The in the larger context of physical danger. The development of training programs for the public resulting appreciation of the risk/benefit conse- to appreciate the need for full body washes may quence of refusal of treatment may mitigate social be more useful in the near-term. concerns. Washing contaminated body areas with water, detergent and bleach is a preferred MR.8 – Medical Staff Surge, Re-Supply and method but has restricted applications in cold cli- Proper Accreditation. The ability to identify and mates. Sensors for assuring decontamination are alert appropriate medical personnel from geographi- needed. cally distant areas about a CBRNE incident, and permit a rapid procedure for accreditation of profes- State of the Art: sional persons that can provide assistance from distant jurisdictions. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory has a program for decontamination called REACT/S The technologies exist for accreditation of care (Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training givers and for establishing national databases. Site). The interagency Technical Support The distribution of individual smart cards (with Working Group (TSWG) has a current broad date of birth, credentials, other pertinent records, agency announcement requesting novel concepts biometrics, etc.) is one technological solution for rapid decontamination. Several programs (See also EMPP.2 (Mission Rehearsal, Simulation, exist in the United States for developing deconta- Embedded Training and Distance Education).) mination protocols for chemical or radiological The data entered on the card will be most effec- agent exposure: these programs include develop- tive if standardized on a national level. These ments by the Army’s ECBC (formerly SBC- points and control of access to the data are COM), and Montgomery County, MD. therefore policy issues. The accountability of Technology transfer from former Soviet Union the agency for distribution of data is a major countries and Israel is being explored to achieve problem to be managed given recent public these goals. concern regarding large scale data assembly and acquisition.

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Goals: Technology Limitations and Barriers: • Creation of a national database of credentialed This issue is not a technology issue but is rather a individuals which could be accessed by policy issue related to standardization of data in authorized personnel, sorted, and “mobilized” biometric identification, database and Web when needed (e.g., FEMA Disaster Assistance access. As such it requires evaluation of existing Employees (DAEs), medical reserve corps, protocols and procedures to determine the most etc.). appropriate system for the task. The goal could be realized with little or no new technological • Biometric identification. advances. This is primarily a policy problem.

• Database and web technology. Gap Fillers: • Process: initial and ongoing maintenance. Since the technology for accomplishing the capability exists, no new technology efforts are Current Capabilities: recommended. At present, individuals who wish to provide assis- MR.9 – Telemedicine in Support of Surge tance during a threat situation arrive at an event Requirements. The ability to access geograph- without credentials. These persons could include ically distant medical skills in real-time via imposters or even terrorists. Certifications are telecommunications. not recognized across state borders. In the Murrah Building bombing and at the World It is anticipated that in responding to a CBRNE Trade Center, an appropriate deployment of the attack, there will be a need to access medical volunteers could not be realized because of the expertise that may be geographically distant from lack of certification and loss of communications. the event, either because the number of victims Plans for the use of skilled volunteers remain to have overwhelmed the local medical capacity, or be developed in most jurisdictions. Various because the unusual nature of the injuries may regions throughout the U.S. have Disaster require specialized expertise. The latter was the Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) that are cre- case during the release of anthrax through the dentialed, trained, and equipped, but, there are postal system in October 2001. not enough DMAT personnel to manage a catastrophic event that may occur during a WMD Various scenarios have assumed that a terrorist attack. strike with a highly contagious disease such as smallpox would lead to approximately 10,000 The Department of Homeland Security clinical cases within seven days of exposure. This Emergency Preparedness and Response would be the first wave. Subsequent waves Directorate is exploring credentialing. The DoD would then ensue. The dissemination of an Smart Card program is also being evaluated to agent, if perpetrated at a major port of entry (e.g., determine whether it may be useful in a WMD airport) would be rapid, with multiple sites setting. immediately affected. There is no current telemedicine capability in the U.S. or elsewhere State of the Art: that can support medical care delivery to 10,000 This is another area where the technology to cre- patients with a highly infectious disease such as ate the capability is available. Smart card tech- smallpox. In the event of a strike with an infec- nology, along with biometrics and current Web- tious and lethal – but not contagious – biological based information management technologies can agent (e.g., anthrax), the care of 10,000 patients be brought together rather easily to create this would overwhelm the public health capability of function once the policy and administrative issues the local community, but propagation of disease are solved. These issues are also addressed in would not be a major concern. Chapter IV (UIC) and Chapter VI (EMPP).

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A nationally distributed telemedicine capability, procedures including surgery. In the civilian sec- involving several thousand available physicians tor, telemedicine is primarily used to provide with all medical specialties, could provide access health care to persons in correctional institutions to distant care-givers. Emergency care physicians (costs of care and risk of escape are reduced). see more than eighty patients per day in emergency room environments. Under conditions of Telemedicine capabilities are present in many stress the processing of patients will permit fifty regions of the U.S. including: the University of patients per day per physician. Under these con- Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, the East ditions 200 physicians can manage 10,000 Carolina University, and the Maryland Institute patients on a 24×7 basis. The use of simple dedi- of Trauma Studies. These telemedicine programs cated telecommunications facilities, both terres- are primarily terrestrial-based systems with a lim- trial and satellite based, can provide a robust ited number of physicians at the university site. response to a mass casualty event. There will be The Department of Defense Joint Medical minimal disruption of normal patient care in the Operations-Telemedicine program is a focus of secondary support area. This also alleviates a telemedicine developments for the military. tremendous logistics burden and financial cost of Telemedicine practitioners at the current time do having to transport physicians into the area of an not have the experience or capability to manage attack. simultaneously a thousand injured people. More If this sort of telemedicine capability were estab- training and exposure to telemedicine will be lished, physicians and health care providers will required. In addition, it is unclear that the med- require training familiarity with visual and audi- ical system in the U.S. has sufficient emergency tory telemedicine devices, or several hours train- medical physicians to care for several thousand ing, prior to a threat event. affected patients. Research is required regarding mechanisms to manage a crisis with mass casual- Goals: ties on the order of tens of thousands. Research is also required to understand the pool of skills The goals for a telemedicine capability are: available among the national public health com- • Haptic, auditory, and video capabilities, scala- munity for such a capability. ble for large numbers of casualties; multiple sites; flexible. State of the Art: Beyond the activities described in the previous • Robust, encrypted (secure/protected) section, the DoD has completed a Telemedicine communications. Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD) which advanced the state of the art in • Automated collection or compilation, mainte- using telemedicine across great distances and in nance of and access to electronic medical using such a system to collect data to add fidelity records. to the theater commanders situational awareness. • Ability to reach patients in their homes. The program developed and demonstrated a deployable telemedicine system that can be trans- • Standardized technology protocols. ported to a field of operation providing medical reach back to austere environments. • Rapid deployability. Technology Limitations and Barriers: Current Capability: Current telemedicine systems were not designed Telemedicine is in use today for medical consul- to provide care for hundreds or thousands of per- tation, but has not been widely tried in the emer- sons. The potential throughput therefore gency/crisis context. The military has experi- remains to be determined. DARPA has per- mented with actual tele-operated remote medical formed some impressive work in transmitting

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haptic sensation for use in telemedicine. numbers of victims. Taking advantage of model- However, the bandwidth requirements are so ing and simulation and using the information large it would be impractical for application to above, the tool will identify the geographic loca- this capability in the near future. Providing tion of likely or possible victims and provide robust, high-data-rate communications, that will responders with a recommended course of action. be available even during an attack could prove The tool should include a highly intuitive challenging (see Chapter IV (UIC)). Graphical User Interface (GUI) and be useable on a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) or a laptop Gap Fillers: in a vehicle to augment the training of emergency Research is needed into how quickly doctors and responders. This effort should leverage and be distant caregivers can screen patients via telemed- integrated with R&Rrto.1 (Contaminated Victim icine; this research is needed so that any technical Knowledge Base). It may be efficient to merge the requirements can be identified that support two efforts. increased throughput. In parallel a telemedicine test bed should be created that can continue to Payoffs: explore improvements in telemedicine to support This will help emergency responders effectively disasters and mass casualty incidents. The identify and prepare to provide mass prophylaxis telemedicine program could develop into a pro- to victims and potential victims. It will help to gram for an Artificial Intelligence Virtual save lives and reduce the effects of a chemical or Clinician in the far term. The system would pro- biological attack.11 vide information to a caregiver on the ground in a remote site so that the patient’s survival and Challenges: well being is sustained. It will likely enable non- The development of such a tool is considered physician practitioner to screen patients. moderate risk. Its utility will depend on the real- Although the subject of communications avail- time data about the event and the quality of the ability is critical, the government and telecom- demographic data that can be developed about munications companies are working hard on the area in question. It will also depend on the those issues already. accuracy of our projections of the lethality of biological warfare (BW) agents. Recent information Medical Response – Response on the lethality of anthrax spores indicates that Technology Objectives (MRrto) previous projections of the lethal dose being 10,000 spores may be off by several orders of MRrto.1 – Mass Prophylaxis Knowledge Base magnitude. This may be true of other agents. and Decision Aid Integrating meteorological information, especially Objectives: in urban areas will be a challenge. Data on the Develop a tool for emergency responder respon- susceptibility to specific threat agents may also be ders to use in determining the “at-risk” popula- difficult to develop. Availability of real-time data tion in a mass chemical, biological or radiation is dependent upon the development of new and contamination event and developing a mass pro- improved sensors, which are addressed in Chapter phylaxis course of action. Using data provided III (DIDA). by available sensors, micro-weather information, demographic and medical protocol information, Milestones/Metrics: and other information stored before the event, FY2004: Begin research on the types of data that the tool will provide responders with the best will be needed to be able to predict who the at- course of action to begin the vaccination of large risk population is and where they are located.

11 However, high precision will not be achieved without much greater understanding of the lethality of various agents. The ultimate level of understanding is limited not only by ethical limits on testing but by the possibility that terrorists will use a novel or modified agent for which information cannot be developed in advance.

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This will likely include weather, demographics, MRrto.2 – Mass Prophylaxis Delivery System susceptibility and threat information. Survey demographic information available in large cities Objectives: and determine if that data can be used for this Develop a tool that allows responders to signifi- system. Develop strategies for acquiring the cantly increase the throughput of individuals who needed data. Evaluate the BW lethality informa- are receiving prophylactic treatment. In cases tion and research and assess its effect on current where there are thousands of people who need to modeling. be vaccinated, one of the rate-limiting processes is the actual delivery of antibiotics, antivirals, anti FY2005: Continue research into the types of nerve agents and vaccinations. Current technol- data that will be needed to accurately predict the ogy such as the jet injectors used by the military impact of the BW event. Develop strategies for can not be used for some vaccines such as ones acquiring the needed data (demographic, weather, with particulates or those that absorb alum. The etc.). Continue evaluating research on lethality objective of this RTO is to develop a system modeling. If appropriate, add funding to acceler- with the speed of jet injectors but with the flexi- ate that research. bility to inject any necessary substance. The FY2006: Benchmark existing or emerging sys- training on the system must be easy and take tems for developing course of action recommen- only a few hours. The system must be very low dations. Develop architectural design for the maintenance. tool, collect and integrate existing information. Begin work in improving the modeling and sim- Payoffs: ulation (M&S) capability using real-time data to This will help emergency responders protect make predictions. If possible, coordinate with greater numbers of people in a shorter amount of R&Rrto.1 (Contaminated Victim Knowledge Base). time. It will help to save lives and reduce the effects of a chemical or biological attack. FY2007: Begin development of a prototype of the tool. Begin commercialization effort to aid in Challenges: transition to responders. Continue to improve The development of such a tool is considered to the modeling capability to support the predictive have moderate risk. Prophylaxis media vary goals of the system. greatly in physical characteristics and delivery FY2008: Complete development of the proto- method. Injector mechanisms that can provide type system and begin emergency responder any kind of prophylaxis will be a challenge. The testing. system will have to deliver a number of different drugs with very similar procedures to make train- FY2009-2010: Continue responder testing. ing requirements as simple as possible. The clini- Deploy systems for emergency responders while cal trials for such a system will be extensive and continuing to integrate new products and costly. methodologies into the system. Complete commercialization effort. Milestones/Metrics: FY2004: Begin investigating candidate MRrto.1 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 20082009 Totals prophylaxis delivery technologies and Mass Prophylaxis $9 $12 $18 $20 $20 $25 $104 strategies. Knowledge Base and Decision Aid

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FY2005: Award contract or grants for up to four Payoffs: competing approaches to developing the technol- This will help emergency responders effectively ogy. Investigate potential applicability to every- manage very large numbers of victims. It will day needs. reduce mistakes in treatment, provide important information for incident command and even pre- FY2006: Continue to fund competing vent losing patients amidst the chaos of a cata- approaches. strophic event. It will help to save lives and allow FY2007: Complete prototype development. the medical community to treat the casualties Begin animal testing of prototype systems. more effectively. Down select the best approach for clinical trials. Begin commercialization effort. Challenges: Voice recognition in noisy environments is very FY2008: Complete animal testing and begin difficult. This capability must be highly reliable Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval because it will be the method for entering patient process. Continue commercialization effort. data into the system, and that increases the chal- FY2009-2010: Conduct human trials. Continue lenge. Integration with legacy systems is always a testing and FDA approval process until approved. technical challenge. Interoperability with command systems may prove difficult. The MRrto.2 – Budget in Millions ability to support hundreds of practition- Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 20082009 Totals Mass Prophylaxis $10 $30 $30 $35 $35 $50 $190 ers in the field, all at once and wirelessly, Delivery System may present bandwidth problems.

MRrto.3 – Casualty Management System Milestones/Metrics: FY2004: Benchmark systems that track objects Objectives: through processes such as that used by parcel Develop a tool for emergency responders to use delivery services. Evaluate current patient man- to manage potentially tens of thousands of vic- agement systems especially those intended to tims from a mass casualty event. The systems manage thousands of patients like the Defense of should be able to positively track each patient Department. Evaluate the state of biometric either through tagging (i.e., bar code) or through identification and other ways to positively iden- biometrics. The system should provide the med- tify and track patients. Determine the available ical/syndromic and treatment records as well as enabling technologies and begin development of the physical location of the patient. Data should a Casualty Management System Architecture. be able to be entered into the systems in several ways including voice recognition and wireless FY2005: Continue to develop the system archi- PDA keyboards. The system should be inte- tecture. Begin first prototype system develop- grated with the Incident Command System to ment with available technology even if it falls provide commanders with real-time picture of the short of goals but improves capabilities. Begin commercialization effort. medical operational situation. The system should be able to be used in everyday operations and FY2006: Complete system prototype and begin scalable to be used in mass casualty situations. It field testing the system in realistic situation where must integrate with legacy systems at hospital. thousands of victims must be processed. Adjust Finally, patient privacy needs to be ensured in the system design based on result of testing and design of the system. The work should be man- review opportunities for technology insertion to aged in tandem with that of EMPPrto.3. increase capability.

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FY2007: Continue field testing. Begin develop- Milestones/Metrics: ment of second prototype. The second prototype FY2004: Begin development of a telemedicine should be able to handle ten thousand patients in architecture for the testbed. Issue a broad area 24 hours. Complete commercialization efforts. announcement for a health care and research Transition initial capability for use by responders. organization to host the testbed and begin research on how quickly physicians can screen FY2008: Complete development of second pro- patients using telemedicine. totype. Field test second prototype. Transition improved capability to responders through com- FY2005: Continue research on how quickly mercialization efforts. patients can be screened and begin work on MRrto.3 – Budget in Millions bringing large numbers of physicians on line Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals to respond to a mass casualty incident. Begin Casualty $2 $3 $4 $7 $6 $22 Management work on a virtual clinician capability. System FY2006: Continue optimizing the telemedi- MRrto.4 – Telemedicine Testbed cine capability. Test the system in mock disaster Objectives: exercises. The goal is to screen at this point is to screen at least 5,000 patients in 24 hours. There are three objectives in this RTO. First, Continue work on virtual clinician. establish a telemedicine testbed where research on new concepts of operation and new enabling FY2007: Begin investigating strategies for technology can be explored to support disasters deploying a robust telemedicine capability and mass casualty incidents. Second, conduct around the country. Investigate how to host research on how quickly doctors can screen the disaster telemedicine system on existing or patients via telemedicine. Third, develop an arti- easily modified infrastructure. Continue testing ficial intelligence virtual clinician, with the ability and exercising the telemedicine system. to provide medical advice to a distant practitioner Continue add capability and use the system without a physician being directly involved. including virtual clinician capability, if available.

Payoffs: FY2008: Continue to test new capability and respond to disasters. The goal at this point is This will help responders screen and treat more to screen at least 10,000 patients in 24 hours. victims in a shorter period of time. It will allow Integrate new virtual clinician capability. Deploy reach back to specialists who may not be in the systems in other cities as funding allows. area of the incident. It could provide access to doctors or credible medical advice to an MRrto.4 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals incident anywhere in the country. This could Telemedicine Test $5 $10 $12 $15 $10 $52 also provide an important capability to health Bed care in remote areas on a daily basis. MRrto.5 – Novel Decontamination – Research Challenges: The biggest challenges will be creating the Objectives: telecommunications and information technology This will help responders effectively decontami- capacity necessary to bring access to hundreds of nate large number of victims in the event of a doctors to an incident, training enough clinicians chemical or biological attack, especially in cold to test the system, and of course the long-term weather. It should significantly increase the research into building a virtual clinician. throughput of people being decontaminated and

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will probably save lives. This is fundamental Milestones/Metrics: research, which should focus on use of gaseous FY2004: Begin research into various materials material (benign to humans but not to threat and strategies for dry decontamination of people. agents), ultraviolet light and other energy sources, Issue a BAA seeking new ideas to accomplish the and powders and kinetic methods. goals set forth above; award several significant grants to research activities to fund several Payoffs: approaches. This is fundamental work and will Responders would prefer a capability to decon- need to be continued until breakthroughs occur taminate people without liquid or soaking decon- or the science community runs out of credible tamination materials. The decontamination ideas to pursue. method should be able to quickly reduce the threat to levels that do not cause toxicity, in all FY2005-2008: Continue fundamental research weather conditions, without the victim having to into various approaches for dry decontamination. remove all their clothes. There are currently no By 2006 or 2007 it may be possible to begin known dry materials that can decontaminate a some applied research. range of agents but are also benign to humans. MRrto.5 – Budget in Millions Challenges: Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals Novel $2 $4 $6 $6 $6 $24 There are currently no known dry or gaseous Decontamination materials that can decontaminate a range of agents that are also benign to humans.

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 • Determine “At Risk” Population • Recommend Course of MRrto.1 – Mass Prophylaxis KB and Decision Aid Action • Real-Time • High-Speed • Low Maintenance MRrto.2 – Mass Prophylaxis Delivery System • Multi-Drug Capable

• Manage >10K Patients • Wireless Connect to IC MRrto.3 – Casualty Management System • Uses Biometrics

• Up to 10K Patients in MRrto.4 – Telemedicine Test Bed 24 Hours • Access to >100 Physicians Patient Screening Research • Expert System Support to Field Practitioners Virtual Clinician

• Dry Decontamination Materials MRrto.5 – Novel Decontamination • New Delivery Methods

Medical Response Technology Roadmap

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PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter VIII Public Health Readiness for Biological Agent Events (PHRBAE) Chapter Chair: Dr. Stephen Kornguth Chapter Coordinator: Michelle Royal

Definition Operational Environments Public Health Readiness for Biological Agent This NTRO is only concerned with biological Events (PHRBAE) is the capability for public agents, so the other (CRNE) attack modes are health infrastructure and health care delivery sys- not relevant. Within biological agent incidents, tems to be prepared for and respond to an event it is possible to distinguish among different sorts involving biological agents. of attack. There are three major categories of biological threat agents: highly infectious/conta- Biological agents include bacteria, viruses, fungi gious organisms that will replicate in a human or and biological toxins. While biological toxins are animal host and generate new infectious bacteria essentially poisons of biological origin, the first or viruses (e.g., smallpox, ebola); live organisms three are infectious, meaning that because they that will cause disease in a host following expo- can multiply in the human body, a very small sure of the host but that are not readily transmit- amount of agent can cause illness. The most seri- ted from one person to another (e.g., anthrax); ous biological attacks may involve a subset of the and biological materials that can cause severe infectious agents that are especially contagious – clinical distress or death in a human or animal disease is easily communicated from person to but do not have the ability to replicate (toxins). person, raising the possibility of epidemic or even Although materials from all three categories can pandemic spread. As the recent SARS epidemic cause illness, the virulence of the first one and the demonstrated, the medical system channels sick possibility of pandemic makes it of special con- people into the care of health professionals, cern. The distinct modes of exposure and course meaning that an especially virulent disease organ- of illness characteristic of different agents means ism will be automatically vectored against those that the type of agent is indeed an important fac- assets that are needed to contain and treat the tor in determining the appropriate response. outbreak. However, using the type of agent to distinguish among operational environments makes only lim- This NTRO is not a complete recipe for readi- ited sense because often the type of agent ness to deal with a biological attack. First, the involved is something that only becomes clear overall scope of Project Responder has excluded over the course of an incident. innovations in medical treatment such as improved vaccines, antibacterials, and antivirals. Instead, progression of exposure and disease pro- Second, many key elements of preparedness, such vides the defining characteristic for the opera- as networked sensor systems for detection of an tional environments. A successful biological urban airborne biological agent release, are attack is likely to be mounted covertly, with the included in other NTROs where they have com- dispersal of agent going unnoticed. Without monalities with preparedness for chemical, radio- widespread deployment of advanced technology logical, nuclear, or explosive and incendiary sensors (see Chapter III (DIDA)), sick patients attacks.

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appearing in doctors’ offices and emergency • Rapid, High-Throughput Clinical Assessment rooms will likely be the first indication that any- and Testing thing is awry. Thus the first and primary responders in this event may be health professionals • Modeling of Exposure and Containment rather than the public safety officers who are typ- • Isolation and Quarantine ically the responders in the other NTROs. There are major differences between technologies that • Affordable Specimen Transport for CW/BW are important before symptoms are widespread, Agents and technologies that are useful after mass illness has occurred. In the case of contagious disease, • Transport of Contagious Patients exposed victims may present a continued threat to others, extending the attack in time and geog- • Safe Handling of Medical Waste raphy. Therefore, the operational environments The functional capabilities are presented in prior- associated with the PHRBAE NTRO are: Pre- ity order based on responders’ input in work- Event, Immediate Post-Dispersal, Initial Post- shops and field interviews conducted during the Symptomatic, Mass Illness, and Recovery. earlier phases of this effort and subsequently The use of biological agents by hostile nations or modified or validated in both responder and terrorist groups differs from other WMD threats. technical workshops in this phase. This is because the clinical signs resulting from Surveillance and Information Integration Systems exposure to biological agents may take 48 or (PHRBAE.1) was universally assessed to be a more hours to emerge and because the replicating high priority and this was also ranked as the most nature of all the biological agents (except toxins) important functional capability to fulfill. Rapid, causes a persistent clinical threat well after the High-Throughput Clinical Assessment and Testing, first episode has completed its course. While not (PHRBAE.2) and Modeling Exposure/Containment a focus of the NTRO, it is also worth noting that (PHRBAE.3) also received a large number of the improved capabilities it would afford would high-priority votes from the responders. Isolation also be relevant to naturally occurring emergent and Quarantine (PHRBAE.4) received a wide diseases. With the exception of the anthrax range of rankings, from high- to low-priority. release through the mail in October and The functional capabilities of Affordable Specimen November 2001 and the Salmonella poisoning Transport (PHRBAE.5), Transport of Contagious event of a decade ago in Oregon, all disease out- Patients (PHRBAE.6), and Safe Handling of breaks in the continental United States were nat- Medical Waste (PHRBAE.7) received only mid- urally emergent diseases. This is generally true and low-level priority rankings. on a global scale. Therefore steps taken to ameliorate the clinical impact of biological agent attack will generally improve the health of all Overall State of Technology for Public U.S. citizens and residents and have beneficial Health Readiness for Biological Agent consequences for medical care world-wide. Events The matrix on the next page shows a wide variety in the readiness of technology to meet the needs Needed Functional Capabilities and Priorities of responding to biological agent event. In order of declining priority, the needed capabil- Several of these capabilities require new techno- ities for PHRBAE are: logical developments (e.g., the identification of biomarkers for human exposure to biological • Surveillance & Information Integration threat agents) while others require acquisition of Systems costly equipment (e.g., transport of infected patients) or a thoughtful restructuring of current

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Public Health Readiness for Biological Agent Events The surveillance system Operational Environments should include both Immediate Initial Post- Mass automated reporting of Functional Capabilities Pre-EventPost-Event Symptomatic Illness Recovery data for routine analysis 1. Surveillance and Information Integration Systems and collation of reports

2. Rapid, High-Throughput Clinical by health professionals Assessment and Testing of unusual cases and 3. Modeling Exposure/ patterns. Containment Early detection has 4. Isolation/Quarantine three components: data 5. Affordable Specimen Transport input, data analysis, and of Cw/BW Agents display of information. 6. Transport of Contagious The data input includes Patients archival data sets, cur- 7. Safe Handling of Medical Waste rent and emergent disease-related data sets, 1 1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this 2 operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO and reports from pri- 3 2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional mary emergency med- capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO 3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability? ical care. Effective LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH response decision-mak- Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’ ing requires (1) access in real-time to the full administrative policy (e.g., development of com- spectrum of health related data (archival data sets mand and control infrastructure and procedures with seasonal patterns of disease incidence and for quarantine). In other important areas, such prescription and over-the-counter pharmaceutical as surveillance, the needed technology is well in demand, current status-of-patient reports) hand and merely needs to be applied in a stan- throughout a network; (2) the ability to evaluate dardized framework. and disseminate specific actions and resource PHRBAE.1 – Surveillance and Information allocation requirements (including focused epi- Integration Systems. The capability to do routine demiological and clinical investigation) following near-real-time processing of epidemiological and integration of the information; and (3) capability veterinary data to provide early detection, identifi- to transfer data electronically to alternative deci- cation, assessment, and tracking of exposure to bio- sion makers when situations such as task overload logical agents. occurs.

Since early appropriate prophylaxis and treatment Archival data sets for occurrence of disease in the can often dramatically improve health outcomes, U.S., during the past three years are available early alerting of an attack is crucial. In the through most of the state departments of health. absence of physical discovery of the attack itself, Diseases and symptoms requiring public health the first indication of an attack will be sickened reporting can be tracked through the Center for people and animals. Data sources for alerting Disease Control (CDC). The incidence of ill- information may include hospitals, emergency nesses not subject to reporting requirements is rooms, ambulance and other EMS services, clin- more difficult to characterize. Today, statistics on ics, doctors offices, schools, pharmacies, veteri- emergency room visits across many hospitals narians, coroners, laboratories, nursing homes, could provide an understanding of disease emer- major employers (including military installa- gence but only with a significant delay after the tions), prisons, and points of entry into the conti- disease presents clinically. Physicians use codes nental U.S. (CONUS) for humans and livestock. from the International Classification of Diseases,

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ninth edition (ICD-9) to define the illnesses (and this activity. The acquired data must be compli- cause of death) of patients; assignment and ant with health privacy regulations (HIPAA) and reporting of the ICD-9 codes now lags presenta- transmitted to the appropriate users with secure tion of clinical signs by 24-48 hours or more— communication systems. somewhat late for dealing with the initial cases of fast-onset infections. Moreover, novel or rare dis- This will by necessity be an evolutionary system eases are likely to be mischaracterized at the start, because few of our medical facilities utilize real further delaying clear reporting. time electronic admission protocols or systems; therefore the adopted process should integrate (to The initial recognition and description of an the greatest extent possible) the output of legacy emergent illness greatly eases the identification systems while encouraging hospitals, clinics, and of subsequent cases of illness (e.g., anthrax in other reporting entities to move toward systems October 2001, SARS and monkeypox). Once that immediately capture interactions in digital an illness is identified and either its signs and form. symptoms codified or a clinical test developed, it can be readily tracked. However the concur- The acquired information at the local level must rent emergence of two or more biological diseases be integrated with regional and national data or a similar disease with two or more sources of because of the highly mobile culture in which we agent greatly increases difficulty in diagnosis and live. tracking, and this possibility must be taken The presentation of the data should include both into account in preparedness and technology geographic and time dimensions. It should be development. iconographic and scalable to permit comprehen- Prior to diagnosis and the assignment of an sion by the user community that an event is in ICD-9 code, illness may be classified by present- progress. The software must also provide multi- ing signs (syndromic characterization) and most ple views to allow analysis of the data; for exam- emergency room admissions nurses – and, ple the geographic and temporal data should be increasingly ambulance and other emergency able to be overlaid with actual weather and wind medical service (EMS) personnel—do categorize data, local and regional transportation systems, the patient in this way. and commuting and other movement patterns. The system should automatically provide all the A large number of patients in a reporting uni- information and contacts needed for more verse may be needed to detect initial disease out- detailed epidemiological investigation (identifica- break merely on the basis of statistics; a small but tion of index cases, etc.). The system must be geographically dispersed initial outbreak (such as user-friendly to public health experts and epi- might result from exposure in a hub airport or demiologists. The tactical decision making under even a metropolitan train station) would be espe- stress (TADMUS) program developed by the cially difficult to identify unless travel informa- three military departments can serve as a model tion were routinely included in reporting. for this activity. In addition to these advanced data displays, the Goals: systems should include validated, highly credible, A primary goal is the near-real-time capture (ide- probabilistic models for analysis of the data. This ally within six hours of early clinical signs) of would permit detection and assessment of devia- indicators that a disease with high threat poten- tion from baseline rates based on archival data as tial is emerging in a community. To enable cap- adjusted for seasonal, weekly, and other variation ture of such data, an automated data collection and demographic change. and retrieval system is necessary and the reporting of this data should be mandated on a Advances in rapid clinical assessment and testing, national level with associated funding to support including the sensing of specific biomarkers of

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infection as described in PHRBAE.2 (Rapid, must be a simple product-with no requirement High-Throughput Clinical Assessment and Testing), for local technical support. would be highly complementary with the surveillance system. The surveillance system indicating Current Capabilities: unusual numbers of cases could prompt the use Many metropolitan public safety agencies have of tests that might not otherwise be ordered, and established multi-source reporting systems but affordable and rapid clinical screening would without the scope, reporting rapidity and fre- increase the specificity and accuracy of initial quency, regional and national integration, detail diagnosis and thus increase the power of the sur- or analytic power envisioned under this func- veillance system. Even rapid tests that are not tional capability. Summary information on 9-1-1 capable of identifying biological warfare agents and EMS calls are already generally available to but that commonly result in earlier diagnoses that public health departments but not always with exclude biological warfare agents as the cause the timeliness, analysis, and level of detail that would improve the power and speed of the sur- would make them fully useful. They are not typ- veillance system by reducing the background ically summarized in a standard manner, and are noise against which a biological agent event often not collated across jurisdictional lines. would need to be detected. New York City has a syndromic surveillance sys- Similarly, the widespread deployment of net- tem in place that is widely regarded as one of the worked environmental sensors capable of detect- best. Many modern hospitals have adopted elec- ing airborne biological agent (DIDA.5 (Detector tronic data entry of syndromic signs because this Arrays and Networks)) and improved surveillance facilitates billing procedures and cost recovery; of the food chain for foodborne pathogens several systems have been prepared by the private (MRPA.1 (Rapid Diagnostics and Detection to sector (e.g., Cerner and Eclipsys) for this purpose. Confirm the Introduction of CBR Agents to Such data can be made available for surveillance Animals, Plants, and Food/Feed)) would also be in real time. Privacy rights of the patient are a highly complementary with the epidemiological primary concern, but all personal identifiers in surveillance capability. The surveillance informa- the data may be removed prior to screening by tion display should also easily interoperate with public health and emergency response officials. programs for collecting weather information Reportable data (i.e., data on illness required to (DIDA.7 (Collection and Dissemination of be reported to public health authorities) is exam- Weather and Environmental Conditions)) model- ined for significant increases (compared to nor- ing agent dispersal (DIDA.6 (CBRNE Effects mal expectations based on seasonal and weekly Modeling and Simulation)), exposure (MR.6 patterns, and local weather and other sources of (Modeling of Exposure/Casualties for Locations and variation) in illness having particular clinical Numbers)), and onward contagion (PHRBAE.3 manifestations (e.g., rash, bleeding from orifices) (Modeling of Exposure and Containment)). as well as less specific indications (respiratory dis- Finally, the EMS and healthcare aspects should tress, fever). be integrated with the health resource optimization and casualty management data systems in Several nationally funded programs have explored other NTROs (MR.2 (Mass Casualty Medical methods to identify emergent disease from hospi- Care Management)) and EMPP.4 (Alternate/ tal admissions and have met with limited opera- Mobile Hospital Contingencies)). tional success. One major difficulty is that health care providers have limited time for pro- Because the likelihood of a WMD event is low, cessing the additional paperwork that most of even as the consequences can be catastrophic, these systems require today. Clinics, free stand- training of response officials in the use of the sys- ing urgent care facilities, and doctors’ offices may tem should require less than four hours. The be even richer sources of early indications of an developed system should include automated deci- outbreak, but these are even more decentralized sion support tools; analysis tools and the output than hospitals, and so a major effort would be

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needed to attain adequate participation. The Archival data sets currently exist for disease inci- data to be captured must benefit the hospital dence in most states in the U.S. and for much of administration, physician or allied health person the developed world. Data relevant to emergent in a cost-effective manner. While the primary diseases may also be obtained from the World driver of the electronic data entry system may be and Pan-American Health Organizations and early recovery of payment from third party agen- other relevant international agencies. However, cies such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, advocates of what one really wants for a baseline is data col- fully digital case management (including links to lected in the same way and format as the data the pharmacy and automated filling of prescrip- being collected on a current basis. Thus a syn- tions and tracking of clinical tests and their dromic surveillance system will only be maxi- results) suggest that it can reduce medical and mally effective once it is in place long enough for pharmacy errors and cut costs as well. a baseline of syndromic data (and not just finished diagnoses at a later stage of disease) to be An additional parameter that has been considered able for comparison. The increased geographical for early indication of emergent disease is pur- distribution of West Nile Virus during the past chase of over-the-counter pharmaceuticals or three years has increased vigilance and monitor- health care items (e.g., analgesics, antipyretics, tis- ing of diseases in birds. The West Nile Virus sues for the nose). Many of these items are effec- outbreak was first recognized because of the large tively stockpiled in the home and purchased as number of deaths of birds in the New York area part of periodic shopping trips (e.g., on week- (and particularly at the Bronx Zoo). As a result ends, coincident with grocery sales); therefore of the lessons-learned analyses from that event, these data may not provide sensitive early indica- state health laboratories, regional zoological soci- tion of emergent disease. Proprietary issues eties and federal laboratories have developed include the reluctance of stores to reveal informa- communications linkages and network programs tion that would compromise a competitive edge. and have resurrected decades-old efforts to main- Private hospitals are also reluctant to provide tain and watch chickens as disease sentinels for daily occupancy information to competitors bird-borne illness. because of the proprietary nature of the information. Trust building is thus a major concern. State of the Art: The information processing technologies required Once archival data sets have been established and are not different in kind from those in use by real time syndromic data are obtained and large commercial enterprises (for example, Wal- processed, a variety of statistical techniques can Mart) to track, analyze, predict, and respond to be used to assess the significance of apparent various components of consumer demand on a deviations from the baseline. Appropriate soft- near-real-time basis. Nearly every capability ware, together with expert judgment, could sug- imagined has been demonstrated in one research gest a full-blown alert or a call for more detailed project or another. However the heterogeneity of clinical and epidemiological investigation. data sources, the multiplicity of regional users, the concern for privacy, and the need for early In the current environment, near-real time, fine- response to and focus on small signals in the data grained electronic surveillance in medical facilities imposes additional challenges. Thus the required is not available, although some communities have technology integration will not be entirely developed data reporting and alerting procedures straightforward. based on grosser indications. Few localities have automated download capabilities to public health Project Responder has identified at least nine servers. At present, approximately 15% of emer- local, regional, and national efforts to standardize gency room facilities capture data digitally and so data formats and provide timely information. could be used to track emergent disease. Many of these are Web-based and provide hospital, EMS, and/or pharmacy status to users and

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can issue a web alert and/or alert emergency In 2003 the real time acquisition and transmittal room doctors and public health specialists via of electronic data from large hospitals and other pagers. Some provide both spatial and temporal health system participants is technically feasible. displays of the surveillance data and statistical There is a need to identify baseline standards for analysis of the data compared to expectations. machine data analysis and presentation in an iconographic format that is comprehensible. The The National Electronic Disease Surveillance integration of different agencies, communities System (NEDSS) is an initiative of the Centers and disciplines (to include veterinary) into the for Disease Control that promotes the use of data surveillance effort is technically feasible. The and information system standards to advance the overlay with transportation lines, water systems, development of efficient, integrated, and interop- commuting patterns, weather data, and the like is erable surveillance systems at federal, state and not technically difficult but it may be costly. The local levels. CDC’s Health Alert Network automated alerting function, even once made (HAN) is developing Internet connectivity at reliable, should still be backstopped by the flexi- state and local health departments; this mecha- ble display of all the data and the ability for nism could be used for exchanging information experts to manipulate the data for appropriate and for distributing alerts based on surveillance. display. (This is needed for detailed investigation in any event.) ESSENCE II (Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community Based Technology Limitations and Barriers: Epidemics) is an operational prototype testbed As implied in the previous discussion, the major for the National Capital Region being used to barriers are institutional rather than technologi- test concepts and technologies that are not cal, although integration of disparate software mature enough to be fielded by local health systems can pose thorny problems. Privacy issues departments. Sponsored by DoD, ESSENCE II are of some concern as well, although there is is integrating military and civilian health indica- clear precedent for reporting based on public tor data, evaluating non-traditional data sources, health needs. and developing new analytical techniques to identify abnormal health conditions. Business incentives lead to reluctance on the part of pharmacies and health providers to participate Commercial systems enable capture of syndromic prior to the confirmed outbreak of a disease. data or confirmed diagnoses in health care facili- There is a need for trusted agents who will inter- ties. Although there is currently no standardiza- face between public health and emergency tion of approaches across these multiple systems, response agencies, pharmacies and medical cen- the CDC is developing standards for syndromic ters as an integrated system is being created. surveillance. Large national programs are devel- Some technology is required to allow for auto- oping technology to identify biological agents in mated data input, regional monitoring of data livestock, to encourage the use of sentinel chick- and the reduction of background noise until a ens and establishment of joint efforts between large enough data set is established. zoos and state departments of health (see MRPA.2 (Coordination of Animal and Plant Because there are thousands of emergency rooms Entities with Public Health, Law Enforcement, and and many more doctors’ offices, data acquisition State, Local, and Federal Government and will be costly and cumbersome unless it is built Industry)). DARPA has funded the Bio-event into the medical reimbursement system. Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Detailed information of causes of death is not (BioALIRT) project for advanced surveillance reported on a timely basis in many medical exam- techniques and the ENCOMPASS Project to iners’ offices because of cost and low numbers of demonstrate techniques for effective allocation of autopsies. There is a requirement for research to resources when a crisis situation has emerged. determine what types of information should be

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collected (and to what level of detail) and the integration is the biggest technical challenge, with cost effectiveness of such information. the technical challenge itself being dwarfed by the difficulties in getting private sector organizations Gap Fillers: to cooperate and the need to assure that privacy Perhaps the most immediately available and most requirements are adhered to. sensitive early indicator of severe acute illness is PHRBAE.2 – Rapid High-Throughput Clinical 9-1-1 call and EMS treatment records. These are Assessment and Testing. The capability to do largely accessible to public safety departments rapid testing of clinical specimens to determine the now, and efforts at standardization of data are nature of an infectious agent so that specific treat- underway. This is probably the “lowest hanging ment can begin before the appearance of symptoms. fruit” for immediate improvement in capability. Multiple projects are already under way to collect Rapid clinical assessment and testing is important such data. What is needed is a forum for demon- because of the dramatically improved health out- stration of what is being done and harmonization comes that can result from early treatment and of the different approaches and a path toward full isolation of affected individuals. The capability is interoperability in the future. applicable to biological agent events in three For many threat agents, the onset of severe illness main contexts: screening of large numbers of pos- is too late. Picking up indications of less severe sibly exposed individuals who have been in the initial symptoms is a harder problem – clusters of vicinity of a suspected biological agent release to work absences may be the earliest indicator and see if they are likely to become ill; containing the detailed reporting from doctors’ offices and clin- spread of an epidemic by determining if individu- ics may be the best indicator. Despite the diffi- als are infected and contagious, ideally recogniz- culties, several of the regional demonstrations ing initial human spreaders of disease and cer- have shown promise in improving the early tainly rendering isolation and quarantine more recognition of disease outbreaks. Further efficient; and identifying the pathogen in a research and analysis is needed to understand the patient so that specific treatment can begin as relative cost and value of including various soon as possible and ideally before appearance of sources of information in the surveillance system. severe symptoms. Such understanding is needed to guide the evolu- The three contexts impose somewhat different tion of the overall surveillance system. A key requirements but some common technologies are factor in such value-of-information approaches useful across more than one. Some tests may is the cascade of actions that follows from a look directly for the offending organisms; others warning being delivered. Such actions include look for an early systemic response (for example, further investigation of the possibly identified stress factor or antibody production). Different outbreak as well as moves toward containment types of agents and agent-induced illness will be and treatment. more or less susceptible to detection and identifi- For the overall surveillance system to be maxi- cation by these different methods, and this sus- mally effective, interoperability of data sets and ceptibility will typically be different at different data standardization is needed to facilitate robust points over the course of an illness induced by data mining. Data mining and statistical com- biological agent. Shortly after initial exposure, an parison of actual data with expected rates (based agent may be detectable in the mucosa or on the on history, seasonal and weekly patterns, etc.) is skin, but very sensitive detection would be the key to early detection of disease outbreak. required for this type of detection to succeed Thus an important initiative will be harmoniza- against organisms that can cause infection even in tion of data standards. very small numbers. Some time after that, but still before the onset of clinical symptoms, it may In all of these examples many existing programs be possible to detect systemic responses. During are pointed in the right direction. Systems this phase it may be still be hard to detect the

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infectious organism itself in the body. The sys- technology capable of performing the desired temic response may be detectable long after the detection and characterization of infection with illness has past and the patient is no longer con- threat agents would likely also be able to diagnose tagious, producing a false positive if the test is naturally-occurring infections. intended to be used for an index of potential morbidity and contagion. In each of these settings identified above, a key goal would be for the test to be rapid enough to For these reasons, as well as the wide variation in allow a single encounter with the individual healthy physiology, there is unlikely to be one test being tested so the sample or signature can be or set of tests that can be used in all contexts for acquired, the test run, and the results made avail- all suspected pathogens. In many cases the best able before the individual leaves the controlled solution is a fairly imprecise screening test fol- setting of the test venue. Otherwise the individu- lowed by a more exact (and probably less rapid) als must be called back with results and there is test where the screening test raises concern. an inevitable leakage of patients from the system and a lag before treatment or other appropriate As noted previously, routine use of such testing in intervention can be started. If a single encounter emergency rooms, urgent care clinics, and doc- is not practical, then an important element of the tors’ offices would significantly improve the overall system would be record keeping and pos- power of the surveillance system discussed in sibly biometric identification to ensure that indi- PHRBAE.1 (Surveillance and Information viduals can be contacted and that identity infor- Integration Systems). If, as is likely, the capability mation is maintained through the process. also identifies normal disease agents more rapidly than current medical practice, then its adoption Responders indicated that ideally the sampling in routine medical care would also produce a system should be field deployable, non-invasive general improvement in health. (Health would and be completed in less than a minute. The be further protected through a dramatic reduc- most probable system concepts would involve tion in the inappropriate use of antibiotics, lead- multi-level screening. The first level would indi- ing to reduced proliferation of resistant bacteria.) cate presence or absence of threat agent while the second would verify the initial positive read- Goals: ing and identify the agent. Clearly a very low A primary goal is the rapid detection and identi- rate of false negatives is essential in the first level fication of multiple threat agents in biological of screening. Training for responder use of the samples from human and animal sources. screening system should require less than Responders would like a system that rapidly and 1 hour and therefore the methodology must accurately assesses a patient for all possible ill- be transparent. nesses without invasive sample taking, at low cost, and ideally without any previous informa- In our workshops, responders imagined a release tion on the nature of exposure. Traditionally, of biological agent in a stadium; they would like most medical tests are deployed to screen for par- to be able to screen all attendees on the way ticular conditions or to rule out particular diag- out—requiring total processing times per person noses rather than to determine health and expo- of a minute or so at most. The most preferred sure status to all harmful organisms, so this goal situation would have infected individuals readily amounts to a revolution in screening and diag- identified by some spectral image within sixty nostic practice. Such testing would be maximally seconds from a distance of greater than ten feet, effective in initial detection of an attack on the or by breathing into an advanced breathalyzer. general population if it were incorporated in This is not achievable currently. An intermediate everyday medical practice in doctors’ offices solution would utilize sweat and nasal swabs, or and clinics, as well as emergency rooms and hos- small samples of blood (<10 microliters) taken pitals. This would be likely to occur because a for example by a capillary prick. The time

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required for obtaining these samples would proteomic systems are subject to cross-reactions approximate thirty seconds leaving a minute at and therefore have a significant false positive rate. most for processing to meet the responders’ ideal throughput requirement. In this case a screening Transdermal IR spectroscopy can reveal the pres- test for exposure could be supplemented by a ence of low molecular weight metabolites in more detailed test to identify the agent. blood and this may provide indication of chemi- Obviously in this scenario the supplementary test cal (e.g., nerve agents) or biological agents (tox- to characterize the agent need only be given to a ins) that markedly reduce blood glucose, oxygen small subset of exposed individuals—to identify or other vital materials. This technology comple- the agent and to ensure that only one agent had ments iontophoresis (electrically-driven transport been dispersed. of small molecules through the skin) that is used commercially in the GlucoWatch, a wrist device However, for ill patients in an emergency room diabetics can wear, to monitor their blood glu- or hospital, even tests that took an hour or more cose profiles.12 would be substantial improvements over standard differential diagnosis techniques and would meet The recently completed human genome project the single encounter standard. has permitted researchers to identify early biomarkers of human response to threat agents. Current Capabilities: This technology, funded in large part by the Department of Health and Human Services Current capabilities are limited to traditional (HHS) will allow rapid growth in this general medical diagnosis tools in the hands of trained arena. medical personnel. Novel research tools, based on human genome State of the Art: expression, are correlating the appearance of Current technologies permit thermal imaging of inducible protein with various disease states. individuals to determine if they are febrile; this Research to this point suggests that such host technique has been employed during the SARS response biomarkers may permit clinical investi- epidemic to screen persons traveling from the hot gators to determine whether an individual has zone (China, Hong Kong, Taiwan) to the U.S. been exposed to a pathogenic agent. Such However there is no experimental data assuring changes may appear within 4-10 hours following the value of this approach. exposure. Various corporate entities have developed platforms for rapid screening of inducible In hospital environments, it is now possible to proteins that may have utility as biomarkers of identify many threat agents using genomic exposure and disease (e.g., Affymetrix, Roche, (DNA/RNA) or proteomic (antibody) based Chiron, Rules-Based Medicine, Biosite). Even if tests. Some genomic systems are deployable and the biomarkers can only differentiate bacterial weigh less than forty pounds (e.g., Cepheid). from viral agent exposure, treatment and prophy- These systems allow detection of a limited num- laxis may be initiated while the individuals are ber of threat agents or sequences, but systems pre-symptomatic. It would be useful to develop that allow greater parallelism are emerging software that correlates syndromic surveillance from the laboratory (Nanogen, Sequenom, and biomarker expression patterns. Applied Biosystems). The proteomic systems can be adapted to paper strips similar to that for blood glucose monitoring by diabetic, or adapted Technology Limitations and Barriers: for smaller sample sizes through automated fluo- There is no current technology available for the rescent readout (Rules-Based Medicine). The non-invasive rapid characterization of biological

12 However the GlucoWatch is marketed only as a supplement and not a replacement for regular blood glucose metering. It must be calibrated each time it is worn and it is far from instantaneous—it takes 2 hours to “warm up” and then produces readings that are time-averaged over twenty minutes. So a capillary prick is much faster and more accurate.

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agents in the body including viruses, bacteria, Transdermal detection of blood metabolites is fungi and toxins. Characterizing biological most effective for low molecular weight materials agents in clinical samples is also problematic. (not proteins). However, IR spectroscopy is so Point detectors are currently available but require far unproven and iontophoresis is slow. significant time and their ability to detect small amounts of agent in biological samples such as Electronic nose technology developed at several mucous is not clear. Genomic analyses require a universities, including The University of Texas at sample preparation of approximately ten minutes Austin, Department of Energy National to release the DNA or RNA. Subsequent pro- Laboratories and private industry may provide cessing is also on the order of ten or more min- tools with utility but this is an emergent technol- utes. Genomic analyses, if done with sufficient ogy. The idea is to sample the breath or perhaps well-identified and appropriate probes will be sweat and/or saliva. very accurate with very few false positives or negatives. Proteomic analyses based on immunologi- Gap Fillers: cal reactions will require much less time (approxi- The disease process for threat agents – including mately five to ten minutes) but cross reactions the body’s response—is imperfectly understood. between the immunoglobulin and related but An effort to learn more about the biomarkers non-pathogenic organisms will result in signifi- that correlate with different stages of the disease cant false positives and negatives. While genetic process for different biological threat agents has engineering of threat agents can circumvent the been proposed as a Strategic Research Area (see immunoassay-based systems, appropriate Chapter I (Introduction)). genomic probes should be able to detect the organism anyway. The panoply of technical approaches to rapid clinical assessment and testing must be winnowed The genomic systems can utilize samples in the over time to the level of a few alternatives for tens of microliters (drops) because of nucleic serious investment throughout the medical acid amplification. Proteomic analyses may community. require somewhat larger sample volumes. Several identified proteins that are induced following However, responder interest in an extremely rapid infection are also induced by stress not related to test that can be administered if necessary without infection (e.g., pregnancy) and so are not reliable trained medical personnel suggests an early indicators. emphasis on evaluating the power of transdermal IR chromoscopy to detect low-molecular weight DARPA is developing a single, hand held device biomarkers. If this approach pans out, then the that is anticipated to use proteomic and genomic development of a library of infrared spectral technology to detect infectious agents. properties of blood components, which can be Microelectronic chips that can detect biological used to determine the presence of biological threat agents are under development in the com- agents, will benefit both responders dealing with mercial sector as well. A Nanogen on-chips chemical and biological threats as well as the gen- strand displacement amplification technique and eral medical community. third wave technology invader systems are non- polymerase chain reaction systems. The feasibil- To the extent that the testing process separates a ity of detecting biological agents in the field by sample from the person even within the confines these methods remains to be demonstrated. of the single encounter standard (and even more These will have a rapid-turnaround if successful. so if the single encounter norm must be vio- lated), then a process for certain identification of At the present time there are no truly non-inva- the individual and association of the sample with sive rapid analytical systems for detecting threat the individual is needed. Bar code technology agents or host response markers for infection. and existing personal identifiers (e.g., drivers’

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license magnetic strips) can be of assistance in an insect vector) dissemination patterns are a this task. The use of biometrics should also be function of the migration of the host and pres- explored. ence of the vector (such as West Nile Virus).

With the exception of the person/sample identifi- Goals: cation technology, all of these technologies are Responders and public health officials recognize judged to be high risk because no technology is that they will be lucky to discover a biological readily available to meet the stated goals of emer- agent release in progress. So the modeling soft- gency responders. ware must have the capability to backtrack from PHRBAE.3 – Modeling of Exposure and emergent illness and epidemiological information Containment. The ability to predict the likely to discern the initial dispersal mechanism and numbers and geographical distribution of individu- area. The system must also be able to model the als exposed to biological agents through modeling likely pattern of infection from residual agent in exposure to or containment of an agent. The tech- the environment. It should predict likely demo- nology will help public health and safety officials graphic and geographic progression of an epi- manage emerging threat conditions by anticipat- demic starting from information on the disease ing which regional areas and personal lifestyles agent, its virulence, the current health status are conducive to exposure to moderate to high of the population, and other factors such as levels of agent and thereby plan for prophylaxis, weather. In addition, it should also be capable and quarantine, and for back-tracing contagion of projecting the effects of such policy measures to its source(s). as quarantine.

The DIDA.6 (CBRNE Effects Modeling and The modeling capability to interpret information Simulation) and MR.6 (Modeling of output during threat conditions must be available Exposure/Casualties for Location and Numbers) to responders and public health officials at the functional capabilities focus respectively on mod- incident scene as well as command centers, and eling atmospheric dispersion of CRBNE agents be accessed from mobile computers. The model- and effects and the illness resulting from exposure ing information should have the capability to be to chemical and radiological materials. The mod- integrated with other data sources and data users eling of dissemination of biological agents after (including early detection/syndromic data, deci- initial airborne dispersal, and their distribution sion support for isolation/quarantine/contain- through other channels, is addressed in this sec- ment, hazmat integration) and preferably be web- tion. The major differences between biological enabled. The operation of the modeling program agent dissemination and that of either chemical should be graphical and easy to understand. The or radiological agents include the self-replicating software should not require significant technical nature of the biological agents and their very long support on-site. The training of responders to survival in particular circumstances. As a result, use the modeling program should require four persistent infection is a problem in certain hours or less and the results of a modeling run exposed individuals. For highly contagious bio- should be available within one hour. The model- logical agents, infected individuals can serve as ing system should utilize real-time meteorological seeds for iterative dissemination of the agent and data and be capable of managing multi-level therefore cause multiple waves of illness. (The security. SARS epidemic has prompted research into the phenomenon of the “super spreader.”) In highly Current Capabilities: mobile modern society, exposure of a small popu- The Army Medical Command has published a lation in an airplane can lead to rapid distribu- book that catalogues biological threat agents, tion of pathogen globally. For zoonotic disease prognosis of clinical disease from these agents and (transferred from animals to humans or spread by treatment protocols. The book is available in a

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wireless form that can be accessed from a PDA. research has been performed by the defense com- This material is prepared for physicians rather munity in agent dispersal there is a need to fuse than public safety responders. military information with public health modeling and data sets. The airborne dispersal models discussed in DIDA.6 (CBRNE Effects Modeling and Technology Limitations and Barriers: Simulation) generally do not consider the possi- The likelihood that a given dose of agent encoun- bility of re-aerosolization of agent that has been tered by various routes will cause infection in deposited after an initial airborne dispersal, or humans is not well characterized. The relative that has been introduced into the environment susceptibility of young persons, the aged, patients through non-airborne means. with compromised immune systems (e.g., AIDS, Crude epidemiological transmission models have organ transplant recipients) remains to be deter- been used to support exercises but are not typi- mined. The number of anthrax particles believed cally deployed in incident command centers or in necessary to cause disease in August 2001 had to state public health headquarters. be revised downward in 2002 because of an elderly woman in Connecticut who developed the State of the Art: disease. Almost all susceptibility data was acquired from models using healthy animals. Communities around the U.S. monitor environ- The effects of urban crowding, nutrition, co- mental air quality and study the dispersal of par- infection with other agents, and occupational sta- ticulates in urban and rural communities. tus are confounding elements. Moreover, it is Included in this are the Houston Advanced entirely possible that an incident will involve spe- Research Council (HARC) environmental air cially bred or engineered organisms that have vir- quality program and programs in the Los Angeles ulence or toxicity different from the strains previ- area. Similar data are collected in major ously encountered. European cities concerned about environmental quality. While the particulates monitored (e.g., The determination of which modeling system is diesel emissions) have a significantly smaller size to be used will affect training programs and the (0.1 micron diameter) than biological agents, the need to have consensus on national use of a spe- patterns of agent dispersal and distribution can cific model will delay implementation of this be estimated by responders using appropriate task. This is less a technology issue than a policy technology. The Los Alamos National issue. Laboratory (LANL) epidemiological program for toxic metals and threat-agent dispersal has mod- Gap Fillers: eled the diffusion of such materials in ground and surface water. The linking of early disease detection systems (e.g., syndromic) with Global Information The CDC has modeled the spread of infectious Systems and data/mapping is readily achievable. disease in communities. Some of this is available The electronic storage of archival disease emer- through the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly gence data, from state departments of health, can Reports of CDC. Epidemiological models provide a basis for an analysis and review of les- have been used in policy analyses of vaccination sons learned. The information of interest strategy. includes: the co-dependency of agents on other kinds of infection, the effects of demographic Some of the cited data may not be readily avail- shifts on emergent disease and virulence changes able to the general responder community for rea- in biological organisms. sons of security. The establishment of trusted individuals at major centers, who could access Research is required to investigate the role of var- such data, may facilitate rapid transfer to person- ious societal and biological situations on agent nel in the field as necessary. While extensive dissemination and emergent epidemics. These

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situations include how the living conditions Goals: (urban/rural), employment conditions (density, The emergence of SARS in China and Canada ventilation, humidity), transportation patterns has heightened awareness of the need to develop and genomic markers affect the spread and viru- a capability to isolate and quarantine individuals lence of the disease. The SARS epidemic in with serious contagious disease. There is an asso- China revealed significant differences in suscepti- ciated need to monitor the success of isolation. bility of various communities in affected areas to GPS monitoring of quarantined individuals severe disease. would be an enabling technology for this goal, although it is also necessary to ensure that previ- Many continuing research initiatives are relevant ously uninfected individuals do not stray into to this area and there are no particularly difficult contact with quarantined people and places. technological questions in system development; Education of the public to achieve operational the difficulties relate primarily to a lack of full acceptance is also needed. knowledge on the modes of transmission and degree of virulence of the wide variety of threat An important requirement is creation of an entity agents that can be envisioned (some of them that can authorize orders for isolation and quar- genetically engineered). Thus there is an inherent antine and can enforce such an order. At the limit to the accuracy of the modeling that can be present time the authority to quarantine resides developed. in the state departments of health while enforcement resides with public safety organizations or PHRBAE.4 – Isolation and Quarantine. The the National Guard. ability of public health and safety officials to minimize the onward spread of infectious disease through Current Capability: the control of contact between unexposed and contagious individuals. Isolation refers primarily to In the period after recognition of a release of a techniques for protecting healthy people from biological threat agent in an urban area it will be exposure to contagion even when they must be necessary to process thousands of people. If hos- near and even interact with contagious individu- pitals and public spaces are to be used for isola- als; quarantine refers to the enforced residential tion of patients with highly communicable dis- segregation of possibly contagious people. ease, such facilities will need to be retrofitted with effective isolation capability (e.g., positive The technology should support the identification and negative pressure and airflow). Very often of exposed populations and measures to ensure the unintentional admission of a person with a effective isolation of exposed and unexposed pop- highly contagious disease results in contamina- ulations. This applies to potentially contagious tion of the hospital. For example, the air han- populations both in and out of treatment facili- dling capability of many emergency rooms is ties. This capability will permit establishment of directly connected to air handling in the whole care delivery facilities that will house thousands facility. Containment then becomes a matter of of patients in a secure, appropriate manner. security and exercise of authority—extremely MR.3 (Individual and Collective Protection – contagious people must be kept out of the emer- health Care Facilities and Personnel) discusses gency room. A sensor which could scan people technologies and mechanisms to prevent the as they walk in and determine which persons spread of contamination from threat agents were exposed would be very advantageous.13 within established medical care facilities (e.g., Screening stations may need to be established clinics, hospitals). A significant portion of the outside of the treatment facility itself. Patients population within these facilities is immuno- with highly communicable diseases should be compromised or otherwise more susceptible to provided rooms with negative pressure to reduce disease (nosocomial infections). dissemination of contaminated air throughout a

13 Unfortunately, since very small numbers of certain kinds of bacteria or virus particles lodged within the body can bloom into a virulent and contagious infection, it is entirely possible that someone entering the hospital appearing to be “clean” could after a period of days in the hospital become a source of contagion without encountering any further agent within the hospital.

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structure; other patients may be provided rooms home-based, hospitals). The National Guard with filtered airflow and positive pressure if there Bureau in 1999 prepared a report on the role of is high confidence that they are not contagious. the NGB during quarantine and came to the Ideally each patient would be provided with fil- conclusion that declaration of quarantine is tered air and provision would be made for the problematic. removal of the bulk of the air from a room so that inadvertent spread does not occur. Related The most serious issues related to isolation and to this point is that most mobile or portable hos- quarantine primarily have to do with policy and pital units do not have the capability to regulate resources, not technology. airflow in the manner needed to sustain negative pressure. Today, most hospitals do not have a Technology Limitations and Barriers: significant number of isolation units. Policies and procedures for declaration of quarantine vary from state to state and are markedly New guidance on effective quarantine emerged affected by legal issues. There is a clear diver- from the SARS experience. The experience with gence between authority to declare a quarantine SARS has been described in the CDC’s and enforcement of the declaration. Because of Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report the expectation that a biological event will affect (MMMWR) and provides good data on the thousands of people, it appears clear that neither Toronto experience showing how they did isola- the U.S., nor any other nation in the developed tion and quarantine in schools and home- based world, has the capability to manage thousands of and hospital isolation. Home care was provided people ill with a highly contagious and lethal dis- for 350 individuals suspected of SARS. In addi- ease. The likelihood that the disease will emerge tion, Canada prepared forms alerting deplaning in a short time period (less than fifteen days) passengers to the signs of SARS. The SARS compounds the logistics of medical management. response projects of Canada, Taiwan and South In addition to medical care there will be difficul- Asia are models for developing new approaches to ties with enforcement of policy and maintaining biological threats in the developed world. Yet the security. rules of engagement for declaration of quarantine are ambiguous as was seen during the SARS event in Canada. Economic loss to the commu- Gap Fillers: nity and political requests to remove quarantine Various federal entities have examined the role emerged. Standardized methods of quarantine they may play in quarantine. The Department of enforcement remain to be developed. Homeland Security is expected to participate in this effort and the National Guard has examined State of the Art: its potential role in the quarantine process. The In the event of a severe outbreak of highly infec- success of the SARS efforts is likely to influence tious disease the military uses field hospitals for future quarantine processes. mass quarantine rather than fixed facilities. Responders believe that current procedures for Architectural and engineering plans have been protecting health providers and responders are prepared to retrofit the emergency room facilities not adequate. However, a search for enabling at the University of Pittsburgh for management technologies led to little more than air handling of patients with highly infectious disease. The systems, locator devices, personal protective retrofitting includes placement of fans and HEPA equipment for medical workers, and decision filters. Other hospitals have been retrofitted or support tools—all of which are well within the have plans to be retrofitted for such an incident. state of the art. Needed sensor systems will be The CDC has prepared a report on lessons developed as part of other functional capabilities learned from the Toronto SARS event (schools, and NTROs.

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PHRBAE.5 – Affordable Specimen Transport shipping and containers is less than $100. for CW and BW Agents. Procedures and devices Federal Express now knowingly transports these which provide the ability for transportation of hazardous samples. potentially lethal chemical and biological agents and the availability and security of containers used The responders indicated that the average fire to transport biological agent samples. department does not have the money to purchase the available biohazard containers. If federal Goals: funds are not provided, the realities of today’s fiscal climate mean that local governments will not Emergency responders have a need to contain purchase the vials even at low cost. Responder biological samples for shipment to a laboratory departments that have special operations capabili- where they can be analyzed. The shipping con- ties typically have one or two containers. There tainers (vials) must be affordable, cost less than was a perceived need for readily available proce- $100, be available in multiple sizes and be able to dures, protocols, and shipping vials for sample sustain viability of living cells that are being sam- recovery pled. The vials and shipping containers must be ruggedized (they should withstand a plane crash State of the Art: without dispersing agent). Training of responders is required for collection of the sample without Several federal agencies and commercial organiza- disturbing a chain of evidence, packaging of the tions have standardized protocols for the ship- sample and addition of nutrients or other amend- ment of biological samples (i.e., USAMRIID, ments to assure intact arrival at the analytical site. CDC, American Type Culture Collection There is a particular need to address evidence and [ATCC]). The U.S. Department of documenting the chain of custody. Transportation (DOT) describes protocols for sample shipment and carriers that can safely Current Capabilities: transport such materials. At the current time chemical agent samples are Technology Limitations and Barriers: transported in salvage cylinders that cost about $6,000 each. Lawrence Livermore uses The shipment of biological agents does not microfibers in a waterproof plastic case that is require new technology development. The opened in a hot zone and then closed, decontam- majority of samples to be analyzed for the pres- inated on the surface and transferred to an ana- ence of biological agents are small in volume lytical laboratory. (under 50 milliliters).

The shipment of suspected or actual biological Although responders do not have appropriate agents does not require such expensive packaging containers, such containers are available and rou- because no volatiles are involved. The biological tinely used. While no RTO is associated with samples are placed in sample vials, secured with this functional capability, the Department of an O Ring, placed in a zip lock bag and then Homeland Security should review the market packed using triple containers (each inserted into availability of affordable appropriate containers a larger container) and labeled as biohazard. The and establish standards and guidelines for respon- container can be manipulated despite limited der stocking of these containers. dexterity of responders in HAZMAT suits. Some clinical specimens need oxygen, some refrigera- PHRBAE.6 – Transport of Contagious Patients. tion, and some positive pressure. The size of The ability to transport multiple contagious patients the sample is frequently small but may vary without endangering medical care providers or the and include large sample volumes. The cost of public.

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Goals: designed for long-range air transport, which Responders want access to single-patient mobile imposes requirements that may not be needed for isolation environments that are cost effective metropolitan emergency response. (priced below $1500), have disposable liners, are USAMRIID has a small number of Aeromedical easily deployed and non-stressful to the patient. Isolation Teams to safely transport patients with The unit must allow clinical assessment and criti- lethal communicable diseases from the field into cal interventions by multiple providers, be user USAMRIID containment facilities. The teams friendly and require less than one hour of train- are equipped with flexible clear plastic enclosures ing of emergency responders for appropriate use. on wire frames with battery-operated negative- It should be light-weight and easily processed for pressure air filtration systems and glove boxes. decontamination, and be accommodated on a These come in two sizes—a stretcher size unit standard ambulance stretcher. that can be carried by two people and a larger air It should accept a full range of patient sizes (pedi- transportation unit that facilitates in-flight med- atric through obese) and those with special needs. ical care. It should be self-sufficient with respect to power for at least two hours and allow for administra- The Life Support for Trauma and Transport tion of life support oxygen. In the best of cir- (LSTAT) is an individualized portable intensive cumstances the unit should be able to accept a care system and surgical platform providing resus- new patient after fifteen minutes of decontamina- citation and stabilization capability through an tion. Such a device should be introduced into integrated suite of state-of-the-art medical the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. devices. It is designed to decrease mortality, morbidity and disability by moving trauma care far- Current Capability: ther forward toward the site of an injury for Patient isolation systems for use in transport are improved diagnostics and therapeutics through- not currently in use by emergency responders, out the evacuation and treatment process. The and are not deployed in quantity by the current, third generation, LSTAT, features a ven- Department of Defense or other federal agencies. tilator, suction, oxygen system, infusion pump, physiological monitor, clinical blood analyzer, There are no standards or accepted protocols for and defibrillator. These medical devices are com- transporting hundreds of patients infected with a plemented with a fully network-capable on-board highly contagious lethal disease. Affordability is a computer monitoring system and stand alone big barrier for acquisition of the pod systems. power system all packaged together in the NATO Because current policy strongly recommends litter form factor. However, owing to the small against the movement of patients who are numbers of systems (around 25) currently field- infected with a highly contagious biological deployed, the systems tend to be used more as agent, reconsideration of this guideline in con- mobile forward patient support systems in austere junction with analysis of technological options environments rather than end-to-end trans- would be needed before transportation isolation porters. The price of the system ($165,000) is systems would become a critical item for biologi- also an obstacle to widespread use. The high-end cal defense in the United States. medical support features would often not be required for transport of patients who are conta- State of the Art: gious but stable. Although the current LSTAT The Department of Defense has invested in the does not have isolation capability; the next-gener- development of systems that facilitate transport ation LSTAT, currently in development, will be of very ill (especially trauma) patients and other available with a canopy and negative and positive systems that permit transport of persons infected pressure and filtering for isolation of contagious with highly contagious agents. These systems are and “clean” patients (respectively).

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The Alion Corp has a product that involves plac- hazardous trash that can be used by existing ing the patient in a contained elastomeric unit infrastructure in major medical centers and hos- with capability to administer critical gasses pitals. The containers require minimal handling, including oxygen. must be rugged and able to contain most dangerous organisms. Safe storage would be required Technology Limitations and Barriers: until disposal capacity can be arranged. Design of such pod systems is fairly straightfor- Training of home health care providers for use of ward. Tradeoffs between cost and levels of capa- these containers should require less than ten min- bility must be addressed in the context of pre- utes. The containers must be part of a national ferred concepts of operations for where and how stockpile and part of all home care kits. This is a patients would be treated. It would be worth- logistics issue, with education and procedural while for the Department of Homeland Security components. to host a demonstration and standards development process that would help coordinate a mar- State of the Art: ket for vendors of such systems. Existing products for home health care currently PHRBAE.7 – Safe Handling of Medical Waste. exist. The safe handling and disposal of large quantities of unusually infectious medical waste, for use in homes Technology Limitations and Barriers: and alternative treatment facilities as well as doc- There are no technology or cultural limitations or tors’ offices and other established medical care facili- barriers. No RTO is defined for this functional ties. In a situation following massive outbreak of capability. disease with a highly contagious and lethal biological agent, the large volume of contaminated Public Health Readiness for Biological materials would pose a major logistical problem. Agent Events Response Technology The rate of accumulation of contaminated mate- Objectives (PHRBAErto) rials and large volume differentiates scenarios involving biological agents from what we do PHRBAErto.1 – Health Surveillance for Early today. Medical waste includes used needles, Detection of Biological Agent Events blood and pus, absorbent materials from diapers and sponges, bandages and dressings, and human Objectives: excretory products. Among the components that Develop a comprehensive surveillance system that could mitigate the management problem are spe- ensures initial recognition of an emergent illness cial vehicles or containers configured to fit exist- at the earliest point in the progress of a biological ing vehicles. High tensile strength disposable agent event. This system would be based in met- materials must be used because infected individu- ropolitan and regional areas but would allow fully als may be self-administering drugs with needles transparent data aggregation up to the national and current practices may result in improperly level. Near-real-time data sources would include covered sharp pointed objects which can poke work and school absences, over-the-counter and holes in trash bags. The disposal bags and pro- prescription pharmaceutical purchases, syndromic cessing must be affordable, but may be third information on clinic, doctor, emergency room party reimbursable. and hospital visits, 9-1-1 and EMS calls, and information from veterinary sources and medical Responders recommend including waste-handling examiners. It would encompass historical data supplies in the stockpiled push packs. sets and regional demographics, commuting and travel patterns to support full data mining capa- Goals: bilities, and forward links into epidemic model- The potential magnitude of the waste suggests ing capability. It would have a full set of icono- the development of interoperable containers for graphic, geographic, and temporal display modes

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and semi-automated and automated modes for identifying information must be held in reserve correlation of data bearing on emerging clusters for rapid exploitation in fast follow-up epidemio- of illness and their statistical significance com- logical investigation once disease clusters have pared to base rates. The system would also pro- been recognized. vide alerting functions for further epidemiological investigation and for policy interventions. Cost/benefit research will be needed to determine the types of data sources to be included in the Payoffs: deployed system and the level of detail that There is a 48 to 72 hour lag between initial expo- should be reported. Careful attention to archi- sure to an agent and appearance of clinical signs. tecture will be required so that useable systems Medical interventions with antibiotics/antivirals, can be brought up quickly with provision for vaccines or containment of the exposed persons them to evolve gracefully into a fully powered during this window can greatly diminish the integrated system over time. Different regions number and severity of subsequent cases of ill- will have different starting points and needs and ness. Early recognition will lead to early identifi- so the system will definitely have to tolerate cation of the pathogen; once an infectious illness diversity. is identified, further occurrences can be more readily identified and treated. Milestones/Metrics: FY2004: Benchmark epidemiological early warn- The result will be a decrease in the number of ing research to date. Survey public health data- patients that will acquire the disease from second- bases and select data sets appropriate for these ary or tertiary exposure and a decrease in the purposes. Harmonize diagnoses and other infor- severity of illness in those persons exposed to the mation codes used in these systems. Using the agent initially. Of course, a powerful health sur- best practices of existing research efforts, begin veillance of this sort would help in dealing with design of an Syndromic Surveillance and natural as well as deliberate public health threats. Response Prototype. Initiate research on new methods of automated population of health care Challenges: databases (e.g., automated diagnostic labs with A key challenge is identifying emergent disease in real-time links to syndromic databases – see a cohort sufficient in size to reduce false posi- PHRBAErto.2 (Rapid, High Throughput Clinical tive/negative data sets. A large number of Assessment and Testing) and the Strategic Research patients are needed and this can be achieved by Area on Biomarkers of Agent Induced Disease and networking multiple hospitals/clinics in a Systemic Injury), for possible eventual inclusion in regional system. However, the ability to detect later versions of the system. small initial clusters (ideally) of pre-clinical illness against this background requires sophisticated FY2005: Deploy Syndromic Surveillance and data mining tools. In addition to alerting, the Response Prototype initial capability (perhaps at system must allow rapid revealing of patient iden- three sites with different demographic characteris- tifying information for further investigation, tics); establish minimum standards for interoper- while maintaining patient privacy under normal ability, data formats, and provisions for display circumstances. and analysis. Begin test and evaluation of prototype in three cities. Continue research into value The surveillance data must be acquired in near- of disparate data sources and integrate into proto- real-time without additional effort by the health type as appropriate. Continue research into auto- care providers. This is a medical economics issue. mated syndromic data generation. A surveillance system based on capture of electronic medical data, from which all individual FY2006: Conclude research on value of disparate identifiers have been removed, can be devised data sources. Continue testing and evaluating to protect patient privacy. However, sufficient prototype system. Develop improvements to the

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prototype based on test results and data access improving the speed and accuracy of ordinary and generation research. medical diagnosis, faster clinical testing will also improve the power of the health surveillance sys- FY2007: Finalize interoperability standards for tem, even apart from its direct role in diagnosing Syndromic Surveillance and Response systems. biological agent induced illness among patients in Increase deployment and testing of prototype to doctors’ offices, emergency rooms, and clinics. several more metropolitan areas. Continue Finally, the technology for rapid diagnosis would research into automated data gathering and inte- improve health outcomes and reduce medical grating results of that research. costs in the absence of a biological agent event.

FY2008: Finalize Syndromic Surveillance and Challenges: Response System architecture, design and tools. Demonstrate target capability nationwide. No combination of current technology exists to Assess results of research on automated diagnosis provide the combination of speed and stand-off and reporting for inclusion in future version as desired by responders. Fortunately, achieving appropriate. much of the payoff identified does not require reaching this level of capability. PHRBAErto.1 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals However, no other context is likely to place Early Detection $20 $30 $45 $60 $50 $205 the emphasis on minimal contact and on speed as the role of screening for exposure to PHRBAErto.2 – Rapid High-Throughput biological agents; so this should have a special Clinical Assessment and Testing priority. At the same time, there would be such a high payoff for accurate clinical blood tests that Objectives: would take even an hour or more that this Improve the speed, throughput, comprehensive- avenue is also important to explore. ness, and convenience of clinical assessment and As compared to naturally-occurring disease, bio- testing for characterization of biological agent exposure and disease status, in the three contexts logical agents may be engineered to circumvent identified in PHRBAE.2. Draw on the Strategic detection; this possibility needs to be taken into Research Area, Biomarkers of Bio-Agent Induced account and may bias the preferred approach in Disease (see Chapter I), to develop additional, favor of genomic tests instead of immunoassays, non-invasive, approaches to screening and even though these tests tend to take more time. diagnosis. Finally, there is likely to be an interval after exposure where no minimally invasive test will iden- Payoffs: tify 100% of those who may become ill. Also, Such an improved capability would significantly attempting to identify agents before they rise to improve the likelihood of early recognition and the level of major infection means that the test accurate characterization of a biological-agent will face a very high background noise level of induced epidemic, with substantial benefits in other microorganisms. Many biological agents reduction of morbidity and mortality. will be hard to distinguish from similar non- Depending on the context, it may also: improve pathogenic organisms. For all these reasons, the accuracy of treatment, improving results and achieving the ultimate level of capability cannot reducing the threat of side effects; improve the be the sole focus of this RTO. efficiency of efforts at isolation and quarantine, further reducing the scope of an epidemic; and Because of the strong overlap with normal med- reduce exposure of health care workers and ical practice, agencies of HHS, including the responders to threat agent and permit responders National Institute of Allergy and Infectious to operate with reduced protective gear. By Disease, and the CDC, should be directly

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involved in the development of programs under Payoffs: this RTO, together with agencies with expertise All biological agents, with the exception of toxin threat agents. ins, will replicate in a host. As a result, persistent infection is a problem in certain exposed individ- Milestones/Metrics: uals. For highly contagious biological agents, FY2006: Review progress of Strategic Research infected individuals can serve as seeds for iterative (see Chapter I) into the outward physiological dissemination of an agent and therefore cause signs of exposure, disease and injury. Review cur- multiple waves of illness. The payoff for success rent research and technology developments in in this task may be the reduction in severity of minimally invasive rapid testing techniques. illness in potentially infected persons and the Begin developing an architecture and strategy for elimination of subsequent waves of illness in indi- designing a Rapid High-Throughput Clinical viduals coming in contact with the initial target Assessment and Testing System (RHTCAT), at population. first with minimally invasive techniques and later with non-invasive techniques. Challenges: Modeling of this sort faces three primary chal- FY2007: Issue a Broad Area Announcement lenges. First, accurate predictions would require seeking several approaches to designing and very detailed data about initial exposure and building RHTCAT. future patterns of interaction, which would be FY2008-2010: Award several contracts to difficult to get. Second, because the models develop promising approaches. Test and evaluate attempt to capture events of a sort that have several competing prototypes. Begin commercial- never happened, the estimated parameters of con- ization and clinical testing efforts on the most tagion and survival are likely to be wildly inaccu- promising approaches, most likely through rate. Finally, for many of the biological agents, partnerships with established medical diagnostic we do not have human infectivity or lethality suppliers. doses. Extrapolation from old data or inappropriate animal models is insufficient. (Moreover, a PHRBAErto.2 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2006 2007 2008 Totals biological agent event may involve a wholly new RHTCAT $15 $30 $40 $85 variant of an existing organism.) In the interim, the modeling and simulation community must PHRBAErto.3 – Models for Re-dissemination continue to refine the physical, chemical, meteor- and Contagion of Biological Agents ological effects and other parameters that do not rely on human effects. Objectives: Therefore, the main challenge will be to keep the Develop improved models for the re-dissemina- modeling at a level where it is relevant to policy tion and contagion of biological agents. The and not to expect it to be an exact, “validated” major differences between biological agent dis- reflection of reality. semination and that of either chemical or radiological agents include the self-replicating nature Milestones/Metrics: of the biological agents and their very long sur- FY2004: Survey existing models and define vival in particular circumstances. The models appropriate performance levels. Identify gaps in must be integrated with surveillance information capability needed to accomplish goals. Develop (PHRBAErto.1 (Health Surveillance for Early strategy to fill the gaps. Detection of Biological Agent Events)) to help get a starting point. They must also encompass policy FY2005: Issue a Broad Area Announcement options such as quarantine and treatment to see seeking an advanced technology demonstration the effect on projections.

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using the strategy developed. Evaluate BAA FY2008: Begin to transition final capability responses and choose one or more performers. to users.

FY2006-2007: Develop Bio Contagion PHRBAErto.3 – Budget in Millions Modeling Tool. Conduct field demonstra- Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals Bio Contagion $10 $25 $40 $40 $40 $155 tions and finalize specification for deployable Modeling Tool system(s).

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 • Initial Recognition of an Emergent Illness at the Earliest point PHRBAErto.1 – Health Surveillance for Early • Near Real-Time Data Detection of Biological Agent Events Sources

• Improved Speed, PHRBAErto.2 – Rapid, High- Throughput, Throughput Clinical Assessment Comprehensiveness, and Testing and Convenience

• Integration of Models PHRBAErto.3 – Models for Re-dissemination and with Surveillance Contagion of Bio-Agents Information Public Health Readiness for Biological Agent Events (PHRBAE) Technology Roadmap

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PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter ix Logistics Support (LS) Chapter Chair: Dr. Lou Mason Chapter Coordinator: Dr. Maria Powell Definition desired performance, standardization of procedures and items would improve performance Logistics Support is the capability to deliver even without an infusion of new technology. The equipment, consumables, food, water, other sup- process of deploying an affordable technology- plies, shelter and transportation when and where based tool can work to harmonize procedures as needed in support of emergency response to a well as providing more rapid, more precise, and terrorist incident. more comprehensive logistics management, and thus better support to emergency responders. Several aspects of this definition should be kept in mind. First, many functions that would be viewed as logistics in a military operation overseas Operational Environments do not appear here because they are primarily Logistics is the process of supplying, transporting, civil support rather than support to the response maintaining, and servicing all elements of the per se. Functions of ordinary civil society such as responder’s capabilities. In evaluating logistics traffic management and water and electricity are functions, responders thought it more useful to covered in other NTROs (Emergency distinguish between phases of the response rather Management, Response and Recovery, and than the type of attack. They thought that there Medical Response) and not in logistics. Second, was likely to be as much variation in logistics this NTRO primarily addresses the ability to requirements within a particular attack category deliver support to responders rather than the sup- as between categories. Responders focused on port itself. It is the marshalling of the supplies needs to ensure a high state of readiness prior to rather than the supplies themselves. Finally, the operations through the use of deliberate plan- NTRO focuses on aspects of logistics that can be ning, to provide support during the initial enabled by technology; much prosaic supply and response to an incident, to provide tailored sup- maintenance activity does not get specific men- port as the specific requirements of an incident tion as a result. For example, the NTRO does emerge, and to rapidly reconstitute logistics capa- not address the pre-positioning of supplies or the bilities at the conclusion of the incident. These pre-loading of purpose-specific pallets of supplies. phases are conveniently labeled: pre-crisis deliberate planning, post-event initial logistics response, The specter of catastrophic terrorism requires adaptive execution, and logistics recovery. that disparate responder organizations – ones that normally do not work closely together – Throughout these phases of an incident, there is must learn to operate together. Efficient inter- the need to effectively anticipate requirements, operation requires consistent procedures and communicate among jurisdictions and organiza- equipment standards. However, inconsistent tions, manage transportation and other logistics policies, specialized responder needs, limited processes, and optimize assets. Due to the variety budgets, imperfect communications, and of responder disciplines and organizations, poli- restricted training all limit the success of current cies, procedures, and equipment in a given loca- logistics operating procedures. While technology tion are not standardized and often not interoper- is important to achieving the ultimate level of able. The lack of standardization of equipment

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complicates the provision of consumables such as solidly in the second position. Only the last batteries and service items, which may vary capability received a majority vote as a low prior- according to the type of equipment. This diffi- ity; the other four capabilities received mixed cult situation is likely to be further complicated values. by a lack of trained logistics personnel and effective logistics command and control procedures. In examining how these capabilities can best be A language barrier often causes additional diffi- improved, technologists and responders partici- culties and delays: naming conventions often cre- pating in the technology workshop determined ate confusion, especially when communicating a that, to the extent that capabilities identified in critical need where specificity is paramount. the FCEs are susceptible to improvement by Responders cited the need to not only coordinate technology, the gains will be realized most expe- logistics operations internally, but also with exter- ditiously if these capabilities are addressed essen- nal organizations (other responders, federal, state, tially as modules of an Integrated Logistics and commercial) throughout the planning, execu- Information System. tion, and reconstitution processes. Overall State of Technology for Needed Functional Capabilities and Logistics Support Priorities The matrix below summarizes the readiness of Listed below, in declining priority order, are the technology to underpin capabilities for Logistics logistics functional capabilities required: Support.

• Logistics Information System The predominance of green in the inner boxes means technologies needed to support functional • Automatic Generation and Assessment of capabilities in most of the operational environ- Supply Requirements ments are within reach; the preponderance of yel- lows and greens in the intermediate boxes means • Inventory Management that there are few gaps that are believed to exist Logisitcs Support • Mortuary Affairs Operational Environments Management Pre-Crisis Post-Event Deliberate Initial Logistics Adaptive Logisitics • Lightweight, Long- Functional Capabilities Planning Response Execution Recovery lived Power Sources 1. Logistics Info Systems

2. Automatic Generation and • Transportation Assessment of Supply Optimization Requirements 3. Inventory Management • Assessment of Safe Air, Sea and Ground 4. Mortuary Affairs Management Bases of Operations 5. Lightweight, Long-lived Power (Supply Depots) Sources

Responders rated the 6. Transportation Optimization Logistics Information 7. Assessment of Safe Air, Sea, and Ground Bases of System (LS.1) capability Operations (Supply Depots) well above the rest in 1 1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this priority; the Automatic 2 operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO 3 2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional Generation and capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO Assessment of Supply 3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability? Requirements (LS.2) was LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’

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between the capabilities that are needed and the and health status monitors discussed under UIC, expected results of commercial and government the various attack characterization technologies development programs already in train. This is discussed in DIDA and the smart breathing because of the close relevance of both commercial apparatus and protective clothing addressed in and military logistics systems in meeting respon- PPE.) The LIS should provide a collaborative der needs. Even for the Logistics Information planning and management environment, allow- System (LS.1), the red coloration of the innermost ing appropriate responders and officials at various boxes was governed only by a few “ideal” capabil- levels to address logistics issues via voice and data, ities; dramatic capability improvements compared sharing a common logistics picture of the current to today were judged to fall well within the gam- and projected status of assets and flows. bit of existing technologies. In other words, responders want a flexible, adap- LS.1 – Logistics Information System. The capa- tive, and easy means to share a blueprint of the bility to provide response commanders at various situation (like a scalable map of an area – the pic- levels accurate and timely information on supply ture), the ability to mark (draw and annotate), availability, resupply needs, and logistics resources and the ability to aggregate and drill down on and to allow them to manage the flow for optimum content (data and information). All responders response effectiveness. Access to the LIS by com- and technologists realize that this need cannot be manders and other elements of the logistics sys- met by imposing a standardized, one-size-fits-all tem must be standardized, interoperable, and system across the variety of responder domains, affordable, and the LIS must be capable of: cities, states, etc. By paying attention to an open architecture and interoperable systems, many of • Accurate and timely logistics data capture and the information system needs can be met by deci- information fusion. sion support tools that require minimal training, permit reliable access to information, and provide • Real time mission response asset accountabil- synchronous and asynchronous collaboration. ity and tracking for personnel and equipment. In the pre-crisis phase, the LIS would function to • Current supply usage and demand tracking facilitate deliberate planning and simulated and and communication. physical exercises of logistics response across juris- • Distributed visibility into the pipeline. dictional and disciplinary boundaries. In the immediate post-event phase, the LIS would help • Assured real-time logistics operational commanders tailor and manage the initial logis- management. tics flow, mostly based on pre-planned options. The LIS would enable an early transition to the The need for such an integrated logistic informa- adaptive execution phase, in which the logistics tion system is paramount, to ensure that respon- response is closely matched to the actual needs of ders on the incident scene are maximally effective the event rather than to pre-planned scenarios. and that the effort to supply everything they might need (in the absence of good information In the adaptive execution phase, the LIS would on the actual needs) does not become an obstacle incorporate up-to-the minute inputs both about to other elements of the response. the evolving nature and scale of the event and the needs of responders on the scene to recalculate Responders need an affordable solution, with the logistics needs. Finally, the real-time tracking inherent flexibility to track assets (people, things, provided by the LIS will support an earlier, more supplies) in real-time with a high degree of accu- accurate, and less-costly repositioning of logistics racy for their location and status. (Many of the assets and reordering of consumables, resulting in inputs would be provided by sensors and com- an earlier and more efficient recovery of full logis- munication channels developed under other tics capability. NTROS—for example the responder location

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Goals: Current Capabilities: The LIS must meet responder needs in three Today, the logistics function is not generally rec- areas: performance, integration with broader inci- ognized as a separate discipline. Automated dent management systems, and openness to all tracking capabilities are non-existent in most response organizations. The performance goals responder contexts. Although some jurisdictions relate to the ability of the system to collect, track, have established bar-code tracking for materials and present information relevant to projecting over a certain value ($500), these are not typically detailed logistics demand, tracking and displaying integrated across disciplines and jurisdictions. logistics flows and assets, and planning and man- Responder personnel are typically tracked by aging the deployment of logistics assets to meet blackboard or at an aggregated (squad) level. the demand over the full course of the response. ICS (incident command system) software exists The LIS must function as a part of a broader but is unaffordable for most jurisdictions and not incident command system and supporting soft- standardized. ware, for the most part running on the same hardware and using the same communication Information integration and scalability are cur- channels and protocols. Finally, the LIS must be rent limitations to the effectiveness of logistics flexible and open (while remaining robust and management across responder domains. secure) so that it can accept demand, flow, and Capturing and managing data and knowledge is asset information from and allow planning partic- difficult and limited. Information on the status ipation by all response organizations, including of equipment readiness and inventories is virtu- all responder specialties, all regional responder ally non-existent, and where information exists, departments, volunteer personnel and private- the lack of accessibility, transparency and interop- sector assets, as well as FEMA and other federal erability makes the information of little value to government participants. external elements.

Ideally, all response and regional and federal gov- State of the Art: ernment organizations would be included, inte- The current state of logistics information systems gration with the incident command system is evolving at a rapid rate, both within the com- would be seamless, and the status of all personnel mercial supply chain and also in government. In and equipment (no matter what jurisdiction or addition to full visibility of assets and goods in organization they belong to) would be tracked transit, the trend is toward increased integration, automatically along with their projected demand collaboration, and adaptability. Making informa- for consumables. Similarly, all supplies and tion systems completely Web-accessible reduces transportation and storage assets would automati- the significance of boundaries among organiza- cally communicate their availability, location, and tions and functional domains. Data integration, other relevant attributes to the LIS on a real-time mining, and mediation technologies are permit- basis. ting the use of data residing in legacy systems, even with differing semantics and schemas, to be In practice, of course, significant improvements accessed and combined in near real-time without over current capabilities could be achieved by sys- special-purpose programming. High resolution tems that fall well short of meeting these ideal graphics and visualization capabilities permit goals. Because of the mix of systems that differ- users to create customized views of information ent jurisdictions, agencies, and vendors will have for collaborative analysis via the Web. in place, the LIS must provide interfaces for tracking and marshalling assets that are not Tagging and sensing mechanisms (bar codes, equipped with the most modern reporting radio-frequency ID tags, etc.) are becoming capabilities. cheaper and more reliable, as are mechanisms

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that automatically report on the status of and purchased via the Web. This medium has mechanical systems and power sources. Finally, reduced government inventories, reduced order- discretionary access control and role-based cus- ing and financial paperwork, increased customer tomization is evolving as a standardized feature in satisfaction, and optimized transportation time. decision support tools to permit a level of secu- It has also permitted greater vendor participation rity and prevention of information being misused and competition. An EMALL for responders or interpreted out of context. The major chal- could identify, locate, and purchase items to meet lenge in the responder domain is to obtain a incident needs, in the quantities required, with- capability that can be put at the disposal of a crit- out having to hold significant and costly invento- ical mass of users to ensure stability, providing ries locally, let alone be burdened with additional strong incentives for cultural issues to be decisions in times of crisis. resolved. Commercial supply chain management solutions Today, responder logistics command and control exist that could be readily adapted for use by does not take advantage even of yesterday’s tech- responders to meet many basic and collaborative nologies, not to speak of tomorrow’s. Emerging needs. Short of the single EMALL concept, technologies will permit greater flexibility at a regional or national organizations could standard- lower cost. The key to leveraging state-of-the-art ize the interfaces between responder organizations software is integration and user access, permitting and vendors and other logistics asset providers, to users to tailor products to meet multiple logistic provide visibility into supplier pipelines. One functions with the level of specificity required to way of doing this would be to provide incentives forecast needs, make decisions, prioritize assets, for vendors to use customized plug-ins for cus- and monitor readiness during any phase of an tomer relations management (CRM) software incident. packages. Optimization tools for transportation routing and movement planning could provide The military has invested years in evolving and responders the ability to integrate a myriad of customizing logistics capabilities. Current trends organizations supporting an incident into a com- see the military looking to the commercial supply mon picture to set priorities and maximize uti- chain for inventory, transportation, optimization, lization. Companies like i2 and Manugistics are management systems, and business practices. leaders in this arena supporting large organiza- Commercial supply chain practices, born in the tions like FEDEX, UPS, Dell, etc., in meeting “lean” or “just-in-time” manufacturing ethos and transportation optimization needs. the Wal-Mart lean inventory, low-margin, customer focus, facilitate reduced inventory and Technology Limitations and Barriers: delivering the right product at the right time to meet customer demands. Tracking of shipments Communications connectivity must be assured is critical and anticipation of needs is being for the LIS to be effective. Managers of logistics accomplished with an unprecedented level of response during an incident will have to compete accuracy. Small businesses who have limited for limited communications resources. While resources have turned to third party logistics logisticians might prefer the autonomy of dedi- providers (3PL) to provide support (parts and cated communications, it is easier to provide transportation) for low density critical resources. redundancy, security, and communications assur- 3PL providers have moved into a global broker ance as part of a unified communications system. position to make the best of the competitive mar- Since responder logistics and overall incident kets. command must interact frequently and be synchronized, it makes sense for the communications The military has realized the value of this concept to be effectively seamless. with the creation of the Defense Logistics Agency’s EMALL (electronic commerce mall) Responders are not satisfied with the level of permitting consumables to be identified, located experience and training that characterize the

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people who end up fulfilling logistics tasks in a • Establish standard interfaces for COTS track- crisis. Modern systems have more complex logis- ing capabilities (bar codes, RFID) ($5M over tics demands, requiring more sophisticated sys- two years). tems and managers. Training across boundaries, both practical and cultural, is required with any • Evaluate commercial and military candidates implemented systems solution. While training for inclusion in a semi-automatic suite of and integrated exercises are costly, this cost is logistics decision-support and command and mitigated if the systems developed for terrorist control system ($5M over two years.) incidents are put in use every day. Responders • Establish a robust server infrastructure on the and technologists agree that any information sys- Internet as the medium for collaborative logis- tem should be used on a day-to-day basis and tics information systems. A mesh of coopera- must serve equally well throughout the opera- tive servers could be established at a cost of tional environments of the planning and execu- $1M a year over 1-2 years. This should be tion continuum. done in conjunction with filling other secure Any system must be scalable and able to retrieve responder collaboration and communication and mediate data from disparate sources without needs, as described in Chapter IV (UIC). the need to cache at fixed points. Also, data may • Integrate commercial products and the above require integration and downloading to local gap fillers – approximately 2 years at a cost of clients for immediate use while not connected to $6-10M. networks. In addition, the following longer-term initiatives Integrating tracking technologies is difficult and could be started: demands continued testing for interoperability, reliability, and scalability. Responders worry that • Evaluate the benefits of an automated logistics today’s technologies for tracking are not mature command and control suite of decision sup- enough to eliminate risk to life and mission. port products, with software agent technolo- However, the limited logistics throughput in a gies for search and optimization. Such a crisis means that even with some risk of break- system could be developed and fielded within down, an improvement in visibility would 5 years at a cost of $40-120M, depending increase the reliability of the right supplies arriv- on the level of fielding and training. The ing. These risks are arguments for good prac- big problem here is the need for automated tices, for testing and for backup operational domain bridging by software agents. Such methods, not for avoiding the use of modern a project should involve agencies such as techniques for tracking critical assets during DARPA to ensure that emerging information execution. and communication technologies would be considered where appropriate. Gap Fillers: In the short term, several initiatives could • Evaluate the possible benefits of a next- enhance logistics information systems available generation, higher-resolution, longer-distance to Responders: tracking capability, not hindered by interference (using ultra-wideband, mesh net, orthog- • Establish a Web presence to disseminate expe- onal frequency division multiplex (OFDM), rience with logistics in exercises and incidents, and related technologies). Fully evaluating and to engender discussion of best practices such a capability would be possible within and appropriate lessons. An initial national 3 years at a cost of $5-10M; it could perhaps capability could be provided within a year for be deployable in 10 years at $50M. This under $2M. This could be tied to MIPT’s is a high-risk S&T endeavor with global Best Practices – Lessons Learned Knowledge- implications. base effort.

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The next-generation tracking capability, and to a requests. Responders agree that no incident is lesser extent the automated domain-bridging like another, but that a capability must be avail- aspects of the command and control decision- able to generate requirements that have a high support suite, are high-risk; without these ele- degree of accuracy for meeting projected needs; ments the overall level of technical risk for LS.1 in other words the system must “learn” from pre- would be moderate and the increase in logistics vious endeavors and make reasonable recommen- performance from the intermediate technologies dations of supplies required in scope and time. (COTS tracking and expert-guided decision support systems) would still be dramatic compared Goals: to current practice. • Develop an acceptable nationally recommended and standardized database/system to In addition to the high technical risk, there is the generate requirements appropriate for specific question of what could be called commercializa- CBRNE. The information needs to be user- tion risk. This is the equivalent of Sony’s techni- friendly, consolidated and formatted to fit spe- cally superior Betamax videocassette format – a cific incidents, command organizations, and technical success that even its inventors do not logistics systems and suppliers. use because of the dominance of VHS in the marketplace. Because of economies of scale as • Provide capability in execution phase to re- well as the need for interoperability, responders supply in real-time with just the right supplies could not afford to buy a logistics system based so as not to overburden a staging system. on components that differ from those in use in Coordinate private donations and on-scene commercial and military systems; thus the success procurement (Wal-Mart, Home Depot, etc.). of the next-generation tags would require that they would be adopted into military and com- • Interface with Logistics Information System mercial systems before being made available to and its tracking element as well as the Incident responders. But it seems unlikely that the Commanders’ operational plans. responder tail could wag the commercial and military dog in this way unless their requirements Current Capabilities: were very similar; if the requirements are so simi- This capability, as defined, is largely unavailable lar then it is unclear why the larger commercial to responders today: and military R&D budgets would not result in off-the-shelf products that could then be adopted • Very limited baseline requirements informa- by responders without any substantial DHS tion exists for explosives, incendiary and R&D investment. Thus all that may be required chemical incidents. Information exists to a in these advanced areas is a mechanism for insert- lesser extent to meet biological and radiologi- ing a responder voice into the counsels of mili- cal incidents. tary and commercial decision-making. • In all cases, information retrieval is problem- LS.2 – Automatic Generation and Assessment atic. of Supply Requirements. The capability to help responders forecast needs, identify sources, prioritize • During execution, assessing requirements is requirements, and order supplies. Additionally, manual and reactive – tools are non-existent to requirements for sustaining an incident must take provide options, let alone determine, source, into account the type of incident, weather, dura- and order sustainment. tion, available transportation throughput, and • No capability exists nationally for responders order/ship times. Responders need a decision from varied domains to access. support tool for meeting this need that is intuitive, helps determine requirements, maintains • Some capability exists within FEMA and the accountability, and can automatically generate USAR to pick sustainment items and find

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sources of supply; however, the programs do Goals: not generate projected sustainment based on • Develop a category-based, interoperable, specifics of the subject incident. inventory management system that can be made mission-specific, affordable, and State of the Art: accessible. Both the Army and USMC have built requirements-generation products for meeting wartime • System must be easy to use, shared across scenarios. The Joint Theater Logistics ACTD jurisdictions, and data continually updated (DARPA) has created collaborative Web-based and accessible. aides that do requirements generation for mission needs based on force structure. Commercial sup- • System should interface with the LIS. ply-chain systems tend to be oriented to repeti- Current Capabilities: tive operations rather than one-of-a-kind incidents; thus there is no single off-the-shelf system Inventory management systems that span organi- that performs this task. zational boundaries are not used by responders today. Current practice has the following Technology Limitations and Barriers: characteristics: Creating a flexible decision support tool for • Manual – use of whiteboards, markers, etc. requirements generation is not limited by technology. The ability to field, integrate, and ensure • Local commercial sources required to fill interoperability of such a capability are the only emergency orders, if stocks are available. challenges. Additionally, this capability must be orchestrated to work in concert with a logistics • Some jurisdictions have limited inventory command and control and information system. management tools (most “home spun”).

Gap Fillers: State of the Art: Using COTS products, software could rapidly be Commercial supply chain tools exist to meet this adapted to this need and fielded. This capability need. Some jurisdictions have limited programs, would have to link to commercial sources for but at a very basic level. COTS inventory pro- placing orders and managing shipments. grams continue to increase capabilities, interoper- Software could be accessible for download via the ability, and flexibility. Many programs share data Web and use Web-based interfaces for generating across the Web and provide collaborative inven- requirements, sourcing, and monitoring of tory decision making. orders. Additionally, the software must continually update historical “knowledge” for types of Technology Limitations and Barriers: incidents, commodities used, and shortfalls. This Technology is not a barrier – many similar pack- capability could be provided to responders within ages exist in industry. However, the integration 2 years for approximately $15M. The right of a variety of different packages chosen by differ- approach is to build this capability in as a module ent responder organizations would be a signifi- in the LIS. cant problem.

LS.3 – Inventory Management. The ability to Gap Fillers: manage sustainment inventories, ensuring stocks are Commercial supply chain software could be rotated, consumed prior to shelf-life expiration, and adapted on a decentralized basis to meet this optimized for best use. In addition, responders need, with the proviso that it interface with the desire to maintain minimal stocks, while not fail- LIS so that supply status be more broadly visible ing to meet emergency needs, at the least possible to incident commanders. Additionally, via a 3PL cost. provider, commercial inventories could be made

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visible to responders in times of crisis for needs to • Forensic DNA typing technologies. be met locally by rapid purchase. The inventory management software needs to be cognizant of • GPS for site marking and discovery. location of inventory as it moves (in space and • Use of animals and limited mechanical sensors across jurisdictional boundaries), especially if for finding body parts. interim supply depots are created. For this reason the most sensible arrangement would be to Technology Limitations and Barriers: have the inventory management system serve as a modular element within the LIS. The primary technology challenge is making the identification, not tracking it. Automated tech- LS.4 – Mortuary Affairs Management. The niques for sensing and finding body parts have ability of responders to recover remains and make not been a real focus of investigation. The high forensic identification of victims of CBRNE inci- level of background contamination on the site of dents. Recent history has made responders con- an explosion, fire, or building collapse poses diffi- scious of the magnitude and sensitivity of recov- culties for detection technology. DNA matching ery tasks. technologies take too long because of the need for amplification. Also, current technologies Goals: require expert personnel, so the need for training • An information system that can match DNA of personnel and providing experts rapidly to of many recovered fragments to multiple incidents is a problem. DNA samples of victims or relatives (sometimes each in the 1,000s). Gap Fillers: Several initiatives are worth exploring: • Provide temporary morgues on site. • Robotic system with appropriate sensors (arti- Current Capabilities: ficial nose) for location of body parts. Existing capabilities vary across localities but are • Automated support for geospatial and forensic geared for standard forensic work. The New York record keeping of remains. City (World Trade Center) and Oklahoma City incidents demonstrate a need for procedures and • More rapid techniques for matching DNA in information tools to be linked. Standard forensic the hundreds to thousands context. DNA tools are designed for comparing one sample to a few possibilities. The need to match LS.5 – Lightweight, Long-Lived Power Sources. multiple samples to vast populations increases Longer-lasting, lighter weight, shorter recharge, easy- complexity. Evidence rules normally require to-manage batteries. Batteries are expensive and medical examiner notation of all bodies or parts consumed at a rapid rate by all categories of recovered. Thus delays occur in massive events. responders. Types of batteries are as varied as the Two temporary morgues (equipment caches) cur- systems they support. Shelf life and cost prohibit rently exist in the U.S. Potential military assis- the warehousing of all battery requirements in tance is extremely limited. The Army has only ample quantities to support incidents. Weight one active duty mortuary affairs company (54th and space prohibit the individual from carrying a Quartermaster) without laboratory capabilities supply of batteries to last for continual support for scientific identification. during incidents. Standardization of equipment and batteries would be desirable but seems State of the Art: unlikely to happen soon given the large installed The following technologies are available: base.

• PDA-based scanning technology for inventory Battery sustainment is a critical issue for and segregation. interoperability.

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Goals: • CECOM is also working with throw-away • Responder safety and effectiveness in emergen- lithium battery technology, rapid charging cies that may require extended presence in the technology (to reduce recharge times by 50 area. percent), metal-air battery technology, and integration of power distribution into clothing • Rapid resupply with reduced logistics tail and equipment. (supply and maintenance). Exotic future power sources include novel electro- • Alternative power sources. chemistries, portable fuel cells and fluid electrolyte cells that are recharged by exchanging the • Minimum 24 hour battery. electrolyte rather than being electrically recharged within the battery. – Reduce recharge time to under 15 minutes. – Reduce size and weight to absolute mini- In general, however, the main driver for improve- mum for various categories of batteries. ment in batteries has been the commercial market (cell phones, laptop computers, etc.). Except – Chip that tells the logistics system that bat- for very specialized purposes, this seems likely to teries are running low. continue to be the case.

Current Capabilities: Technology Limitations and Barriers: • Responders find that batteries limit their abil- The CECOM programs face problems in work- ity to operate equipment, even short of a full ing with the market to guarantee the volume 8 hour shift. required to have commercial partners invest in the technologies. There is an inherent danger in • Batteries often fail without notice. attempting to standardizing power sources for future equipment; standardization inevitably has • Responders view batteries as unreliable, heavy, the character of a least common denominator, and large, with long and unpredictable restricting performance and limiting innovation. recharge times. Cost is crucial. The cost for some future battery • Gel cells and solar cells are used for communi- source meeting the specified goals may run the cations and repeater systems, but are limited cost up to three times the current price. by weight. Because economies of scale dictate that respon- • Generators carried by responder equipment ders use battery technology that is commercially are not geared for servicing individual respon- available, there is little possibility of economically der equipment. producing specific developmental items for responder use. State of the Art: Gap Fillers: The same issues faced by responders are receiving the attention from military leadership with spe- While the perfect world would at least standard- cific programs and funding. ize the equipment used by responders, legacy equipment would prevent this for some time even • A DoD program (STO IV LG 2003.01) is if standardization for new equipment were to focusing on portable and mobile power for the begin today. Battery sustainment should be a Army’s “Objective Force.” This program is a critical concern when purchasing new equipment 3 year effort at $20M designed to address or upgrading. Additionally, large organizations lithium polymer technology. should manage battery sustainment as a critical

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item and seek contracts for rapid resupply during • Secure, timely capabilities for command and major incidents. control and rerouting.

As communication capability begins to perfuse Current Capabilities: the responder community (for example via the • Responders are conscious of imperfect integra- personnel status tracker in UIC.1 (Point Location tion between federal and local transportation and Identification)), consideration should be resources, across local jurisdictions, and given to automatic reporting of battery status between public and private sector transporta- to allow improved management of battery tion authorities and providers. replacement. • Emergency managers currently rely on com- DHS should ensure that both DoD and commer- mercial carriers, military transport, or con- cial battery developers are aware of responder tracts with local bus system operators. power source requirements and that these requirements are factored into DoD R&D proj- State of the Art: ects and acquisition requirements. However, the • Commercial software exists that can assist in most likely scenario is that responders will benefit route and carrier scheduling and selection so from advances in cell phone and laptop batteries. long as information on degraded networks is provided. LS.6 – Transportation Optimization. The ability to have assured delivery of mission critical • Establishing emergency access routes for trans- personnel and goods. Transportation in support of portation bottlenecks and plans is addressed an incident is often in direct competition for the by large jurisdictions. same routes as emergency equipment (and evacuation). Sustainment is limited by scarce routes, • Some cameras exist in large areas that provide assets, size and capacity of vehicles under traffic monitoring and permit changing traffic degraded road conditions, and scheduling. light patterns to optimize flow on command. Transportation planning, scheduling, routing, • Sensors on vehicles in traffic could automati- and mode determination are issues that require cally report positions and speeds to a central optimization and risk avoidance. Often the mix facility (assuming communications are of commercial contractors, responder support, available). and other agency vehicles moving equipment and resupply creates transportation chaos requiring Technology Limitations and Barriers: intervention on the part other responders (police) Technology exists to provide real-time monitor- who may not be fully aware of the logistics situa- ing of transportation assets. However, the costs tion or priorities. are considered prohibitive. Equipping every vehicle on the road and providing visual monitoring Goals: of all routes is regarded as impossible by respon- • Local – monitoring traffic patterns and restric- ders today. Another major problem is the con- tions, location of transportation bottlenecks flict of responder needs with evacuation of citi- and assets, all in near real-time. zens from danger zones. The confusion in New York City on September 11th is a perfect example. • Non-local – Fed Ex, UPS and military long- Here logistics needs to be facilitated by capabili- haul transport; have plans in place to follow- ties in Chapter VI (EMPP) and Chapter V through with local representatives of compa- (R&R). nies, or through digital communication. Gap Fillers: • Personnel coordination with military Some COTS products exist that could be made transports. available to plan, optimize, and execute logistics

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transportation assets. For example, i2 • Database of locations which could be used for Technologies recently fielded a lightweight appli- support bases; updated regularly. cation with basic map visualizations to the Army’s 7th Transportation Command for port clearance • Consideration of security (to include marine, and sustainment delivery. Providing a basic capa- temporary structures). bility for planning and execution would be a • Rapid and accurate re-assessment during an start. This could be accomplished within a year incident to avoid delays in response. at a cost of approximately $2M. Technologists quickly imagined many systems concepts that Current Capabilities: could relatively inexpensively provide information on the status of the road network. UAVs or Most localities have identified areas for use, but aerostats could provide inexpensive traffic flow not a database of areas. Technology that could information in conjunction with other emergency help determine safety of the areas (GIS/sensors) is missions such as communications relay. If com- not available and/or very expensive. Local munications bandwidth is available, communicat- knowledge is applicable but interaction of avail- ing tags on vehicles hold substantial promise of ability with detailed requirements is not currently providing adequate near-real-time information. facilitated. (If the cell phone system is working, one could imagine that a small reprogramming of the State of the Art: OnStar and similar systems in cars could be used Technologists noted programs exist, that if inte- to automatically report information on traffic grated with LS.1, could assist logistics responders: speeds and bottlenecks. Such an emergency mode could be required on cars and trucks • UAVs, satellite photography (remote imag- equipped with similar GPS systems in the ing/sensing). future.) • National databases for ports and airfields (NGA) with integration into decision support LS.7 – Assessment of Safe Air, Sea and Ground tools (Transportation Command Bases of Operations (Supply Depots). The abil- (TRANSCOM) and DARPA both have cre- ity to assess the safety, security, accessibility and ated limited products). capacity of potential bases of operations (supply depots). During an incident, logistics responders • CECOM – Single Integrated Ground Picture often need to establish temporary locations to (SIG-P). marshal personnel and supplies and to operate support bases. Route considerations, space, • Military Traffic Management Command buildings, and security are factors that must be (MTMC) route databases. considered, while locating the operation as closely as possible to the incident. In some cases, more • Intelligent Roadway and Railway Information than one site may be required. The assessment System (IRRIS). must be rapid and accurate to ensure that the response is not delayed or impeded. Technology Limitations and Barriers: The main limitations to full capability in this Goals: area are in the area of resources. To a lesser • Real-time satellite imagery (GIS), sensors of extent, there are issues with how best to integrate storage locations and adjacent routes. heterogeneous sensors (a central concern in Chapter III (DIDA)). Problems of knowledge • Template of requirements for basing – nature management, representation, and optimization of materials, resulting base requirements. would need to be worked through but these are

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not particularly difficult problems. Finally, infor- (UIC). It must be based on an open architecture mation collaboration across jurisdictions would that allows software from different vendors to be a practical issue. However, none of these is interoperate, and it must provide basic interfaces considered a technology limitation. (Web-based and call-centers) that allow some level of service to and integration with depart- Gap Fillers: ments lacking modern logistics systems. The technologists determined that this issue can be facilitated by adapting existing government Payoffs: products for civilian use. The concept would be Such an integrated logistics information system is to permit access to systems over the Web which the only feasible way to ensure that the decentral- provide collaborative viewing of the operational ized and diverse character of responder organiza- picture. Integrating the Web-based Joint Theater tions does not remain a significant impediment Logistics collaborative mapping tools into the LIS to mission support in the difficult context of the can provide planning and real-time execution limited resources available for a response to cata- management of depots. This effort would take strophic terrorism and the significant physical two years and possibility up to $15M to field the obstacles that would attend such a response. capability for use by responders nationally. Challenges: Logistics Support Response Technology There are no severe technical challenges in pro- Objectives (LSrto) viding the individual components of a logistics information system that would provide signifi- LSrto.1 – Integrated Logistics Information cant improvements to capability. Careful system System (ILIS). This Responder Technology design should allow multilevel processes, some Objective is designed to improve capabilities for advanced planning, and additional human effort LS.2 (Automatic Generation and Assessment of to provide adequate capability even if the most Supply Requirements), LS.3 (Inventory advanced capabilities outlined by technologists Management), LS.6 (Transportation (automatic domain-bridging and wide-area tags Optimization), and LS.7 (Assessment of Safe Air, that cannot be jammed) are in fact not achieved. Sea and Ground Bases of Operations), in addition However, very significant challenges do exist, to LS.1 (Logistics Information System). including: software integration on the scale required, providing for the needed level of open- Objectives: ness to the variety of user interfaces required Develop an integrated yet evolutionary Integrated while also providing for continual evolutionary Logistics Information System capable of connect- improvement. A further challenge will be entic- ing all echelons of command (including regional ing both software vendors and responder depart- and national) and all types of suppliers and other ments to participate in the development and logistics nodes. The functions of this informa- technology transition processes. tion system include planning and launching the appropriate initial logistics response to support Milestones/Metrics: emergency response to disasters, tracking invento- FY2004: Develop the basic architecture for the ries and items in transit (across jurisdictions), LIS and the mechanisms by which the develop- projecting needs for consumables and other sup- ment will be carried forward. (In other words port items including transportation, providing determine the boundaries and ownership of and information and decision support for transporta- supervisory structure for centrally-provided utili- tion optimization, and providing information rel- ties and interfaces and the procedures by which evant to the rapid assessment of safe bases of modules that will be owned and used by respon- operation. The information system should use der units will be certified and maintained.) communication links provided in Chapter IV Begin the short-term initiatives listed as gap

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fillers under LS.1 and the evaluation of the Payoffs: longer term gap fillers (next generation tracking Such a capability would ease the uncertainty and and automated domain bridging). suffering of relatives and also aid in the forensic reconstruction of mass casualty events. FY2005: Provide an initial demonstration testbed including appropriate initial simulations and Challenges: scenarios that will allow evaluation of off-the- shelf software components. Establish a roadmap The rapid development of novel DNA sequenc- of milestones for incremental capability rollout. ing technologies provides the means for achieving Complete the evaluation of longer-term initia- this capability but it also means that the process tives and establish a plan of action for them. of choosing a technological approach will be uncertain. FY2006: Establish an initial operating capability for central services; establish two regional opera- Milestones/Metrics: tional testbeds. FY2004: Review technologies for locating and recovering remains and possible approaches FY2007: Establish a third regional operational to rapid DNA comparison. Issue an RFP for testbed. elaboration of technical approaches and proof FY2008: Initial National Operational Capability of concepts. for the LIS. FY2005-2006: Choose a maximum of three LSrto.1 – Budget in Millions recovery and three identification technologies for Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals further development; issue appropriate RFPs and ILIS $9 $21 $27 $32 $40 $129 fund winners.

FY2007: Field prototype systems; conduct LSrto.2 Many-to-Many DNA Matching of demonstrations. Body Parts FY2008: Develop operational systems for field- Objectives: ing in FY2009.

Develop the capability to recover, track, and LSrto.2 – Budget in Millions identify using DNA comparisons of bodily Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals remains from mass casualty events. DNA $3 $6 $10 $10 $10 $39 Matching

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 • Integrated System Capable of Connecting All Echelons of LSrto.1 – Integrated Logistics Information System Command and All Types of Suppliers and Logistics Nodes • Ability to Recover, Track, and Identify using DNA Comparisons LSrto.2 – Many-to-Many DNA • Aids in Forensic Matching of Body Parts Reconstruction of Event Logistics Support Technology Roadmap

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PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter x Crisis Evaluation and Management (CE) Chapter Chair: Hal Kempfer Chapter Coordinator: Michelle Royal Definition Overall State of Technology for Crisis Evaluation and Management Crisis Evaluation and Management (CE) is the ability to enforce the law and protect public Capabilities providing intelligence, surveillance, safety by anticipating, preventing, reducing and reconnaissance (ISR) are critical to crisis eval- and/or removing a threat or act of terrorism uation and management capabilities. Responders including disabling terrorists and threat devices. generally lack high-technology ISR tools integrated in such as way as to cross jurisdictional Operational Environments and disciplinary lines. Many systems used in the special operations, military and intelligence com- This NTRO is focused on the five operational munities are not widely used by responders. In environments represented by threat: chemical, some cases, “low-density high-impact” items such biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-explo- as millimeter wave imaging technology or sive/incendiary effects of an event (i.e., CBRNE). adapted remote-controlled fiber optically-guided vehicles could be decisive in providing real-time Needed Functional Capabilities and intelligence needed for crisis evaluation and man- Priorities agement.

Responders and technologists considered a set of The matrix below shows that technology is avail- six functional capabilities required to function in able today to increase capability in most of the the operational context described above. These lower-priority functional capabilities. The chart capabilities are presented Crisis Evaluation and Management below in order of Operational Environments descending priority: High Explosive/ • Identifying, Locating, Functional Capabilities Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Incendiary 1. Identifying, Locating, Disarming, Disarming and and Seizing Perpetrator Seizing Perpetrator(s) 2. Tactical Threat Assessment • Tactical Threat Assessment 3. Disposing of CBRNE Devices

4. Initiating Crisis Management • Disposing of CBRNE Process Devices 5. Perimeter Security • Initiating Crisis 6. Media Management and Management Process Accommodation 1 1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this • Perimeter Security 2 operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO 3 2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional • Media Management capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO 3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability? and Accommodation LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’

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indicates, however, that in the higher-priority applications as well as for counter-terrorism at functional capabilities, there are still moderate special events (e.g., the 2003 Super Bowl). technology challenges to increasing capabilities. Details on this are further explained in CE.5 It will be important to focus on these challenges, (Perimeter Security). especially in tactical threat assessment in the biological environment, where responders indicated COTS technologies for facial and body recogni- that virtually no capability exists today. tion are available today for identification of perpetrators in the field. Some advanced applica- CE.1 – Identifying, Locating, Disarming and tions of this technology have been developed in Seizing Perpetrator(s). The ability to neutralize Las Vegas casinos. Voice recognition software and then apprehend the perpetrator(s). with advanced wireless technology is seen as a way to do biometric identification in the field Goals: through voice print analysis technology. • Ability to neutralize and take custody of the Technologically, this has far greater potential perpetrator(s), eliminate the threat without today due to recent advances in wireless telecom- hindering the ability to acquire more informa- munications and opportunities for better exploit- tion and evidence, understand the threat, etc. ing the standard technique of field interviews.

• Safety for responders, hostages, and if possible One technology requirement discussed by perpetrators. responders is the need to “see through walls.” Infrared “flashlights” or portable camera systems • The technology of the responders should are commercially available that can provide exceed the technology of the perpetrators. images from inside buildings and vehicles to determine “hotspots,” such as people, lamps, etc. Current Capabilities: At border crossings, infrared imaging of contain- Responders divided the capabilities of CE.1 into ers and vehicles is a common practice used by two main areas; 1) identifying and locating per- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Millimeter wave cameras are also used for petrators, and 2) disarming and seizing perpetra- “remote frisking” to detect weapons or drugs car- tors. The first area is more ISR-intensive; the ried by persons. second area more focused on tactical operations. The crucial technologies for both of these areas Non-intrusive tracking measures include surveil- are: ISR systems, non-lethal weapons, and sensors lance technologies such as optical sensors and and tracking. Safety for responders and the pub- software that can discriminate between colors, lic is a constant theme. Technological superiority shapes, movement and background. Law of public safety officials over perpetrators is enforcement helicopters use these technologies to implied or assumed (although during workshops, follow moving vehicles in heavy urban traffic. perpetrator technology was occasionally brought up for benchmark discussion and to challenge For physically capturing and disarming perpetra- assumptions). tors, there are a variety of capabilities available, to include lethal force, and “non-lethal” capabilities. Initially, responders need to be able to identify a non-lethal technologies include bean-bag projec- suspect or perpetrator quickly through both tiles and rubber bullets, flash-bangs, sticky foam, information sharing systems and technologies to HERF (high energy radio frequency including physically identify perpetrators. There are a vari- high power microwave or HPM weapons), robot- ety of means available today to do this if the sus- ics, tasers, net guns, microwave vehicle stopping, pect’s identity information is already archived. NIJ’s ring airfoil projectile (RAP), and advanced For non-intrusive identification, facial recogni- weapons being developed at the U.S. Army’s tion (and voice recognition) technology and Picatinny Arsenal and Rome Labs. software has been used for law enforcement

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Disabling perpetrators wired with remote or sui- provides a systems interface to coordinate efforts cide explosives presents a challenge against which against criminals nationwide. LEO is available to responders have no capability. Responders need a state and local law enforcement, but is a U.S. technical means to block or neutralize the fre- Department of Justice sponsored system managed quencies of a remote detonating transmitter with- by the FBI. out detonating the device itself. Disarming and seizing such a perpetrator puts responders and the Non-lethal technologies, whether against persons public at substantial risk; the presence of or vehicles, are not fully mature, and probably chem/bio or radiological agents presents a variety require several years’ development for full utility. of additional technical challenges. Tasers and the ring airfoil projectile hold promise for wider application in the NTRO, and could be State of the Art: critical gap fillers until more robust technologies Programs such as the Regional Information come online. The air taser is a very popular non- Sharing System Network (RISSNET), Open lethal weapon that uses projectile probes con- Source Information System (OSIS), Law nected by wire with a power source to deliver a Enforcement Online (LEO) and Joint Regional large high voltage, low amperage charge to the Information Exchange System (JRIES) show dra- target. It is widely used in law enforcement, cor- matic promise for sharing critical threat intelli- rections, security work and for self-protection. gence, or criminal or perpetrator identification The drawback is that there is no technical means and location. However, these systems are not at the time to make the probe or round self-con- fully integrated. Integrating these systems would tained; it must be connected to the main gun by appear “low-hanging fruit” that could result in wires. This dramatically limits range and utility, large returns on investment. With OSIS now with maximum range of 21 feet, and very limited being managed under the INTELINK office, the ability to quickly engage other targets. capability exists to more quickly sanitize and then Lasers are currently used for aiming of ballistic further tie together classified federal intelligence into timely bulletins, warnings or database infor- rounds (and illegally used by criminals for flash mation for unclassified dissemination to state and blindness of enforcement personnel or oppo- local authorities. nents), but may be used in the future as a carrier of disruptive effects such as tetanization to dis- Database information on the perpetrator is essen- rupt muscle function. The technology to this tial, along with the ability of responders to does not exist yet, it is mostly theoretical and sev- quickly query online databases. RISSNET is eral years off by most estimates. designed to share law enforcement information across municipal and state boundaries, and tie While not technology per se, there is a general state and local law enforcement in with federal responder shortfall in working with technology, law enforcement agencies. RISSNET currently particularly for analytical purposes. Identifying provides valuable information on potential or and locating perpetrators and developing threat actual perpetrators of terrorism to support active assessments are primarily intelligence functions investigations, although much of the RISSNET tied to investigations, but not solely investigative. data is still related to drug investigations. Personnel such as Criminal Intelligence Analysts (with the State of California), or analysts with The FBI’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO) sys- DHS and the FBI are not trained with technol- tem was originally started as an alternative to ogy, software and techniques commensurate to RISSNET, but is now is integrated with it. LEO their other intelligence community counterparts. has a multitude of applications and information The ability to assess a transnational criminal sharing tools. RISSNET has six networked enterprise, or one that simply supports terrorism, regional centers that share criminal intelligence and then define its modis operandi, infrastructure, and information, to include perpetrator data, and

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key players and their roles, etc. is different from threatening to detonate a WMD (to include the training for standard crime analysis. high-yield explosives). With current non-lethal technology, there is no assured method of achiev- Technology Limitations and Barriers: ing “instant paralyzation” without killing the per- A significant barrier is the problem of systems petrator. The only truly fail-safe means to stop a developed along “stovepiped” bureaucratic lines, perpetrator was referenced by the term “head which prevents information sharing. Federal shot,” meaning a ballistic projectile being fired bureaucracies (and state and local agencies) have into the perpetrators brain causing instant cessa- been wedded to their own in-house systems as tion of cognitive and sensory capabilities, to the backbone of their information management include motor function. By the same token, even program. The FBI uses FBINET, the DEA uses this solution was potentially flawed due to the NADDIS or FIREBIRD, ICE uses TECS II, and terrorist perpetrator only having to build a simple so on throughout the government. Shared infor- “dead-man’s switch,” which triggers the device mation systems such as RISSNET, JRIES and when pressure is removed. Examples of this are LEO are often viewed as secondary and less use- found in Israel with suicide bombers. ful, except for some state and local enforcement When disarming the perpetrator, there was con- agencies that have adopted them as their primary cern about interference of RF (radio frequency) law enforcement sensitive database. signals from portable communication devices LEO, RISSNET, OSIS, JRIES and OpenNET used by responders, with mention that as little as are not fully integrated. Looking at their systems five watts could trigger a standard high explosive backbones and operating software, there does not device. All capabilities developed for responders appear to be a clear technological limitation from should heed this risk, especially those developed further or complete integration of these systems. to disable perpetrators.

For responders, information or intelligence shar- Gap Fillers: ing is a key part of identifying perpetrators, but There was discussion by responders of using a security of sensitive case information has been a “stepladder approach,” building symmetrically on primary limitation to sharing perpetrator data. capability sets as they were developed or fielded. Workshop participants highlighted the Drug This approach includes establishing an urban Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) National testbed of new concepts and technologies; figur- Drug Pointer Index (NDPIX) system that allows ing out what works and what does not in a data queries on various types of information shorter time period. fields such as names, numbers, addresses, dates, etc. While allowing “cross pollination” between A near-term gap filler is to leverage the explosion investigators, it only allows sharing of as much of mobile information or telecommunications information as the inputting investigator, or ana- infrastructure. The ability to collect and send lyst wishes to reveal. When a query results in a information to and from the field has grown ‘hit,’ contact information for the case agent or exponentially over the last few years, and this analyst is provided. This linkage process allows provides tremendous advantages for responders in wide dissemination of key data components to how they can identify and locate a perpetrator. other law enforcement agencies while protecting When combined with technologies such as facial, sensitive data surrounding persons, places, num- body and voice recognition, or even biometrics bers or things involved with ongoing or sensitive such as electronic fingerprinting, there is an abil- investigations. ity to rapidly identify perpetrators, and then front-load critical intelligence on them to facili- There are significant technological barriers tate accelerated or safer apprehension. Examples to developing systems to stop a perpetrator include merged technologies of PDAs (personal

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digital assistants) that can store images, cell Goals: phones with cameras, Blackberry systems used for • Rapid (within minutes) risk, hazard, and situa- paging and email usage during a crisis. tional size-up.

While known sensor and biometric technology • Ability to differentiate perpetrators from the appears far less than 100% accurate or foolproof, other people (hostages, victims, bystanders collectively they appear to have great deterrence and responders). value and redundancy that greatly minimizes or mitigates the chance of perpetrator or device • All-in-one integrated suite that also tells you remaining unidentified if “sensed.” Technologists what you are dealing with (a “reach” goal). and responders discussed the establishment of some sort of fixed or semi-fixed system of sensors Current Capabilities: in critical places, and much of this seemed cen- There is very limited capability for tactical threat tered on high profile targets like sports venues or assessment in reference to meeting these goals, theme parks. with almost no available capability for biological threats. There are current technologies that can Current practice at many large public events is to be applied such as infrared imaging, acoustic physically check personal identification and detectors and processors, radar motion detectors, search any bags, carriages, etc. upon entering the and optical motion detection. facilities or venues. Technological means exists to conduct multiple biometric and sensor scans State of the Art: using existing systems of persons and personal gear. This would provide an automated tool to Acoustic technology that can penetrate solid sur- flag anomalous characteristics for further inquiry faces exists, and DoD has done considerable work or search. While there are still substantial in this area. “Ping” technology was referenced by improvements in these systems to be done, this responders and technologists as a tool for identi- capability has the potential for screening more fying hidden weapons or devices in tactical threat people faster, while exhibiting a strong deterrent assessment. “Multi-ping” technology uses varia- to those trying to do something unlawful. An tions in the local acoustic environment exploited 80%, or even 50%, accuracy rate for facial recog- by target classification algorithms. This falls nition, combined with a digital fingerprint under the category of broadband active acoustic match, voiceprint match, and an array of mil- signal processing, particularly the area of nontra- limeter wave and “sniffer” sensors, would appear ditional homing. to be a potent gap filler. Imaging millimeter wave sensors can be used There is nothing more reliable or realistic than with some measure of stand-off to see through the current low-tech approaches such as spike the walls of buildings. It is essentially microwave strips to stop vehicles. For apprehending or stop- flooding that can provide a sense of where walls ping persons, it appears that short term gap fillers and flooring are, and then provide movement are confined to tasers, air tasers (with their patterns by taking the differences in the baseline extremely limited range) and possibly advanced with the current images. The limitation is that it fielding of the new ring foil projectile being cannot see completely through the building and developed by NIJ (see CE.5 (Perimeter Security)). does not provide a high resolution motion video picture, but it can tell if there is movement in the CE.2 – Tactical Threat Assessment. The ability front rooms of the building and where that to assess threats inside buildings (i.e., seeing through movement is located. Special operations and walls), identify individuals and objects that are at counterintelligence units have been using this risk, and have awareness of perpetrators’ actions, technology for some years, and the equipment is position, and status of devices and weapons.

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specially manufactured and obtained through The Department of Homeland Security is start- intelligence channels. ing test flights at Fort Huachuca and Gila Bend in Arizona on unmanned aerial vehicles, building In addition, a system using millimeter wave sens- on the lessons learned and adapted applications ing is completely contained within van that can developed in Afghanistan and Iraq. UAVs bring drive up and down parking lots or other car loca- some distinct advantages such as a loiter time of tions and “look into” vehicles to identify com- 4-50 hours, far longer than manned aircraft can partments. This is a significant improvement sustain, and fly at a high enough altitude to be over earlier versions that had a backscatter issue virtually undetectable by noise. A UAV or drone requiring a hard backing on the target. The new being used for this purpose outfitted with cam- system requires no such backing and is com- eras and sensors can cost between $1.5 to $4 mil- pletely self-contained. lion, which compares very favorably to costs incurred from helicopter or other manned aerial Another technological approach used for tactical surveillance options with similar capabilities. assessment of building interiors is small, remote controlled vehicles with a fiber optic link and Systems that archive building plans can afford special sound dampening rubber wheels. With rapid access to blueprints, floorplans, and even access to an air shaft or other avenue of approach, photographs of building interiors to assist with these vehicles can gain surreptitious entry for tactical assessment. Currently, most large build- observation and audio collection on the targets. ings and facilities submit plans to the fire depart- Normally, the system is outfitted with infrared ment, and tall buildings are required to have imaging capability. blueprints on hand in the lobby for responders to reference as needed in cases of emergency. Along with the more advanced means, there is Software exists that allows 3-D manipulation of also standard equipment such as fiber optic cam- these plans. This facilitates the ability of a eras for peering under doors or around corners, responder to “see” into a building. along with less hi-tech mirrors. These fiber optic systems can be remotely controlled over short dis- Technology Limitations and Barriers: tances to twist or turn in a particular direction to aid movement or observation. There are also a Portability of these technologies is a major tech- myriad of miniature cameras and listening nological barrier to meeting the goals of this devices that can be clandestinely emplaced, but functional capability. In addition, stand-off sen- this requires very close proximity to the target in sor systems that use millimeter wave, infrared, or order to do so. There are also parabolic dish other radar technologies will continue to face devices for listening to conversations over technological challenges penetrating thick walls extended distances, and many different ways that sufficiently, and yielding enough detail, to meet listening or camera devices can be secreted into the accuracy demands of sensitive, dangerous tac- apparel, eyeglasses, luggage, doorknobs, “pole tical operations involving armed perpetrators and cams,” “tree cams,” or other common items. possibly hostages.

DARPA is working on projects that will equip Gap Fillers: small ISR (intelligence, surveillance and recon- A key gap filler is to digitize building and facility naissance) systems like UAVs (unmanned aerial data for rapid access and 3-D manipulation by vehicles) to detect perpetrators, and use sensor tactical responders. This should build on both systems to detect chemical, radiological and bio- technologies and policies that automate the logical weapons. Obviously, these could be easily collection, digitization, and compilation of adapted for emplacement on a remotely con- information gained as various members of the trolled tactical ground vehicle, with space and public safety community visit and inspect a weight limitations being a consideration. given building. For example, fire inspectors,

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health inspectors, building code inspectors, (the challenge is handling the mass of explosives, municipal licensing authorities, police officers, rather than the type of explosive). No capability etc., as they inspect a building in the course of exists at local levels to dispose of a biological, their duties, could provide data to an automated radiological, or nuclear devices sufficient to meet information system, such as how many people the goals, although responders recognize these work in an office, daily operation patterns, or a capabilities exist at the federal level. potential vulnerability of a particular location. This information could to be tied in with the State of the Art: building plans or layout to provide responders Workshop participants felt that much of the state and tactical commanders a far more complete of the art for this capability resides with the mili- picture of the building and what is likely inside tary and federal agencies. For example, if a juris- it. Moreover, it would provide a foundation for diction faced the problem of disposing of a radio- an open architecture for augmentation by logical device, they would not attempt to do so advanced “see through wall” sensor systems as on their own. The Department of Energy they become available and are perfected. Nuclear Emergency Response Teams (NEST) teams are designed and equipped for this mission Another near-term gap filler is to develop a tech- and would be called in. Similarly for biologicals, nology bridge between public and private sector the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of closed circuit television (CCTV) and other Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) has disposal remote sensor systems. This sort of public-pri- capability. vate cooperation has been done successfully in other spheres, to include utility and information For the responder community, there are some sharing. The administrative burdens and techno- total containment vessels that will contain a mod- logical challenges would be minimal. erately-sized explosive device (2-5 lbs) which are available to responders. In addition, a tent device CE.3 – Disposing of CBRNE Devices. The is being developed in Canada which disperses ability to disable, render safe, contain, handle, foam that degrades biological agents. transport, and dispose or destroy of contaminated threat devices, including contaminated explosive Technology Limitations and Barriers: ordnance disposal. Limitations and barriers for Disposing of CBRNE Goals: Devices are similar to those for decontamination. There is always a question of “how clean is • Containment or otherwise management of clean.” The device, and all trace particles from “excessive” amounts of explosives. that device, needs to be disposed of with a level • Accomplishing this functional objective safely of surety that will placate both responders and while preserving evidence or sources of intelli- the public. Cost is also represented as a techno- gence, and not exacerbating the situation. logical barrier here because the large price tag associated with some of these items is prohibitive • Ability to render safe the location where the for all but the largest jurisdictions. device was built/assembled/grown, if the location also poses a threat. Gap Fillers: A primary concern of the responders is develop- Current Capabilities: ment of technologies to aid in the disposal of Most large jurisdictions, especially the federal biological devices. The technologists also felt that agencies, have the capability to dispose of chemi- this operational environment presented the cal devices. A marginal capability exists to dis- biggest challenge for technology development to pose of high explosive devices, usually limited in meet the responders’ needs. This capability is cases of “excessively” large amounts of explosives related to the development of sensors (see

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Chapter III (DIDA) which are needed to deter- ing and calling of key emergency response per- mine the composition of the device, and there- sonnel or emergency managers. The system will fore the proper disposal means. Responders com- tell those on duty who is available and how far mented that they have to way of reliably out they are, and it is event driven. It keeps on containing an unknown threat. calling or paging someone until it gets a response that they have been found and the message CE.4 – Initiating Crisis Management Process. delivered. The ability to initiate functions, systems, and technologies to support decision-making, course-of-action For seismic events in California, the state devel- determination, and subsequent incident action oped EDIS (Emergency Digital Information plans. System) following the Loma Prieta earthquake in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1989. However, Goals: this has since grown considerably, and is a combi- • Timely, automated notification of other agen- nation Website, newsier and 24 hour broadcast cies, disciplines, and levels of government with service. Authorized agencies can release text, pic- functional responsibilities. tures and sounds over EDIS using their own existing networks, and the news media and pub- • Automated activation of Memorandums of lic have access to the latest EDIS information Understanding (MOUs) and Mutual Aid over the Internet, via digital radio broadcasts, on Agreements, etc. their pagers, and by email.

Current Capabilities: EDIS is designed to be disaster-resistant, with a Responders do not have this functional capability sophisticated satellite distribution network con- today in an automated system. Activation of cri- stantly updating “mirrored” EDIS servers in sis management processes is still a manual, selected newsrooms and networked facilities chaotic process. around the state. Even when public networks are clogged after a disaster, EDIS information will be State of the Art: available statewide. Responders and technologists agreed that the technology exists today to enable this functional Technology Limitations and Barriers: capability. It is only a matter of integration and The technologies exist today to deliver this capa- implementation, beginning with a policy-level bility. Cost and political will are the biggest bar- decision to do so. There are several examples of riers. Systems that rely on cellular or other technology approaches that could be integrated. telecommunications networks will encounter the same technological challenges that are present California’s Response Information Management today (e.g., bandwidth availability, cell disruption System (RIMS) is a statewide computer system or overloading, nodal failure or destruction, etc.). used to coordinate and manage the state’s response to disasters and emergencies. It is Gap Fillers: Internet based, and was developed by the California Office of Emergency Services (OES) in At the municipal or regional level, the main gap 1995. Today it has over 2000 internal and exter- filler would be the development of a standard sys- nal clients, and is available to all cities, special tem such as the “find me follow me” system that districts and state agencies within California that San Diego has put in place. For automated trig- have a computer access through the Internet, and gering of mutual aid and memorandums of agree- is controlled through IDs and passwords. ment, the Washington metropolitan system established by MITRE would appear to be a In San Diego, as well as other cities, there is the benchmark for expansion and adaptation. “find me, follow me” system for automated pag-

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CE.5 – Perimeter Security. The ability to con- For access control, there are a variety of technolo- trol individuals, crowds, and vehicles, to prevent gies that can be applied to ensure only authorized public disorder or endangerment from the threat personnel are allowed access to within the secured (i.e., keeping public out of the blast radius, keeping perimeter. This includes technology like bar the public from snipers or hostage-takers, etc.), and codes, magnetic strips, passwords and so on. to keep public citizens and vehicles from interfering More advanced technology measures biometric with efforts to manage and reduce the threat. data (e.g., retina scanners, face recognition). Smart cards can also be applied to this capability, Goals: capturing personnel authorization as well as train- • Public safety – keep the public out of the dan- ing proficiency and currency (see Chapter VI ger zone. (EMPP)).

• Extend and control security perimeter and Responders were also concerned about tactical zone far enough out so that response person- accounting of equipment into a control zone. nel and staging activity can operate unhin- One common technology used to account for dered by the public. this is to attach a tag with a bar code. More advanced technology involves attaching a remote • Ensure that only authorized credentialed indi- transmitting device that can then be monitored viduals are within the perimeter. This also remotely. GPS technology, similar to what is would include authorization of equipment used with On-Star devices on automobiles, can entering perimeter/staging area. send out the signal of where the equipment is at any given time. Current Capabilities: Surveillance technology for monitoring a perime- Responders have a marginal capability to meet ter was deemed very important to responders, these goals today, hindered mainly by the ability with great interest on CCTVs, motion detectors to ensure authorized credentialed personnel and unattended ground sensors. All of this tech- within the perimeter. The technologies to nology exists, and the ability to establish a net- achieve these goals exist today. work using wireless networking has only recently become easily achievable. State of the Art: Currently most emergency or consequence man- Technology Limitations and Barriers: agement locations, especially involving CBRNE, The technologies are available in the near term to are sealed off manually using personnel and tape meet the goals of this functional capability. to keep intruders away. As the situation develops, physical barriers are put in place, and over For authorization verification, there are still prob- time temporary fencing may be emplaced as well. lems with reading strip cards, especially in the For pre-existing facilities, such as amusement field. Sometimes the magnetic strip loses its parks, major airports, shopping centers and casi- code, or the automated reader is otherwise unable nos, there may be an existing CCTV system that to read the card. In a field environment with a can provide remote visual surveillance of the fast-paced crisis or event, corrective action may perimeter to augment “boots on the ground.” not be immediately available. There is also the possibility of counterfeit cards being produced, In major HAZMAT incidents, emergency and the sophistication of counterfeiters today responders have often had to man checkpoints makes this a serious threat. It is possible to and set up a perimeter with personnel keeping embed anti-counterfeiting technology into the out intruders, or enforcing an evacuation of system, however. If cards are used, there would downwind areas. The same capability will proba- be a need for a lot of readers and reading stations, bly be relied upon for a CBRNE incident. which would become manpower intensive, either

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taking away from the available responders in not give the perpetrator any tactical benefits from order to manage this activity or requiring addi- media exposure. tional manpower dedicated to this activity. Furthermore, the technology of biometrics is not Goals: fool-proof, and both technologists and responders • Keep the media within the right places inside were aware of false positives and false negatives the appropriate perimeter, such that no sensi- being a substantial problem. tive tactical operations can be broadcast by the media. Non-lethal force technology for perimeter control is a critical concern of responders. The current • Provide enough access to the press to satisfy state of non-lethal technology deployed in the them to the extent that they do not try to field is inadequate to address enforcement of thwart the above functions. This includes perimeters without resorting to the threat or use cooperation with the media to the extent pos- of deadly force. The scenario of a little girl run- sible without compromising the operation. ning away from a quarantine area comes to mind, with the implied ethical, legal and political ques- Current Capabilities: tions of whether deadly force should be used, Responders have this capability today. with the corresponding failure to stop her as risk- ing the chance of a greater epidemic. State of the Art: Non-lethal enforcement of quarantine operations Responders felt that this capability is not technol- is becoming more important. With major inci- ogy enabled. Good relationships with the media dents, civil-military operations are more likely. result in the best outcomes for managing media In many cases, this will require military augmen- personnel and equipment, as well as information tation in the role of large-scale quarantine opera- flows. tions. Whereas technology exists to identify quarantine violators with substantial stand-off Crisis Evaluation and Management range depending on the perimeter, the ability to Response Technology Objectives (CErto) stop them from escape is primarily the threatened CErto.1 – Non-Lethal Safe Seizure of use of lethal force at present. Perpetrators Gap Fillers: Objectives: There is technology being developed that allows Develop less-than-lethal technologies to instantly the reader to scan the thumbprint of the person immobilize perpetrators with weapons or holding the card with the card, thus minimizing hostages, such that explosive devices or other the chance of counterfeiting ID. Smart chip weapons are not detonated, released, etc. This technology is also a readily available solution that technology will not emit radio frequency or other can meet needs in this and other NTROs such as signals that might set off an RF detonator. Medical Response, Emergency Management Preparation and Planning, etc.: anywhere where Payoffs: identification, location, and proficiency of personnel needs to be known by an incident com- This will provide responders a way to take perpe- mander. trators into custody without relying on deadly force, or presenting a danger of detonating the CE.6 – Media Management and perpetrator’s weapon. Accommodation. The ability to manage and accommodate the media such that media personnel Challenges: and equipment (e.g., vehicles, lights, recording/ Some of the more exotic technologies, like broadcasting, and communications equipment) does HERF, are still in the R&D phase, and won’t be

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available for years. When they do become avail- tools. Develop the architecture and Broad Area able, some of the less technical means currently Announcement to begin development and inte- available may quickly become obsolete. gration of Block 1.

Traditionally, identifying and seizing perpetrators FY2007: Continue development of Block 1 suite. has been focused on the professional knowledge Begin commercialization process and planning and judgment of the agent or officer on the for operational demonstration. Begin develop- scene. Modern communications technology has ment testing of Block 1. Select enabling tech- been slowly eroding this traditional approach, nologies for Block 2 capability. and the technology being discussed here would erode that more. FY2008: Conduct operational demonstration of Block 1 capability. Begin development of Milestones/Metrics: Block 2 suite of tools. Continue commercialization efforts. FY2005: Review the state of the art in non-lethal technology developments in the DoD and public FY2009-2010: Deploy Block 1 suite. Continue safety community and assess the applicability of Development of Block 2. Conduct development the technology to the goals in this NTRO. testing of Block 2. Demonstrate Block 2 in an Develop concepts of operation and functional operational environment. Deploy Block 2. specifications for a suite of non-lethal tools. CErto.1 – Budget in Millions FY2006: Select enabling technologies Thrust 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Totals for the initial operational capability Non-Lethal Suite $5 $7.5 $8 $8 $8 $4 $40.5 (Block 1) of the non-lethal suite of of Tools

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 • Instant Immobilization • Explosive Devices or Other Weapons Not CErto.1 – Less-Than-Lethal Safe Seizure of Perpetrators Detonated

Crisis Evaluation and Management Technology Roadmap

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PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter xi All-Source Situational Understanding (ASU) Chapter Chair: Hal Kempfer Chapter Coordinator: Michelle Royal

Definition after a threat manifests itself, as well during consequence management and restoration. The All-Source Situational Understanding (ASU) is Operational Environments are defined as: the ability to perform four interrelated tasks in order to have the earliest possible, specific, and • Awareness continuing knowledge of a threat, and to support incident command decisions across all phases of a • Alert and Warning local or regional response: • Crisis Response and Threat Reduction • Collect and identify threat-relevant information; • Consequence Management and Restoration

• Fuse and analyze information to support Needed Functional Capabilities and threat awareness; Priorities • Identify persons who need to know specific The needed functional capabilities prioritized in types of information (and what that the Emergency Responders’ workshops include information is); and the following items, prioritized in order of importance to the responders. • Disseminate appropriate information to (and only to) appropriate persons. • Threat Assessment/Data Collection/Analysis

As a threat crosses jurisdictional and even state • Intelligence Preparation for Operations lines, so must information. A crucial element of this ability is the need to make information read- • Threat Relevant Data Distribution ily available and useful to all relevant actors across • Intelligence Support to Unified Incident disciplinary, jurisdictional, and geographic lines, Command Structure as appropriate to a particular evolving event, without compromising the security of this information. Skillful use of ASU speeds response Overall State of Technology for All- by decreasing response time, decision time Source Situational Understanding and time required for course of action (COA) While responders believe that they have marginal development. capability for each of the functional capabilities, the technologists rated the technologies to enable Operational Environments these capabilities as available in the near-term, if The operational environments most relevant to not currently. Threat Assessment/Data all-source situational understanding are derived Collection/Analysis (ASU.1) and Intelligence from the operational progression of an event, rep- Preparation for Operations (ASU.2) are the only resenting phases of the “intelligence process” in capabilities which should require technology supporting incident command before, during and development with a moderate degree of risk. All

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All-Source Situational Understanding • The ability to inte- Operational Environments grate information Crisis Response Consequence among several differ- Preparation Alert and and Threat Management Functional Capabilities and Awareness Warning Reduction and Restoration ent jurisdictions and 1. Threat Assessment/Data levels of government. Collection/Analysis

2. Intelligence Preparation for • The establishment of Operations processes that allow 3. Threat Relevant Data quick data validation, Distribution using information on 4. Intelligence Support to Unified data source. Incident Command Structure 1 1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this • The ability to link 2 operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO 3 2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional information/analysis capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO and detection across 3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability? LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH different sources. Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’ other technology areas can achieve results with low technology development risk. • The establishment of processes and systems that foster redundant analysis and competition ASU.1 – Threat Assessment/Data Collection/ among analytical hypotheses. Analysis. The ability to collect and identify/recognize threat-relevant information (i.e., indications • The ability to analyze multi-disciplinary (i.e., and warning), validate and analyze the data, and not just law enforcement-originated) threat validate and assess the threat for purposes of evalu- assessments. ating threat levels and credibility. Note: this functional capability is crucial to the overall value of • The ability to centralize pooling and synthesis the ASU NTRO. of distributed or multiple sources of analysis, with access to all sources of threat information Goals: and updates, including electronic clearing- The goals identified by responders for this area houses (e.g., FBI’s Law Enforcement Online include: and RISS-ATIX).

• Ability to provide all relevant jurisdictions and • The ability to support unconstrained “think- disciplines access to near-real-time, same-qual- ing outside the box” rather than forcing ana- ity information and an awareness of the threat. lysts to consider limited or non-creative Responders defined near real-time as being hypotheses, options, etc. (no blinders on ana- within 15 minutes. They saw this as the time lysts). This is “red teaming” at its most useful. when the information product has “real • The ability to integrate tools for data mining value.” of both structured and unstructured informa- • Ability to collect, validate and fuse information, geared toward detection of changing tion from several disciplines (technical as well trends (i.e., early detection of emerging as observations from patrol officers, firefight- threats), detection of alert situations including ers, epidemiologists, and other responders), anomalous detection via normalization, auto- especially automated open-source information. mated foreign language translation including understanding of context supported by cul- • Threat assessment toolkit that aids in pattern tural intelligence, and processing of images, recognition and validating data. video, audio and signal data with automated extraction of text and image data elements.

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Current Capabilities: smaller jurisdictions, the needed information There are indications and warning (I&W) technology is simply not available. If given the processes currently used by responders, but rarely technology without proper preparation and plan- are they formal or disseminated as in the military. ning, it will be poorly utilized. If the govern- The military uses I&W in a combined human, ment intends to provide these smaller jurisdic- analytical and information technology-assisted tions with technology, it will need to assist them process that quickly identifies patterns and trends with: which enable the development of broad intelli- • Need assessments (i.e., what do we really gence collections plans (i.e., sensors) to “watch” need?) named areas of interest (NAI). For example, in an urban environment, if an underground pas- • Training on how to use it sageway is a likely avenue of approach for intruders to a particular building, then movement of • Integration of technology into current personnel though that passageway could provide operations (tactical) I&W of a possible rehearsal, probing, infiltration or attack. Unattended ground sensors Responders noted that the critical need is for “tai- or motion detectors could be used on this pas- lored” intelligence, not just data dumping. Not sageway, and the passageway would probably be everyone needs to know everything, but those designated an NAI. Responders face similar who do need to know should be getting it. For issues; however, tactical I&W generates a very example, if the fire department is responding to small window in which to make that intelligence an address and there is threat information that actionable. It is difficult for responders to ana- says this could be a highly dangerous situation, lyze this information while responding to an then that “intelligence” needs to get to the initial event, disaster or incident using the current, well- responders (prior to arriving on scene) for course accepted and well-proven concepts of operation of action development. in public safety. Integration of I&W as a capabil- Responders specifically noted some of the crisis ity requires modification of current operating management software packages that provide col- procedures. laborative and situational awareness tools, and interoperability with other tools. Their browser- Responders noted that, currently, a fire captain or based software links the key players in a response fire chief is likely to be the Incident Commander, for multi-agency, multi-jurisdiction collaboration, but this fire chief is not normally inside the infor- and for sharing a common operational picture mation “loop,” at least not to the same degree as and information. One of the tools includes: law enforcement. There is a need for fire officials, and other non-enforcement officials, to get • Incident Reporting and Tracking federal security clearances granting them access to current threat intelligence. As intelligence infor- • Critical Infrastructure Reporting mation comes in, especially that dealing with potential WMD threats, responders need to • Situation Reporting intervene by taking preventive or mitigating steps early on. Since fire officials normally don’t have • Action Planning clearances, they won’t get the information early • Personnel Management when they can do the most with it. • Alert Notification Another alternative is to maintain an open source information analysis capability, which does • Real Time Messaging not currently exist. The lack of familiarity in dealing with intelligence information risks opera- Los Angeles area law enforcement uses the War tional compromise of that information. For Room of the Los Angeles Clearinghouse. An

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enforcement operation is plotted on an electronic • Technologists in the workshop mentioned Thomas Brothers map, where it is automatically industry innovations which extend the per- geo-assessed with regard to any other events formance of these systems by providing peer- occurring in the immediate vicinity. If there is to-peer collaboration, distribution, visualiza- other law enforcement activity, especially under- tion and analysis of GIS data layers. These cover operations, an audible and visual alert will systems utilize standard Web browsers and activate. War Room personnel would then notify Microsoft Office documents to collaborate both active groups of their respective operations. with geospatial information. Interaction is There have been cases where undercover groups in 2-D, 3-D or 4-D and is extended for use unbeknownst to each other are actually conduct- with standard email, chat rooms and instant ing enforcement operations on the same location, messaging. resulting in a “blue-on-blue” confrontation. This automated GIS technology has prevented this • There is at least one COTS product that from happening on several occasions, probably breaks down data into the simplest form and saving the lives of officers and special agents. then maps it to find common links. Thousands of items are analyzed simultane- State of the Art: ously for cross-referencing. The deliverable The enabling technologies for this functional ele- product is a very different kind of “map” that ment include geospatial visualization and map- shows links between persons, places or things. ping technology, automated link analysis systems, Other COTS software offer link and network database access and mining techniques, collabora- analysis, timeline and transaction analysis. tion technologies and non-structured information Many of these systems automatically link to analysis and visualization technologies, all GIS to array information geospatially. Just brought together with integrated command, con- after September 11th, these products suddenly trol and communications systems (C3I). There saw a rise in demand from military users are multiple COTS technologies in this area; working counterterrorism research and analy- unfortunately few of them operate on a single sis. Some of these companies have moved into platform. the competitive or business intelligence market with link analysis software for use in the com- In terms of mapping software, there are only a mercial world, which has potential application few main vendors who provide the sort of inte- to analyze criminal enterprises like terrorist grated graphic software package that can allow networks or drug cartels. graphically depicting “map data” as broader intelligence products. Specifically, this involves using • With regard to access databases and data min- this sort of GIS product for uncovering hidden ing, there are many companies who sell large connections or inconsistancies requiring further open source data bases such as the public investigation. Some of these are: record databases most commonly used by insurance investigators. LexisNexis™ pro- • Early into the Bosnia mission, one commercial vides substantial legal, news, public records provider adapted its GIS ArcView package to and business information; including tax and include embedding critical data fields and regulatory publications in online, print or imagery onto electronic maps that allowed CD-ROM formats. These can be viewed commanders and their staffs to “drill down” using various types of proprietary products on specific locations, especially in urban ter- or services by occupation, industry or task. rain. The latest intelligence could be graphi- LexisNexis has application software that can cally embedded, providing the commander an integrate technologies and content to support ability to visualize the battlespace and pull up critical decisions-making as well. In addition, important information about that area to there are companies that sell databases that shape his decision-making. provide past employment records, education

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verification, criminal history, and other back- wireless integrated mobile data communica- ground information. More than 5000 compa- tions network being implemented to support nies use one such service which is widely used federal, state, and local law enforcement, fire for employment screening information. and emergency medical services (EMS), transportation, and other public safety agencies pri- • Open source databases, even proprietary ones marily in the Washington, DC Metropolitan like those described above provide investiga- area. The purpose of CapWIN is to greatly tors with the ability to find information on enhance communication and messaging sys- persons, property, businesses, trends or other tems, effectively creating the first multi-state, elements of interest that may not appear in inter-jurisdictional transportation and public criminal databases, or be fully available safety integrated wireless network in the through other official government databases. United States. For the most part, these information firms buy public records, or information from private • The federally sponsored Disaster Management sources such as the media, professional publi- Integration Services, or DMI-Services provides cations, etc., and then put them together in a capability for the consequence management large databases that are enabled with software community to share digital information. search processes. DMI-Services provides a series of basic automated tools. These tools are designed to give • The Defense Information Systems Agency’s organizations the “starter set” of applications (DISA) Area Security Operations Command that will enable them to share digital informa- and Control (ASOCC) is an ACTD that was tion with others agencies. developed after September 11th. ASOCC combines advanced information-handling • Workshop participants referenced Cybercop. tools with command and control tools for The Cybercop Secure Portal was developed as homeland security purposes, linking all of the a volunteer private sector initiative as a result communications capabilities with the National of Presidential Decision Directive 63. The Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) and the Cybercop Secure Portal has its roots in a military command authorities, as well as to secure computer mediated communications the regional intelligence centers and civilian project created at DARPA (Extranet for authorities, including law enforcement agen- Security Professionals or ESP). It uses 128 bit cies. Civilian law enforcement entities SSL encryption technology to create an online included within the ASOCC ACTD include gated community where law enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. information security professionals can securely Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), the Drug communicate and collaborate. The portal links Enforcement Agency, U.S. Immigration and over 1,400 users and contains over 700 files in Customs Enforcement, and the Coast Guard, its libraries with a focus on homeland defense, along with their associated intelligence enti- critical infrastructure protection and cyber- ties. After September 11th, DoD quickly real- security issues. Currently, Cybercop is highly ized that no such “linkage” capability existed; integrated with FBI’s InfraGuard program. so ASOCC was developed. Also important to this function are technologies • Another program specifically referenced by that support the analysis of non-structured responders and technologists is the Capitol information and data fusion for all-source situa- Wireless Integrated Network (CapWIN). tional understanding. Starlight is an advanced CapWIN provides a “communication bridge” three-dimensional visualization technology that allowing mobile access to multiple criminal was developed by Pacific Northwest National justice, transportation, and hazardous material Laboratory (PNNL). It helps solve the problem data sources. In essence, it is a state-of-the-art of information overload. It has been used by the

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U.S. intelligence community, but can be applied out that we are a “crisis-oriented society.” Issues to a variety of other fields, such as medical data related to all-source situational understanding are analysis, environmental security and current often long-term and low profile. Since the events monitoring. Starlight uses a tool for non- squeaky wheel gets the grease, money for law structured information software called GENOA. enforcement typically gets siphoned off into eas- GENOA is a customizable, front-end retargetable ily explainable items such as putting more sworn source code analysis framework. Starlight is a police on the streets or buying new cars or other visualization tool that will be integrated into the enforcement oriented equipment. GENOA system as part of the development of new and complementary visualization tools. A Gap Fillers: collaborative investigation of the use of Starlight A nation-wide trusted collaborative infrastructure in the Southern California area shows that the that can be used to share sensitive information is tool has operational utility but needs modifica- a requirement. A national response All Source tion for local public safety use. Local and Situational Awareness prototype system, which regional public safety operations will require a combines the integration of the latest technology networked operational capability which is not with the development of new concepts of opera- currently inherent in such operations. Starlight, tion that support incident command with intelli- or a similar tool, could be of great value in devel- gence analysis and information sharing, would be oping such a regional operational capability. a useful step in filling this capability gap. The prototype system and process could be emulated There are no national standards or cooperative by and coordinated across local regions. The goal operational procedures in this area. Various of affordable implementation should be a pro- national bodies such as the IAB (Inter-Agency gram objective. The system must include the Board), LEWG (Law Enforcement Working high-bandwidth communications necessary. Group) and OLES (Office of Law Enforcement Standards) have sub-groups trying to establish ASU.2 – Intelligence Preparation for standards. Operations (IPO). The ability to: (1) identify Technology Limitations and Barriers: which agency, office or official is responsible for collecting and analyzing which types of intelligence, As the foregoing discussions indicate, technolo- and (2) implement tools, training and processes to gies to support the goals in this functional area support those responsibilities. exist and are commercially available. Integration of these technologies, many of which are propri- Goals: etary, would facilitate the needed capability. • Automated systems for information sharing Some of the most vexing technical limitations and notification of intelligence responsibilities involve the same challenges found across the entire command, control, communications and • Minimal redundancy in intelligence information management spectrum: integration dissemination with legacy systems and communications capacity (bandwidth). These challenges are being aggres- • Maximum access to needed information and sively pursued across the industry. background for those who need to know and have the responsibilities The barriers to attaining these goals are intelligence community administrative and policy • Information and facilities technologies to issues, cultural differences between responder and support different levels of clearance and national security communities, the lack of classification, for seamless sharing of informa- national standards, and most significantly, the tion among those with responsibilities, irre- lack of funding support at the local level. In our spective of different clearances and venues. workshops, responders and technologists pointed

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• Information sent via our channels and appli- If “threat” is broadened to mean anything that ances that are not open to unauthorized users can threaten lives or have an adverse impact on or the public. operations, it changes the traditional concept of IPB from being focused on the enemy, to being • Regional clearinghouse for data analysis to focused on preparing responders to plan and con- support nearby smaller jurisdiction without duct a broad array of emergency operations. In the manpower for an all-source situational assessing the urban environment, information understanding capabilities. must be collected on a number of “friendly” factors and assessed with the same process as one Current Capabilities: might assess the “threat.” This could include The concept of “Intelligence Preparation for information on businesses, and municipal gov- Operations” (IPO) originally stems from the mil- ernment and other entities that could assist or itary doctrine called Intelligence Preparation of hinder operations. Demographic and socio- the Battlefield (IPB). It is a rigorous process of political factors must be understood also. There looking at a particular area of terrain wherein are ample examples in the US and overseas where friendly forces are anticipating or planning opera- emergency operations have been hindered by tions. IPB centers on three principal features: public mistrust of response forces, gross misun- weather, enemy and terrain (WET). During the derstandings of what is being done, or enemy deployment of the Combined Joint Task Force – information operations meant to seed both dis- Consequence Management in the Persian Gulf in trust and confusion. 2002, this acronym was modified for civil-military purposes to WETT, or weather, enemy, IPO as a doctrinal term was developed by the Los threats and terrain. Part of this WETT modifica- Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group (LA tion was directly related to the emerging civil- TEW). It has several components that take the military concept of IPO. traditional intelligence cycle, and then “spoke” out in various directions to develop a comprehen- By definition, IPB is a continuous process sive fusion process. The term “intelligence” is defined as: often misunderstood. Doctrinally, intelligence is an analyzed information product. Collected raw • Define the battlefield environment data is synthesized and fused into useful information. While that information could be acted on • Describe the battlefield’s effects as presented (and frequently is), the information • Evaluate the threat is further analyzed to draw out more inferences or conclusions, which becomes an “analytical • Determine threat COAs (Courses of Action) product.”

Responders however, are not on a “battlefield,” The Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning Group but instead conducting operations in their develops and maintains a series of target folders locales. However, if the “battlefield” is changed (description of possible terrorist targets) and play- to “operating area,” it also changes the context books in preparation for a large variety of poten- and substantive meaning for responders. For tial threat scenarios and venues. It uses an all- example with this simple change the four source, all-discipline, all governmental level processes become: approach in evaluation intelligence, and a network methodology for sharing and disseminating • Define the operating area environment sensitive information. Unlike other “intelligence fusion centers,” such as the FBI Joint Terrorism • Describe the operating area’s effects Task Force or California Anti-Terrorism • Evaluate the threat Information Center, the TEW concept includes responders and analysts representing federal, • Determine threat COAs (Courses of Action) state, local, military, national agencies and critical

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industries. That way, the LA TEW ensures its security concerns. As part of the bid process, input processes, collection methodologies and they posted detailed plans of the water system products meet the larger crisis and consequence online for potential vendors to review. This “vul- management needs of fire, health, enforcement nerability” was eventually brought to their atten- and the greater intelligence community. tion and taken off the Internet, but not before Although there are other systems that have better the information was accessed (and presumably equipment and software, as well as better connec- downloaded) by overseas email addresses in tivity to national systems, those tend to be lim- Pakistan and elsewhere in South Asia. ited to the law enforcement community. The LA TEW is working on improving these issues. Threat assessments from some of the criminal intelligence clearinghouses are probably the clos- The Pierce County, Washington TEW has taken est products to anything resembling IPO. On the next step by automating a number of key the drug enforcement side, the “Threat files. A particularly apt example of this auto- Assessment” actually comes from a related “cen- mated IPO product’s potential occurred in ter” (the Joint Drug Intelligence Group) run by Spokane, Washington, at Lewis and Clark High the FBI. That product is mostly distilled statis- School. The school had plans of the school avail- tics on enforcement actions geared towards justi- able on-line through a secure system called Rapid fying funding of regional counterdrug activities. Responder. This system provided responders Threat assessments on the terrorism side have blueprints, photographs, evacuations plans and focused on critical infrastructure and been princi- lists of hazardous materials. The plans also pally done by National Guardsmen trying to showed such key features as windows and doors. apply IPB doctrine. This has resulted in lengthy locations of security systems, shutoffs for utilities, lists of potential targets covering the state. In and a photographic layout offering a 360 Minnesota, the National Guard has developed a panoramic view that includes rooftops, gymnasi- separate methodology for this kind of critical ums, libraries, auditoriums and other gathering infrastructure assessment process, and a quantita- places. The database includes phone numbers tive model used to assess the vulnerability or crit- and all emergency plans. In late September icality that various utility, industry or other 2003, a disturbed 16 year-old came to school “infrastructure” represents. armed, and took over a classroom telling the teacher and students to leave. SWAT members One example of information sharing and collabo- were able to readily access the Rapid Responder ration that the workshop participants identified database, discover a second door to the room, was the Statewide Anti-Terrorism Unified and conduct a timely and successful take down of Response Network (SATURN) program in the perpetrator, thereby proving the value of this Massachusetts. SATURN is an information shar- type of automated “intelligence preparation for ing and responder network that builds on current operations” product for responders. systems. It provides fire and emergency management personnel a process for exchanging infor- Originally, the DMI-Services, was placing what mation, and for providing training and coordina- were essentially target folders and playbooks, tion of anti-terrorism strategies tied to along with other kinds of venue plans, imagery collaborative public safety capabilities. SATURN and related response information online. is a Web-based information sharing architecture However, online information security is a big that brings together federal, state and local first concern with regard to dissemination of IPO responders and emergency management with des- related information. A recent example of how ignated citizen groups called Citizen Mobilization bureaucracy can sometimes run astray of intent Teams (CMT). occurred when the Los Angeles Metropolitan Water District requested a vulnerability and haz- Responders also identified the Consequences ard assessment of its system due to homeland Assessment Tool Set (CATS). CATS is a joint

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ESRI and SAIC program that provides a compre- State of the Art: hensive package of emergency management deci- Several companies have teamed up on a concept sion aids, including hazard prediction models called Active Citizen, with the goal of creating a (natural hazards and technological hazards) and community communication architecture to con- casualty and damage assessment tools. It also nect citizens, augment responders and provide accepts real time data from local meteorological critical cultural information for public safety and stations. The tool set is supplied with over 150 law enforcement. Active Citizen has three steps data bases and map layers. These include the within what is termed a Community Intelligence location of resources to support response to spe- Coordination Center (CICC) that begins with: cific hazards, infrastructure objects and facilities (communications, electric power, oil and gas, • Data – All source reporting. emergency services, government, transportation, water supply), a variety of population breakouts • Information – What is happening. and much more. It also allows the user to add databases for custom analysis. However, like • Knowledge – Context. nearly all hazard prediction or plume modeling The end-state of CICC is to enable decision sup- software, it is unable to do detailed modeling port with products such as planning tools and for complex areas in urban terrain, but rather environmental, cultural and incident scene infor- uses a model of open terrain, like a traditional mation. All of this is fed to public safety and law battlefield. enforcement agencies. It is a community-based approach that empowers citizens as partners with Fire pre-plans are an “intelligence product” law enforcement in the effort to protect their widely used by emergency responders. These are neighborhoods and communities, with the idea normally hard copy documents that include lay- that an alert and trained public is the greatest out and fire-specific criteria of buildings that can deterrent to attack. At the center of the model is be used in an emergency. These are rarely auto- the cyber citizen corps portal that feeds in envi- mated, and fire services normally have neither the ronmental data, cultural data, specific informa- necessary digital communications nor the infor- tion requirements, incident situation reporting mation technology available to support such and even damage assessments. The CICC’s prod- automation. Currently, most large buildings and ucts are cultural analyses, environmental risk mit- facilities submit plans to the fire department. igation, pattern recognition and GIS products. It Regulations require blueprints for tall building to is anticipated that this capability could grow to be on hand in the lobby for responders to refer- include video teleconferencing (VTC) and a vir- ence as needed in cases of emergency. All of this tual emergency operations center (EOC). In its data could be digitally archived for immediate final form, the cyber citizen portal would be the retrieval, and for data manipulation (i.e., 3-D collaborative center linking the federal informa- projection) using various advanced software tion center, state information center, local law applications. The ability for emergency respon- enforcement and community. ders to “see” into buildings using this type of data is generally available now. Fire inspectors rou- Tied in with Active Citizen is the Domestic tinely visit buildings and are able to update files, Emergency Response Information Service and image the inside of various buildings. Urban (DERIS) concept. DERIS demonstrated the wargaming techniques currently being evaluated feasibility of a portal approach to law enforce- by some agencies may offer the ability to assess ment crisis response. It implements National the tactical threat of urban buildings in a fashion Institute for Urban Search and Rescue standards similar to a military assessment. for extreme information infrastructure, and can

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act as a prototype for civil military C2 (command Gap Fillers: and control) supporting the Common Some of the concerns with IPO stem from infor- Operational Picture (COP). DERIS was tested mation sharing, and the quality of intelligence using the Burning Man annual event in Nevada analysis. A highlighted concern voiced by work- and then at Shadow Bowl, an exercise that simu- shop participants is the need for a regional clear- lated a Super Bowl in San Diego with a relative inghouse for data and analysis to support nearby degree of success. smaller jurisdictions. NYPD has a substantial clearinghouse capability, but this is mostly sup- Active Citizen and DERIS provide a number of porting operations within its own jurisdiction. information tools, such as: As previously mentioned, the Los Angeles • Prepared Response – an automated target folder Country Regional Criminal Information Center archive. (LACRCIC) or the “the LA Clearinghouse” per- • CyberCop – ESP’s free secure collaboration forms this function. It is a combined center that portal. has a 24/7 data sharing/research and event de- confliction center, along with analyst groups that • Netowl – a knowledge mining tool. provide case support. It is also home to the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center • Virtual Operations Center – MindTel’s modi- (CTIC), which leverages its capabilities from the fied version of a virtual 3-D workspace tai- same infrastructure. lored for emergency management and law enforcement situational awareness. In California currently, the “clearinghouse” focuses almost solely on criminal intelligence, and Technology Limitations and Barriers: is tied in with the Los Angeles High Intensity The barriers to accomplishing IPO are not pri- Drug Trafficking Area. Their methodology is marily technical. As in any information technol- placing “analysts” in support of criminal investi- ogy enabled function, there are concerns about gations, whether it is against drug traffickers or available bandwidth and whether the communi- terrorists. There is a need to develop and deploy cation and information management infrastruc- a benchmark IPO process for responding to a ter- ture can support the multilevel security needs of rorist threat. The federal government should processing intelligence. These problems are being develop such a process which can be used by addressed in other areas. We simply have little regional authorities as a template for creating a experience in moving information, especially similar indigenous process. intelligence information, around the responder community during a major incident. Until ASU.3 – Threat-Relevant Data Dissemination. September 11th, there was little motivation on the The ability to (1) identify what kinds of threat- part the federal government to establish strong related information must be disseminated, (2) intelligence sharing relationships with the respon- identify who must receive what information (i.e., der community, especially outside tight law need-to-know), and (3) deliver the appropriate enforcement circles. Before September 11th, very information among disciplines only to the appro- few people considered the response to an incident priate agency, office, or official. as “battlefield” for which intelligence needs to be prepared. Funding priorities, training require- Goals: ments and cultural adaptations have yet to catch • Integrated secure system of delivery up with the need. • Identification of need-to-know criteria.

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• Methodology for transmission of timely, in- police chief or fire chief into a de facto intelli- real-time knowledge and confirmation of such gence analyst, since there are no effective filters or receipt. additional assessment processes to tailor the information for specific needs or requirements. Pull × • Smart and timely 24 7 intelligence dissemina- dissemination, in contrast, requires an active tion (emphasis on timely receipt). search to find needed information. Much of the information pull capability today is Internet- • “Smart Security” in dissemination technology based. A simple example would be a Google and methods, according to kind of informa- search. tion. Level of security (and hence dissemination method, e.g., fax) depends on the kind The debate is ongoing in the military with the of information: open channels sometimes proliferation of information on the battlefield. appropriate. The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force moved to a • Dissemination, security and access issues taken pull-based information environment focused on Web-centric dissemination of critical informa- into account at the regional operational level, th st not hoarded at the individual department or tion. Even before September 11 , 1 MEF staff functional agency level. and commanders were overloaded with emails on the host of operations, plans and administrative Any dissemination system must also maintain information dealing with contingencies covering assured operational security (OPSEC). two-thirds of the globe. For the most senior personnel, this meant they would get hundreds of Current Capabilities: emails daily using the traditional push method of The consensus among responders is that there is dissemination. As one senior staff officer at 1st only marginal capability to disseminate threat rel- MEF put it, “the Commander has become the evant data to the responder community. An senior analyst,” hence the change in the method example of this is the information that does or of information access. doesn’t accompany the Department of Homeland Security’s National Terrorism Alerts. Among the Emergency responders note that systems using a concerns were that there is no intelligence capa- pull method for homeland security or terrorism bility to adequately disseminate sufficient infor- information, such as a Web-centric system, mation to compliment what is essentially an should include secure access, information post- operational threat condition change, and that this ing, a tailored alert system using specific parame- system is not tied to a nationwide IPO process ters and a drill up/drill down capability to sup- for moving intelligence information or assess- port analysis, as it is needed. Supporting ments either to or from the local, state and fed- technology probably exists, but is not obvious or eral levels. easily available to public safety emergency response organizations. This problem is partially characterized in the debates over PUSH vs. PULL intelligence. With Both the issue of information classification and email dissemination, there is a problem with get- the handling of classified information are signifi- ting the “spigot turned on” by being part of vari- cant elements in information sharing that must ous Homeland Security or Terrorism Threat be addressed. The Department of Defense information groups, both open source and closed. (DoD), as noted in Crisis Evaluation and Traditional “push” intelligence under the current Management, has initiated several projects to system creates information overload, with the address the capability to exchange information same effect as too little information, producing and data through an automated multilevel secu- the equivalent of spam emails on terrorism or rity system (MLS). These issues are significant related threats. This push methodology over- for public safety first response. whelms the recipients. This effectively turns the

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Among the many law enforcement telecommuni- • Producing analytical products on information cation systems in the country, the Oklahoma Law received through the InfraGuard network; Enforcement Telecommunications System (OLETS) appears to be a benchmark. It is a pri- • Expanding communication between govern- vate, leased-line, digital telecommunications net- ment and private sector members. work maintained by the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety. It serves over 750 police depart- State of the Art: ments, county sheriff’s offices, highway patrol Responders and technologists pointed to the headquarters, military bases, and emergency Tulsa Area Syndromic Surveillance System operations centers (EOC), and other agencies (TASSS) program as a benchmark in biological or concerned with pubic safety and law enforce- epidemiological intelligence (i.e., epi-intel) shar- ment. OLETS agencies communicate through a ing and dissemination. It looks at all key data central message switching computer housed at fields and ties into the labs, especially for trend OLETS headquarters in Oklahoma City that identification. TASSS’s objective is to alert med- allows those agencies to query central databases ical professionals to the possibility of significant in search of criminal records, license and registra- outbreaks before large numbers of patients pres- tion information. OLETS also allows them to ent with advanced stages of disease. It is a part- communicate with other agencies across the state nership with area hospitals by electronic transfer and nation, and access information tables that of emergency room chief complaints into the reside at the OLETS switch. TASSS model with analytical focus on five principal syndromes: fever, rash, respiratory, diarrhea, InfraGuard, an FBI-industry collaboration and vomiting. TASSS, which is maintained by focused on the cyber-security and the informa- the Planning and Epidemiology Division of the tion technology sector may be a good benchmark Tulsa City/County Health Department, can be for two-way communication of threat informa- accessed through the Internet with proper clear- tion. The national InfraGuard program began as ance, and is a key component of the new Tulsa a pilot project in 1996, when the Cleveland FBI Terrorism Early Warning Group program. Other Field Office asked local computer professionals to sites that are being considered to expand the epi- assist the FBI in determining how to better pro- demiological surveillance program of TASSS tect critical information systems in both the pub- include schools, clinics and major employers. lic and private sectors. Today it is a joint teaming project linking the private sector with the U.S. The needs of responders to conduct IPO are not government, or more specifically the FBI. The unlike those of power grid management and initiative was developed to encourage the there is technology in that industry that could be exchange of information by the government and adapted for emergency response. The the private sector members, and private sector Department of Energy’s Pacific Northwest members and an FBI field representative form National Laboratory (PNNL) has been working local area chapters. With hundreds of company on this power grid reliability, from the impact of members across the nation, there are now 79 aging infrastructure, deregulation, and the vul- active chapters of InfraGuard. The Federal nerabilities to terrorism. PNNL envisions a Bureau of Investigation acts as the facilitator by: power grid of the future through its Energy Systems Transformation Initiative. Called • Gathering information and distributing it to GridWise™, it enables collaboration among gen- members; erators, the grid and customer loads to collec- • Educating the public and members on infra- tively increase the stability and cost-effectiveness structure protection; of the power system. It applies solutions for adapting and influencing information, and con- • Disseminating information through the trol technology approaches to deliver reliable InfraGuard network; energy.

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GridWise is a regionally networked, but also administered by the Bureau of Diplomatic decentralized approach, using smart chips that Security, and has developed into a productive would be fitted onto household appliances and joint venture for effective security cooperation. would continually monitor fluctuations in the power grid. In high periods of stress for the grid, One example of an emerging enabling technology a “grid-friendly” appliance would identify fluctua- is Situation Management and Awareness in Real tions and automatically shut down. Brief inter- Time (SMART), a tactical command and control ruptions of 5 or 10 minutes of time give the grid system developed by International Aerospace operators time to stabilize the system, but would- which enables the secure, two-way exchange of n’t be noticeable to the consumer. The idea was information and intelligence over a low-band- that it would potentially stop a cascade effect width, public network. The software is designed similar to what happened in the Northeast when to correlate, integrate and update data, informa- the whole grid essentially collapsed. Smart appli- tion and intelligence from a wide range of ances could also stagger return to service after an sources. It supports display of its Common outage and thus ease the restoration of power. Operating Picture (COP) or Single Integrated From an IPO technology standpoint, it is a Picture (SIP) in near-real time and in interactive decentralized information collection and assess- 2-D and 3-D formats. SMART uses a “one-to- ment process that facilitates a flexible response to many” peer to peer network, and is intended for an emergency situation. use in tactical operations involving networked tablet computers or PDA’s. Described as ‘glue- Another benchmark medical surveillance system ware,’ because it links incompatible command is the Emergency Medical Alert Network and control or information systems, each (EMAN) of San Diego County. EMAN was SMART unit has the ability to connect to a GPS developed by the Epidemiology Division of the receiver or a vehicle interface and could be used San Diego County Health and Human Services to disseminate its position and all associated data Agency (HHSA) in December 1999. EMAN is with that unit. intended to expedite confidential communication between healthcare and public health profession- Technology Limitations and Barriers: als in San Diego County. Fundamentally, it is a The most significant barrier to dissemination of network dedicated to facilitating bi-directional threat-relevant data may be the restrictions on confidential communication between San Diego classified data. The technical and administrative County’s medical community and public health infrastructure required to store and disseminate and safety agencies in order to ensure rapid iden- classified material is not available in the respon- tification of and response to unusual disease der community. To implement such a system events or public health emergencies. would require granting clearances for thousands of additional people and the implementation of Another example of collaborative communication additional secure networks over which to trans- of security information is the Overseas Security mit the data. Significantly increasing the dissem- Advisory Council (OSAC). Through OSAC, ination of data to the responder community U.S. companies, to include public and private will require a large and expensive effort and it colleges and universities, are provided timely will be primarily the responsibility of the federal information in which to make informed corpo- government. rate decisions on how best to protect their investment, facilities, personnel and intellectual prop- The implementation of technology to assist inci- erty abroad. It was established in 1985 by the dent commanders requires significant investment U.S. Department of State to foster the exchanges in time and effort to achieve, but minimal invest- of security-related information between the U.S. ment to develop. Most of the useful or applicable Government and American private sector technology is either available or will be in the interests operating abroad. OSAC is currently near term. A significant challenge will be to scale

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the national dissemination system to effectively Current Capabilities: support the responder community while safe- Many of the functional needs in this area are the guarding sensitive information. same as those required in ASU.1 (Threat Assessment/Data Collection/Analysis), ASU.2 Gap Fillers: (Intelligence Preparation for Operations) and The technological building blocks for developing ASU.3 (Threat Relevant Data Distribution). a threat dissemination system appear to be pres- Therefore, only the differences will be addressed ent in many of the products sited above. Some here. As was the case in the preceding functional tailoring of those will be necessary. The capabil- areas, the responders and technologists who par- ity gap seems to be the ability to integrate infor- ticipated in Project Responder felt that this capa- mation processing systems. This issue could be bility was marginal today. One problem noted at resolved by developing a national standard to the national level is that the capability is very dif- which regional authorities can build. ficult to develop and maintain if local officials choose not to use the Incident Command System ASU.4 – Intelligence Support to Unified (ICS) and its structure. Use of the ICS is consid- Incident Command Structure. The ability to ered the essential building block on which to provide valid intelligence assessments (including build a doctrinal intelligence fusion capability. estimates of threat capability, intentions/targets and Currently, use of the ICS is not universal. trends/potentials), damage assessments/reports, Political acceptance and establishment of a resource capability and availability, recommenda- national model for both developing and feeding tions for courses of action, and timely situation intelligence to an incident commander is required briefings, in an operationally useful and real-time to set up and implement processes like the one process, to the incident commander/unified com- described here. The use of the ICS nation-wide mand at all phases of response. is considered essential.

Goals: In order to provide intelligence support to uni- • Support real-time decision making. fied command we may look to the military for examples of current capability. At the UIC level, • Seamless integration with other related there is a need for an all-source intelligence Functional Capabilities. fusion center (or IFC), similar to a military Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) or Joint Intelligence • Enable maximum use of visual methods to Support Element (JISE). The size of these intelli- display needed information. gence fusion elements is scalable. For example, a JIC may have hundreds of personnel. By con- • Insulate incident command intelligence brief- trast, a JISE is normally for a smaller joint task ings and decision-making from chaos and force with a headquarters of 100-300, and is distractions. normally has a dozen or dozens of personnel assigned. • Incorporate reports from the field (downrange) real-time into the intelligence product Typically, a military IFC (JIC/JISE/IOC) will as updates for the overall situational have a surveillance and reconnaissance center understanding. (SARC) either embedded or adjacent for immediate feed from all sensors or reconnaissance assets; • Allow the incident commander to disseminate ground, air, maritime, human or mechanical. decisions with relevant intelligence “attached” They will become the center of data feeds for all to the command. IMINT/imagery, HUMINT/human, SIGINT/ signals, ELINT/electronic, MASINT/measure- • Enable “rolling” documentation of lessons ment and signature, and any other form of col- learned as the crisis evolves. lections assets that provide raw intelligence. In a

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typical enforcement operation, collecting infor- DMI-Services provides a capability for the conse- mation from witnesses or informants would fall quence management community to share digital under HUMINT. The IFC may also have plans, information. This stemmed from key develop- operations and fusion or analysis sections that ment work with the Consequence Management support all of these functions, along with those Information System (CMIS) working with the technologies needed to develop and maintain the Marine Corps Systems Command prior to common operational picture or COP, or that por- September 11th. DMI-Services has expanded tion of it that is sometimes called the common upon this to provide digital information solutions intelligence picture or CIP. in an all-hazards disaster incident command response environment. The intelligence directorate or section using it is involved with all facets of the intelligence cycle Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s process that includes: Direction and Planning, (DARPA) Command Post of the Future (CPOF) Collections, Fusion and Synthesis, Analysis and has a number of relevant technologies. CPOF Production, Dissemination, Utilization, and the includes a Command Post Information inputs back to Direction and Planning. Environment (CPIE) that will provide new ways Normally, the intelligence fusion is often focused to collaborate and to interact with supporting on what is called intelligence production, or turn- information assets and sources. Included in this, ing out finished products for operational con- the Navy is developing both 2-D and 3-D virtual sumption or utilization. Within non-traditional reality (VR) tools that enable better battlespace military mission spectrums, there is the potential visualization by commanders in the CPOF. for functions involved with collections planning CPOF components include: and management that may fall under the intelligence fusion center, and since that requires a • Access to information and control devices via high degree of operational assets that have dual PDAs. capabilities for collection information and data • Speech recognition from microphones (i.e., responders, investigators, aircraft, etc.), this throughout the center. role must be clearly defined early on with senior executive intent stated and widely understood. • Interactive 3-D visualization. Having an IFC, enabled by the latest technology and reporting directly to the unified or incident • Gesture recognition. commander is the key to this functional capability. • Tailorable information awareness. A number of these technologies would be very State of the Art: helpful in getting intelligence and situational The Incident Command Information Tool awareness information directly to the incident (ICIT) is an example of current technology that commander and reflect his action upon that can address this issue. The incident commander information. needs real-time video capability on-site. As proven during the Democratic Convention in Some capabilities similar to those of CPOF are 2000, monitoring the media is critical to sup- emerging in the commercial sector. MindTel has porting decision-making by the incident com- been developing situational merging technologies mander, since so much of what is being done and with displays to create optimized operational communicated has far-reaching consequences and space visualization platforms. However, the the IC must be responsive to the elected information link is equally important. At a leadership. recent exercise in San Diego, a borrowed Navy airship was used to beam real-time visual “scenes” As mentioned previously, the federally-sponsored back to an analyst in what was called “street Disaster Management Integration Services, or scene.” During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),

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the Common Operational Picture or COP was user can have access to the most accurate and up- transmitted simultaneously to 1000 vehicles to-date information, accelerating the decision- 20-30 miles inside Iraq. making process and providing continuous support at all points in the decision-making process. The National Interagency Fire Command Center These “agents” monitor and contribute solution (NIFCC) in Boise, Idaho, is an example of an all- strategies within their areas of knowledge. source fusion center specifically designed for supporting incident command decision-making Currently, EMERRS is an evolving collection of regarding the threat of forest fires. This fusion decision-support applications designed to assist center coalesces complex data on logistics, per- urban response units in dealing with a wide range sonnel, operations and other support across mul- of crisis management situations. It is a collabora- tiple states and jurisdictions, acting as a fire infor- tive toolset that monitors an urban environment mation clearinghouse. For example, the Regional and provides enhanced near real-time situational Fire Directors furnish a daily status reports dur- awareness to emergency response commanders ing the fire season to the National Interagency and their staffs. Functionally, EMERRS inte- Fire Coordination Center (NIFCC), and the grates data from disparate sources into a single NIFCC Coordinator fuses this to provide a daily coherent view that provides a disciplined deci- summary, by region, of the fire danger and fire sion-making environment. Potentially, it enables occurrence statistics, and distributes this to their the crisis management staff to minimize or elimi- Washington office, regions, areas, and requesting nate time-consuming data filtering tasks. For the states. The NIFCC uses state of the art technol- UIC, this allows greater resources and attention ogy, to include broadband communications, to to higher-level situational assessment and rapid collect and disseminate visual products to enable response to changing events. User requests for command decision-making, and has a dedicated assistance are supported. However, the system intelligence section that solely works issues does not wait for requests to offer contributions. related to fires. EMERRS provides a decision-support environment in which agents and human users interact Computer generated intelligent agents or, more to solve problems collaboratively. appropriately, “intelligent software agents” are also an enabling technology. These agents are Technology Limitations and Barriers: capable of recognizing certain conditions, reason- Bandwidth is again a huge limitation. Real-time ing about these conditions, forming conclusions, video and the types of large data files involved and taking actions on the basis of those conclu- with imagery, modeling and special GIS products sions. One example germane to All-Source will truly revolutionize how emergency respon- Situational Understanding being developed ders communicate. through California Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo, California, is EMERRS or Developing intelligence agents is another issue Emergency Regional Response Systems. addressed at the workshop, or more appropriately smart automated agents that can mine data and In general, EMMERS is the emergency response learn artificially. The potential of these is great, version of this same intelligent agent approach, but so is the time needed to significantly improve and is described as an integrated decision-support the current technology to the point where it can capability for enhancing crisis management and provide truly smart agents. With the overwhelm- improving or expanding response. The EMERRS ing amount of information available today, system design incorporates collaborative agents especially through the Internet, today’s smart with knowledge in specific domains. Proactively agents could end up funneling tremendous mirroring changing circumstances, these auto- amounts of information to a human analyst or mated agents send alerts, inferences, and recom- responder that would slow down their assessment mendations to response personnel. Agents are or decision-making processes instead of stream- used to gather and reveal information so that the lining and improving them.

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Training of emergency personnel is another issue. and vulnerabilities, and foresee the impact of pro- There is tremendous software and hardware avail- posed courses of action. able, but the threshold of training that it may take to gain, let alone maintain, proficiency in The system should be able to provide analysts using them is very significant. Current methods with access to information from agencies at the relying on on-the-job training or going to a local, state and federal level, including intelli- course and then rarely using it won’t work. The gence agencies, when required. Therefore, it will training must be made available and that will be need to be able to transmit and manage classified expensive. However, it does play to one of the information appropriately at various levels. The strengths of the Department of Defense and the intent is to develop a prototype suite of informa- rest of the federal government in that there is a tion and communications technologies and a powerful training capability available to address doctrinal and procedural template for regional this need for the nation’s responder community. authorities to procure and implement to create This is especially true for areas dealing with intel- this capability. This capability follows the philos- ligence support to the Unified Incident ophy of preparing for all hazards. It would be Command, since DoD is virtually the only useful not only in terrorists’ incidents but in any organization that has training schools with course critical incident and perhaps on a daily basis in subjects and substantive experience or knowledge some regions. dealing with this requirement. The objectives of this RTO are very similar to Gap Fillers: those of the Homeland Security Command and Control ACTD in the Department of Defense. Responders saw the development of common Therefore, it will be useful to leverage that pro- doctrine and processes across multi-jurisdictional, gram and wait to begin this RTO until the governmental and civil-military lines as critical. HSC2 ACTD is completed. As this is a classic Once doctrine has been developed, there must be opportunity for spiral development, the program a corresponding systems integration effort that should be planned in a way that seeks to deploy a mirrors operational or intelligence doctrine. capability as early as possible with plans to upgrade the capability as experience with the sys- All-Source Situational Awareness tem grows. The prototypes can then be used by Response Technology Objectives local governments as a guide for implementing (ASUrto) their own capability. ASUrto.1 – All-Source Information Fusion and Analysis System Payoffs: This will provide incident command authorities Objectives: with intelligence products (analyzed all-source Develop a prototype tool and doctrinal template information) with far more fidelity than is for an information and analysis cell to support currently available. It would enable access to Incident Command. The objective is to evaluate, sensitive information previously not available to select and integrate technologies that will enable them because they could not handle sensitive the capability to collect, fuse, analyze and present information. It would greatly strengthen their information from all sources, including sensitive decision-making by providing a better picture intelligence information. The tool should of the incident environment but also provide provide analysts supporting Unified Incident better analysis of the courses of action they are Command with the ability to collect, mine, cor- considering. In the long run, responders will be relate, perform pattern recognition, and visualize better prepared, incident commanders will make large amounts of data in order to contribute to better decisions, lives will be saved and property real-time situational awareness, predict threats damage mitigated.

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Challenges: information analysis and intelligence sharing The technologies to support the objectives of this techniques and protocols. The team will begin to RTO exist and many are commercially available. develop standard doctrine and concept of opera- What is not commercially available is likely avail- tion for a responder all-source information analy- able in the Defense technology base. Integration sis cell. of these technologies, some of which may be pro- FY2007: Continue development of CONOPS prietary, is the technical challenge. Some of the and standard doctrine and procedures for infor- most vexing technical limitations involve the mation and intelligence support to incident com- same challenges found across the entire command. Complete architecture and perform a gap mand, control, communications and information analysis between the target technology suite and management spectrum: integration with legacy the HSC2 ACTD. Determine how to fill the systems, communications capacity (bandwidth), gaps either with emerging technology or new and whether the communication and information development. Select available technologies that management infrastructure can be made to sup- will support the developed process and begin port the multilevel security needs of processing integration. Begin integration of initial capabil- intelligence. Scalability and quality of service ity prototype system, including the technology requirements may also be a challenge. In addi- suite and CONOPS and doctrinal templates. tion, responders simply have little experience in moving information, especially intelligence infor- FY2008: Complete integration of initial capabil- mation, around their community during a major ity prototype system. Begin testing of prototype incident. Federal authorities have concern about system. Analyze test results and develop improve- passing sensitive information to local and larger ments in the technology suite and process tem- audiences. Overcoming cultural and policy issues plates based on test results. Demonstrate the with multi-agency information sharing will be a prototype system in a major critical incident challenge. exercise.

Milestones/Metrics: FY2009: Begin deployment of the prototype FY2006: Evaluate the Homeland Security system in several cities. Continue to integrate Command and Control ACTD. Review the improvements in capability either through tech- results and assess the applicability of the nology upgrades or improvements in CONOPS. technology suite and other developments Demonstrate new capability as appropriate. (i.e., doctrine, techniques) to the objec- ASUrto.1 – Budget in Millions tives of this RTO. Begin development of Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Totals the prototype architecture. Establish a All-Source $0 $0 $3.0 $5.0 $6.2 $4.0 $18.2 Information concept of operation/doctrine develop- Fusion and ment team. The team will review current Analysis System

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 • Capability to Collect, Fuse, Analyze and Present Information ASUrto.1 – All-Source Information Fusion and from All Sources Analysis System • Pattern Recognition • Data Visaualization All-Source Situational Understanding Technology Roadmap

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PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter xii Criminal Investigation and Attribution (CI) Chapter Chair: Hal Kempfer Chapter Coordinator: Dr. Maria E. Powell

Definition • Post-Incident Forensic Modeling and Simulation Criminal Investigation and Attribution (CI) is the ability to rapidly, reliably and safely identify the perpetrators of suspected terrorism incidents, Overall State of Technology for Criminal Investigation and Attribution including the ability to collect, process, and examine the evidence, identify and interview wit- As the matrix below indicates, responders feel nesses, and determine the type, cause and initial they have at least a marginal capability in most location of an incident. areas in this NTRO, with the exception of radioactive evidence recovery and preservation. Operational Environment Furthermore, the technologies that support this NTRO are available today for the top three prior- This NTRO is focused on the five Operational ity functional capabilities. The fourth-priority Environments represented by threat: chemical, capability, Post-Incident Forensic Modeling and biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-explo- Simulation (CI.4), relies on technologies that are sive/incendiary (i.e., CBRNE) effects of an event. marginally available in the near-term, except in the biological operational environment: in this Needed Functional Capabilities and environment, the technologies are high-risk and Priorities not available in the near term. Responders identified Criminal Investigation/Attribution four functional capability Operational Environments elements they require for High Explosive/ this NTRO, presented Functional Capabilities Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Incendiary below in order of 1. Management of Contaminated descending priority Suspects/Witnesses (as determined by 2. Contaminated Evidence Recovery and Preservation responders). 3. Coordination Between law Enforcement and Public Health • Management of Con- Authorities taminated Suspects 4. Post-Incident Forensic Modeling and Simulation and Witnesses 1 1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this 2 operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO • Contaminated 3 2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional Evidence Recovery capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO 3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability? and Preservation LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’ • Coordination between Law Enforcement CI.1 – Management of Contaminated Suspects and Public Health Authorities and Witnesses. The ability to quickly identify,

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quarantine and decontaminate potential suspects An important issue is the need to assess the situa- and witnesses, and interview and process them. tion quickly during a CBRNE incident. This involves some use of technologies such as sensors, Goals: imaging equipment and wideband connectivity. • Quickly identify and segregate suspects from Whereas smaller jurisdictions may not have on- witnesses, in quarantine facilities. hand all of the PPE and decontamination capability they need, they may be able to develop and • Integrate, sustain and equip (with proper PPE) disseminate an accurate picture of the contami- law enforcement personnel within decontaminated area, and then virtually be supported in nation process, so they can have the ability to designating a hot/warm/cold zone. Thus, this observe and interview during decontamination functional capability is inherently dependent on process. capabilities described in Chapter III (DIDA).

• Every patrol officer outfitted with quickly Responders noted that there is a shortage of facial adaptable Level C PPE specifically designed recognition capability useful for tagging suspects for their use, to apprehend suspects and inter- or other persons of interest. Other technologies view if no time for decontamination (includ- might be more useful to collect and retain bio- ing knowledge of contaminant and/or symp- metric data for identification use at a later date, toms of victims). (See Chapter II (PPE).) such as iris scans, or technologies from programs such as DARPA’s Human Identification from a • Pre-positioned or ultra-light PPE for foot Distance (HID). Nevertheless, most of these patrol officers (multi-purpose uniform). capabilities are not present in most responder jurisdictions. • A checklist for immediate action to assess the situation and provide for better and safer State of the Art: response. Technologists identified virtual or automated • Track individuals who were decontaminated or means for identifying and tagging suspects or processed (facial recognition, photo/video, persons of interest. Amongst the ways of tagging etc.). suspects is facial recognition or some other biometric identification means. Currently, law Current Capabilities: enforcement is using finger and palm prints for identification of suspects, and casinos have been Responders have this capability today in high- widely adopting facial recognition technology for explosive or incendiary environments, but there is tagging suspects within the gambling industry. a marginal capability for emergency responders in These technologies are useful for managing sus- most communities to conduct interviews or inter- pects in a contaminated environment. These rogations in a warm zone (i.e., with chemical, technologies are also useful for identifying and biological, or radiological contaminants). distinguishing witnesses among crowds. Handling contaminated witnesses or suspects relies on the same capabilities as handling con- Biometric technologies are also useful in cases taminated general populations. These capabilities when contaminated suspects must be interviewed were discussed in earlier chapters (especially from a distance, for example, using isolation and Chapter II (PPE)). Finally, responders have (or closed-circuit television. Responders noted that have access to) capabilities for stand-off inter- only California can conduct interviews of con- viewing/interrogation such as closed-circuit tele- taminated suspects, and federal resources are vision: the challenges here would be more from needed to help with this issue. The FBI has criminal procedure and legal requirements rather HAZMAT teams that are trained and equipped than technology. for crime scene investigations in contaminated

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areas, to include interviewing contaminated sus- to those in Chapter III (DIDA); that is, knowing pects. There are technologies that ensure identity about the presence of hazards and the parameters through biometrics sufficiently for legal purposes. of the hot and warm zones.

It has been said that the casino industry is “push- Gap Fillers: ing the envelope” of technical innovation in Since technology is relatively mature, no gap visual and behavioral surveillance. Modern fillers were considered. developments in closed circuit television (CCTV) and video recording technology have become CI.2 – Contaminated Evidence Recovery and methods for uncovering crime as it is taking place Preservation. The ability to collect, process and and providing an archived record for later inves- preserve potentially contaminated evidence (to tigative action. Breakthroughs in digital imaging include devices and fragments), in a contaminated technology, especially regarding facial recogni- environment while ensuring chain of custody. tion, have created the public impression that casinos are much farther ahead in this area than Goals: other industries. For example, the Trump Marina • Process contaminated fatalities. Casino in Atlantic City, NJ, claims to have 10,000 photographs of cheaters, and people who • Secure separate storage facility for custody and have been arrested, evicted or ejected from their examination of contaminated evidence. or other casinos, for use in their facial recognition system. • Tracking of evidence that supports the chain of custody. Responders identified the need for fusion of pre- existing databases for suspect management and • Contamination control for selective deconta- record correlation. There is also a need for mination without cross-contamination tools immediate fusion and correlation of interview that do not destroy evidence. and investigative data, with the added capability of providing logical leads and dynamic investiga- • Safe transportation and containers for contam- tive decision modeling in near-real time. With inated evidence to include contaminated improvements in imaging technology, wireless corpses. internet service, and personal communications • Remote or stand-off devices for collection of and information devices, the ability to input, evidence. query and receive data from pre-existing databases while in the field is becoming less of a tech- • Easily decontaminated or disposable process- nology hurdle. In most cases, this technology ing tools for all of the above. already exists and it is only matter of funding and political will to test and evaluate it, and deploy it Current Capabilities: in the field. Responders have this capability in the high explosive and incendiary environments. This capabil- Technology Limitations and Barriers: ity is marginal in the biological and chemical The technology to provide this capability is avail- environments, and is non-existent among most able today, across all of the operational environ- responder jurisdictions for the nuclear and radio- ments. Technology limitations to providing this logical environments. capability are mainly interoperability (to fuse communications between hot zones and other Collection and preservation of evidence is critical responder locations) and portability (for example, to responders. Much evidence is collected after getting equipment for contaminated witness incident, but contaminated evidence poses chal- interview or suspect questioning into a hot zone). lenges in transporting, analyzing, and using it for Otherwise, the technology limitations are similar evidentiary purposes. This is an issue of expertise

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and training as much as it is an issue of State of the Art: technology. Technologies exist for connecting contaminated samples from hazardous buildings. Samples con- Responders generally rely on clear plastic bagging taminated by biological and chemical agents (or for sending contaminated evidence out of hot when sampling the agents themselves) usually zones. One notable exception is a corpse or requires secure transport of the samples to a labo- human remains, which are still wrapped and ratory for final composition analysis. While there sealed so to avoid contamination. are only a few “Gold Standard” laboratories in Forensic standards for bioagents are not well the country that can make a 100% accurate iden- established, either in law or practice. This is an tification, there has been an increase in the num- area that is still evolving, and the anthrax attacks ber of “Silver Standard” laboratories that can following September 11th may eventually provide make a 90-99% accurate identification. In the lessons or direction that can be used to shape the last two years, a number of the field-deployable appropriate technologies needed for forensic National Guard Civil Support Teams (CSTs) have trace-back. In addition, state courts (and thus, added this silver standard laboratory capability. It local responders) will probably look to federal should be noted, however, that the application of legal experience, procedures, and case law when these standards is usually for identifying a biolog- applying forensic standards, in the event a terror- ical agent and its characteristics, rather than nec- ist attack would be a subject for state courts. essarily identifying the origin of a biological agent Much will be learned from the use of the for forensic attribution purposes. The two appli- Daubert test and the introduction of new tech- cations are related, but not distinct, and require nologies and procedures at the federal level. different standards of effectiveness.

Responders have marginal capability to collect Another application for biometric technologies is handling contaminated evidence. This includes bioagents as evidence. The technology to do “triage tags” for contaminated items, to include this has been bulky, expensive and not widely evidence tags. With current commercial technol- available. ogy, it is possible to image any piece of evidence For secure storage of contaminated evidence (for in the hot zone prior to it being moved, and thus custody and examination), it is unlikely that the create a visual tag. Potentially, this could be expertise and capabilities to exploit the evidence linked with other automated means of “tagging” fully (including for leads) will exist in sufficient that could minimize the amount of manpower quantity and quality to perform these analyses involved with collecting and tagging evidence. and examinations, without federal help and inter- The FBI’s Hazardous Materials Response Unit vention. Some of the expertise already exists and the FBI Laboratory have spent years develop- (e.g., identification of microorganisms) within the ing capabilities and procedures for collecting, pre- state and county public health laboratories. serving, and the administrative handling of con- However, this expertise does not extend to the taminated evidence. Furthermore, the FBI forensic analysis and investigation of the event. conducts training for responders, especially HAZ- Virtually all of the forensic expertise and capabil- MAT and WMD response teams, on issues ity related to these events resides at the federal regarding preservation of evidence. Saving lives level. Unique sets of complementary expertise continues to be first priority for responders. reside in various components of the federal gov- However, sensitizing responders to criminal evi- ernment (with help from a select group of con- dence issues and collection requirements can help sulting experts, some of whom are at the state, to avoid unnecessary damage to the forensic value local or university levels). of potential evidence. FBI procedures are to bag

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the evidence in the hot zone, and then “double- Potentially, this can improve the process of deter- bag” it. The outer bag is then decontaminated in mining origins of biological samples. the warm zone, and the evidence bag is tagged in either the warm or cold zone by an Evidence CI.3 – Coordination between Law Enforcement Response Team Technician, who then preserves and Public Health Authorities. The ability to chain of custody. Tagging evidence in the hot coordinate among law enforcement, public health zone is not something easily accomplished now. authorities and medical examiners/coroners, for epidemiological surveillance, information to support On some occasions, it might be necessary to cap- attribution (and vice versa), to include fusing epi- ture images of the crime scene as rescue opera- demiological surveillance information from public tions begin, in order to capture the visual evi- health with law enforcement epidemiological dence of what the scene looked like prior to evidence. responders conducting operations there. Even if physical evidence is moved, an imaged scene Goals: allows investigators to recreate where certain Provide evidence and analysis to law enforce- pieces of evidence were in relation to the original ment, supported by the documentation, and layout prior to recovery operations, and then put within the parameters by which law enforcement this together for potential criminal prosecution receives notification of epidemiologists’ observa- later on. Furthermore, it might be important for tions and conclusions. juries and judges to visualize the evidence in context of the scene of the crime. Current technol- • Receive and interpret epidemiological infor- ogy can be used to portray the crime scene safely mation to support the investigation. in court, using robotics, aerial reconnaissance (unmanned or manned), CCTV, etc. Taking les- • Provide evidence and information to epidemi- sons from the imagery intelligence (IMINT) ologists to support their efforts. community, it is possible to develop extensive analyses using imagery of what happened. • Automate alert and cueing system supporting Responders noted that using robotics is clumsy, two way information flow between law but is sufficient to ensure chain of custody in enforcement and medical examiners. order to meet rules of evidence. • Standardized and interoperable technologies Technology Limitations and Barriers: and mapping, information sharing, etc. The technologies are basically available today to provide this capability, with some challenges. Current Capabilities: Occasionally the decontamination process This capability is marginally available today to destroys evidence. Contaminated objects cannot emergency responders in the chemical, biological, be entered into evidence or handled and stored in and radiological operational environments. This the same way as uncontaminated evidence. functional capability is not relevant to the high- Traditionally the court questions the chemical explosive/incendiary and nuclear (i.e., blast effects alteration from compounds or added surface per se) operational environments. deposits due to the decontamination process. Attorneys will argue about what was done to Much of this functional capability is dependent “decon” the evidence, and how this may have upon coordination between law enforcement compromised its forensic value. authorities and public health/epidemiological officers. This cooperation exists today. However, Gap Fillers: automation would greatly enhance this functional Technologists have noted rapid improvements in capability. bio-genomics, which are useful in the development of forensics biological databases.

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State of the Art: TEW and the HHS Metropolitan Medical The CDC has funded several new labs that fuse Response System (MMRS) are state-of-the-art information between hospitals and law enforce- practices, as opposed to technologies. MMRS ment. For example, in April 2003, the CDC enhances the capabilities of existing systems that opened the new Marcus Emergency Operations involve hazardous materials, law enforcement, Center, a facility that improves the agency's and emergency medical services personnel, public response to health crises and enables faster and hospitals, and the American Red Cross, as well as more coordinated response to public health emer- public health agencies and laboratories, private gencies nationally and worldwide. It has com- hospitals, clinics, independent physicians, and munication links with the Department of Health other private-sector organizations. Over the last and Human Services, federal intelligence and six years, HHS has established contracts with 122 emergency response officials, the Department of cities. HHS provides the cities with funding for Homeland Security, and state and local public special equipment and pharmaceutical and med- health officials. ical supplies, and in return, HHS requires cities to provide detailed plans on how the city will The Syndromic Surveillance System is a bench- organize and respond to chemical, biological, or mark of current capabilities, including some tech- radiological agents. nologies that enable automation. Its data focus and staff includes: Technology Limitations and Barriers: Technologies in support of this functional capa- • Epidemiology bility are available today, including information • Health Planning technologies that would automate information sharing. Primary limitations and barriers are • GIS/Mapping cost, organizational, or, in some cases, political and legal. For example, responders noted that if • Administrative Coordination the syndromic information is collected in hospitals, the technology readily exists to flag it for dis- By May 2003, the CDC estimated that state and semination to law enforcement, but the question local health departments have begun syndromic of compliance with privacy laws is not necessarily surveillance systems in about 100 locations resolved. A good deal of the medical data sources around the country, with the goal of earlier detec- routinely collected for other purposes, such as tion of epidemics and faster public health emergency room logs, pharmacy sales, school response (i.e., from days to hours). absenteeism, etc. can be fused and analyzed for The Los Angeles County Terrorism Early spotting emerging trends. There is legal concern Warning Group (TEW) has an epidemiological about this though, since this is not generally intelligence (“epi-intel”) team that monitors something done by health departments. health service information for indicators and warning of a potential outbreak. Responders Responders noted that law enforcement officers noted that bio-information needs to tie into need basic training in the “epi-intelligence” investigations for quickly finding the perpetra- process. This is not a traditional area of standard tors, and then removing them from further threat law enforcement training curricula, either at the and hopefully deriving valuable information to academy level or advanced training. help mitigate the current threat. The LA TEW does this by directly linking epi-intel into terror- Gap Fillers: ism investigation groups through its investigative There are already extensive law enforcement and liaison office. TEWs are being established in a public health communications and information number of cities nationwide, especially on the systems already in place; responders and technol- East and West Coasts. ogists agree that a critical gap filler is simply

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expansion of existing systems. In addition to predicatively “model” what is happening or going expansion, information flows in these systems to happen. Since it is unknown if some of these need to be two-way: health authorities need to fires are related to terrorism, causality could be be sensitized and responsive to law enforcement assumed either way regardless. With that said, and public security issues, and law enforcement there are many good fire prediction modeling must be equally sensitive to the needs of the software applications available, but the results of health services community. the fires speak for themselves. With nearly 3000 homes destroyed, sixteen lives lost and over $2 CI.4 – Post-Incident Forensic Modeling and billion in damage, there is now the problem of Simulation. The ability to reconstruct and ana- creating a detailed forensic model that can help lyze the incident, to support inferential evidence, investigators determine causality and, eventually, and to support investigation and prosecution. culpability.

Goals: State of the Art: • Models that support analysis in three dimen- There exist several plume modeling programs sions, and take into account environmental (notably those developed by the DoD Defense conditions such as atmospheric, humidity, etc. Threat Reduction Agency and the Department of Energy), but within these programs there is still • Portable (for responders) laptop systems to the need to add the fourth dimension of time. document and gather data at incident site to These models have various strengths and weak- use as inputs for the model. nesses, but as static constructs, their utility • Reconstruct passage of events. diminishes over time as contamination areas shift with weather and other factors. • Automated playback of events. Various laboratories have been developing meth- • User-friendly, low cost, and easily upgraded. ods for early detection and rapid treatment. For example, universities in New Mexico have formed Current Capabilities: a consortium with Los Alamos and Sandia This functional capability is marginally available National Laboratories and the New Mexico State to responders today, mainly because of cost limi- Department of Health, to develop a model for tations. Technology exists to support this capa- population surveillance using real-time reporting bility today to a limited extent, but tends to be by health professionals in emergency departments prohibitively expensive and only large jurisdic- of any patients reporting flu-like symptoms. tions can afford it. These technology efforts can be applied to forensic modeling. Forensic modeling and simulation are critical objectives for responders. They represent the Technology Limitations and Barriers: ability to “see” what has happened or is happen- The technologies to provide forensic modeling ing respectively on the ground regarding CBRN are marginally available in the near term, and are contamination or effects. Forensic modeling is of medium technology risk for development, for far more detailed than simulation modeling, and all operational environments except biological probably less defined in some respects, because it threats. For the biological operational environ- is potentially used for evidentiary purposes and ment, the technology is not available in the near not just to enable operational decision-making. term, and development of the technology faces For example, the wildland fires in Southern high development risk. In addition to the limita- California in Fall 2003 exhibited what can tions described below, technology in this area will happen when those managing a dynamic series face many of the same challenges inherent in of very large, destructive incidents cannot detecting, identifying, and assessing threat agents

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(see Chapter III (DIDA), for a discussion of these The effects of chemicals and biological agents dis- challenges). This functional capability relies on persed in urban or complex terrain are difficult to many of the capabilities described in Chapter III. model effectively with current technology. DoD modelers for U.S. Northern Command’s exercise Most models today have limited model validation “Determined Promise ’03” had to manually alter and certification, with no centralization. This models to reflect urban terrain, environmental undermines their effectiveness for forensic model- impacts, and “micro-climates” of the Strip area of ing. Many models rest on data that is either out- Las Vegas. Several research projects are under- dated or limited in the range of threat agents. way, but there is still no software package avail- Modeling systems work well for anthrax but not able that can automatically adjust for this com- others. Models that function for chemical plexity. In particular, biological models are the weapons do not work well for toxic industrial highest risk for technology development. In chemicals/materials, and vice versa. In many addition to the above limitations and barriers, cases the working models or projections rely on it is inherently more difficult to model for outdated, obsolete data. Biological models are contagion. especially problematic in their underlying data, as there are few effective simulants for the models, Gap Fillers: and thus the models cannot be tested for effectiveness short of actual deployment in a real There is much data in the federal government attack. There is a need for new models and adap- (especially DoD) that could be used to enhance tive models that can be tailored to specific urban or update the underlying data sets of existing environments and fused with other datapoints models. Added data sets needed in these models (i.e., terrain, population, meteorological input, include inputs for microweather variations found etc.). Furthermore, many models are limited by in vertical terrain, such as urban areas. In addi- data entry and human factors issues: to be more tion, “After Action Reports” on public health or effective, forensic models must have automated terrorist events, notably the October 2001 data entry (i.e., tied to agent and environmental anthrax attacks, can be useful for strengthening sensors), and be more user friendly. existing models’ data sets.

Models are also undermined by a poor under- Note: Responders and technologists felt that the standing of incendiary physics (especially thermo- critical technologies supporting this NTRO are barics), fate and effects for biological agents, and being proposed in other NTROs, principally effects from combinations of agents in attacks. Chapter II (PPE), Chapter III (DIDA) and This lack of comprehension undermines the ana- Chapter IV (UIC). Therefore, no Response lytical basis and thus accuracy of models. Technology Objectives are offered here.

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PROJECT RESPONDER Chapter xiii Mitigation and Restoration for Plant and Animal Resources (MRPA) Chapter Chair: Dr. Thomas W. Frazier Chapter Coordinator: Dr. Maria Powell Definition and dioxins, and because the incorporation into animal feed of central nervous system materials Mitigation and Restoration for Plant and Animal carrying bovine spongiform encephalopathy Resources is the ability to prevent or mitigate, (Mad Cow) disease has had such a devastating detect and neutralize damage to plant-life, ani- effect on the English beef industry and is cur- mals (i.e., wildlife, livestock, exotics, pets and rently the cause of an embargo on Canadian beef. other domesticated animals), food, feedstuffs, and Food processing and food distribution are also humans caused by a terrorist event aimed at agri- distinct environments with different methods for culture and human and animal health.14 surveillance, detection and decontamination. In line with the Project Responder emphasis on Human Health is called out separately as an responders, this NTRO leaves out many impor- operational environment to ensure adequate con- tant elements of plant and animal resource pro- sideration of the effects of vector borne and tection. For example, research on novel vaccines zoonotic diseases that are transmitted to people. and prophylaxis (as opposed to responder delivery of these medicines), and developing resistant In contrast to the other NTROs, although in strains of plants and animals, are outside the some instances firefighters and law enforcement scope of Project Responder. personnel may be pressed into service to protect plant and animal resources, the first line of defense will be extension agents, employees of Operational Environments state departments of agriculture and natural Mitigation and Restoration for Plant and Animal resources, veterinarians, forest rangers, and simi- Resources occur in six operational environments: lar professionals. Animal, Plant, Human Health, Food Processing, Food Distribution, and Feedstuffs. Rather than restricting animal and plant environments of Needed Functional Capabilities and present concern to livestock and crops, it was Priorities concluded that there should be a wider perspec- Responders and technologists considered a set tive that would encompass animal wildlife, of eight functional capabilities to handle the insects, weeds, flowers and decorative plants. operational context described above. These capa- While these may not be the focus of catastrophic bilities are presented below in order of descend- terrorism, they reflect the very broad scope of the ing priority: food and agriculture sector and the activities and resources it involves. Feedstuffs are of concern • Rapid Diagnostics and Detection to Confirm because of previous deliberate contaminations of the Introduction of CBR Agents to Animals, animal feed with toxic substances like insecticides Plants, and Food/Feed

14 The MRPA NTRO evolved from the Agricultural Mitigation and Restoration NTRO that was discussed as being under development in the March 2003 Project Responder Interim Report, Emergency Responders’ Needs, Goals and Priorities.

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• Coordination of Animal and Plant Entities technology needed to confirm a CBR incident, with Public Health, Law Enforcement, and the technologies needed to achieve the desired State, Local, and Federal Government and level of capability do not yet exist. By contrast, Industry capabilities for organizational and technical communications networking needed to coordinate • Identification of Outbreak Origins and Spread remedial action are lacking but the technology to support these capabilities is readily available. • Animal and Plant Diagnostic Surge Capacity Technology for determining outbreak origin and • Vaccination/Treatment and Protection spread generally exists, but is not operationally • Quarantine, Isolation and Recall available to emergency responders in the animal, plant, or human health areas. For food process- • Rapid and Humane Euthanasia and Disposal ing, food distribution and feedstuffs, the technol- of Contaminated Carcasses, Plants and Food ogy is commercially available and used in prac- Products tice. Similarly, the animal and plant agriculture communities have yet to establish functional • Decontamination cooperative relationships for meeting surge diagnostic needs, although the technical capability to It should be noted that under directives for do so exists. The human health, food processing, Awareness and Warning, Mitigation Strategies, food distribution, and feedstuffs areas are better Response Planning and Recovery, Outreach and prepared to meet surge capability needs and have Professional Development, the Homeland procedures and technology in place to do so. Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-9 Defense of the United States Agriculture and Food, January The Vaccination/Treatment and Protection 30, 2004, touches upon a number of issues sub- (MRPA.5) ratings reflect that the technology gen- sumed under these functional capabilities. erally exists, but is not operationally available to HSPD-9 establishes a Mitigation and Restoration for Plant and Animal Resources national policy to defend Operational Environments the agriculture and food system against terrorist Human Food Food Functional Capabilities Animal Plant Health Processing Distribution Feedstuffs attacks, major disasters, 1. Rapid Diagnostics and Detection to Confirm and other emergencies. Introduction of CBR Agents 2. Coordination of Animal and Overall State of Plant Authorities with PH, LE Technology for 3. Identification of Outbreak Mitigation and Origins and Spread Restoration for 4. Animal and Plant Diagnostic Animal and Plant Surge Capability Resources 5. Vaccination/Treatment and Protection The matrix below pres- 6. Quarantine, Isolation and Recall ents a mixed picture of the current and near- 7. Rapid and Humane Euthanasia term availability of and Disposal needed technologies and 8. Decontamination the degree of technical 1 1. Do emergency responders have the functional capability in this risk associated with operational environment? YES / MARGINAL / NO 2 developing and fielding 3 2. Are technologies available in the near-term to provide this functional capability? YES / MARGINAL / NO the needed capabilities 3. What are the technology risks of developing this functional capability? for the future. For rapid LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH diagnostics and detection Gray coloration signifies ‘Not Applicable.’

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meet the challenges of some potential attacks Goals: involving relevant chemical, biological, or nuclear • Rapid (i.e., 15 minute-test) field diagnostics threats. Relative to the overall readiness of vac- for use by emergency responders are critical. cines and alternative treatments to meet the full threat spectrum, a “red” rating could have been • Reduction of the time between pathogen justified. (The Project Responder focus is not on introduction and response. the availability of vaccines and treatments but the availability to responders of the means to admin- • Adequate field instrumentation to both detect ister them.) and identify chemical contaminants, pests, pathogens, toxins, and adulterants. Quarantine, Isolation, and Recall (MRPA.6) technology is also relatively available to emergency • Lab tests to identify genomic components. responders, although the capabilities would not • Rapid laboratory identification and verifica- be fully adequate for catastrophic incidents tion of highly contagious diseases that require involving large numbers of animals or large grow- immediate attention and drastic actions as ing areas. The same applies to rapid and humane opposed to those conditions with similar euthanasia and disposal of contaminated car- symptoms (high sensitivity and specificity). casses, plants and food products. The technology exists, although it could be improved. It is not • Education, training, and equipping staff in immediately available to emergency responders in identification and sourcing, of potential front- agriculture and they would need orientation and line responders (including producers) to know training for using it in emergency situations. what to look for, whom to contact, appropriate procedures, and incentives to report poten- Contaminated animals and plants are usually tial threats. destroyed rather than decontaminated. The same applies to feedstuffs. Technology for decontami- • Adequate stocks and distribution of diagnostic nation of food processing and distribution facili- reagents and resources (cells, primers, tests, ties exists. Emergency responders who work in reagents, etc.) with long shelf lives. these settings are familiar with its use and have access to it. • Surveillance grid that is automated and active for remote plant and animal disease surveil- MRPA.1 – Rapid Diagnostics and Detection to lance to indicate deviation from baseline Confirm the Introduction of CBR Agents to within 4-6 hours (for animals) twenty-four Animals, Plants, and Food/Feed. The ability to hours (for plants) and four-six hours (for food either run a field test, or a more definitive test at a processors/distributors). state or regional laboratory, and to perform aggregation and analysis of the results. This capability • Standardization of diagnostic methods, and includes ongoing surveillance and rapid detection instituting an accreditation process for diag- of chemical contaminants, pests, pathogens, tox- nostic laboratories. ins, and adulterants (known and unknown). Field capabilities should include software-assisted syn- • Improved techniques for screening bulk con- dromic evaluation of animal or plant symptoms tainers (including ships, barges, trucking and and signs as well as testing of specimens. Over- railcars) and methods to screen and analyze lapping or similar capabilities are addressed in foods/feedstuffs. DIDA.1 (On Scene Detection), DIDA.3 (Classi- fication and Mitigation), MR.4 (Rapid Clinical • Redundant laboratory capabilities, able to Environmental and Veterinary Field Assessment), manage nationally distributed/multi-target PHRBAE.1 (Surveillance and Information incidents and handle varying levels of biologi- Integration System), and PHRBAE.2 (Rapid, High- cal materials; good workability between public Throughput Clinical Assessment and Testing). and private industry reference laboratories.

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• Identification and testing for prodromal • Special emphasis needs to be placed on tech- state/onset of symptoms based on behavioral nology transfer and human engineering activi- and/or physiological parameters/signs in ties concerned with transforming laboratory real-time. tests into field analyzers suitable for use by relatively untrained emergency responders and • Access to animal and plant disease databases producer staff. with reference images, which includes diagnostic test procedures available for pathogens and • DIDA surveillance capabilities should include where they are performed; contact information monitoring of water and air for pathogens and for scientific experts by disease agent; and chemical contaminants of concern to plant plant and animal pathogen/pest information and animal health. for initial identification. • Wildlife biologists and ornithologists should • Mobile laboratories suitable for Biosafety Level be considered emergency responders. 3-4 disease management and analysis for field • Weed analysis tests are also needed since weeds use, so that specimens don’t have to be can be most destructive to plant crops. trucked to the laboratory.

• Real-time detection and analysis capability for Current Capabilities: viability and disease potential assessments. There is limited understanding of the baseline data to adequately differentiate between what is Additional Considerations Regarding Goals for normal and what is not. Current screening tests MRPA.1: don’t apply to all animals/species or all pathogens, • Many (especially plant and insect) exotic dis- since some remain either unknown or poorly eases are not widely known by American field studied. However, analytic capabilities are better personnel, suggesting the need for visually rich for most chemical contaminants than for electronic field diagnostic aids and tropical pathogens. disease networking with foreign laboratories and state and private sector laboratories. There is no rapid high through-put diagnostics. State and local jurisdictions lack facilities, high • Field tests are needed for prohibited adulter- volume sample processing potential and adequate ants, antibiotics, hormones, and genetically staffing for emergencies. While all State diagnos- modified varieties. tic facilities have ELISA (enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay) test capabilities, only some • Testing capabilities should include tests for have PCR (polymerase chain reaction) tests for a biological toxins, which may be the main way limited number of pathogens only There is also that a pathogen attacks a host. an insufficient number of national reference laboratories; currently, there is just Plum Island (New • Rapid diagnostics capabilities also need to York) and the Ames (Iowa) USDA Centers. include capabilities for testing dead animals which many screening tests cannot do. Currently, veterinary diagnostic laboratories routinely handle many pathogen analyses and could • A complete rapid diagnostics capability substantially increase surge capacities if necessary. should include field screening tests that can For classical pathogens, veterinary laboratories help emergency responders avoid exposure already undertake a great deal of pathology and to pathogens (especially viral) agents that operate successfully under an established self- might be dangerous to them, including accreditation system under the American protective gear for use while making these Association of Veterinary Laboratory determinations. Diagnosticians (AAVLD).

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State of the Art: • Navy/DLA: food perishability tracking One approach would be to monitor the environ- (smart-tags) ment for pathogens before they become endemic • Coast Guard/DHS: container inspection in flora and fauna. As discussed in Chapter III (DIDA) and Chapter VIII (PHRBAE), there are • NASA: Satellite imagery for a host of detection strategies for biological agents, plants/crops/forestry but each has significant limitations. Such surveillance systems must be automated with little need • Nano-fabrication (existing for chemical base- for user intervention or servicing. BW agents need lines and now being worked on in biologics) to be identified at extremely low concentrations in to get protein profiles as the baseline for complex, changing backgrounds, in near real time detection and with low power requirements and no reagents. • FDA: food container inspection Clearly, existing systems do not meet the needs well. They suffer from relatively poor sensitivity, • Commercial program initiatives: Wal-Mart occasional false positives, and lengthy response program for tracking food processing and times. Good detection equipment would deter the distribution use of such weapons by reducing an attack’s effectiveness and increasing the probability of detecting • Food safety inspection programs at University the perpetrator. However, improved detection sys- of Maryland, College Park’s FDA lab, the tems would present a host of positive spin-offs, FDA Food Safety Lab (Chicago), and the such as in medical diagnostics, environmental FDA Center for Food Safety and Applied monitoring, food and beverage processing, and Nutrition product tracking. • Los Alamos National Laboratory program on Despite a multitude of ongoing and proposed high-throughput diagnostics labs development efforts on systems to meet Rapid • Genomics research and data for setting base- Diagnostics and Detection to confirm the delib- lines and distinguishing between erate introduction of CBR agents to Animal, pathogens/adulterants Plants, and Food/Feed, this technology remains still far from where it needs to be in meeting • Work in progress on gas chromatography for homeland security needs. This large gap exists plant/animal studies across all the relevant operations environments reviewed. This combination of overall signifi- • The National Seed Health System (NSHS) cance of MRPA in the face of a relatively early works to implement diagnostic methods that point in the state of the art supports making a have been evaluated and proven to be accu- major funding investment in these detection rate, reproducible, and capable of detecting strategies, tools, and analytical systems at both pathogens at a defined level of sensitivity; also basic and applied research and development levels conducts research in the development and of the systems development process. standardization of seed health testing methods.

A variety of federal agencies are now addressing Technology Limitations and Barriers: these pressing, high-priority needs for rapid diag- A variety of different technology limitations and nostics and detection equipment to confirm the barriers limit progress in developing and intro- presence of CBR agents in these different opera- ducing rapid-diagnostics/detection systems for tional environments. Some of the programs of confirming introduction of CBR agents in the early particular note include: food and agriculture sector.

• DARPA programs: TIGER and on-chip There have been substantial advances in technol- technology ogy for important biological agents, but they

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have often not included agriculturally important increasing problem because of new immigration pests or pathogens, nor have they been inexpen- and national security restraints placed on these sive or field-deployable. PCR-based tests cannot professionals from particular countries. be used for newly emerging pathogens or novel genetically engineered pathogens/agents. Thus it An associated problem is that laws and regula- is desirable to develop approaches oriented tions associated with biosecurity RDT&E are in toward identifying classes of related agents. an evolutionary period at present. Genomics has potential to provide such screening tests, but contemporary knowledge of genomic Gap Fillers: structures and functional genomics for plant Considering the present state of flux in agency species, pests, and pathogens is very incomplete. missions, budgets, state and private sector initia- Knowledge of functional genomics is actually still tives and perceived vulnerability of the food and in its infancy. Analyzer technology cannot com- agriculture sector, two broad initiatives are pensate for this deficit in basic knowledge. The important. These initiatives have to do with: great majority of plant species, for example, still (a) continuing productive basic RDT&E programs remain to be subjected to genomic study. The that need funding continuity and expansion; and same limitations exist for pathogens and pests, (b) expanding national capabilities in personnel especially those associated with foreign plant dis- and institutional resources to build operational ease. Prions too remain poorly understood.15 capabilities for surveillance and detection.

Another source of limitations and barriers relates Past these broad institutional directions, an SRA to funding abilities and incentives of the private and two RTOs have been identified to fill the sector for new technology development in the identified gaps. As described in the Introduction absence of commercial demand. Once a new dis- (Chapter I), the SRA on biomarkers includes a ease has become established, then a market will focus on markers of CBR exposure in plants and be created for such diagnostic equipment. For animals; MRPArto.1 (Plant and Animal some threat agent that has not been experienced, Responders’ Decision Aid) addresses the respon- however, the private sector will not invest capital der need for a portable decision aid to help inter- for development in the absence of return on this pret signs and symptoms, to guide further infor- investment. mation acquisition, to facilitate reach-back to additional expertise, and to suggest mitigation An associated barrier has to do with sharing intel- course of action; and MRPArto.2 (Field Screening lectual property. Researchers and R&D compa- and Assessment Tests) addresses technologies for nies that have developed genomics information rapid screening and testing of plants and animals or other related kinds of information consider for exposure to and contamination/infection by this information proprietary. Some charge fees threat agents. to access genomics databases, for example. Other companies will simply not divulge this MRPA.2 – Coordination of Animal and Plant information. Entities with Public Health, Law Enforcement, and State, Local, and Federal Government and Other financially related barriers include difficul- Industry. The ability to bring together full power ties private sector and state laboratories experi- of local, state and federal emergency management ence in meeting overhead costs during austere and supporting agencies, as well as private industry- times and associated collapsing infrastructures, civilian intelligence, on a plant/animal/food event. maintaining program continuity, and recruiting and keeping talented scientists and technologists Goals: in uncertain times. Recruiting foreign national • Access to common (shared and standardized) scientists and technologists has become an communication devices and integrated (shared

15 Prions (improperly formed proteins) are the causative agent in Mad Cow and related degenerative diseases of the central nervous system.

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and standardized) data systems is essential for • Smart distribution of information to include emergency responders. industry. • Intelligence agencies including private ones • Multi-agency command (MAC) on the should be included in coordination efforts. national level; interagency work group at the federal level. • Legal authority to protect both security and commercial sensitive data and to share data • Tailored emergency response task force that (surveillance, health alerts and response data) can be activated in a matter of hours that is – needs to be considered as a national security pre-established and composed of government, resource; national, state and local levels; gov- industry, and academia. ernment/public safety sensitive. • Integration into federal, state, county and • Incentive structure to encourage industry par- local, emergency management and incident ticipation in information sharing. command systems as well as private industry (Infraguard16 and existing Information Sharing • Integrated and coordinated mechanism or and Analysis Centers [ISACs]). platform for a shared database or e-warning system; needs to include the ER community. • A single ISAC from food production through processing to consumption. • Interface with a national/state hotline for plant/animal/food incidents. • Integration into Incident Command System.

• Better awareness of threats to the food and Current Capabilities: agriculture sector by the law enforcement A study by the National Research Council17 con- community (especially rural), producers and cluded (2003) that coordination amongst federal, industry. state/local and private entities appears to be • Establishment of diverse cooperator and stake- insufficient for effectively deterring, preventing, holder relationships with worldwide, national, detecting, responding to, and recovering from state, and local agricultural entities, industry agricultural threats. It is difficult to develop a through joint programs and regulatory frame- coordinated emergency plan for agriculture work initiatives; to include consequences/ because there is no publicly-available, in-depth, understanding of international trade interagency or interdepartmental national plan implications. for defense against intentional introductions of biological agents directed at agriculture. While • Ability to establish a two-way information the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service flow between plant/animal specialists and (APHIS) does have emergency plans for dealing human epidemiological surveillance activities with unintentional introductions of plant and (See PHRBAE.1 (Surveillance and Information animal pests and pathogens, they are not ade- Integration System)). Currently, plant/animal quate for responding to agricultural bioterrorism specialists do not have access to human epi- incidents. demiological surveillance information. Specifically, there is poor industry/government • More effective communication systems (other interaction and cooperation. In addition, state- than conference calls) to discuss incidents; based incident command structures and plans are broadly distributed peer communication sys- not well-defined or integrated with industry. tem; secure and redundant.

16 InfraGard is a cooperative undertaking between the U.S. Government (led by the FBI and the National Infrastructure Protection Center) and an association of businesses, academic institutions, state and local law enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to increasing the security of United States critical infrastructures. The goal of InfraGard is to enable information flow so that the owners and operators of infrastructure assets can better protect themselves and so that the United States government can better discharge its law enforcement and national security responsibilities. 17 National Research Council of the National Academies, “Counting Agricultural Bio-Terrorism,” National Academics Press, Washington, D.C. (2003)

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Currently, there are limited public/private part- animal health and diagnostic information, and nership capabilities. allows access by epidemiologists, public health officials, and defense agencies to real-time Current efforts include a food ISAC which is analyses and reports. The purpose of such a sys- being restructured toward some of the above tem is to be able plan responses to a potential goals. APHIS has a reporting system and a epidemic as an early warning system for the National Animal Health Emergency Management infection of humans. Over 2000 participating Steering Committee (NAHEMS). Other net- organizations would give inputs to the system works do exist even if ad-hoc or informally, such which would include zoos, veterinary clinics, as the animal health emergency response system wildlife rehabilitators (both captive and free-rang- and state veterinarians. ing). Through routine sampling and medical exams using existing infrastructure within these Capabilities for a Uniform Surveillance and organizations, it is projected that a new working Reporting System: national system could be operational within a Currently, there is no uniform reporting system year. Costs are estimated at $1.95 Million for the for all zoonotic diseases but, as identified above, first year, and $10 Million over 5 years the full there have been programs and proposals moving implementation and operation of the system. towards this capability. The requisite funding to fully implement and create these programs and Basically, the technological and the architectural proposals seems to be stalled. In 2000, the CDC wherewithal to produce a national surveillance sponsored the West Nile Virus National system for zoonotic diseases exists, but has not Surveillance System or ArboNet that now been harnessed to the task. While coordination includes all 50 states. Surveillance data is simul- of animal and plant entities with public health, taneously collected on humans, horses, mosqui- law enforcement, and state, local and federal gov- toes, dead birds and sentinel chicken flocks. An ernments and industry was rated as one of the offshoot of this is the National Zoo Surveillance top priorities for federal emphasis, there is still a System or ZooNet which started in 2001 as a very long way to go in achieving coordination pilot project sponsored by the CDC to include objectives for all of the operational environments. animal data not normally found or integrated into traditional surveillance channels. ZooNet State of the Art: now represents 157 zoos and animal facilities that From a technology perspective, all the hardware submit samples for West Nile Virus testing and software that such systems would require are through the Cornell University Animal Health available today. This includes multi-level security Diagnostic Laboratory. Some additional funding on information system, XML for data tagging was provided by the Ellison Foundation and put and tracking, and ICS technologies. towards the creation of a Web-based system to provide approved parties with automatic updates. Technology Limitations and Barriers: ZooNet is distinct because it is the only animal The barriers that need to be overcome, beyond disease surveillance network to share real-time those that are organizational and financial, relate data on disease threat with public health to system scalability, information systems archi- nationally. tecture, rural digital signal bandwidth availability, dialogue design/human factors system usability, A framework for a National Zoonotic and reporting format development. Surveillance System has also been proposed. The basic concept is to expand the reporting system The main thrusts of the work that will be to other agents and to bring in additional veteri- required to realize these coordination goals will nary diagnostic labs to maintain real-time diag- be largely concerned with devising appropriate nostics and reporting. The goal is to deploy a field study tactics, techniques and procedures and nation-wide data network that centrally collects integrating this information into an overall crisis

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field communications plan. This requires creative and common communications across operational development cooperation between discipline environments, uniformity and standardization of specialists and IT professionals during systems data requirements, and linking mechanisms development, followed by thorough human fac- among technically relevant networks (networking tors assessment of system usability. This would across networks). be an iterative approach to development of design specifications and adoption of standardized field The strategy for approaching these networking observation and reporting practices. and coordination problems that seems most attractive at present is one of building on the Design issues include compensating for lacking ongoing efforts of those organizations that have ontology/terminology or standards for communi- already demonstrated initiatives and operationally cating information on genomics and proteomics. sound networking systems for which demand can Also, the architecture must accommodate require- be demonstrated. These various initiatives can be ments for standardized reporting at all levels and nourished and expanded through helping provide across all involved disciplines, which does not yet expansions of capabilities and a sound annual exist. funding base for their continued operation. Private sector industries that remain unmotivated System portability, reliability, and usability across to cooperate with the federal biodefense program the various operational environments are a signif- at DHS and elsewhere can be dealt with in a reg- icant issue, especially where work has to be done ulatory fashion. This would be an overall “car- in environmentally challenging settings. rots and sticks” approach that can be selectively applied where it is important to national security It will be important to involve the diagnostic lab- to do so. oratories in the design process for helping determine approaches to field and follow-on diagnos- In all cases these efforts should be conducted in tics, test result interpretations, reporting systems, coordination with efforts to increase coordination and reporting formats. capability needed for other NTROs. Finally, the coordination needs in the MRPA area MRPA.3 – Identification of Outbreak Origins share most technical characteristics and many and Spread. The ability to track movements of users with the general and specialized coordina- animal and plant shipments and plant pest out- tion needs addressed under other NTROs. breaks and to identify the origin of individual ani- Moving forward with special purpose networking mals and the spread of pestilence. systems in any of these areas could erect new barriers to effective collaboration and coordination Goals: during planning and response phases. • GIS enabled systems. Gap Fillers: • National secure database. The major goals can be roughly broken down into two general areas: (1) issues concerning net- • DIDA capabilities applied to tracing. working in an organizational sense; and (2) issues concerning networking from a data integration • All possible movements of infectious animals and technical communications sense. The orga- must be identified as quickly as possible and nizational issues include such concerns as indus- modes of potential spread eliminated. try incentives for cooperation, pre-trained teams • National identification system is needed for for responding to outbreaks and better integrated livestock. command systems. The data integration and technical communications issues include develop- • Expansion of diagnostic network worldwide to ment of trace-back data systems, hotline services, track multiple pest outbreaks.

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• Trained and equipped staff in shipment trac- information in or on the animal. Different ing and evaluations. methods were found to be suitable, including chip-based methods. Being able to pinpoint the • Trained staff are needed for overt and covert movement of a specific animal in relation to its monitoring of international and domestic potential contacts and infection is very useful aid movements of infectious substances and pests, in trace-back during an outbreak. This is an area including training in pattern recognition and that can be further developed. However, while analysis, offshore staffing and surveillance the technology itself generally exists to support capabilities. further development of these goals, factors such as limitations on funding availability and political • Ability to trace and track processed crops and will have restrained progress across all the opera- livestock optimally down to the individual tional environments. animal level.

• Access to an integrated tracking system that State of the Art: includes purchasing, identification, sale and Different sources can be useful for identification distribution records. of outbreak origin and spread information. This includes county extension agents, state veterinari- • Ongoing global risk assessment and pathway ans and departments of agriculture and wildlife, analysis. the American Farm Bureau, and APHIS intelligence. For foreign outbreaks, the World Health Current Capabilities: Organization and Office International des The National Research Council has stated that Epizooties (OIE) organizations can be queried information about agricultural diseases and infes- through their Internet information tations in foreign countries is often vague and not services. always time-sensitive. Since substantial expertise in exotic plant, animal, and insect diseases does Geographical information systems offer promise exist in other countries sharing information, for such analyses and for sentinel systems deploy- ideas, and programs through international scien- ment. Sandia National Laboratories, for exam- tific collaboration would be able to help fortify ple, has done productive work in this area and our national system for safeguarding plants and has been demonstrating a relevant system offering animals against intentional threats. recently. Some of this work is also being accomplished at state departments of agriculture and Regarding plants, even a serious plant disease in a wildlife, land grant universities, and at APHIS populated area can go undetected for a very long laboratories. time, and as such, domestic surveillance needs to be bolstered. Infrared remote sensing technology Technology Limitations and Barriers: for crop analysis exists but is not generally Some of the analytical modeling work has gone applied to disease propagation. beyond the capacity of the current scientific knowledge base to support its further develop- Work is being done on animal tags and informa- ment. This technology is limited, for example, tion systems to determine the history of diseased by the fact that many plants have not had their animals and to allow rapid intervention to limit genomic structures established. Pathogen an outbreak. The FDA has recently published genomics is also far from completely understood. draft regulations for trace-back information Yet, tracing is somewhat dependent on applica- reporting for the agriculture industry for public tions of bioinformatics, and of comparative and review and comment. In addition, the European functional genomics for understanding specific Union has recently completed a large study on origins and comparative threats of foreign different methods for storing animal history pathogens.

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Gap Fillers: emergency responders (public and private) in a crisis Identifying origins of specific pathogens and situation. plant life is a valuable analytic tool. Tagging and information systems can assure that the history of Goals: a diseased plant or animal in commerce can be Animals: traced back to its source to help determine the • Sufficient numbers of trained personnel avail- source of an outbreak; for successful intervention able on two weeks or less notice to assist in an it would also be useful that all plants and animals outbreak. There is no firm general estimate that have moved through the relevant loci can be on how many persons this might usually rapidly located and sequestered as well. Tracking involve, but it could range up to several hun- diseases of wild animals poses different problems; dreds of thousands for a major national event. some populations could be tagged and locations monitored but the value and cost of such an • Ability to identify the numbers of responders: approach is unclear at present. trained personnel and support personnel.

Some specific legal and policy amendments to • Mandatory requirements for certification in existing statutes are needed to treat intellectual responding to large-scale animal emergencies property rights issues, confidentiality issues, and for all vets in training. balance scientific information sharing vs. divul- gence of national security-sensitive information. • Development of nationwide State Animal The last issue is equivalent to optimizing access Response Teams (SART) teams. to DNA repositories through properly balancing these two competing areas of consideration. • Online capability to approve surge personnel rapidly for foreign animal Two review projects seem particularly relevant to disease diagnosticians. this capability. One would be an interagency cooperative review of remote sensing capabilities Plants: for detecting crop disease and contamination. • Surge capability for qualified diagnosticians to This project would involve the various agencies respond effectively to outbreaks and to assess that do satellite and aerial surveillance of geo- potential outbreaks. graphical areas (see MRPArto.3 (Overhead Imaging for Wide-Area Surveillance and • National and state notification tree. Assessment). The other project would review what remains to be done in developing the chip-based • Technological advances would curtail out- solutions to trace-back for tracking the move- breaks by expanding the use of digital cam- ments of livestock, harvested plant crops, and eras, electronic communication of pest photos food products from origin to the points of retail and impacts, and treatment strategies. sale (MRPArto.4 (Trace-Back Capabilities Using • Incentives for private sector/industry to Information Systems and Tags)). All the indica- become involved. tions are that the technology in both cases is ready to place into commercial operations. Issues • Security clearance issue – more are needed for of costs to producers, processors, and consumers more existing personnel and surge personnel. now need to be examined. Cost/benefit of commercialization needs to be analyzed • Draw upon trained global resources.

MRPA.4 – Animal and Plant Diagnostic Surge Current Capabilities: Capability. The ability to rapidly mobilize (hire, contract and deploy) private animal health profes- A number of states have recently just begun sionals or qualified diagnosticians and other to develop mutual assistance agreements with

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adjacent cooperative status to realize veterinary groups, based on the Los Angeles County TEW and diagnostic surge capability expansions for model and similar intelligence fusion centers and emergencies. Federal-state cooperation has been their technologies. The Medical Response (MR) better for addressing these objectives in the NTRO discusses telemedicine applications in human health and food/feed environments than support of this objective, development of field for animal and plant agriculture. Leadership and laboratories and other measures as stop-gaps and voluntary initiatives in support of this area and surge support. others is growing on the part of associations, especially associations such as the American The National Animal Health Laboratory Phytopathological Society and different veteri- Network (NAHLN) is a potentially valuable nary medical associations and state diagnostic surge capability resource. It is moving toward laboratory associations. bringing the APHIS national laboratories and state and university labs together into a net- There are a number of organizations or organiza- worked community, along with CDC’s tional structures that can be used for surge capac- Laboratory Reporting Network (LRN) and FDA’s ity. These include: Food Emergency Reporting Network (FERN). Also, it can support training and certification • EMAC (Emergency Management Assistance needs and coordinate with the appropriate aca- Compact) agreements. demic institutions. The National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN) is the plant field’s • TEW (Terrorism Early Warning) type virtual analogous entity, but its funding did not survive surge capacity. Congressional review in the last cycle. • Veterinary schools and their students in large- scale emergencies. Technology Limitations and Barriers: A limiting consideration in building a surge capa- • Mutual aid agreements among adjacent states. bility in the U.S. at this time has to do with the fact that government has lost a large amount of • VMAT (Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams) its previously available personnel pool in USDA, can find a helpful place in veterinary and diag- APHIS, and other relevant federal agencies. nostic surge capacity expansions. States are, therefore, increasingly unwilling to rely • SART (State Animal Response Teams) also on federal personnel resources that might or have a place but exist only in a few states. might not be available or sufficient when needed. Consequently, states especially interested in this However, drawing upon human resources across issue are increasingly developing their own plans operational environments, the capability is not and programs. However, budget limitations of available for the animal and plant environments states have restricted relevant personnel to skeletal but is marginally so for the other areas. levels in many of our states. Another problem is that small animal veterinarians have rather differ- State of the Art: ent skill sets than large animal veterinarians. The Building surge capabilities for diagnosticians pres- two specialties are not the same and therefore ents substantial challenges in coordination, train- cannot always be tapped into for surge. ing, orientation, and mission management. That capability does not yet exist for the animal and These personnel and budget limitations place a plant communities. It has advanced forward fur- heavy responsibility on technology to compensate ther in the human health, food processing, food for them. There are the problems of maintaining distribution, and feedstuffs communities. human resources databases and of developing communications and coordination mechanisms Precedents exist, however, such as the emerging for contacting and using them productively. network of Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Outbreaks require the swiftest possible

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interventions for containment and mitigation. • Restoration of ability to export if “clean” ani- However, the necessary technologies already exist mals can be distinguished from exposed ones. and could be made quickly available with the necessary financial resources and incentives. • Multivalent vaccines needed to be useful at multiple stages of exposure. Gap Fillers: • Animal vaccine stockpile to respond to any The animal and plant diagnostic surge capability likely threat. problem could be addressed by: • Vaccine procedures are needed for free-ranging • Expanding these capabilities through support wildlife. to the two major agricultural diagnostic associations; • Strategic and fieldable stockpile of vaccines and therapeutics; accessible to emergency • Creating the proposed center for plant biose- responders under expert supervision. curity at Ft. Detrick; • Rapid prioritization of vaccines needed; pro- • Engaging university departments of plant duction of vaccines appropriate to size of pathology and schools of veterinary medicine incident. through collaboration with the proper associations in organizing conferences on emergency • Marker vaccines (that indicate prior exposure). programs for agricultural mitigation and recovery; • Government sponsored orphan (low production) vaccines. • Development of database and communications networking systems for this particular • Modeling of vaccination strategies (for cost application; and effectiveness, etc.).

• Provision of a small number of demonstration • Alternatives to widespread aerial chemical con- grants to support promising initiatives on the trol of insect vectors of human, animal and part of state departments of agriculture. zoonotic diseases.

None of these have a particularly high technolog- • Ability to draw quickly upon the global vac- ical content. To some extent surge will be facili- cine stockpile. tated by the decision support technology that will be encouraged via MRPArto.1. • Development of alternative treatment (systemic treatments are very expensive). MRPA.5 – Vaccination/Treatment and Protection. The ability to produce, distribute and • Improved knowledge on host resistance to administer large numbers of safe and secure vaccine diseases. doses, or alternative treatments, for highly conta- • Maintain broad and diverse genetic base for gious animal diseases, and distinguish vaccinated plants and animals. animals; the ability to make crops and livestock more resistant or less susceptible to disease and threat agents. Plants: • Establishment multi-pronged treatment meas- Goals: ures including biologicals for dealing with resistant diseases. Animals: • Limitation of the number of animals that • Secure doses (chemicals and biologicals) are must be sacrificed. needed for treatments, including credibility of

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same for efficacy, purity, and safety; ensure Current research emphasizes recombinant DNA- swift distribution. based vaccines, virus-carried vaccines, subunit vaccines and study of bacterins. For wildlife uses, • Better validation of treatment methodologies. emphasis is being placed on oral vaccines available through salt licks, range cubes and other • Improvement of plant genetic resistance feeding devices. Water and aerosol administra- through classic breeding techniques, geneti- tion is also being contemplated as alternatives to cally modified organisms (GMOs) and other injection methods. mechanisms. Other kinds of treatments and protective meas- • Improved understanding of foreign/exotic ures being emphasized at present include crop plant diseases and pests. “hardening” through genetic modification or the • Assessment/modification of regulations to rap- use of GMOs, and classical breeding methods for idly approve (1) access to genetic material; and disease resistance. Other treatment development (2) development of new crop lines and their approaches emphasize fungicides and bacteri- field utilization. cides, and prophylactic sprays. However, while the science for GMOs development as well as Current Capabilities: commercialization exists, it is currently a very controversial political issue, and remains even Development and production of vaccines and more so for Genetically Modified Animals. alternate treatments is a slow moving process, and the capability is hampered by economic and The traditional mass euthanasia/mass vaccina- political issues. There is no current capability to tion strategies are coming increasingly into make vaccination production and administration question, as a result of the European experiences. decisions from an economic standpoint. Conflicts Vaccination ring strategies are being examined. exist between trade issues and security issues. Quick tests are being emphasized as ways to There is also a gap between publicly funded guide vaccination strategies. Epidemiological research and private industry needs. The science models taking weather variables into account exists but costs and commercial considerations are also receiving special attention with respect raise barriers to company initiatives. There is also to vaccination and mass euthanasia. These insufficient industrial capacity to produce new newer, more discriminate, strategies may place vaccines quickly; it takes months to ramp up pro- a greater burden on testing and on skilled duction (domestically). The orphan vaccine issues personnel. are not being addressed Technology Limitations and Barriers: State of the Art: The main barriers limiting progress in the vac- The state of the art in vaccines and alternative cines area are not technical, but rather financial treatment/protection is advanced and vaccines are and political. Vaccines development is very available for numerous diseases and species. A costly. When there is an insufficient market to recent announcement has been made that an induce the private sector to assume these costs, effective West Nile Virus vaccine is even now government can be given a heavy cost burden. available. A number of the new vaccines have Animals and plants have not been given the polit- been given conditional approvals, which make ical or financial support that the human vaccines them available for release, but they lack confirm- have received. This seems unlikely to change ing tests of efficacy. Other vaccines still are con- unless what is perceived as a low probability sidered experimental and can be released only threat becomes a reality. Plant vaccination18 pro- through an emergency declaration. gram cost-benefit estimations are more marginal

18 Technique is similar to human/animal vaccine; involves inserting small amount of DNA from virus into plant’s chromosome allowing the plant to recognize and destroy a virus when it attacks. It gives the plant the ability to see what the virus looks like so that its defenses are ready. Unlike traditional vaccines, however, immunity from a plant vaccine passes onto succeeding generations.

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than those calculated for livestock vaccines. The MRPA.6 – Quarantine, Isolation and Recall. neglect of insect vectors still remains, but that sit- The ability for responding agencies (to include uation may improve because of the West Nile industry) to segregate, condemn, detain, or recall Virus experience and an effective vaccine for the contaminated plant/animal/food/feed. disease. Delivery methods for vaccine administration of vaccines to livestock and wildlife repre- Goals: sent a difficult challenge that is not present in • Expansion of offshore data collection for human vaccination situations. determining potential pests that can reach U.S. shores. The most limiting factor in new vaccine development from a technological and scientific perspec- • Determination and prioritization of lists on tive relates to the lack of fundamental knowledge pests. of genome structure, and the molecular biology of disease processes and associated pathogens. • Extensive domestic and international “data This, however, is just a negative way of saying mining” to seek information on control that the most promising prospect for advancing strategies. vaccine development depends upon making major investments in animal and plant genomics. • Ability to safely and rapidly secure, isolate, and transport suspected infectious or contami- Gap Fillers: nated material for evaluation. There are three major areas of special technologi- • Ability to rapidly quarantine infected, infested, cal emphasis that can be identified to aid the or exposed areas, plants, animals, or com- process: modities and to initiate delimiting surveys. • Applied research on developing new multiva- • Threat Analysis Critical Control Points pro- lent vaccines, marker vaccines, and orphan gram schema and execution plans to combat vaccines; deliberate disease/adulterants, contamination • Inexpensive but accurate field screening tests of raw materials, and processed foods (similar for quickly discriminating between healthy to the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points and infected animals (for guidance of contain- programs used to combat natural risks). ment efforts through vaccination); and • Ability to modulate and communicate perme- • A vaccine production program capable of ability of quarantine zone (for roads, ports, meeting large crisis needs for selected diseases. airports, etc.).

The USDA, in cooperation with DHS and other • Ability to enforce quarantine zones and critical entities, has recently completed a draft report on control points. a national agricultural vaccination program plan. • Biosecurity of quarantine facilities needs Currently, the report is not publicly releasable. improvement where they exist. It is clear that the main needs are in the areas of development and production of vaccines and • Establishment of perimeters or perimeter secu- other treatments rather than innovations in rity for plants, animals. See also R&R.3 responder distribution and administration of (Establishment of Perimeters). these treatments and prophylactic measures. • Legal authorities to enforce quarantine. Therefore there is little in this functional capability of immediate interest to technical develop- • All goals apply to protective isolation as well. ment as Project Responder is now defined.

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• Quarantine facilities – improve biosecurity quarantine, and for rapid food products recall. (e.g., mosquitoes). Accuracy and reliability might be enhanced further, however, through recourse to military pre- • National real-time permitting system. dictive modeling software and other associated technology. General availability of these tech- • Ability to access database from MRPA.1 nologies is marginal in the near-term, however, (Rapid Diagnostics and Detection) at all quar- because of costs limitations, knowledge limita- antine systems. tions, and modeling content. Therefore, there is • National ID system for plants/animals. every reasons to expect that a large-scale, multifocal outbreak would quickly overwhelm resources • Reduction of quarantine time; varies by as mentioned above. species/agent. Gap Fillers: • Unaffected animals in quarantine zones need Three RTOs were developed to improve upon to be fed and cared for. the present state of the art in this area. • Ability to shut down air corridors. MRPArto.5 aims to develop a Threat Analysis Critical Control Points Program to help protect the Current Capabilities: food chain; MRPArto.3 (Overhead Imaging for Wide-Area Surveillance and Assessment) addresses Quarantine and containment facilities exist at overhead surveillance capabilities for detecting present. There are three national facilities and and isolating geographic areas affected by out- additional facilities located at airports and in pri- breaks; and MRPArto.6 (Modeling of Plant and vate facilities. USDA and FDA have well estab- Animal Outbreaks, Surveillance, and Response) lished and workable systems for food recall. addresses modeling tools to optimize planning for More research is needed to develop and test epi- and responses to outbreaks. demiological models for plant and animal pests and pathogens so that optimal eradication and MRPA.7 – Rapid and Humane Euthanasia containment strategies can be developed before a and Disposal of Contaminated Carcasses, threat agent is introduced. Plants and Food Products. The ability to humanely kill and dispose of up to thousands/mil- Eradication plans that have been tested, ideally in lions of animals and plants within 24 hours of the area of origin of the target pest or pathogen, detection of disease or exposure and to destroy plant need to be developed. Such complex programs pests. are unlikely to be initiated and accomplished in a timely fashion if plans are made on an ad hoc Goals: basis. • Limiting spread of disease and ceasing produc- Capabilities for human health are not applicable tion of infectious particles as quickly as in this context because humans are not quaran- possible. tined for exposure to contaminated animals, plants, food, or feed. See PHRBAE.5 (Isolation • Assessment of port and regional facility incin- and Quarantine). However, humans can carry eration and laboratory autoclaving capabilities. diseases affecting animals such as West Nile • Identification of appropriate rendering, Virus. slaughter, landfill, cremation, compost, and burial facilities. State of the Art: The basic technology exists for targeting • Ability to safety transport contaminated live- animals/plants/foods for isolation, areas to stock to burial.

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• Ability to burn continuously at 2000 degrees There are no large scale humane slaughter (required to destroy prions, CB agents, fats, methods. proteins). A similar concept applies for the capability in • BSL-3 slaughter facilities. food distribution: if there is a problem at one restaurant chain, they have the capability to • Temporary refrigerated storage of destroy and dispose of contaminated food: if the carcasses/plant materials until disposal. problem occurs at many restaurants on a nationwide basis, it becomes more difficult to over- • Need a more adequate understanding of the come. While capability exists to deal with biolog- toxic biological products of massive animal ical agents in the food processing environment, if disposal. radiological or chemical agents are used, there is • Needs for environmentally safe disposal and not the desired capability. Capabilities vary euthanasia procedures. depending upon type of agent and size of event.

• High numbers (poultry houses) and high mass State of the Art: loading (as in elephant/whale disposals) Euthanasia and disposal technology exists in all throughput – slaughter and burial. the four applicable environments, but is somewhat less suitable and available for animal carcass • Animal welfare needs to be considered. disposal than for plants or food products. The • Information on costs and impacts of only facility with BSL-3 biosafety capabilities for alternative measures (burial, composting, work with large animals that also includes measures for worker protection is Plum Island. It incineration). could take five years to build a comparable facil- Current Capabilities: ity at Ft. Detrick. Protective suits for individuals involved in euthanasia and disposal of contami- Animal carcass digesters exist, but are not widely nated carcasses exist, but do not permit active fielded. These are being modeled to be portable, work while wearing them for very long work but this will not solve the scalability problem. In periods. At present, there is no alternative to the Europe, plasma destruction has been used as well burial/landfill and burial methods that had to be as a dirty transport corridor from contaminated used in England for the FMD cattle disposals. area to burial area. Bio-bag systems for transporting large animals or large numbers of smaller animals can be useful Current techniques include rendering, incinera- for transport safety purposes. Animals, harvested tion (open and curtain), and burial (on-site or in plants, and food can also be quick-frozen in landfill). However, there is limited landfill capa- preparation for safe transportation and subse- bility. Mass burial and burning are the main quent disposal. There is technology also for alternatives to disposal of infected and potentially breaking down and microwaving remains for san- exposed animals. Both are expensive, repugnant itary disposal purposes. to many, and raise environmental concerns. For humanely euthanizing animals, aerosolized Although these types of technologies exist for dis- chemical agents deserve consideration. posal, capabilities vary depending upon incident characteristics. For example, the technology is Technology Limitations and Barriers: simply not the same for 800 lb steer as it would Plant crop disposal presents some special prob- be for human bodies. The technology is suitable lems that can degrade effectiveness in destroying for dealing with smaller amounts but in a big diseases of concern. One such problem relates to incident how would we be able to scale up? the fact that plant diseases sometimes choose What process for 1000s works for 10,000s? alternative hosts. For example, soybean rust has

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kudzu as an additional host. Soybean rust is of Gap Fillers: particular present concern because of its extreme The earlier statement that the three main limita- transmissibility and the fact that it is presently tions of present technology include portability, endemic in Mexico. Another example is scalability, and contamination avoidance provides Ralstonia solanacearum Race 3, Biovar 2, which a good guide in this case for filling gaps. Three causes Southern Bacterial Wilt. The initial entry engineering development activities would address into the U.S. was on geraniums found in green- these gaps: houses from several states this last winter. However, this pathogen is known to be a perni- • Engineering study of portable systems employ- cious pathogen of potatoes, causing serious losses ing digesters and plasma burners for disposal in Europe in recent years. It will also attack of contaminated animals in field settings (see other solanaceous crops such as tomato, pepper, MRPArto.9 (Digesters and Plasma Burners)). tobacco and some weed species. It survives in soil and in temperate and subtropical climates in • Development of a prototype prefabricated cre- soil and host weed species. matorium facility that can be rapidly constructed on field sites to undertake disposal or Weather and climate effects greatly affect the sur- large animals in large numbers (see vivability, wind-borne transmission, and replica- MRPArto.10 (Prototype Prefabricated tion ability of crop pathogens. Tropical climates Crematorium Facility)). especially are preferred by many pathogens, which is reflected by the abundance of varieties of • Design specification study of refrigerated tropical diseases, many of which still have yet to transport carriers suitable for the sanitary be studied and understood for the first time. transport of animals infected with diseases of Weather also affects eradication efforts through special concern to national security (addressed incineration and other approaches, as well as the through decontamination rather than special- geographic spread of incineration byproducts. ized transport).

The three main limitations of present technology Feedstuffs were not discussed much because feed have to do with portability, scalability, and con- is usually destroyed if contaminated. tamination avoidance in carriers. There are no MRPA.8 – Decontamination. The ability to portable disposal systems capable of more than ameliorate the effects of the pathogen or adulterant very small-scale disposal problems. Different with minimal damage to animal/plant/food or the technologies are needed for large-scale, numer- environments, including facilities and equipment. ous-animal disposal needs, with no fully satisfactory methods available. Contamination avoid- Goals: ance through transportation carrier and storage container systems is still in need of systematic • Quick, effective, and inexpensive post-expo- environmental engineering study and associated sure treatment and prophylactic countermea- new system design. sures for those responders that are potentially exposed to agents/pathogens. On animal euthanasia, aerosol applications for mass humane euthanasia require highly skilled • Need for further technological development operators. Also, aerosol dissemination has other and research on irradiation of food and fiber. well-known problems when conducted in open • Rapid tests for efficacy of decontamination. environments that can degrade effectiveness and produce unintended adverse consequences of var- • Establishment of on-the-shelf work plans for ious kinds. likely pests.

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• Discovery of potential “self-imposed” regula- facilities are needed (in the aftermath of euthana- tory obstacles (permit requirements, pesticide sia and disposal). registrations, etc.) to rapid reaction and to development of needed protocols, plans and State of the Art: agreements for effective response. Most decontamination approaches involve finding or assessing contamination, applying chemi- • Easier compliance with environmental and cal agents to wash off and kill harmful bacteria or legal rules. viral agents or toxins and chemicals. Some • Better fumigation procedures (time and cost) decontamination procedures, however, use irradi- of plant/plant products to make rapidly ation to sterilize surfaces, food products, etc. acceptable for commerce. Food may be decontaminated by applications of hydrogen peroxide or ozone under some circum- • Full decontamination of transportation carri- stances. Surfaces may be decontaminated using ers/facilities that contained diseased animals or paraformaldehyde or formaldehyde in some set- plants. tings, but they present a potential HAZMAT problem in disposing of the residuals. Medical or • Metric for decontamination or destruction: veterinary treatments may be used to treat skin maintain commercial viability (or safety in the damage or disease resulting from contamination, case of household pets or items of substantial but that is not directly relevant to this functional intrinsic value, etc.). capability.

• Utilization of modeling tools for decision sup- Relevant military research and development activ- port to determine physical boundaries for ities are in current progress at Edgewood Arsenal decontamination (see Chapter VIII and at Ft. Detrick on advanced methods for (PHRBAE)). decontamination.

• Faster process than sentinel animals for verify- A key final step is to provide assurance that ing decontamination efficacy. decontamination has been successful. This can be achieved either by detection technology simi- Current Capabilities: lar to that which may have located the contami- Contaminated animals and plants are usually nation in the first place, or by knowledge of destroyed rather than decontaminated, so capabil- decontamination effectiveness gained either from ities are not always used. first principles or empirical studies.

There are approved lists for animal decontamina- More extensive discussions of both the decontam- tion that contain detailed instructions, but this ination and the sensor states of the art can be can be difficult and time consuming. There are found in the DIDA, PHRBAE, MR, R&R and limited plume/pathogen/containment models to PPE NTROs. aid in decontamination planning. Technology Limitations and Barriers: Food processing becomes a liability issue, it is simply easier to destroy it; in addition, there are The major limitations and barriers in this MRPA business incentives to support rapid decontami- relate to food-borne bacteria. Since such con- nation of a processing plant or distribution facil- tamination occurs routinely and under natural ity. Feedstuffs are usually destroyed rather than conditions, terrorist recourse to introducing such decontaminated, so there are no capability con- contamination does not usually become apparent cerns for decontaminating feedstuff. until much later after many individuals become sick. It would be very difficult to discriminate More efficient and effective methods for large- between a naturally occurring gastrointestinal scale sterilization of soils, equipment, and

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pathogen and one caused by a deliberate intro- decontamination procedures when needed under duction into the food supply. ordinary circumstances. However, other public facilities and transport systems such as postage Higgins et al. (1999)19 concluded that there is facilities and both cargo and passenger ships still utility in rapid detection assays for: (1) prophy- present difficult and time-consuming challenges lactic monitoring of food or water suspected of in decontamination. Therefore, it is suggested being the target of a bioterrorist attack and (2) that new RDT&E be undertaken to explore new serving as “first use” diagnostics when an other- and refined decontamination techniques. The wise routine outbreak of gastrointestinal illness main thrust would involve exploring different shows evidence of being something else entirely. forms of irradiation and chemical fumigation to The same investigators suggested that the rapid identify potential faster and cheaper solutions to sample preparation techniques and real-time treating especially difficult facilities for deconta- diagnostic assays developed at USAMRIID would mination purposes. allow authorities to perform the quickest and most accurate tests to determine if the threat is Also, a requirement continues to exist for using real and decontamination or disposal actions are appropriate low-level and benign irradiation tech- needed. niques to prevent contamination of foods and to restore food safety when environmental condi- A number of passenger cruise liners have been tions may have allowed bacterial contamination plagued by recurrent gastrointestinal pathogens. of food or feed to exceed threshold levels or for Part of the problem of decontaminating these treatments for reducing pest problems. The ships is attributable to the rough surfaces and USDA has recently approved the use of irradia- many nooks and crannies built into these vessels. tion for extending shelf life of packaged foods, but this approval has not as yet had much influ- Exotic Newcastle Disease is one good example of ence on commercial practices. the difficulty an infectious animal disease can present in decontamination. It can be carried by Two RTOs are suggested for addressing these humans on nasal surfaces, clothing, shoes or needs. MRPArto.7 (Improved Irradiation boots, or even on cleaning and transportation Methods) addresses irradiation methods for con- equipment. A poultry production facility can trolling bacterial, funga, and pest infestations in only be decontaminated through total destruc- packages, containers, or large storage and trans- tion or through draconian measures including port facilities; and MRPArto.8 (Enhanced destroying all the poultry and eggs and removing Fumigation Technology) addresses fumigation earth surfaces down to 3-4 feet below the surface. technology for decontaminating food processing and storage facilities, and transportation carriers. There is a further problem in recognizing biological pathogens that have been carried into the country in humans, live animals, in feed, or in Mitigation and Restoration for Plant other ways. Parasites are the most common and Animal Resources Response Technology Objectives (MRPArto) problem associated with foreign travelers, and they remain poorly treated if at all upon arrival. MRPArto.1 – Plant and Animal Responders’ Decision Aid Gap Fillers: Chemical decontamination technology seems to Objectives: be generally available and receiving appropriate A CBR event may well involve exotic damage current emphasis by military laboratories. Also, mechanisms outside of the experience of typical food processing and retail chain restaurants seem plant and animal professionals, not to mention generally prepared to engage in appropriate public safety officers. In surge situations

19 Frazier, T. W. and D. C. Richardson (Editors), “Food and Agricultural Security,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 894 (1999).

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relatively untrained people will be called on to FY2006: Availability of initial suite of validated perform field assessment roles. This RTO will content; finalization of provide content that will allow plant and animal commercialization/deployment strategy. responders to apply codified knowledge and to reach back to specialists so that they will act to FY2007-2009: Demonstration of improved sys- most efficiently assess and identify damage, limit tems concepts integrating COTS technologies onward contamination, and embark on the cor- and initial content. rect mitigation strategy. FY2010: Demonstration of final system variants. Payoffs: MRPArto.1 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 20092010 Totals Early accurate assessment and initia- Plant and Animal $2.5 $7 $6 $6 $4 $3 $3 $31.5 tion of appropriate mitigation is Decision Aid likely to localize the impact and minimize damage. Codification of best practices MRPArto.2 – Field Screening and Assessment and making them available in the field will also Tests. Development of rapid screening tests for enable meaningful surge by relatively unspecial- animal and plant viral pathogens in conjunction ized individuals. Wide availability of the systems with improved surveillance and trace-back sys- and content would enable effective surge. tems offers a way to allow the adoption of new strategies for identification, location, and eradica- Challenges: tion of diseased animals and crops. It could also While no unique systems technologies need be help direct emergency responders in employing developed for this purpose, the wide range of effective small-scale vaccination strategies. environments in which the system would be used and the need for relatively low cost (especially for Objectives: use in surge) requires careful attention to system Build on the research from the Strategic Research design. Multiple connectivity modes for reach- Area (see Chapter I) on SBR exposure and else- back would be required. The need for high- where to develop a cost-effective set of rapid fidelity visual component (with a high-end vari- screening tests for plant and animal disease and ant involving two-way communication of images) the presence of CBR agents in plant and animals. will need to be traded off against cost. If possi- These tests should allow identification of the ble, this capability should have an option for pathogen (ideally including ones not expected in implementation as a software add-on to existing advance). responder systems rather than as a stand-alone addition. This RTO should be carried forward in Payoffs: coordination with similar RTOs in DIDA and Validated screening tests would allow emergency MR. responders simple and inexpensive ways to contribute to initial epidemiological analyses for esti- Milestones/Metrics: mating scope, locations, and rates at which FY2004: Initial system requirements definition pathogens are spreading across a geographical and characterization of cognate available systems; area. This information can be useful for deter- initiation of content development through appro- mining specific containment, isolation, and eradi- priate contracting means. cation strategies, including vaccination strategies. This can help limit the number of animals that FY2005: Demonstration of alternative system must be sacrificed and delimit areas that must be concepts using COTS systems. sprayed using aerial chemicals.

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Challenges: funded missions and approvals from the mili- As a strategically important foundation of sec- tary/intelligence communities. These programs toral defense, this line of research needs contin- require substantial budgets in view of the costs of ued emphasis and funding for the entire period unmanned satellites and unmanned military air- of the present planning horizon and beyond. craft operations. High-level approvals would Teaching emergency responders to use, interpret, then be needed to permit the suggested uses of and report upon these tests is a slowly moving this equipment and other program resources. process. Widespread distribution of such tests can be costly. Milestones/Metrics: FY2004: Develop an interagency working (steer- Milestones/Metrics: ing) group to develop and justify this program in An annual allocation of $30 million seems rea- detail and associated applications, resulting in an sonable if it includes development costs and costs official authority to proceed. of production and distribution of test materials. FY2005: Develop a program for validation and MRPArto.2 – Budget in Millions testing representative applications Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 20092010 Totals of the technology for food and Field Screening and $30 $30 $30 $30 $30 $30 $30 $210 Assessment Tests agriculture surveillance and analysis: conduct several pilot studies MRPArto.3 – Overhead Imaging for Wide-Area of simulated attacks, as scientific Surveillance and Assessment payloads on other programmed missions. Obtain approval to proceed into building an operational Objectives: capability. Exploit existing imaging technology involving FY2006-2007: Create a fully operational mission earth orbit satellite and unmanned surveillance capability that can become a part of the national’s aircraft to remotely survey agricultural terrain for homeland security emergency response armamen- the presence of crop plant disease, down live- tarium and test on convenient natural disasters stock, and wildlife remains. and crises experienced during this time. Payoffs: MRPArto.3 – Budget in Millions Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 Totals Different agencies employ this technology for Overhead Imaging $0.4 $4 $25 $25 $54.4 other purposes and the proposed application goes all the way back to the 1960s. Since agriculture covers such a large portion of the countryside, MRPArto.4 – Trace-Back Capabilities Using aerospace and aerial sensing technologies could Information Systems and Tags provide a very cost-effective approach to surveillance and detection of emerging or near-term Objectives: biological impacts of terrorist attacks. Validate an optimized system approach to using miniaturized chip technology for tracking plant, Challenges: animals and food products back to points-of- Different agencies have this technology in place origin with data updating at critical control and working, but have as yet to develop a cooper- points. Review European findings on tagging ative approach for crisis and consequences action systems and FDA regulations on data item and epidemiological intelligence studies. These requirements for these purposes. Undertake field agencies include NASA, NOAA, and military tests of alternative system configurations. image mapping and surveillance agencies. Undertake cost analyses of costs for national and However, these uses for platforms such as international implementation of the recom- Predator and military satellite programs require mended tagging and trace-back system.

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Payoffs: efficacy and payoff potential of the system; also, This technology exists now and can offer early locate interested vendors and solicit bids on sys- returns in a health and food safety area of estab- tem fabrication and purchase costs. lished importance. Implementation of this pro- MRPArto.4 – Budget in Millions gram will satisfy long-standing calls for develop- Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 Totals Trace-back $0.5 $4 $4 $5 $13.5 ing a viable tagging and trace-back system for use Capabilities in the different operational environments under current consideration. The system findings will facilitate epidemiological investigations of animal MRPArto.5 – Threat Analysis Critical Control and plant disease outbreaks and help refine and Points Program for the Food Chain reduce the costs of recalls and destruction of contaminated food products. Terrorist attacks, like the accidental spread of pathogens and accidental contaminations, can Challenges: occur at many vulnerable points in the food pro- FDA has taken the lead on forming data item duction, processing and distribution process from requirements for producers, but has left the deci- the farm to the table. Consequently, surveillance sions on how to comply in satisfying these should be exercised at key points in the process to requirements to producers, processors, etc. The achieve the earliest possible detection of acciden- European studies have shown that a variety of tal or intentional introduction of pathogens or methods for on-animal or in-animal data capture contaminants. A Threat Analysis Critical and storage are completely feasible The major Control Points Program modeled after the USDA challenge will be the overall aggregated costs of Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points Program operating such a massive information system and offers good prospects for this kind of target-hard- the associated investigation and enforcement ening. This approach, linked with trace-back activities needed to ensure compliance with data systems, could become an important detec- requirements. The costs will ultimately be paid tion and analysis tool for field use. for by consumers, but they are very high. This RTO should be conducted in coordination with Objectives: work in the Logistics Support (LS) area addressing tracking and tagging issues. Use systems analysis to identify the key points in the food chain at which detection is to be Milestones/Metrics: attempted and the detection techniques and technologies (including visual inspection) that would FY2004: Review the appropriate literature and be most cost effective. Evaluate alternative con- develop a research strategy under FDA auspices cepts of operation for use of these detection tech- to demonstrate a cost-effective system compatible nologies (including those developed under with FDA proposed requirements. Secure the MRPArto.2). cooperation of the relevant industries to pursue a large-scale validation study. Payoffs: FY2005: Develop and demonstrate one or more For a relatively modest federal investment, the prototype hardware/software system configura- demonstrated value of the HACCP program tions for tests and evaluation purposes. devised by the USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) could be extended to underline FY2006: Conduct a series of pilot studies in the and enhance industry’s cooperation with federal relevant operational environments and modify national biosecurity program. Such enhanced the system as indicated to be necessary. cooperation would be a very valuable objective, FY2007: Design and conduct a one-year valida- since such cooperation might be generalized to tion and cost-benefit field study to confirm the other aspects of homeland security requiring

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voluntary industry cooperation. The program Payoffs: could, at the same time, provide opportunities for Extensions and new applications of this technol- monitoring industry compliance with FDA regu- ogy can significantly help prevent and mitigate lations concerning trace-back records compliance. the impacts of foreign pest introductions and outbreaks that threaten agricultural productivity Challenges: and ecosystems, including plant crops, exotic The greatest technical challenge is the need to species, companion animals, livestock and animal determine the most cost-effective detection strat- wildlife. These measures will enhance human egy given the wide range of possible terrorist health assurance and national security, as well as attacks on the food chain and changing modes of protect U.S. agriculture from diseases and con- detection that may become available over the taminations that would jeopardize food and fiber next decade. sales abroad.

Milestones/Metrics: Challenges: FY2004: Organize a cooperative FDA/USDA The U.S. still has deficiencies in its emergency task force from the appropriate internal entities response infrastructures and little experience in to devise a TACCP program plan and draft asso- coping effectively with large-scale, multifocal ter- ciated prospective regulations. Invite industry rorist attacks or naturalistic spread of animal and and general public inputs and hold regional hear- plant disease. The most challenging experience ings with groups from the different operational in recent times has been the Exotic Newcastle environments to be involved. Disease (END) poultry outbreak which began this year in California. Lack of advance prepara- FY2005: Devise and undertake pilot study exer- tion, limited analytic tools and staff limitations cises to confirm that the proposed system will thwarted its early control. A post eradication sur- work efficiently and that it is minimally intrusive veillance program is ongoing and a national pro- to business operations. Undertake user surveys of gram for END is tying together education and the system to test acceptability. strategy and working on issues such as how to deal with non-traditional agricultural entities FY2006: Conduct red team field tests exercises such as live bird markets and exotics in the sur- to test the systems usability during a prospective veillance chain. It is hoped that this program will crisis and operator conformity with regulations. eventually include other avian diseases. The pro- FY2006-2010: Evaluate advanced technology posed technology development effort can address screening systems and incorporate them into the these deficiencies in preparedness to face threats system plan. to our agriculture and environment both with respect to ongoing surveillance, analy- MRPArto.5 – Budget in Millions sis, and prescriptive action when a Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 20092010 Totals significant crisis is discovered that is Critical Control $2 $3 $6 $1 $7 $2 $5 $26 Points Program amenable to study by remote imaging technology or by epidemiological reporting by producers. One other associated MRPArto.6 – Modeling of Plant and Animal challenge is that of helping discriminate between Outbreaks, Surveillance, and Response a natural disease occurrence and an intentional introduction of a contaminant or pathogen Objectives: through the application of this technology. Develop modeling tools for use by cognizant agencies and incident commanders that can aid Milestones/Metrics: in optimizing plant and animal surveillance and FY2004: Develop an organizing committee com- response strategies. prised of representatives from APHIS, the DHS

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S&T directorate, HHS, Department of the year and precipitate associated hospitalizations Army, state departments of Agriculture and and mortalities. Fresh fruit and vegetables losses Wildlife, DARPA, and potentially the through spoilage would be very significantly Department of Commerce to flesh out a multi- reduced. Container facilities and food processing faceted program for surveillance and modeling facilities can be made more sanitary, thus con- technology applications to epidemiological analy- tributing to reducing food contamination. sis, population control, and mitigation actions. Microwave and ionizing radiation represent the Develop an RFP and associated statements of two major approaches to food irradiation that work for use in applications for grant support by have proven helpful thus far. university centers, and associated in-house participation by APHIS and other appropriate govern- Challenges: ment research activities. This technology needs further exploration and refinement. The public has to become convinced FY2005: Approve and initiate individual projects of the efficacy of irradiation as a safe means for in the relevant application areas (animal, plant decontamination. To create a market for irradi- crops, wildlife, and environmental health). ated foods, industry needs to be convinced that FY2006: Create an integrated action plan for markets exist for long shelf-life packaged foods real-world application of the technology and treated in this way and that legal liabilities will launch a training program for creating and not threaten the adoption of these food preserva- expanding expertise in selected state university tion methods. Applicator personnel safety can be settings, based upon competitive bids. a particular health problem and legal liability if accidents occur in the commercial use of this FY2007: Undertake case studies as outbreak technology. Little is known yet about the biolog- or large-scale contamination incidents opportuni- ical effects of EMP beams, which are used mostly ties are presented for further assessments of for military purposes at this time. The human cost-benefit. health hazards of exposure to lasers, microwaves, and ionizing radiation, of course, can be MRPArto.6 – Budget in Millions substantial. Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Totals Modeling of $2 $10 $20 $10 $10 $52 Outbreaks, Milestones/Metrics: Surveillance, and Response FY2004: Undertake a literature review and then design an experimental R&D program for extending the state of the art in this application MRPArto.7 – Improved Irradiation Methods area in different operational environments and task appropriate national laboratories to design Objectives: the different individual project tasks involved. Find quick, effective and inexpensive prophylactic and post-exposure treatment countermeasures FY2005: Integrate the individual studies into an for contaminations and infestations in food and overall program proposal and commence pilot feed through different forms of irradiation. studies work following an authority to proceed by the DHS. Payoffs: FY2006: Specify the replanning suggested by ini- Food losses due to bacterial contamination and tial pilot study findings and begin a one-year for- associated disposal are massive every year, even in mal study effort. the U.S. Developing more effective sanitary methods for preserving food safety would reduce FY2007: Analyze results and develop demonstra- these losses and reduce the associated food-borne tions and orientation materials concerning illnesses that attack millions of Americans every

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commercialization of the validated technology for would need to be edited so that they do not con- industry and government. vey useful information to potential terrorist MRPArto.7 – Budget in Millions adversaries. This is a rather routine challenge Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 Totals that is faced frequently when dealing with sensi- Improved Irradiation $3 $3 $10 $5 $21 tive matters that affect national security. The Methods other main consideration is that of ensuring that the study panel that is organized and the outside MRPArto.8 – Enhanced Fumigation contributors brought into meetings to make addi- Technology tional technical and scientific contributions are carefully chosen. Objectives: Fumigation technology has been used for a long Milestones/Metrics: time and military chemical commands know a lot A two-year study effort is envisaged: (a) a first about how to use it effectively. Nonetheless, the year effort concerned with study design and recent experiences in decontaminating congres- topic selection, as well as panel organization and sional buildings and postal facilities following identification of desirable outside contributors; anthrax mailings to these locations vividly illus- and (b) a second year concerned with the con- trated the complexities and major outlays needed duct of review meetings and preparation of the in manpower time and costs that the current committee report. state-of-the-art technology requires. An associated objective is to find cheaper and more effi- FY2004: Perform the detailed review study cient ways to decontaminate transportation carri- design and develop the needed expert human ers such as cruise ships, ambulances, food storage resources. facilities, and food processing facilities. FY2005: Undertake the actual study program A variety of contaminants and biological and publish and distribute a final report includ- pathogens are of concern here, such as parasites, ing recommendations. pests, molds, spores, bacteria and viruses. So this MRPArto.8 – Budget in Millions review would be concerned with: (a) contami- Thrust 2004 2005 Totals nants and pathogens (including toxins), (b) dif- Enhanced Fumigation $1 $2.5 $3.5 Technology ferent decontamination agents, and (c) facilities and containers (large and small). MRPArto.9 – Digesters and Plasma Burners Payoffs: Objectives: The resulting recommendations from this Undertake a literature review on portable systems extended study activity could be used as the basis for carcass disposal and develop a program for for undertaking a major DHS initiative in ascertaining the relative strengths and weaknesses improving new contamination technology utiliza- of the individual systems and their operational tion. The longer-term payoffs include improved capacities, limitations, and costs of procurement food safety, positive impacts on animal and and operation in representative field settings. human health, and reduced losses in agricultural and food products domestic sales and exports due Payoffs: to contamination and spoilage. These systems exist and have been used in Europe. We have not yet found technical litera- Challenges: ture that describes the strengths and limitations The main procedural challenge to this study proj- of these systems sufficiently or whether they are ect is that some of the most relevant information available from U.S. suppliers. Nonetheless, some is classified by military authorities. The findings pathogens such as BSE and its human counter-

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part require extreme heat for their destruction. Payoffs: Also, in cases of large masses of carcass materials Availability of this system would be valuable in disposal, minimal ash residuals or other residuals orienting state governments and emergency can be significant attractions. responders in agriculture about animal disposal problems. A training facility housing this equip- Challenges: ment would allow specific training on the system The main technical challenge has to do with to be used for emergency responders from coop- determining how far these technologies can be erating jurisdictions. taken for large-number and small/medium- animal disposal situations. Challenges: The effectiveness of this approach would be Milestones/Metrics: dependent upon the number of such facilities FY2004: Undertake an engineering study as available and their distance from the locations described above. from which infected animals or contaminated crops originated. The system would need FY2005-2007: If findings show continued designed in conjunction with a safe and secure promise, procure several units and test their oper- transportation carrier system for deliveries of carcasses and plant material. If multiple focal sites MRPArto.9 – Budget in Millions were involved within a particular geographic area Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 Totals served, computer decision support systems Digesters and $0.5 $1 $1 $0.5 $3 Plasma Burners involving optimization algorithms would best be used to minimize carrier travel distance and time and optimize avoiding travel through populated ational capacities, limitations, and costs of opera- areas and travel over heavily used roads during tion in field settings. periods of heavy traffic. MRPArto.10 – Prototype Prefabricated Milestones/Metrics: Crematorium Facility FY2004: Design and conduct of an engineering Objective: study of the general approach. An important part of preparing the nation to FY2005: Construction of a central facility for become capable of managing large-scale agroter- design verification and training. rorism incidents is to develop a better way to dispose of contaminated carcasses and plants. It is FY2006: Construction and modification of a neither practical nor economical to build crema- prototype transportable facility and pilot testing torium facilities for burning carcasses and con- of disposal capacities for a simulated large-scale taminated harvested crop materials all over the incident. country. However, a prefabricated system that could be erected and made operational in a matter of several days to alternative sites by trained MRPArto.10 – Budget in Millions workers is feasible and could meeting this partic- Thrust 2004 2005 2006 2007 Totals Prototype $2 $20 $30 $40 $92 ular need if and when it arises. Crematorium Facility

FY2007: Make needed modifications and begin construction of operational models; begin training program; undertake a supervised simulation with a cooperating entity.

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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

• Application of Codified Knowledge and Reach- MRPArto.1 – Plant and Animal Responders Decision Aid Back to Specialists • Rapid Viral Screening • Improved Surveillance and Trace-Back MRPArto.2 – Field Screening and Assessment Tests Systems • Remotely Survey MRPArto.3 – Overhead Imaging for Wide- Agricultural Terrain Area Surveillance

• Miniaturized Chip Technology for Plant, MRPArto.4 – Trace-Back Capabilities Animal and Food Products

• Detection of Accidental or Intentional MRPArto.5 – Critical Control Points Program Introduction of Contaminants • Mitigate Impacts of MRPArto.6 – Modeling of Outbreaks, Surveillance and Foreign Pest Response Introduction

• Prophylactic and Post- EMPPrto.7 – Improved Irradiation Exposure Treatment Methods Countermeasures • Contamination MRPArto.8 – Fumigation Technology Study Technology

• Portable Systems for EMPPrto.9 – Digesters and Carcass Disposal Plasma Burners

• Disposal System for MRPArto.10 – Prototype Prefab Contaminated Crematorium Facility Carcasses and Plants Mitigation and Restoration for Plant and Animal Resources Technology Roadmap

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PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix A Spiral Development and Commercialization of Affordable Advanced Technology Systems

The need for Emergency Responders to be pre- intermediate design points and upgrade paths can pared for catastrophic terrorism has been evident both maximize prospects for a smooth, interoper- to experts for some time. However, it has only able, transition where that is feasible, and avoid begun to attract sustained government attention recriminations about misplaced expectations and resources since September 11th, 2001. where it is not.

It was to be expected that, in many capability In other words, technology planning to improve areas, gaps in responder capabilities could be capabilities for dealing with potentially cata- reduced through straightforward, near-term adap- strophic terrorism cannot be undertaken in a vac- tations (or “transfers”) of existing commercial and uum; instead it must be cognizant of the chan- military technologies. The Project Responder nels through which technology will actually be planning effort has verified this expectation integrated into systems and deployed to improve and suggests that much relevant investment is responder capability. Moreover, while the current already being made by the federal government project focused initially on responder require- and industry. ments (or “technology-pull”), room must be made in the S&T process for the fruits of “tech- For such an intractable problem as catastrophic nology-push” as well (for example, the fruits of terrorism, it was also to be expected that areas work in the Strategic Research Areas defined in would be identified where major progress in the Introduction). A full discussion of how this eliminating capability gaps would require signifi- should be accomplished is beyond the scope of cant technology investment and even basic the current project. However, this appendix pres- research—if progress could be made at all. The ents some of the concepts should be considered current effort has verified this expectation as well. by the Department of Homeland Security in managing a portfolio of science and technology Finally, in many areas, significant improvement activities aimed at enhancing future responder in capability can be expected from near-term capabilities. technology (and non-technological solutions), yet further dramatic improvements can be expected As noted in the Preface and Introduction, the to result from a later generation of technology. decentralized and diverse character of responder In these instances, technology planners and organizations means that technology adoption by responder organizations must be concerned that responders is very different from the procurement pursuit of ultimate performance levels does not process that most federal science and technology unnecessarily inhibit early deployment of signifi- planners are used to. Whereas a successful federal cantly improved systems, and also that early technology development program usually leads to deployment of improved systems does not unnec- federal government procurement (indeed, the essarily impede the later adoption of further term “acquisition” was adopted to describe the system improvements. Explicit attention to combination of development and procurement),

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in the case of emergency responders the engineer- In contrast to earlier acquisition concepts, sys- ing and manufacturing development (EMD) and tems can be deployed for operational use before production will usually be performed by com- they are fully developed, and they do not have a mercial suppliers. However, the heavy role of predefined end state. Early operational use of government organizations at all levels and the new capabilities and new operational concepts strong requirement for standardization and inter- enabled by new technology has benefits for oper- operability means that the market is also very dif- ational effectiveness and also for the development ferent from the typical commercial market for process. Getting advanced technology in the high technology goods. hands of users early helps refine the true operational value of the technology and thus helps Responder organizations have very limited pro- make design tradeoffs; it also increases the con- curement budgets and so it would only take a few stituency for useful innovations and helps extin- instances where a deployed system was unexpect- guish invalid ones. edly rendered obsolete by the next generation, to sour responders on the process. Similarly, com- Of course, this new thinking in DoD brings mercial suppliers to responder organizations have DoD much closer to the evolutionary approach limited product development budgets, and a key that is already typical of industry—in which the role of federal technology programs will be notion of working more closely with customers reduce uncertainty about the future marketplace (or a lead customer) in developing new products so that suppliers will have the confidence to has taken hold. One key process within DoD for invest in developing appropriate products. A this new approach is the “Advanced Concept cooperative process of integrated demonstration Technology Demonstration (ACTD).” ACTDs and consensus-building will be an important ele- involve the application of advanced technology to ment of the technology transfer process. a military problem, but the focus is on the military application rather than the development of Many of the federal officials and organizations the technology itself. The focus is not just on the now involved in developing technologies for operational test of a new piece of equipment but responders have experience in the Department of generally an assessment of a new operational or Defense. DoD has learned from the commercial organizational approach that is made possible by market place that attempts to leap a generation of the new technology. technology and meet specified “requirements” through development of an integrated system Both a user organization as well as a technology using new technology in all the subsystems leads developer are required as co-sponsors before the to slower progress as well as the risk of total ACTD can be initiated. An essential element of failure. the ACTD is that there be a small operational leave-behind capability after the demonstration By contrast, an “open systems” approach that uses period has ended. defined (but not permanent) architecture and interface specifications to allow competitive In the DoD acquisition process, the intended development at the subsystems/level allows both next step after a successful ACTD was the initia- earlier deployment of improved capability and tion of a formal procurement including a full more rapid technological evolution beyond that scale engineering and manufacturing develop- level. DoD officials have come to understand ment phase. In the responder world, a successful the need for “spiral development” and “evolution- ACTD-like demonstration would instead be fol- ary acquisition” in order to get systems in the lowed by the commitment by one or more com- field early that take advantage of current technol- mercial suppliers to develop products based on ogy and then continually refreshing the technol- the demonstration. This commitment would ogy embodied in deployed systems in order to likely be facilitated by responder involvement in improve capability over time. integrated demonstrations and by a national level

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identification of the new capability as an appro- Open systems architectures are important to priate standard. allow innovation to occur at many levels. Some of this innovation will be pleasant surprises to Thus the Department of Homeland Security federal S&T planners, and the planning process should consider replacing the DoD phrase “evo- must be flexible enough to accommodate it. But lutionary acquisition” with “evolutionary com- there is still room for a systems engineering mercialization and deployment.” Beyond this approach that assesses the risk at the level of each change in words, it will be necessary to calibrate system component and helps generate an appro- the S&T investment process to the realities of the priate level of redundancy in technical approach responder adoption process. and in scheduling to reduce the overall risk to acceptable levels. In other words, to be successful, a science and technology effort focused on responder capabili- One element of such a risk management ties will affect the assessed demand for, as well as approach is the use of Technology Readiness the supply of, technology. Vendors need to feel Levels (TRLs). TRLs are a set of nine graded comfortable with the level of commercial risk in descriptions of stages of technology maturity. selling a product as well as the technical risk in They were originated by the National developing it. Testing and standards and harmo- Aeronautics and Space Administration and nized expectations of future technology availabil- adapted by the DoD for use in its acquisition sys- ity will be as important to success as increments tem. TRLs are used by program managers to of technical performance. plan the phases of their spiral development programs. As the program manager considers when While the ACTD focuses on new operational to insert a new technology into future evolutions applications of relatively mature technology, an of his system, he or she uses TRLs to understand older form of technology demonstration – the when the technology will have been matured to “Advanced Technology Demonstration” (ATD) – the point where there is acceptable risk in using typically focuses on proving the feasibility of the that technology. That way, the continuous basic technology underlying a novel system. upgrade of complex systems can move forward Such ATDs generally involve system-level tests, without unexpected perturbations to cost and though component-level demonstrations are also schedule. possible. Because of the expense involved in developing a prototype, such demonstrations are Because complex system developments usually only appropriate if there is a high degree of confi- involve the integration of various component dence that the demonstration will succeed. A technologies that may have different technology slew of research and engineering activities, readiness levels, and because the integration even including experiments of various types, must of mature technologies is not a simple task, generally be undertaken before an ATD is NASA personnel have recently developed considered. Integration Readiness Levels (IRLs) that are useful in assessing development risk and appropriate The difference between an experiment and a testing approaches from the point of view of the demonstration is that an experiment is primarily system as a whole. conducted for the purpose of learning while a demonstration aims at verification (and perhaps The TRLs and IRLs are themselves only descrip- improving the “art” that goes into producing the tions of stages of technical maturity (or risk test articles.) In modern engineering practice, reduction); by themselves they are not a manage- the expectation is that the underlying science will ment tool. However, rules of good practice can generally be understood before an attempt is be developed that address (for example) the mini- made to develop a product based on a new mum TRL that must be attained before a compo- discovery. nent is considered for inclusion in a particular

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system-level test (IRL). However, compared to envisioning a continual increase in capability. So the Department of Homeland Security, NASA DHS will need to adapt this system for its more (even with the increased international participa- difficult environment and its required focus on tion in its missions) is able to comprehend more evolutionary commercialization and deployment. of the overall system of concern in its own planning and development process; it controls its Descriptions of the TRLs and IRLs, together own procurement, and it still generally develops with clarifying definitions, are provided in the systems to a particular requirement rather than table below and on the next page.

Technology Readiness Level Description 1. Basic principles observed Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins to be translated into applied research and and reported. development. Examples might include paper studies of a technology’s basic properties. 2. Technology concept and/or Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical applications can be invented. Applications are application formulated. speculative and there may be no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumptions. Examples are limited to analytic studies.

3. Analytical and experimental Active research and development is initiated. This includes analytical studies and laboratory studies to critical function and/or physically validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the technology. Examples include components characteristic proof of that are not yet integrated or representative. concept. 4. Component and/or Basic technological components are integrated to establish that they will work together. This is relatively “low breadboard validation in fidelity” compared to the eventual system. Examples include integration of “ad hoc” hardware in the laboratory. laboratory environment. 5. Component and/or Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic technological components are integrated breadboard validation in with reasonably realistic supporting elements so it can be tested in a simulated environment. Examples include relevant environment. “high fidelity” laboratory integration of components. 6. System/subsystem model or Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond that of TRL 5, is tested in a relevant prototype demonstration in a environment. Represents a major step up in a technology’s demonstrated readiness. Examples include testing relevant environment. a prototype in a high-fidelity laboratory environment or in simulated operational environment. 7. System prototype Prototype near, or at, planned operational system. Represents a major step up from TRL 6, requiring demonstration in an demonstration of an actual system prototype in an operational environment such as an aircraft, vehicle, or operational environment. space. Examples include testing the prototype in a test bed aircraft. 8. Actual system completed and Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions. In almost all cases, this qualified through test and TRL represents the end of true system development. Examples include developmental test and evaluation of demonstration. the system in its intended weapon system to determine if it meets design specifications. 9. Actual system proven Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in through successful mission operational test and evaluation. Examples include using the system under operational mission conditions. operations.

Integrated Readiness Level Description 1. Concept Systems Analyses Requires definition of how system components operate together to achieve functionality, together with rough Completed performance specifications for components. 2. Detailed System Design Interfaces and component characteristics are specified and subjected to engineering analysis and simulation. Completed 3. System Mockup or Focus is on risk reduction of novel interfaces and identification of unexpected interactions. Well-defined Prototype, Subjected to components may be simulated as well as the environment. Simulated Test Environments 4. Prototype/Demonstrator Focus is on system demonstration in operational environments that may not be fully characterized by Exercised in Representative simulations. Operational Environments 5. Operational System Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission conditions, such as those encountered in Deployment operational test and evaluation.

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Clarifying Definitions Description 1. Breadboard Integrated components that provide a representation of a system/subsystem and which can be used to determine concept feasibility and to develop technical data. Typically configured for laboratory use to demonstrate the technical principles of immediate interest. May resemble final system/subsystem in function only.

2. High Fidelity Addresses form, fit and function. High fidelity laboratory environment would involve testing with equipment that can simulate and validate all system specifications within a laboratory setting.

3. Low Fidelity A representative of the component or system that has limited ability to provide anything but first order information about the end product. Low fidelity assessments are used to provide trend analysis.

4. Model A reduced scale, functional form of a system, near or at operational specification. Models will be sufficiently hardened to allow demonstration of the technical and operational capabilities required of the final system.

5. Operational Environment Environment that addresses all of the operational requirements and specifications required of the final system to include platform/packaging.

6. Prototype The first early representation of the system which offers the expected functionality and performance expected of the final implementation. Prototypes will be sufficiently hardened to allow demonstration of the technical and operational capabilities required of the final system.

7. Relevant Environment Testing environment that simulates the key aspects of the operational environment. 8. Simulated Operational Environment that can simulate all of the operational requirements and specifications required of the final system Environment or a simulated environment that allows for testing of a virtual prototype to determine whether it meets the operational requirements and specifications of the final system.

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248

PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix A Acronyms

2G General Packet Radio Services APHIS Animal and Plant Health (GPRS) Inspection Service 3-D Three Dimensional ARA Applied Research Associates, Inc. 3-D GIS Three Dimensional Geographic ARL Army Research Laboratory Information System ASCO Advanced Systems and Concepts 3G Universal Mobile Office Telecommunication Service ASOCC Area Secure Operations (UMTS) Command and Control rd 3PL 3 Party Logistics ASU All-Source Situational AAVLD American Association of Understanding Veterinary Laboratory ATCC American Type Culture Diagnosticians Collection AC/DC Alternating Current/Direct ATD Advanced Technology Current Demonstration ACPLA Agent-Containing Particles per BAA Broad Agency Announcement Liter of Air BioAlirt Bio-event Advanced Leading ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Indicator Recognition Demonstration Bio-ToF MS Biological Time-of-Flight Mass ADASHI™ Automated Decision Aid System Spectrometer for Hazardous Incidents BSL-3/4 Bio-Safety Level-3/4 AFCEA Armed Forces Communications & Electronics Association BMG Building Model Generator AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome BSPS-ESI/MS Biological Sample Prep System – Electrospray Ionization/Mass AIS Automated Information Systems Spectrometry ALP Advanced Logistics Program BTCM Bio Threat Consequence ANSI American National Standards Management Institute BW Biological Warfare APDS Autonomous Pathogen Detection C2 Command and Control System

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PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix B

C4ISR Command, Control, CICC Community Intelligence Communications, Computers, Coordination Center Intelligence, Surveillance, and CINC Commander in Chief Reconnaissance CMIS Consequence Management CAC Common Access Cards Information System CADB Chemical Agent Detection CMI-Services Consequence Management Badges Interoperability Services CAMEO Computer Aided Management of CMT Citizen Mobilization Teams Emergency Operations CNN Cable News Network CapWin Capital Wireless Integrated Network CNS Community Notifications System

CATS Consequence Assessment Tool CO2 Carbon Dioxide Set COA Course of Action CB Chemical and Biological CoBRA Chemical Biological Response CPR U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Aide CBR Chemical, Biological and CONOPS Concept of Operations Radiological COP Common Operating Picture CBRE Chemical, Biological, COTS Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Radiological, and Explosive CPIE Command Post Information CBRNE/HE Chemical, Biological, Environment Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive/High Explosive CPOF Command Post of the Future CBRNE Chemical, Biological, CRM Customer Relations Management Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive/Incendiary CRNE Chemical Radiological Nuclear Explosive CBW Chemical Biological Warfare CRT Cathode Ray Tube CCTV Closed-Circuit Television CTIC California Anti-Terrorism CDC Centers for Disease Control (and Information Center Prevention) CW Chemical Warfare CE Crisis Evaluation and DAE Disaster Assistance Employee Management DARPA Defense Advanced Research CECOM Communications Electronics Projects Agency Command (Army) DATSD Deputy Assistant to the Secretary CFU Colony Forming Units of Defense CGNS Carrier Grade Notification DCTS Defense Collaborative Tool Suite System CI Criminal Investigation and DEA Drug Enforcement Attribution Administration

250

PROJECT RESPONDER Acronyms

DERIS Domestic Emergency Response EMAN Emergency Medical Alert Information Service Network DHS Department of Homeland EMD Engineering and Manufacturing Security Development DIDA Detection, Identification, and EMERRS Emergency Regional Response Assessment System DISA Defense Information Systems EMP Electromagnetic Pulse Agency EMPP Emergency Management DLA Defense Logistics Agency Preparation and Planning DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance EMS Emergency Medical Service(s) Teams ENCOMPASS Enhanced Consequence DMORT Disaster Mortuary Response Management Planning and Support system Team END Exotic Newcastle Disease DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid ENS Emergency Notification System DoD Department of Defense EOC Emergency Operations Center DOE Department of Energy EPA Environmental Protection DoT Department of Transportation Agency DREAMS Disaster Relief and Emergency ESP Extranet for Security Medical Service Professionals DSS Decision Support Systems ESRI Environmental Systems Research D-S3 DARPA Syndromic Surveillance Institute System ESSENCE II The Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification DTB Mycobacterium Tuberculosis of Community-based Epidemics Complex Direct Detection Assay EXML Expanded eXtensible Markup DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Language Agency FACA Federal Advisory Committee Act ECBC Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center FAST PHRBAE.2 (Anteon Prog) EDIS Emergency Digital Information FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation System FCC Federal Communications ELINT Electronic Intelligence Commission ELISA Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent FCE Functional Capability Element Assay FD Fire Department EMAC Emergency Management FEMA Federal Emergency Management Assistance Compact Agency EMALL Electronic (Commerce) Mall

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PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix B

FERN Food Emergency Reporting HANAA Handheld Advanced Nucleic Network Acid Analyzer FID Flame Ionization Detector HARC Houston Advanced Research Council FIST Field Inventory Survey Tool HAZMAT Hazardous Materials FPD Flame Photometric Detector HE High Explosive FRED Facilities Resource Emergency Database HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air FSIS Food Safety Inspection Service HERF High Energy Radio Frequency HHS (Department of) Health and FTIR Fourier Transform Infrared Human Services (spectroscopy) HHSA Health and Human Services GC Gas Chromatography Agency (San Diego County) GCSAW Gas Chromatography Surface HIPPA Health Insurance Portability and Acoustic Wave Accountability Act GCSS Global Combat Support System HLS/HDC2 Homeland Security/Homeland CINC/JTF Commander in Chief/Joint Task Defense Command and Control Force HMO Health Maintenance GenCon Genomic Resources Management Organization and Services HPAC Hazard Prediction and GIS Geographical Information Assessment Capability Systems HPM High Powered Microwave GMO Genetically Modified Organism HRSA Health Resources and Services GOTS Government Off-the-Shelf Administration GPR Ground Penetrating Radar HSARPA Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency GPS Global Positioning System HUMINT Human Intelligence GPS/GIS Global Positioning System/Geographical HVAC Heating, Ventilation, & Air Information System Conditioning I&W Indications and Warning GRIP Global Response Incident Planner IAB (Federal) Interagency Board GUI Graphical User Interface IC Incident Commander H&AI Hicks & Associates, Inc. ICD-9 International Classification of Diseases (Ninth Edition) HACCP Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement HAN Health Alert Network ICIT Incident Command Information Tool

252

PROJECT RESPONDER Acronyms

ICMS Incident Command Management JPG Graphics file type (developed by System the Joint Photographic Experts Group) ICS Incident Command System JRIES Joint Regional Information ID Identification Exchange System IDS Intrusion Detection Systems JSIPP Joint Service Installation Pilot IEEE Institute of Electrical & Project Electronics Engineers JSLIST Joint Services Lightweight IFC Intelligence Fusion Center Integrated Suite Technology IMINT Imagery Intelligence JTF Joint Task Force IMS Ion Mobility Spectrometry JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System IPB Intelligence Preparation of the JWARN Joint Warning and Reporting Battlefield Network IPO Intelligence Preparation for KIPP Knowledge and Intelligence Operations Program Professionals IR Infrared LACRCIC Los Angeles County Regional Criminal Information Center IRL Integration Readiness Level LAN Local Area Network IRRIS Intelligent Roadway and Railway Information System LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis LEADERS Lightweight Epidemiology and Centers Advanced Detection, Emergency Response System ISN Institute for Soldier Nanotechnology LEO Law Enforcement Online ISR Intelligence Surveillance and LEWG Law Enforcement Working Group Reconnaissance LIBS Laser Induced Breakdown ISS Internet Security Systems Spectroscopy IT Information Technology LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging ITS Intelligent Transportation LIS Logistics Information System Systems LPOSS Long Path Optical Sensor System JBREWS Joint Biological Remote Early Warning System LRN Laboratory Reporting Network JDST Joint Logistics Decision Support LS Logistics Support Tools LSTAT Life Support for Trauma and JIC Joint Intelligence Center Transport JISE Joint Intelligence Support M&S Modeling and Simulation Element MAC Multi-Agency Command

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PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix B

MALDI Matrix Assisted Laser Desorption NATO North Atlantic Treaty Ionization Organization MASINT Measurement and Signature NBC Nuclear/Biological/Chemical Intelligence NBCR Nuclear/Biological/Chemical/ MBLM Multi-Zonal Blowdown Model Radiological MEF Marine Expeditionary Force NBS National Bureau of Standards MEVA Munitions Effectiveness NC North Carolina Vulnerability Assessment NDPIX National Drug Pointer Index MHz Megahertz NE Nuclear, Explosive, and MIDAS-AT Meteorological Information and Incendiary Dispersion Assessment System NEDSS National Electronic Disease Anti-Terrorism Surveillance System MIPT Memorial Institute for the NEST Nuclear Emergency Response Prevention of Terrorism Team MIT Massachusetts Institute of NFPA National Fire Protection Agency Technology NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence MLS Multilevel Security Agency MMMWR Morbidity and Mortality Weekly NIFCC National Interagency Fire Report Command Center MOU Memorandum of Understanding NIJ National Institute of Justice MPEG Motion Picture Experts Group NIMS National Incident Management MR Medical Response System MRPA Mitigation and Restoration for NIOSH National Institute for Plant and Animal Resources Occupational Safety & Health MTMC Military Traffic Management NIST National Institute of Standards Command and Technology NAHEMS National Animal Health NMIC National Military Intelligence Emergency Management Steering Center Committee NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NAHLN National Animal Health Laboratory Network NOC Network Operating Center NAI Named Areas of Interest NOTAMs Notice to Airmen NARAC National Atmospheric Release NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission Advisory Center NRE Nuclear, Radiological, Explosive NASA National Aeronautics & Space Administration NRIC-VI National Reliability and Interoperability Council (rechartered)

254

PROJECT RESPONDER Acronyms

NSHS National Seed Health System PCR Polymerase Chain Reaction NSOF Network Sensors for the PDA Personal Digital Assistant Objective Force PEAC Palmtop Emergency Access for NTRO National Terrorism Response Chemicals Objective PHRBAE Public Health Readiness for NVESD Night Vision and Electronic Biological Agent Events Sensors Directorate PKI Public Key Infrastructure OASIS Organization for the PLC Programmed Logic Controllers Advancement of Structured Information Standards PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory ODISC4 Office of the Director of Information Systems for ppb parts per billion Command, Control, Communications & Computers PPE Personal Protection and (Army) Equipment OEM Office of Emergency PPO Preferred Provider Organization Management PPW Partnership for Public Warning OES Office of Emergency Services PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (California) R&D Research and Development OIE Office International des Epizooties R&R Response and Recovery OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom R3S Remote Surveillance Support System OFDM Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplex RAP Ring Airfoil Projectile OLES Office of Law Enforcement RDT&E Research, Development, Test & Standards Evaluation OLETS Oklahoma Law Enforcement REACT/S Radiation Emergency Assistance Telecommunications System Center/Training Site OPSEC Operational Security RF Radio Frequency OSAC Overseas Security Advisory RFID Radio Frequency Identification Council RFP Request for Proposal OSD Office of the Secretary of RHTCAT Rapid High-Throughput Clinical Defense Assessment and Testing (System) OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration RIMS Response Information Management System OSIS Open Source Information System RISS-ATIX Regional Information Sharing OSMLS Operating Systems Multi-Level Systems – Anti-Terrorism Security Information eXchange OT&E Operational Test & Evaluation

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PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix B

RISSNET Regional Information Sharing SNORT Proper name of an open-source System Network intrusion detection system RNA Ribonucleic Acid SONET Synchronous Optical Network ROC Regional Operations Centers SPAWAR Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command (Navy) RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade RTO Response Technology Objective SRA Strategic Research Area S&T Science & Technology SWAT Special Weapons And Tactics SAIC Science Applications T&E Test and Evaluation International Corporation TACAS Thermal Access Control and SARC Surveillance and Reconnaissance Authorization Systems Center TACCS Threat Analysis and Critical SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Control Point Syndrome TADMUS Tactical Decision Making Under SART State Animal Response Teams Stress SATURN Statewide Anti-Terrorist Unified TASSS Tulsa Area Syndromic Response Network Surveillance System SAW/IMS Surface Acoustic Wave / Ion TD Technology Demonstration Mobility Spectrometry TEW Terrorism Early Warning SBCCOM Soldier & Biological Chemical (Group) Command (Army) TIC Toxic Industrial Chemicals SCA Software Communications Architecture TIGER Team Integrated Electronic Response SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition TIM Toxic Industrial Material SCBA Self-Contained Breathing TRANSCOM Transportation Command Apparatus TRC Terrorism Research Center, Inc. SESI IR MS Systems Engineering Solutions, TRL Technology Readiness Level Inc. Infrared Mass Spectrometry TSR Technical Search and Rescue SIGINT Signals Intelligence TSWG Technical Support Working SIGP Single Integrated Ground Picture Group SIP Single Integrated Picture UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle SLD Second Line of Defense UGS Unattended Ground Sensors SMART Situation Management and UIC Unified Incident Command Awareness in Real Time Decision Support and SMO Semiconducting Metal Oxides Interoperable Communications SMPTE Society of Motion Picture and UNWD Unconventional Nuclear Television Engineers Weapons Defense

256

PROJECT RESPONDER Acronyms

UPS United Parcel Service VMAT Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams USAMRIID United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious VR Virtual Reality Diseases VTC Video Teleconferencing USAR Urban Search and Rescue WATS Wide-Area Tracking System USDA United States Department of Agriculture WET Weather, Enemy and Terrain USMC United States Marine Corps WETT Weather, Enemy, Threats, and Terrain UV Ultraviolet WHO World Health Organization UWB Ultra Wide Band WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction VLSTRACK Vapor Liquid and Solid Tracking XML eXtensible Markup Language

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PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix B

258

PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix C Home Agencies of Project Participants And Interviewees

Congress FEMA Senior Advisor for Terrorism

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and FEMA National Technology Transfer Center Capabilities, Senate Armed Services Committee FEMA WMD Resource Database Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Massachusetts Committee on Government Reform Task Force 1 House Republican Conference Terrorism Department of Justice Working Group FBI Counterterrorism Division, Domestic Executive Office of the President Terrorism WMD Group National Security Council National Institute of Justice

Office of Homeland Security FBI Laboratory

Office of Management and Budget FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit Office of Science and Technology Policy National Department of Defense Security and International Affairs Division Interagency Board for Equipment Department of Homeland Security Standardization and Interoperability Science and Technology Directorate Technical Support Working Group

Emergency Preparedness and Response Office of the Undersecretary of Defense Directorate (Comptroller)

Office of the Chief Counsel Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (DATSD) for Counterproliferation and Chem- Bureau of Transportation and Security Bio Defense (CP&CBD) Directorate, Office of Domestic Preparedness Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense National Domestic Preparedness Office (Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict)

Plum Island Disease Center Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense National Emergency Training Center for Civil Support

National Bioterrorism Detection and Analysis Joint Staff Deputy Directorate for Combating Assessment Center Terrorism (J-34)

259 PROJECT RESPONDER DRAFT Appendix C

Joint Forces Command Joint Task Force (Civil Food and Drug Administration, Center for Food Support) Safety and Applied Nutrition

US Army Communications and Electronics Department of Agriculture Command Office of Crisis Planning and Management US Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense Homeland Security Staff

US Army Medical Research Institute of Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), Office Infectious Diseases of Food Safety and Emergency Preparedness

US Army Soldier Biological and Chemical Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Command Agricultural Research Service US Marine Corps Systems Command Department of Transportation US Marine Corps Security Force Battalion Office of Emergency Transportation US Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory

National Guard Bureau National Academy of Sciences

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Environmental Protection Agency

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Central Intelligence Agency

Defense Intelligence Agency State and Local Jurisdictions National Defense University Arlington County, VA, Fire Department

Department of Energy Baltimore MD Department of Health Sandia National Laboratories Baton Rouge LA Coroner’s Office

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Baton Rouge LA Police Department Laboratory Boston Emergency Management Agency Department of Commerce Boston Emergency Medical Service National Institute of Standards and Technology, Office of Law Enforcement Standards Boston Fire Department

Department of State Chicago Department of Public Health Office of the Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Chicago Office of Emergency Management City of Tulsa Department of Public Works Department of Health and Human Services City of Tulsa Fire Department/HAZMAT Team

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention City of Tulsa Health Department Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program Commonwealth of Virginia Chief Veterinarian

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PROJECT RESPONDER Home Agencies of Project Participants And Interviewees

District of Columbia Emergency Management New York City Mayor’s Office of Emergency Agency Management

District of Columbia Metropolitan Transit Police Oklahoma City Metropolitan Medical Response System Fairfax County HAZMAT Response Unit Oklahoma City/County Health Department Fairfax County Police Department Orange County, CA, Sheriff Department of the Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue/ Coroner Virginia Task Force 1/USAID SAR Team 1 Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture Fire Department of New York City Pennsylvania Department of Health Fishers, IN, Fire Department Philadelphia Police Department Harris County TX Department of Public Health Pittsfield, MA, Fire Department Illinois Department of Public Health Redlands, CA, Police Department Kansas City MO Health Department San Diego Sheriff’s Department Los Angeles City Fire Department Salt Lake City Corporation Management Services Los Angeles Department of the Coroner Department

Los Angeles County Fire Department Salt Lake City Fire Department Special Operations Coordinator Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Emergency Operations Bureau Seattle Fire Department

Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Seattle Urban Search and Rescue/Metropolitan Group Medical Strike Team

Los Angeles Police Department Sheffield, MA, Police Department

Matteson, IL, Police Department South Carolina Law Enforcement Department

Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority Utah Department of Health

Miami/Dade County Office of Emergency Utah Department of Public Safety Management Tulsa Area Emergency Management Agency Miami/Dade County Urban Search and Rescue

Montgomery County Fire Department Private/Academic/Research Organizations North Carolina Department of Agriculture and American Meat Institute Consumer Services, Emergency Programs Division American Phytopathological Society

New Hampshire Office of Emergency American Veterinary Medical Association Management Auburn University

261 PROJECT RESPONDER DRAFT Appendix C

Aurora Safety Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies Banfield Pet Hospital, Fredericksburg, VA National Research Council Cactus Technology Nuclear Threat Initiative Center for Strategic and International Studies OrthoOklahoma Healthcare CMI-Services Radix Corporation Communications Applied Technology RAND Corporation Cornell University Sabiosi, Inc Cugaar Software Science Applications International Corporation Dartmouth University Media Labs Southern Research Institute Defense Group Inc. Tex-Shield, Inc Drexel University Tulsa Hillcrest Health Care System Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology University of Kansas

GenCon, Inc. University of Florida

Institute for Defense Analysis University of Georgia at Griffin

Institute for the Study of Terrorism and Political University of Guelph, Canada Violence University of Maryland, Baltimore, National International Association of Chiefs of Police Study Center for Trauma and EMS

Lion Apparel University of Nebraska

Louisiana State University University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public Health Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Service Systems University of Texas at Austin Institute for Advanced Technology McDonalds Corporation University of Texas, San Antonio MIT Lincoln Labs University of Texas Medical Branch (Galveston) MITRE Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Monmouth University University

Natick Labs Washington State University National Association of Emergency Medical Technicians

262

PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix D About the Authors and Editors

GUY BEAKLEY, PH.D., is Vice President of C4ISR biomedical research specialist at the Johnson for Hicks & Associates, Inc., senior scientist of Manned Spacecraft Center. He then came to the DoD/Intelligence Community Motion Walter Reed Army Institute of Research where he Imagery Standards Board, and a member of the became Chief, Department of Experimental SAIC Executive Science and Technology Council, Psychophysiology. He founded Behavioral a small group of scientists and technologists Technology Consultants, Inc, which was a selected from SAIC and Telcordia as representa- research, teaching, and consulting firm special- tive of the highest standards of technical quality. ized in behavioral research and treatment pro- Recent programs he led include full-motion wire- grams, office automation technology develop- less video, voice and data communications sys- ment, and research on human stress and fatigue. tem, International Telecommunication Union and NATO standards development, higher order Now at GenCon, he has developed various con- protocols for Common Data Link, distance learn- ferences and workshops for senior professionals, ing using optical fiber networks and satellites, and organized congressional briefings concerned and future imaging systems meeting the require- particularly with issues confronting genomic ments of Joint Vision 2010. His current interests researchers, administrators and legislators in the include high resolution systems for precision tar- emerging threats arena. Through GenCon he has geting, new technology compression systems, and developed concept proposals for technology broadband communications systems for urban assessments investigating how to optimize surveil- and mobile environments. Prior to joining Hicks lance and containment strategies through detec- & Associates he was Director of Government tion devices technology development. On Programs for Optivision, Inc., Vice President of emerging threats to food and agriculture, he has Research and Development for Scientific-Atlanta, focused especially on emerging threats of radical Inc. and Head of Image Processing Research at environmental and animal rights organizations to Sarnoff. He is a member of MPEG, IEEE, modern U.S. agricultural biotechnology and to SMPTE, AFCEA, author of more than 60 papers contemporary agricultural and food production and the recipient of the 1996 SMPTE Journal processes and processor organizations. Award for most outstanding paper. Dr. Beakley received a B.E. in Electrical Engineering from THOMAS M. GARWIN is Vice President of Hicks Vanderbilt University and M.S., M.Phil., and & Associates, Inc., where he undertakes national Ph.D. degrees from Yale University in security research and consulting tasks, primarily Engineering and Applied Science. for the Departments of Energy and Defense. He has focused on counter-terrorism, counter-prolif- THOMAS W. F RAZIER is the President of the eration, defense transformation, and the health of National Consortium for Genomic Resources the nuclear weapons stockpile. Before joining Management and Services (GenCon). Dr. Frazier Hicks & Associates, Mr. Garwin served on the is an experimental and physiological psychologist professional staff of the Committee on Armed with a research and management background in Services of the U.S. House of Representatives. aerospace and military biomedical research pro- Mr. Garwin managed the full committee’s hear- grams. Prior to creating GenCon, he was a ings and developed policies on defense budgets

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and force structure, military roles and missions, Technologies, where he supports public sector European and Asian security, and export controls. projects related to Telcordia’s core telecommuni- As a policy and economics advisor to Committee cations and IT functions. Mr. Hammill repre- Chairman Les Aspin, Mr. Garwin helped formu- sents Telcordia as a member of the FCC’s late policy initiatives regarding post-Cold War National Reliability and Interoperability national security strategy, military force posture, Committee (NRIC-VI), Homeland Security technology development, and defense conversion. Public Safety Committee; and through the Before joining the House Armed Services MITRE Corporation, represents Telcordia in the Committee, Mr. Garwin served as the American Partnership for Public Warning, which will Coordinator of the Nuclear History Program at become a Federal Advisory Committee for the the University of Maryland. In this position, he standardization of emergency warning for the oversaw the startup of a multimillion-dollar inter- United States. In this capacity, Mr. Hammill national research and training program. As a serves as chair of the Operating System Standards full-time consultant to the John D. and Committee for Public Warning Technology, and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation from 1985 co-chair of the Standards Terminology through 1987, Mr. Garwin helped define priori- Committee. ties, select grantees, and solidify support for the Foundation’s $20 million-a-year International HAL KEMPFER of Knowledge & Intelligence Security Program. Mr. Garwin previously served Program Professionals (KIPP) is a public and pri- as an analyst with the U.S. Congressional Office vate sector intelligence professional with over fif- of Technology Assessment from 1983 to 1985, teen years of experience in the field. Involved where he managed research on the role of com- with business intelligence since 1992, Hal has putation and communications in future U.S. eco- had subsequent lengthy engagements involved nomic growth. From 1981 to 1983, he was a with cutting-edge law enforcement and military researcher with the Brookings Institution, where intelligence program initiatives. Lieutenant he analyzed OPEC’s role in oil markets and Colonel Kempfer, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, related national security issues. Mr. Garwin was completed a tour overseas last year as the a senior consultant to the Analytic Assessments Director of Intelligence (J-2) of the Combined Corporation from 1978 to 1983, where he Joint Task Force for Consequence Management, invented “tagging” systems for arms control veri- and is currently the Marine Emergency fication. He also analyzed intelligence collection Preparedness Liaison Officer for California, systems and requirements, wartime command Arizona, Nevada and Hawaii. KIPP is teamed and control, and nuclear targeting issues. Mr. with leading companies in the area of competitive Garwin worked in the Office of the Assistant intelligence and strategic risk management with a Secretary of Defense for International Affairs variety of clients in government and industry. from 1976 to 1977, where he represented the Hal currently appears on ABC 7 television and Office of the Secretary of Defense on National NPR radio in Southern California as a military Security Council Task Forces concerning defense and terrorism analyst, and lectures at the strategy, technology, and arms control. Mr. National Interagency Civil-Military Institute. Garwin holds a Master of Public Policy from Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of DR. STEVEN KORNGUTH is currently the Director Government and an A.B. degree in History from of Chemical and Biological Defense at the Harvard College. In 1994, Mr. Garwin returned Institute for Advanced Technology and visiting to the Kennedy School to attend the Program for Professor of Neurobiology at the University of Senior Executives in National and International Texas at Austin. Dr. Kornguth is Principle Security. Investigator on the University of Texas Compo- nent of the Biological Chemical Countermeasures JAMES HAMMILL is Vice President for Effort of a National Consortium. He has research Government Special Projects at Telcordia activities in sensors, magnetic resonance imaging

264

PROJECT RESPONDER About the Authors and Editors

and human performance. Dr. Kornguth has a sensors, electronic components, electronic war- B.S. Chemistry from Columbia University, a fare, space platforms, space propulsion, medical M.S. in Biochemistry and Ph.D. Biochemistry sensing, and space sensors. From 1993 1996 he from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. served as Director for Research, in the Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, MR. BRETT KRIGER was Deputy Director of the where he managed the $1.1B Department of Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness Defense (DoD) Basic Research Program, chaired from 1990 to 1997. He has over 30 years of the Defense Committee on Research, managed domestic and international military and civilian the DoD Multidisciplinary University Research experience in all aspects of planning, training, Program, and established the DoD Strategic and exercise development and evaluation for all- Research Objectives and first Basic Research Plan. hazards including: national security, CBRNE Before joining OSD, he was Assistant Director accidents/incidents, nuclear weapon accidents, for Smart Weapons, Tactical Technology Office, nuclear power plants, industrial chemicals, and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency terrorist attack. He is an expert in emergency (DARPA). He directed programs in smart response and has coordinated planning teams to weapons, sensor development, sensor processing, develop WMD incident management plans, was and automatic target recognition; he also chaired a Team Leader for the National Guard WMD the DARPA Neural Network Study. Dr. Lupo Study, and a member of the planning team and a has a Ph.D. in Physics from Georgetown player/controller for the FBI series of Improvised University. Nuclear Device exercises held prior to the Atlanta Olympics. He assisted in the development of the JOHN W. LYONS, PH.D., is a physical chemist, initial guidelines for the Chemical Stockpile technology consultant, retired director of the Emergency Preparedness Program and serves as a Army Research Laboratory (ARL), and member Regional Coordinator and Team Leader for of the National Academy of Engineering. He FEMA’s Radiological Emergency Preparedness served in research and development positions Program. He is a nationally recognized expert in with the Monsanto Company for 18 years. In WMD planning and response with extensive 1973 he joined the Commerce Department’s qualifications in developing state and local terror- National Bureau of Standards (NBS). At NBS, ist incident response capabilities. Lyons was the first director of the Center for Fire Research. In 1990, Dr. Lyons was appointed by JASPER C. LUPO, PH.D., is Director of Sensor President George H.W. Bush to be the ninth Systems and Principal Scientist at Applied director of NBS; by that time renamed the Research Associates, Inc. He leads ARA pro- National Institute of Standards and Technology grams in the areas of space and defense, especially (NIST). In September 1993, he was appointed sensor initiatives. Dr. Lupo is a senior technolo- the first permanent director of ARL. At ARL, gist with over thirty years experience in conduct- Dr. Lyons managed a broad array of science and ing and leading defense research and develop- technology programs. He has served on many ment, from the laboratory to the Office of boards and commissions, to include the Federal Secretary of Defense. This experience is mainly Advisory Commission on Consolidation and in science and technology, but spans the range Conversion of Defense Research and from basic research to early production. Many of Development Laboratories. He currently serves his projects have been fielded or been incorpo- on two boards of visitors at the University of rated into fielded military systems. From 1996 Maryland. He is a member of the National to 2001 he served as Director, Sensor Systems, Research Council’s Board on Army Science Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense and Technology, as well as a member of a (OSD) for Science and Technology, where he congressionally chartered committee at the managed the $1.4B Department of Defense National Defense University to study the poten- (DoD) science and technology investment in tial effectiveness of the DoD laboratories in the

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PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix D

transformed military of the future. Dr. Lyons MICHELLE ROYAL is Director for Strategic was elected to the National Academy of Planning at Hicks & Associates, Inc., where she Engineering in 1985. He is a Fellow of the supports technology planning for the Memorial American Association for the Advancement of Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), Science and of the Washington Academy of and the Border and Transportation Security Science, and is a member of the American Administration within the Department of Chemical Society and of Sigma Xi. Homeland Security (DHS). Prior to joining Hicks & Associates, Inc., Ms. Royal was a Project LOU MASON is Director of Logistics Director at Science Applications International Transformation at the Hicks & Associates Corporation, where she was responsible for pro- Advanced Systems and Concepts Office. Prior to gram management of a number of projects, arriving at Hicks & Associates, he was the including a market survey and analysis of the DARPA Program Manager for the Logistic high explosives market (to include DoD, foreign, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations, and private industry procurement and demilita- including the Joint Logistics ACTD and the Joint rization), DoD ODISC4 Smart Card/Common Theater Logistics ACTD, with the mission to Access Card/Public Key Infrastructure analytical develop and integrate web-based Joint Logistics support, and an assessment of the U.S. solid Decision Support Tools (JDSTs) into the Global rocket-motor propellant market for a foreign pro- Combat Support System. Several of his products pellant manufacturer. In addition to program are currently being integrated into the GCSS management duties, Ms. Royal supported the CINC/JTF and Army Logistics Transformation development of technology roadmaps for the Air Agency programs. Lou came to DARPA from Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). Prior to MITRE Corporation, where as a Senior Lead joining SAIC, Ms. Royal was an Intelligence Engineer, he was the GCSS Task Lead for the Research Specialist for the Federal Bureau of DARPA/DISA Joint Program Office (JPO). He Investigation, where she conducted research and is a retired Army logistician with over 36 years analysis for foreign counterintelligence opera- experience in strategic and operational planning, tions. Ms. Royal has a B.A. in International analysis, and logistic systems integration. He has Relations and Italian, an M.A. in Security Policy extensive joint logistics and Special Operations Studies, and an M.B.A. from The George experience, and has authored key joint logistics Washington University. doctrine. While on active duty in the Army, he served as the Director of Operations for the NEAL A. POLLARD, J.D., is Vice President, Army Material Command, the Deputy Chief of Emerging Threats & Capabilities, at Hicks & Staff for Logistics U.S. Army Special Operations Associates, Inc., where he leads Project Command, Commander of the Special Responder, as well as consults on numerous gov- Operations Support Command, Chief of ernment projects as a terrorism expert, technol- Organization and Mission Defense Logistics ogy planner, and national security lawyer. Mr. Agency, and Chief of Supply Systems U.S. Forces Pollard has over twelve years of experience in Korea. Lou has supported numerous DARPA researching terrorism and transnational threats, projects, including the Logistics for the Warrior and eight years’ experience developing counterter- Program, the Logistics Anchor Desk, and the rorism strategies and plans. In 1996, Mr. Pollard Advanced Logistics Program (ALP). He is a co-founded the Terrorism Research Center, Inc. graduate of the Army War College and the Army (TRC), an institute with representation in seven Command and General Staff College. Lou is also countries worldwide, and dedicated to research a graduate of the University of Southern and analysis of terrorism, counterterrorism policy Mississippi, and holds advanced degrees from and strategy development, and public informa- Georgia State University and the University of tion and education. Mr. Pollard continues North Alabama. to serve on the TRC Board of Directors.

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PROJECT RESPONDER About the Authors and Editors

Mr. Pollard holds degrees in mathematics and and information technology systems. For more political science, an M.Litt. in International than 26 years, Dr. Reagor and her department Security Studies from the University of St. worked on such events as World Trade Center Andrews, Scotland, and a Juris Doctor cum laude Bombings, Pentagon Bombing, Mt. Saint Helens, from the Georgetown University Law Center, Hurricane Andrew, the Hinsdale Fire, the where he specialized in international and national Northridge Earthquake, the Oklahoma City security law. Federal Building Bombing and many more disasters associated with fires, floods, hurricanes, MARIA E. POWELL, PH.D., is a Senior Director earthquakes, and dust storms. She has been the with the Terrorism Research Center. Her main Telcordia Spokesperson for Homeland Security portfolio includes work with the emergency and Critical Infrastructure Protection since the responder community and technologists to define September 11th Terrorist Attacks, and is coordina- requirements, priorities, and roadmaps in order tor of the Telcordia Task Force in support of the to develop a national technology planning U.S. Governments Homeland Security initiatives. process for capabilities to respond to terrorism; Over the past 3 years, Dr. Reagor lead the and to develop a model of the Terrorism Early research, development and commercialization of Warning Group concept that can be tailored and an advanced messaging platform ideally suited for replicated in other local jurisdictions. From Public Safety Notification for large and small- 1997-2003, Dr. Powell was a Project Analyst/ scale emergencies, including hurricanes, floods, Director with Science Applications International gas leaks and missing children. She is currently Corporation where she specialized in terrorism, on the Interim Board of Directors for a newly nuclear strategies, biological technologies, non- forming FACA organization called the lethal weapons, and the Revolution in Military “Partnership for Public Warning.” Dr. Reagor Affairs. Dr. Powell has also worked on demining has a B.Sc. in Chemistry, an M.S. in Organic issues in the Department of Humanitarian Affairs Chemistry, and a Ph.D. in Inorganic Laser of the United Nations in New York, and was a Chemistry from Seton Hall University. member of a delegation to a preparatory conference in Geneva for the Convention on Certain ROBERT V. T UOHY is Vice President for Strategic Conventional Weapons. Dr. Powell received Planning at Hicks & Associates, Inc. Since com- a B.A. in Russian and Political Science from ing to Hicks, Mr. Tuohy has been advising several Allegheny College, and an M.Phil. and Ph.D. government and non-government organizations in International Relations from the University of on technology planning. Besides leading the St. Andrews, Scotland, where she focused on ter- development of Project Responder’s National rorism, police and intelligence cooperation to Technology Plan for Responding to Terrorism, he combat terrorism in the European Community, is also assisting the Department of Homeland and the interplay between international humani- Security in developing processes for addressing tarian law and arms control in the context of the their Border & Transportation Security technol- landmine and chemical weapons regimes. ogy needs. Prior to joining Hicks & Associates, Mr. Tuohy served as the Director of Science and BARBARA REAGOR, PH.D., is Vice President for Technology Plans & Programs in the Office of Homeland Security and Government Markets, at the Secretary of Defense. Mr. Tuohy was respon- Telcordia Technologies. Dr. Reagor has worked sible for developing and coordinating the for the last 33 years in the fields of Broadband Department’s science and technology strategic Networking, Enterprise Management Solutions, planning and program assessment activities. Mr. e-Business Solutions, Community Notification Tuohy has a B.A. in Applied Behavioral Sciences (Reverse 9-1-1), Disaster Prevention & Recovery, from National-Louis University, and an M.S. in Crisis Management, Chemical Contamination, Science and Technology Commercialization from Network Reliability and Network Risk the University of Texas at Austin. Assessment associated with telecommunications

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PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix D

268

PROJECT RESPONDER Index

Appendix E Index

1st Marine Expeditionary Force 199 All-Source Information Fusion viii, 205-206 (MEF) and Analysis System 2G/3G 68, 249 All-Source Situational iii, viii, xi, xiv, Understanding (ASU) 94, 189-190, 54th Quartermaster (U.S. Army) 171 194-195, 206, 249 7th Transportation Command 174 alpha radiation 36 (U.S. Army) alternate power sources 87 9/11 94 Alternate/Mobile Hospital vii, 101, 107, access control 70, 167, 185, 256 Contingencies 116-118, 124, 126 acoustic detectors 181 Amber Alert System 88 Active Citizen 197-198 American Association of 218, 249 Activity Based Sensors 36 Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians (AAVLD) Advanced Concept Technology 4, 73, 78-79, Demonstration (ACTD) 134, 170, 193, American Farm Bureau 224 205-206, 244-245, American Phytopathological Society 226, 261 249, 266 American Red Cross 90, 212 Advanced Technology Demonstrations 4, 161, (ATD) 245, 249 American Type Culture Collection 156, 249 (ATCC) Advice Nurse 129 Ames, IA USDA Center 218 Aeromedical Isolation Team 157 Animal and Plant Diagnostic Surge 216 aerosol dispersal 130-131 Capacity Aerosol Gel 36 Animal and Plant Health 221-222, 224, 226, aerostats 174 Inspection Service (APHIS) 238-239, 249, 260, 275 Affordable Specimen Transport 142 for CW/BW Animal Genomic Structures 8 Affymetrix 150 animal tags 224 agricultural bioterrorism 221 Animal Vaccine Stockpile 227 AIDS 123, 153, 249 ANSI 102 68 Alion Corp 158

269

PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix E

anthrax vi, 15, 22, 92, 96, 120, batteries 65, 71, 88, 164, 171-173 127, 130, 133, 135, 141-142, Beta Radiation 36 144, 153, 210, 214, 240 Bio Threat Consequence 43, 249 antibiotics 32, 119-122, 136, Management (BTCM) 149, 159, 218 Bio-Defense Initiative 43 Anti-Terrorism Information 195, 198, 250 Center (ATIC) Bio-Event Advanced Leading 147, 249 Indicator Recognition (BioALIRT) anti-toxins 119 bio-genomics 211 antivirals 119-121, 136, 141, 159 bioinformatics 224 Apple Computer 66 Biological Agents iii, v, vii, ix, xi, 6-7, 15, 22, Applied Biosystems 150 32-33, 38, 41-42, 44, 53, Applied Physics Laboratory 128 54-56, 85, 119-121, 130, 132-133, 141-142, 145, ArboNet 222 147-153, 156-158, 160-162, Area Secure Operations 72, 193, 249 183, 210, 214, 219, 221 Command and Control (ASOCC) biological toxins 141, 218 Armed Forces Radiobiology 18, 22 Biological Warfare Agents 54, 145 Research Institute biomarkers ix, 7-8, 142, 144, Army Medical Command 152 150-151, 159-160, 220 Army Telemedicine Program 49 biometrics 70, 132-133, 137, Artificial Intelligence Virtual Clinician 135 139, 152, 180, 186, 209 Assessment of Safe Air, Sea and 164, 174-175 Biosafety Level 218 Ground Bases of Operations Biosite 150 (Supply Depots) Blackberry 181 Association of Public Safety 68 Communications Officials Blue Cross/Blue Shield 146 Automated Decision Aid System 40, 249 body protection v, 11, 16, 23, 25-27, 29 for Hazardous Incidents (ADASHI) Bomb Damage Assessment 50 Automated Information Systems (AIS) 70, 249 Bovine Spongiform 215, 240, 249 Automatic Generation and 164, 169, 175 Encephalopathy (BSE) Assessment of Supply Requirements Bronx Zoo 146 bacteria 32, 120, 141, 149, Building Model Generator (BMG) 50, 249 151, 154, 233, 240 Bureau of Diplomatic Security 210 bandwidth 7, 45, 68, 74, 105, 118, 135, 137, 174, 184, Burning Man 198 194, 198, 204, 206, 222 California Anti-Terrorism 195, 198, 250 bar code vii, 85, 125, 137, Information Center (CTIC) 151, 166, 168, 185

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PROJECT RESPONDER Index

California Office of Emergency 184, 255 Coast Guard 193, 219 Services (OES) cold zone 86, 208, 211 California Polytechnic University 204 Collection and Dissemination 33-34, 38, CAMEO 73, 250 of Weather and Environmental 47, 145 Conditions Capillary Electrophoresis 36 Combined Effects Modeling v, 46, 48, 58, 61 Capitol Wireless Integrated 193, 250 for Urban Canyons Network (CapWIN) Command Post Information 203, 250 Carrier Grade Notification 89, 250 Environment (CPIE) Systems (CGNS) Command Post of the Future (CPOF) 203, 250 Casualty Management System vii, 125, 137-139 commercial carriers 173 Casualty Management System 137 Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) 12, 63, 65, Architecture 70, 72, 250 CBRNE Effects Modeling and v, 33-34, 45, commercialization iv, xii-xiv, 3, 9, Simulation 58, 145, 152-153 77, 84-85, 95-96, 136-138, 161, 169, CECOM 43, 65-66, 72, 90, 187, 228, 235, 240, 172, 174, 250 243, 246, 267 Cell Based Sensors 36 Common Access Card (CAC) 70, 250, 266 Centers for Disease Control 45, 108-109, 114, Common Operational Picture 67, 107, 114, (CDC) 116, 123, 128, 143, (COP) 124-125, 191, 198, 153, 155-156, 160, 201, 203-204, 250 212, 222, 226, 250, 260 Communications Electronics 43, 65-66, 72, Cerner 125, 145 Command (CECOM) 90, 172, 174, chain of custody 156, 209, 211 250, 260 Chem Bio Response Aid (CoBRA) 40, 73, 250 Community Intelligence 197, 250 Coordination Center (CICC) Chemical Agents v-vi, ix, 6-7, 32, 38, 42, 53-55, 59, 61, Community Notification 89, 250 83, 108, 128, 210, 231 Systems (CNS) Chemical Biological Response 40, 73, 250 Consequence Assessment Tool 45, 117, Aide (CoBRA) Set (CATS) 196, 250 chemical decontamination 83, 234 Consequence Management 32, 40, 43, 100, 115, 185, 189-190, Chiron 150 193, 195-196, 203, Cisco Systems, Inc. 70 249-250, 264 Citizen Mobilization Team (CMT) 196, 250 Consequence Management 203, 250 Information System (CMIS) Classification and Mitigation 33-34, 40, 84, 95 contagious 8, 32, 133, 141-143, classified information 70, 130, 199, 205 148, 152, 154-158, 161, 217 CNN 73, 250

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PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix E

containment 32, 96, 126, 142-143, Data Correlation Engines 70 145, 148, 152, 154, data fusion 43-45, 193 157, 159, 183, 227, 230, 233, 235, 263 data mining 72, 74, 78, 123, 148, 158-159, 166, 190, 229 Contaminated Evidence 207, 209 Recovery and Preservation data standards 148 Contaminated Victim vi, 94, 97, 135-136 Daubert test 210 Knowledge Base DaVinci 72 Coordination between Law 207, 211 Enforcement and Public decision support tool 72, 145, 155, 165, 167, Health Authorities 169-170, 174, 253, 266 Coordination of Animal and 147, 216, decontamination v-vii, ix, 5, 11, 16, 22-23, Plant Entities with Public 220, 222 25, 28-29, 36, 40, 48, 52, Health, Law Enforcement, 81-86, 88, 91-92, 94-97, and State, Local, and Federal 120-121, 127, 131-132, Government and Industry 138-139, 157, 183, 208, 211, 215-216, 232-234, CorpNet 103 239-240 Course of Action (COA) 64, 139, 189, Defense Advanced 39-41, 49, 65, 70, 90, 93, 195, 250 Research Projects 134, 147, 151, 168, 170, Agency (DARPA) 174, 182, 193, 203, 208, Course of Action Development vii, 63-64, 219, 239, 250-251, 260, 101, 109, 265-266 117-118, 189 Defense Collaborative Tool Suite 72, 74, 251 credentialed 133, 185 Defense Information Systems 193, 251, 266 criminal intelligence analysts 179 Agency (DISA) Criminal Investigation and iii, xi, xiv, Defense Logistics Agency 167, 251, 266 Attribution (CI) 207, 250 Defense Technology Objective 42 Crisis Evaluation and iii, viii, xi, xiv, 177, Management (CE) 186-187, 199, 250 Defense Threat Reduction 39, 43-45, 47, 50, Agency (DTRA) 102, 115, 117, 251, 260 Crop “Hardening” 228 definitive decontamination 84, 120-121, 131 Crop Disease and Contamination 225 Dell 167 Cybercop Secure Portal 193 Department of xii, 1, 3-4, 6, 18, 23-26, DARPA 39-41, 49, 65, 70, 90, Defense (DoD) 28, 32, 36, 39, 43-44, 93, 134, 147, 151, 168, 46-48, 50-55, 57-60, 70, 170, 174, 182, 193, 76-78, 84, 87, 90, 93, 96, 203, 208, 219, 239, 104, 113-114, 123, 130, 250-251, 265-266 133-134, 147, 157, 172-173, DARPA “Force Provider” 90 181, 187, 193, 199, 205, 213-214, 244-245, 251, DARPA Advanced Diagnostics Program 49 259, 263, 265-266 DARPA Syndromic 41, 251 Department of Defense Joint Medical 134 Surveillance System (D-S3) Operations – Telemedicine Program

272

PROJECT RESPONDER Index

Department of Energy 33, 36, 151, 183, Disaster Relief and Emergency 125, 251 (DOE) 200, 213, 251, 260 Medical Service (DREAMS) Department of Health and 150, 212, 252, 260 Disposing of CBRNE Devices 177, 183 Human Services distance learning 84, 103-105 Department of Homeland xi, 4-5, 13, 75, 102, DNA viii, 150, 151, 171, Security 117, 123, 133, 176, 225, 228, 251 155-156, 158, 182, 199, 212, 243, 245-246, DoD Office of Technology 251, 259, 266-267 Transition 84 Department of Justice xi, 179, 259 Domestic Emergency Response 197-198, 251 Information Service (DERIS) Department of State 201, 260 Doppler 130 Department of 87, 156, 251, 260 Transportation dosimeters 35, 37, 86 Detection, Identification, iii, v, ix, xi, xiv, 5-7, Drug Enforcement 180, 193, 251 and Assessment (DIDA) 16, 21, 23, 31-34, 37, Administration (DEA) 39-42, 44, 46, 48-49, 51, 56, 61, 64, 81-83, Dry Decontamination 22, 131-132, 139 86-87, 95, 107, 121-125, Dual GC 36 127-128, 131, 135, 141, 165, 174, 184, 208-209, E9-1-1 65-66, 88 214, 218-219, 223, 233, East Carolina University 134 235, 251 Ebola 141 Detector Arrays and 33-34, 38, 42, 47, 145 Networks Eclipsys 145 Determined Promise 03 214 Edgewood Chemical and 85, 132, 251 Biological Center (ECBC) Diagnostic Assays 234 E-learning 103 Digesters and Plasma viii, 232, 240-242 Burners Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) 37, 113, 239, 251 Digital Area Thermography 49 Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) 202, 251 digital fingerprinting 70, 181 Electronic Surveillance System 44, 147, 251 Disaster Assistance Employees 133, 250 for the Early Notification of (DAEs) Community-based Epidemics Disaster Management 193, 196, 203 (ESSENCE) Integration Services EMALL 167, 251 (DMI-Services) Emergency Broadcast System 88 Disaster Medical Assistance 133, 251 Teams (DMAT) Emergency Digital Information 184, 251 System (EDIS) Disaster Mortuary Operational 92, 251 Response Team (DMORT) Emergency Management 226, 251 Assistance Compact (EMAC)

273

PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix E

Emergency Management iii, vi, xi, xiv, 91, 99, Establish Emergency 101, 110, 112 Preparation and Planning 101, 114, 118, 133, Operations Center (EMPP) 173, 185-186, 251 Establishment of Perimeters 81-82, 86, 229 Emergency Management 112 Evacuation/In-Place Shelter 81-82, 90, 93 XML Consortium Management Emergency Medical Alert 201, 251 evidence 91, 102, 156, 171, 178, Network (EMAN) 183, 207, 209-211, 213, 234 Emergency Medical 108, 120, 124-125, 144, Exotic Newcastle Disease 234, 238, 251 Services 193, 212, 251, 260, 262 (END) Emergency Notification 88-89, 251 Expanded eXtensible Markup 102-103, 112 Systems (ENS) Language/ xTensible Markup Emergency Operations 99-101, 103, 108-113, Language (EXML/XML) Center (EOC) 115-118, 124-125, 197, Explosive and Incendiary Devices 33 200, 212, 251 Explosive Sniffing Robots 38 Emergency Regional 204, 251 Response Systems (EMERRS) exposure vi-vii, 7-9, 18, 22, 28, 32-34, 38, 40, 43, 45, Energy Systems Transformation 200 48-49, 51-53, 58-59, 61, Initiative 75-76, 78-79, 95, 119-121, Enhanced Consequence 40-41, 147, 251 123, 126, 129-130, Management Planning and 132-134, 141-145, 148-150, Support System (ENCOMPASS) 152, 154, 159-161, 186, 218, 220, 227, 230, 235, 239 Enhanced Fumigation viii, 234, 240 Technology facial recognition 70, 178, 180-181, 208-209 Enteyosys 70 Facilities Resource 109, 252 Emergency Database (FRED) Environmental Monitoring 21, 38, 42, 47, 219 Facilities/Infrastructure Hardening 101, 113 Environmental Protection 43, 83, 91, false negatives 36, 149, 151, 159, 186 Agency (EPA) 251, 260 false positives 36, 83, 149-151, 186, 219 Environmental Protection 46 FBI 104, 179-180, 190, 193, Agency’s Office of Research 195-196, 200, 208, 210, and Development 221, 251, 259, 265 Enzyme Based Devices 36 FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force 195 Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent 218, 251 FBINET 180 Assay (ELISA) Federal Biodefense Program 223 Epidemiological Information 152, 211 Federal Emergency 87, 89, 91, 102, Escape Mask 24-25, 29 Management Agency (FEMA) 104, 111, Escape Respiratory Protection v, 11, 16, 113-114, 117, 23-25, 28-29 133, 166, 169, 252, 259, 265 ESRI 197, 251

274

PROJECT RESPONDER Index

Federal Express 125, 156 gamma rays 33, 36, 38-39, 42, 52-53 Federal Urban Search and 89 Gas Chromatography 36, 252 Rescue Task Forces Surface Acoustic Wave (GCSAW) FEMA 87, 89, 91, 102, 104, Geiger counters 22 111, 113-114, 117, 133, gel cells 172 166, 169, 252, 259, 265 Genetic Assay 36 FEMA HAZUS-MH 117 System Genetically Modified Animals 228 fiber optic 38, 182 Genetically Modified Organisms 228, 252 (GMO) field hospitals 107, 125-126, 155 GENOA 194 Field Inventory Survey Tool 40, 252 (FIST) Genomic Test 160 Field Screening and Assessment viii, 220, genomic-based tests 150 235-236, 242 genomics 8, 211, 219-220, FIREBIRD 180 224, 229 Flame Ionization Detector (FID) 36, 252 Geographical Information 42, 45, 87, 93, 102, System (GIS) 106, 109, 117, 123, Flame Photometric Detector (FPD) 36, 252 192, 197, 204, 212, fluid electrolyte cells 172 223-224, 252 Food and Drug Administration 137, 260 Gila Bend 182 Food Emergency Reporting 226, 252 GIS ArcView 192 Network (FERN) Global Grid 77 food irradiation vi, 92, 96, 239 Global Positioning System 252, 45, 66, 116, Food Safety and Inspection 237, 252, 260 118, 154, 171, 174, Service (FSIS) 185, 201 Food-borne Bacteria 233 Global Response Incident 40, 252 Planner (GRIP) forensic identification 171 GlucoWatch 150 Fort Detrick 126, 227, 231, 233 Google 199 Fort Huachuca 182 Government Off-the-Shelf 43, 72, 252 Fourier Transform Infrared 38, 252 (GOTS) Spectroscopy (FTIR) Graphical User Interface 84, 95, 97, 135, 252 Functioning in the Absence 81-82, 87 (GUI) of Critical Infrastructure and Restoration of Essential Public GridWise 200-201 Services Ground Penetrating vi, 50, 89-90, 96, 252 fungi 120, 141, 151, 234 Radar (GPR) Future Force Warrior 18, 76 Ground Penetrating Radar vi, 96-97 for Specialized Search and Rescue

275

PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix E

half-life 119 Homeland Security Command 73, 78, and Control ACTD 205-206 Hazard Analysis Critical 229, 237, 252 Control Points Program hot zone 27, 35, 37, 48, 85-86, 89, 120, 131, 150, 156, 208-211 Hazard Prediction and 45, 47, 252 Assessment Capability (HPAC) Houston Advanced Research 153, 252 Council (HARC) Hazardous Materials 210, 259 Response Unit Human Identification from a 208 Distance (HID) HAZMAT 15-17, 19, 91, 103-104, 156, 185, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 72, 202-203, 208, 233, 252, 260-261 252 Health Alert Network Hyperspectral Imaging 38 (HAN) 108, 147, 252 i2 167, 174 Health and Crisis Response 81-82, 88 I3 Systems 74 Education Idaho National Engineering 50, 260 Health Maintenance 129, 252 Laboratory Organizations (HMOs) Identification of Outbreak 216, 223-224 Health Privacy Regulations (HIPAA) 144 Origins and Spread Health Resources and Services 108, 252 Identifying, Locating, Disarming, 177-178 Administration (HRSA) and Seizing Perpetrator(s) Health Surveillance for Early vii, 158, IEEE 802 68 Detection of Biological Agent 161-162 Events Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) 202, 211, 253 heating, ventilation, and air 90 Immune Buildings Program 90 conditioning (HVAC) systems Immunoassay 35-37, 151, 160 HEPA filters 155 Improved Irradiation Methods viii, 234, high energy particulate air 90 239-240, 242 (HEPA) filters Incident Action Planning 81-82, 93 High Explosive/Incendiary 11, 16, 19, 34, 81-84, 86, 90, 92, Incident Command Information vi, 63-64, 99, 101, 119, 121, Management and Dissemination 71, 77-78, 177, 207, 211 80, 109 High Power Microwave (HPM) 178, 252 Incident Command Information 203, 253 Tool (ICIT) High Value Target Identification 101, 105, 113 and Monitoring Incident Command Management 41, 253 System (ICMS) High-Energy Radio Frequency 178, 186, 252 (HERF) Incident Command System (ICS) 69, 99-100, 112, 125, 137, Home Depot 169 166, 202, 221, 253 Homeland Security Advanced 2, 252 Research Projects Agency

276

PROJECT RESPONDER Index

Incident Commander 9, 40-41, 57, 63-64, Intelligence Fusion Center 195, 202-203, 72-73, 78, 83, 99-100, 226, 253 105, 111, 117-118, Intelligence Preparation for 189-190, 194-196, 169-170, 186, 191, Operations (IPO) 198-202, 253 202-203, 205, 238, 252 Intelligence Preparation of 195-196, 253 Indications and Warning v, 56, 190-191, 252 the Battlefield (IPB) (I&W) Intelligence Support to 189-190, 202 Individual and Collective 120-121, 125, 154 Unified Incident Command Protection of Health Care Structure Personnel and Facilities Intelligence, Surveillance 177-178, 182, 253 infectious 7-8, 119, 126-127, 133, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 141, 148-149, 151, 153-155, 158-160, 183, 223-224, Intelligent Roadway and 174, 253 229-230, 234, 257, 260 Railway Information System Information Assurance vi, 63-64, 67, 69, Intelligent Transportation System 88, 253 71, 76-78 Interagency Board for 24, 194, 252, 259 Information Sharing and 221-222, 253 Equipment Standardization Analysis Centers (ISACs) and Interoperability (IAB) InfraGuard 193, 200, 221 International Aerospace 201 Infrared imaging 178, 181-182 International Classification 143-144, 252 of Diseases (ICD – 9) Initiating Crisis Management 177, 184 Process International Telecommunication 74 Union and International Standards Institute for Soldier 18, 253 Organization Nanotechnology (ISN) Internet Security Systems (ISS) 70, 253 Integrated Logistics Information vii, 164-165, System (ILIS) 175-176 interoperability iv, 2, 4, 24, 43, 63, 67-71, 74, 76-77, 94, Integrated Networked Sensors v, 44, 48, 102, 104, 112, 115-118, for CBRNE Detection 56, 61, 77 137, 148, 159-160, 166, Integrated Project Team 1 168-171, 191, 209, 244, 250, 255, 264 Integrated Remote Detection v, 40, 53, 61 of CB Agents Intrusion Detection Systems 70, 253 (IDS) Integrated Spatial Recognition 75 inventories viii, 166-167, 170, 175 Integration Readiness Levels (IRL) 246 Inventory Management 164, 170-171, 175 INTELINK 179 Ion Mobility Spectrometry 35-36, 253, 256 intelligence viii, 54, 72-73, 77, 102, 135, 138, (IMS) 177, 179-180, 182-183, 189-206, 211-212, 220- 221, 224, 226, 236, 250-254, 256, 260, 263- iontophoresis 150-151 264, 266-267 Iontrack 36 IR spectroscopy 150-151

277

PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix E

Iris recognition 70 Laboratory Reporting Network 226, 254 (LRN) Iris scans 208 Land Warrior 18, 65, 76 irradiation vi, viii, 92, 96-97, 232-234, 239-240, 242 Laser Diode Technology 39 Irradiation and Gaseous vi, 96-97 Laser Induced Breakdown 36, 253 Decontamination for Spectrometry (LIBS) Mass Fatalities Laser Trace Explosives Detection 42 isolation 120, 126-127, 142-143, Law Enforcement Online (LEO) 71, 179-180, 148, 152, 154-155, 157, 190, 253 160, 208, 216-217, 229-230, 235 Law Enforcement Working 194, 253 Group (LEWG) Isolation and Quarantine 142, 148, 154-155, 160, 230 Lawrence Livermore Laboratory 44, 65, 156 Johns Hopkins University 126, 128 less-than-lethal 186-187 Joint Biological Remote Early 44, 253 Less-Than-Lethal Safe Seizure 187 Warning System (JBREWS) of Perpetrators Joint Drug Intelligence Group 196 LexisNexis 192 Joint Intelligence Center 202, 253 Life Support for Trauma and 157, 254 Transport (LSTAT) Joint Intelligence Support Element 202, 253 Light Detection and Ranging 39, 253 Joint Interoperability Test Command 74 (LIDAR) Joint Medical Operation Telemedicine 134 Lightweight Epidemiology 40, 253 Joint Project Office for CB Defense 44 and Advanced Detection, Emergency Response System Joint Regional Information 179-180, 253 (LEADERS) Exchange System (JRIES) Lightweight, Long-lived 88, 164, 171 Joint Service Installation 44, 253 Power Sources Pilot Project (JSIPP) Lincoln Laboratory 36, 262 Joint Services Lightweight 17, 253 Integrated Suit lithium 172 Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) 68, 253 lockdown systems 126 Joint Theater Logistics 170, 175, 266 Logistics Information vii, 109, 164-166, System 168-169, 175-176, 253 Joint Warfighting Science and xii Technology Plan Logistics Support (LS) iii, vii, xi, xiv, 22, 111, 163-164, 175-176, Joint Warning and Reporting 44, 253 237, 254 Network (JWARN) Long Path Optical Sensor 36, 253 just-in-time 167 System (LPOSS) Khobar Towers 33, 46 Long-Term Respiratory 11, 16, 19, 21-22, 24 Protection

278

PROJECT RESPONDER Index

Los Alamos National 39, 45, 50, 128, medical waste 142-143, 158 Laboratory 153, 213, 219, 253 Memorial Institute for the iii, xi, 254, 266 Los Angeles Clearinghouse 191 Prevention of Terrorism Los Angeles County Regional 198, 253 Metropolitan Medical 212, 261 Criminal Information Center Response Team (MMRS) (LACRCIC) microclimate cooling 17, 26 Management of Contaminated 207 Microsoft Office 192 Suspects and Witnesses micro-weather effects 130 Manugistics 167 Military Traffic Management 174, 254 Many-to-Many DNA Matching viii, 176 Command of Body Parts millimeter wave 39, 177-178, 181-182 Marcus Emergency Operations Center 212 Millimeter Wave Imaging 39, 177 Maryland Institute of Trauma Studies 134 MindTel 198, 203 Mass Casualty Medical 108, 120-121, Care Management 123, 126, 145 Mission Rehearsal, Simulation, 100-101, 103, Embedded Training and Distance 125, 132 Mass Euthanasia 228 Education Mass Fatality Management 81-82, 91 Mitigation and Restoration iii, viii-ix, xi, xiv, 7, Mass Medical Prophylaxis 120-121, 124 for Plant and Animal 215-216, 219, 223, Resources (MRPA) 233-234, 242, 254 Mass Prophylaxis vii, 136-137, 139 Delivery System MITRE Corporation 184, 262, 264, 266 Mass Prophylaxis Knowledge vii, 135-136, 139 Mobility Spectrometry 35-36, 253, 256 Base and Decision Aid Modeling & Simulation iv, vi, 3, 33-34, Mass Spectrometry 35-36, 249, 256 45-46, 54, 57-59, 71-72, 77, 84, 122, Mass Victim Decontamination 81-82, 84, 91 130, 135-136, 145, Matrix Assisted Laser 128, 254 152-153, 161, 207, Desorption Ionization (MALDI) 213, 254 Measures and Signature 202, 254 Modeling of Exposure 142-143, 145, 152 Intelligence (MASINT) and Containment Media Management and 177, 186 Modeling of Exposure/ 120-121, 129, Accommodation Casualties for Location 145, 152 and Numbers Medical Response (MR) iii, vii, ix, xi, xiv, 7, 92, 119-121, 128-129, Modeling of Plant and viii, 230, 238 135, 139, 163, 186, 212, Animal Outbreaks, Surveillance, 226, 233, 235, 254, 261 and Response Medical Response to Public Affairs 120, 128 Models for Re-Dissemination vii, 161-162 and Contagion of Bio-Agents Medical Staff Surge, Re-Supply 120-121, 132 and Proper Accreditation Monkeypox 144

279

PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix E

morbidity 123, 127, 149, 153, National Fire Protection 104, 254 155, 157, 160, 254 Agency (NFPA) Morbidity and Mortality 153, 155, 254 National Geospatial-Intelligence 102, 254 Weekly Report Agency (NGA) morgues 171 National Guard 38, 74, 84, 104, 154-155, 196, mortality 127, 153, 155, 210, 260, 265 157, 160, 254 National Guard Civil Support 38, 210 Mortuary Affairs Management 164, 171 Teams (CST) Multi-Agency Command 221, 254 National Institute for 24, 254 Multilevel Security Systems 70, 199, 254 Occupational Safety & (MLS) Health (NIOSH) Multimedia Supported vi, 63-64, 73, 78-80 National Institute for Standards 50 Telepresence and Technology Fire Research Laboratory MultiSpectral Solutions, Inc. 66 National Institute for Urban 197 Search and Rescue Multi-Zonal Blowdown 50, 254 Model (MBLM) National Institute of Allergy 8, 160 and Infectious Disease Munitions Effectiveness 50, 254 Vulnerability Assessment (MEVA) National Interagency Fire 204, 254 Command Center (NIFCC) muons 39 National Laboratories 33, 39-40, 44-45, Murrah Building 133 50, 128, 132, 151, 153, 193, 200, 213, 219, 224, Mutual Assistance Agreements 225 226, 239, 253, 255, 260 NADDIS 180 National Libraries of Medicine 88 Nanogen 150-151 National Medical Response Plan 92 Nanotechnology ix, 5, 18-19, 25-27, 253 National Oceanic and 47, 130-131, Natick Army Research & 127 Atmospheric Administration 236, 254 Development Center (NOAA) National Pharmaceutical Stockpile 157 National Animal Health 222, 254 Emergency Management National Plant Diagnostic 226 Steering Committee (NAHEMS) Network (NPDN) National Animal Health 226, 254 National Seed Health 219, 255 Laboratory Network (NAHLN) System (NSHS) National Atmospheric Release 45, 254 National Terrorism Alerts 199 Advisory Center (NARAC) National Terrorism Response iii-v, ix, xi, 1, 4, National Disaster Medical System 107 Objectives (NTRO) 7, 9-12, 16, 22, 27, 31, 64, 81, National Drug Pointer Index 180, 254 99-100, 112, 119-120, (NDPIX) 141-142, 163, 177, 179, National Electronic Disease 147, 254 187, 190, 207, Surveillance System (NEDSS) 214-215, 226, 255

280

PROJECT RESPONDER Index

National Weather Service 48, 88 Office of Law Enforcement 194, 255 Standards (OLES) National Zoo Surveillance System 222 (ZooNet) Oklahoma City iii, xi, 33, 46, 130, 171, 200, 261, 267 Naval Air Systems Command 65 Oklahoma Law Enforcement 200, National Incident Management 93-94, 254 255Telecommunications System System (NIMS) (OLETS) Network Operating Center (NOC) 70, 255 online learning 103 Network Sensors for the Objective 43, 255 On-Scene Assessment for vi, 49, 59, 61 Force (NSOF) Low-Dose Exposure to neutrons 19, 33, 36, 52-53 Chemical Agents Non-Intrusive, Stand-off Inspection 33-34, 41 On-Scene Detection 5, 33-35, 37-38, 42 Non-Structured Information 192-194 OnStar 174 Novel Decontamination - Research 138 Open Source Community Research 70 novel electrochemistries 172 Open Source Database 192, 193 nuclear iii, v, xi, 1, 11, 15-16, 31, Open Source Information 179-180, 255 33-41, 43-45, 52-53, 56-57, System (OSIS) 63, 81-82, 85-88, 92, 99, OpenNET 180 101-102, 106-107, 111, 113-114, 119, 121, 123, 128, 141, 177, Operating Systems Multi-Level 70, 255 183, 207, 209, 211, 217, 250, Security (OSMLS) 254-255, 257, 262-265, 267 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 203, 255 Nuclear Emergency Response 183, 254 Operational Security (OPSEC) 199, 255 Team (NEST) Operational Test & 89-90, 246, 255 Nuclear Regulatory 87-88, 255 Evaluation (OT&E) Commission (NRC) optical motion detectors 181 Nuclear Weapons v, 33, 39-40, 43, 52-53, 57, 106-107, Overhead Imaging for viii, 225, 230, 257, 263, 265 Wide-Area Surveillance 236, 242 and Assessment Oak Ridge National Laboratory 132 Overseas Security Advisory 201, 255 Objective Force (U.S. Army) 43, 66, 172 Council (OSAC) Observables and Sensing for ix, 6 Pacific Northwest National 193, 200, 255 Stand-off Inspection of Containers Laboratory (PNNL) with Chemical or Biological Agents Palmtop Emergency Access 73, 255 Occupational Safety and Health 104, 255 for Chemicals (PEAC) Administration (OSHA) Pan-American Health Organization 146 Office International des Epizooties 224, 255 pandemic 141 Office of Emergency Management 93, 109, 255

281

PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix E

Partnership for Public 88, 255, 264, 267 portable fuel cells 172 Warning (PPW) Portable, Stand-off v, 42, 54, 61 Patient privacy 137, 159 Container Inspection Peer-to-Peer Collaboration 192 Post-Incident Forensic 207, 213 Modeling and Simulation Pentagon 24, 67, 267 Preferred Provider 129, 255 perimeter 47, 65, 81-82, 86-87, Organizations (PPOs) 93, 106, 116, 119, 177-178, 181, 185-186, 229 Presidential Decision Directive 63, 193 Perimeter Security 177-178, 181, 185, 229 Pre-Triage/Differentiation 33-34, 40, Among Levels of Exposure 48, 58, 95 perpetrator viii, 60, 177-182, 186-187, 196, 207, 212, 219 prevention iii, xi, 31, 33, 167, 250, 254, 260, 266-267 Personal Digital 37, 40, 61, 84, 95, Assistant (PDA) 135, 137, 153, 171, 255 prions 220, 231 Personal Protection and iii, v, ix, xi, xiv, 5, Programmed Logic 107, 255 Equipment (PPE) 11, 15-16, 24, 29, 255 Controllers (PLC) pharmaceutical stockpiles 122, 157 Project Guardian 44 Physical Security Systems 70 Project Responder iii, xi-xii, 1, 9-11, 122, 141, 146, 202, 215, 217, Picatinny Arsenal (U.S. Army) 178 229, 243, 266-267 Plant and Animal Responders’ viii, 220, prophylaxis v, vii, 51, 120-124, Decision Aid 234-235, 242 135-137, 139, 143, Plant Biosecurity 227 150, 152, 215 Plant Crop Disposal 231 Protective Coatings for vi, 95, 97 Critical Equipment plant vaccination 228 Public Health Readiness iii, vii, ix, xi, xiv, Playbook Manager 40 for Biological Agent 7, 119, 141-143, playbooks 195-196 Events (PHRBAE) 145, 147, 149, 157-158, 162, 255 Plum Island, NY USDA Center 218 Public Health Service 109, 116 plume modeling 45, 86, 91, 102, 130, 197, 213 Public Key Infrastructure 70, 108, 119, (PKI) 141, 255, 266 plumes v, 32, 38-39, 45, 53-54, 58-59, 73, 86, 91, 102, Public Relations and 81-82, 94 130, 197, 213, 233 Media Management Point Location and vi, 5, 7, 48, 52, Public Safety Wireless 68-69 Identification 63-64, 75-77, 80, 173 Network Program Polychromator Chip 36 Public/Private Partnerships xii, 222 Polymerase Chain Reaction 35-37, 218, pyrolysis 35 (PCR) 220, 255

282

PROJECT RESPONDER Index

quarantine 32, 91, 107, 142-143, Rapid High-Throughput 161, 256 148, 152, 154-155, Clinical Assessment and 160-161, 186, 208, Testing System (RHTCAT) 216-217, 229, 230 Rapid Responder 196 Quarantine, Isolation 216-217, 229 Rapid, Clinical, Environmental 120, 121-122, and Recall and Veterinary Field Assessment 127, 217 radar motion detectors 181 Rapid, High-Throughput vii, 122, 142-143, radiacs 22 Clinical Assessment and 145, 148, 159-162, Testing 217, 256 Radiation Emergency 132-255 Assistance Center/Training Ray Neutron Activation Analysis 42 Site (REACT/S) Real-Time Structural Stress vi, 51, 60-61 Radio Frequency Identification 65, 168, 255 Measurement (RFID) Regional Information Sharing 179-180, 256 radio frequency tags 125, 166 System Network (RISSNET) radiological iii, v, xi, 1, 11, 15-17, Regional Purchasing Arrangements xii 19, 31-36, 38-39, 41, Remote and Stand-off Detection 33-34, 37-38 52, 56-57, 81-83, 86, 92, 96, 99, 101-102, 113, Remote Detection of Deception/Intent 51 117, 119, 121, 123, 127, 129, 131-132, 152, 177, Remote Surveillance Support 89, 255 179, 182-183, 207-208, System (R3S) 211-212, 231, 250, Residual Hazards Assessment 5, 81-82, 9 254-255, 265 and Mitigation 1 radiological Agents 15, 32, 123, 132, respiratory protection v, 11, 16, 19, 152, 179, 212, 231 21-29, 126 Raman Spectroscopy 36 Response and Recovery iii, vi, ix, xi, xiv, 5, Rapid and Humane 216-217, 230 (R&R) 23, 57, 81-82, 94, 97, Euthanasia and Disposal 99, 132, 163, 233, 255 of Contaminated Carcasses, Response Information 184, 256 Plants and Food Products Management System (RIMS) Rapid Assessment of Structural 33-34, 49 Response Technology iv, 1, 4, 9-13, 24, Integrity/Other Risks Objectives (RTO) 34, 51, 54, 75, 94, Rapid Decontamination of 5, 81, 82, 84, 91 114-115, 135-136, 138, High Value and Critical 156, 158, 160-161, 175, Response Equipment 186, 205-206, 214, 234-235, 237 Rapid Diagnostics 127, 145, 215-219, 230 Reverse 911 Systems 129 Rapid Diagnostics and 145, 215, 217, 219 Detection to Confirm Risk Awareness and vi, 100-101, the Introduction of CBR Assessment 109-110, 115, 118 Agents to Animals, Plants, RISS-ATIX 190, 256 and Food/Feed Roche 150

283

PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix E

Rome Laboratory 178 Situation Management and 201, 256 Awareness in Real Time (SMART) rules-based medicine 150 Smallpox 123, 133, 141 Safe Handling of Medical Waste 142-143, 158 smart cards vii, 36, 48, 105, SAFECOMM 69, 76-77 115-116, 118, 132-133, SAIC 197, 256, 263, 266 185, 266 Salmonella 142 Smart Healthcare Management System 43 Sandia National Laboratory 39-40, 128, smart sensor networks 123 213, 224, 260 Smart SensorWeb 43 SARS 128, 141, 144, 150, 152, Sodium Iodide Detectors 36 154-155, 256 Software Communications 68, 256 Seamless Connectivity and vi, 76 Architecture Information Assurance solar cells 172 Seamless Connectivity and 63-64, 67 Integration Sony 169 Second Line of Defense 39, 256 Specialized Search and Rescue 81-82, 89 Capabilities Secure ID 70 spiral development iv, xiv, 2, 57, 69, 73, Secure Internet Protocol Router 256 76-77, 205, 243, 245 Network (SIPRINET) standardization vii, 24, 68, 93, 102, security clearances 131 112, 116, 133, 148, 163, Self-Accreditation 218 171-172, 217, 219, 223, 244, 259, 264 Self-Contained Breathing v, 6, 21, 24, Apparatus (SCBA) 27, 256 Standardization Committee 112 of the Organization for the Semiconducting Metal 36, 256 Advancement of Structured Oxides (SMO) Information Standards (OASIS) September 11th 112, 243 67, 173, standards iv, vii, xiii, 2, 17, 19-21, 192-193, 198-199, 41, 50, 63, 68-69, 72-74, 203, 210, 267 76-77, 79-80, 84, 88-90, Sequenom 150 94, 101-105, 108, 112-114, 116, 125-126, 147-148, Severe Acute Respiratory 128, 141, 144, 150, 156-160, 163, 194, 197, Syndrome (SARS) 152, 154-155, 256 210, 223, 245, 249, 254-255, Shadow Bowl 198 260, 263-265 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 202, 256 Stand-off Automatic Choke vi, 51, 60 Point Screener Single Integrated Ground 74, 174, 256 Picture (SIGP) Stand-off Radiation ID 39, 52, 61 Single Integrated Picture 201, 256 Starlight 193-194

284

PROJECT RESPONDER Index

State Animal Response 225-226, 256 Technology Readiness 4, 245-246, 257 Teams (SART) Levels (TRL) Statewide Anti-Terrorism 196, 256 TECS II 180 Unified Response Network telemedicine vii, 49, 120, 121, (SATURN) 133-135, 138-139, 226 Steve Wozniak 66 Telemedicine Advanced 134 Strategic Research iv, ix, xiv, 3, 5, 7-8, Concepts Technology Demonstration Area (SRA) 25, 27, 90, 95, 128, Telemedicine in Support of Surge 120-121, 133 151, 159-160, 220, 235, 243, 256 Telemedicine Test Bed vii, 135, 138-139 Supervisory Control 107, 256 Terminal Access Control and 70 and Data Acquisition Authorization Systems (TACAS) Systems (SCADA) Terrorism Early Warning 195-196, 200, 212, supply chain management 167 Group (TEW) 226, 256, 261, 267 supply depots 164, 171, 174 Test & Evaluation (T&E) 27-28, 57, 90, 159, 246, 256 Sure-Beam 92 third party logistics 167, 170, 249 Surface Science ix, 5 providers (3PL) Surveillance & Information 108-109, 122, third wave technology invader systems 151 Integration Systems 142-143, 149, 217, 221 Thomas Brothers maps 192 Surveillance and Reconnaissance 202, 256 Threat Analysis Critical Control viii, 229-230, Center (SARC) Points Program (TACCP) 237-238 Synchronous Optical 77-78, 256 Threat Analysis Critical Control viii, 230, Network (SONET) Points Program for the Food Chain 237 syndromic information 158, 212 Threat Assessment 177-179, 181, 189-190, 196 syndromic surveillance system 145, 200, 212, 251, 256 Threat Assessment/Data 189-190 Collection/Analysis Synthetic Ligands 36 Threat Relevant Data Distribution 189-190 Tactical Decision Making 144, 256 Under Stress (TADMUS) Three Mile Island 88 Tactical Threat Assessment 177-178, 181 Time Domain Corp 66 target folders 110, 195-196, 198 Tissue Based Sensors 36 Technical Search and 49, 257 Top Secret Sensitive Compartmentalized 257 Rescue (TSR) Information (TS/SCI) Technical Support Working xii, 24, 36, 42, Toxic Industrial Chemicals 16, 32, 38, 46, 54, Group (TSWG) 73-75, 132, 257, 259 (TIC) 59, 61, 82-83, 214, 256

285

PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix E

Toxic Industrial 82-83, 214, 256 U.S. Navy Space and Naval 93, 256 Materials (TIM) Warfare Systems Command Trace-back viii, 210, 223, 224-225, U.S. Northern Command 214 235-238, 242 Ultra Wideband (UWB) ix, 7, 9, 65-66, Trace-back Capabilities Using viii, 225, 236 75, 90, 168, 257 Information Systems and Tags Ultra Wideband Communications ix, 7, 90 tracking vi, viii, 38, 42, 44-46, Ultraviolet Sensing 38 57-59, 65-66, 71-73, 75, 77, 80, 83-84, 96-97, 109, Unattended Ground 43, 106, 116-117, 122-123, 143-144, Sensors (UGS) 185, 191, 257 146, 165-169, 171, 175-176, 178, 191, 209, 219, 222, Unconventional Nuclear 39, 43, 257 224-225, 236, 257 Weapons Defense (UNWD) traffic management 44, 81-82, 92-93, Unified Incident Command iii, vi, ix, xi, xiv, 163, 174, 254 Decision Support and 5, 7, 9, 22, Interoperable Communications 63-65, 67, 69, Transdermal IR chromoscopy 151 (UIC) 71-73, 75,77, 79, 80, 84, 93-94, 99, 112, Transdermal IR spectroscopy 150 189-190, 202, 205, 257 Transport of Contagious Patients 142-143, 156 United States Marine 170, 203, 257, 260, 264 Transportation Command 174, 256 Corps (USMC) (TRANSCOM) Universal Serial Bus (USB) 43 Transportation Optimization 164, 167, 173 University of Pittsburgh 155, 262 Trump Marina Casino 209 University of Texas at Tyler 126, 262 Tulsa Area Syndromic Surveillance 200, 256 University of Texas Medical Branch 134, 262 System (TASSS) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 78, 182, 257 U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal 23, 233 Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) 257 U.S. Army Land Warrior Program 18, 65, 76 UPS 167, 173, 257 U.S. Army Medical Research 183, 257, 260 Institute of Infectious Diseases urban canyon effects 130 (USAMRIID) Urban Search and Rescue 49, 81, 89-90, 96, U.S. Army Night Vision UWB Prototype 75 (USAR) 169, 197, 257, 259, 261 U.S. Army NVESD 65 USS COLE 46 U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 193 Vaccination Ring Strategies 228 U.S. Department of 88, 218, 226, Agriculture (USDA) 229-230, 234, 2 Vaccination/Treatment 216, 227 37-238, 257 and Protection U.S. Immigration and 178, 193178, 193 vaccines xii, 120, 123, 136, 141, Customs Enforcement 159, 215, 217, 227-229

286

PROJECT RESPONDER Index

Vapor, Liquid, and Solid 46, 257 Wearable Integrated v, 37, 52, 61 Tracking (VLSTRACK) CBR Sensors Veterinary Medical Assistance 226, 257 weather, enemy and 195, 257 Teams (VMAT) terrain (WET) Video teleconferencing 72, 74, 197, 257 web-based learning 103 (VTC) West Nile Virus 146, 152, 222, Virtual Clinician 135, 138-139 228-230 virulence 37, 141, 152-154 Wide-Area Tracking System 44, 257 viruses 32, 120, 141, 151, 240 World Health Organization 146, 224, 257 (WHO) voice print analysis 178 World Trade Center 50, 72, 129, Wal-Mart 146, 167, 169, 219 133, 171, 267 War Room 191-192 zoonotic 152, 215, 222, 227 warm zone 82, 84-86, 208-209, 211

287

PROJECT RESPONDER Appendix E

288

PROJECT RESPONDER Project Respo der: National T chnology Plan or Em rg ncy R spons to Catastrophic T rrorism April 2004