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Out of Sight, Not out of Mind - a User-View on the Criticality of the Submarine Cable Network Shucheng Liu Zachary S

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Out of Sight, Not out of Mind - a User-View on the Criticality of the Submarine Cable Network Shucheng Liu Zachary S Out of Sight, Not Out of Mind - A User-View on the Criticality of the Submarine Cable Network Shucheng Liu Zachary S. Bischof Ishaan Madan Northwestern University IIJ Research Lab Northwestern University Peter K. Chan Fabián E. Bustamante Northwestern University Northwestern University ABSTRACT deployments of the submarine network date back to the mid- Nearly all international data is carried by a mesh of subma- 19th century [22], the recent explosion of Internet traffic rine cables connecting virtually every region in the world. has driven an exponential proliferation on the total capacity It is generally assumed that Internet services rely on this required of this infrastructure [30]. submarine cable network (SCN) for backend traffic, but that Today, the submarine cable network (SCN) is recognized most users do not directly depend on it, as popular resources as vitally important to the global economy and as an enabler are either local or cached nearby. In this paper, we study the of sustainable growth in developing regions [7, 21]. For in- criticality of the SCN from the perspective of end users. We stance, it is estimated that if the ≈40 cables connecting the present a general methodology for analyzing the reliance US to the rest of the world were cut, only 7% of the total US on the SCN for a given region, and apply it to the most pop- traffic volume could be carried by satellite [28]. At the same ular web resources accessed by users in 63 countries from time, new cable deployments increase international capacity every inhabited continent, collectively capturing ≈80% of the and add competition at the backhaul level, triggering drops global Internet population. We find that as many as 64.33% on wholesale and connectivity prices, thus helping expand of all web resources accessed from a specific country rely on Internet access previously limited by cost [18]. the SCN. Despite the explosive growth of data center and Despite its obvious importance, we lack a clear under- CDN infrastructure around the world, at least 28.22% of the standing of the criticality of the SCN in the global Internet. CDN-hosted resources traverse a submarine cable. While it is generally understood that Internet services rely on the SCN for backend traffic, the common assumption ACM Reference Format: is that most Internet users do not directly depend on it, as Shucheng Liu, Zachary S. Bischof, Ishaan Madan, Peter K. Chan, popular resources are either local or cached by nearby CDN and Fabián E. Bustamante. 2020. Out of Sight, Not Out of Mind - A User-View on the Criticality of the Submarine Cable Network. servers [19]. The reoccurrence of country-wide disconnec- In ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’20), October 27– tions or performance issues as a result of submarine cable 29, 2020, Virtual Event, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 7 pages. cuts casts doubt on this assumption [26]. https://doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423633 In this work, we study the criticality of the SCN from the perspective of Internet end users. We present a general 1 INTRODUCTION methodology for analyzing the reliance on the SCN of a given region (§3). We apply this methodology to the most Ninety-nine percent of all international data is carried by a popular web resources accessed by users in over 60 coun- mesh of submarine cables at the bottom of the ocean [34], tries, covering every inhabited continent in the world and connecting nearly every region in the world. While initial collectively capturing ≈80% of the global Internet population Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for (§4). We show (§5) that as many as 64.33% of all resources personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies accessed from an island country and 43.18% accessed from a are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that non-island country rely on the SCN. Even from landlocked copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights countries – those without direct access to an ocean – 16.25% for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or of all web requests, on average, depend on the SCN. Despite republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific the explosive growth of datacenter and CDN infrastructure permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]. around the world, we find that on average, at least 28.22% of IMC ’20, October 27–29, 2020, Virtual Event, USA the CDN-hosted resources hit a submarine cable, with that © 2020 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed figure as high as 65.1% for some countries. to ACM. To encourage further research on the criticality of the SCN, ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-8138-3/20/10...$15.00 https://doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423633 we make our measurement framework, dataset, and analysis 194 IMC ’20, October 27–29, 2020, Virtual Event, USA S. Liu et al. code publicly available at https://github.com/NU-AquaLab/ For our analysis, we use the top Alexa sites for each coun- Criticality-SCN. try as a proxy for identifying Internet resources that are important to users in that region. We thus define the criti- 2 MOTIVATION cality of the SCN as the percentage of resources for these top sites retrieved via SCN infrastructure, as revealed by our Today’s SCN includes over 400 cables across more than 1 mil- analysis. We use this to calculate a SCN hit rate of a region. lion kilometers, and transfers over 1 Pbps of traffic [20]. The In considering criticality, we focus on the impact of SCN majority of these cables have been constructed and managed failures on reachability, and leave the potential impact on per- by consortia, and are shared by multiple network operators. formance – as networks route around failures via potentially TAT-8, for instance, had 35 participants, including most ma- less optimal paths [5, 6] – for future work. jor international carriers at the time (including AT&T, British In addition to web browsing, other categories of network Telecom and France Telecom) [35]. However, the latest con- applications such as personalized live streaming, video con- struction boom has been largely driven by content providers ferencing and IP telephony could serve as viable proxies for such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon [29]. Ac- evaluating the criticality of the SCN, potentially requiring a cording to TeleGeography, the amount of capacity deployed different methodology and yielding different results. Thisis by content providers has risen tenfold between 2013 and another promising direction for future research. 2017, outpacing all other customers of international band- width [29]. Damage to submarine cables can cause wide-spread net- 3 METHODOLOGY work issues impacting Internet services and end users, es- In this section, we describe the methodology developed for pecially when multiple such events occur in a short time this work. At a high level, for a given country, we look to period [26]. One particularly severe example was the 2008 determine the degree of criticality of the SCN from the per- submarine cable disruption [36], wherein a series of cable spective of Internet users in that country by: ¹1º identifying a cuts within a two week period resulted in 14 countries having set of popular Internet resources (e.g., resources used by top x connectivity issues that ranged from complete disconnec- Alexa sites for the country, popular video hosting/streaming tions to severely limited bandwidth. In early 2013, divers off services, etc.), ¹2º geographically locating the servers hosting the coast of Egypt attempting to cut the cable SEA-WE-ME-4 those resources and a sufficient fraction of the routers along caused a 60% drop in Internet speed, which took about 20 the path, and ¹3º identifying the use of SCN links on the path hours to recover from [17]. As recently as January 2020, cable to the aforementioned servers. The following paragraphs cuts to FALCON, SAT3/WASC and WACS resulted in major expand on this. outages and degraded Internet performance in parts of the Middle East and throughout much of Africa [16, 32]. 3.1 Popular Internet Resources Despite the continued investments in the SCN over the last As a first step in our methodology, we identify a set of popu- three decades, increased caching infrastructure (e.g., CDNs) lar Internet resources for a given country. For this, we con- around the globe, and data centers moving closer to the sider the Alexa country/region rankings to identify those network edge, major events such as these seem to occur resources relied on by the most popular sites for a given with some regularity, directly impacting not only backend country. While other definitions of popularity are plausible, traffic, but resource retrieval for end users aswell. we argue that resources from top Alexa sites are a good proxy, Previous works have demonstrated how changes in SCN considering that web browsing is one of the most common infrastructure can affect network traffic at a general level Internet activities. (e.g., performance and reachability) [21, 25]. Our goal is to understand, empirically, the degree to which the SCN is 3.2 Resource Paths Geolocation critical for end users. To this end, we need to start with a After identifying the set of popular Internet resources, we clear, quantifiable definition of criticality. geolocate both the servers hosting them and a large sub- set of the routers in the path. To this end, we first launch 2.1 Defining Criticality traceroute measurements from RIPE Atlas nodes [31] in each Critical infrastructure generally refers to an asset that is es- country/region towards the identified hosting servers.
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